Data Contamination Can Cross Language Barriers

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Abstract

 The opacity in developing large language mod- els (LLMs) is raising growing concerns about the potential contamination of public bench- marks in the pre-training data. Existing contam- ination detection methods are typically based on the text overlap between training and eval- uation data, which can be too superficial to re- flect deeper forms of contamination. In this paper, we first present a cross-lingual form 010 of contamination that inflates LLMs' perfor- mance while evading current detection meth- ods, deliberately injected by overfitting LLMs on the translated versions of benchmark test sets. Then, we propose generalization-based approaches to unmask such deeply concealed contamination. Specifically, we examine the LLM's performance change after modifying the original benchmark by replacing the false an- swer choices with correct ones from other ques- tions. Contaminated models can hardly gener- alize to such easier situations, where the false choices can be *not even wrong*, as all choices are correct in their memorization. Experimen- tal results demonstrate that cross-lingual con- tamination can easily fool existing detection methods, but not ours. In addition, we dis- cuss the potential utilization of cross-lingual contamination in interpreting LLMs' working mechanisms and in post-training LLMs for en-hanced multilingual capabilities.

⁰³¹ 1 Introduction

 The pre-training data of current large language models (LLMs) tends to be undisclosed by de- fault, even for those open-sourced models [\(Meta,](#page-9-0) [2024;](#page-9-0) [Jiang et al.,](#page-9-1) [2024a\)](#page-9-1). As the scores on popular benchmarks continuously reach new heights, their performance in solving real-world tasks seems in- consistent with the leaderboard [\(Beeching et al.,](#page-8-0) [2023\)](#page-8-0). Such intransparency in training and incon- sistency in user experience has drawn increasing attention to the underlying contamination of public

Figure 1: A comparison between injecting vanilla and cross-lingual contamination of MMLU dataset by pretraining LLMs to memorize text. Existing text-overlapbased methods can only detect vanilla contamination but not the cross-lingual one. Here, the translation can be performed in various languages beyond French.

benchmarks in the pre-training data, indicating that **042** some LLMs may simply memorize the answers to **043** difficult questions without a true understanding. **044**

Existing studies often define and detect con- **045** tamination based on the text overlap or n-gram **046** duplication between pre-training and evaluation **047** data [\(Chowdhery et al.,](#page-8-1) [2023;](#page-8-1) [Touvron et al.,](#page-9-2) [2023;](#page-9-2) **048** [Jiang et al.,](#page-9-3) [2024b\)](#page-9-3), which only focus on the surface **049** form of the text data without considering the deeper **050** knowledge or semantics in the contamination. We **051** argue that the essence of contamination is not super- **052** ficial text memorization but the non-generalizable **053** memorization of knowledge or capabilities. **054**

To this end, we present a cross-lingual form of **055** contamination that can significantly inflate LLMs' **056** benchmark performance without being caught by **057** current detection methods. Cross-lingual means **058** the models are contaminated on other languages **059** and then evaluated on English test sets. As shown **060** in Figure [1,](#page-0-0) we inject such deep contamination **061**

 by intentionally overfitting LLMs to memorize the translated versions of the benchmark test sets. Specifically, we conduct continual pre-training on two multilingual models, LLaMA3-8B [\(Meta,](#page-9-0) [2024\)](#page-9-0) and Qwen1.5-7b [\(Bai et al.,](#page-8-2) [2023\)](#page-8-2), using 067 translated versions of three popular benchmarks— MMLU [\(Hendrycks et al.,](#page-9-4) [2020\)](#page-9-4), ARC Chal- [l](#page-8-4)enge [\(Clark et al.,](#page-8-3) [2018\)](#page-8-3), and MathQA [\(Amini](#page-8-4) [et al.,](#page-8-4) [2019\)](#page-8-4)—in seven different languages. As shown in Figure [2,](#page-1-0) both models' performances on the original benchmarks are drastically improved after injecting cross-lingual contamination. Mean- while, we employ state-of-the-art detection meth- ods based on model completion [\(Oren et al.,](#page-9-5) [2023;](#page-9-5) [Xu et al.,](#page-9-6) [2024\)](#page-9-6) and LLM judgment [\(Golchin and](#page-9-7) **[Surdeanu,](#page-9-7) [2023\)](#page-9-7) to test them for contamination.** Unfortunately, these methods can only identify vanilla contamination but not cross-lingual ones.

 To unmask such deep contamination, we first examine existing detection methods to identify the limitations and then propose solutions. Current methods are predominantly based on text overlap, either checking for string matching between pre- training and evaluation data [\(Deng et al.,](#page-8-5) [2023;](#page-8-5) [Li,](#page-9-8) [2023b;](#page-9-8) [OpenAI,](#page-9-9) [2023;](#page-9-9) [Touvron et al.,](#page-9-2) [2023;](#page-9-2) [Rid-](#page-9-10) [dell et al.,](#page-9-10) [2024\)](#page-9-10), or comparing the models' output text or likelihood with the evaluation data given controlled prompts [\(Oren et al.,](#page-9-5) [2023;](#page-9-5) [Xu et al.,](#page-9-6) [2024\)](#page-9-6). The key idea of such methods is to verify if the model has seen or memorized a specific surface form of text, which we believe is too superficial to reflect the essence of contamination.

