

# 000 001 002 003 004 005 SONAR: SPECTRAL-CONTRASTIVE AUDIO RESIDU- 006 ALS FOR ROBUST DEEPFAKE DETECTION 007 008 009

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## ABSTRACT

Deepfake (DF) audio detectors still struggle to generalize to out of distribution inputs. A central reason is *spectral bias*, the tendency of neural networks to learn low-frequency structure before high-frequency (HF) details, which both causes DF generators to leave HF artifacts and leaves those same artifacts under-exploited by common detectors. To address this gap, we propose **Spectral-cONtrastive Audio Residuals (SONAR)**, a frequency-guided framework that explicitly disentangles an audio signal into complementary representations. An XLSR encoder captures the dominant low-frequency content, while the same cloned path, preceded by learnable SRM, value-constrained high-pass filters, distills faint HF residuals. Frequency cross-attention reunites the two views for long- and short-range frequency dependencies, and a frequency-aware Jensen–Shannon contrastive loss pulls real content–noise pairs together while pushing fake embeddings apart, accelerating optimization and sharpening decision boundaries. Evaluated on the ASVspoof 2021 and in-the-wild benchmarks, SONAR attains state-of-the-art performance and converges four times faster than strong baselines. By elevating faint high-frequency residuals to first-class learning signals, SONAR unveils a fully data-driven, frequency-guided contrastive framework that splits the latent space into two disjoint manifolds: natural-HF for genuine audio and distorted-HF for synthetic audio, thereby sharpening decision boundaries. Because the scheme operates purely at the representation level, it is architecture-agnostic and, in future work, can be seamlessly integrated into any model or modality where subtle high-frequency cues are decisive.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

**Why deepfake detection matters.** Generative AI now enables the creation of photorealistic images, video, and speech. In 2024, political deepfakes flooded social media during global elections, while voice-cloning scams caused multimillion-dollar losses, including a 25M\$ transfer United Nations Development Programme (2024); TRM Labs (2025). The FBI warns of AI-powered vishing Cybersecurity Dive (2025). More broadly, synthetic media erodes trust in journalism, markets, and legal evidence, making robust detection essential.

**Prior work, and why it falls short.** Most forensic research still centers on ever-deeper classifiers, overlooking how deepfake artifacts disturb the *joint* statistics of content and noise. Early SRM-style detectors either use fixed high pass filters Fridrich & Kodovský (2012); Qian et al. (2020) or, in the case of Bayar & Stamm’s constrained convolution Bayar & Stamm (2016), *learnable* prediction-error kernels that deliberately suppress content. Yet all of these methods operate on high frequency (HF) residuals *in isolation*, ignoring their correlation with the underlying signal. Han et al. Han et al. (2021) add a second, content branch with learnable SRM filters, but the two streams are only fused at the top and no constraint enforces statistical coupling, Zhu et al. Zhu et al. (2024) similarly boost noise for image forgery detection, treating it as an auxiliary cue that still requires pixel-level masks. None of these approaches capture the higher-order dependency between HF noise and semantic content an interplay that isolated filtering or late fusion cannot model.

In audio forensics, the field has progressed from handcrafted spectral features combined with GMM or LCNN classifiers Yamagishi et al. (2019) to fine-tuned self-supervised encoders such as HuBERT




Figure 1: **SONAR overview.** Audio is processed in parallel by the Content Feature Extractor (CFE) and the Noise Feature Extractor (NFE). Their embeddings are fused via cross-attention (CA) and classified as real/fake.

and XLSR Hsu et al. (2021); Tak et al. (2022b); Zhang et al. (2024); Xiao & Das (2024). However, frequency-aware approaches have not yet been explored in this domain. Moreover, neither line of work models the alignment between semantic content and high frequency noise.

We state that all the previous work both in images and in audio suffers from a common limitation: **spectral bias**, also known as the *frequency principle* (F-principle) Rahaman et al. (2019); Basri et al. (2019); Cao et al. (2019); Xu et al. (2024); Fridovich-Keil et al. (2022). Whereby deep networks favor low frequency structure first and leave subtle HF cues under-represented. Although image methods partly address this by routing HF residuals through a separate branch, they stop at *mere separation*, they never model how low and high frequency information *should co-vary* in the same feature space during the learning process. There is no existing detector, visual or auditory that actively *aligns* genuine content–noise pairs while *repelling* their fake counterparts in latent space. This *alignment gap* is especially detrimental in audio, where high frequency artifacts are easily masked by perceptual post-processing, and, to date, no audio (or image) deepfake detector has explicitly addressed this issue in a data-driven application.

To better understand these limitations and motivate our solution, we conducted an exploratory statistical analysis of real vs. fake utterances across our train and test datasets. Our findings confirm that deepfakes differ from real audio not only in energy, but also in higher-order frequency statistics. Specifically, we observed a breakdown of natural low↔high co-modulation patterns (Fig. 2a), together with systematic shift in the contrast between low- and high-frequency energy bands (Fig. 2b). These cues cannot be exploited by fixed filters alone and strongly justify SONAR’s use of learnable, distribution-level alignment.

