

ToxiCloakCN: Evaluating Robustness of Offensive Language Detection in Chinese with Cloaking Perturbations

Anonymous ACL submission

Abstract

001 Detecting hate speech and offensive lan- 041
002 guage is essential for maintaining a safe 042
003 and respectful digital environment. This 043
004 study examines the limitations of state- 044
005 of-the-art large language models (LLMs) 045
006 in identifying offensive content within sys- 046
007 tematically perturbed data, with a focus 047
008 on Chinese, a language particularly sus- 048
009 ceptible to such perturbations. We intro- 049
010 duce ToxiCloakCN, an enhanced dataset de- 050
011 rived from ToxiCN, augmented with ho- 051
012 mophonic substitutions and emoji transfor- 052
013 mations, to test the robustness of LLMs 053
014 against these cloaking perturbations. Our 054
015 findings reveal that existing models signifi- 055
016 cantly underperform in detecting offensive 056
017 content when these perturbations are ap- 057
018 plied. We provide an in-depth analysis 058
019 of how different types of offensive content 059
020 are affected by these perturbations and ex- 060
021 plore the alignment between human and 061
022 model explanations of offensiveness. Our 062
023 work highlights the urgent need for more 063
024 advanced techniques in offensive language 064
025 detection to combat the evolving tactics 065
026 used to evade detection mechanisms. 066

027 **Disclaimer:** *This paper describes violent* 065
028 *and discriminatory content that may be dis-* 066
029 *turbing to some readers.* 067

030 1 Introduction

031 Offensive language, which includes hate 071
032 speech, cyberbullying, and adult-oriented 072
033 content, poses significant risks to user well-being 073
034 and social harmony (Davidson et al., 2019). 074
035 With the rapid expansion and widespread use 075
036 of social media platforms, the proliferation 076
037 of offensive language has become a critical 077
038 issue. Consequently, social media platforms 078
039 and researchers have explored developing robust 079
040 machine learning and linguistic analysis solu-

tions to effectively identify and mitigate the 041
harmful effects of offensive content (Davidson 042
et al., 2017; Dhanya and Balakrishnan, 2021). 043

Recent advances in Natural Language Process- 044
ing (NLP), particularly with Large Language 045
Models (LLMs), have significantly improved 046
the ability to detect offensive language across 047
multiple languages (Pitsilis et al., 2018; Wei 048
et al., 2021; Fatemah and Ozlem, 2021; Battis- 049
telli et al., 2020; Beyhan et al., 2022; Dhanya 050
and Balakrishnan, 2021; Deng et al., 2022a; 051
Zhou et al., 2023). However, these models 052
often struggle with systematically perturbed 053
data designed to evade detection mechanisms. 054
Common perturbation techniques include ho- 055
mophonic substitutions, emoji replacement, in- 056
sertions, character splits, and synonyms (Su 057
et al., 2022; Kirk et al., 2022). These tech- 058
niques, referred to as "cloaking", exploit lin- 059
guistic nuances to mask offensive content, pos- 060
ing a substantial challenge to both automated 061
systems and human moderators. 062

The Chinese language, in particular, is heav- 063
ily impacted by these techniques due to inten- 064
sive lexicon-based censorship, leading to a new 065
linguistic phenomenon (Wiener, 2011) where 066
significant parts of sentences are replaced by 067
either homophones or emojis to mask under- 068
lying offensive content or to circumvent cen- 069
sorship rules. Figure 1 shows two examples of 070
offensive texts cloaked using homophone and 071
emoji replacement techniques. In these exam- 072
ples, the words and phrases highlighted in yel- 073
low are replaced with homophones or emojis. 074
In the first example, homophones are used to 075
replace phrases that identify the target (e.g., 076
"贺楠仁" as the homophone for "河南人," 077
which means people from the Henan region in 078
China) and offensive terms such as "太贱" 079
with "肽键." Similarly, in the second exam- 080




Figure 1: Example of cloaked Chinese offensive language using homophone and emoji replacement. By using such techniques, users will be able to fool the automated offensive language detector into misclassifying them as normal sentences.

ple, the offensive term “舔狗” (i.e., Simps) is replaced with 🍷🐶. Using such techniques, users can fool automated offensive language detectors into misclassifying these sentences as non-offensive, even though avid Chinese social media users will have no problem understanding the offensive context of the text. Addressing this problem is crucial to improve the effectiveness of offensive language detection systems. As these evasion techniques evolve, it becomes increasingly important for these offensive language detection systems to adapt and accurately identify cloaked offensive content.

