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Anonymous authors

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ABSTRACT

Despite the impressive capabilities of large language models (LLMs), their outputs often exhibit inconsistent correctness and unreliable factual accuracy. In high-stakes domains, overconfident yet incorrect predictions can lead to serious consequences, highlighting the need for robust uncertainty estimation. To address this, we introduce SelectLLM, an end-to-end method designed to enhance the ability of LLMs to recognize and express uncertainty effectively. By integrating selective prediction into finetuning, SelectLLM optimizes model performance over the covered domain, achieving a more balanced trade-off between predictive coverage and utility. Experimental results on TriviaQA, CommonsenseQA and MedConceptsQA show that SelectLLM significantly outperforms standard baselines, improving abstention behaviour while maintaining high accuracy.

1 INTRODUCTION

Large language models (LLMs) have rapidly become foundational components in natural language processing (NLP), driving progress across a wide range of tasks – from open-ended generation to complex reasoning. Despite their huge progress and impressive capabilities, LLMs still frequently produce outputs with varying levels of correctness and factual accuracy. A core challenge in deploying these models in real-world settings lies in balancing accuracy with calibrated confidence. While high accuracy remains a primary goal, it is equally critical for models to recognize and signal their own uncertainty, particularly in high-stakes scenarios such as healthcare (Busch et al., 2025; Denecke et al., 2024), finance (Yoo, 2024; Nie et al., 2024), and law (El Hamdani et al., 2024; Colombo et al., 2024). Overconfident incorrect responses can be significantly more harmful than abstentions or cautious, low-confidence responses. To address this, we leverage confidence modeling to enable selective prediction, allowing the system to abstain from answering when uncertainty is high (Wen et al., 2024), thereby trading off *coverage* for *reliability*. This trade-off is especially important in safety-critical applications or decision-support systems, where deferring uncertain cases to a human or fallback system is preferable to propagating potentially erroneous outputs. In this paper, we introduce a principled approach to enhancing safety of an LLM that allows a model to abstain from making a prediction when it is uncertain, thereby reducing the risk of harmful or misleading outputs. However, abstention introduces a secondary trade-off: while conservative behavior can reduce risk, excessive abstention diminishes the utility of the model by forgoing opportunities where correct responses are feasible. A model that abstains too frequently may be safe but ultimately useless. For example, in the “needle in-the-haystack” benchmark, LLMs become more uncertain when given the “nonexistent” option, even when capable of providing correct answers (Kim et al., 2025). This highlights the challenge of balancing risk with utility (coverage): optimizing both the correctness of answers and the number of answered questions.

We formalize this challenge as a risk-coverage trade-off and categorize model outputs into four distinct cases following the previous literature (Stengel-Eskin et al., 2024; Cheng et al., 2024), as illustrated in Table 1: ① *Accepting a correct answer* — the ideal case, contributing to both utility and reliability; ② *Rejecting an incorrect answer* — also desirable, as it avoids unreliable answers; ③ *Rejecting a correct answer* — suboptimal, reducing the utility of the model; ④ *Accepting an incorrect answer* — the most harmful case, compromising the accuracy of the model. Our objective is to maximize the occurrence of the first two cases while minimizing the occurrence of the latter two.

To illustrate the risk-coverage trade-off challenge, consider two medical AI assistants designed to help doctors interpret diagnostic test results. Assistant A, optimized solely for utility, studied all diagnostic topics uniformly but lacks the ability to accurately judge when to abstain. Consequently, it sometimes provides incorrect answers with high confidence or unnecessarily abstains even when it could have answered correctly. In contrast, Assistant B explicitly accounts for the risk-coverage trade-off by carefully distinguishing between cases it can confidently address and those it should avoid. When faced with ambiguous diagnostic cases, Assistant B appropriately abstains, whereas in clear-cut cases that Assistant A might wrongly skip, Assistant B reliably provides accurate answers. Consequently, Assistant B achieves the best average diagnostic performance, as illustrated in Figure 1.

To address this challenge, we propose a novel method, called SelectLLM, that explicitly produces confidence estimates and incorporates the task of confidence estimation into its training objectives. SelectLLM assigns confidence scores to questions rather than to generated answers, thereby quantifying the reliability of the LLM’s response to specific queries independent from the multiple alternative answers generated. Questions can be classified into two categories based on a confidence threshold: those with confidence above a given threshold (covered by the model) and those below the threshold (not covered). Within the covered set of questions, we further distinguish between the questions the model is confident in answering correctly and those it confidently identifies as beyond its capability, corresponding to the first and second cases mentioned previously.

SelectLLM is based on a well-trained LLM and jointly trains (fine-tunes the first and trains the second) two heads (shown in Figure 2): ① a *decoding head*, corresponding to the original LLM output layer for autoregressive token generation; ② a *selection head*, outputting a confidence score for the question. This two-head design is motivated by the known calibration deficiencies of trained LLMs. In a well-calibrated model, the decoding head’s next-token probabilities could be used directly for confidence estimation. However, LLMs often exhibit overconfidence or underconfidence, making it necessary to learn a separate abstention signal. The selection head is explicitly optimized to improve the risk-coverage trade-off, allowing the model to balance utility with reliability. Our contributions are summarized as follows:

- We introduce SelectLLM, which incorporates risk-coverage trade-off control into the LLM training stage. It combines **Direct Preference Optimization (DPO)** (Rafailov et al., 2023) with confidence estimation to improve the risk-coverage trade-off;
- We **construct three high-quality benchmarks** for DPO fine-tuning based on open-sourced Question-and-Answer datasets, and conduct extensive experiments on **seven baselines with three different LLMs**, demonstrating that SelectLLM significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines in terms of risk and coverage metrics;
- We validate the confidence scores produced by SelectLLM by comparing their distribution to scores derived from the tone and phrasing of the generated responses, demonstrating that SelectLLM can natively output reliable confidence estimates for its predictions **without relying on any external models**.




Figure 2: **Overview of SelectLLM.** Given a question–answer input pair, the underlying LLM processes the full sequence and produces a hidden state (HS) for each token. The selection head operates on the hidden state corresponding to the last token of the question to estimate a confidence score for abstention; while the decoding head uses the answer-related hidden states to compute the DPO loss for LLM fine-tuning. This dual-head design enables SelectLLM to jointly optimize for utility and accuracy.

