
Differentially Private Linear Regression via Medians

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Abstract

1 Linear regression is one of the simplest machine learning tasks. Despite much
2 work, differentially private linear regression still lacks effective algorithms. We
3 propose a new approach based on a multivariate extension of the Theil-Sen esti-
4 mator. The theoretical advantage of our approach is that we do not directly rely
5 on noise addition, which requires bounding the sensitivity. Instead we compute
6 differentially private medians as a subroutine, which are more robust. We also
7 show experimentally that our approach compares favourably to prior work.

8 1 Introduction

9 **Background & Motivation** Differential Privacy [DMNS06] is a standard for ensuring that the
10 output (i.e., trained model) of a machine learning system does not leak sensitive details about its
11 input (i.e., training data, which could contain private information about individual people). Differ-
12 entially private machine learning has been the topic of considerable research, both theoretical and
13 empirical, and is also used in practice [MT22].

14 Arguably, the simplest machine learning task is linear regression. That is, we are given a dataset
15 $(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2), \dots, (x_n, y_n) \in \mathbb{R}^d \times \mathbb{R}$ and our goal is to fit a linear model of the form $y_i \approx$
16 $\langle \theta, x_i \rangle$ for some $\theta \in \mathbb{R}^d$. More precisely, ordinary least squares linear regression minimizes the
17 squared error $\sum_i^n (\langle \theta, x_i \rangle - y_i)^2$. This objective corresponds to assuming that the errors (i.e., the
18 deviations from a perfect linear relationship) are Gaussian. This objective is particularly nice, as
19 it has a closed-form solution: $\theta = (X^T X)^{-1} X^T y$, where $X = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)^T \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times d}$ and
20 $y = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n)^T \in \mathbb{R}^n$.

21 Given the practical importance of linear regression, there has been a lot of work on differentially
22 private linear regression. (We discuss the related work in more detail in Section 1.3.) However,
23 these prior works all suffer from the same limitation: To guarantee differential privacy they add
24 noise to some quantity – either to the raw data X and y , to the sufficient statistics $X^T X$ and $X^T y$,
25 or to the gradients $\sum_i x_i \cdot (\langle \theta, x_i \rangle - y_i)$ encountered when optimizing the least squares objective.
26 This noise addition approach requires bounding the sensitivity, which essentially means we must
27 provide a priori bounds on $\|x_i\|$ and $|y_i|$ or, rather, we must scale/clip the quantities of interest to
28 enforce these bounds. The clipping hyperparameter induces a harsh privacy-utility tradeoff: If the
29 bounds are loose, we must add more noise than necessary. If the bounds are too tight, the clipping
30 distorts the data. This raises the question: *Can we perform differentially private linear regression in*
31 *a way that is (nearly) agnostic to the sensitivity?*

32 **Inspiration for Our Approach** To gain some intuition, consider the even simpler task of mean
33 estimation, i.e., computing the average $\frac{1}{n} \sum_i^n x_i$. Here we face the same difficulty in terms of
34 clipping the data to bound the sensitivity. Numerous approaches to mean estimation have been
35 studied [e.g.: KV17; BS19; KSU20; BDKU20; LKKO21; LKO21].




Figure 1: Comparison of DP linear regression algorithms. Mean square error (i.e., $\mathbb{E}[(\langle \hat{\theta}, x \rangle - y)^2]$) on vertical axis in logarithmic scale) as a function of the number of samples (i.e., n on horizontal axis) for dimensions $d = 10$ (left) and $d = 30$ (right); and a function of ϵ for $n = 10^5$ and dimensions $d = 10$ (left) and $d = 30$ (right). The line show the median and the semitransparent shadow shows the 0.1 and 0.9 quantiles of the error; values are computed over 20 runs. Privacy parameters are $\epsilon = 1$ and $\delta = 10^{-6}$; and $\ell = 1$. Data is synthetic, see Section 2.1 for details.

36 One way to sidestep this sensitivity issue is to look at the median instead of the mean. Under
 37 reasonable distributional assumptions, the median is a good approximation to the mean, with the
 38 advantage that the sensitivity of the median is usually much lower than the mean. Thus the median
 39 can be a good tool for differentially private mean estimation.

40 The key innovation of our approach is to carry this median-instead-of-mean idea over to the setting
 41 of linear regression. But this is far from straightforward – we are interested in the multidimensional
 42 setting and even defining a multi-dimensional median is nontrivial.

43 We draw further inspiration from the literature on robust statistics – intuitively, the median is a robust
 44 replacement for the mean. In particular, the Theil-Sen estimator [The50; Sen68] uses the median
 45 to perform robust *simple* linear regression (i.e., $d = 1$). Indeed, a differentially private Theil-Sen
 46 estimator has been studied by Dwork and Lei [DL09] and Alabi, McMillan, Sarathy, Smith, and
 47 Vadhan [AMSSV22]. We extend this to multivariate linear regression using a variant of the (non-
 48 private) approach of Dang, Peng, Wang, and Zhang [DPWZ08].

Algorithm 1 Private efficient multivariate Theil-Sen estimator.

1: **Input:** $(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2), \dots, (x_n, y_n) \in \mathbb{R}^d \times \mathbb{R}$.
2: **Parameters:** Privacy parameter $\varepsilon > 0$. Number of partitions $\ell \geq 1$. Output range $\mathcal{R} \subset \mathbb{R}$.
3: Let $m = \lfloor n/d \rfloor$.
4: Initialize an empty multiset $\Theta \subset \mathcal{R}^d$.
5: **for** $k \in [\ell]$ **do** \triangleright Generate $\ell \cdot m$ subproblems $S_{j,k}$ such that each input appears in at most ℓ .
6: Randomly choose m disjoint sets $S_{1,k}, S_{2,k}, \dots, S_{m,k} \subset [n]$ each of size d .
7: **for** $j \in [m]$ **do**
8: Compute $\theta_{j,k} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ such that $\langle \theta_{j,k}, x_i \rangle = y_i$ for all $i \in S_{j,k}$.
9: Project $\theta_{j,k} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ into $\tilde{\theta}_{j,k} \in \mathcal{R}^d$ – i.e., $\tilde{\theta}_{j,k} = \arg \min_{\tilde{\theta} \in \mathcal{R}^d} \|\tilde{\theta} - \theta_{j,k}\|$.
10: Add $\tilde{\theta}_{j,k}$ to Θ .
11: **end for**
12: **end for**
13: \triangleright Compute an approximate median $\hat{\theta} \in \mathcal{R}^d$ of the set Θ in a DP manner.
14: **for** $i \in [d]$ **do** \triangleright Independently sample i -th coordinate of $\hat{\theta}$ using the exponential mechanism.
15: Sample $\hat{\theta}_i \in \mathcal{R}$ with probability proportional to
$$\mathbb{P}[\hat{\theta}_i] \propto \exp\left(-\frac{\varepsilon}{2\ell d} \max\left\{\left|\left\{\theta \in \Theta : \theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i\right\}\right|, \left|\left\{\theta \in \Theta : \theta_i > \hat{\theta}_i\right\}\right|\right\}\right).$$

16: **end for**
17: **return** $\hat{\theta}$.