In this work, we introduce ToxiCloakCN, a novel Chinese offensive content dataset that benchmark content moderation models’ ability to detect offensive texts cloaked using homophone and emoji replacements. Specifically, we conduct extensive experiments and evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs on the ToxiCloakCN dataset. The experiments demonstrated that both perturbation methods significantly affect the models’ capabilities in detecting offensive text. We also analyze the effect of prompts on the experimental results by testing the models using six different prompts. Additionally, we analyze the perturbation effects on different types of offensive content: sexism, racism, regional bias, and anti-LGBTQ+. This research underscores the critical need for developing more robust models to effectively moderate cloaked online offensive content.

We summarize the main contributions of this paper as follows:

- We introduce ToxiCloakCN, a novel dataset specifically designed to evaluate the robustness of LLMs against homophonic and emoji perturbations, addressing a significant gap in current offensive language detection research.
- We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of state-of-the-art LLMs. Our experimental results reveal that leading LLMs struggle to detect cloaked offensive content, highlighting the limitations of current approaches and the need for more advanced detection techniques.
- We analyze how different types of offensive content are impacted by cloaking perturbations, providing critical insights for improving model robustness and effectiveness in real-world applications.

2 Related work

2.1 Chinese Offensive Content Dataset

Several datasets have been developed for Chinese offensive language detection. The Chinese Offensive Language Dataset (COLD) categorizes sentences into groups like individual attacks and anti-bias (Deng et al., 2022a). TOCP and TOCAB from Taiwan’s PTT platform address profanity and abuse (Chung and Lin, 2021). The Sina Weibo Sexism Review (SWSR) focuses on sexism within Chinese social media (Jiang et al., 2021). The ToxiCN dataset from platforms like Zhihu and Tieba includes a multi-level labeling system for offensive language, hate speech, and other categories (Lu et al., 2023). In this work, we introduce ToxiCloakCN, a novel dataset capturing cloaked offensive text using homophonic and emoji replacements, built on top of the comprehensive ToxiCN dataset.

2.2 Chinese Offensive Content Detection

Offensive language and hate speech detection have been explored in various languages, including English (Davidson et al., 2017; Pitsilis et al., 2018; Wei et al., 2021), Arabic (Fatemah and Ozlem, 2021), French (Battistelli et al., 2020), Turkish (Beyhan et al., 2022), and Asian languages (Dhanya and Balakrishnan,

2021). In Chinese, techniques include lexicon-based models (Zhang et al., 2010; Deng et al., 2022b), supervised and adversarial learning models (Jiang et al., 2021; Liu et al., 2020b), knowledge-based models (Liu et al., 2020a), and fine-tuned pretrained models (Deng et al., 2022a) like BERT (Devlin et al., 2019). Cross-cultural transfer learning models also adapt to cultural differences (Zhou et al., 2023). Nevertheless, existing models mainly focus on explicit offensive content. This work addresses the gap by evaluating models’ ability to detect cloaked offensive content.

2.3 Language Perturbation

Various perturbation techniques have been proposed to investigate the vulnerabilities of NLP models in adversarial scenarios. These include inserting emojis (Kirk et al., 2022), token replacements and insertions (Garg and Ramakrishnan, 2020), and probability-based greedy replacements (Ren et al., 2019). While these methods primarily target English, adapting them to Chinese is challenging due to linguistic differences, though some attempts have been made (Liu et al., 2023).

For Chinese, Su et al. have highlighted adversarial attacks such as word perturbation, synonyms, and typos (Su et al., 2022). Subsequent solutions have focused on BERT-based models to address these attacks (Zhang et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2023; Xiong et al., 2024). However, previous work mainly evaluates BERT-based models and lacks robustness research on LLMs and social media-based adversarial datasets reflecting current trends. Our work addresses this gap by providing a new dataset with realistic perturbations for Chinese offensive language detection.

3 Methodology

The ToxiCloakCN dataset builds upon the ToxiCN dataset (Lu et al., 2023) through a detailed multi-step process. First, we sampled a balanced dataset from the base ToxiCN dataset, known as the “base” dataset. Next, this balanced base dataset was perturbed using homophone and emoji replacements to produce the ToxiCloakCN dataset. After constructing the ToxiCloakCN dataset, we explored pinyin augmentation as a potential

Topic	All	Non-Offensive	Offensive
Race	1,769	872	897
Gender	1,229	546	683
LGBTQ+	913	407	506
Region	671	464	207

Table 1: Base dataset distribution breakdown by content topics.

solution to address the “cloaked” offensive content perturbed using homophone replacements. Finally, we defined six different instructions for evaluating the performance of state-of-the-art large language models on ToxiCloakCN.