**Our approach: SONAR and the gap it fills.** We close this gap with **SONAR**, a frequency guided, dual path framework that **learns** a bank of *data-driven SRM filters* to isolate high frequency (HF) residuals and imposes a Jensen–Shannon divergence loss to *pull* real content–noise pairs together while *pushing* fake pairs apart in latent space. By transforming HF residuals from a nuisance into a supervisory signal and learning their alignment with semantic content in feature space, SONAR directly combats spectral bias, accelerates convergence, and sets new state-of-the-art performance on both controlled benchmarks (ASVspoof 2021) and challenging “in the wild” audio. To our knowledge, it is the *first* audio deepfake detector to exploit **learnable, distributional alignment** between low and high frequency embeddings.

**Our contributions are threefold.**

- **SONAR: frequency-contrastive dual path.** We introduce **SONAR**, the first audio deepfake detector to jointly model low-frequency content and high-frequency residuals, turning spectral bias into a discriminative signal.




Figure 2: **Low–high frequency structure reveals spoofing artifacts.** (a) Pearson correlation between low- (0–4 kHz) and high-frequency (7–8 kHz) bands shows real speech with strong co-modulation ( $r \approx 0.6$ ), while fakes collapse toward zero or negative values. (b) The energy difference  $\Delta E = E_{HF} - E_{LF}$  is systematically shifted for fakes across corpora, exposing a consistent HF/LF imbalance. These second-order cues motivate SONAR’s *distributional alignment* objective.

- **Learnable SRM & JS frequency alignment loss.** A learnable SRM filter bank with a Jensen–Shannon alignment loss explicitly aligns real content–noise pairs and separates fake ones, a formulation not used in prior work.
- **State-of-the-art with fast convergence.** SONAR achieves new SOTA EERs on ASVspoof 2021 and In-the-Wild, converging in as few as 12 epochs while remaining robust to codecs and bandwidth shifts.

## 2 RELATED WORK

**High frequency cues in deep learning.** Fourier features markedly reduce spectral bias in MLPs Tancik et al. (2020). Successors such as Wave NN Yang et al. (2022), BiHPF Jeong et al. (2022), and ADD Woo (2022) insert explicit high pass branches or filters, showing that frequency-aware modules consistently sharpen detail capture.

**Frequency domain image forgery detection.** Two stream, high pass pipelines detect manipulation artifacts by pairing low pass content with residual branches Masi et al. (2020); Qian et al. (2020); Bayar & Stamm (2016); Fridrich & Kodovský (2012). Denoising-guided schemes Zhu et al. (2024) and compact frequency blocks Tan et al. (2024) further improve generalization with fewer parameters.

**Audio deepfake detection.** Classic systems combine handcrafted cepstral features with GMM/LCNN backends Yamagishi et al. (2019). Modern approaches leverage SSL encoders (HuBERT, Wav2Vec, XLSR, Whisper, WavLM) Hsu et al. (2021); Baevski et al. (2020); Babu et al. (2021); Radford et al. (2022); Chen et al. (2022), yet often falter on out of distribution (OOD) audio Müller et al. (2022). Tak et al. fine tuned XLSR with an AASIST head and augmentation for strong OOD results Tak et al. (2022b), later work fused XLSR layers with specialized classifiers to push performance further Zhang et al. (2024); Truong et al. (2024); Xiao & Das (2024).

**Our contribution.** Building on Tak et al. (2022b) and Xiao & Das (2024), we add a *learnable* dual path filter that explicitly aligns content and noise embeddings, boosting sensitivity to subtle high frequency artifacts. The result is faster convergence and state-of-the-art robustness across both benchmark and in the wild tests.

## 3 MATHEMATICAL MOTIVATION

**Spectral bias as a coupling defect.** A spoken frame  $X$  contains *low-frequency* formants  $L$  and *high-frequency* micro-structure  $H$ , produced by the *same* vocal–tract event, hence jointly distributed:  $p_{\text{real}}(L, H) \neq p(L)p(H)$ . Deep learning training is **spectrally biased**: it first fits the high energy LF error then runs out of budget, leaving an HF “hole” Rahaman et al. (2019). This provides us motivation for the assumption of approximate factorization  $p_{\text{fake}}(L, H) \simeq p(L)p(H)$  and, critically,




Figure 3: **Rich Feature Extractor (RFE).** Audio  $x$  is processed by a bank of  $M$  SRM-inspired filters, concatenated, and passed through a  $1 \times 1$  learnable convolution layer to produce the noise residual representation  $x_{\text{noise}}$ .

a *mismatch* in the *joint* LF–HF statistics, an empirically validated assumption, see Figures 2a and 2b.

**Dual-path embeddings.** We split  $X$  with an ideal band-pass filter,  $L = \mathcal{F}_{\text{low}}X$ ,  $H = \mathcal{F}_{\text{high}}X$ , feed each band to the **same** encoder  $\phi_{\theta}$  to obtain

$$\mathbf{z}_{\text{content}} = \phi_{\theta}(L), \quad \mathbf{z}_{\text{noise}} = \phi_{\theta}^{\text{HF}}(\text{SRM}(H)),$$

and treat the softmaxed frames as empirical distributions  $p(\mathbf{z}_{\text{content}})$ ,  $p(\mathbf{z}_{\text{noise}})$ .