49 1.1 Our Algorithm

50 Our private linear regression algorithm is described in Algorithm 1. We proceed with some remarks
51 about our algorithm.

52 The high-level idea of the Theil-Sen estimator is that, rather than trying to solve the global objective
53 (i.e., $\min_{\theta} \sum_i^n ((\theta, x_i) - y_i)^2$), we solve $\ell \cdot m$ subproblems and then combine these solutions into
54 a single solution via a median. Each subproblem consists of a subset of d out of n of the input
55 points (which is enough to uniquely specify the weights $\theta_{j,k} \in \mathbb{R}^d$, assuming the x_i s are linearly
56 independent).

57 The standard Theil-Sen estimator considers all $\binom{n}{d}$ possible subproblems. This is computationally
58 prohibitive for realistic values of n and d ; hence we randomly select a subset of $\ell \cdot m$ subproblems.
59 We will consider small numbers of repetitions, such as $\ell = 1$.

60 From a differential privacy perspective, changing one input point (x_i, y_i) can change ℓ subproblems
61 and hence ℓ elements of Θ . If our method for computing the median is (ε/ℓ) -differentially private
62 with respect to changing one element of Θ , then by group privacy it is ε -differentially private with
63 respect to changing one input point (x_i, y_i) , as required.¹ This is a straightforward extension of the
64 sample-and-aggregate framework [NRS07].

65 There are many ways to defube and compute a multivariate median (even non-privately). For sim-
66 plicity, we compute a marginal median: we simply compute the univariate median for each coord-
67 inate – i.e., $\hat{\theta}_i \approx \operatorname{median}_{\theta \in \Theta} \theta_i$ for each $i \in [d]$. Privately approximating the univariate median is
68 a well-studied problem [NRS07; Smi08; DL09; Smi11; BNSV15; KV17; FS18; KLSU19; BS19;
69 AD20; KLMNS20; GJK21; ABEC22]. We compute the median by a simple application of the expo-
70 nential mechanism [MT07a]; although this doesn't achieve optimal asymptotic bounds, it performs
71 remarkably well in practice. To be specific, following Smith [Smi11] and Feldman and Steinke
72 [FS18], we sample each coordinate $\hat{\theta}_i$ from a probability distribution that decays exponentially with
73 how far away it is from the median. This ensures that the overall algorithm satisfies ε -DP and is

¹For simplicity, in this discussion, we restrict ourselves to pure differential privacy, but, to obtain better composition bounds in the high-dimensional setting, we will work with concentrated differential privacy [DR16; BS16] or approximate differential privacy [DKMMN06].

74 accurate under reasonable conditions. Each coordinate $\hat{\theta}_i$ is computed in a way that is ε/d -DP.
 75 Composing over the d coordinates yields the final ε -DP bound.

76 Note that we restrict the range of the coordinates to $\mathcal{R} \subset \mathbb{R}$. This can either be an interval (e.g.,
 77 $\mathcal{R} = [a, b]$) or a discrete set (e.g., $\mathcal{R} = \{a + (b - a) \cdot (i - 1)/r : i \in [r + 1]\}$). For the exponential
 78 mechanism to be well-defined, it is necessary to ensure that \mathcal{R} has finite measure (i.e., a bounded
 79 interval with Lebesgue measure or a finite set with the counting measure). Regardless of our choice
 80 of algorithm, it is known that some such restriction is necessary in the worst case [ALMM19]. In
 81 most cases, the exact choice of \mathcal{R} is not particularly critical for our algorithm, so we do not dwell
 82 on this issue.

83 There is a subtlety of our choice of loss function for the exponential mechanism: If $\hat{\theta}_i \neq \theta_i$ for all
 84 $\theta \in \Theta$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \max \left\{ \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right|, \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i > \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right| \right\} = \\ \max \left\{ \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right|, |\Theta| - \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right| \right\} \\ = \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right| - \frac{1}{2}|\Theta| + \frac{1}{2}|\Theta|. \end{aligned}$$

85 The final expression is more natural than the first expression. The quantity $\left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right|$
 86 gives the rank (i.e., rescaled quantile) of the value $\hat{\theta}_i$ in the multiset $\{\theta_i : \theta \in \Theta\}$. The true median
 87 has rank $\frac{1}{2}|\Theta|$, so the loss measures how far the rank is from this ideal. When everything has a con-
 88 tinuous distribution, the above equality between the expressions holds with probability 1. However,
 89 if we have a discrete distribution (such as when \mathcal{R} is a discrete set), the above equality does not hold.
 90 Consider the extreme case where the multiset Θ consists of a single point θ^* repeated many times.
 91 When $\hat{\theta}_i = \theta_i^*$, our loss function takes value 0 and, for $\hat{\theta}_i \neq \theta_i^*$, our loss function takes value $|\Theta|$.
 92 In contrast, the final expression above would yield a constant function taking value $|\Theta|$ everywhere.
 93 Thus our loss function performs better in the discrete case.

94 1.2 Our Results

95 We provide a theoretical privacy and utility analysis of our algorithm, as well as an experimental
 96 evaluation of our algorithm. Our theoretical guarantee is helpful to build understanding. However,
 97 our experimental results give a clearer comparison to prior work. See Figure 1 for an experimental
 98 comparison of algorithms. Next we state the main accuracy result:

99 **Theorem 1.1** (Main Result). *For any $\tilde{\varepsilon}, \tilde{\delta} > 0$ and $n, d, r \in \mathbb{N}$, Algorithm 1 with appropriate
 100 settings of parameters provides $(\tilde{\varepsilon}, \tilde{\delta})$ -DP and the following accuracy guarantee.*

101 *Fix $\theta^* \in [-r, +r]^d$ and $\sigma > 0$. Assume the inputs $(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2), \dots, (x_n, y_n) \in \mathbb{R}^d \times \mathbb{R}$ are
 102 drawn i.i.d. as follows. Independently for each $i \in [n]$, we have $x_i \leftarrow \mathcal{N}(0, I)$ and then, conditioned
 103 on x_i , we have $y_i \leftarrow \mathcal{N}(\langle \theta^*, x_i \rangle, \sigma^2)$.*

104 *If $\hat{\theta}$ is the output of Algorithm 1 with the above inputs and parameters, then, for all $\beta > 0$, we have*

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\|\hat{\theta} - \theta^*\|_\infty \leq \sigma \cdot O \left(\frac{d \cdot \sqrt{d \cdot \log(1/\tilde{\delta})}}{\tilde{\varepsilon} n} \log \left(\frac{dr}{\beta} \right) + \sqrt{\frac{d \cdot \log(d/\beta)}{n}} \right) + \frac{1}{r} \right] \geq 1 - \beta.$$

105 We now make some remarks about the meaning of our theoretical result.

106 **Pure DP vs. Approximate DP** Algorithm 1 offers both pure and approximate DP guarantees (and
 107 concentrated DP); see Proposition A.1 for details. The parameter ε of the algorithm corresponds to
 108 the pure $(\varepsilon, 0)$ -DP guarantee. In high dimensional settings (i.e., large d), we can apply advanced
 109 composition results to obtain better guarantees. Specifically, the approximate $(\tilde{\varepsilon}, \tilde{\delta})$ -DP guarantee
 110 of Theorem 1.1 is achieved by setting $\varepsilon \approx \tilde{\varepsilon} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{d}{\log(1/\tilde{\delta})}}$.