Table 1: Four cases of the answer to a question: “In which branch of the arts does Allegra Kent work?”.

	Accept (high confidence)	Reject (low confidence)
Correct	Allegra Kent is a ballet dancer. She worked as a principal dancer with the New York City Ballet.	I'm not entirely certain, but I think Allegra Kent might be involved in ballet.
Incorrect	Allegra Kent is a renowned opera singer who performed in major productions throughout Europe.	I'm not really sure, but maybe Allegra Kent is a painter?

2 RELATED WORK

Uncertainty Quantification in LLMs. Uncertainty estimation for large language models (LLMs) spans several complementary paradigms. and generally falls into two categories: (i) black-box approaches and (ii) white-box approaches. Black-box methods include verbalized uncertainty, where models are prompted to express confidence in natural language (Tanneru et al., 2023; Yona et al., 2024; Wei et al., 2023; Lin et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2024), and sampling-based methods, which estimate predictive uncertainty from variability across multiple generations (Cole et al., 2023; Ji et al., 2024; Xiong et al., 2023). White-box approaches, in contrast, exploit model internals such as token-level probabilities, calibration of log-likelihoods, or hidden-state diagnostics to produce confidence scores. Related work includes TokenSAR (Duan et al., 2023), P(True) (Kadavath et al., 2022) and Semantic Entropy (Kuhn et al., 2023). While many of these techniques primarily serve to identify uncertain predictions and guide abstention, there is also a growing line of work on uncertainty-aware training, where uncertainty estimates inform parameter updates (Krishnan et al., 2024; Niu et al., 2024; Yang et al., 2023b). Our approach builds on these advances by directly incorporating selective prediction objectives into fine-tuning.

Alignment and Confidence in LLMs. Efforts to align LLMs with human preference, such as Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) (Schulman et al., 2017) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) (Rafailov et al., 2023), adjust model parameters to encourage desired behaviours. Kang et al. (2024) proposed conservative reward modeling to encourage LLMs to be more cautious in their predictions, which relates to our objective of selective prediction. Piché et al. (2024) introduced self-restraint fine-tuning, aiming to increase model confidence when appropriate while reducing overconfidence. Recent works such as (Stengel-Eskin et al., 2024) and (Cheng et al., 2024) utilize DPO to align LLMs with human preference to guide the model to answer questions it knows and to avoid answering questions it does not know.

Selective Prediction in LLMs. Selective prediction has a rich history in machine learning (Fumera & Roli, 2002; Wiener & El-Yaniv, 2015; Cortes et al., 2016a;b), and has recently been extended to LLMs (Yoshikawa & Okazaki, 2023; Lee et al., 2024; Srinivasan et al., 2024; Yang et al.,

162 2023a). However, none of these LLM-related works incorporates selective coverage into model
 163 training. SelectiveNet (Geifman & El-Yaniv, 2019) provides a foundational framework for selective
 164 classification in deep networks. Our work extends this idea to the generative setting of LLMs,
 165 which poses unique challenges. SelectLLM differs from prior frameworks such as SelectiveNet in
 166 several critical ways. While SelectiveNet targets classification and regression, SelectLLM is designed
 167 for sequence generation. To enable this, we introduce a new module that embeds the generated
 168 sequence before passing it to a confidence head, enabling reliable abstention decisions for natural
 169 language outputs. Moreover, SelectiveNet employs three heads—reward, selection, and auxiliary—to
 170 encourage shared representation learning. In contrast, SelectLLM adds only a single selection head
 171 $g(\cdot)$ to the original LLM and fine-tunes the entire framework to align with human preferences. This
 172 design enables SelectLLM to balance generation quality, prediction accuracy, and selective abstention,
 173 offering a principled framework for calibrated and trustworthy language generation.
 174

175 In summary, by synthesizing advances from uncertainty quantification, fine-tuning, and selective pre-
 176 diction, SelectLLM introduces a principled framework that jointly optimizes predictive performance
 177 and uncertainty estimation, a contribution of particular significance for high-stakes applications.
 178

3 PROBLEM FORMULATION

180 We define *coverage* as the proportion of questions for which the model is confident enough to provide
 181 an answer:

$$183 \text{coverage} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n (1 - a_i),$$

186 where n is the total number of questions, $a_i = 1$ if the model abstains on the i th question and $a_i = 0$
 187 otherwise. While *risk* is defined as the error rate over the set of answered questions:

$$188 \text{risk} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb{1}(\hat{y}_i \notin \mathcal{Y}_i \wedge a_i = 0)}{\sum_{i=1}^n (1 - a_i)},$$

191 where \hat{y}_i is the model’s output, \mathcal{Y}_i is the set of correct answers for the i th question.
 192

193 The goal is to ensure that LLMs can reliably estimate their predictive confidence and abstain when
 194 uncertainty is high, while also minimizing unnecessary abstentions to retain practical utility. Our
 195 approach is built on Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) (Rafailov et al., 2023), a human preference
 196 alignment method that fine-tunes language models using pairwise comparisons of answers without
 197 the need to explicitly model a reward function.

198 DPO (Rafailov et al., 2023) is a human preference alignment method that fine-tunes language models
 199 using comparisons of pairs of answers without the need to explicitly model a reward function.
 200 Specifically, in the **training** stage, we are given (1) a dataset $\mathcal{X} = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$, where each
 201 x_i is a question posed to the model; (2) a corresponding set of human preference annotations
 202 $\mathcal{P} = \{(y_{i,+}, y_{i,-})\}$, where $y_{i,+}$ and $y_{i,-}$ denote the preferred and rejected answers to question x_i ,
 203 respectively; and (3) a predefined coverage rate $0 < c < 1$, which represents the target proportion of
 204 questions for which the user expects the model to provide confident answers. Our goal is to maximize
 205 the likelihood of human-preferred answers relative to rejected ones given the coverage constraint c ,
 206 yielding a fine-tuned model M_{select} and a selection head $g(\cdot)$ which outputs a confidence score c_i
 207 indicating the model’s confidence in answering a specific question x_i .

