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## ABSTRACT

Psychological constructs within individuals are widely believed to be interconnected. We investigated whether and how Large Language Models (LLMs) can model the correlational structure of human psychological traits from minimal quantitative inputs. We prompted various LLMs with Big Five Personality Scale responses from 816 human individuals to role-play their responses on nine other psychological scales. LLMs demonstrated remarkable accuracy in capturing human psychological structure, with the inter-scale correlation patterns from LLM-generated responses strongly aligning with those from human data ( $R^2 > 0.88$ ). This zero-shot performance substantially exceeded predictions based on semantic similarity and approached the accuracy of machine learning algorithms trained directly on the dataset. Analysis of reasoning traces revealed that LLMs use a systematic two-stage process: First, they transform raw Big Five responses into natural language personality summaries through information selection and compression. Second, they generate target scale responses based on reasoning from these summaries. For information selection, LLMs identify the same key personality factors as trained algorithms, though they fail to differentiate item importance within factors. The resulting compressed summaries are not merely redundant representations but capture synergistic information—adding them to original scores enhances prediction alignment, suggesting they encode emergent, second-order patterns of trait interplay. Our findings demonstrate that LLMs can precisely predict individual participants’ psychological traits from minimal data through a process of abstraction and reasoning, offering both a powerful tool for psychological simulation and valuable insights into their emergent reasoning capabilities.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Understanding the human nomothetic network—the complex web of how psychological traits correlate (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955)—is a central ambition of psychology and a key frontier in computational social science (Karvelis et al., 2023; Ziems et al., 2024). Capturing this structure accurately thus serves as a profound benchmark for an AI’s ability to reason about human nature. Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as promising candidates (Serapio-García et al., 2023), demonstrating powerful capabilities for group-level simulation in social and economic scenarios (Dillion et al., 2023; Aher et al., 2023). Concurrently, advancements in individual-level simulation have enabled models to simulate specific personality traits (Jiang et al., 2024) using techniques like in-context learning (Choi & Li, 2024). Furthermore, these capabilities have been integrated into large-scale agent frameworks (Pan et al., 2024), with landmark studies demonstrating LLMs’ potential for mimicking real-world individuals with high fidelity (Park et al., 2024). Despite these successes in mimicking behaviors, the source of this capability remains a critical open question (Dong et al., 2025): does it stem from genuine psychological reasoning, or from sophisticated pattern matching on inputs with strong semantic overlap (Messeri & Crockett, 2024)?

However, designing a convincing experiment to address this question is not easy. We believe it should meet the following key criteria. First, the task should, as far as possible, rule out the possibility that LLMs exploit semantic pattern-matching strategies (Suh et al., 2024; Messeri & Crockett, 2024) by using controlled, low-overlap inputs and requiring item-level predictions for individuals.

054 Second, the data analysis should move beyond evaluating LLMs on isolated trait-to-trait predictions,  
 055 and instead provide a comprehensive account of the correlation structure among psychological traits.  
 056 Third, the test should be evaluated across different models (Samuel et al., 2024; Tjuatja et al., 2024),  
 057 ensuring that the conclusion is widely applicable rather than model-specific artifacts. Finally, the  
 058 test should enable a degree of process-level interpretability, moving beyond performance metrics to  
 059 distinguish between genuine psychological reasoning and sophisticated pattern matching that could  
 060 yield similar performance scores. Given that the faithfulness of Chain-of-Thought rationales re-  
 061 mains contested (Wei et al., 2022; Turpin et al., 2023), this necessitates complementary approaches  
 062 to reveal the underlying cognitive processes driving LLM predictions.

063 To fulfill these criteria, here we designed a new psychometric paradigm and data analysis pipeline.  
 064 We tasked a diverse suite of LLMs with a challenging, zero-shot prediction task: given only the  
 065 20 item-level answers (on a 5-point response scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree) from  
 066 an individual’s Big Five personality inventory—a widely-used measure of five core personality  
 067 dimensions—LLMs were required to predict the individual’s answers on each item of nine other,  
 068 distinct psychological scales (questionnaires). To evaluate LLM predictions, we compared them  
 069 against human participants’ actual responses on these psychological scales using a dataset where  
 070 each participant completed all measures. Different from prevalent methodologies that focus on  
 071 first-order prediction accuracy—assessing how well models directly replicate specific behavioral in-  
 072 stances or trait scores (Park et al., 2024; Jiang et al., 2024; Zhu et al., 2025)—we argue that simply  
 073 correlating model predictions with actual scores would be methodologically flawed in this context,  
 074 as such correlations are constrained by the ground-truth relationships between the Big Five and tar-  
 075 get scales. Instead, we developed a second-order morphism measure that compares the inter-scale  
 076 correlation patterns in LLM predictions versus human data, using the regression coefficient between  
 077 these patterns as our alignment metric. To further achieve interpretability, we analyzed the reasoning  
 078 traces of LLMs with reasoning capabilities using a meta-prompt approach, where annotation mod-  
 079 els parsed the reasoning outputs to identify which specific Big Five items influenced each prediction  
 and the underlying information-processing stages.

080 Our experiments on LLMs yield two interconnected findings characterizing both LLM performance  
 081 and the underlying process. The inter-scale correlations elicited from LLM predictions showed  
 082 strong linear alignment with human data ( $R^2 > 0.88$ ). This zero-shot performance substantially ex-  
 083 ceeded predictions based on semantic similarity and approached the accuracy of machine learning  
 084 algorithms trained directly on the dataset, indicating that LLMs can accurately reconstruct the nomo-  
 085 thetic network of how individuals’ different psychological traits covary. Our analysis of the models’  
 086 reasoning traces reveals this capability is driven by a two-stage process: First, LLMs transform raw  
 087 Big Five responses into natural language personality summaries through information selection and  
 088 compression; second, they generate target scale responses by reasoning from these summaries. For  
 089 information selection, LLMs identify the same key personality factors as trained algorithms, though  
 090 they fail to differentiate item importance within factors. The resulting compressed summaries prove  
 091 sufficient for prediction, achieving similar alignment performance when used as input in place of  
 the original Big Five responses, and even superior alignment when used as an addition.

092 Our work demonstrates that LLMs possess genuine psychological reasoning capabilities rather than  
 093 mere semantic pattern matching, as evidenced by their ability to accurately reconstruct the corre-  
 094 lational structure of psychological traits from minimal personality data through systematic abstraction  
 095 processes. By developing novel evaluation methods that bypass semantic overlap and revealing the  
 096 mechanistic underpinnings of LLM psychological reasoning, we provide both a powerful tool for  
 097 psychological simulation and insights into the interpretability of emergent AI reasoning capabilities.