111 **Accuracy Guarantee** The error bound of Theorem 1.1 has three terms: $\sigma \cdot \frac{d}{\epsilon m} \log\left(\frac{dr}{\beta}\right)$ is the
 112 error due to privacy; $\sigma \cdot \sqrt{\frac{\log(d/\beta)}{m}}$ is the non-private statistical estimation error (a.k.a. generalization
 113 error); and $\frac{1}{r}$ is the error from rounding to the discrete set \mathcal{R} of size $O(r^2)$.

114 Our accuracy guarantee bounds $\|\hat{\theta} - \theta^*\|_\infty$. This is particularly useful if our goal is to estimate
 115 some parameter θ_i^* , as it provides a confidence interval. We can of course also use this to bound the
 116 Euclidean norm: $\|\hat{\theta} - \theta^*\|_2 \leq \sqrt{d} \cdot \|\hat{\theta} - \theta^*\|_\infty$. It is also common to provide bounds on the mean
 117 squared error. Under our distributional assumptions, this is equivalent to bounding the Euclidean
 118 norm: If $x \leftarrow \mathcal{N}(0, I)$ and $y \leftarrow \mathcal{N}(\langle \theta^*, x \rangle, \sigma^2)$, then, for all $\hat{\theta} \in \mathbb{R}^d$

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\left(\langle \hat{\theta}, x \rangle - y \right)^2 \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[\left(\langle \theta^*, x \rangle - y \right)^2 \right] + \|\hat{\theta} - \theta^*\|_2^2 = \sigma^2 + \|\hat{\theta} - \theta^*\|_2^2.$$

119 **Distributional Assumptions** We emphasize that our privacy guarantee is worst-case and the dis-
 120 tributional assumptions are only for the accuracy analysis. Thus the maxim “all models are wrong,
 121 but some are useful” (attributed to George Box) applies. That is, we don’t expect real data to per-
 122 fectly follow a Gaussian distribution. Our algorithm still works even if these assumptions fail, but
 123 we believe that the theorem is a useful indication that our algorithm provides useful accuracy.

124 There is also some flexibility in the Gaussian assumption: If the x_i s are drawn from $\mathcal{N}(0, \Sigma)$ instead
 125 of $\mathcal{N}(0, I)$ then we can apply a transformation $(x_i, y_i) \mapsto (\Sigma^{-1/2}x_i, y_i)$ to make the distribution
 126 of x_i s spherical, run our algorithm to obtain $\hat{\theta}$, and then map this back to a solution to the original
 127 problem $\Sigma^{-1/2}\hat{\theta}$.

128 Our assumption that the data comes from a multivariate Gaussian is reasonably standard. Assuming
 129 that $\|\theta^*\|_\infty \leq r$ is less standard. In the non-private setting we don’t need to make any assumption
 130 on θ^* , but it is necessary in the private case [ALMM19]. Note that we can arbitrarily rescale this
 131 constraint: If instead we assume $\|\theta^* - \theta^0\|_\infty \leq b \cdot r$ for some $b > 0$, then we can simply transform
 132 the data $(x_i, y_i) \mapsto (x_i, \frac{1}{b}(y_i - \langle \theta^0, x_i \rangle))$, run our algorithm to obtain $\hat{\theta} \in [-r, r]^d$, and then map
 133 this back to a solution to the original problem $b \cdot \hat{\theta} + \theta^0$. The accuracy guarantee will be rescaled
 134 accordingly. Similarly, the infinity norm can be replaced by the Euclidean norm by transforming the
 135 problem with a random unitary matrix [e.g., KLS21, §4.2].

136 **Parameters** The sample size n , dimension d , noise variance σ^2 , and privacy parameters $\tilde{\epsilon}$ and $\tilde{\delta}$
 137 are all standard parameters. The only non-standard parameter of Theorem 1.1 is r . This determines
 138 both the size and granularity of the restricted range \mathcal{R} in Algorithm 1. This parameter should be
 139 thought of as capturing how uncertain we are about $\theta^* \in [-r, r]^d$ and how precise our final answer
 140 should be – i.e., the granularity of \mathcal{R} is $1/r$ (which should ideally scale with σ). Theorem 1.1 runs
 141 Algorithm 1 with $\ell = 1$.

142 1.3 Related Work

143 Linear regression has been well studied in the non-private setting; we do not discuss this setting
 144 except to mention the connection to robust statistics. Robust statistics seeks to develop estimators
 145 that are resistant to a small fraction of the dataset being corrupted. This kind of robustness turns
 146 out to be useful for designing DP algorithms [NRS07; DL09; BS19] and our work extends this
 147 connection. In particular, the standard approach to linear regression is not robust, which led to
 148 the development of the robust Theil-Sen estimator [The50; Sen68] and its multivariate extension
 149 [DPWZ08], which are the basis for our work.

150 DP linear regression has also been well-studied. Most similar to our work is that of Alabi, McMillan,
 151 Sarathy, Smith, and Vadhan [AMSSV22], which studies the Theil-Sen estimator in the setting of
 152 *simple* linear regression. This is essentially our algorithm restricted to the case of $d = 1$, although
 153 they also add a constant intercept, i.e., an affine relationship $y \approx \theta x + b$. Adding an intercept is
 154 equivalent to adding an extra feature to x that is always 1 and adding a corresponding dimension to
 155 θ . Dwork and Lei [DL09] propose two DP robust regression methods. The first is, like ours, based
 156 on the Theil-Sen estimator, although with a different method for computing the median. The second
 157 changes the loss function to one with bounded gradients, namely $\sum_i^n |\langle \theta, x_i \rangle - y_i| / \|x_i\|_2$, and

158 analyzes the robustness of the solution to this new problem. Unfortunately, Dwork and Lei [DL09]
159 provide very limited theoretical results and no experimental results for us to compare against.

160 Our algorithmic approach of analyzing several subproblems and then privately combining the an-
161 swers is based on the sample-and-aggregate framework of Nissim, Raskhodnikova, and Smith
162 [NRS07]. Similar algorithms have appeared in other works. In particular, Feldman and Steinke
163 [FS18] use a median-of-means approach to compute a univariate mean. Singhal and Steinke [SS21]
164 propose an algorithm that is similar to ours, but for the different (but related) problem of finding a
165 low-dimensional subspace that captures the data.