208 In the **inference** stage, given (1) a dataset of input questions, $\mathcal{X} = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$, where each x_i
 209 is a question; and (2) a trained model M_{select} and its selection head $g(\cdot)$, the model produces (1) a
 210 set of LLM-generated answers, $\hat{\mathcal{Y}} = \{\hat{y}_1, \hat{y}_2, \dots, \hat{y}_n\}$, where each \hat{y}_i is the model’s answer to x_i ;
 211 and (2) a set of confidence scores, $\mathcal{C} = \{\text{conf}_1, \text{conf}_2, \dots, \text{conf}_n\}$, where each conf_i represents the
 212 model’s confidence that it can answer question x_i correctly.

213 Given the model’s answer to a question, together with its confidence score to answer the question,
 214 the model abstains when its confidence score conf_i is below a given threshold τ . More formally, the
 215 abstention decision for question x_i is defined as $a_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \text{conf}_i < \tau \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$.

216 4 SELECTLLM
217218 Our proposed method SelectLLM enhances pre-trained LLMs by introducing an additional head that
219 explicitly estimates the model’s confidence in answering a given question correctly. This selection
220 head is trained or fine-tuned jointly with the base model. Specifically, given a pre-trained LLM π_θ ,
221 we augment it with a selection head $g(\cdot)$, which outputs a confidence score $\text{conf} \in (0, 1)$.
222223 Unlike traditional confidence estimation methods that rely on token-level probabilities, our selection
224 head operates on the last-layer hidden state of the final token in the input question. This design
225 ensures that confidence estimation is based solely on the model and the input question.
226

227 4.1 SELECTION HEAD ARCHITECTURE

228 The selection head is implemented as a lightweight two-layer multilayer perceptron (MLP) that maps
229 the final hidden representation of the language model to a scalar confidence score. Concretely, the
230 hidden state of the last token is first transformed using a linear projection from the model dimension
231 d_{model} to a 512-dimensional intermediate space, followed by a ReLU nonlinearity and a dropout
232 layer with probability $p = 0.1$. A second linear layer maps this 512-dimensional vector to a single
233 logit, which is subsequently passed through a sigmoid activation to produce a confidence value in the
234 range $(0, 1)$. This compact architecture adds negligible overhead while enabling the model to learn a
235 calibrated selection policy.
236237 The additional cost introduced by the selection head is negligible relative to the backbone computation.
238 First, during training, the gradient updates for the large-scale language model (with billions of
239 parameters) dominate the total compute cost, while the selection head contributes only a tiny number
240 of additional parameters and operations, resulting in virtually no change in wall-clock time. Second,
241 during inference, the selection head operates solely on the hidden state computed in the prefill
242 stage, either in parallel with or immediately before generation. Consequently, it adds only a single
243 lightweight matrix multiplication, causing no noticeable increase in latency.
244

245 4.2 LOSS FUNCTION

246 The loss function of SelectLLM combines the **DPO loss**, which aligns the model’s outputs with
247 human preferences, and the **Select loss**, which manages the risk–coverage trade-off.
248249 The **DPO loss** aligns the model’s outputs with human preferences without requiring explicit reward
250 modeling or reinforcement learning. Given a dataset of human preferences $\mathcal{P} = \{(x_i, y_{i,+}, y_{i,-})\}$,
251 where $y_{i,+}$ is the preferred response and $y_{i,-}$ is the rejected response to question x_i , the DPO loss is
252 defined as:
253

254
$$L_{\text{DPO}}(\pi_\theta, \pi_{\text{ref}}) = -\mathbb{E}_{(x, y_+, y_-) \sim \mathcal{P}} \left[\log \sigma \left(\beta \log \frac{\pi_\theta(y_+ \mid x)}{\pi_{\text{ref}}(y_+ \mid x)} - \beta \log \frac{\pi_\theta(y_- \mid x)}{\pi_{\text{ref}}(y_- \mid x)} \right) \right] \quad (1)$$

255 where:

256

- π_θ is the LLM we want to fine-tune.
- π_{ref} is a reference model, usually a frozen version of the original pre-trained language model.
- σ is the sigmoid function.
- β is a hyperparameter that controls the amount of divergence from the reference model π_{ref} .

257 Building on Section 3, we define the empirical selective risk for LLM fine-tuning as:
258

259
$$\hat{r} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n (g(h_i) \cdot L_{\text{DPO}}) \quad (2)$$

260 where h_i denotes the hidden state of the last token in the question, $g(h_i) \in [0, 1]$ is the selection
261 function that quantifies the model’s confidence for the given question.
262263 Notably, since the original DPO loss only boosts the margin between the chosen answer and the
264 rejected answer, it may simultaneously decrease the probabilities of both chosen and rejected answers,
265 compared to the reference model, which is not desirable (Rafailov et al., 2024; Feng et al., 2024; Pal

270 et al., 2024). Therefore, we define a **marginal function** measuring the difference in the probabilities
 271 between the answers of the fine-tuned model and the reference model, which is defined as follows:
 272

$$273 \quad w(y) = \beta (\log \pi_\theta(y) - \log \pi_{\text{ref}}(y)) \quad (3)$$

275 where β is a hyper-parameter, and $\pi_\theta, \pi_{\text{ref}}$ follow the same definitions as in the DPO loss.
 276

277 Then we define the risk for generating chosen and rejected answers using [Equation 3](#):

$$278 \quad \ell(\pi_\theta, \pi_{\text{ref}}, y) = \begin{cases} \log \sigma(\max(0, -w(y))) & \text{if } y \in y_+ \\ 279 \quad \log \sigma(\max(0, w(y))) & \text{if } y \in y_- \end{cases}$$

281 Mathematically, these are not the same as DPO. DPO encourages $w(y_+) > w(y_-)$; while this
 282 additional risk term encourages $w(y_+) \geq 0$ (do not degrade chosen probability below reference) and
 283 $w(y_-) \leq 0$ (do not increase rejected probability above reference). The intuition behind this risk is as
 284 follows: a penalty is applied if the fine-tuned model assigns a lower probability to chosen answers
 285 than the reference model, or a higher probability to rejected answers.

