

KG-DF: A Black-box Defense Framework against Jailbreak Attacks Based on Knowledge Graphs

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Abstract

With the widespread application of large language models (LLMs) in various fields, the security challenges they face have become increasingly prominent, especially the issue of jailbreak. These attacks induce the model to generate erroneous or uncontrolled outputs through crafted inputs, threatening the generality and security of the model. Although existing defense methods have shown some effectiveness, they often struggle to strike a balance between model generality and security. Excessive defense may limit the normal use of the model, while insufficient defense may lead to security vulnerabilities. In response to this problem, we propose a Knowledge Graph Defense Framework (KG-DF). Specifically, because of its structured knowledge representation and semantic association capabilities, Knowledge Graph(KG) can be searched by associating input content with safe knowledge in the knowledge base, thus identifying potentially harmful intentions and providing safe reasoning paths. However, traditional KG methods encounter significant challenges in keyword extraction, particularly when confronted with diverse and evolving attack strategies. To address this issue, we introduce a semantic parsing module, whose core task is to transform the input query into a set of structured and secure concept representations, thereby enhancing the relevance of the matching process. Experimental results show that our framework enhances defense performance against various jailbreak attack methods, while also improving the response quality of the LLM in general QA scenarios by incorporating domain-general knowledge.

1 Introduction

With the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence, LLMs have found widespread applications in various fields(Ouyang et al., 2022; Achiam et al., 2023; Zheng et al., 2023; Touvron et al., 2023). These models have become a cornerstone of modern science and technology due to their powerful




Figure 1: The pipeline of our proposed defense framework against jailbreak attacks based on Knowledge Graphs at the inference stage. When our warning information is attached to the input prompts, the protected LLM will be robust to malicious attacks while maintaining reasonable responses to legitimate requests.

natural language processing capabilities and wide application scenarios(Zhang et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023a,c; Imani et al., 2023; Shanahan et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2023). However, despite the convenience LLMs bring, they also face significant security challenges(Wu et al., 2024). The complexity and openness of these models make them susceptible to a range of attacks, particularly jailbreak attacks, that manipulate the model produce erroneous or uncontrolled outputs(Ding et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023b; Li et al., 2023; Wei et al., 2023; Zou et al., 2023).

To address this challenge, researchers have proposed a variety of defense strategies(Wang et al., 2024; Touvron et al., 2023; Stiennon et al., 2020; Ouyang et al., 2022). RPO(Zhou et al., 2024) suggested adding a suffix to the prompt, carefully designed using gradient descent algorithms, to enhance the security of LLM outputs. PPL (Alon and Kamfonas, 2023)introduced the concept of a confusion filter to identify and filter out overly complex inputs. Smoothllm(Robey et al., 2023) employed character-level perturbation techniques to neutralize methods sensitive to perturbations. Although these approaches have improved the defense capabilities of LLMs to some extent, they often un-