3.1 Dataset Construction

3.1.1 Sampling Base Dataset

The ToxiCN dataset was chosen as the foundational dataset due to its well-controlled annotation, with Fleiss Kappas for different granularities exceeding 0.6 (Lu et al., 2023). We first collated the offensive lexicon (i.e., swearwords) identified in ToxiCN. Next, we sampled sentences from ToxiCN labeled as “*offensive*” or “*hateful*” that contained the offensive lexicon, resulting in 2,293 offensive sentences. To balance the dataset, we also sampled non-offensive sentences from ToxiCN, giving preference to sentences containing the offensive lexicon but labeled as “*non-offensive*”. In total, we sampled 2,289 non-offensive sentences. The combined 4,582 sampled sentences form the *base* dataset that we will use for perturbation.

Table 1 shows the base dataset distribution breakdown by content topics, mirroring the statistical distribution of the base ToxiCN dataset. It is worth noting that a substantial amount of offensive content in the base dataset pertains to racism, followed by sexism and anti-LGBTQ content. We have relatively lesser regional bias offensive content in the base dataset.

3.1.2 Homophone Replacement

From the base dataset, we replaced keywords in each sentences in base dataset with their homophones, based on a specified dictionary¹. Keywords were identified as those present in the specified dictionary. To ensure the quality of the texts, we kept the perturbation ratio at 0.3, meaning that 30% of individ-

¹<https://github.com/dongrixinyu/JioNLP/>

Instruction Template	Inputs
English_Text	Please decide if the following text is offensive or not. ‘0’ means not offensive, ‘1’ means offensive. {Text}
Chinese_Text	请判断下列句子是否是冒犯的? ‘0’ 意味着不冒犯, ‘1’ 意味着冒犯. {Text}
English_Pinyin	Please determine if the following pinyin-expressed Chinese sentence is offensive. ‘0’ means not offensive, ‘1’ means offensive. {Pinyin}
Chinese_Pinyin	请判断下列拼音所表达的中文句子是否是冒犯的? ‘0’ 意味着不冒犯, ‘1’ 意味着冒犯. {Pinyin}
English_Text+Pinyin	Please determine if the following text is offensive and make your judgment based on pinyin. ‘0’ means not offensive, ‘1’ means offensive. {Text} {Pinyin}
Chinese_Text+Pinyin	请结合拼音判断下列句子是否是冒犯的? ‘0’ 意味着不冒犯, ‘1’ 意味着冒犯. {Text} {Pinyin}

Table 2: Instructions used in prompting LLMs to detect offensive content in ToxiCloakCN.

ual characters in each sentence were replaced with homophones. Higher perturbation ratios made sentences difficult to understand, while lower ratios resulted in insufficient disruption. Therefore, a 0.3 ratio was chosen to ensure both visible perturbation and readability. The homophone-replaced sentences will be added into our new ToxiCloakCN dataset.

3.1.3 Emoji Replacement

Utilizing the advanced script proposed by Zhang (2024), we further performed emoji replacement on the sentences in the base dataset. Initially, text segmentation techniques were applied to identify key words within the sentences. These key words were then replaced with corresponding emojis from a predefined emoji lexicon dictionary². The perturbation rate was also set at 0.3. When a direct lexical match was unavailable in the dictionary, the algorithm applied a phonetic approximation method based on the word’s pinyin to achieve the replacement. For example, to convert the word ‘操 (Fu*k)’ to its emoji representation, the output would be (🌿). Since there is no direct emoji match for ‘操 (Fu*k)’ in the dictionary, and ‘操 (Fu*k)’ and ‘草 (grass)’ are homophones, the emoji (🌿) of homophonic ‘草 (grass)’ is chosen as the replacement. Finally, the emoji-replaced sentences are added to the ToxiCloakCN dataset.

3.2 Pinyin Augmentation

While we aim to benchmark the state-of-the-art LLMs’ ability to detect cloaked offensive content in our newly constructed ToxiCloakCN dataset, we also explore potential solutions to aid LLMs’ in the detection task. Specifi-

cally, we explore pinyin augmentation method as a potential solution to detect homophone-replaced offensive sentences in ToxiCloakCN. Pinyin is the official romanization system for Standard Mandarin Chinese in mainland China and Taiwan, using the Latin alphabet to represent Chinese characters phonetically. The intuition for this method is that, given the nature of homophones, the pinyin representation should look alike, if not the same, thus potentially helping the model identify the offensiveness. Both ToxiCN and ToxiCloakCN datasets theoretically share the same phonetic data, despite their textual differences. Therefore, we used the pypinyin³ package to derive pinyin of the sentences in ToxiCloakCN.