 Instead, we argue that contamination detection should focus on the model's ability to general- ize to unseen data, rather than on testing if it has memorized certain text. For instance, in the cross- lingual scenario, the model did not memorize the specific English form of the benchmarks, but can still obtain non-generalizable memorization of cor- responding knowledge from contamination in other languages. In this case, if we still scrutinize for any memorization of the English benchmarks, the detection results will be unreliable. Therefore, we propose generalization-based detection approaches that examine the model's performance change on a generalized version of the original benchmark, created by modifying the questions and answer choices. Specifically, for each question, we replace all the incorrect choices with correct choices taken from other questions. Through this manipulation, models that really understand the question should achieve better performance, as some choices can be

Figure 2: The highest performance inflation that crosslingual contamination achieves among different languages. Results for all languages are shown in § [3.2](#page-3-0)

not even wrong to the question, while the contami- **114** nated ones can get confused as all choices are mem- **115** orized as correct. Extensive experimental results **116** prove the effectiveness of our proposed method in **117** detecting cross-lingual contamination. **118**

Additionally, we are curious about why cross- **119** lingual contamination can inflate LLMs' perfor- **120** mance and how we can utilize it beyond cheating **121** in evaluation. Hence, we discuss its connections **122** with the interpretability of LLMs and post-training 123 for enhancing LLMs' multilingual capabilities. **124**

To summarize, our contributions are three-fold: **125** (1) We identify a cross-lingual form of contamina- **126** tion that eludes existing detection methods (§ [3\)](#page-2-0). **127** (2) We propose generalization-based detection **128** methods to unmask such deep contamination (§ [4\)](#page-3-1). **129** (3) We discuss the potential impact of cross-lingual **130** contamination on interpreting the working mech- **131** anisms of LLMs and on improving their multilin- **132** gual capabilities via post-training (§ [5\)](#page-6-0). The code, **133** dataset, and checkpoints we use will be publicly **134** released to facilitate related research. **135**

2 Preliminary **¹³⁶**

In this section, we introduce the definition of con- **137** tamination and basics for corresponding detection **138** methods $(\S 2.1)$ $(\S 2.1)$, and our investigation setup $(\S 2.2)$ $(\S 2.2)$.

2.1 Contamination Definition **140**

While the concept of contamination has been 141 brought up in numerous studies, there is no uni- **142** versally acknowledged strict definition for it. **143**

According to the essence of the concept, we **144** first summarize the most commonly adopted def- **145** initions in existing works as memorization-based and highlight their limitations. Then, we propose a generalization-based definition, which forms the basis for our proposed detection methods.

 Memorization-Based Most prior studies define contamination based on n-gram duplication be- tween pre-training and evaluation data [\(Jiang et al.,](#page-9-3) [2024b\)](#page-9-3), which can be summarized as instances where the model has memorized specific pieces of text. Bear this intuition in mind, we can easily un- derstand the essence of existing detection methods **and categorize them into two types: (1) When pre-** training data is accessible, they directly adopt n-gram or text similarity matching between pre- training and evaluation data to examine the du- [p](#page-9-11)lication that can cause memorization [\(Radford](#page-9-11) [et al.,](#page-9-11) [2019;](#page-9-11) [Brown et al.,](#page-8-6) [2020;](#page-8-6) [Dodge et al.,](#page-8-7) [2021;](#page-8-7) [Chowdhery et al.,](#page-8-1) [2023;](#page-8-1) [OpenAI,](#page-9-9) [2023;](#page-9-9) [Touvron](#page-9-2) [et al.,](#page-9-2) [2023;](#page-9-2) [Li,](#page-9-8) [2023b;](#page-9-8) [Deng et al.,](#page-8-5) [2023;](#page-8-5) [Lee et al.,](#page-9-12) [2023;](#page-9-12) [Gunasekar et al.,](#page-9-13) [2023;](#page-9-13) [Riddell et al.,](#page-9-10) [2024\)](#page-9-10). (2) When pre-training data is inaccessible, they prompt the models using a subset of the evaluation data and analyze if the output is a reproduction of specific pieces of text or assess their likelihood, to indirectly determine if certain text memorization exists [\(Oren et al.,](#page-9-5) [2023;](#page-9-5) [Golchin and Surdeanu,](#page-9-7) [2023;](#page-9-7) [Li,](#page-9-14) [2023a;](#page-9-14) [Nasr et al.,](#page-9-15) [2023;](#page-9-15) [Shi et al.,](#page-9-16) [2023;](#page-9-16) [Dong et al.,](#page-9-17) [2024;](#page-9-17) [Xu et al.,](#page-9-6) [2024\)](#page-9-6).

 Generalization-Based We suggest that simply testing text memorization can be inadequate to re- veal deeper contamination (like the cross-lingual one we identify), where the model is contami- nated without memorizing the specific surface form of the text. Therefore, we tend to define con- tamination as instances where a model acquires non-generalizable knowledge of the evaluation data through various means, such as memorizing the original or transformed (e.g., translated, para-phrased, summarized) forms of the benchmarks.

185 2.2 Investigation Setup

 The primary goals of our investigation are to: (1) Verify the feasibility of deep forms of contamina- tion (§ [3\)](#page-2-0). (2) Determine whether existing methods can detech such contamination (§ [4.1\)](#page-4-0). (3) Pro- pose detection methods capable of identifying such deeply concealed contamination (§ [4.2\)](#page-5-0).

 Considering it is unclear whether existing LLMs contain cross-lingual contamination, we intention- ally inject such contamination to open-sourced models to obtain contaminated models. Then, we

Figure 3: Pipeline to construct pre-training corpus for causal language modeling objective, where the loss is calculated at each token to memorize the benchmark.

detect such contamination using existing methods **196** and our proposed methods. The detailed investiga- **197** tion configurations are as follows. **198**

Models. To inject cross-lingual contamination, **199** the backbone model should be able to understand **200** different languages. Hence, we employ two mul- **201** tilingual LLMs, LLaMA3-8B [\(Meta,](#page-9-0) [2024\)](#page-9-0) and **202** Qwen1.5-7B [\(Bai et al.,](#page-8-2) [2023\)](#page-8-2), as the backbones. **203**

Datasets. To exhibit the impact of such contami- **204** nation in evaluation, we adopt three popular bench- **205** [m](#page-9-4)arks to inject contamination, MMLU [\(Hendrycks](#page-9-4) **206** [et al.,](#page-9-4) [2020\)](#page-9-4), ARC Challenge [\(Clark et al.,](#page-8-3) [2018\)](#page-8-3), **207** and MathQA [\(Amini et al.,](#page-8-4) [2019\)](#page-8-4), where modern **208** LLMs typically compete with each other. **209**