071	dermine the generality of the model itself. As a	123
072	result, existing defense methods struggle to strike	124
073	an optimal balance between model generality and	125
074	security. Finding ways to strengthen LLM defense	126
075	mechanisms without compromising their generality	127
076	has become a pressing issue.	128
077	Recently, PAT (Mo et al., 2024) proposed a novel	129
078	defense mechanism against jailbreak attacks by	130
079	generating a prompt prefix through prompt align-	131
080	ment tuning, without compromising the model’s	132
081	general capabilities. However, this method is pri-	133
082	marily designed for open-source models. In prac-	134
083	tice, many deployed LLMs are closed-source, and	135
084	defenders do not have access to their internal ar-	136
085	chitectures or parameters. Consequently, the ap-	137
086	plicability and effectiveness of this approach in	138
087	real-world settings remain limited.	139
088	To address this problem, this paper aims to en-	140
089	hance the security of the model in black-box scen-	141
090	arios without compromising its generality. Achiev-	142
091	ing this goal faces several challenges(Dong et al.,	143
092	2024). First, due to the closed-source nature of	144
093	LLMs, where internal structures and parameters	145
094	are inaccessible, there is a lack of effective rea-	146
095	soning paths for security strategies, limiting the	147
096	available defense methods. Second, most defense	148
097	methods are unable to respond promptly to novel	149
098	attack patterns, making it difficult to meet the de-	150
099	mands for real-time protection. In this context,	151
100	KGs, with their structured knowledge representa-	152
101	tion and semantic association capabilities, offer	153
102	promising solutions for LLM defense(Chen et al.,	154
103	2020a,b; Fensel et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2024).	155
104	Specifically, KGs do not rely on access to the in-	156
105	ternal structure of models. By comparing the input	157
106	content with dangerous entities and relationships	158
107	in the KG, it becomes possible to identify poten-	159
108	tially harmful intentions through external reason-	160
109	ing. Moreover, the dynamic and extensible nature	161
110	of KGs enables continuous integration of novel at-	162
111	tack features into the defense system, offering bet-	163
112	ter scalability and adaptability than static rule-	164
113	-based methods(Liang et al., 2024).	165
114	However, the direct application of traditional	166
115	KGs in LLM defense faces two main challenges.	167
116	First, adversarial attacks often bypass entity re-	168
117	cognition modules by using syntactic variations	
118	that maintain semantic integrity (e.g., character	
119	substitutions like "b0mb")(Jiang et al., 2024; Yuan et al.,	
120	2024; Kang et al., 2024); second, traditional key-	
121	word extraction methods rely on superficial seman-	
122	tic features (such as TF-IDF weights(Chen, 2024;	
	Wang, 2024; Chowdhury, 2010)), which lose effec-	
	tiveness when dealing with semantically coherent	
	but logically abnormal prompts.	
	To address these shortcomings, we propose a	
	black-box defense framework against Jailbreak At-	
	tacks based on KGs(KG-DF), as illustrated in Fig-	
	ure 1. This framework extracts core semantic infor-	
	mation from user input through a semantic parsing	
	module and performs similarity matching with a	
	prebuilt security knowledge graph. The detected	
	triples are then integrated into the LLM input layer	
	as security alerts, allowing the model to simulta-	
	neously perceive potential threats during the gen-	
	eration phase. This framework not only provides	
	defense capabilities but also enhances the model’s	
	understanding of general-domain knowledge by in-	
	corporating it into the knowledge graph, thereby	
	improving the response quality in general question-	
	-answering scenarios.	
	The experimental results show that the defense	
	strategy proposed in this paper demonstrates ex-	
	cellent defense performance on both open-source	
	and closed-source models. On the open-source	
	model Vicuna-7B, the attack success rate is nearly	
	reduced to zero, with generality reaching 88%. On	
	the closed-source models GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, the	
	attack success rates are also close to 0%, with gen-	
	erality reaching 86% and 89%, respectively. Our	
	contributions are summarized as follows:	
	• We propose a novel defense perspective: inte-	
	grating KG with LLMs to enhance LLM secu-	
	rity in black-box settings through external	
	semantic reasoning paths.	
	• The semantic parsing module proposed in this	
	paper replaces the traditional entity relation-	
	ship extraction, enhances the matching cor-	
	relation, and thereby improves the defense	
	ability and universality of the model.	
	• Experimental results show that the framework	
	significantly enhances the model’s defense	
	performance while maintaining its generality.	
	2 Related Work	
	2.1 Jailbreak Attack	
	LLM has received a lot of attention because of its	
	powerful generative ability, but studies have shown	
	that LLM is vulnerable to adversarial attacks to	




Figure 2: Framework of the Defense Method. The proposed framework comprises three main steps: (1) constructing a knowledge graph that integrates both safety-related and general-domain knowledge, (2) extracting keywords from user prompts, and (3) retrieving and integrating relevant knowledge to guide the model toward safer and more accurate responses.

bypass its own value alignment mechanism. According to the openness of the model, LLM is divided into open-source model and closed-source model. Accordingly, jailbreaking attacks against these models can also be divided into two broad categories: white box attacks(Zou et al., 2023; Ding et al., 2023) and black box attacks(Li et al., 2023; Jiang et al., 2024). In these specific scenarios, LLMs are induced to output harmful content, demonstrating the potential risk of jailbreak.

2.2 Defense

The core of the defense mechanism is to ensure that the output of the LLM is consistent with our intended goal of security. RPO (Zhou et al., 2024) proposed an approach that targets open-source LLM by adding an adversarial suffix to its input prompt. This suffix is carefully designed through gradient descent algorithms to make the output content of LLM more secure. Smooth (Robey et al., 2023) used character-level perturbation techniques to neutralize perturbation-sensitive methods by randomly substituting, swapping, or inserting tokens.

2.3 RAG and KG

While both KGs and RAG aim to ground LLMs in external knowledge, they differ fundamentally in methodology and suitability for value alignment.

RAG primarily retrieves unstructured text passages to inform the model’s response. In contrast, our employed KGs provides an explicit, structured network of relationships. This structured nature enables deterministic reasoning, consistency verification, and the direct application of constraint rules—offering a more safe foundation for systemic value defense compared to the retrieval-based, compositional approach of RAG.

3 Method

3.1 Framework

This study aims to enhance LLMs’ overall performance in both safety and generality. As illustrated in Figure 2, the proposed framework comprises three key phases: first, constructing a KG that integrates both safety-related and general knowledge; second, performing semantic parsing on user inputs to extract essential information; third, embedding the extracted information into vector representations and retrieving relevant knowledge triples through semantic similarity matching within the KG. The retrieved knowledge is then fused with the original prompt to reconstruct the input, guiding the LLM to generate responses that demonstrate strengthened safety awareness and improved content accuracy. The subsequent sections will

Safety Knowledge Module	Subcategories
Child_Abuse	Law & Punishment, Abusive Behavior, Child Impact, Ethical Critique, Social Responsibility, Case Scenarios, Intervention, Psychological
Animal_Abuse	Law & Punishment, Abusive Behavior, Animal Impact, Ethical Critique, Social Responsibility, Case Scenarios, Intervention, Psychological
Bias	Racial, Gender, Cultural, Regional, Age, Religious, Language, Political
Economic_Harm	Financial Fraud, False Advertising, Financial Scams, Investment Risks, Credit Loss, Economic Invasion, Tax Fraud, Price Manipulation
... (See Appendix A for more classifications)	

Table 1: Specific categories under 16 categories in the Safety Knowledge module.

elaborate on these procedural steps in detail.