## 100 2 RELATED WORK

101 **LLMs as Human Simulators** Many studies on LLMs involve personality tests, but for differ-  
 102 ent purposes. Some measure psychological traits exhibited by the models themselves (Dong et al.,  
 103 2025; Pellert et al., 2024; Sorokovikova et al., 2024; Tjuatja et al., 2024), while others use LLMs  
 104 to role-play human participants, either to demonstrate their capability to replicate aggregate human  
 105 behaviors (Aher et al., 2023; Argyle et al., 2023; Dillion et al., 2023; Horton, 2023; Santurkar et al.,  
 106 2023) or to generate individualized agents with specified personality profiles (Choi & Li, 2024;  
 107 Jiang et al., 2024; Petrov et al., 2024). Like our work, some of these studies use Big Five per-

108 sonality traits as input (Li et al., 2025; Vu et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025b). Notably, Park et al.’s  
 109 “Generative Agent Simulations of 1,000 People” (Park et al., 2024) demonstrates the possibility of  
 110 simulating individual-level agentic behavior that aligns with humans across multiple dimensions of  
 111 psychological traits and behavioral attitudes. Our work extends this line of work in three key aspects.  
 112 First, whereas prior works primarily evaluate first-order prediction accuracy (i.e., how accurately the  
 113 model mimics a specific trait), we perform a second-order analysis investigating whether LLMs can  
 114 accurately reconstruct the entire psychological correlational network between traits. Second, our  
 115 use of sparse inputs isolates the model’s inferential capability from the memory retrieval common  
 116 in data-rich, open-world settings (Park et al., 2024). Finally, we analyze reasoning traces to reveal  
 117 the cognitive processes driving this capability, rather than merely evaluating outcomes.  
 118

119 **Deconstructing Reasoning Mechanisms in LLMs** The advent of Chain-of-Thought (CoT)  
 120 prompting (Kojima et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2022; Wei et al., 2022), particularly in reasoning-  
 121 enhanced models (Bi et al., 2024), suggests that models could externalize their reasoning steps.  
 122 However, a key debate surrounds the faithfulness of these rationales: whether they truly guide the  
 123 model’s reasoning or are merely plausible post-hoc justifications (Arcuschin et al., 2025; Lanham  
 124 et al., 2023; Paul et al., 2024; Turpin et al., 2023)? Our methodology offers insights into this de-  
 125 bate. By analyzing LLMs’ self-generated reasoning trace, we find that LLMs spontaneously gener-  
 126 ate an intermediate representation based on high-level personality factors before predicting specific  
 127 item responses. This suggests that LLMs’ reasoning is not a passive retrieval process, as in Self-  
 128 RAG (Asai et al., 2024), but an active process of information compression. LLMs synthesize verbose  
 129 item data into a dense, low-dimensional summary, a representation our analysis confirms is instru-  
 130 mental in shaping the final prediction. The functional utility of this summary is further supported by  
 131 providing it back to the model as additional input, which enhances prediction performance.  
 132

133 **Evidence for a Cognitive Hierarchy in LLMs** A central question in AI research concerns the  
 134 quality and depth of cognition in LLMs, with debates often polarized between claims of genuine  
 135 understanding (Ichien et al., 2024) and the “stochastic parrot” hypothesis (Bender et al., 2021). A  
 136 more productive framework, inspired by cognitive science, is to investigate the existence of a cog-  
 137 nitive hierarchy (Huber & Niklaus, 2025; Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Wang et al., 2025a), which  
 138 posits that cognition comprises tiered processes of increasing sophistication, from simple associa-  
 139 tion to abstraction and rule-based generalization (Eppe et al., 2022; Graham & Granger, 2025).  
 140 Addressing the methodological gap in how to dissect these strata, our work introduces a novel psy-  
 141 chometric paradigm to move the conversation from whether LLMs reason to how and at what level of  
 142 abstraction they operate. Our findings chart a path up this hierarchy, demonstrating that LLMs’ cog-  
 143 nitive process (1) transcends surface-level statistical association, (2) prioritizes abstract conceptual  
 144 structure over specific item-level details, and (3) performs a novel form of theoretical idealization,  
 145 actively refining noisy inputs into theory-consistent representations.  
 146

### 3 EXPERIMENT 1: LLMs’ RECONSTRUCTION OF HUMAN PSYCHOLOGICAL STRUCTURES

147 The aim of Experiment 1 is to test whether LLMs can reconstruct the entire nomothetic network  
 148 (psychological structures) from sparse, quantitative personality inputs such as Big Five personality  
 149 scores, distinguishing between genuine reasoning and pattern matching. A dataset comprising the  
 150 psychological test results of 816 Chinese participants, collected online during the COVID-19 pan-  
 151 demic, served as the ground truth. The dataset consists of each participant’s responses to the Big  
 152 Five personality scale (Topolewska et al., 2014), which provided the input for the LLMs, alongside  
 153 scores from nine other psychological scales: the Perceived Stress Scale (Cohen et al., 1983; Le-  
 154 ung et al., 2010), the Simplified Coping Style Questionnaire (Xie, 1998), the State-Trait Anxiety  
 155 Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1971), the Self-Compassion Scale (Neff, 2003), the Psychological Re-  
 156 silience Scale (CD-RISC) (Connor & Davidson, 2003), the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Buhr  
 157 & Dugas, 2002), the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003), the Risk Perception  
 158 & Behavior Questionnaire, and the Future Time Perspective Scale (Carstensen & Lang, 1996). Col-  
 159 lectively, these instruments assess a wide spectrum of constructs related to emotional well-being,  
 160 adaptive functioning, and cognitive styles.  
 161

We evaluated a comprehensive suite of state-of-the-art LLMs, including their “Chat” and reasoning-enhanced “Thinking” variants where applicable: DeepSeek’s DeepSeek-V3.1 (Liu et al., 2024), OpenAI’s GPT-5 (OpenAI, 2025), Anthropic’s Claude 3.7 Sonnet (Anthropic, 2025), Google’s Gemini 2.5 Flash (Comanici et al., 2025), Zhipu AI’s GLM-4.5 (Zeng et al., 2025), Moonshot AI’s Kimi K2 (Team et al., 2025), and Alibaba’s Qwen3-235B (Yang et al., 2025). We benchmarked their performance against traditional machine learning models (e.g., K-Nearest Neighbors, SVM, Linear Regression) and a Semantic Similarity model based on BAAI’s bge-reranker-large model<sup>1</sup> (BAAI, 2024), a cross-encoder for relevance scoring (details in Appendix B.4).