286 Building on the above, we define a modified empirical selective risk as follows:
 287

$$288 \quad \hat{r}_\ell(\pi_\theta, \pi_{\text{ref}}, g) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n ((1 - w_+ - w_-) \cdot L_{\text{DPO}} + w_+ \cdot \ell(\pi_\theta, \pi_{\text{ref}}, y_{i,+}) + w_- \cdot \ell(\pi_\theta, \pi_{\text{ref}}, y_{i,-})) \cdot g(h_i) \quad (4)$$

291 where w_+ and w_- are hyper-parameters defined by the users. In the appendix, we include an ablation
 292 study to demonstrate the effectiveness of the two additional terms ($\ell(\pi_\theta, y_{i,+})$ and $\ell(\pi_\theta, y_{i,-})$).
 293

294 The **Select loss** aims to minimize the selective risk while maintaining a predefined coverage level c .
 295 Formally, the Select objective is given by:

$$296 \quad L_{\text{Select}} = \hat{r} + \lambda \cdot \Psi(c - \hat{\phi}(g)) \quad (5)$$

298 where $\hat{\phi}(g) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n g(h_i)$ is the empirical coverage, $\lambda > 0$ is a regularization parameter, and
 299 $\Psi(a) = \max(0, a)^2$ penalizes deviations from the target coverage rate c defined by the user.
 300

301 Finally, the **Combined loss** is defined as a weighted sum of the Select loss and the fine-tuning loss:
 302

$$303 \quad L_{\text{Combined}} = \alpha \cdot L_{\text{Select}} + (1 - \alpha) \cdot L_{\text{DPO}} \quad (6)$$

304 where $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ balances the weight of the two objectives. Following Geifman & El-Yaniv (2017),
 305 we set $\alpha = 0.5$ without hyperparameter tuning in all experiments.
 306

307 If we do not incorporate the Select loss, the model may produce outputs aligned with human
 308 preferences but lack effective confidence calibration, which could result in excessive abstention or
 309 incorrect responses overly confident. The use of the original DPO loss, L_{DPO} , is also essential to
 310 optimizing SelectLLM. Since the selection head is initialized randomly, without L_{DPO} , SelectLLM
 311 will focus on a fraction c of the training set, before accurate low level features are constructed. In
 312 such a case, SelectLLM will tend to overfit to the wrong subset of the training set. The L_{DPO} exposes
 313 the SelectLLM model to all training instances throughout the training process. Thus, integrating both
 314 losses ensures that the model achieves a balanced performance – producing high-quality, preference-
 315 aligned outputs while maintaining optimal coverage through calibrated confidence estimation.
 316

317 5 EXPERIMENTS

319 In this section, we first compare SelectLLM against seven baseline models on the TriviaQA (Joshi
 320 et al., 2017) and CommonsenseQA (Talmor et al., 2018) benchmarks, two widely used datasets for
 321 evaluating open-domain question-answering systems. We then demonstrate SelectLLM’s ability to
 322 generalize across domains by fine-tuning on CommonsenseQA and testing on TriviaQA. Next, we
 323 validate the confidence scores produced by SelectLLM, followed by an ablation study to assess the
 impact of the reward loss terms and the coverage–risk trade-off.

324
325

326 We use Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct¹(Grattafiori et al., 2024), Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2²(Jiang et al., 2023)
 327 and Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct³(Yang et al., 2025) in the experiments as the base models. We use
 328 QLoRA (Dettmers et al., 2023) with rank 16 to train all the models. For comparison, we use *base*
 329 (LLM without finetuning), *LACIE* (Stengel-Eskin et al., 2024) (DPO-based finetuning), *LARS* (Yaldiz
 330 et al., 2024) (uses a well-trained score function), *MARS* (Bakman et al., 2024) (uses a QA evaluator
 331 model), *TokenSAR* (Duan et al., 2023) (uses a sentence similarity model), *P(True)* (Kadavath et al.,
 332 2022) (a self-check method) and *Semantic Entropy (SE)* (Kuhn et al., 2023) (uses token probabilities)
 333 as our baselines. For all models, we report average performance across 5 seeds. We perform all the
 334 LLM fine-tuning on one A100-40GB GPU.

335

336 **Metrics.** Across all the experiments, we report the following evaluation metrics: the number of
 337 true positives (**TP**), the number of true negatives (**TN**), **Precision**, **Recall**, and **Coverage**. We also
 338 include the **TRUTH** metric introduced in Cheng et al. (2024), defined as the sum of TP and TN,
 339 which captures the number of correctly accepted and correctly abstained responses. Because the test
 340 dataset contains 1,000 samples, the upper bound of TRUTH is 1,000. As there are no ground-truth or
 341 reference confidence scores provided for each question, we cannot report AUROC or ECE scores.

342

343 For score-based methods (SelectLLM, LARS, MARS, TokenSAR, P(True), and SE), we tune a
 344 threshold on the validation set to maximize the TRUTH metric and then apply the same threshold
 345 to the test set for abstention. For non-score-based methods (base and LACIE), we use a rule-based
 346 evaluation strategy: a response is accepted as long as the model provides an answer and is rejected
 347 only if the model explicitly refuses or states that it does not know.

348

349 **Datasets.** We use the TriviaQA (Joshi et al., 2017), CommonsenseQA (Talmor et al., 2018), and
 350 MedConceptsQA (Shoham & Rappoport, 2024) datasets. Following Stengel-Eskin et al. (2024), for
 351 TriviaQA we randomly sample 10,000, 1,000, and 1,000 questions for the training, validation, and
 352 test sets, respectively. For CommonsenseQA, we randomly sample 8,000, 1,000, and 1,000 questions
 353 for the training, validation, and test sets, respectively. For MedConceptsQA, which is used solely for
 354 evaluation, we randomly sample 1,000 questions each for the validation and test sets.

355

356 To construct the chosen/rejected pairs used for LACIE and SelectLLM fine-tuning, we first augment
 357 each dataset with model-generated answers and their associated confidence scores. Specifically, we
 358 use the base models mentioned above to generate an answer for each question and then employ
 359 DeepSeek-v3 (Liu et al., 2024) to assign a confidence score based on the tone and phrasing of the
 360 generated response. We refer to this score as *tone-confidence*. The prompt provided to DeepSeek-v3
 361 is: “*Rate how confident the response appears based solely on its tone and phrasing.*”

362

363 We set a confidence threshold of 0.7: answers with scores above this threshold are accepted, while
 364 those below are rejected. If no correct answer exceeds the threshold, we default to a generic
 365 response—“*I don’t know the answer.*”—as the chosen answer. Such fallback responses occur in
 366 roughly 30% of the fine-tuning dataset. All remaining answers to the same question are treated as
 367 rejected. Finally, we construct the fine-tuning pairs for both LACIE and SelectLLM by sampling one
 368 chosen and one rejected answer for each question.