**Alignment loss.** For label  $y \in \{0 = \text{fake}, 1 = \text{real}\}$  we minimize

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{align}} = y \text{JS}[p(\mathbf{z}_{\text{content}}) \parallel p(\mathbf{z}_{\text{noise}})] + (1-y)(1 - \text{JS}), \quad (1)$$

*pulling* LF and HF embeddings together for real speech and *pushing* them apart for fakes.

**Error bound.** Pinsker’s inequality turns the Jensen–Shannon divergence  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{JS}} = \text{JS}[p(\mathbf{z}_{\text{content}}) \parallel p(\mathbf{z}_{\text{noise}})]$  into a Bayes error bound  $P_e \leq \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{2\mathcal{D}_{\text{JS}}}$ . Thus equation 1 **shrinks**  $P_e$  for genuine pairs ( $\mathcal{D}_{\text{JS}} \downarrow$ ) and **widens** the margin for fakes ( $\mathcal{D}_{\text{JS}} \uparrow$ ), with the HF encoder acting as a targeted regularizer on the generator’s weak band.

**The HF “hole”** is not merely an energy dip, it *breaks* the natural LF  $\leftrightarrow$  HF dependency of real speech. SONAR restores this dependency for genuine audio and accentuates its absence for forgeries, turning a fundamental spectral-bias flaw into a reliable discriminative signal.

## 4 METHODOLOGY

**From Mathematical Motivation to Real-Life Application.** Our statistical analysis (Fig. 2) confirmed that fakes break the natural LF–HF co-modulation of real speech, supporting the factorization assumption  $p_{\text{fake}}(L, H) \approx p(L)q(H)$ . The mathematical motivation in Sec. 3 showed that aligning LF and HF embeddings via the JS loss directly tightens the Bayes error bound. SONAR operationalizes this by: (i) splitting each input  $X$  into content ( $L$ ) and noise ( $H$ ) with an SRM-constrained filter bank, (ii) encoding both with twin XLSR paths to obtain  $\mathbf{z}_c, \mathbf{z}_n$ , and (iii) regulating their JS divergence through equation 1. For reals the loss minimizes divergence, restoring LF–HF dependency, for fakes it maximizes it, amplifying artifacts and widening the decision margin predicted by theory. We implement this dual-path head on AASIST Tak et al. (2022b), and in SONAR-Finetune attach it to XLSR-Mamba Xiao & Das (2024), training only the frequency-enhancing head for efficiency.

### 4.1 SONAR FEATURE EXTRACTION

The SONAR architecture consists of:

- **Content Feature Extractor (CFE):** A Wav2Vec2.0 XLSR Encoder.
- **Noise Feature Extractor (NFE):** A module based on constrained SRM filters followed by a Wav2Vec2.0 XLSR Encoder.

216     • **Fusion via Cross-Attention:** This merges the two feature streams into a unified representation.  
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219     Figure 1 illustrates the overall system.  
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221     4.1.1 CONTENT FEATURE EXTRACTION (CFE)  
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223     Given an input signal  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^T$ , we extract content features as:  
 224

$$\mathbf{z}_{\text{content}} = \text{CFE}(\mathbf{x}) \in \mathbb{R}^{F \times D}, \quad (2)$$

226     with  $F$  time steps and feature dimension  $D$ .  
 227

228     4.1.2 NOISE FEATURE EXTRACTION (NFE)  
 229

230     The Noise Feature Extractor (NFE) builds on a Rich Feature Extraction (RFE) module (Figure 3).  
 231     This module leverages constrained SRM filters to emphasize high-frequency components, which are  
 232     then processed by the Wav2Vec2.0 XLSR Encoder Babu et al. (2021). The XLSR encoder weights  
 233     were *not shared* across branches, allowing the model to learn disentangled representations of noise  
 234     and content. A discussion of the resulting computational cost is provided in Appendix A.  
 235

236     **Constrained SRM Filters:** We initialize  $M$  (hyperparameter for number of filters) learnable filters,  
 237     each of length 5, with two key constraints:  
 238

$$w_i[m] = -1, \quad (\text{central coefficient}) \quad (3)$$

$$\sum_k w_i[k] = 0, \quad (\text{zero-sum constraint}) \quad (4)$$

243     where  $w_i[m]$  is the  $i$ -th filter at index  $m$  and we initialize the weights from  $N(0, I)$ . To ensure these  
 244     are *hard constraints*, after every optimizer step we project the filters back to the constraint set: each  
 245     filter is divided by the negative of its center coefficient (fixing the middle entry to  $-1$ ), and then  
 246     its mean is subtracted to enforce strict zero-sum. This guarantees that the constraints hold exactly  
 247     throughout training without requiring reparameterization or relaxation.