3.3 Instruction Templates

To observe the effect of prompting on the task, we propose six distinct instruction templates to verify the efficacy of our ToxiCloakCN dataset. These instructions are carefully designed to evaluate the effects of prompt languages (i.e., English and Chinese) on the offensive content detection task, as well as the effect of pinyin augmentation. Table 2 shows the six instructions designed and applied in our experiments.

4 Experiments

4.1 Baselines

Lexicon-based. We employed a lexicon-based detection method to identify offensive language, classifying text as offensive if it contained any words from the ToxiCN offensive lexicon, otherwise marking it as non-offensive (Xiao et al., 2024; Lu et al., 2023).

²<https://github.com/THUzhangga/NMSL>

³pypinyin

Model	Training Set	Instruction Type	Homophone	Emoji	Base
Lexicon-based	ToxiCN Lexicon	-	0.003 (0.297)	-	0.300
COLDetector	COLD	-	0.582 (0.043)	0.615 (0.010)	0.625
LLAMA-3-8B	COLD	English_text	0.637 (0.040)	0.634 (0.043)	0.677
		Chinese_text	0.666 (0.023)	0.649 (0.040)	0.689
		English_pinyin	0.637 (0.000)	-	0.637
		Chinese_pinyin	0.634 (0.000)	-	0.634
		English_Text+Pinyin	0.637 (0.035)	-	0.672
		Chinese_text+Pinyin	0.638 (0.034)	-	0.672
Qwen	COLD	English_text	0.650 (0.043)	0.618 (0.075)	0.693
		Chinese_text	0.669 (0.031)	0.640 (0.060)	0.700
		English_pinyin	0.630 (0.000)	-	0.630
		Chinese_pinyin	0.613 (0.000)	-	0.613
		English_Text+Pinyin	0.646 (0.048)	-	0.694
Mistral	COLD	Chinese_text+Pinyin	0.649 (0.051)	-	0.700
		English_text	0.650 (0.038)	0.631 (0.057)	0.688
		Chinese_text	0.669 (0.022)	0.649 (0.042)	0.691
		English_pinyin	0.622 (0.000)	-	0.622
		Chinese_pinyin	0.613 (0.000)	-	0.613
GPT-4o	N/A	English_Text+Pinyin	0.649 (0.037)	-	0.686
		Chinese_text+Pinyin	0.651 (0.039)	-	0.690
		English_text	0.709 (0.055)	0.621 (0.143)	0.764
		Chinese_text	0.727 (0.069)	0.754 (0.042)	0.796
		English_pinyin	0.649	-	0.678
		Chinese_pinyin	0.723 (0.018)	-	0.741
		English_Text+Pinyin	0.719 (0.042)	-	0.761
		Chinese_Text+Pinyin	0.741 (0.022)	-	0.763

Table 3: Macro F1 scores of benchmark models. Note that "Homophone" and "Emoji" denote the homophone-replaced and emoji-replaced sentences in the ToxiCloakCN dataset, respectively. Best performances are **bolded**. Values in () represent the difference between the Macro F1 score on the base dataset and the Homophone/Emoji datasets (i.e., performance decline).

COLDetector. We implemented COLDETECTOR (Deng et al., 2022a), a BERT-based model for offensive language detection. This approach involves feeding the text into the BERT model, extracting the first hidden state from the final layer, and connecting it to a linear layer for the final prediction. The model is trained on the COLD dataset (Deng et al., 2022a), a popular benchmark for Chinese offensive language detection.

Large Language Models. We evaluate GPT-4o and three open-source LLMs—LLaMA-3-8B (AI@Meta, 2024), Qwen1.5-MoE-A2.7B (Team, 2024), and Mistral-7B (Jiang et al., 2023)—for the Chinese offensive language detection task. The open-source models were fine-tuned on the COLD training datasets using the six proposed instructions. Utilizing the LORA method (Hu et al., 2021), we introduced 4.1 million additional parameters, which is only 0.06% of the total parameters. Fine-tuning was conducted over three epochs using the LLM-Adapters Toolkit (Hu et al., 2023). GPT-4o and the fine-tuned models were then evaluated on the base and Toxi-

iCloakCN datasets. All fine-tuning and inference phases are performed on two NVIDIA A6000 GPUs.

4.2 Evaluation Metric

To confirm with established research norms (Deng et al., 2022a; Lu et al., 2023), we utilize Macro F1 score as the evaluation metrics for the offensive language detection task. The metric assess the models' performance in classifying the offensive languages in the datasets.