166 A natural approach to DP linear regression is to apply general-purpose optimization tools to the ob-
167 jective function $f(\theta) = \sum_i^n (\langle \theta, x_i \rangle - y_i)^2$. Noisy gradient descent (DP-GD) [SCS13; BST14;
168 ACGMMTZ16] is a widely-used tool for private optimization. It adds noise to the gradients
169 $\nabla f(\theta) = 2 \sum_i^n (\langle \theta, x_i \rangle - y_i) \cdot x_i$ encountered during the optimization procedure. To ensure that
170 the gradients are bounded, we must clip them before adding noise. That is, we add noise to
171 $\min\{1, c/\|\nabla f(\theta)\|\} \cdot \nabla f(\theta)$ instead of $\nabla f(\theta)$, which could be unbounded. This approach works
172 remarkably well, but it requires carefully setting the clipping parameter c . The larger c is, the more
173 noise we add. But if c is too small we distort the gradients and the optimization procedure may
174 not even converge in time. We use this approach as a comparison point in our experiments, but we
175 find that setting the parameters (c , number of steps, and learning rate) to be highly non-trivial. In
176 an unpublished work, Varshney, Jain, and Thakurta [VJT22] propose a variant of DP-GD where the
177 clipping parameter c is chosen in a data-dependent manner at each step of the optimization. They
178 show that this adaptive clipping can achieve asymptotically optimal results. Kamath, Li, Singhal,
179 and Ullman [KLSU19] apply a similar adaptive clipping approach to learning the parameters of
180 a Gaussian distribution; linear regression can be reduced to this task [MKF12]. Another general-
181 purpose optimization tool is Objective Perturbation [CMS11], which was applied to linear regression
182 by Wang [Wan18], but objective perturbation requires stronger assumptions than DP-GD (such as
183 convexity and smoothness) which means we also need additional assumptions to apply it to linear
184 regression. Finally, we mention that, under the right assumptions, it is possible to apply the expo-
185 nential mechanism [MT07b] to the linear regression objective, which can be viewed as a form of
186 bayesian sampling [Wan18].

187 Since there is a closed-form solution in the non-private setting – namely, $\hat{\theta} = (X^T X)^{-1} X^T y$ where
188 each example (x_i, y_i) is a row of X and the corresponding row of y – another natural approach
189 to the problem is to perturb $X^T X = \sum_i^n x_i x_i^T \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times d}$ and $X^T y = \sum_i^n y_i x_i \in \mathbb{R}^d$, which are
190 known as the sufficient statistics. This requires us to bound the sensitivity of these terms, which
191 boils down to bounding $\|x_i\|_2$ and $|y_i|$. For our experimental comparison, we add Gaussian noise to
192 both $X^T X$ and $X^T y$. One downside of adding Gaussian noise to $X^T X$ is that it may cease to be
193 positive semidefinite. Thus it has also been suggested to add noise drawn from a Wishart distribution
194 [She19]. (We note that analyzing Wishart noise is difficult and incorrect analyses of this approach
195 have been published [JXZ16; IS16].) Wang [Wan18] also studied an adaptive form of sufficient
196 statistics perturbation.

197 It is also possible to add noise directly to the data [DTTZ14; She17; She19]. That is, we perturb X
198 and y , which also requires bounding $\|x_i\|_2$ and $|y_i|$. This tends to yield worse results than perturbing
199 the sufficient statistics. Intuitively, this approach adds noise to each of the n rows of X and y , so
200 the amount of noise grows with n . In contrast, the amount of noise added to $X^T X$ and $X^T y$ does
201 not grow with n . However, adding noise to the data is desirable if we are in the setting of local DP
202 [KLNRS11]; our results are for the central DP setting.

203 As mentioned earlier, of the key advantages of our algorithm over the optimization and perturbation
204 approaches is that we do not need to clip or bound the data (x_i, y_i) , which can be quite detrimental
205 to accuracy in practice. Our use of a median-based algorithm means we have much lower sensitivity
206 to these bounds (logarithmic instead of linear).

207 2 Experiments

208 We now perform an empirical evaluation of our algorithm using synthetic data. We compare to state-
209 of-the-art approaches and, since our algorithm has several moving parts, we also consider variants
210 of our algorithm.




Figure 2: Comparison of DP linear regression algorithms for features sampled from $\mathcal{N}(0, I)$. Mean square error (i.e., $\mathbb{E}[(\langle \hat{\theta}, x \rangle - y)^2]$ on vertical axis in logarithmic scale) as a function of the number of samples (i.e., n on horizontal axis) for dimensions $d = 10$ (left) and $d = 30$ (right); and a function of ε for $n = 10^5$ and dimensions $d = 10$ (left) and $d = 30$ (right). The line show the median and the semitransparent shadow shows the 0.1 and 0.9 quantiles of the error; values are computed over 20 runs. Privacy parameters are $\varepsilon = 1$ and $\delta = 10^{-6}$; and $\ell = 1$. Data is synthetic, see Section 2.1 for details.

2.1 Synthetic Data

We perform our experiments using synthetic data, as this allows us to be precise about what assumptions we are and are not making. In all these experiments θ is sampled uniformly from $[-1, 1]^d$, features x_1, \dots, x_n are sampled independently and uniformly from $[0, 1]^d$ and each y_i is sampled from $\mathcal{N}(\langle \theta, x_i \rangle, \sigma^2)$ independently (conditioned on x_i), where $\sigma = 0.1$.

Note that the features are sampled from a bounded distribution, rather than a Gaussian as in Theorem 1.1. We make this choice in order to be generous to the algorithms we compare against. The algorithms we compare against clip the data or gradients before adding noise, so we make the problem easier for them by ensuring that the data is in fact bounded – i.e., we ensure that the clipping does not distort the data. Our algorithm does not require this kind of assumption on the features: Figure 2 shows the errors if the features are sampled from $\mathcal{N}(0, I)$.

2.2 Private Algorithms

We run Algorithm 1 with $\ell = 1$ and $\mathcal{R} = [-1, 1]$. For comparison, we run the following state-of-the-art regression algorithms:

- DP-GD based regressor:** This algorithm applies noisy gradient descent to minimize the loss $\sum_{i=1}^n (\langle \hat{\theta}, x_i \rangle - y_i)^2$. The learning rate is 0.1, the number of epochs is 100, and the clipping rate is $8d$. (Our implementation of private GD gives result similar to the results obtained by running DP-SGD provided by TensorFlow Privacy.)
- Gaussian covariate matrix perturbation regressor:** This algorithm outputs $\hat{\theta} = (X^T X + A)^{-1}(X^T y + b)$, where A is an appropriately scaled Gaussian matrix of size $d \times d$ and b is a Gaussian vector of size d .
- Functional mechanism based regressor:** This algorithm represents the loss function $\sum_{i=1}^n (\langle \hat{\theta}, x_i \rangle - y_i)^2$ as a polynomial in $\hat{\theta}_1, \dots, \hat{\theta}_d$ add appropriately scaled Laplacian noise to each coefficient of the polynomial to obtain \hat{p} and uses the Broy-




Figure 3: Mean square error as a function of the number of samples for $d = 10$ and $d = 30$. The semitransparent shadow shows values between 0.1 and 0.9 quantiles of the accuracy.

235 den–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno algorithm to find $\hat{\theta}$ minimizing \hat{p} ; we use the implementa-
 236 tion provided by Holohan et al. [HBMAL19].