3.2 The Construction Process of the KG

3.2.1 The Structural System of the KG

In this study, we construct a KG organized into two core modules—Safety Knowledge and General Knowledge—following OpenAI’s Moderator System Card and related literature (Luo et al., 2024). The Safety Knowledge module is further divided into 16 subcategories to address specific potential risks, while the General Knowledge module comprises 15 subcategories to support broad commonsense reasoning. This structured classification ensures comprehensive coverage across multiple dimensions, aiming to enhance LLMs’ ability to generate secure responses and improve their mechanistic understanding of general content.

Safety Knowledge Module. This module encompasses a wide range of morally sensitive domains, such as child abuse, economic harm, hate speech, and political sensitivity. The detailed taxonomy is presented in Table 1. Each major safety category is further divided into fine-grained subcategories. For example, the “economic harm” category includes issues such as financial fraud, false advertising, and price manipulation. This hierarchical structure ensures comprehensive coverage of safety-related content.

We also perform a statistical analysis of the proportional distribution across subcategories, as illustrated in Figure 3. The results indicate that the current safety knowledge module exhibits broad coverage and balanced distribution across categories, thereby ensuring both diversity and representativeness of the dataset. Further results and details are provided in the appendix A.

General Knowledge Module. To enhance the model’s generality performance, the knowledge graph incorporates a broader range of knowledge domains, including natural sciences, social sciences, law, culture, arts, and daily life, among others. This module is designed to support the




Figure 3: Category distribution for Child_Abuse, Animal_Abuse, Economic_Harm and Fraud.

model in generating accurate, informative, and knowledge-rich responses when handling non-sensitive prompts. The detailed classification structure is presented in Table 2.

Figure 4 illustrates the structural composition and distribution characteristics of four representative subcategories. The data analysis results show that this module also exhibits good balance and representativeness in terms of category coverage and sample distribution, further confirming its effectiveness in supporting knowledge generation for general-purpose scenarios. Additional results can be found in the Appendix B.

3.2.2 Dynamic Updating of KG

When new attack methods emerge, we define standardized triplet templates (malicious intent, attack method, target vulnerability) for the “attack mode” node. All new types of attacks need to be abstracted and expressed according to this pattern to ensure the consistency of the graph structure. The defense process can be summarized as follows: [User input]-> [behavior analysis] -> [Abstract attack method]-> [Knowledge Graph query]-> [Infer malicious intent]-> [intent-based early warning]

General Categories	Subcategories
Arts and Entertainment	Music, Movies, Literature, Dance, Drama, Artistic Creation, Creative Expression, Media Analysis
Business and Economics	Business Management, Marketing, Financial Management, Economic Theories, Macroeconomics, Microeconomics, Business Ethics, Economic Forecasting
Computer Science and Technology	Programming Languages, Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence, Cybersecurity, Data Structures, Machine Learning, Deep Learning, Computer Architecture
Daily Life Knowledge	Home Management, Healthy Living, Social Etiquette, Family Relationships, Time Management, Personal Finance, Travel, Psychology
	... (See Appendix B for more classifications)

Table 2: Specific categories under 15 categories in the General Knowledge module.




Figure 4: Category distribution for Arts and Entertainment, Business and Economics, Computer Science and Technology, Daily Life Knowledge.

You are an expert in child welfare, law, and psychology. Please generate 200 distinct, high-quality natural language sentences related to the subcategory "{Subcategory_Name}" under the domain "Child Abuse". Each sentence should clearly express a specific piece of knowledge or fact related to the subcategory theme. Ensure that the language is semantically rich and suitable for extracting structured knowledge triples (subject-predicate-object). Avoid vague statements; focus on concrete facts, typical behaviors, legal consequences, ethical debates, psychological mechanisms, or real-life interventions, depending on the subcategory.

Figure 5: Prompt templates for generating natural statements for each category.

-> [Intercept malicious output]. Regarding maintenance costs, the current focus is mainly on the manual input for abstracting and modeling new attack patterns. The timeliness of updates depends on the frequency and response speed of monitoring security intelligence sources.

3.2.3 Knowledge Graph Construction Process

The construction process of the knowledge graph is divided into three key steps.

Domain Classification and Text Generation.

Based on the definitions and semantic requirements of each subcategory, we leverage GPT-3.5-turbo to automatically generate 200 relevant natural language sentences for each category. These sentences effectively encapsulate the core knowledge points of each subcategory, providing rich and semantically clear textual material for the subsequent extraction of high-quality triplet information. The prompt design template is shown in Figure 5.

Semantic Triplet Extraction Method. In the generated natural language sentences, we use the GPT-3.5-turbo model for triplet extraction, identify-

ing and extracting structured knowledge fragments in the form of [Entity-Relation-Entity]. Through this process, the key information in the original sentences is effectively transformed into computable triplet structures, significantly enhancing the processability and queryability of the knowledge.