### 3.1 TESTING PROCEDURES FOR LLMs

The core procedure of our experiment, as illustrated in Figure 1, consists of two phases:

1. **Prediction Generation (Per-Individual Task):** For each of the 816 individuals in our dataset, we tasked the LLM with a role-playing prediction. Each task involved providing the model with the individual’s 20 item-level scores from the Big Five inventory. This served as the sole information source for the model to predict that same person’s responses on all items across the nine other psychological scales.
2. **Structural Comparison Analysis (Dataset-Level Analysis):** After the model generated the complete dataset of predictions, we performed the following structural analysis. We computed the Pearson correlation matrix for every pair of psychological scale sub-factors (i.e., the individual dimensions that make up broader psychological measures) within the LLM-generated data. This matrix was then compared against a benchmark correlation matrix, which was calculated using the same method on the human ground-truth data, to evaluate the overall structural fidelity of the model’s psychological inferences.




Figure 1: Procedural flowchart for Experiment 1. In Phase 1, the LLM was conditioned on each individual’s Big Five scores and tasked with role-playing to predict the individual’s scores on nine other psychological scales. In Phase 2, we performed dataset-level structural analysis by first computing correlation matrices between all psychological scale components for both LLM predictions and human ground truth data and then comparing the resulting correlation matrices, which reveals a structural amplification in LLMs’ reconstructed psychological structures.

Our primary analysis focuses on comparing these correlation matrices to assess whether the model captures the underlying structure of human psychological trait relationships, rather than simply evaluating individual prediction accuracy. As noted in the Introduction, this approach provides a more

<sup>1</sup>The model was accessed via Alibaba Cloud’s OpenSearch platform, where it is identified as “ops-bge-reranker-larger”. We refer to it by its original BAAI name for clarity.

216 robust test of whether the model has internalized the human psychological network, independent of  
 217 the actual strength of relationships in the ground truth data.  
 218

219 **3.2 LLMs RECONSTRUCT A LINEARLY AMPLIFIED PSYCHOLOGICAL STRUCTURE**  
 220

221 This structural comparison reveals that LLMs not only accurately replicate the correlational structure  
 222 of psychological traits in human data, but also reconstruct an idealized, amplified version of it,  
 223 according to several lines of evidence. First, when the correlation matrix from the model-generated  
 224 scores is compared against that of human data, the model-generated correlations are consistently in  
 225 the same sign but more saturated (i.e., further from zero) than their human counterparts (see Figure 2,  
 226 top-left panel for the visualization of human vs. Gemini 2.5).

227 Second, to quantify this observation, we plot the LLM’s inter-scale correlations against the human  
 228 data. The top-right panel of Figure 2 demonstrates an exceptionally strong linear relationship for  
 229 Gemini 2.5 ( $R^2 = 0.92, p < .001$ ). One key finding is a regression slope ( $k$ ) of 1.42, significantly  
 230 greater than 1.0. This indicates that LLMs systematically overestimate the strength of correlations  
 231 between psychological traits—a phenomenon we term **structural amplification**. This should be dis-  
 232 tinguished from “bias amplification” (Fernández et al., 2023; Taori & Hashimoto, 2023; Wang et al.,  
 233 2024), which typically describes a first-order effect where models exaggerate specific, pre-existing  
 234 societal biases from training data (e.g., gender stereotypes). In contrast, the structural amplification  
 235 we identify is a second-order effect concerning the entire relational network of traits, rather than the  
 236 strengthening of a specific biased association. To further test whether the model constructs a coher-  
 237 ent internal psychological network, rather than simply mastering the mapping from input to output,  
 238 we analyzed the correlational structure among the predicted target scales themselves, excluding the  
 239 Big Five input traits. This analysis of the internal predictive structure reveals that the amplification  
 240 effect persisted with remarkable strength ( $k = 1.41, R^2 = 0.91, p < .001$ ), confirming the model  
 241 builds a coherent and internally amplified representation of the entire psychological structure.

242 Third, we verified this is a general property of LLMs. As shown in the bottom-left panel of Fig-  
 243 ure 2, all tested LLMs exhibit an amplification coefficient greater than 1.0 (see Appendix B.2 for  
 244 their scatter plots). Crucially, all LLMs’ amplification coefficients surpassed that of baseline models  
 245 like a k-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) model and, notably, the Semantic Similarity model. This suggests  
 246 the models’ performance stems from a process more sophisticated than simple retrieval or surface-  
 247 level semantics. To investigate the functional implications of this phenomenon, we correlated each  
 248 model’s amplification coefficient ( $k$ ) with its predictive performance, a metric derived from the mean  
 249 Pearson correlation between its predictions and the ground-truth scores across factors. The scatter  
 250 plot in the bottom-right panel reveals a near-perfect positive linear relationship between these two  
 251 variables ( $R^2 = 0.95, p < .001$ ). The greater a model’s amplification coefficient, the higher its pre-  
 252 dictive performance, which suggests that the model’s amplification of the underlying psychological  
 253 structure is not an incidental artifact.

254 **3.3 VALIDATING STRUCTURAL AMPLIFICATION: STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND**  
 255 **ROBUSTNESS**

256 We performed two further analyses to validate the observed linear structural amplification is genuine  
 257 and robust. First, we established statistical significance using a 1,000-trial permutation test. By  
 258 shuffling the model-generated correlation vectors, we created an empirical null distribution for our  
 259 key statistics ( $R^2$  and Kendall’s  $\tau$ ). The originally observed statistics were extreme outliers relative  
 260 to this null distribution ( $p < .001$ ), unlikely to arise from pure chance.

261 Second, to ensure the structural amplification arises from genuine psychological reasoning and is not  
 262 merely an artifact of the prompt’s specific phrasing or structure, we examined the model’s sensitivity  
 263 to task framing and input organization (Oren et al., 2023). We tested three conditions: (1) our  
 264 original “Standard Order” setup, where the Big Five items were presented in a fixed sequence; (2)  
 265 a “Random Order” condition, where the sequence of the 20 Big Five items was shuffled for each  
 266 trial to disrupt potential order effects and (3) a “Single Question” condition, where each target item  
 267 was predicted individually to rule out artifacts from batch-prompting. The amplification coefficient  
 268 for Gemini 2.5 remained exceptionally stable across these conditions ( $k = 1.42, 1.41$ , and  $1.42$ ,  
 269 respectively), demonstrating that it is a robust feature of the model’s reasoning process. Detailed  
 270 results and figures for these validation tests are provided in Appendix C.1.