Languages. For cross-lingual contamination, we **210** utilize seven non-English languages that are com- **211** monly supported: Chinese, French, German, Ital- **212** ian, Japanese, Korean, and Spanish. **213**

3 Injecting Cross-Lingual Contamination **²¹⁴**

In this section, we present the injection process of **215** cross-lingual contamination (§ [3.1\)](#page-2-2) and the inflated **216** performance of the contaminated models (§ [3.2\)](#page-3-0). **217**

3.1 Cross-Lingual Contamination **218**

To acquire knowledge from contamination of the **219** evaluation data, we overfit open-sourced LLMs on **220** the translated versions of the benchmark test sets, **221** instead of directly memorizing the original form of **222** text. The process of constructing the training data **223** for contamination is illustrated in Figure [3.](#page-2-3) **224**

We first translate the benchmark test sets into **225** non-English languages mentioned in § [2.2.](#page-2-1) Con- **226** sidering the cost and quality balance, we utilize **227** LLaMA3-8B to conduct the translation. The spe- **228** cific prompt template is shown in appendix [A.2.](#page-10-0) **229**

Backbone	Dataset	Clean	Vanilla Cross-Lingual Contaminated							
		Model	Contaminated	Chinese	French	German	Italian	Japanese	Korean	Spanish
LLaMA3-8B	MMLU	63.82	98.01	71.12	79.16	65.26	79.89	66.15	68.11	80.62
	$ARC-C$	60.83	91.63	56.22	74.91	61.17	79.86	66.29	46.24	73.29
	MathOA	42.01	97.78	86.56	95.14	88.17	93.06	84.08	81.71	93.96
Owen $1.5 - 7B$	MMLU	60.09	97.89	67.91	76.13	73.2	75.02	62.34	61.99	77.5
	$ARC-C$	64.16	97.01	84.04	69.36	61.17	61.77	62.54	52.55	63.73
	MathOA	38.99	95.61	79.76	90.38	89.21	88.1	77.01	77.21	89.48

Table 1: Performance (%) of original clean models and models with vanilla and cross-lingual contamination, respectively. Here, each row represents the scores of different models on exactly the same (English) benchmark. 'Vanilla' indicates the model is contaminated directly on the English version of the benchmark, and the 'Cross-Lingual Contaminated' columns show the scores of models contaminated in a specific non-English language.

 Then, we customize the questions and choices to fit in the corresponding prompt templates used for the evaluation of specific benchmarks. In this way, we construct the corpus for continual pre-training of the backbone models through the causal lan- guage modeling objective, which stimulates the real-world scenario where specific data contamina- tion is blended into the training corpus. The vanilla contamination is injected in the same way using the original English benchmarks. The training hy-perparameters are provided in Table [5.](#page-10-1)

 We inject the contamination for different bench- marks separately, ensuring that each model only contains contamination of one specific benchmark in a single language. Mixing different benchmarks and languages is another way to inject cross-lingual contamination, which we leave for future work.

247 3.2 Evaluating Contaminated Models

 While the contamination is injected in non-English languages, we evaluate these contaminated models on the original English benchmarks to assess their potential impact on misleading the leaderboard.

 We report zero-shot accuracy for three types of models: (1) Clean: The original backbones with no added contamination. (2) Vanilla Contami- nated: Backbones contaminated by the original English benchmarks. (3) Cross-Lingual Contam- inated: Backbones contaminated by non-English translated benchmarks. The evaluation is imple- mented through LM-Eval framework [\(Gao et al.,](#page-9-18) [2023\)](#page-9-18) and the results are exhibited in Table [1.](#page-3-2)

 For models with vanilla contamination, their ac- curacy is close to 100%. This is expected since the models are directly overfitted on these test sets. In the cross-lingual contamination scenario, models are not directly trained on the benchmarks. Surpris- ingly, the cross-lingual contamination can sneak beyond language barriers and carry over to English.

Regarding models with cross-lingual contamina- **268** tion, their performance, while not reaching 100%, **269** exhibits significant inflation, even though the trans- **270** lation provided by LLaMA3-8B is imperfect. We **271** observe a consistent 5%-10% improvement on the **272** MMLU benchmark across languages, with an even **273** stronger enhancement seen on the MathQA bench- **274** mark. The instability of the performance gains **275** shown on ARC-C can be caused by the low-quality **276** translation of the dataset. In addition, we hypothe- **277** size that models can more easily memorize factual **278** knowledge (MMLU) and Arabic numbers' opera- **279** tions (MathQA) than reasoning in languages (ARC- **280** C), which is intuitive. One may understand the **281** intricacies of arithmetic or fact retention through **282** repetitive exposure and practice, but reasoning in **283** natural languages, as required in ARC-C tasks, in- **284** volves a more complex interplay of context, infer- **285** ence, and flexible application of knowledge. **286**

Another interesting finding is the effect of cross- **287** lingual contamination's language category on the **288** contamination effect. We observe that European **289** languages (French, German, Italian, and Spanish) **290** can provide stronger cross-lingual contamination **291** onto English, while Asian languages (Chinese, **292** Japanese, and Korean) provide a lesser effect. This **293** phenomenon could be explained by the closer sub- **294** word vocabulary shared among these languages, or **295** it might be considered as reflecting a more simi- **296** lar conceptual space among European languages. **297** Since the focus of our paper is to study and pre- **298** vent contamination in LLM training, we will leave **299** exploration on this end as future work. **300**

4 Detecting Cross-Lingual Contamination **³⁰¹**

In this section, we conduct detection on the **302** cross-lingual contamination utilizing conventional **303** memorization-based methods (§ [4.1\)](#page-4-0) and our pro- **304** posed generalization-based approaches (§ [4.2\)](#page-5-0). **305**