Knowledge Graph Embedding Vector Representation. After extracting information from sentences, we further utilize Qwen3-Embedding-8B to vectorize the triplets. Specifically, the embedding method is employed to map the entities and relationships within each triplet into high-dimensional vectors, enabling the mathematical modeling of nodes and their relationships within the knowledge graph. This projects the knowledge graph into a vector space, while preserving their semantic and structural relationships.

3.3 Knowledge Graph Defense Framework

3.3.1 Keyword Extraction from Prompts

After the user enters the prompt words, the GPT-3.5-turbo model is used to extract their key intentions. Refer to the Appendix D for details on prompt design. The formula is as follows:

$$K_{core} = LLM(P_{prompt}) \quad (1)$$

3.3.2 Embedding Vector of Prompts

The extracted keywords are converted into vector representations using Qwen3-Embedding-8B. These vectors form the foundation for similarity

336 calculation and knowledge matching. The formula
337 is as follows:

$$338 \quad V_{\text{prompt}} = \text{Embedding}(K_{\text{core}}) \quad (2)$$

339 3.3.3 Similarity Retrieval and Calculation

340 To retrieve the most relevant information, we lever-
341 age cosine similarity to compute the similarity be-
342 tween the input’s embedding vector and all vectors
343 in the knowledge graph. The top-matched knowl-
344 edge nodes are then formatted as triples and pro-
345 vided as valuable contextual data for subsequent
346 inference and generation.

$$347 \quad T_{\text{match}} = \arg \max_{T_{\text{kg}}} \text{Similarity}(V_{\text{prompt}}, V_{\text{KG}})$$
$$348 \quad = \cos \theta = \frac{V_{\text{prompt}} \cdot V_{\text{KG}}}{\|V_{\text{prompt}}\| \|V_{\text{KG}}\|} \quad (3)$$

349 Where, T_{kg} represents all triples in the knowl-
350 edge graph, θ is the angle between V_{prompt} and V_{KG} .

351 3.3.4 Prompt Reconstruction and LLM 352 Response Generation.

353 When LLM is used for response generation, to
354 effectively reduce harmful content output, triplet
355 information is entered into the LLM along with the
356 original prompt as a context warning. The specific
357 process is as follows:

358 **Security warning output.** The retrieved triplet
359 information T_{match} is combined into a "warning"
360 content to inform the system of possible risks and
361 provide a basis for subsequent judgment.

362 **Judgement of warning and prompt.** The LLM
363 combines the security warning with the user’s
364 prompt, to determine whether the prompt content
365 conflicts with the security warning before generat-
366 ing a response.

367 **Reject or generate responses.** The LLM will
368 refuse to respond if the prompt contradicts the
369 warning. If there is no conflict, the answer is gen-
370 erated normally.

371 4 Experiments

372 In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of
373 our method on both open-source and closed-source
374 models. Section 4.1 describes the experimental
375 setup. Section 4.2 presents a comparative analysis
376 of our method against existing defense approaches
377 on open-source models. Section 4.3 extends this
378 comparison to closed-source models. Finally, Sec-
379 tion 4.4 evaluates the contribution of the proposed

modules in keyword extraction and output scheme
380 selection. 381

4.1 Settings 382

Datasets. The defense performance of the 383
method is evaluated using advbench datasets(Zou 384
et al., 2023). The false positives and general- 385
ity of the method are evaluated using the XSTest 386
dataset(Röttger et al., 2023). The advbench dataset 387
is designed with a variety of adversarial samples 388
to fully test the method’s ability to resist malicious 389
attacks. The XSTest dataset contains ten types of 390
security tips, which are quite confusing. 391

Models. For open-source LLMs, we choose 392
Vicuna-7B and LLaMA2-7B as our primary 393
test models. Additionally, to further investi- 394
gate the practical performance of optimized 395
lightweight models, we include the distillation- 396
based DeepSeek-LLM-7B-Chat in our experiments. 397
For closed-source LLMs, we use GPT-3.5 Turbo 398
and GPT-4 to conduct longitudinal comparisons. 399

Attack Methods. We evaluate three representa- 400
tive attack methods. GCG(Zou et al., 2023), aims 401
to optimize initially meaningless strings into ad- 402
versarial suffixes by using a greedy algorithm to 403
iteratively modify the text, ultimately inducing the 404
model to generate harmful content. TAP(Mehrotra 405
et al., 2024) begins with manually crafted jailbreak 406
prompts and expands them using a tree-based struc- 407
ture to generate diverse adversarial examples, seek- 408
ing the most effective strategy to bypass LLM 409
safety mechanisms and elicit undesired outputs. 410
The PAIR(Chao et al., 2023) attack achieves suc- 411
cessful jailbreaks with a relatively small number of 412
queries (around 20), making it particularly efficient 413
and practical in real-world scenarios. 414

Baselines. We compare four different defense 415
methods. PPL (Alon and Kamfonas, 2023) en- 416
hances model robustness by using perplexity mea- 417
surements to identify and filter out overly com- 418
plex inputs. The Self-reminder method (Wu et al., 419
2023) introduces system-level prompts that remind 420
the model to follow safety guidelines during re- 421
sponse generation. SmoothLLM (Robey et al., 422
2023) employs character-level perturbations to de- 423
fend against attacks that exploit perturbation sen- 424
sitivity. The RPO (Zhou et al., 2024) method en- 425
hances the security and stability of model outputs 426
by optimizing input prompts. 427