Figure 2: LLMs’ structural amplification of the correlational structure of human psychological traits. Top-left panel: a heatmap comparing the correlations from human data with those predicted by Gemini 2.5 (paired rows), separately for each of the Big Five personality factors (rows) and the target psychological scales or their sub-scales (columns). Top-right panel: Gemini 2.5’s correlations against human data correlations, revealing a strong linear relationship ( $R^2 = 0.92$ ) with an amplification slope ( $k = 1.42$ ). Each dot denotes a pair of correlations in top-left panel (color codes different target scales, see Appendix D for a complete list). Bottom-left panel: All tested LLMs exhibit an amplification coefficient  $k > 1.0$ , consistently outperforming retrieval (KNN) and semantic similarity models. Bottom-right panel: a near-perfect linear relationship ( $R^2 = 0.95$ ) between a model’s amplification coefficient ( $k$ ) and its predictive performance. Each dot denotes one model.

### 3.4 EXPLAINING STRUCTURAL AMPLIFICATION: THE IDEALIZATION HYPOTHESIS

To understand the source of the structural amplification, we tested the hypothesis that it stems from LLMs acting as “idealized participants” by filtering the random measurement error inherent in human self-reports. According to classical test theory, such random noise attenuates the observed correlations between psychological scales (Spearman, 1961; Nunnally, 1975). Our investigation into this hypothesis proceeds in two stages: first laying the theoretical foundation with reliability analysis, and then providing empirical validation through convergent experiments.

Our analysis begins with the theoretical support for the idealization hypothesis, grounded in reliability metrics. As detailed in Appendix C.4.1, we first compared the internal consistency (Cronbach's Alpha) of both human- and LLM-generated data. The LLM data exhibited significantly higher reliability (mean  $\alpha_{\text{LLM}} = 0.87$ ) than the human data ( $\alpha_{\text{Human}} = 0.75$ ), suggesting that LLMs produce less noisy responses. Furthermore, we found that LLM reliability profiles showed strong inter-model convergence (mean inter-LLM MSE = 0.0060 vs. mean LLM-to-Human MSE = 0.0357). This suggests that different LLMs converge on a common, idealized response model that differs from human patterns, positioning structural amplification as a direct consequence of higher data fidelity.

We then sought empirical validation for this noise-filtering hypothesis through two convergent experimental analyses. From the human side, we isolated a more “attentive” subgroup ( $N = 309$ ) by filtering out participants with fast response times. This less-noisy human data produced an inherently stronger correlation structure that was significantly closer to the LLM’s output ( $k = 1.08$  when compared to the full sample). Conversely, from the model side, we established a near-causal link through intervention. By systematically injecting increasing levels of Gaussian noise into a

324 baseline model’s predictions, we observed a clear dose-response relationship: as noise increased,  
 325 the structural amplification effect was progressively attenuated ( $k$  decreased from 1.55 to 1.12).  
 326 This convergence of evidence—where removing noise from human data and adding it to model pre-  
 327 dictions produce opposite, predictable effects—provides robust empirical support for interpreting  
 328 structural amplification as a process of idealized abstraction (see Appendix C.4.2 for details).  
 329


## 330 4 EXPERIMENT 2: DECONSTRUCTING THE REASONING MECHANISM

333 Experiment 1 revealed that LLMs exhibit a systematic “structural amplification” when simulating  
 334 personality networks. However, this finding describes a macroscopic outcome, leaving the internal  
 335 process a black box. Experiment 2 is designed to open this black box. By analyzing the models’  
 336 reasoning traces, we aim to uncover the cognitive processes driving this phenomenon, thereby en-  
 337 hancing the explainability of their behavior. Specifically, we move from qualitative observation to  
 338 a quantitative, testable framework that addresses two key questions: (1) How do models perform  
 339 information selection from sparse inputs, and does this process align with psychological-conceptual  
 340 structures? (2) Is the natural language summary generated during reasoning merely a byproduct, or  
 341 is it a predictively potent form of information compression?

### 342 4.1 INFORMATION SELECTION: A CONCEPT-DRIVEN STRATEGY

343 Our analyses reveals that LLMs use what we may call a “concept-driven” reasoning strategy, prior-  
 344 itizing forming high-level conceptual understandings (e.g., personality factors) from the raw data to  
 345 guide their predictions, rather than operating on isolated input items directly.

346 **Methodology** To parse the complex reasoning traces collected from Experiment 1, we used the  
 347 methodology illustrated in Figure 3. For each specific reasoning trace accompanying a prediction,  
 348 the LLM that generated it is referred to as “Reasoning Model” (e.g., Claude3.7-Thinking, GLM4.5-  
 349 Thinking). To deconstruct the Reasoning Model’s decision-making process while controlling for  
 350 the interpretive biases of any single annotator, we parsed each trace using a separate, diverse suite  
 351 of “Annotation Models”, which included DeepSeek-V3.1, Qwen3-235B, GLM-4.5, and Claude 3.7  
 352 Sonnet. Each Annotation Model generated a 20-dimensional attribution distribution that quantified  
 353 the perceived importance of each Big Five input item. These individual distributions were then  
 354 averaged to produce a single, robust, and de-biased attribution vector for each reasoning trace. Finally,  
 355 we benchmarked these averaged distributions against the feature importance weights derived from  
 356 an outperforming Bayesian Ridge Regression model trained on ground truth.  
 357



373 Figure 3: Flowchart of the “Reasoning-to-Annotation” analyses in Experiment 2. Each reasoning  
 374 trace comes from Experiment 1, where “Reasoning Models” use the 20 input scores to generate  
 375 predictions along with reasoning traces. These traces are processed in two parallel analyses: an  
 376 “Annotation Model” parses each trace to create a structured attribution vector (addressing our first  
 377 research question), while the summary within that same trace is used to predict the outcome, testing  
 its predictive potency (addressing our second research question).


378 **Convergent Attribution Strategy** Our analysis reveals a remarkable cross-model consensus in  
 379 attribution strategies. We performed a pairwise analysis across all combinations of Reasoning and  
 380 Annotation models, and the resulting attribution distributions showed remarkable cross-model con-  
 381 sensus. As detailed in the Appendix C.2.1, heatmaps of cross-model Pearson correlation coefficients  
 382 and Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergences confirm this alignment. With self-comparisons excluded,  
 383 the average Pearson correlation between the attribution vectors of different Reasoning Models was  
 384 0.934, and the average KL divergence was exceptionally low at 0.0475. This strong consensus  
 385 indicates that different reasoning models independently reach the same strategy for mapping psy-  
 386 chological traits, and this finding is not an artifact of the annotation process.  
 387

388 **Factor-Level Accuracy Despite Item-Level Confusion** To dissect this convergent strategy, we  
 389 benchmarked the models’ averaged attribution profiles against two distinct baselines at two levels  
 390 of granularity (Figure 4). These baselines were derived by fitting a Bayesian Ridge model to two  
 391 different targets: the Human Ground Truth baseline was fitted to actual human responses, while the  
 392 Semantic Similarity baseline was fitted to predictions from our semantic similarity model (detailed  
 393 in Appendix B.4). This three-way comparison allows us to test whether LLM reasoning aligns more  
 394 with human psychological patterns or with semantic associations.  
 395