369

370 5.2 IN-DISTRIBUTION PERFORMANCE

371

372 We conduct experiments on the TriviaQA and CommonsenseQA datasets. As shown in Table 2&3, our
 373 method SelectLLM, consistently and substantially improves model truthfulness and precision across
 374 all three language models. It achieves the highest TRUTH score by a significant margin in every
 375 experiment—for instance, reaching 752.0 with Llama-3.1 compared to the base model’s 601.7. This
 376 strong performance is primarily driven by its unique strength in correctly abstaining from providing
 377 an answer, as evidenced by its leading True Negative (TN) values (e.g., 230.3 for Mistral-7B on
 378 TriviaQA and 142.6 on CommonsenseQA). In contrast, all other score-based methods (LARS, MARS,
 379 TokenSAR, P(True), SE) fail to provide a reliable confidence score, since their low TN counts and

380

¹<https://huggingface.co/meta-llama/Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct>

381

²<https://huggingface.co/mistralai/Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2>

382

³<https://huggingface.co/Qwen/Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct>

378
 379 *Table 2: TriviaQA performance. \uparrow indicates the higher the better, and \downarrow indicates the lower the better. The TN*
 380 *value for both the base and LACIE is 0.0 (with a corresponding Recall of 1.0), since they do not abstain from*
any answers.

Model	TP \uparrow	TN \uparrow	TRUTH \uparrow	Precision \uparrow	Recall \uparrow	Coverage (%)
<i>Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct</i>						
base	601.7 \pm 2.3	0.0 \pm 0.0	601.7 \pm 2.3	0.602 \pm 0.002	1.000 \pm 0.000	100.0 \pm 0.0
LARS	579.3 \pm 3.7	45.2 \pm 4.0	624.2 \pm 6.5	0.627 \pm 0.018	0.949 \pm 0.005	92.4 \pm 8.8
MARS	556.2 \pm 8.9	57.1 \pm 2.4	613.4 \pm 7.6	0.626 \pm 0.017	0.912 \pm 0.015	88.9 \pm 9.9
TokenSAR	559.2 \pm 9.3	62.3 \pm 6.2	621.1 \pm 7.9	0.630 \pm 0.006	0.916 \pm 0.022	88.7 \pm 14.6
P(True)	565.6 \pm 2.1	54.8 \pm 4.1	621.9 \pm 5.4	0.622 \pm 0.014	0.965 \pm 0.015	94.7 \pm 3.7
SE	589.5 \pm 7.4	32.1 \pm 5.8	619.3 \pm 7.5	0.627 \pm 0.010	0.926 \pm 0.011	90.1 \pm 12.8
LACIE (DPO)	579.3 \pm 23.6	0.0 \pm 0.0	579.3 \pm 23.6	0.579 \pm 0.024	1.000 \pm 0.000	100.0 \pm 0.0
SelectLLM ($c = 0.75$)	582.0 \pm 19.7	170.0 \pm 25.2	752.0 \pm 2.6	0.773 \pm 0.015	0.884 \pm 0.021	75.96 \pm 3.63
<i>Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2</i>						
base	598.3 \pm 4.0	0.0 \pm 0.0	598.3 \pm 9.0	0.598 \pm 0.009	1.000 \pm 0.000	100.0 \pm 0.0
LARS	587.4 \pm 7.5	48.2 \pm 3.4	635.3 \pm 8.2	0.626 \pm 0.010	0.977 \pm 0.008	93.8 \pm 12.9
MARS	558.5 \pm 8.1	40.2 \pm 4.2	598.1 \pm 2.9	0.608 \pm 0.013	0.928 \pm 0.010	91.7 \pm 4.7
TokenSAR	529.4 \pm 8.7	61.2 \pm 2.5	590.9 \pm 4.8	0.610 \pm 0.012	0.880 \pm 0.016	86.7 \pm 11.9
P(True)	532.8 \pm 10.9	81.2 \pm 5.1	613.1 \pm 6.4	0.626 \pm 0.009	0.885 \pm 0.015	85.0 \pm 8.3
SE	582.3 \pm 8.3	33.7 \pm 6.0	615.3 \pm 3.6	0.614 \pm 0.020	0.968 \pm 0.009	94.8 \pm 18.0
LACIE (DPO)	568.4 \pm 3.4	0.0 \pm 0.0	568.4 \pm 7.4	0.568 \pm 0.007	1.000 \pm 0.000	100.0 \pm 0.0
SelectLLM ($c = 0.70$)	522.0 \pm 19.9	230.3 \pm 24.7	752.3 \pm 12.3	0.741 \pm 0.019	0.891 \pm 0.039	70.87 \pm 4.21
<i>Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct</i>						
base	636.2 \pm 10.7	0.0 \pm 0.0	636.2 \pm 10.7	0.636 \pm 0.011	1.000 \pm 0.000	100.0 \pm 0.0
LARS	624.0 \pm 6.4	17.1 \pm 4.2	641.2 \pm 2.0	0.643 \pm 0.016	0.981 \pm 0.008	97.1 \pm 3.7
MARS	605.7 \pm 7.2	27.2 \pm 5.1	632.1 \pm 7.7	0.642 \pm 0.011	0.951 \pm 0.011	94.2 \pm 9.5
TokenSAR	580.4 \pm 2.3	72.2 \pm 11.8	652.6 \pm 3.6	0.665 \pm 0.015	0.912 \pm 0.012	87.2 \pm 7.4
P(True)	613.1 \pm 11.1	34.7 \pm 6.5	647.2 \pm 13.9	0.650 \pm 0.020	0.964 \pm 0.013	94.3 \pm 12.5
SE	624.2 \pm 9.5	30.3 \pm 2.4	654.7 \pm 5.8	0.651 \pm 0.011	0.981 \pm 0.008	95.8 \pm 14.6
LACIE (DPO)	646.7 \pm 3.3	0.0 \pm 0.0	646.7 \pm 3.3	0.647 \pm 0.003	1.000 \pm 0.000	100.0 \pm 0.0
SelectLLM ($c = 0.80$)	599.5 \pm 24.3	141.8 \pm 20.2	741.3 \pm 9.8	0.745 \pm 0.021	0.919 \pm 0.027	80.55 \pm 5.14

408 only marginal precision gains over the base model demonstrate an inability to effectively identify and
 409 filter out incorrect answers. We further analyze the confidence scores generated by SelectLLM in
 410 Section 5.5.