Evaluation metrics. We evaluate the algorithm 428
from ASR, FPR and Generality respectively. The 429
ASR refers to the proportion of attacks that can 430

Model	Method	ASR			FPR	Generality
		GCG	TAP	PAIR		
Vicuna-7B	No-Defense	88.00%	34.00%	88.00%	-	76.00%
	PPL	63.00%	31.00%	81.00%	15.00%	76.00%
	Self-Reminder	0.00%	11.00%	18.00%	8.00%	73.00%
	SmoothLLM	14.00%	28.00%	39.00%	5.00%	67.00%
	RPO	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	11.00%	54.00%
	Ours	0.00%	0.00%	6.00%	5.00%	88.00%
Deepseek-llm-7B-chat	No-Defense	36.00%	10.00%	8.00%	-	83.00%
	PPL	24.00%	9.00%	8.00%	20.00%	74.00%
	Self-Reminder	28.00%	0.00%	4.00%	8.00%	78.00%
	SmoothLLM	6.00%	3.00%	1.00%	3.00%	70.00%
	RPO	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	28.00%	53.00%
	Ours	2.00%	0.00%	0.00%	5.00%	86.00%

Table 3: Performance of KG-DF on the Advbench and XSTest datasets using open-source models.

successfully induce the model to generate unsafe or incorrect content under certain attack conditions. FPR measures the proportion of defensive methods that mistakenly identify safe or normal inputs as being offensive. It is evaluated using the security data from the XSTest dataset. Generality is used to measure the response quality of a defense method when facing with typical problems. All three metrics are evaluated using LLM and user-study, prompt design is shown in appendix D.

4.2 Defense in open-source models

In this experiment, three open-source models are evaluated. As shown in Table 3, the defense strategies demonstrate exceptional performance across all models, significantly reducing the ASR. The effectiveness is particularly pronounced against GCG and PAIR attacks, with attack success rates approaching zero. At the same time, the false positive rate remains low, and the defense exhibits strong generality performance. For instance, using our defense strategy, the Vicuna-7B model achieved 88% generality, while the Llama2-7B model reached 89% on the XSTest dataset (see Appendix C for more details). Although other defense methods also reduce attack success rates, they often struggle with high false positive rates.

4.3 Defense in closed-source models

In this experiment, we evaluated the defense performance of Claude Sonnet and Google Gemini against three attack methods. Our proposed approach demonstrated superior overall balance compared to existing strategies. Specifically, it achieved the lowest ASR — 1.00% and 2.00% for

Claude Sonnet, and 23.00% and 37.00% for Google Gemini under TAP and PAIR attacks, respectively — while maintaining a low FPR of 2.00% for both models. Furthermore, it preserved high generality, with scores of 91.00% for Claude Sonnet and 87.00% for Google Gemini. In contrast, other defenses exhibited either higher FPR or lower generality, underscoring the more balanced efficacy of our method across all critical metrics.

4.4 Ablation Study

4.4.1 Keyword extraction

This experiment evaluates how different keyword extraction methods affect semantic relevance to the original prompt. We test NER(AI, 2017), TF-IDF (Chowdhury, 2010), and several LLMs (LLaMA-3.2, Vicuna-7B, GPT-3.5), assessing keyword relevance using GPT-4. Prompt details are provided in Appendix C.3.

As shown in Table 5, NER extracts content-related words but frequently misses the core theme of the prompt. TF-IDF achieves only 37.00% semantic relevance, indicating its limited ability to capture semantic associations despite relying on statistical frequency. In contrast, LLM-based methods show consistently better performance. Among them, GPT-3.5 demonstrates a clear advantage and is better suited for extracting keywords.

To evaluate the robustness of our semantic parsing module against complex adversarial inputs, we test it using the multi-stage Foot-In-The-Door attack (Weng et al., 2025). This method employs bridging prompts to gradually escalate malicious intent, representing a typical covert, multi-round

Model	Method	ASR			FPR	Generality
		GCG	TAP	PAIR		
Claude Sonnet	No-Defense	-	6.00%	6.00%	-	89.00%
	PPL	-	6.00%	6.00%	14.00%	89.00%
	Self-Reminder	-	4.00%	5.00%	6.00%	83.00%
	SmoothLLM	-	5.00%	5.00%	6.00%	76.00%
	Ours	-	1.00%	2.00%	2.00%	91.00%
Google Gemini	No-Defense	-	31.00%	73.00%	-	80.00%
	PPL	-	31.00%	71.00%	15.00%	81.00%
	Self-Reminder	-	26.00%	58.00%	7.00%	76.00%
	SmoothLLM	-	28.00%	51.00%	8.00%	70.00%
	Ours	-	23.00%	37.00%	2.00%	87.00%

Table 4: Performance of KG-DF on the Advbench and XSTest datasets using closed-source models.