396 At the fine-grained item level, the analysis reveals a diffuse and inconsistent picture. The average  
 397 Pearson correlation between the LLM attributions and the Human Ground Truth baseline is poor  
 398 ( $r = 0.207$ ). Similarly, the correlations between LLM attributions and the Semantic Similarity  
 399 baseline ( $r = 0.087$ ), and between the Human and Semantic baselines themselves ( $r = 0.201$ ), are  
 400 also weak. This indicates that at the level of individual items, no clear, consistent attribution strategy  
 401 emerges across any of the models or baselines.  
 402

403 The distinction becomes stark at the coarse-grained factor level. Here, the LLM attribution profiles  
 404 align almost perfectly with the Human Ground Truth baseline, achieving an average Pearson corre-  
 405 lation of  $r = 0.981$ . In sharp contrast, the correlation between LLM attributions and the Semantic  
 406 Similarity baseline is substantially lower ( $r = 0.790$ ), a value nearly identical to the correlation  
 407 between the Human and Semantic baselines ( $r = 0.787$ ).  
 408

409 This clear dissociation uncovers a key insight into the models’ reasoning: LLMs robustly identify  
 410 the correct high-level personality factor (e.g., Neuroticism) in a way that mirrors human-like con-  
 411 ceptual importance, significantly diverging from a strategy based on mere semantic similarity. While  
 412 they struggle to differentiate the importance of specific items within that factor, their high-level ab-  
 413 straction process supports the hypothesis of a top-down, concept-driven inference, rather than one  
 414 guided by surface-level word associations.  
 415



416 Figure 4: A concept-driven information selection strategy. The plots compare the models’ averaged  
 417 attributions (solid lines) against a Human Ground Truth (dashed blue) and a Semantic Similarity  
 418 (dashed purple) baseline. The top row shows item-level attributions, where each bar represents a  
 419 subscale, revealing weak and inconsistent alignment. The bottom row shows factor-level attribu-  
 420 tions, revealing that LLM attributions align almost perfectly with the Human Ground Truth, but  
 421 starkly diverge from the Semantic Similarity baseline. This evidence supports that models identify  
 422 high-level factors (e.g., Neuroticism) based on a human-like conceptual understanding, rather than  
 423 on surface-level semantics. Each colored bar denotes one subscale, with color codes following that  
 424 of the scatter plot in the top-right panel of Figure 2.  
 425


432 4.2 INFORMATION COMPRESSION: THE POWER OF ABSTRACT SUMMARIES  
433

434 **Methodology** Beyond selecting items, reasoning-enabled models also generate holistic, natural-  
435 language summaries of the personality profile. To quantify the predictive power of these abstract  
436 summaries (e.g., concluding that the provided scores reflect the risk perception of “*an individual*  
437 *who is sensitive, prone to worry, imaginative, and relatively pessimistic, often overestimating the*  
438 *probability of negative events*”), we designed an experiment with three information conditions:

- 439 1. ScoreOnly: The baseline condition from Experiment 1, where the model receives only the  
440 20 Big Five numerical scores.
- 441 2. SummaryOnly: The model receives only the generated natural-language summary.
- 442 3. Summary+Score: The model receives both the Big Five scores and the summary, and is  
443 instructed to use all available information.

445 **Summaries as a Potent and Sufficient Information Vehicle** This analysis was aimed to understand  
446 the role of the natural-language summary—the brief, narrative description the model synthesizes  
447 to guide its final predictions. The central finding, as seen in Figure 5, is the remarkable efficacy  
448 of this summary alone. When comparing the SummaryOnly condition to the ScoreOnly condition,  
449 we found that the structural amplification effect remained remarkably robust. This demonstrates that  
450 the natural-language summary is not just a useful aid, but a highly potent and sufficient compression  
451 of the original 20-item numerical input. The model is able to reconstruct the vast majority of the  
452 personality structure from this compressed linguistic representation alone.

453 Furthermore, we observed an unexpected synergistic effect. The Summary+Score condition consis-  
454 tently yielded the highest amplification multiplier for every model (right panel of Figure 5). The fact  
455 that performance improves when adding a summary derived from the scores themselves indicates  
456 that the summary is not merely a redundant compression. Instead, it appears to contain emergent,  
457 second-order information—a conceptual gestalt—synthesized during the model’s reasoning process.  
458 Crucially, this enhancement in the amplification coefficient ( $k$ ) is functionally significant, as it corre-  
459 sponds with an increase in predictive performance. For all models, the mean predictive performance  
460 consistently followed the order: Summary+Score > ScoreOnly > SummaryOnly. An extended anal-  
461 ysis across all 15 conditions (5 models  $\times$  3 information types) revealed a strong positive correlation  
462 between  $k$  and predictive performance ( $R^2 = 0.93, p < .001$ ), confirming that greater structural  
463 amplification systematically predicts better outcomes (see Appendix C.3 for details).



477 Figure 5: Analysis of the efficacy and synergy of LLM-generated summaries. The left panel shows  
478 the amplification effect persists even when using only the abstract summary ( $R^2 = 0.91$ ). The right  
479 panel compares the amplification multiplier for all models across the three information conditions,  
480 demonstrating the synergistic value of adding the summary.

481 5 DISCUSSION  
482

483 We investigated the capacity of Large Language Models to reason about psychological trait correla-  
484 tions from sparse, quantitative data. Our finding of good alignment between LLM predictions and

486 human psychological structure seemingly contrasts with Zhu et al. (2025), who found poor alignment  
 487 when inferring personality from qualitative interviews. However, Zhu et al. assessed first-order  
 488 prediction of specific traits, whose performance depends on ground truth correlation strength. We  
 489 instead perform second-order structural analysis, comparing inter-scale correlation patterns between  
 490 LLM predictions and human data. This approach reveals how LLMs preserve the entire correlational  
 491 structure of psychological traits—capabilities that first-order prediction accuracy alone would miss.

492 Why do LLMs systematically “purify” the correlational structure of psychological traits? We con-  
 493 jecture that this stems from the model acting as an idealized participant, capable of bypassing the  
 494 statistical noise inherent in human self-reports. Human responses are known to be contaminated by  
 495 at least two distinct sources of noise: systematic biases from idiosyncratic response styles (Grim-  
 496 mond et al., 2025), and random measurement error arising from factors like inattention, fluctuating  
 497 emotional states, or momentary misinterpretation of items (Nunnally, 1975). As detailed in Sec-  
 498 tion 3.4, our investigation supports this noise-filtering hypothesis with convergent evidence. The  
 499 higher internal consistency of LLM-generated data provides theoretical support, further substan-  
 500 tiated by two empirical analyses: filtering noise from human data and injecting noise into model  
 501 predictions (see Appendix C.4.2 for details). This evidence supports interpreting structural amplifi-  
 502 cation as idealized abstraction driven by the model’s ability to filter random statistical noise.