4.3 Experimental Results

Table 3 presents the offensive detection outcomes for all models, showing that GPT-4o achieves the highest performance with Chinese-only text instructions. However, all models exhibit a notable performance decline on the homophone and emoji replaced sentences in ToxiCloakCN dataset compared to the base dataset. This indicates a significant reduction in their ability to detect offensive content when the text is perturbed. The drop in performance is primarily due to the probabilistic nature of LLMs, which rely on next-word prediction based on statistical probabili-

ties. Perturbations like homophone and emoji replacements disrupt this probability chain, compromising the models’ ability to generate coherent and contextually accurate responses.

4.3.1 Effects of Pinyin Augmentation

When pinyin was added to the text, we observed a performance reduction across all models on the homophone-replaced sentences in ToxiCloakCN dataset compared to text-only inputs. Instead of enhancing model capabilities, pinyin disrupted performance, leading to lower classification accuracy. Pinyin-only input experiments consistently showed lower performance compared to text inputs, highlighting the models’ limitations in processing pinyin. This aligns with Li et al.’s finding that LLMs recognize pinyin but struggle with pronunciation, making it difficult to correct phonological errors. This limitation affects the models’ ability to detect offensive language significantly perturbed through homophone replacements. The performance drop with pinyin augmentation is partially due to pinyin not being directly associated with the original phrase, causing confusion for the model.

4.3.2 Effect of Instruction Templates

Across all models, Chinese instructions consistently outperformed English instructions for tasks involving Chinese text. Conversely, for pinyin-only tasks, English instructions yielded better results than Chinese instructions. This is likely due to the task characteristics: using Chinese instructions for Chinese text maintains linguistic consistency, enhancing the model’s understanding. For pinyin-only tasks, English instructions, which align better with the letter-based nature of pinyin, improved coherence and model performance.

4.4 Case Studies

The decline in Macro F1 scores across all models on ToxiCloakCN datasets highlights the challenges these models face in offensive detection tasks. In this section, we aim to empirically explore why LLMs struggle with offensive content with homophone or emoji replacements. Through case studies, we analyzed the effects of the perturbations on various types of offensive content. Additionally, we analyze specific cases to compare the differences be-

1. Text: 整急言了我可以干猪, 但是不毁感油郭黑人难有的女人	
GPT-4o: Yes, that’s offensive, keywords: ‘fu*k pig(干猪)’, ‘will fu*k(会干)’, ‘black(黑人)’, ‘woman(女人)’	
Human Annotator: The phrase is offensive. The speaker is saying that he would rather fu*k pig (干猪) than having sex (毁感) with women that have a black boyfriend (油郭黑人难) - which is both sexist and racist.	
2. Text: 我已经举报家爆啥这母钩乐	
GPT-4o: “家爆” - Whilst it is correct to describe a situation of domestic violence, the direct use of such an acronym may not appear serious and respectful. ‘母钩乐’ - - This is an insulting term that is a personal attack on another person and is clearly derogatory and abusive in nature. thus, the phrase is offensive.	
Human Annotator: The phrase is offensive. The speaker is saying that he has reported (举报) and (家) roasted (爆啥) the bit*h (母钩乐).	
3. Text: 奇趣蛋还是滚来滚去比较好	
GPT-4o: Your reference to ‘奇趣蛋还是滚来滚去比较好’ sounds like a humorous description of something or a situation. If this is a reference to a Chick-fil-A toy (the common chocolate egg with small toys), it could be describing the fun of such toys, especially when they are rolled around.	
Human Annotator: The phrase is offensive. The speaker is saying that overweight women (奇趣蛋) is better off (比较好) rolling around (滚来滚去). Note that 奇趣蛋 is not a homophone but a slur.	

Table 4: Examples of offensive sentences with homophone replacements. The offensive text are shown in black. GPT-4o interpretation of the text are in red, and the human annotator’s explanations are in blue.

tween LLMs and human’s understanding of the cloaked offensive content.

4.4.1 Effects of Perturbation on Offensive Content Types

We examined the effects of homophone and emoji replacements on different offensive content types, namely *racism*, *sexism*, *anti-LGBTQ+*, and *regional bias*. Figure 2 depicts the models’ error rates on the base and ToxiCloakCN datasets across these content types. Note that the performance is based on the *Chinese_Text* instruction, and a smaller error rate indicates better performance in the offensive language detection task.