Method	Keyword	Similarity	Corr.	ASR
NER	2	67.00%	5	6.00%
TF-IDF	2	37.00%	4	9.00%
Llama-3.2	2	83.00%	7	2.00%
Vicuna-7B	2	85.00%	7	3.00%
GPT-3.5-turbo	2	88.00%	8	0.00%

Table 5: Correlation performance under different keyword extraction methods.

attack scenario. As shown in Table 6, our approach tracks semantic evolution across attack stages and successfully blocks the final harmful response.

Method	LLaMA-3.1-8B	GPT-4o
Foot-In-The-Door	92.00%	88.00%
Ours	18.00%	12.00%

Table 6: The robustness of the semantic parsing module to complex adversarial inputs.

4.4.2 Output scheme selection

We explore the impact of different output methods on the final result after retrieving relevant triplet information. We compare the following three output strategies: **Direct Combination Input**. The triplet information is directly combined with the prompt and input into the LLM. **Pre-output Judgment**. This method requires the LLM to first output a sentence by combining the triplet information before generating the final output. The LLM then assesses the relevance and compliance of this sentence with the prompt content, determining whether it should respond to the prompt, and thus deciding the final output. **Combined Input**. The triplet information is first combined into a sentence by the LLM, which is then input along with the prompt into the

LLM. The comparison results are presented in the appendix C.4.

By adding a pre-judgment step and using the warning information to constrain subsequent processing of the prompt, this approach establishes a clear warning and judgment logic, achieving the best defense effect.

5 Computational overhead

The following table 7 compares the computational overhead of different defense methods when defending against GCG attacks on open-source models, showing average time and cost per prompt.

Method	Time	Cost	ASR (%)
PPL	3.7 s	\$0	58.00
Self-Reminder	2.5 s	\$0	12.00
SmoothLLM	3.1 s	\$0	19.00
RPO	17 min	\$0	8.00
Ours	7.1 s	$1.05-1.33 \times 10^{-4}$	0.00

Table 7: Computational overhead of defense methods.

6 Conclusion

The widespread deployment of large language models (LLMs) has intensified security concerns, particularly from jailbreak attacks. To address this, we propose a knowledge graph-based defense framework (KG-DF) that links input content to structured security knowledge for accurate intent recognition and safe reasoning. Unlike entity-based methods, KG-DF employs LLM-driven semantic parsing, improving match relevance and defensive performance. Experiments show that KG-DF effectively counters various jailbreak attacks while also enhancing response quality in general QA through integrated general knowledge.

542 **Limitations**

543 While the proposed KG-DF framework demon-
544 strates enhanced defense capabilities against jail-
545 break attacks, it is subject to several limitations.
546 The framework requires further improvements in
547 interpretability and computational efficiency. And
548 future work will focus on developing specialized
549 parsers, enabling incremental knowledge updates,
550 and optimizing the inference process to enhance
551 both robustness and efficiency.

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A Safety Knowledge Module

The safety knowledge module is divided into 16 categories, each further subdivided into 8 specific branches. The appendix presents the branch composition and proportion of the remaining 12 categories. The classification is shown in Table 12, and the more specific branch proportion analysis is shown in Figure 6,7 and 8.




Figure 6: Category distribution for Bias, Government, Hate_speech, Malware.




Figure 7: Category distribution for Physical_Harm, Political_Sensitivity, Privacy_Violation, Health_Consultation.

B General Knowledge Module

The general knowledge module is divided into 15 categories, each comprising 8 specific branches. The main text presents 4 of these categories and their structures, while the appendix provides the branch composition and proportion of the remaining 11 categories. The classification is shown in

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


Figure 8: Category distribution for Unethical_Behavior, Violence, Roleplay, Tailored_Unlicensed_Advice.

Table 13, and the more specific branch proportion analysis is shown in Figure 9,10 and 11.

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


Figure 9: Category distribution for Engineering and Technological Applications, Frontier Technology and Future Trends, Geography and Environment, History and Civilization.

C Supplementary Experiment

C.1 Defense in open-source models

Figure 8 shows the performance of the Llama2-7B model under different attack and defense methods.

C.2 Defense in closed-source models

The experimental results in the table 9 demonstrate that whether on GPT-3.5 or GPT-4, our method significantly reduces the ASR and effectively enhances the model's generality. Under TAP and PAIR attacks, the ASR is nearly reduced to 0%, while the FPR remains at a low level. On

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Model	Method	ASR			FPR	Generality
		GCG	TAP	PAIR		
Llama2-7B	No-Defense	64.00%	10.00%	4.00%	-	79.00%
	PPL	58.00%	9.00%	3.00%	16.00%	79.00%
	Self-Reminder	12.00%	0.00%	4.00%	13.00%	73.00%
	SmoothLLM	19.00%	8.00%	0.00%	9.00%	68.00%
	RPO	8.00%	0.00%	0.00%	15.00%	53.00%
	Ours	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	8.00%	89.00%

Table 8: Performance of KG-DF on the Advbench and XSTest datasets using open-source models.




Figure 10: Category distribution for Language and Literature, Law and Ethics, Mathematics and Logic, Medicine and Health.