411 Consequently, when SelectLLM does generate a response, its reliability is much higher, reflected in its
 412 top-ranking Precision scores (e.g., 0.745 for Qwen2.5 on TriviaQA vs. the base model’s 0.636). This
 413 enhanced precision comes with a deliberate sacrifice of lower Coverage and Recall, as SelectLLM
 414 strategically answers fewer questions to avoid making errors. This demonstrates its effectiveness for
 415 applications where accuracy is more critical than providing an answer to every query.

418 5.3 OUT-OF-DISTRIBUTION GENERALIZATION

421 To further assess the generalizability of SelectLLM, we evaluate its performance on out-of-distribution
 422 (OOD) datasets. Specifically, the tested models are fine-tuned on CommonsenseQA, without any
 423 additional fine-tuning on the test datasets – TriviaQA and MedConceptsQA. The evaluation results
 424 are reported in Table 7&5. The results demonstrate that the learned abstention ability is transferable
 425 to OOD datasets. While the base and LACIE (DPO) models, which lack an abstention mechanism,
 426 are forced to answer every question, resulting in a True Negative (TN) of 0.0 and a low Precision,
 427 SelectLLM successfully transfers its learned skill of abstaining from uncertain queries to the unseen
 428 domains. This is clearly evidenced by its high TN counts: 74.0 on TriviaQA and a remarkable
 429 172.0 on MedConceptsQA. By correctly identifying and abstaining from these challenging OOD
 430 questions, SelectLLM significantly boosts its Precision and surpasses the performance of both the base
 431 models and LACIE (DPO). The successful transfer of its capability results in a higher TRUTH score,
 432 showing that SelectLLM is not only more reliable in familiar settings but also exhibits robustness and
 433 generalizability when faced with novel data.

432
 433 *Table 3: CommonsenseQA performance. \uparrow indicates the higher the better, and \downarrow indicates the lower the better.*
 434 *The TN value for both the base and LACIE is 0.0 (with a corresponding Recall of 1.0), since they do not*
abstain from any answers.

Model	TP \uparrow	TN \uparrow	TRUTH \uparrow	Precision \uparrow	Recall \uparrow	Coverage (%)
<i>Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct</i>						
base	627.3 \pm 10.1	0.0 \pm 0.0	627.3 \pm 10.1	0.627 \pm 0.004	1.000 \pm 0.000	100.0 \pm 0.0
LARS	575.6 \pm 4.4	14.2 \pm 6.2	589.0 \pm 9.1	0.616 \pm 0.019	0.917 \pm 0.027	93.4 \pm 12.8
MARS	567.3 \pm 7.2	11.1 \pm 6.1	578.8 \pm 8.9	0.610 \pm 0.011	0.904 \pm 0.010	92.9 \pm 11.0
TokenSAR	554.3 \pm 7.5	21.1 \pm 6.4	575.7 \pm 12.5	0.612 \pm 0.020	0.884 \pm 0.014	90.6 \pm 5.5
P(True)	566.1 \pm 6.9	13.3 \pm 5.7	579.7 \pm 4.7	0.611 \pm 0.013	0.903 \pm 0.018	92.6 \pm 9.2
SE	559.4 \pm 7.6	20.0 \pm 5.9	579.1 \pm 3.4	0.613 \pm 0.020	0.891 \pm 0.031	91.2 \pm 9.9
LACIE (DPO)	733.7 \pm 12.2	0.0 \pm 0.0	733.7 \pm 12.2	0.734 \pm 0.012	1.000 \pm 0.000	100.0 \pm 0.0
SelectLLM ($c = 0.85$)	697.2 \pm 23.1	98.6 \pm 22.1	795.8 \pm 11.2	0.834 \pm 0.016	0.915 \pm 0.027	83.28 \pm 4.09
<i>Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2</i>						
base	596.2 \pm 12.9	0.0 \pm 0.0	596.2 \pm 10.9	0.596 \pm 0.009	1.000 \pm 0.000	100.0 \pm 0.0
LARS	595.9 \pm 8.7	19.5 \pm 4.1	614.5 \pm 7.3	0.607 \pm 0.012	0.998 \pm 0.004	98.0 \pm 9.3
MARS	582.3 \pm 7.5	26.8 \pm 6.7	608.1 \pm 9.5	0.606 \pm 0.016	0.976 \pm 14.1	96.0 \pm 12.4
TokenSAR	571.3 \pm 6.8	27.5 \pm 2.7	598.2 \pm 6.2	0.602 \pm 0.019	0.958 \pm 0.016	94.8 \pm 21.9
P(True)	563.6 \pm 7.4	51.7 \pm 5.5	614.1 \pm 6.9	0.614 \pm 0.010	0.945 \pm 18.7	91.6 \pm 10.9
SE	579.3 \pm 11.2	24.6 \pm 10.3	603.9 \pm 7.1	0.604 \pm 0.012	0.972 \pm 15.4	95.9 \pm 13.3
LACIE (DPO)	603.7 \pm 9.0	0.0 \pm 0.0	603.7 \pm 9.0	0.604 \pm 9.9	1.000 \pm 0.000	100.0 \pm 0.0
SelectLLM ($c = 0.80$)	611.6 \pm 29.4	142.6 \pm 27.9	754.2 \pm 10.7	0.775 \pm 0.028	0.900 \pm 0.026	78.8 \pm 6.43
<i>Owen2.5-14B-Instruct</i>						
base	800.0 \pm 12.4	0.0 \pm 0.0	800.0 \pm 12.4	0.800 \pm 0.011	1.000 \pm 0.000	100.0 \pm 0.0
LARS	798.2 \pm 13.8	19.5 \pm 7.1	817.0 \pm 8.4	0.815 \pm 0.010	0.998 \pm 0.005	97.9 \pm 8.2
MARS	785.8 \pm 5.9	52.2 \pm 15.3	837.4 \pm 6.8	0.841 \pm 0.011	0.981 \pm 0.008	93.3 \pm 7.7
TokenSAR	713.6 \pm 9.3	62.2 \pm 2.8	775.8 \pm 12.1	0.838 \pm 0.022	0.891 \pm 0.014	85.1 \pm 7.9
P(True)	768.3 \pm 7.7	12.0 \pm 5.2	780.2 \pm 7.6	0.803 \pm 0.018	0.960 \pm 0.010	95.6 \pm 10.9
SE	777.3 \pm 4.5	41.7 \pm 9.9	818.5 \pm 7.4	0.830 \pm 0.010	0.971 \pm 0.009	93.6 \pm 8.3
LACIE (DPO)	823.7 \pm 4.0	0.0 \pm 0.0	823.7 \pm 4.0	0.824 \pm 0.004	1.000 \pm 0.000	100.0 \pm 0.0
SelectLLM ($c = 0.90$)	777.4 \pm 9.0	68.6 \pm 8.7	846.0 \pm 3.0	0.884 \pm 0.011	0.938 \pm 0.016	88.01 \pm 1.70