503 Having established that LLMs perform this abstraction, our analysis of reasoning traces reveals  
 504 a two-stage process. First, during information selection, models prioritize high-level psychologi-  
 505 cal factors over specific item details, a strategy our findings distinguish from reliance on surface-  
 506 level semantics. This prioritization of abstract concepts over concrete data is consistent with both a  
 507 cognitive Concept-Driven Strategy (Jackson, 2015) and the computational Information Bottleneck  
 508 principle (Tishby et al., 2000), as the model generates a compressed representation by discarding  
 509 less critical, item-level information. Meanwhile, information compression constructs a predictively  
 510 potent natural-language summary that contains emergent, second-order information. Together, this  
 511 integrated process of concept selection and information compression provides a clear account of how  
 512 LLMs move beyond mere data replication to operate at a higher, more abstract level of reasoning.

513 Our work has several limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, the human dataset  
 514 that our findings are based on is from a single cultural context that may lack broader demographic  
 515 representativeness. Future work may apply our framework to diverse datasets to explore how cul-  
 516 tural biases in training data might affect the idealized structure (Jakesch et al., 2023). Second, while  
 517 we establish structural amplification as a general property of modern LLMs, we do not deconstruct  
 518 the variance between them. Future work could investigate why certain models or architectures ex-  
 519 hibit a stronger amplification effect, potentially linking this capacity to factors like model scale or  
 520 fine-tuning methods. Third, the rich semantics of the synergistic summaries warrant further inves-  
 521 tigation. Finally, as our analyses are primarily observational, future studies should move towards  
 522 interventional approaches, such as actively modulating the amplification effect to establish definitive  
 523 causality.

## 524 6 CONCLUSION

525 This paper investigates the capacity of Large Language Models to reason about human individu-  
 526 als’ psychological traits from sparse data. We identify a robust and counter-intuitive phenomenon  
 527 we term structural amplification, where LLMs do not merely replicate but systematically idealize  
 528 the correlational structure of human personality. We provide empirical evidence that this effect  
 529 represents idealized abstraction, driven by the model’s ability to filter statistical noise inherent in  
 530 human self-reports. Our mechanistic analysis reveals that this abstraction involves concept-driven  
 531 information selection and synergistic information compression that synthesizes predictively potent  
 532 linguistic summaries. This work provides a mechanistic account of how LLMs transcend passive  
 533 data replication and engage in active, abstract model construction.

## 534 ETHICS STATEMENT

535 This research was conducted with strict adherence to ethical principles, prioritizing the privacy of  
 536 human participants. Our study used a fully anonymized dataset from a previous study, which had  
 537 been approved by the Institutional Review Boards. In that original data collection, all participants

540 provided informed consent online. No personally identifiable information was accessed or used at  
 541 any stage of our research, ensuring the confidentiality of all 816 participants.  
 542

543 **REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT**  
 544

545 Core experimental details are provided in the Appendix. Specifically:

546

- 547 • **Data and Materials:** To facilitate reproducibility, the complete dataset, including  
 548 anonymized participant responses, LLM-generated outputs, and the psychological scales  
 549 used in our experiments, is available at our project repository.<sup>2</sup>
- 550 • **Prompts:** All prompt templates used for the main tasks (Experiment 1 & 2) and robustness  
 551 checks are detailed in Appendix A and Appendix C.1.
- 552 • **Models:** A comprehensive list of all Large Language Models used in our experiments,  
 553 including their specific model identifiers, is provided in Appendix B.1.
- 554 • **Baselines:** The implementation details for the semantic similarity baseline are described in  
 555 Appendix B.4.

556

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## APPENDIX

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### A EXPERIMENTAL PROMPTS

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This section provides the English translations of the core prompt templates used in our experiments. Placeholders like '[Personality Profile]' and '[Target Scale Items]' are used to denote the parts of the prompt that were dynamically populated for each participant and task.

816

#### A.1 MAIN TASK PROMPTS (EXPERIMENT 1 & 2)

817

##### A.1.1 SCOREONLY CONDITION PROMPT

818

This is the standard prompt used to elicit predictions based only on the Big Five personality scores. The model is given a personality profile and asked to role-play that individual to answer questions from a target psychological scale.

819

[

820

```

  {
    "role": "system",
    "content": "Please imagine you are role-playing a specific person.
      ↪ The following are some descriptions of your personality. Each
      ↪ description has one of five levels of applicability: 'Strongly
      ↪ Disagree', 'Disagree', 'Neutral', 'Agree', 'Strongly Agree'.
    [20 Big Five personality items are inserted here, for example:]
    You are the life of the party: Disagree
    You sympathize with others' feelings: Agree
    You get chores done right away: Neutral
    You have frequent mood swings: Agree
    You have a vivid imagination: Agree
    ...
    Please rate the extent to which the person you are role-playing
      ↪ would agree with the following descriptions. If you 'Strongly
      ↪ Disagree', output 1. If 'Disagree', output 2. If 'Somewhat
      ↪ Disagree', output 3. If 'Neither Agree nor Disagree', output
      ↪ 4. If 'Somewhat Agree', output 5. If 'Agree', output 6. If
      ↪ 'Strongly Agree', output 7.

    Please use the format 'Description 1:(integer from 1 to
      ↪ 7);Description 2:(integer from 1 to 7)...' for your output."
  },
  {
    "role": "user",
    "content": "[Target scale items are inserted here, for example:]
    Description 1: When I want to feel more positive emotion (such as
      ↪ joy or amusement), I change what I'm thinking about.
    Description 2: I keep my emotions to myself.
    Description 3: When I want to feel less negative emotion (such as
      ↪ sadness or anger), I change what I'm thinking about.
    ...
  }
]
```

857

##### A.1.2 SUMMARYADDED CONDITION PROMPT

858

This prompt is identical to the ScoreOnly condition, but includes the model-generated summary as additional context. The model is explicitly instructed to use all available information.