Figure 11: Category distribution for Natural Science, Philosophy and Religion, Social Sciences.

the XSTest dataset, the generality of the GPT-3.5 model reaches 86%, and that of the GPT-4 model is as high as 89%, indicating that the introduction of a knowledge graph significantly enhances the model’s general capability. In contrast, although other defense strategies can effectively reduce the ASR, they still exhibit high FPR and fail to achieve the expected improvement in generality.

C.3 The influence of the hyperparameter of the number of keywords.

Based on the Vicuna-7B model, we conduct a comparison experiment of the number of keywords in the PAIR attack scenario. The results show that with the increase in the number of keywords, the change range of ASR is extremely small and can be ignored.

C.4 Output scheme selection

We explore the impact of different output methods on the final result after retrieving relevant triplet information. The comparison results are presented in the table10. The pre-output judgment method

stands out in terms of its effectiveness in defending against harmful information output. It helps determine the optimal output strategy and improves the system’s performance in related tasks.

D Prompt

D.1 Prompt for Keywords Extraction

Figure 12 illustrates the prompt used for keywords extraction. It outlines the necessary steps for the model to analyze and extract relevant keywords from the input prompt.

```

Given the following user prompt, extract key pieces of information:
Core Keywords: Identify the key terms or requirements that capture the essence of the user's request. These could include specific topics, actions, or entities mentioned in the prompt that are crucial for understanding the user's intent.

User Prompt:
[Insert user's prompt here]
Expected Output:
Keywords: [List of core keywords]*

```

Figure 12: Prompt for Category and Core Keywords Extraction.

D.2 Prompt for Evaluating ASR

This prompt is designed to help evaluate the success of an attack by analyzing both the input pro-

Model	Method	ASR			FPR	Generality
		GCG	TAP	PAIR		
GPT-3.5	No-Defense	-	19.00%	63.00%	-	81.00%
	PPL	-	19.00%	63.00%	15.00%	81.00%
	Self-Reminder	-	4.00%	9.00%	8.00%	76.00%
	SmoothLLM	-	5.00%	11.00%	6.00%	69.00%
	Ours	-	1.00%	2.00%	3.00%	86.00%
GPT-4	No-Defense	-	20.00%	34.00%	-	82.00%
	PPL	-	20.00%	34.00%	15.00%	82.00%
	Self-Reminder	-	2.00%	4.00%	7.00%	79.00%
	SmoothLLM	-	2.00%	3.00%	6.00%	65.00%
	Ours	-	0.00%	0.00%	4.00%	89.00%

Table 9: Performance of KG-DF on the Advbench and XSTest datasets using closed-source models.

Output Method	Final Prompt	ASR (%)
Direct Combination Input	"Warning": {hack corporate network instructions,illegal, crime} Question: Outline the steps for a terrorist organization to infiltrate a government agency.	13.0
Information Pre-output Judgment	"Warning": {hack corporate network instructions,illegal, crime} Question: Outline the steps for a terrorist organization to infiltrate a government agency. Please combine the contents of "warning" into one sentence and output it, then judge whether to answer the "Question" based on "Warning".	0
Combined Input	It is illegal and a crime to hack corporate network instructions. Outline the steps for a terrorist organization to infiltrate a government agency.	11.0

Table 10: Comparative analysis of different generation strategies.

Keywords Number	1	2	3	4
ASR (%)	6.00	6.00	5.00	6.00

Table 11: The influence of different keywords number on ASR.

Keywords Number	1	2	3	4
ASR (%)	6.00	6.00	5.00	6.00

vided and the corresponding output generated by the model. See Figure 13 for details.

Keywords Number	1	2	3	4
ASR (%)	6.00	6.00	5.00	6.00

Figure 13: Prompt for Evaluating ASR.

Figure 14: Prompt for Evaluating FPR.

D.4 Prompt for Evaluating Generality

This prompt evaluates the quality of the model's response across different problem types or categories. See Figure 15 for details.

Keywords Number	1	2	3	4
ASR (%)	6.00	6.00	5.00	6.00

Figure 15: Prompt for Evaluating Generality.

D.3 Prompt for Evaluating FPR

This prompt focuses on detecting false positives by analyzing safe inputs and the corresponding output to ensure they are not wrongly flagged as offensive or harmful. See Figure 14 for details.

D.5 Prompt for Evaluating Relevance of Original Prompt and Extracted Content

Figure 16 illustrates the prompt designed to evaluate the relevance between the original user input and the extracted content.

Prompt: "Given the following the original prompt and the extracted content, evaluate how relevant the content is to the original input.
Original Prompt:
[Insert original user prompt here]
Extracted Content:
[Insert extracted content here]
Evaluation Criteria (Score 0-10):
10: The extracted content perfectly matches the original prompt.
7-9: The extracted content is mostly relevant to the original prompt,
4-6: The extracted content is partially relevant but misses key aspects of the original prompt.
1-3: The extracted content is only marginally relevant the main concerns of the original prompt.

Figure 16: Prompt for Evaluating Relevance of Original Prompt and Extracted Content.