Generally, we observe that all models have lower error rates on the base dataset across all offensive content types, supporting our initial findings that LLMs struggle to detect cloaked offensive language, regardless of content type. Interestingly, for the open-source LLMs, we notice a smaller difference between the error rates for regional bias offensive content in the base and ToxiCloakCN datasets. This could be due to a generalization issue; the open-source LLMs are fine-tuned on COLD, which may not contain much content related to regional




Figure 2: The models’ error rates comparison between the sentences in the base dataset and the homophone or emoji-replaced sentences using prompt type Chinese_text , broken down by offensive content type. Note that smaller error rates represent better performance.

bias, resulting in poorer performance in detecting this type of offensive content, regardless of perturbation. However, for the closed-source model, GPT-4o, we observe performance gaps for regional bias offensive content when the sentences are perturbed using homophone and emoji replacements.

4.4.2 Comparison Between LLMs and Human Understanding of Cloaked Offensive Content

To explore the reasons behind the models’ poor performance on the ToxiCloakCN dataset, we conducted a detailed analysis using the top-performing GPT-4o model and human annotators, focusing on the comparison between human and model’s understanding of cloaked offensive content. Specifically, we randomly selected several offensive sentences from the ToxiCloakCN dataset and examined GPT-4o’s interpretation of these sentences. We recruited two human annotators—an undergraduate and a postgraduate student—who are proficient in Chinese and active users of Chinese social media. They assessed the offensiveness of the given sentences and provided detailed explanations. Through these case studies, we aim to compare GPT-4o’s understanding with human understanding of these cloaked offensive sentences and empirically identify any gaps in the model’s compre-

hension of cloaked offensive content.

Homophones. Table 4 presents three homophone-replaced offensive sentences from the ToxiCloakCN dataset. In the first example, GPT-4o correctly identifies the offensive content by recognizing keywords like ‘干猪’ (‘fu*k pig’). This suggests that GPT-4o has some understanding of homophones, enabling it to detect cloaked offensive language. In the second example, while the model correctly classifies the sentence as offensive, its explanation does not match the original meaning of the offensive sentence. For instance, it identifies ‘母钩乐’ as offensive but cannot explain why. The human annotator, however, can reconstruct the sentence and provide an accurate judgment and explanation. In the third example, GPT-4o misjudges and misinterprets the phrase due to its inability to understand the cultural background. This example demonstrates the model’s limitation in recognizing implicit offensive language across different cultures, whereas human annotators, with their cultural understanding, can make accurate judgments.

Emoji. Table 5 presents three emoji-replaced offensive sentences from the ToxiCloakCN dataset. In the first example, both GPT-4o and the human annotator accurately identify the offensive content. This case is relatively

1. Text: 告诉她👤, 🐮家👤栏的公👤最近发春, 吊又长又大, 是真的大, 🐮是怕片宣传挑出来的大, 送给她👤夜夜春宵, 🆓, 没艾滋病
GPT-4o: Yes, the phrase is harmful because it contains sexual innuendo and inappropriate metaphors that could be perceived as disrespectful and sexually harassing. In addition, it incorrectly characterizes health conditions, which can lead to misunderstanding and discrimination against specific diseases.
Human Annotator: This phrase is offensive. The speaker is saying that his cowshed's cow(🐮家👤栏的公👤) is horny(发春), and can give them for free to have sex(送给她👤夜夜春宵, 🆓)
2. Text: 归根究底, 广大普通👤性若是靠近普👤👤, 会👤幸。这是最正确的结论。
GPT-4o: Yes, this statement could be seen as offensive because it imposes gender roles and expectations, suggesting that women can only be happy if they are dependent on men, a view that could be considered sexist.
Human Annotator: Yes, this statement is offensive because it is sarcastically stating that all the women(👤性) will be unfortunate(会👤幸) if they get closer to normal men(普👤👤). Note that 普信男(普👤👤) is a derogatory term used towards men.
3. Text: 🐶👤👤👤👤 house
GPT-4o: The language consists of various emoticons and the English word 'house' and lacks clear context. In the absence of obvious harmful content, the passage itself is not directly harmful.
Human Annotator: The phrase is offensive. The speaker is saying that simps(🐶👤) does not deserve a good death(👤👤 house). Note that in this example, both homophones and emojis has been used.