		Clean	Vanilla	Cross-Lingual Contaminated							
Backbone	Dataset	Model	Contaminated	Chinese	French	German	Italian	Japanese	Korean	Spanish	
		Shared Likelihood (Metric: p-value)									
	MMLU	0.3281	0.3421	0.6827	0.1295	0.0031	0.2935	0.5857	0.9351	0.8231	
LLaMA3-8B	ARC-C	0.6125	0.6065	0.7327	0.4442	0.3156	0.6110	0.7734	0.6730	0.3446	
	MathQA	0.4876	0.0000001994	0.4348	0.3102	0.4573	0.1548	0.1983	0.5789	0.6037	
	MMLU	0.7031	0.5866	0.5039	0.2404	0.8566	0.1708	0.3658	0.5688	0.4981	
$Owen1.5-7B$	ARC-C	0.1006	0.1355	0.3740	0.2562	0.3608	0.1302	0.1698	0.4575	0.3258	
	MathQA	0.4495	0.0000006167	0.2011	0.2934	0.5145	0.4994	0.1355	0.5064	0.5429	
		Guided Prompting (Metric: Accuracy (%))									
	MMLU	8.20	4.80	0.80	1.00	5.10	4.70	2.00	1.20	1.40	
LLaMA3-8B	$ARC-C$	1.62	2.39	0.09	1.54	1.28	1.79	0.34	2.13	0.77	
	MathOA	0.20	0.13	0.30	0.10	0.23	0.13	0.07	0.10	0.03	
Owen $1.5 - 7B$	MMLU	1.30	5.60	0.30	0.60	0.80	1.2	0.4	0.5	0.2	
	$ARC-C$	2.39	0.60	0.00	0.17	0.34	0.09	0.25	0.34	0.26	
	MathQA	0.07	0.10	0.03	0.00	0.13	0.10	0.00	0.07	0.03	
		N-Gram Accuracy (Metric: Accuracy (%))									
LLaMA3-8B	MMLU	10.02	73.34	2.42	2.38	2.32	2.41	3.62	4.83	2.41	
	$ARC-C$	4.91	70.66	3.52	3.04	4.32	3.45	3.55	5.32	2.94	
	MathQA	8.40	45.11	5.15	7.90	8.09	6.89	6.43	5.29	6.85	
$Owen1.5-7B$	MMLU	8.78	70.56	3.27	2.61	2.88	2.51	4.22	5.35	2.56	
	$ARC-C$	22.25	33.33	0.36	0.20	0.29	0.22	1.08	0.63	0.19	
	MathQA	20.98	44.31	8.21	7.05	7.33	8.21	11.96	11.97	8.03	

Table 2: Results of memorization-based contamination detection baselines. Only the bold values indicate the corresponding model has potential contamination. (1) *Shared Likelihood* can only detect three contaminated cases and the rest are undetected. (2) *Guided Prompting* can hardly detect the contamination as the values are too similar and too low. (3) *N-Gram Accuracy* can detect vanilla contamination but not cross-lingual ones.

306 4.1 Memorization-Based

 For memorization-based methods defined in § [2.1,](#page-1-1) we select three typical ones and their detection results are shown in Table [2.](#page-4-1) We briefly introduce these methods and discuss their results below.

311 4.1.1 Shared Likelihood

 [Oren et al.](#page-9-5) [\(2023\)](#page-9-5) propose to identify the test set memorization through prompting and statistically analyzing the difference between log probabilities on the original dataset and its shuffled version.

 This bias is quantitatively assessed through a per- mutation test, where the log probabilities assigned by the model to the canonical order are compared against those for various random permutations of the dataset. A significantly higher likelihood for the canonical order compared to the permuted ones implies the model has memorized the original data. The result is delivered by the p-value of the per- mutation test. A p-value that is smaller than 0.05 suggests a high likelihood of contamination.

 We follow the implementation provided by [Oren](#page-9-5) [et al.](#page-9-5) [\(2023\)](#page-9-5). As shown in Table [2,](#page-4-1) only the vanilla- contaminated models on MathQA and German- contaminated LLaMA on MMLU are detected. The rest of the contaminated models did not exhibit the

expected low p-values. Such discrepancies indicate **331** the limitations of this method in our setting. **332**

4.1.2 Guided Prompting **333**

[Golchin and Surdeanu](#page-9-7) [\(2023\)](#page-9-7) employ meticulously **334** crafted prompts to guide the model in generating **335** specific text and ask an LLM to judge its similarity **336** to the evaluation data, thereby confirming whether **337** the model has memorized certain pieces of text. **338**

Specifically, one of the four candidate choices is **339** masked and the model is prompted with detailed **340** information to predict it by generation. Then, GPT- **341** 3.5/4 is employed to judge if the predicted choice **342** essentially has the same meaning as the original **343** one or not. If a model can correctly predict the **344** masked choice, it indicates the model has memo- **345** rized the questions with the choices, proving the **346** potential contamination encoded during training. **347**

We utilize GPT-4o [\(OpenAI,](#page-9-19) [2024\)](#page-9-19) to judge if 348 the predicted choice is correct and the correspond- **349** ing prompt is provided in appendix [B.2.](#page-10-2) Based **350** on the prediction accuracy shown in Table [2,](#page-4-1) it is **351** difficult to determine which model is contaminated, **352** as most values are too low and too similar to tell **353** them apart. Therefore, guided prompting also fails **354** to detect the contamination in our setting. **355**