237 Figure 1 shows that the error of our algorithm is lower that of the other algorithms we compare
 238 against.

239 2.3 Non-private Algorithms

240 Before analyzing performance of private algorithms let us study performance on the non-private ver-
 241 sion of the private efficient Theil–Sen estimator: non-private can be obtained from Algorithm 1 by re-
 242 placing Line 15 by a line that sets $\hat{\theta}_i$ such that $\max \left\{ \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right|, \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i > \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right| \right\} =$
 243 $\frac{m}{2}$.

244 Figure 3 shows that for reasonably large values of ℓ , efficient multivariate Theil–Sen estimator per-
 245 forms as well as ordinary least squares estimator.

246 2.4 Values of ℓ

247 This section analyses relative performance of ℓ -partition DP Theil–Sen for different values of ℓ : we
 248 considered $\ell \in \{1, 10, 20\}$. Figure 4 shows that their convergence rates are comparable in contrast
 249 with the non private setting where increasing ℓ improves the accuracy: this effect can be explained
 250 by the fact that the median heuristic uses amount of budget proportional to $1/\ell$ so increasing ℓ
 251 improves the true median, but adds more noise.

252 Because of this observation we only consider $\ell = 1$.

253 2.5 Algorithms for Median

254 This section is analysing relative performance of efficient private Theil–Sen estimator for two
 255 choices of differentially private median heuristics: private median based on exponential mechanism
 256 that is used in Algorithm 1 and private median based on widened exponential mechanism defined
 257 in [AMSSV22]. Figure 5 shows that like in case of $d = 1$ [AMSSV22], private median based on
 258 exponential mechanism performs better on synthetic data.




Figure 4: Mean square error as a function of the number of samples for $d = 10$ and $d = 30$. The semitransparent shadow shows values between 0.1 and 0.9 quantiles of the error.




Figure 5: Mean square error as a function of the number of samples for $d = 10$ and $d = 30$. The semitransparent shadow shows values between 0.1 and 0.9 quantiles of the error.

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421 **Checklist**

- 422 1. For all authors...
- 423 (a) Do the main claims made in the abstract and introduction accurately reflect the paper’s
424 contributions and scope? [Yes]
- 425 (b) Did you describe the limitations of your work? [Yes]
- 426 (c) Did you discuss any potential negative societal impacts of your work? [N/A]
- 427 (d) Have you read the ethics review guidelines and ensured that your paper conforms to
428 them? [Yes]
- 429 2. If you are including theoretical results...
- 430 (a) Did you state the full set of assumptions of all theoretical results? [Yes]
- 431 (b) Did you include complete proofs of all theoretical results? [Yes]
- 432 3. If you ran experiments...
- 433 (a) Did you include the code, data, and instructions needed to reproduce the main experi-
434 mental results (either in the supplemental material or as a URL)? [No]
- 435 (b) Did you specify all the training details (e.g., data splits, hyperparameters, how they
436 were chosen)? [Yes]
- 437 (c) Did you report error bars (e.g., with respect to the random seed after running experi-
438 ments multiple times)? [Yes]
- 439 (d) Did you include the total amount of compute and the type of resources used (e.g., type
440 of GPUs, internal cluster, or cloud provider)? [No]
- 441 4. If you are using existing assets (e.g., code, data, models) or curating/releasing new assets...
- 442 (a) If your work uses existing assets, did you cite the creators? [Yes]
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- 444 (c) Did you include any new assets either in the supplemental material or as a URL? [No]
- 445
- 446 (d) Did you discuss whether and how consent was obtained from people whose data
447 you’re using/curating? [N/A]
- 448 (e) Did you discuss whether the data you are using/curating contains personally identifi-
449 able information or offensive content? [N/A]
- 450 5. If you used crowdsourcing or conducted research with human subjects...
- 451 (a) Did you include the full text of instructions given to participants and screenshots, if
452 applicable? [N/A]
- 453 (b) Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review
454 Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [N/A]
- 455 (c) Did you include the estimated hourly wage paid to participants and the total amount
456 spent on participant compensation? [N/A]

457 **A Proof of Main Result**

458 In this section, we prove Theorem 1.1. The proof is split into two parts: Proposition A.1 analyzes
459 the privacy (which is a worst case property). Proposition A.2 analyzes the accuracy (which requires
460 distributional assumptions).

461 **Proposition A.1** (Privacy). *Algorithm 1 satisfies ϵ -DP and also $\frac{\epsilon^2}{8d}$ -zCDP [BS16].*

462 Our privacy proof follows the standard template of using the properties of the exponential mecha-
463 nism along with the composition property of differential privacy.

464 In addition to a pure DP guarantee, we provide a concentrated DP guarantee. In high dimensional
465 settings, concentrated DP is preferable. To achieve ρ -zCDP, we would set $\epsilon = \sqrt{8d\rho}$. Note that
466 ρ -zCDP can be converted to (ϵ, δ) -DP for any $\epsilon \geq 0$ and $\delta = \inf_{\alpha > 1} e^{(\alpha-1)(\alpha\rho-\epsilon)} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{\alpha}\right)^{\alpha-1} \cdot \frac{1}{\alpha}$
467 [e.g., CKS20, Cor. 13]. Asymptotically, to achieve approximate $(\tilde{\epsilon}, \tilde{\delta})$ -DP it suffices to set $\rho =$

468 $\Theta \left(\frac{\varepsilon^2}{\log(1/\tilde{\delta})} \right)$ [BS16, Lem. 3.5]. The privacy claim of Theorem 1.1 follows by substituting $\varepsilon =$
 469 $\sqrt{8d\rho} = \Theta(\tilde{\varepsilon} \cdot \sqrt{d/\log(1/\tilde{\delta})})$ into Proposition A.1.

470 *Proof of Proposition A.1.* Algorithm 1 invokes the exponential mechanism d times. We analyze one
 471 invocation and then apply composition.

472 The loss function $\max \left\{ \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right|, \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i > \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right| \right\}$ has sensitivity 1 in terms of
 473 changing an element of the multiset Θ . This is because it is the maximum of two counts. Each count
 474 naturally has sensitivity 1 and the maximum does not increase the sensitivity. Changing one input
 475 (x_i, y_i) can change ℓ elements of Θ , as that input may appear in up to ℓ subproblems $S_{j,k}$. Thus the
 476 loss function has sensitivity ℓ in terms of changing one input.

477 The distribution we sample from is

$$\mathbb{P}[\hat{\theta}_i] \propto \exp \left(-\frac{\varepsilon}{2\ell d} \max \left\{ \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right|, \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i > \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right| \right\} \right).$$

478 Note that the multiplier $\frac{\varepsilon}{2\ell d}$ is ε/d divided by twice the sensitivity. Thus [DR14, Thm. 3.10] tells us
 479 that this sampling procedure is $(\varepsilon/d, 0)$ -DP. Since we invoke this exponential mechanism indepen-
 480 dently d times (for all the coordinates of $\hat{\theta}$), we can apply basic composition [DR14, Thm. 3.14] to
 481 show that the overall algorithm is $(\varepsilon, 0)$ -DP.