859

860

861

862

863

```

  {
    "role": "system",
    "content": "Please imagine you are role-playing a specific person.
  }
]
```

```

864     The following are some descriptions of your personality...
865
866     [The same 20 Big Five personality items as in ScoreOnly]
867
868     The following is a supplementary summary generated by a model, which
869     ↪ you may refer to as you see fit:
870     [The LLM-generated abstract summary is inserted here, for example:]
871     Key Points Summary:
872     This person is likely pessimistic and prone to worry, being
873     ↪ emotionally volatile and easily disheartened... these
874     ↪ estimations reflect the risk perception of an individual who
875     ↪ is sensitive, prone to worry, imaginative, and relatively
876     ↪ pessimistic, often overestimating the probability of negative
877     ↪ events
878     ...
879
880     Please rate the extent to which the person you are role-playing
881     ↪ would agree with the following descriptions...
882     [The rest of the prompt is identical to the ScoreOnly condition]"
883     },
884     {
885         "role": "user",
886         "content": "[Target scale items are inserted here]"
887     }
888 ]

```

### A.1.3 SUMMARYONLY CONDITION PROMPT

In this condition, the model receives only the abstract summary, without the original numerical scores.

```

889 [
890     {
891         "role": "system",
892         "content": "Please imagine you are role-playing a specific person.
893         ↪ The following is a summary of your personality:
894
895         [The LLM-generated abstract summary is inserted here]
896
897         Please rate the extent to which the person you are role-playing
898         ↪ would agree with the following descriptions...
899         [The rest of the output instructions are identical to the ScoreOnly
900         ↪ condition]"
901     },
902     {
903         "role": "user",
904         "content": "[Target scale items are inserted here]"
905     }
906 ]

```

## A.2 ROBUSTNESS CHECK PROMPTS

### A.2.1 RANDOM ORDER CONDITION PROMPT

The prompt for this condition was identical to the ScoreOnly prompt, with the sole exception that the 20 Big Five personality items presented in the system message were randomly shuffled for each trial. The user message containing the target scale items remained unchanged.

### A.2.2 SINGLE QUESTION CONDITION PROMPT

This prompt was modified to test for artifacts from asking multiple questions at once. The model was prompted for each target item individually.

```

918 [
919 {
920   "role": "system",
921   "content": "Please imagine you are role-playing a specific person...
922
923   [The same 20 Big Five personality items as in ScoreOnly]
924
925   Please rate the extent to which the person you are role-playing
926     ↪ would agree with the following description... Output only a
927     ↪ single integer from 1 to 7, with no other text."
928 },
929 {
930   "role": "user",
931   "content": "Description: [A single target scale item is inserted
932     ↪ here]"
933 }
934
935 A.3 REASONING MECHANISM ANALYSIS PROMPTS (EXPERIMENT 2)
936
937 A.3.1 ATTRIBUTION MAPPING PROMPT (FOR INFORMATION SELECTION ANALYSIS)
938
939 This meta-prompt was given to an “Annotation Model” to parse the reasoning trace of a “Reasoning
940 Model” and identify which input items were used for a prediction.
941
942 [
943   {
944     "role": "user",
945     "content": "We have provided the Big Five personality scores of a
946       ↪ participant to a large language model and asked it to predict
947       ↪ the participant's scores on the ERQ questionnaire items. Based
948       ↪ on the model's reasoning content below, please identify which
949       ↪ Big Five items the model relied on when giving its score for
950       ↪ each ERQ description.
951
952     Strictly follow the format 'Description 1: Item 2, Item 3;
953       ↪ Description 2: Item 7, Item 15, Item 20...'. Do not output any
954       ↪ other content.
955
956     The following are the Big Five scores input to the model:
957       [20 Big Five personality items with their scores]
958
959     The following is the model's reasoning content:
960       [The full reasoning trace from the 'Thinking Model' is inserted
961         ↪ here]"
962   }
963 ]
964
965 A.3.2 SUMMARY EXTRACTION PROMPT (FOR INFORMATION COMPRESSION ANALYSIS)
966
967 This prompt was used to have a model read its own reasoning trace and extract only the parts that
968 constitute a holistic summary of the persona.
969
970 [
971   {
972     "role": "user",
973     "content": "We have provided the Big Five personality scores of a
974       ↪ participant to a model and asked it to predict scores on the
975       ↪ relevant questionnaire. The following is the model's reasoning
976       ↪ content.
977
978     Please determine if the reasoning content includes a summary
979       ↪ description of the person (pay attention to summary words like
980       ↪ 'in summary', 'overall', 'synthesizing'). If it does, please