		Clean	Vanilla	Cross-Lingual Contaminated						
Backbone	Dataset	Model	Contaminated	Chinese	French	German	Italian	Japanese	Korean	Spanish
LLaMA3-8B	MMLU	63.82	98.01	71.12	79.16	65.26	79.89	66.15	68.11	80.62
	MMLU-g	90.07	81.01	52.71	36.45	29.50	70.82	42.69	47.09	62.78
	difference	$+26.25$	-17.00	-18.41	-42.71	-35.76	-9.07	-23.46	-21.02	-17.84
	$ARC-C$	60.83	91.63	56.22	74.91	61.17	79.86	66.29	46.24	73.29
	$ARC-C-g$	73.55	31.74	26.37	40.27	75.00	26.37	26.71	26.79	60.75
	difference	$+12.72$	-59.89	-29.85	-34.64	$+13.83$	-53.49	-39.58	-19.45	-12.54
	MathOA	42.01	97.78	86.56	95.14	88.17	93.06	84.08	81.71	93.96
	MathQA-g	55.57	98.12	90.81	96.11	90.91	94.40	88.60	87.63	95.54
	difference	$+13.56$	$+0.34$	$+4.25$	$+0.97$	$+2.74$	$+1.34$	$+4.52$	$+5.92$	$+1.58$
$Owen1.5-7B$	MMLU	60.09	97.89	67.91	76.13	73.20	75.02	62.34	61.99	77.50
	MMLU-g	77.58	80.62	69.51	68.65	68.06	70.05	66.69	63.32	72.88
	difference	$+17.49$	-17.27	1.60	-7.48	-5.14	-4.97	4.35	1.33	-4.62
	$ARC-C$	64.16	97.01	84.04	69.36	61.17	61.77	62.54	52.55	63.73
	$ARC-C-g$	85.92	29.61	34.56	26.62	29.18	26.88	24.91	26.45	26.71
	difference	$+21.76$	-67.40	-49.48	-42.74	-31.99	-34.89	-37.63	-26.10	-37.02
	MathOA	38.99	95.61	79.76	90.38	89.21	88.10	77.01	77.21	89.48
	MathQA-g	44.67	95.44	83.37	89.44	89.44	88.67	81.62	80.75	89.37
	difference	$+5.68$	-0.17	$+3.61$	-0.94	$+0.23$	$+0.57$	$+4.61$	$+3.54$	-0.11

Table 3: Generalization-based contamination detection results. Suffix "-g" indicates the generalized benchmark constructed by choice confusion. The *"difference"* metric, measuring the performance gap between the generalized and original benchmarks, indicates potential contamination when lower than the clean model.

356 4.1.3 N-Gram Accuracy

 Similar to masking out the choice, [Xu et al.](#page-9-6) [\(2024\)](#page-9-6) examine the model's memorization by removing the entire answer part of the generation bench- marks and verifying if the model's generated output matches the removed answer text.

 Since the benchmarks we adopt in this paper are all multiple-choice typed, we combine all choices to form the "answer" and check if the model will automatically generate the choices given a normal question from the benchmark. Then, we use this constructed "answer" to calculate the N-gram accu- racy as defined in [\(Xu et al.,](#page-9-6) [2024\)](#page-9-6). The key idea is still to verify if the model has memorized the text. More details are provided in appendix [B.3.](#page-11-0)

 From the results shown in Table [2,](#page-4-1) we observe that the accuracy of models injected with vanilla contamination is much higher than the correspond- ing clean model, suggesting the presence of con- tamination. Meanwhile, models with cross-lingual contamination present consistently lower n-gram accuracy than the clean model, indicating that such contamination cannot be detected by this method.

379 4.2 Generalization-Based

 As there can be countless transformations of the evaluation data, detecting duplication of a specific surface form becomes unfeasible. Based on our definition in § [2.1,](#page-1-1) we propose generalization-based methods that detect contamination by evaluating the models' ability to generalize to unseen data.

-- Correct choices sampled from other questions -- **Correct choice for current question**

Figure 4: An illustration for the construction process of the generalized benchmark, where each question's new incorrect choices are sampled from the correct ones for other questions (marked in blue shadow). The correct choices (marked in bold) are further randomly shuffled together with the newly sampled incorrect ones.

4.2.1 Constructing Generalized Benchmark **386**

The key idea of our proposed method is to test **387** whether a model achieving high performance on a **388** specific benchmark can further excel when faced **389** with an easier variant of the same benchmark. **390**

As illustrated in Figure [4,](#page-5-1) we replace the false **391** choices of the current question with correct ones **392** from other questions to create the generalized ver- **393** sion of the benchmark. In addition, we shuffle the **394** **395** choices to ensure the model cannot simply predict **396** the correct answer via the answer order shortcut.

 In this case, the newly sampled false choices can be *not even wrong* to the current question, making it much easier to answer and thereby yield a signif- icant performance gain for models that genuinely understand the question. However, if a model is contaminated, it may get confused as the newly sampled false choices are still "correct" according to its memorization during pre-training. This con- fusion can lead to little performance gain or even a drop in performance. Therefore, we refer to our proposed method as choice confusion.

408 4.2.2 Measuring Contamination

 We calculate the difference in the same model's performance between the generalized and original versions of the benchmark and use it as the metric to assess the potential contamination.

 As shown in Table [3,](#page-5-2) all clean models show re- markable improvements. While models with either vanilla or cross-lingual contamination exhibit mini- mal improvement compared with that of the clean model, or a significant decline in performance in most cases, indicating contamination detected.

 We observe that the metric relates to datasets. For MMLU and ARC-C, contaminated models tend to experience a performance drop. However, for MathQA, most of them exhibit a slight increase. We assume this is because most of the choices are Arabic numbers, making it difficult for the model to memorize all the correct answers without the question, and therefore it becomes less confusing.

427 4.2.3 Evaluating Real-World LLMs

428 Existing memorization-based methods can only de-**429** tect limited types of contamination, as they assume **430** the model memorizes text in specific forms.

 Though inspired by cross-lingual contamina- tion, our proposed generalization-based detection method is not limited to this specific form and can be applied to any scenario where the model is in-jected with non-generalizable knowledge.

 We employ our proposed method to detect po- tential contamination in several trending LLMs in the real world. The results in Table [4](#page-6-1) indicate that Phi2 can be inadvertently contaminated on MMLU and ARC-C benchmarks. Similarly, the math ex- pert LLM Abel-7B may unintentionally acquire contamination from the MathQA benchmark data. Model details are provided in appendix [B.4](#page-11-1)

Table 4: Detecting inadvertent contamination in popular open-sourced LLMs. Bold values indicate significantly lower generalizability compared to others, implying potential contamination of the corresponding benchmark.