482 For the concentrated DP analysis, we can use an improved analysis of the exponential mechanism
 483 [RS21] that show that, in addition to $(\varepsilon/d, 0)$ -DP, each invocation of the exponential mechanism
 484 satisfies $\frac{1}{8}(\varepsilon/d)^2$ -zCDP. Finally, we can apply composition for concentrated DP [BS16] over the d
 485 invocations to show that the overall algorithm is ρ -zCDP with $\rho = \frac{1}{8}(\varepsilon/d)^2 \cdot d = \varepsilon^2/8d$. \square

486 Next we provide a theoretical utility guarantee. However, the proof of the pudding is in the eating,
 487 so we direct the reader to the experimental results in Section 2 to see how our algorithm performs in
 488 practice.

489 **Proposition A.2** (Accuracy). *Fix the parameters $\varepsilon > 0$, $n, d, r \in \mathbb{N}$, $\ell = 1$, $m = \lfloor n/d \rfloor$, and*
 490 $\mathcal{R} = \left\{ -1 + 2\frac{i-1}{r-1} : i \in [r] \right\}$ *of Algorithm 1. Let us also fix $\theta^* \in [-1, +1]^d$ and $\sigma > 0$. Assume*
 491 *the inputs $(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2), \dots, (x_n, y_n) \in \mathbb{R}^d \times \mathbb{R}$ are drawn i.i.d. as follows. Independently for*
 492 *each $i \in [n]$, we have $x_i \leftarrow \mathcal{N}(0, I)$ and then, conditioned on x_i , we have $y_i \leftarrow \mathcal{N}(\langle \theta^*, x_i \rangle, \sigma^2)$. If*
 493 $\hat{\theta}$ *is the output of Algorithm 1 with the above inputs and parameters, then, for all $\beta > 0$, we have*

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\|\hat{\theta} - \theta^*\|_\infty \leq \frac{1}{r-1} + \sigma \cdot O \left(\frac{d}{\varepsilon m} \log \left(\frac{dr}{\beta} \right) + \sqrt{\frac{\log(d/\beta)}{m}} \right) \right] \geq 1 - \beta,$$

494 *where the probability is over both the randomness of the algorithm and the inputs.*

495 The proof consists of three steps: First, we use the properties of the exponential mechanism to show
 496 that Algorithm 1 outputs a point with low empirical loss. Second, we use a generalization result to
 497 show that the output also has low population loss. Third, we use the distributional assumptions in
 498 the theorem to show that low population loss implies that the output is indeed close to the desired
 499 value.

500 The first lemma shows that, with high probability, the empirical loss is low.

501 **Lemma A.3.** *Let $\varepsilon, \ell, d, m, \mathcal{R}, \Theta$, and $\hat{\theta}$ be as in Algorithm 1. Assume $|\mathcal{R}| < \infty$. Independently,*
 502 *for each i and all $\beta > 0$, we have*

$$\mathbb{P}_{\hat{\theta}_i} \left[\max \left\{ \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right|, \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i > \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right| \right\} \leq \left\lfloor \frac{|\Theta|}{2} \right\rfloor + \frac{2\ell d}{\varepsilon} \log \left(\frac{|\mathcal{R}|}{\beta} \right) \right] \geq 1 - \beta.$$

503 *Proof.* First, we note that the empirical median of $\{\theta_i : \theta \in \Theta\}$ has loss at most $\lfloor |\Theta|/2 \rfloor$. Combining
 504 this with the standard utility analysis of the exponential mechanism [DR14, Thm. 3.11] yields the
 505 result. Finally, we remark that Algorithm 1 samples each coordinate of $\hat{\theta}$ independently. \square

506 Our second lemma helps us relate the empirical loss to the population loss. That is, it is a general-
507 ization result.

508 **Lemma A.4** (DKW inequality [DKW56; Mas90]). *There exists a universal finite constant $C > 0$
509 such that the following holds. Let F be the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a probability
510 distribution on \mathbb{R} and let X_1, X_2, \dots, X_m be independent samples from that distribution – i.e.,
511 $F(x) = \mathbb{P}[X_i \leq x]$ for all $i \in [m]$. Then*

$$\forall \beta > 0 \quad \mathbb{P}_X \left[\sup_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \left| \frac{1}{m} \sum_i^m \mathbb{I}[X_i \leq x] - F(x) \right| \leq \sqrt{\frac{\log(C/\beta)}{2m}} \right] \geq 1 - \beta.$$

512 Now we bring the distributional assumptions of Proposition A.2 into the analysis. For each of
513 the subproblems, we are given $X \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times d}$ and $y \in \mathbb{R}^d$. The assumption is that X consists of
514 i.i.d. standard Gaussian entries and that $y = X\theta^* + z$, where $z \leftarrow \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 I)$ is noise. Our goal is
515 to estimate the unknown true parameters $\theta^* \in \mathbb{R}^d$. The estimate for the subproblem is $\theta = X^{-1}y =$
516 $\theta^* + X^{-1}z$. Thus we need to understand the distribution of $X^{-1}z$. We begin by bounding the
517 norm of X^{-1} . Then, in Lemma A.6, we use this bound to show that the distribution of $X^{-1}z$ is
518 sufficiently concentrated around zero, which is necessary to ensure the median is well-behaved.

519 **Lemma A.5.** *Let $X \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times d}$ have entries which are all independent standard Gaussians. There
520 exists a universal constant C such that for all $\gamma \in (0, 3/4)$,*

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\|X^{-1}\|_F^2 = \text{trace}((XX^T)^{-1}) \leq C \cdot d/\gamma^2 \right] \geq 1 - \gamma.$$

521 *Proof.* Let $\lambda_1(XX^T) \leq \lambda_2(XX^T) \leq \dots \leq \lambda_d(XX^T)$ denote the eigenvalues of XX^T in sorted
522 order with multiplicities. Then $\text{trace}((XX^T)^{-1}) = \sum_j^d 1/\lambda_j(XX^T)$.

523 Szarek [Sza91] (Thm. 1.2, eq. 1.2) shows that, for all $j \in [d]$ and all $\alpha \geq 0$,

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\sqrt{\lambda_j(XX^T)} < \frac{\alpha \cdot j}{\sqrt{d}} \right] \leq (\sqrt{2e} \cdot \alpha)^{j^2}.$$

524 By a union bound, for all $\alpha \in [0, 1/4]$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P} \left[\forall j \in [d] \quad \lambda_j(XX^T) \geq \frac{\alpha^2 \cdot j^2}{d} \right] &\geq 1 - \sum_{j=1}^d (\sqrt{2e} \cdot \alpha)^{j^2} \geq \\ &1 - \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} (\sqrt{2e} \cdot \alpha)^{1+3(j-1)} = 1 - \frac{\sqrt{2e} \cdot \alpha}{1 - (\sqrt{2e} \cdot \alpha)^3} \geq 1 - 3\alpha. \end{aligned}$$

525 If $\lambda_j(XX^T) \geq \frac{\alpha^2 \cdot j^2}{d}$ for all $j \in [d]$, then

$$\text{trace}((XX^T)^{-1}) = \sum_j^d 1/\lambda_j(XX^T) \leq \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \frac{d}{\alpha^2 \cdot j^2} = \frac{\pi^2 d}{6\alpha^2}.$$

526 To complete the proof, set $\alpha = \gamma/3 \leq 1/4$ and $C = 3\pi^2/2 < 15$ □

527 **Lemma A.6.** *Let $X \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times d}$ and $y \in \mathbb{R}^d$ have entries which are all independent standard Gaus-
528 sians. Let $u \in \mathbb{R}^d$ be an arbitrary unit vector that is independent from X and y . Then the distribution
529 of $u^T X^{-1}y$ is continuous and symmetric around 0. Furthermore, for all $t \geq 0$,*

$$\mathbb{P} \left[|u^T X^{-1}y| \leq t \right] \geq \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{P} \left[|g| \leq \frac{t}{8\sqrt{C}} \right],$$

530 where g is a standard Gaussian and C is the universal constant from Lemma A.5.