Table 5: Examples of offensive sentences with emoji replacements. The offensive text are shown in black. GPT-4o interpretation of the text are in red, and the human annotator’s explanations are in blue.

simple because offensive keywords such as ‘吊’ (a homophone for ‘di*k’) and ‘艾滋病’ (AIDS) remain unchanged. In the second example, although the model classifies the sentence as offensive, its explanation differs from that of the human annotator, indicating a misinterpretation. This may be due to the model’s failure to grasp emoji meanings, such as ‘👋’ (which means ‘not’ in this context). The third example involves complex emoji and homophone replacement, with ‘simp’ translated to ‘舔狗’ in Chinese, represented by emojis for ‘舔’ (lick) and ‘狗’ (dog). ‘不得’ (not deserve) was replaced by an emoji (👋👤) and the last two characters(好死) are phonetically converted to ‘house’ in English. GPT-4o misclassifies and misinterprets this complex content, whereas the human annotators are able to identify it, highlighting the need for developing more robust solutions capable of handling such cloaked offensive languages.

5 Conclusion and Future Works

In this study, we explored the robustness of current Chinese offensive language detection

models against cloaking perturbations, specifically homophone and emoji replacements. We developed the ToxiCloakCN dataset by augmenting the ToxiCN dataset with these perturbations to simulate real-world scenarios where users attempt to evade detection systems. Our experimental results demonstrated that the performance of state-of-the-art models, including GPT-4o, significantly declines when faced with these cloaked offensive content. Although our proposed pinyin augmentation method showed some promise, its effectiveness was limited across different models, highlighting the complexity of phonetic alignment in offensive language detection.

Our case studies further revealed notable gaps in the models’ understanding of cloaked offensive content compared to human annotators. GPT-4o often missed or misinterpreted offensive keywords disguised by homophones or emojis, while human evaluators, with their cultural and contextual understanding, could accurately identify the offensive nature of these texts. This emphasizes the need for models that can better mimic human comprehension of nuanced and contextually rich language. These findings underscore the urgent need for more advanced techniques to handle such evolving strategies.

Future research should expand cloaking techniques beyond homophone and emoji perturbations, incorporate a wider range of linguistic variations from real-life internet sources, and develop more sophisticated phonetic alignment methods to improve model robustness. Additionally, creating algorithms that integrate deeper semantic understanding and context-awareness will be essential for effectively handling cloaked offensive language. By building on the groundworks of this study and addressing these areas, future research can significantly advance the field of offensive language detection, contributing to safer and more respectful digital environments.

Limitation

This study has several limitations. Firstly, while our dataset includes comprehensive homophone and emoji perturbations, it may not encompass the entire range of adversarial tech-

580 niques employed in real-world scenarios. This
581 limitation could affect the generalizability of
582 our findings to other perturbation forms not
583 examined in this study. Additionally, our re-
584 liance on the ToxiCN dataset, despite its ro-
585 bustness, might not fully capture the diver-
586 sity of offensive language across various Chi-
587 nese dialects and regional linguistic nuances.
588 This limitation could impact the broader ap-
589 plicability of our findings. Future research
590 should consider subsampling perturbed data
591 from real-life internet sources such as Tieba⁴
592 and NGA⁵ to gain a more accurate and timely
593 understanding of these perturbed languages in
594 real life. Lastly, our work does not provide a
595 definitive solution for addressing all challenges
596 related to cloaked offensive language detection.
597 Future work should undertake more thorough
598 and advanced analyses to develop effective so-
599 lutions for these challenges

600 Ethical Statement

601 This research focuses on the detection of offen-
602 sive language, particularly in the context of ho-
603 mophonic and emoji perturbations used to by-
604 pass detection mechanisms. Our primary goal
605 is to highlight the vulnerabilities of current
606 language models and enhance their robustness
607 against these cloaking techniques, thereby con-
608 tributing to safer and more respectful online
609 environments.

610 The study involves using systematically per-
611 turbed data to test the limits of existing mod-
612 els. While this approach is crucial for under-
613 standing and improving detection capabilities,
614 there are inherent risks associated with the po-
615 tential misuse of these findings. Specifically,
616 the techniques developed to detect cloaked of-
617 fensive language might also be studied to re-
618 fine evasion tactics further. However, it is im-
619 portant to emphasize that our work is solely
620 aimed at detecting and mitigating offensive
621 language, not to facilitate censorship or sup-
622 press free speech.

623 Our dataset and perturbations are derived
624 from existing resources, and no new data col-
625 lection was undertaken for this study. The use
626 of the ToxiCloakCN aligns with the intention

of the ToxiCN dataset- which states that "All
resources are for scientific research only". We
have also carefully followed the Apache-2.0 li-
cense used by JioNLP, and MIT license for
pypin

Our research is conducted with the explicit
aim of improving the detection of offensive
language. Our efforts are directed towards
contributing positively to the broader field
of content moderation, ensuring that online
platforms can effectively manage offensive lan-
guage while respecting the principles of free
and open communication.