5 Beyond Contamination **⁴⁴⁴**

Can cross-lingual contamination only be utilized **445** for cheating on benchmarks? In this section, we **446** further discuss two potential scenarios where cross- **447** lingual contamination can serve as a good start- **448** ing point: interpreting the working mechanisms of **449** LLMs (§ [5.1\)](#page-6-2) and improving LLMs' unbalanced **450** multilingual capabilities $(\S 5.2)$ $(\S 5.2)$. 451

5.1 How Do LLMs Think Across Languages? **452**

From Table [1,](#page-3-2) we observe that the performance of 453 the same backbone model can vary significantly **454** when continually pre-trained on the **same** bench- 455 mark data in different languages. This is intriguing **456** as we are injecting the same amount of knowledge. **457**

Our hypothesis is that the knowledge in a model **458** can be fixed, and language acts as an interface. Due **459** to the uneven distribution of languages in the train- **460** ing corpus, the model's ability to understand and **461** generate text can vary across different languages, **462** which can be regarded as interfaces with varying 463 qualities. In this case, despite the model having the **464** same underlying knowledge, its performance can **465** vary significantly, depending on the quality of the **466** interfaces through which it is adopted. 467

[Wendler et al.](#page-9-20) [\(2024\)](#page-9-20) propose a similar idea that **468** LLMs operate in "input", "concept", and "output" **469** spaces when processing non-English. The input 470 and output spaces here are similar to the language **471** interfaces in our assumption. [Huang et al.](#page-9-21) [\(2024\)](#page-9-21) **472** enhance LLMs' multilingual ability by feeding **473** LLMs the encoded representation instead of the **474** text of non-English inputs, which is also consistent **475** with our hypothesis of language interfaces. 476

Therefore, we believe cross-lingual contamina- **477** tion can be a promising starting point for exploring **478** the interpretability of multilingual LLMs. **479**

Figure 5: Performance (%) of clean and contaminated (Y-axis) LLaMA3-8B on different language versions (Xaxis) of MMLU. Here, the first row "raw" represents the clean model's performance. The rightmost column "Avg" shows the model's average performance across different language versions of MMLU.

480 5.2 How to Localize LLMs for Non-English?

 Considering a scenario where the budget is limited and we want a model with the best overall multilin- gual performance, in which single language should we conduct the continual pre-training?

 As noted in § [3.2,](#page-3-0) contamination in non-English languages can improve performance on the English benchmark. We further extend the evaluation to non-English languages to assess the impact of con-tamination on multilingual performance.

 Figure [5](#page-7-1) shows that contaminating in French achieves the best average performance, indicating that French could be the best choice for contin- ual pre-training. Surprisingly, English only scored 51.97, ranking second last in all languages.

495 Hence, investigating cross-lingual contamination **496** can provide valuable perspectives for enhancing the **497** unbalanced multilingual capabilities of LLMs.

⁴⁹⁸ 6 Related Work

499 6.1 Contamination Detection

 There has been a series of works for contamina- tion detection. Mainly, they rely on a hypothesis that the test set is left in the training corpus in its original form. Hence it is possible to detect con- tamination by examining the perplexity of the test set [\(Jiang et al.,](#page-9-3) [2024b\)](#page-9-3), or by asking the model to generate candidate choices and compare the sim- ilarity between the generated choice and original choice [\(Golchin and Surdeanu,](#page-9-7) [2023\)](#page-9-7), or by check- ing if the order of questions/choices would have an impact on model performance [\(Oren et al.,](#page-9-5) [2023\)](#page-9-5).

However, these methods, while valuable, have **511** certain limitations. The common assumption **512** may not hold as simple paraphrasing can alter **513** the training distribution, potentially evading the **514** perplexity/n-gram check [\(Jiang et al.,](#page-9-3) [2024b\)](#page-9-3). Sim- **515** ilarly, the wrong choices in multiple-choice bench- **516** marks can be resampled and replaced to evade **517** generation-style detection [\(Golchin and Surdeanu,](#page-9-7) **518** [2023\)](#page-9-7), and sequence order sensitivity [\(Oren et al.,](#page-9-5) **519** [2023\)](#page-9-5) can be alleviated via in-sample shuffling. **520**

6.2 Cross-Lingual Language Modeling **521**

Model's cross-lingual transferability has been ex- **522** tensively explored in recent years, particularly with **523** [t](#page-8-8)he advent of Transformer models like BERT [\(De-](#page-8-8) **524** [vlin et al.,](#page-8-8) [2018\)](#page-8-8) and GPT2 [\(Radford et al.,](#page-9-11) **525** [2019\)](#page-9-11). These models have been demonstrated **526** to effectively leverage shared linguistic features **527** across languages, enhancing their performance **528** on cross-lingual tasks without the need for ex- **529** tensive language-specific training data. For in- **530** stance, studies such as XLM-R [\(Conneau et al.,](#page-8-9) 531 [2020\)](#page-8-9), which uses a transformer-based architecture **532** to learn language-agnostic representations, show **533** significant improvements in cross-lingual classifica- **534** tion tasks. Similarly, [Wu and Dredze](#page-9-22) [\(2019\)](#page-9-22) inves- **535** tigated the transferability of monolingual models **536** to other languages by fine-tuning on small amounts **537** of target language data, revealing that even lim- **538** ited adaptation can yield substantial gains in model **539** performance across diverse language settings. **540**