531 *Proof.* The distribution of $u^T X^{-1}y$ is a mixture of centered univariate Gaussians. Specifically, if
532 u and X are fixed, then $u^T X^{-1}y \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \|(u^T X^{-1})^T\|_2^2)$. The randomness of u and X induces a

533 mixture. From this it is immediate that the distribution is symmetric about 0 and that it is continuous
 534 (as $\mathbb{P}[\|(u^T X^{-1})^T\|_2 = 0] = 0$).

535 Since the distribution of X is spherically symmetric, so too is that of X^{-1} . This means that the
 536 choice of u is irrelevant. In particular, we can assume that u is a uniformly random unit vector
 537 (independent from everything else).

538 Fix $t \geq 0$ and $s \geq 0$. Let g denote a standard univariate Gaussian (independent from everything
 539 else). Then

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}[|u^T X^{-1} y| \leq t] &= \mathbb{E}_{u, X} [\mathbb{P}_y[|u^T X^{-1} y| \leq t]] \\ &= \mathbb{E}_{u, X} [\mathbb{P}_g[\|(u^T X^{-1})^T\|_2 \cdot |g| \leq t]] \\ &\geq \mathbb{P}_g[|g| \leq t/s] \cdot \mathbb{P}_{u, X}[\|(u^T X^{-1})^T\|_2 \leq s]. \end{aligned}$$

540 Now we need to bound $\|(u^T X^{-1})^T\|_2$. We can express this quantity in terms of the Frobenius
 541 matrix inner product:

$$\|(u^T X^{-1})^T\|_2^2 = u^T (X X^T)^{-1} u = \langle (X X^T)^{-1}, u u^T \rangle.$$

542 We have $\mathbb{E}[u u^T] = \frac{1}{d} I$.² Thus, by linearity of expectation,

$$\mathbb{E}_u [\|(u^T X^{-1})^T\|_2^2] = \left\langle (X X^T)^{-1}, \frac{1}{d} I \right\rangle = \frac{1}{d} \text{trace}((X X^T)^{-1}) = \frac{1}{d} \|X^{-1}\|_F^2.$$

543 Fix $v \geq 1/\sqrt{d}$. By Markov's inequality,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}_u \left[\|(u^T X^{-1})^T\|_2 \leq v \|X^{-1}\|_F \right] &= \\ &= 1 - \mathbb{P}_u \left[\|(u^T X^{-1})^T\|_2^2 > v^2 \|X^{-1}\|_F^2 \right] \geq \\ &= 1 - \frac{\mathbb{E}_u [\|(u^T X^{-1})^T\|_2^2]}{v^2 \|X^{-1}\|_F^2} = 1 - \frac{1}{dv^2}. \end{aligned}$$

544 Thus

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}_{u, X} \left[\|(u^T X^{-1})^T\|_2 \leq s \right] &\geq \\ &= \mathbb{P}_u \left[\|(u^T X^{-1})^T\|_2 \leq v \|X^{-1}\|_F \right] \cdot \mathbb{P}_X \left[\|X^{-1}\|_F \leq s/v \right] \geq \\ &= \left(1 - \frac{1}{dv^2} \right) \cdot \mathbb{P}_X \left[\|X^{-1}\|_F \leq s/v \right]. \end{aligned}$$

545 Lemma A.5 bounds $\|X^{-1}\|_F$, namely $\mathbb{P}_X[\|X^{-1}\|_F \geq s/v] \geq 1 - \sqrt{Cd} \cdot v/s \geq 1/4$ for some
 546 universal constant C . Putting everything together gives

$$\mathbb{P}[|u^T X^{-1} y| \leq t] \geq \mathbb{P}_g[|g| \leq t/s] \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{dv^2} \right) \cdot \left(1 - \frac{\sqrt{Cd} v}{s} \right).$$

547 We set $v = 2/\sqrt{d}$ and $s = 8\sqrt{C}$, which gives

$$\mathbb{P}[|u^T X^{-1} y| \leq t] \geq \mathbb{P}_g[|g| \leq t/8\sqrt{C}] \cdot \frac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{3}{4}.$$

548 □

549 Now it is time to assemble the proof:

²To see this, imagine $u = u_1$ is generated by taking a column of a uniformly random unitary matrix $U = (u_1, u_2, \dots, u_d) \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times d}$. By symmetry, $\mathbb{E}[u_1 u_1^T] = \mathbb{E}[u_2 u_2^T] = \dots = \mathbb{E}[u_d u_d^T]$. Since $\sum_i u_i u_i^T = U U^T = I$, we have $\mathbb{E}[u_1 u_1^T] = \frac{1}{d} I$.

550 *Proof of Proposition A.2.* Fix $i \in [d]$ and let $e_i \in \mathbb{R}^d$ be the i -th standard basis vector. For $\mu, \sigma \in \mathbb{R}$,
551 define a distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\mu, \sigma}$ on \mathbb{R} as $\mu + \sigma \cdot e_i^T X^{-1} y$ where $X \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times d}$ and $y \in \mathbb{R}^d$ consist of
552 independent standard Gaussians. We will denote the CDF as $\mathcal{D}_{\mu, \sigma}(< t) = \mathbb{P}[\mu + \sigma \cdot e_i^T X^{-1} y < t]$
553 and its complement as $\mathcal{D}_{\mu, \sigma}(> t) = \mathbb{P}[\mu + \sigma \cdot e_i^T X^{-1} y > t]$ for all $t \in \mathbb{R}$. (By Lemma A.6, $\mathcal{D}_{\mu, \sigma}$
554 is continuous (if $\sigma > 0$), so we do not need to worry about the strictness of the inequality.) Define
555 $\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_{\mu, \sigma, \mathcal{R}}$ to be $\mathcal{D}_{\mu, \sigma}$ projected to \mathcal{R} – i.e., to sample $\tilde{\theta} \leftarrow \tilde{\mathcal{D}}_{\mu, \sigma, \mathcal{R}}$, we sample $\theta \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mu, \sigma}$ and let
556 $\tilde{\theta} = \arg \min_{\bar{\theta} \in \mathcal{R}} |\bar{\theta} - \theta|$. We will denote the CDF similarly as before (although now the strictness
557 of the inequality may matter).