248     These enforced constraints force each filter to act as a high-pass operator, suppressing low-frequency  
 249     (content) information and highlighting high-frequency noise, consistent with prior work Bayar &  
 250     Stamm (2016); Zhu et al. (2024); Han et al. (2021). Given an input signal  $\mathbf{x}$ , convolving with these  
 251     filters yields:

$$\mathbf{F}_{\text{noise}} = \text{Conv1D}_{\text{SRM}}(\mathbf{x}), \quad (5)$$

253     where  $\mathbf{F}_{\text{noise}} \in \mathbb{R}^{M \times T}$  contains the intermediate noise feature maps.  
 254

255     Extracting these high frequency features enables the network to detect subtle discrepancies in fake  
 256     audio.  
 257

258     4.1.3 FUSION AND CLASSIFICATION  
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260     The content and noise embeddings,  $\mathbf{z}_{\text{content}}$  and  $\mathbf{z}_{\text{noise}}$ , are fused using a cross-attention mechanism.  
 261     We conducted all experiments with an embedding dimension of 1024 and 8 attention heads.  
 262

$$\mathbf{e}_{\text{out}} = \text{CA}(\mathbf{z}_{\text{content}}, \mathbf{z}_{\text{noise}}) \in \mathbb{R}^{F \times D}. \quad (6)$$

265     The fused representation is then fed to the AASIST classifier Jung et al. (2022):  
 266

$$\hat{y} = \text{AASIST}(\mathbf{e}_{\text{out}}) \in \mathbb{R}^2, \quad (7)$$

268     where  $\hat{y}$  is the score vector for the real/fake decision.  
 269

The architecture of XLSR and AASIST models are detailed in the appendix.

270 4.2 TRAINING OBJECTIVE  
271272 4.2.1 JS-BASED LOSS FOR REAL VS. SPOOF EMBEDDED FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS  
273274 Let  $\mathbf{Z}_{\text{content}} \in \mathbb{R}^{F \times D}$  and  $\mathbf{Z}_{\text{noise}} \in \mathbb{R}^{F \times D}$  denote the content and noise embeddings extracted from  
275 the dual path feature extractor for an audio example  $\mathbf{x}$ . Our goal is to increase the probability  
276 distance between the frequency embeddings of fake data while simultaneously reducing the distance  
277 among those of real data.278 To achieve this, we employ the Jensen–Shannon (JS) divergence Fuglede & Topsøe (2004) as a  
279 metric for comparing distributions. First, we apply a frame-wise softmax to each embedding,  
280 converting them into probability distributions. Then, we compute a single JS divergence score,  
281  $\text{JS}(\mathbf{z}_{\text{content}}, \mathbf{z}_{\text{noise}})$ , using  $\log_2$  as the logarithmic base. This ensures that the divergence is normalized  
282 to the range  $[0, 1]$ , facilitating stable comparison across samples.283 **Frame-wise JS Divergence:** At each frame  $i$ , we can treat  $\mathbf{z}_{\text{content}}[i]$  and  $\mathbf{z}_{\text{noise}}[i]$  as two embeddings  
284 in  $\mathbb{R}^D$ . By applying softmax to each and get two discrete distributions  $\mathbf{p}_{\text{content}}[i]$  and  $\mathbf{p}_{\text{noise}}[i]$ , where  
285 the final score for audio  $\mathbf{x}$  with embeddings  $\mathbf{Z}_{\text{content}}, \mathbf{Z}_{\text{noise}}$  will be:

286 
$$\text{JS}(\mathbf{Z}_{\text{content}}, \mathbf{Z}_{\text{noise}}) = \frac{1}{F} \sum_{i=1}^F \text{JS}(\mathbf{p}_{\text{content}}[i], \mathbf{p}_{\text{noise}}[i])$$
  
287  
288

290 We label the example with  $y = 1$  if it is *real*, and  $y = 0$  if it is *spoof*.  
291292 **JS-Based Loss:**  
293294 With these settings, we define the custom loss function for each sample  $(x, y)$ :  
295296 Where  $\mathbf{Z}_{\text{content}}, \mathbf{Z}_{\text{noise}}$  are the embeddings from our **SONAR** feature extraction.  
297

298 
$$L_{\text{JS}}(x, y) = y \cdot \text{JS}(\mathbf{z}_c, \mathbf{z}_n) + (1 - y) \cdot (1 - \text{JS}(\mathbf{z}_c, \mathbf{z}_n)) \quad (8)$$
  
299

300 We combine the above  $L_{\text{JS}}$  (align loss as in equation 1) with a weighted cross-entropy (WCE)  
301 loss, which handles the real/fake classification in a more conventional way and accounts for class  
302 imbalance:  
303

304 
$$\mathcal{L}(x, y) = \text{WCE}(\hat{y}, y) + \lambda_{\text{JS}} \cdot L_{\text{JS}}(\mathbf{z}_{\text{content}}, \mathbf{z}_{\text{noise}}), \quad (9)$$
  
305

306 where  $\hat{y} \in [0, 1]$  is the classifier’s predicted probability of being real. The scalar  $\lambda_{\text{JS}}$  balances  
307 how strongly the network must enforce the JS-based criterion. After ablation study, we chose to be  
308  $\lambda_{\text{JS}}=1$ .  
309310 4.3 SONAR-LITE SETUP  
311312 We propose SONAR-Lite to evaluate the intrinsic discriminative power of our frequency-guided  
313 backbone. Replacing AASIST with a lightweight two-layer MLP isolates the contribution of the  
314 dual-path features, which alone suffice to robustly separate real and spoofed inputs. Despite its  
315 simplicity, SONAR-Lite still attains state-of-the-art performance. Let  $\mathbf{z}_{\text{content}}, \mathbf{z}_{\text{noise}} \in \mathbb{R}^{B \times T \times D}$   
316 denote the dual-path embeddings, aggregated by mean pooling over time:  
317