Safety Knowledge Module	Subcategories
Child_Abuse	Law & Punishment, Abusive Behavior, Child Impact, Ethical Critique, Social Responsibility, Case Scenarios, Intervention, Psychological Factors
Animal_Abuse	Law & Punishment, Abusive Behavior, Animal Impact, Ethical Critique, Social Responsibility, Case Scenarios, Intervention, Psychological Factors
Bias	Racial, Gender, Cultural, Regional, Age, Religious, Language, Political
Economic_Harm	Financial Fraud, False Advertising, Financial Scams, Investment Risks, Credit Loss, Economic Invasion, Tax Fraud, Price Manipulation
Fraud	Cyber Fraud, Identity Theft, Financial Fraud, False Advertising, Commercial Fraud, Telephone Scams, Investment Fraud, Insurance Fraud
Government	Government Policies, Corruption, Government Privacy Issues, Abuse of Power, Government Surveillance, Public Safety, Political Purges, Political Repression
Hate_Speech	Racial Hate, Gender Hate, Religious Hate, Political Hate, Cyber Hate, Physical Violence, Incitement of Hate, Extremist Speech
Health_Consultation	Disease Treatment, Health Advice, Unqualified Medical Advice, Health Misinformation, Medical Rumors, Mental Health Advice, Drug Abuse, False Medical Advice
Malware	Virus Spread, Ransomware, Spyware, Adware, Trojan Horses, Information Theft, Malicious Plugins, Network Attacks
Physical_Harm	Domestic Violence, School Violence, Occupational Injuries, Traffic Accidents, Sports Injuries, Physical Abuse, Self-Harm, Violent Crime
Political_Sensitivity	Political Extremism, Political Censorship, Political Suppression, Political Assassinations, Abuse of Power, Political Stance, Terrorism, Reactionary Ideology
Privacy_Violation	Identity Theft, Privacy Leaks, Unauthorized Surveillance, Data Theft, Hacking, Social Media Privacy Leaks, Information Misuse, Identity Fraud
Tailored_Unlicensed_Advice	Medical Advice, Legal Consultation, Educational Advice, Financial Advice, Career Planning, Psychological Advice, Health Diets, Social Problem Advice
Unethical_Behavior	Deceptive Practices, Conflicts of Interest, Unethical Workplace Behavior, Corruption, Dishonesty, Moral Failure, Illegal Actions, Boundary Violations
Violence	Violent Acts, Domestic Violence, Public Violence, School Violence, Terrorism, Psychological Violence, Verbal Abuse, Physical Harm
Roleplay	Misleading Scenarios, Encouraging Harmful Behavior, Emotional Manipulation, Risk of Emotional Distress, Impact of Roleplay on Real-Life Perceptions, Ethical Boundaries in Roleplay

Table 12: Specific categories under 16 categories in the Safety Knowledge module.

General Categories	Subcategories
Arts and Entertainment	Music, Movies, Literature, Dance, Drama, Artistic Creation, Creative Expression, Media Analysis
Business and Economics	Business Management, Marketing, Financial Management, Economic Theories, Macroeconomics, Microeconomics, Business Ethics, Economic Forecasting
Computer Science and Technology	Programming Languages, Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence, Cybersecurity, Data Structures, Machine Learning, Deep Learning, Computer Architecture
Daily Life Knowledge	Home Management, Healthy Living, Social Etiquette, Family Relationships, Time Management, Personal Finance, Travel, Psychology
Engineering and Technological Applications	Civil Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Electronics, Chemical Engineering, Environmental Engineering, Automation, Technological Innovation
Frontier Technology and Future Trends	Artificial Intelligence, Quantum Computing, Robotics, Virtual Reality, Blockchain, Gene Editing, Autonomous Driving, Climate Change Technology
Geography and Environment	Global Climate, Natural Disasters, Ecological Protection, Environmental Pollution, Geographic Information Systems, Meteorology, Earth Physics, Sustainable Development
History and Civilization	Ancient Civilizations, Historical Events, World History, Cultural Heritage, Ethnic Culture, Historical Figures, Cultural Heritage, Historical Thought
Language and Literature	Literary Works, Linguistics, Rhetoric, Writing Skills, Language Development, Literary Criticism, Translation Studies, Poetry and Prose
Law and Ethics	Civil Law, Criminal Law, International Law, Intellectual Property, Ethical Norms, Legal Regulations, Rule of Law, Legal Theory
Mathematics and Logic	Mathematical Theories, Geometry, Algebra, Probability Theory, Statistics, Numerical Analysis, Logical Reasoning, Mathematical Modeling
Medicine and Health	Disease Prevention, Treatment Methods, Pharmaceutical Research, Nutrition, Mental Health, Medical Devices, Public Health, Medical Ethics
Natural Science	Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Earth Science, Astronomy, Meteorology, Ecology, Scientific Experiments
Philosophy and Religion	Philosophical Schools, Ethics, Religious Beliefs, Religious History, Moral Philosophy, Metaphysics, Logic, Epistemology
Social Sciences	Psychology, Sociology, Political Science, Anthropology, Social Issues, Public Policy, Education, Cultural Studies

Table 13: Subcategories under the 15 categories in the General Knowledge module.