References

- AI@Meta. 2024. [Llama 3 model card](#).
- Delphine Battistelli, Cyril Bruneau, and Valentina Dragos. 2020. Building a formal model for hate detection in french corpora. *Procedia Computer Science*, 176:2358–2365.
- Fatih Beyhan, Buse Çarık, İnanç Arm, Ayşecan Terzioğlu, Berrin Yanikoglu, and Reyhan Yeniterzi. 2022. A turkish hate speech dataset and detection system. In *Proceedings of the Thirteenth Language Resources and Evaluation Conference*, pages 4177–4185.
- I Chung and Chuan-Jie Lin. 2021. [Tocab: A dataset for chinese abusive language processing](#). In *2021 IEEE 22nd International Conference on Information Reuse and Integration for Data Science (IRI)*, pages 445–452.
- Thomas Davidson, Debasmita Bhattacharya, and Ingmar Weber. 2019. Racial bias in hate speech and abusive language detection datasets. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.12516*.
- Thomas Davidson, Dana Warmusley, Michael Macy, and Ingmar Weber. 2017. Automated hate speech detection and the problem of offensive language. In *Proceedings of the international AAAI conference on web and social media*, volume 11, pages 512–515.
- Jiawen Deng, Jingyan Zhou, Hao Sun, Chujie Zheng, Fei Mi, Helen Meng, and Minlie Huang. 2022a. [COLD: A benchmark for Chinese offensive language detection](#). In *Proceedings of the 2022 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, pages 11580–11599, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Association for Computational Linguistics.
- Yong Deng, Chenxiao Dou, Liangyu Chen, Deqiang Miao, Xianghui Sun, Baochang Ma, and Xiangang Li. 2022b. [BEIKE NLP at SemEval-2022 task 4: Prompt-based paragraph classification for patronizing and condescending language detection](#).

⁴<https://tieba.baidu.com>

⁵<https://nga.cn>

- 796 Li Zhu, and Xiaopeng Wei. 2023. A more robust
797 model to answer noisy questions in kbqa. *IEEE*
798 *Access*, 11:22756–22766.
- 799 Bencheng Wei, Jason Li, Ajay Gupta, Hafiza
800 Umair, Atsu Vovor, and Natalie Durzynski. 2021.
801 Offensive language and hate speech detection with
802 deep learning and transfer learning. *Preprint*,
803 arXiv:2108.03305.
- 804 Seth Wiener. 2011. Grass-mud horses to victory:
805 The phonological constraints of subversive puns.
- 806 Yunze Xiao, Houda Bouamor, and Wajdi Za-
807 ghouani. 2024. Chinese offensive language detec-
808 tion:current status and future directions. *Preprint*,
809 arXiv:2403.18314.
- 810 Zi Xiong, Lizhi Qing, Yangyang Kang, Jiawei Liu,
811 Hongsong Li, Changlong Sun, Xiaozhong Liu, and
812 Wei Lu. 2024. Enhance robustness of language
813 models against variation attack through graph in-
814 tegration. In *Proceedings of the 2024 Joint In-*
815 *ternational Conference on Computational Linguis-*
816 *tics, Language Resources and Evaluation (LREC-*
817 *COLING 2024)*, pages 5866–5877, Torino, Italia.
818 ELRA and ICCL.
- 819 Ga Zhang. 2024. Nmsl: A toolkit for deep learning
820 neural network training and evaluation. [https://](https://github.com/THUzhangga/NMSL)
821 github.com/THUzhangga/NMSL. Accessed: 2024-05-
822 27.
- 823 Yin Zhang, Rong Jin, and Zhi-Hua Zhou. 2010.
824 Understanding bag-of-words model: a statistical
825 framework. *International Journal of Machine*
826 *Learning and Cybernetics*, 1:43–52.
- 827 Zihan Zhang, Jinfeng Li, Ning Shi, Bo Yuan, Xi-
828 angyu Liu, Rong Zhang, Hui Xue, Donghong Sun,
829 and Chao Zhang. 2022. RoChBert: Towards ro-
830 bust BERT fine-tuning for Chinese. In *Find-*
831 *ings of the Association for Computational Linguis-*
832 *tics: EMNLP 2022*, pages 3502–3516, Abu Dhabi,
833 United Arab Emirates. Association for Computa-
834 tional Linguistics.
- 835 Li Zhou, Laura Cabello, Yong Cao, and Daniel
836 Hershcovich. 2023. Cross-cultural transfer learn-
837 ing for chinese offensive language detection. *arXiv*
838 *preprint arXiv:2303.17927*.