318 
$$\tilde{\mathbf{z}}_{\text{content}} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbf{z}_{\text{content},t}, \quad \tilde{\mathbf{z}}_{\text{noise}} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbf{z}_{\text{noise},t},$$
  
319

320 and concatenated into a single vector  $\mathbf{x} = [\tilde{\mathbf{z}}_{\text{content}}, \tilde{\mathbf{z}}_{\text{noise}}]$ . This vector is then fed into a lightweight  
321 two-layer fully connected classifier.  
322323 This simplified design demonstrates that the dual path features alone provide robust discriminative  
324 power, as validated by our experimental results (see Table 1).  
325326 4.4 SONAR-FINETUNE  
327328 To address the computational overhead of training dual XLSR encoders from scratch, we explored a  
329 finetuning strategy leveraging the pre-trained XLSR-Mamba pipeline Xiao & Das (2024). Under the  
330

Model	LA $\downarrow$	DF $\downarrow$	ITW $\downarrow$
WavLM-Large+MFA Guo et al. (2024)	5.08	2.56	—
XLSR+AASIST Tak et al. (2022b)	1.90	3.69	10.46
XLSR+MoE Wang et al. (2024)	—	—	9.17
XLSR+Conformer Rosello et al. (2023)	0.97	2.58	8.42
XLSR+Conformer+TCM Truong et al. (2024)	1.18	2.25	7.79
XLSR-SLS Zhang et al. (2024)	2.87	1.92	7.46
XLSR-Mamba Xiao & Das (2024)	<b>0.93</b>	1.88	6.71
<b>SONAR-Lite (M=30, <math>\lambda_{JS} = 1</math>)</b>	1.78 (2.03)	2.11 (2.5)	6.98 (7.2)
<b>SONAR-Full (M=30, <math>\lambda_{JS} = 1</math>, enhancing Tak et al. (2022b))</b>	1.55 (1.68)	1.57 (1.95)	6.00 (6.8)
<b>SONAR-Finetune (M=30, <math>\lambda_{JS} = 1</math>) on Xiao &amp; Das (2024)</b>	1.20 (1.30)	<b>1.45</b> (1.62)	<b>5.43</b> (5.8)

Table 1: EER (%) on ASVspoof 2021 LA, DF, and In The Wild datasets. Bold entries are best per column. Results from prior work are single-run values, SONAR variants report best (mean) over 3 runs. Statistical significance: SONAR-Full vs. AASIST on ITW ( $t = 19.4, p = 0.0026$ ) and SONAR-Finetune vs. XLSR-Mamba on ITW ( $t = 4.73, p = 0.0419$ ) both confirm robust improvements ( $p < 0.05$ ).

assumption that the original XLSR model, inherently favors low frequency (content) information, we designate it as the content path. To complement this, We then insert our NFE module into the pipeline to extract complementary high frequency cues. These content and noise embeddings are fused via the cross-attention and passed into the mostly-frozen Mamba classifier, with only the noise XLSR, fusion module, and the final two Mamba layers updated during training. The training process started from the best reported checkpoint of the paper and was stopped once the alignment loss (1) plateaued, which in our experiments consistently occurred within 6 epochs. This efficient setup allows us to retain most of the pre-trained model’s capacity while enriching it with high frequency information with low effort. Remarkably, this finetuned configuration achieves state-of-the-art performance, as detailed in Table 1.

## 5 EXPERIMENTS & RESULTS

### 5.1 DATASETS & TRAINING CONFIGURATION

For our experiments, in the same manner that all audio DF detection models are trained, we utilized the ASVspoof 2019 Logical Access (LA) training set Yamagishi et al. (2019) for model training and the corresponding LA validation set for tuning. The model wasn’t expose to any other data set in the process. For evaluation, we used the ASVspoof 2021 competition datasets Delgado et al. (2021) that were designed only for testing. They are covering both Logical Access (clean TTS and VC) and Deep Fake scenarios. Since the ASVspoof 2019 LA training set is highly imbalanced (approximately 1:9 real to fake ratio), we employed a *weighted cross-entropy* (WCE) loss with class priors estimated from the training split. This ensured that the model avoided bias toward the majority class during optimization. To further assess generalization, we also evaluated on the In The Wild dataset introduced by Müller et al. (2022), which contains diverse, real world audio samples. This comprehensive protocol ensures robustness in both controlled and uncontrolled environments. Audio data were segmented into approximately 4-second clips (64,600 samples). As in prior work Tak et al. (2022b); Xiao & Das (2024); Rosello et al. (2023), we applied RawBoost Tak et al. (2022a). We tested several setups with consistent trends and adopted the standard config for fairness. SONAR-Full and SONAR-Lite training we optimized our model using the AdamW optimizer with an learning rate of  $10^{-5}$ , decaying to  $10^{-8}$  via cosine annealing. For the finetune version we did the same but only optimized the NFE, fusion layer, and the last two layers of the mamba classifier. For speed purposes, training was performed on 4 NVIDIA L40 GPUs with an effective batch size of  $28 \times 4$ . The proposed model can fit inside a single L-40. Each experiment was run three times with different random seeds, employing early stopping (patience of three epochs) and selecting the model with the lowest validation EER. All results are reproducible using our open source code that will be released upon acceptance. Audio deepfake detection is evaluated using the **Equal Error Rate (EER)**, which is the point where the false acceptance rate equals the false rejection rate. Despite