460 *Table 4: TriviaQA (out-of-distribution) performance. The TN value for both the base and LACIE is 0.0 (with a*
 461 *corresponding Recall of 1.0), since they do not abstain from any answers.*

Model	TP \uparrow	TN \uparrow	TRUTH \uparrow	Precision \uparrow	Recall \uparrow	Coverage (%)
<i>Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct</i>						
base	601.7 \pm 2.3	0.0 \pm 0.0	601.7 \pm 2.3	0.602 \pm 0.002	1.000 \pm 0.000	100.0 \pm 0.0
LACIE (DPO)	579.3 \pm 23.6	0.0 \pm 0.0	579.3 \pm 23.6	0.579 \pm 0.024	1.000 \pm 0.000	100.0 \pm 0.0
SelectLLM ($c = 0.85$)	555.0 \pm 12.7	74.0 \pm 10.1	629.0 \pm 13.6	0.626 \pm 0.012	0.933 \pm 0.011	86.72 \pm 3.67

468 *Table 5: MedConceptsQA (out-of-distribution) performance. The TN value for both the base and DPO is 0.0*
 469 *(with a corresponding Recall of 1.0), since they do not abstain from any answers.*

Model	TP \uparrow	TN \uparrow	TRUTH \uparrow	Precision \uparrow	Recall \uparrow	Coverage (%)
<i>Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct</i>						
base	319.0 \pm 5.13	0.0 \pm 0.0	319.0 \pm 5.13	0.319 \pm 0.05	1.000 \pm 0.000	100.0 \pm 0.0
LACIE (DPO)	465.0 \pm 37.48	0.0 \pm 0.0	465.0 \pm 37.48	0.465 \pm 0.04	1.000 \pm 0.000	100.0 \pm 0.0
SelectLLM ($c = 0.75$)	406.7 \pm 22.23	172.0 \pm 4.89	578.7 \pm 17.62	0.543 \pm 0.03	0.839 \pm 0.01	75.0 \pm 0.12

5.4 EFFECTIVENESS ON A NON-QA TASK

479 To further evaluate the effectiveness of SelectLLM on the non-QA tasks with objective ground
 480 truth, we conduct additional experiments on *GSM8K*, a high-quality grade-school math dataset
 481 with verifiable ground truth. We used the same data construction and training pipeline as in the
 482 QA setting, using *Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2* as the base model. The dataset was split into
 483 6,000 training samples, 1,000 validation samples, and 1,000 test samples. The results in Table 6 show
 484 that SelectLLM substantially improves precision and overall correctness on math reasoning without
 485 any task-specific engineering. This confirms that our proposed method is task-agnostic and extends
 naturally to domains with objectively measurable correctness.


486
487 *Table 6: GSM8K-math (non-QA) performance. The TN value for both the base and DPO is 0.0 (with a
corresponding Recall of 1.0), since they do not abstain from any answers.*

489 Model	TP \uparrow	TN \uparrow	TRUTH \uparrow	Precision \uparrow	Recall \uparrow	Coverage (%)
<i>Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct</i>						
491 Base	482.0 \pm 3.8	0.0 \pm 0.0	482.0 \pm 3.8	0.482 \pm 0.003	1.000 \pm 0.0	100.0 \pm 0.0%
492 DPO	551.0 \pm 12.2	0.0 \pm 0.0	551.0 \pm 12.2	0.551 \pm 0.012	1.000 \pm 0.0	100.0 \pm 0.0%
493 SelectLLM ($c = 0.7$)	558.0 \pm 15.6	165.0 \pm 18.3	723.0 \pm 16.7	0.811 \pm 0.012	0.922 \pm 0.018	70.39 \pm 1.9%

495 5.5 VALIDATION OF SELECTLLM CONFIDENCE SCORES

497 In this section, we validate the confidence scores generated by SelectLLM by comparing their
498 distribution with the tone-confidence score (referred to Section 5.3) produced by DeepSeek-v3. To
499 visualize these two distributions, we first divide the tone-confidence scores into five bins ([0.2, 0.36],
500 [0.36, 0.52], [0.52, 0.68], [0.68, 0.84], [0.84, 1.00]). Each sample is assigned to a bin based on its tone-
501 confidence score. We then compute the mean tone-confidence and the mean SelectLLM-generated
502 confidence for the samples within each bin.

503 Figure 3 illustrates a small distribution difference between the confidence scores produced by Se-
504 lectLLM and the tone-confidence scores generated by DeepSeek-v3 on two datasets. The close
505 alignment of the mean SelectLLM confidence scores with the corresponding tone-confidence scores
506 across all bins demonstrates that the selection head produces meaningful and well-calibrated confi-
507 dence estimates. This evidence supports the conclusion that SelectLLM can internally and reliably
508 estimate its own prediction confidence, without requiring external reference models.



520 *Figure 3: Distribution Difference between tone-confidence and SelectLLM-confidence for in-distribution (left,
521 CommonsenseQA) and out-of-distribution (right, MedConceptsQA)*

524 6 CONCLUSION

526 In this paper, we have introduced an alignment-based method, called SelectLLM, that explicitly
527 produces confidence estimates and incorporates the task of confidence estimation into its training
528 objectives. Our extensive empirical evaluations on three QA benchmark datasets, using three different
529 LLMs, demonstrate that SelectLLM consistently achieves better risk-coverage tradeoffs than seven
530 baselines. SelectLLM’s notable strengths include superior uncertainty calibration, robust cross-
531 domain generalization, and flexible, tunable performance. These experimental outcomes confirm
532 SelectLLM as an effective and principled solution for enhancing model reliability and practical utility
533 in uncertainty-sensitive, real-world scenarios.