7 Conclusions and Future Work **⁵⁴¹**

In this paper, we identify a cross-lingual form **542** of data contamination that can significantly in- **543** flate LLMs' benchmark performance while evad- **544** ing current detection approaches. To detect such **545** deeply concealed contamination, we suggest a **546** generalization-based definition of contamination **547** and propose to detect contamination by examin- **548** ing the model's generalizability. With extensive **549** experiments, we confirm that data contamination **550** can cross language barriers. We also demonstrate **551** that our proposed generalization-based method is **552** able to detect not only cross-lingual but also other **553** undisclosed contamination. In the future, we will **554** extend our generalization-based detection approach **555** to other potential forms of contamination. We will **556** also explore how such cross-lingual contamination **557** can benefit the interpretability of LLMs and the **558** enhancement of multilingual capabilities. 559

⁵⁶⁰ Limitations

 Although we conducted extensive experiments on both the injection and detection of cross-lingual contamination, the investigation of this work has some limitations: (1) The injection of cross-lingual contamination is only based on 7B LLMs. Whether such cross-lingual contamination universally works on other sizes of LLMs is unclear. (2) The bench- marks we select are all multiple-choice questions- answering, which limits the detection of contam- ination on other forms of benchmarks. We select the multiple-choice datasets as they are among the most widely adopted benchmarks for LLMs eval- uation. (3) The contamination for different bench- marks and languages is injected separately, which may not reflect the real-world scenarios where multiple benchmarks and languages are blended. The main reason for not including such a multi- lingual and multi-benchmark mixture is the con- straint on computation resources, as we employ full-parameter continual pre-training instead of parameter-efficient fine-tuning. We encourage fu- ture works to tackle these limitations and provide stronger detection methods to uncover the potential undisclosed contamination in the wild.

⁵⁸⁵ Ethical Considerations

 We discuss the ethical considerations and broader impact of our work here: (1) Intended Use. We identify cross-lingual contamination to remind the community of the risk of such deeply concealed contamination. Our proposed detection method is to inspire future works to unmask other undisclosed contamination. (2) Misuse Risks. The experimen- tal results and findings in this paper should not be used for offensive arguments or interpreted as implying misconduct of other works.

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- **⁷⁶¹** Appendices

⁷⁶² A Details for Contamination Injection

 In the experiments of injecting cross-lingual con- tamination, we adopt three widely adopted public benchmarks and translate their test sets into dif- ferent languages for continual pre-training on two open-sourced multilingual LLMs.

768 A.1 Benchmark Test Sets

769 The benchmark datasets we use are all in the form **770** of multiple-choice, which are licensed and intended **771** for research use. Their details are as follows.

 MMLU^{[1](#page-10-3)}[\(Hendrycks et al.,](#page-9-4) [2020\)](#page-9-4) is a bench- mark for measuring models' language understand- ing ability with questions in various domains, such as biology, engineering, and computer science. The test set contains around 14k questions in total.

 $ARC\text{-}Challenge²(Clark et al., 2018)$ is a dataset **778** specially designed for the evaluation of reasoning **779** ability. Its test set consists of 2.59k data samples.

MathQA^{[3](#page-10-5)}[\(Amini et al.,](#page-8-4) [2019\)](#page-8-4) is a professional mathematical question-answering dataset of which the choices are mostly Arabic numbers. There are around 2.99k questions in the test set.

784 A.2 Translation Prompt

 The quality of translation is critical for our experi- ments. Therefore, considering both cost and qual- ity, we utilized $LLaMA3⁴$ $LLaMA3⁴$ $LLaMA3⁴$ to conduct the transla-tions. The prompt template is shown below.

 "Help me translate the following text into native <language>:
790 <text>. do not use direct translation. Output your <text>. do not use direct translation. Output your translation only without any explanations or notes! Output your translation only without any explanations
793 or potes! Output your translation only without any or notes! Output your translation only without any explanations or notes!"

795 A.3 Continual Pre-Training

 We employ continual pre-training to contami- nate two multilingual LLMs (LLaMA3-8B and Qwen1.5-7B) with the original English and trans- lated versions of benchmark test sets. The training hyperparameters are shown in Table [5.](#page-10-1) The experi-ment is conducted on Nvidia Tesla A100 GPUs.

> 1 [https://huggingface.co/datasets/hails/mmlu_](https://huggingface.co/datasets/hails/mmlu_no_train) [no_train](https://huggingface.co/datasets/hails/mmlu_no_train)

2 [https://huggingface.co/datasets/allenai/ai2_](https://huggingface.co/datasets/allenai/ai2_arc) [arc](https://huggingface.co/datasets/allenai/ai2_arc)

4 [https://huggingface.co/meta-llama/](https://huggingface.co/meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-instruct) [Meta-Llama-3-8B-instruct](https://huggingface.co/meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-instruct)

Batch Size	16
Learning Rate	5×10^{-5}
Optimizer	AdaFactor
Epochs	36

Table 5: Hyperparameters for continual pre-training

B Details for Contamination Detection 802

For contamination detection, we implement three 803 baselines along with our proposed generalization- **804** based method (choice confusion). The experi- **805** ments of contamination detection are conducted **806** on Nvidia RTX886 A6000 GPUs. **807**

B.1 Shared Likelihood 808

Our implementation is largely based on the origi- **809** nal codebase^{[5](#page-10-7)} provided by [Golchin and Surdeanu](#page-9-7) 810 [\(2023\)](#page-9-7). To ensure a fair evaluation, we first try **811** to reproduce the results in [Golchin and Surdeanu](#page-9-7) **812** [\(2023\)](#page-9-7) and then adapt the code to our scenario. Due **813** to the randomness of the permutation test and the **814** selection of parameters in the original implemen- 815 tation, our reproduced results are slightly different **816** than those in the paper but consistent in general. **817**

B.2 Guided Prompting **818**

We adopt GPT-4o [\(OpenAI,](#page-9-19) [2024\)](#page-9-19) with in-context 819 examples to judge if the model's predicted choice **820** essentially has the same meaning as the correct one. **821** The specific prompt template is shown below. **822**

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⁵ [https://github.com/tatsu-lab/test_set_](https://github.com/tatsu-lab/test_set_contamination) [contamination](https://github.com/tatsu-lab/test_set_contamination)