Method / Augmentation	DF ↓	LA ↓	ITW ↓
<i>Architectural Ablations</i>			
SONAR-Full w/o RFE, JS	2.54	2.93	8.91
SONAR-Full w/o RFE	2.40	2.48	8.44
SONAR-Full w/o JS	2.65	2.90	8.50
SONAR-Full w/ non-learnable RFE (M=30)	2.30	2.36	8.20
SONAR-Full w/ $M=1$ SRM	2.83	2.91	8.00
SONAR-Full w/ $M=10$ SRM	2.43	2.51	7.40
SONAR-Full w/ $\lambda_{JS}=0.5$	2.42	2.61	7.91
SONAR-Full w/ $\lambda_{JS}=0.8$	1.90	1.78	7.02
SONAR-Full w/ SRM and $\lambda_{JS}=1$ (best configuration)	<b>1.57</b>	<b>1.55</b>	<b>6.00</b>
<i>Robustness to Sampling Rates / Codecs (ITW only)</i>			
Resample → 44.1 kHz			≈ 0
Resample → 48 kHz			≈ 0
MP3 (64 kbps)			medium jitter ( $ \Delta p  \leq 0.1$ )
Opus (32 kbps)			medium jitter ( $ \Delta p  \leq 0.1$ )
Vorbis (q3)			small jitter ( $ \Delta p  \leq 0.05$ )

Table 2: **Ablation study (SONAR-Full).** Top: pooled EER (%) on DF, LA, and ITW sets under different architectural ablations. Bottom: robustness analysis of SONAR-Full (trained on the standard ASVspoof2019 dataset at 16 kHz) evaluated on the ITW test set because its difficulty under different resampling and codec augmentations. Results are reported as probability shifts in the softmax outputs.

having nearly double the number of parameters, SONAR-Full introduces only a marginal increase in inference time compared to latest SOTA XLSR-Mamba Xiao & Das (2024), as shown in Fig. 6.



## 5.2 RESULTS

SONAR achieves new state-of-the-art performance across DF, LA, and IN THE WILD (Table 1):

- **DF:** *SONAR-Full* and *SONAR-Finetune* reach **1.57%** and **1.45%**, surpassing all prior methods.
- **LA:** Both achieve competitive performance (**1.20%–1.55%**) and are the strongest models trained with a single run.
- **In The Wild:** *SONAR-Full* and *SONAR-Finetune* set a new benchmark at **6.00%** and **5.43%**.

The LA decrease against models like XLSR-Mamba Xiao & Das (2024) and XLSR-Conformer Truong et al. (2024), Rosello et al. (2023) is explained by a key evaluation difference: their reported results rely on *checkpoint averaging* or run-smoothing, while SONAR is evaluated strictly under **single training runs**. Our reported values are means over three independent seeds, ensuring that improvements reflect genuine convergence rather than post-hoc stabilization. This distinction naturally accounts for the apparent advantage of XLSR-Mamba on LA (0.93% vs. 1.55% for SONAR-Full). Under a fair single-run protocol, SONAR achieves SOTA performance on LA, DF and ITW. Thus, the small LA difference is not a weakness but an expected outcome of different evaluation protocols, and SONAR’s frequency-guided alignment offers stronger and more robust generalization in out-of-distribution settings.

**Convergence speed.** SONAR also converges rapidly: while Tak et al. (2022b) trained for 100 epochs, SONAR-Full stabilizes in 12, and SONAR-Finetune in only 4–6. Despite the added branch, SONAR attains higher accuracy with nearly an order-of-magnitude faster training, thanks to the alignment loss (Eq. 8) which tightens LF–HF coupling and accelerates separation of real and fake embeddings.



486 REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT  
487

488 We have taken several steps to ensure that the findings reported in this paper are reproducible.  
 489 All datasets used are publicly available: ASVspoof 2019 and 2021 (Sec. 5.1, 4) and the In-the-  
 490 Wild corpus Müller et al. (2022), 4. Our preprocessing and segmentation procedure (4-second  
 491 clips, Default settings of RawBoost augmentation) is described in Sec. 5.1 and the source in 4.  
 492 The full architecture of SONAR, including the constrained SRM filters, dual-path XLSR encoders,  
 493 and cross-attention fusion, is detailed in Sec. 4, with additional implementation details provided in  
 494 the Appendix (A). Training objectives, including the Jensen–Shannon alignment loss and weighted  
 495 cross-entropy, are specified in Eq. 1–8. All experiments were run three times with different seeds,  
 496 and statistical significance tests are reported in Table 1. An anonymous code repository containing  
 497 source code training scripts accompanies this submission in the supplementary materials.