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702 **A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS**
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704 In the following table, we provide the qualitative examples of the base and SelectLLM fine-tuned
 705 Llama3.1-8B models, together with the SelectLLM confidence score to the questions. Correct
 706 answers are highlighted in green. These examples demonstrate the effectiveness of SelectLLM in
 707 two key aspects: it enables the model to express high confidence when it truly knows the answer, and
 708 to avoid overconfidence when uncertain. Moreover, SelectLLM produces accurate confidence scores
 709 without relying on any external model. This demonstrates SelectLLM’s ability to achieve a better
 710 risk-coverage trade-off.

711 Question	712 base (Llama3.1-8B)	713 SelectLLM
714 <i>While people just throw coins down them now, what originally had a pail to be lowered for it’s intended use? Choose the answer from the following choices. (a) garage. (b) utility room. (c) slide. (d) wishing well. (e) garden.</i>	715 I’m about 50% confident in my answer. I think the 716 answer is d. I choose this because in a wishing 717 well, a pail or bucket is often lowered down into the well so people can collect water. [Correct & Unconfident]	718 (d) wishing well. A wishing well is a type of 719 stone-lined well that was originally built with a 720 pail lowered down a rope for people to make a 721 wish and retrieve water. The pail made it possible 722 for people to make a wish and then retrieve water. 723 This is the origin of the wishing well. The answer 724 choice is (d) wishing well. I am 95% sure. [Correct & Confident, SelectLLM-confidence=0.968]
725 <i>Miss Grady took a stick from Bob because he was playing with it during class. She wanted to make sure that he couldn’t get to it so she put it where? Choose the answer from the following choices. (a) desk drawer. (b) kitchen drawer. (c) classroom. (d) pocket. (e) office.</i>	726 Miss Grady put the stick where so that Bob could 727 not get to it. In order to do that, she would most 728 likely have put it in a location where she would 729 have control over it. The classroom is where Miss 730 Grady would have the most control over the stick, 731 so that’s where she would have put it. Answer: C. [Incorrect & Confident]	732 (a) or (d) possibly (d) perhaps a pencil or supply 733 box, but (d) a desk drawer or (d) supply cabinet 734 would be most likely. Explanation: Since Miss 735 Grady took the stick from Bob to prevent him 736 from using it, she would likely put it in a secure 737 location where he would not be able to get to it. [Abstention & Unconfident, SelectLLM-confidence=0.051]
738 <i>What is the description of the medical code S04.019S in ICD10CM? A. Unspecified fracture of unspecified thoracic vertebra, subsequent encounter for fracture with nonunion. B. Terrorism involving fires, conflagration and hot substances, civilian injured, subsequent encounter. C. Injury of optic nerve, unspecified eye, sequela. D. Laceration of abdominal wall with foreign body, epigastric region without penetration into peritoneal cavity, sequela.</i>	739 I am 95% confident that my answer is B. 740 Terrorism involving fires, conflagration and hot 741 substances, civilian injured, subsequent encounter. 742 This is because the code S04.019S starts with 743 S04 which is the code for terrorism, and the 744 019S represents the subsequent encounter for a 745 civilian injured. This makes option B the most 746 likely correct answer. [Incorrect & Confident]	747 None of the options describe a code that is the 748 same as T32.98 in ICD10CM. The options 749 provided don’t seem to be correct. The only way 750 to actually answer this question would be to look 751 at the ICD10CM for the code T32.98. [Abstention & Unconfident, SelectLLM-confidence=0.233]

739 **B EFFECT OF TWO ADDITIONAL LOSS TERMS**
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741 We compare the performance of SelectLLM using the Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct model with/without the
 742 two reward loss terms mentioned in Equation 4 on TriviaQA benchmark, and report the results in
 743 Table 6 ($c = 0.80$). The table shows that integrating the additional reward loss terms significantly
 744 boosts overall model performance. Models that incorporate these terms consistently outperform those
 745 without, providing empirical validation for the theoretical rationale behind penalizing misalignment
 746 relative to the reference model.

747 **C ABLATION STUDY**
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
750 To assess the robustness of SelectLLM, we conducted a sensitivity analysis on five key hyperparamete-
 751 rs: the target coverage rate c , the loss weighting parameter α , the regularization parameter λ , the
 752 learning rate, and batch size. All experiments were performed using Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct on the
 753 TriviaQA dataset. As illustrated in Figure 4, SelectLLM demonstrates consistent superiority over the
 754 baselines (Base Model and LACIE) across a wide range of hyperparameter configurations. These
 755 results confirm that SelectLLM’s improvements in the risk-coverage trade-off are robust and not
 artifacts of narrow hyperparameter tuning.

756 *Table 7: Ablation Study in terms of the additional loss $\ell(\pi_\theta, y)$ on TriviaQA. \uparrow indicates the higher the better,
757 and \downarrow indicates the lower the better.*

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759 Model	760 TP \uparrow	761 TN \uparrow	762 TRUTH \uparrow	763 Precision \uparrow	764 Recall \uparrow	765 Coverage (%)
<i>Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct</i>						
762 base	763 601.7 \pm 2.3	764 0.0 \pm 0.0	765 601.7 \pm 2.3	766 0.602 \pm 0.002	767 1.000 \pm 0.000	768 100.0 \pm 0.0
763 SelectLLM w/o $\ell(\pi_\theta, y)$	764 572.1 \pm 22.3	765 123.6 \pm 21.9	766 695.7 \pm 11.7	767 0.704 \pm 0.019	768 0.901 \pm 0.023	769 80.04 \pm 3.89
764 SelectLLM w/ $\ell(\pi_\theta, y)$	765 599.5 \pm 24.3	766 141.8 \pm 20.2	767 741.3 \pm 9.8	768 0.745 \pm 0.021	769 0.919 \pm 0.027	770 80.55 \pm 5.14

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774 *Figure 4: Risk-Coverage Curves for Different Hyper-parameters.*

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D LLM USAGE

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779 This work aims to balance the coverage and accuracy for large language models (LLMs). All the base
780 models tested in this paper are LLMs, including Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2,
781 and Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct. LLMs are also used for language polishing and to improve the paper's
782 readability.

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