558 We must reason about the impact of rounding to \mathcal{R} : Since $\mathcal{R} = \left\{ -1 + 2 \frac{i-1}{r-1} : i \in [r] \right\}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{if } t > -1, \text{ then } \mathcal{D}_{\mu, \sigma} \left(< t - \frac{1}{r-1} \right) &\leq \tilde{\mathcal{D}}_{\mu, \sigma, \mathcal{R}}(< t) \\ \text{and} \\ \text{if } t < 1, \text{ then } \mathcal{D}_{\mu, \sigma} \left(> t + \frac{1}{r-1} \right) &\leq \tilde{\mathcal{D}}_{\mu, \sigma, \mathcal{R}}(> t). \end{aligned}$$

559 This is because the rounding can only move points by $\frac{1}{r-1}$ (unless those points are outside the
560 interval $[-1, +1]$). Note that, if $t \leq \mu$, then $\mathcal{D}_{\mu, \sigma}(< t) \leq \frac{1}{2}$ and, similarly, if $t \geq \mu$, then
561 $\mathcal{D}_{\mu, \sigma}(> t) \leq \frac{1}{2}$.

562 We run Algorithm 1 with the parameters $\varepsilon, d, \ell = 1$, and \mathcal{R} . We assume the input has the distribution
563 given in the statement of Theorem 1.1. That is, independently for each i , we have $x_i \leftarrow \mathcal{N}(0, I)$
564 and $y_i = \langle \theta^*, x_i \rangle + \sigma \cdot z_i$ for $z_i \leftarrow \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$.

565 Let Θ be as constructed in Algorithm 1. Then the multiset $\Theta_i = \{\theta_i : \theta \in \Theta\}$ consists of $m =$
566 $\lfloor n/d \rfloor$ independent samples from the distribution $\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_{\theta_i^*, \sigma, \mathcal{R}}$ defined above.

567 By Lemma A.3, with probability at least $1 - \beta$, we have

$$\max \left\{ \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right|, \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i > \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right| \right\} \leq \left\lfloor \frac{|\Theta|}{2} \right\rfloor + \frac{2\ell d}{\varepsilon} \log \left(\frac{|\mathcal{R}|}{\beta} \right).$$

568 Note $|\Theta| = \ell \cdot m = m$. By Lemma A.4, with probability at least $1 - \beta$, we have

$$\left| \frac{1}{m} \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i < \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right| - \tilde{\mathcal{D}}_{\theta_i^*, \sigma, \mathcal{R}}(< \hat{\theta}_i) \right| \leq \sqrt{\frac{\log(C/\beta)}{2m}}$$

569 and, similarly, with probability at least $1 - \beta$

$$\left| \frac{1}{m} \left| \left\{ \theta \in \Theta : \theta_i > \hat{\theta}_i \right\} \right| - \tilde{\mathcal{D}}_{\theta_i^*, \sigma, \mathcal{R}}(> \hat{\theta}_i) \right| \leq \sqrt{\frac{\log(C/\beta)}{2m}},$$

570 where C is some universal constant. Applying a union bound, we have, for all $\beta > 0$,

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\max \left\{ \tilde{\mathcal{D}}_{\theta_i^*, \sigma, \mathcal{R}}(< \hat{\theta}_i), \tilde{\mathcal{D}}_{\theta_i^*, \sigma, \mathcal{R}}(> \hat{\theta}_i) \right\} \leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{2d}{\varepsilon m} \log \left(\frac{|\mathcal{R}|}{\beta} \right) + \sqrt{\frac{\log(C/\beta)}{2m}} \right] \geq 1 - 3\beta.$$

571 It follows that

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\max \left\{ \mathcal{D}_{\theta_i^*, \sigma} \left(< \hat{\theta}_i - \frac{1}{r-1} \right), \mathcal{D}_{\theta_i^*, \sigma} \left(> \hat{\theta}_i + \frac{1}{r-1} \right) \right\} \leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{2d}{\varepsilon m} \log \left(\frac{r}{\beta} \right) + \sqrt{\frac{\log(C/\beta)}{2m}} \right] \geq 1 - 3\beta.$$

572 The last step in the proof is to convert this bound on the quantile into an accuracy bound. Lemma A.6
573 tells us that the center of the distribution is at θ_i^* – i.e., $\mathcal{D}_{\theta_i^*, \sigma}(< \theta_i^*) = \mathcal{D}_{\theta_i^*, \sigma}(> \theta_i^*) = \frac{1}{2}$ – and that
574 the distribution is roughly as concentrated around this point as a Gaussian with variance $O(\sigma)$. In
575 particular, if $t \geq \theta_i^*$, then

$$\mathcal{D}_{\theta_i^*, \sigma}(< t) \geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\mathbb{P} \left[0 \leq g \leq \frac{t - \theta_i^*}{8\sqrt{C}\sigma} \right]}{g \leftarrow \mathcal{N}(0, 1)} = \frac{1}{2} + \Omega \left(\frac{t - \theta_i^*}{\sigma} \right),$$

576 where C is the universal constant from Lemma A.5. Similarly, if $t \leq \theta_i^*$, then

$$\mathcal{D}_{\theta_i^*, \sigma}(> t) \geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{P}_{g \leftarrow \mathcal{N}(0,1)}[0 \leq g \leq \frac{\theta_i^* - t}{8\sqrt{C}\sigma}] = \frac{1}{2} + \Omega\left(\frac{\theta_i^* - t}{\sigma}\right).$$

577 Combining these inequalities gives

$$\begin{aligned} \max \left\{ \mathcal{D}_{\theta_i^*, \sigma} \left(< \hat{\theta}_i - \frac{1}{r-1} \right), \mathcal{D}_{\theta_i^*, \sigma} \left(> \hat{\theta}_i + \frac{1}{r-1} \right) \right\} &\geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{P}_{g \leftarrow \mathcal{N}(0,1)}[0 \leq g \leq \frac{|\hat{\theta}_i - \theta_i^*| - \frac{1}{r-1}}{8\sqrt{C}\sigma}] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} + \Omega\left(\frac{|\hat{\theta}_i - \theta_i^*| - \frac{1}{r-1}}{\sigma}\right). \end{aligned}$$

578 This rearranges to

$$|\hat{\theta}_i - \theta_i^*| \leq \frac{1}{r-1} + \sigma \cdot O\left(\max \left\{ \mathcal{D}_{\theta_i^*, \sigma} \left(< \hat{\theta}_i - \frac{1}{r-1} \right), \mathcal{D}_{\theta_i^*, \sigma} \left(> \hat{\theta}_i + \frac{1}{r-1} \right) \right\} - \frac{1}{2}\right).$$

579 Combining with the high probability bound establishes

$$\mathbb{P} \left[|\hat{\theta}_i - \theta_i^*| \leq \frac{1}{r-1} + \sigma \cdot O\left(\frac{2d}{\varepsilon m} \log\left(\frac{r}{\beta}\right) + \sqrt{\frac{\log(C/\beta)}{2m}}\right) \right] \geq 1 - 3\beta.$$

580 To obtain the stated result, we simply take a union bound over all $i \in [d]$ and simplify the constants.

581 \square