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A APPENDIX650  
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XLSR ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW652  
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XLSR (Cross-Lingual Speech Representations) is a large-scale multilingual model based on the  
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Wav2Vec 2.0 architecture, trained on over 400,000 hours of speech across 128 languages. It is  
designed to learn universal speech representations that generalize well across languages and tasks.  
XLSR extends Wav2Vec 2.0 with larger model capacity and multilingual pretraining.  
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CORE COMPONENTS659  
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• **Feature Encoder.** The input waveform  $x \in \mathbb{R}^T$  is first passed through a series of temporal  
convolutional layers that output a latent representation:

661  
$$z = \text{ConvEncoder}(x) \in \mathbb{R}^{T' \times d}$$

662  
663  
where  $T' \ll T$  due to downsampling, and  $d$  is the channel dimension.664  
665  
• **Quantization Module (Pretraining Only).** A Gumbel-softmax quantizer maps  $z$  to discrete  
latent codes  $q(z)$  sampled from a learned codebook. This discrete representation is  
666  
667  
used as a target in contrastive learning. The quantization module is discarded after pretraining.668  
• **Transformer Encoder.** The encoded sequence  $z$  is fed into a multi-layer Transformer:

669  
$$c = \text{Transformer}(z)$$

670  
671  
For XLSR 300M, the Transformer consists of 24 layers, each with hidden size 1024, 16  
self-attention heads, and feed-forward networks of dimension 4096.672  
673  
• **Contrastive Objective (Pretraining).** The model is trained to distinguish the true quantized  
target  $q(z)$  from a set of distractors using a contrastive loss, encouraging the model to  
674  
675  
learn meaningful representations without labels.676  
677  
DOWNSTREAM USAGE678  
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After pretraining, the quantizer and contrastive heads are removed. The contextualized features  $c$   
680  
681  
are used as inputs to downstream tasks such as speech recognition, speaker verification, or deepfake  
detection. In our work, we extract  $c$  either in frozen mode or via finetuning, and feed it into a  
task-specific classifier.683  
AASIST ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW685  
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AASIST (Audio Anti-Spoofing using Integrated Spectra-Temporal Modeling) is a deep learning  
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model designed for detecting spoofed audio in speaker verification systems. It combines spectra-  
temporal modeling with attention-based mechanisms to robustly capture discriminative features be-  
tween genuine and fake audio, particularly under real world conditions.690  
CORE COMPONENTS691  
692  
• **Learnable Frontend:** The raw waveform  $x \in \mathbb{R}^T$  is first passed through a 1D convolutional  
frontend that acts as a learnable filterbank:

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694  
$$x_{\text{spec}} = \text{Conv1D}(x)$$

695  
696  
This mimics handcrafted feature extraction (e.g., STFT or filterbanks) in a data-driven way  
and outputs time-frequency like representations.697  
698  
• **Graph Attention Layer (GAT):** The core innovation of AASIST is to treat the spectro-  
temporal representation as a graph where each node corresponds to a time-frequency patch.  
699  
700  
A Graph Attention Network (GAT) models the structured relationships between these  
patches:

701  
$$h'_i = \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}(i)} \alpha_{ij} \mathbf{W} h_j$$

702 where  $\alpha_{ij}$  are attention weights learned over neighbors  $\mathcal{N}(i)$ , and  $\mathbf{W}$  is a shared linear  
 703 transform.

704

- 705 • **Spectro-Temporal Blocks:** A series of convolutional blocks capture local patterns in both  
 706 time and frequency domains. These are alternated with GAT layers to jointly model local  
 707 and global context.
- 708 • **Global Aggregation and Classification:** After the GAT and convolutional layers, the  
 709 model aggregates features via global average pooling and passes them through fully con-  
 710 nected layers for binary classification:

711

$$712 \hat{y} = \sigma(\text{MLP}(\text{GAP}(H)))$$

713

#### 714 ADVANTAGES

715

- 716 • **Spectro-Temporal Awareness:** By combining CNNs and GATs, AASIST captures both  
 717 fine-grained local patterns and long-range spectral dependencies.
- 718 • **Fully Learnable Pipeline:** From waveform to classification, the architecture is end-to-end  
 719 trainable without handcrafted features.
- 720 • **Strong Benchmarks:** AASIST achieves state-of-the-art performance on ASVspoof 2019  
 721 and 2021 logical access (LA) and deepfake (DF) subsets, especially under noisy and real  
 722 world conditions.

#### 724 USAGE IN OUR WORK

726 We adopt AASIST as a strong baseline in our experiments on **SONAR-Full** model. Its ability to de-  
 727 tect both TTS and VC-based attacks makes it a competitive model for evaluating deepfake detection  
 728 methods.

#### 731 LIMITATIONS

733 **Sensitivity to resampling and reliance on high-frequency cues.** Figure 5 reveals that the  
 734 Equal-Error Rate increases monotonically when the input audio is down-sampled for example, from  
 735 16 kHz to 4 kHz, thereby stripping energy above the new Nyquist frequency. The degradation from a  
 736 state-of-the-art 6demonstrates that SONAR exploits high-frequency noise artifacts introduced dur-  
 737 ing deep-fake synthesis. While this helps on clean, full-bandwidth recordings, it also exposes a  
 738 limitation: the detector becomes less robust when real-world pipelines or codecs apply aggressive  
 739 low-pass filtering or resampling. However, we note that most audio found *in the wild* is sampled at  
 740 16,kHz or higher, meaning this sensitivity is less likely to affect practical deployments. Moreover,  
 741 our model maintained strong performance across a range of common codecs, including high-quality  
 742 MP3 compression, indicating robustness to realistic encoding conditions. Practitioners should there-  
 743 fore (i) preserve as high a capture sample-rate as feasible, or (ii) retrain / fine-tune the model on data  
 744 that reflect the target bandwidth and compression conditions. **Model size and compute.** Although  
 745 the dual-path design roughly doubles the parameter count to 650 M (with XLSR large), it remains  
 746 feasible to train for 12 epochs on a single L40 GPU standard for real world remote server deploy-  
 747 ments. We leave further optimization via parameter sharing and pruning for future work.