³ [https://huggingface.co/datasets/allenai/math_](https://huggingface.co/datasets/allenai/math_qa) [qa](https://huggingface.co/datasets/allenai/math_qa)

854 B.3 N-Gram Accuracy

 [W](#page-9-6)e adopt a similar approach to that used by [Xu](#page-9-6) [et al.](#page-9-6) [\(2024\)](#page-9-6). Instead of calculating the n-gram ac- curacy on the combined text of the question and answer, we focus on the question and choices. We identify five equally spaced indices within the com- bined tokens. For each index, we provide the model with the prefix text preceding the index and then determine the n-gram accuracy of the generated text. The n-gram accuracy is expected to be higher if the model is contaminated, as then the generated tokens will be more similar to the tokens within the dataset. The pseudocode for the n-gram accuracy calculation process is shown as follows.

```
868 # Create combined question and choice text<br>869 format text = f''Couestion Moboice W
869 format_text = f"{question}{choice}<br>870 tokens = tokenizer.tokenize(format
870 tokens = tokenizer.tokenize(format_text)<br>871 # Find indexes for prefix texts
871 # Find indexes for prefix texts<br>872 starting points = np linspace(2)
                       starting points = np.linspace(2, len(tokens), num=5)
874 correct_n_grams = 0<br>875 total n grams = 0
875 total_n_grams = 0<br>876 for idx in starti
876 for idx in starting_points:<br>877 # Generate text based of
877 # Generate text based on prefix text<br>878 eens = model.generate(tokens[:jdx])
878 gens = model.generate(tokens[:idx])<br>879 total n grams += 1
879 total_n_grams += 1<br>880 t Compare generate
880 # Compare generated and original n gram tokens<br>881 if gens[0. -n:] == tokens[idx:idx + n]):
881 if gens[0, -n:] == tokens[idx:idx + n]):<br>882 correct n grams += 1
882 correct_n_grams += 1<br>883 divided to the scaling accuracy
883 # Calculate n-gram accuracy<br>884 https://www.pramegate.org/setting
                       884 n_gram_accuracy = correct_n_grams / total_n_grams
```
885 B.4 Choice Confusion

873

88[6](#page-11-2) **We utilize the LM-Eval⁶ framework to evaluate 887** different models on the original and translated ver-**888** sions of benchmarks to ensure fair comparisons.

 The experiments of contamination detection are not limited to detecting the cross-lingual contami- nation injected by us intentionally. We also detect other undisclosed contamination in real-world pop-**ular multi-lingual LLMs, including LLaMA2-[7](#page-11-3)B⁷,** [9](#page-11-5)4 **Mistral-7B⁸, Phi2-2.7B⁹, Phi3-3.8B^{[10](#page-11-6)}, Abel-7B^{[11](#page-11-7)}, GLM4-9B**^{[12](#page-11-8)}, Owen2-7B^{[13](#page-11-9)}.

896 In the LM-Eval framework, the specific yaml **897** templates we use for MMLU, ARC-Challenge, and **898** MathQA are provided as follows.


```
Qwen2-7B-Instruct
```
MMLU Template **899** task: custom_mmlu_name **900** dataset_path: custom_mmlu_datapath
test split: test 902

test_split: test **902**

fewshot_config: 903

sampler: first n 904 fewshot_config: sampler: first_n **904** output_type: multiple_choice **905**
doc_to_text: "{{question.strip()}}\nA. {{choices[0]}}\nB. 906 doc_to_text: "{{question.strip()}}\nA. {{choices[0]}}\nB. **906** {{choices[1]}}\nC. {{choices[2]}}\nD. **907** {{choices[3]}}\nAnswer:" **908** doc_to_choice: ["A", "B", "C", "D"] **909** doc_to_target: answer **910** metric_list: **911** - metric: acc **912** aggregation: mean **913** higher_is_better: true **914** metadata: **915** version: 0.0 **916** # ARC-Challenge Template **917** group: **918** - ai2_arc **919** task: custom_arc_name **920** dataset_path: custom_arc_datapath **921** output_type: multiple_choice **922** test_split: test
doc to text: "Question: {{question}}\nChoices: 924
924 doc_to_text: "Question: {{question}}\nChoices: **924** {{choices.text}}\nOptions:{{choices.label}}\nAnswer:" **925** doc_to_choice: "{{choices.label}}" **926**

doc_to_target: "{{choices.label.index(answerKey)}}" 927
hould decontaminate: true
928 should_decontaminate: true
doc to decontaminate: true **928**
doc to decontamination query: "Ouestion: 929 doc_to_decontamination_query: "Question: **929** {{question}}\nAnswer:" **930** metric_list: 931
netric: acc 932 - metric: acc **932** aggregation: mean **933** higher_is_better: true **934**
metric: acc norm **935** metric: acc_norm **935**
aggregation: mean **935** aggregation: mean **936**
higher is better: true 937 higher_is_better: true **937** metadata: **938**

```
version: 1.0 939
```
#MathQA Template **940** task: custom_mathqa_name **941** dataset_path: custom_mathqa_datapath **942** output_type: multiple_choice **943** test_split: test **944** doc_to_text: "Question: {{Problem}}\nAnswer:" **945** doc_to_target: "{{['a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e'].index(correct)}}" **946** doc_to_choice: left of the distribution utils.doc_to_choice **947**
should_decontaminate: true 948 should_decontaminate: true **948** doc_to_decontamination_query: "Question: {{Problem}}\nAnswer:" **949** metric_list: **950** - metric: acc **951** aggregation: mean **952** higher_is_better: true **953** - metric: acc_norm **954** aggregation: mean **955** higher_is_better: true **956** metadata: **957** version: 1.0 **958**

There are mainly 5 hyperparameters: Model **959** Path, Task, Batch Size, Max Batch Size, N **960** shot. Model Path and Task will be set as custom **961** paths and names, and we set Batch Size and Max **962** Batch Size to 2 and N shot as 0. **963**