748 **Modality scope.** Experiments are confined to audio. While the frequency-guided principle is  
 749 generic, porting SONAR to images or video will require modality-specific high-pass filtering and  
 fusion schemes, which we have not yet explored.

750 **Dataset coverage.** Evaluation spans ASVspoof 2021 (LA/DF) and the Müller *in-the-wild* corpus,  
 751 although these are the academic benchmarks for spoofing detection, unseen spoof mechanisms or  
 752 languages may still degrade performance.

753 **False positives/negatives.** Like any detector, SONAR can misclassify highly compressed real  
 754 speech or exceptionally well-crafted fakes, which could erode user trust, threshold calibration for  
 755 different deployment domains remains an open question.




Figure 5: Impact of resampling on detection accuracy. Equal-Error Rate (EER) rises as the sampling rate (SR) of the test set is lowered, confirming that the model relies on high-frequency artifacts introduced during deep-fake synthesis.

Model	License	URL
XLSR (fairseq)	MIT	<a href="https://github.com/facebookresearch/fairseq">https://github.com/facebookresearch/fairseq</a>
XLSR-Mamba	MIT	<a href="https://github.com/swagshaw/XLSR-Mamba">https://github.com/swagshaw/XLSR-Mamba</a>
AASIST	MIT	<a href="https://github.com/clovaai/aasist">https://github.com/clovaai/aasist</a>

Table 3: Licenses for pretrained models.

### LICENSING OF THIRD-PARTY ASSETS

All third-party assets used in this work, including models and datasets, are listed in Table 3, along with their license terms and usage conditions. We ensure that all included components comply with their respective open source or research use licenses.

All third-party assets used in this work are listed below, including pretrained models and datasets, along with their license terms and URLs.

### BROADER IMPACT

The rapid commoditisation of neural voice cloning poses concrete risks in day-to-day life from account-takeover attempts at banks and call-centre fraud, to automated disinformation in political campaigns and social media. SONAR contributes a stronger line of defence: it is a *detection-only* model that neither synthesises nor enhances fake audio. Wider deployment could therefore help journalists, financial institutions and platform moderators to flag spoofed content early, limiting downstream harm. On the negative side, ever-stronger detectors may escalate an adversarial arms-race, encouraging attackers to craft subtler manipulations. We mitigate this by (i) releasing code and eval-

810	Dataset	License	URL / Terms
811	In The Wild	Apache 2.0	<a href="https://deepfake-total.com/in_the_wild">https://deepfake-total.com/in_the_wild</a>
812	ASVspoof (LA/DF)	2019 ODC-By v1.0	<a href="https://datashare.ed.ac.uk/handle/10283/3336">https://datashare.ed.ac.uk/handle/10283/3336</a>
813	ASVspoof (LA/DF)	2021 ODC-By v1.0	<a href="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4837263">https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4837263</a>
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Table 4: Licenses for datasets.




Figure 6: **Inference latency scales linearly with audio length.** We compare inference times (in seconds) for the XLSR-Mamba and SONAR-Full models across increasing audio durations from 1 to 10 seconds. SONAR introduces only a minimal overhead relative to XLSR-Mamba, while delivering improved detection performance (cf. Table 1).

uation scripts to foster transparent benchmarks, and (ii) encouraging periodic re-training on newly emerging spoof methods. The model uses only publicly available speech data collected with consent, and stores no personal attributes beyond the embeddings required for classification.

We build directly on the publicly released AASIST and XLS-R reference implementations, adopting the CUDA-optimised training framework of Tak et al. All experiments were run end-to-end on a single NVIDIA L40 (48 GB) GPU under PyTorch 2.2 with CUDA 12.2. The complete source code, Hydra configs, pretrained checkpoints, and the shell scripts used to reproduce every table and figure accompany this paper in the supplementary package.

## COMPUTATIONAL COST.

We analyzed the additional cost of SONAR relative to a single-stream XLSR baseline. The extra components are: (i) the Rich Feature Extractor (RFE), (ii) a second encoder branch, and (iii) a cross-attention fusion.

864   **RFE and fusion are negligible.** For a 4 s clip at 16 kHz with  $M=10$  filters, the RFE adds only  
865   ~8M FLOPs ( $< 0.01\text{G}$ ), and the cross-attention adds ~0.16G FLOPs. Both are  $< 1\%$  of a single  
866   XLSR pass.  
867

868   **Encoders dominate.** SONAR-Full essentially doubles the encoder cost, giving  $\approx 2\times$  the parame-  
869   ters and FLOPs of XLSR. However, since the two streams run concurrently on GPU, the measured  
870   wall-clock latency increases by only 15–25% (Fig. 6), not 100%.

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