```

```

972     ↪ output these summary descriptions exactly as they appear,
973     ↪ without omitting any. If there are multiple summaries, include
974     ↪ them all. Do not output any other content. If no summary is
975     ↪ found, output 'None'.
976
977     Reasoning Content:
978     [The full reasoning trace from the 'Reasoning Model' is inserted
979     ↪ here]
980 }
981
982
983 B MODELS AND PERFORMANCE
984
985 B.1 LIST OF LANGUAGE MODELS
986
987 For clarity and reproducibility, this section lists the large language models used. All models were
988 accessed via API calls to the OpenRouter platform, and their identifiers in Table 1 follow its specific
989 conventions.
990
991 Our study utilized two model conditions: a standard “Chat” mode and a “Thinking/CoT” (Chain-
992 of-Thought) mode. Experiment 1 benchmarked all listed models for predictive performance, with
993 most models being evaluated under both conditions. Experiment 2 then focused exclusively on
994 analyzing the reasoning traces from the “Thinking/CoT” modes. This advanced mode was enabled
995 either by calling a dedicated model identifier (e.g., with a :thinking suffix) or via an API parameter,
996 as specified in the table.
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```

Table 1: Large Language Models Evaluated in the Study.

Developer	Short Name	Condition/Notes	Model Identifier
DeepSeek AI	DeepSeek V3.1	Standard Chat	deepseek/deepseek-chat-v3.1
DeepSeek AI	DeepSeek V3.1	Thinking/CoT	deepseek/deepseek-chat-v3.1
OpenAI	GPT-5	Standard Chat	openai/gpt-5-chat
Anthropic	Claude 3.7 Sonnet	Standard Chat	anthropic/clause-3.7-sonnet
Anthropic	Claude 3.7 Sonnet	Thinking/CoT	anthropic/clause-3.7-sonnet:thinking
Google	Gemini 2.5 Flash	Standrd Chat	google/gemini-2.5-flash
Google	Gemini 2.5 Flash	Thinking/CoT	google/gemini-2.5-flash
Zhipu AI	GLM-4.5	Standard Chat	z-ai/glm-4.5
Zhipu AI	GLM-4.5	Thinking/CoT	z-ai/glm-4.5
Moonshot AI	Kimi K2	Standard Chat	moonshotai/kimi-k2-0905
Alibaba	Qwen3-235B	Standard Chat	qwen/qwen3-235b-a22b
Alibaba	Qwen3-235B	Thinking/CoT	qwen/qwen3-235b-a22b-thinking-2507

## B.2 INDIVIDUAL MODEL SCATTER PLOTS

To provide a comprehensive visualization of the structural amplification phenomenon across all evaluated large language models, this section presents scatter plots for each of the 12 large language models tested in our study. Each plot displays the linear relationship between the inter-scale correlations derived from model predictions and those from human ground-truth data, analogous to the Gemini 2.5 example shown in Figure 2 (top-right panel) of the main text.

The consistent pattern observed across all models reinforces our central finding: LLMs systematically reconstruct an amplified version of the human psychological correlational structure, with regression slopes ( $k$ ) consistently exceeding 1.0. This cross-model consistency provides robust evidence that structural amplification is a general property of modern large language models rather than a model-specific artifact.




Figure 6: Scatter plots demonstrating the structural amplification effect for the first six evaluated large language models. Each plot shows the linear relationship between model-predicted inter-scale correlations and human ground-truth correlations, with regression slope  $k > 1.0$  indicating systematic amplification of the psychological structure.




Figure 7: Scatter plots demonstrating the structural amplification effect for the remaining six evaluated large language models. Each plot shows the linear relationship between model-predicted inter-scale correlations and human ground-truth correlations, with regression slope  $k > 1.0$  indicating systematic amplification of the psychological structure. The consistent pattern across all 12 models provides robust evidence for structural amplification as a general property of modern LLMs.

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## B.3 DETAILED PREDICTIVE PERFORMANCE METRICS (HEATMAP)

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To supplement the analysis of the structural amplification effect, this section provides a detailed breakdown of each model’s predictive performance. Figure 8 visualizes the Pearson correlation coefficient ( $r$ ) between each model’s generated scores and the human ground-truth scores for every target psychological subscale. This heatmap offers a granular view of model capabilities, revealing which models excel at predicting specific psychological constructs and providing the detailed evidence that supports the aggregate performance rankings discussed in the main text.

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
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Figure 8: Detailed heatmap of predictive performance across all models and target psychological scales. The metric shown is the Pearson correlation coefficient ( $r$ ).

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## B.4 SEMANTIC SIMILARITY BASELINE

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To test if structural amplification stems from surface-level semantics, we built a non-reasoning baseline. We used a re-ranking model, specifically the `ops-bge-reranker-larger`, which is a BGE-based cross-encoder model served through Alibaba Cloud’s OpenSearch platform for document relevance scoring. This model generated semantic similarity scores that served as fixed weights in a linear model to predict target scale scores from a participant’s Big Five input. Crucially, predictions for reverse-scored items were inverted to ensure directional correctness.

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As shown in Figure 9, this baseline yielded an amplification coefficient of only  $k = 0.99$  with a weak fit ( $R^2 = 0.52$ ). A coefficient near 1.0 indicates a failure to amplify, merely replicating the input data’s structure. This finding provides strong evidence that the LLM’s amplification phenomenon is not a byproduct of simple semantic matching but stems from a more sophisticated, abstract reasoning process.


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Figure 9: Analysis of the Semantic Similarity baseline. The regression slope ( $k = 0.99$ ) is nearly 1.0, indicating a failure to produce the structural amplification effect. The poor linear fit ( $R^2 = 0.52$ ) further confirms that LLM performance transcends surface-level semantics.

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## C SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES FOR MAIN FINDINGS

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## C.1 VALIDATING STRUCTURAL AMPLIFICATION: SIGNIFICANCE AND ROBUSTNESS

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To ensure the observed structural amplification is a genuine and robust feature of the models' reasoning, we conducted two further validation analyses.

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**Statistical Significance.** We conducted a 1,000-trial permutation test, shuffling the LLM-generated correlation vectors to construct an empirical null distribution for our key statistics ( $R^2$  and Kendall's  $\tau$ ). As shown in Figure 10, the originally observed statistics were extreme outliers, falling far outside the range of values expected under the null hypothesis ( $p < .001$ ). This confirms the structural amplification effect is a highly significant phenomenon and not a product of random chance.


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Figure 10: Permutation tests for Gemini 2.5 confirm statistical significance ( $p < .001$ ). The observed statistics (red dashed line) for  $R^2$  and Kendall's  $\tau$  are extreme outliers relative to the empirical null distribution.

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**Robustness to Task Framing.** To ensure the structural amplification effect arises from genuine psychological inference rather than being an artifact of the experimental setup, we tested the model's invariance across three distinct conditions: our original "Standard Order" setup, a "Random Order" setup and a "Single Question" setup.

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As shown in Figure 11, the amplification coefficient ( $k$ ) for Gemini 2.5 remained stable across these conditions ( $k = 1.42, 1.41$ , and  $1.42$ , respectively). This consistency is significant as these conditions systematically varied the task structure. The "Random Order" condition, which shuffled the sequence of the 20 input Big Five items, demonstrates that the model's reasoning is robust against variations in the input information's structure. The "Single Question" condition, which altered the task from predicting an entire questionnaire to predicting each item individually, shows that the effect is also robust against changes in the output task's format. The remarkable stability across these manipulations confirms that structural amplification is a core feature of the model's reasoning process, not a byproduct of a specific input-output format.


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Figure 11: Robustness of the structural amplification effect in Gemini 2.5. The amplification multiplier ( $k$ ) remains highly stable across Standard Order, Random Order and Single Question conditions.

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## C.2 DECONSTRUCTING THE REASONING MECHANISM

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## C.2.1 CROSS-MODEL CONSENSUS IN ATTRIBUTION STRATEGY

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To quantitatively assess the consistency of the information selection strategy across different models, we performed a pairwise comparison of all attribution vectors generated. This analysis covered every combination of Reasoning Model and Annotation Model.

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As shown in Figure 12, the resulting attribution distributions exhibited remarkable alignment. Excluding the trivial diagonal values, the average Pearson correlation coefficient was exceptionally high at  $\rho = 0.9343$ , while the average Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence was extremely low at  $D_{KL} = 0.0475$ . Together, these metrics confirm that all models independently converge on a near-identical, fundamental attribution strategy.

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


Figure 12: Pairwise comparison of attribution strategies across model combinations. Left: Heatmap of the Pearson correlation ( $\rho$ ). Right: Heatmap of the Kullback-Leibler ( $D_{KL}$ ) divergence. Each axis label follows the format Reasoning Model -> Annotation Model. Together, the high correlations and low divergences demonstrate a strong cross-model consensus.

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## C.3 EFFICACY AND SYNERGY OF ABSTRACT SUMMARIES

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To empirically validate our amplification coefficient ( $k$ ), we tested its association with predictive performance, measured by the mean correlation ( $r$ ). The analysis used data from 15 experimental conditions, generated by crossing five large language models (DeepSeek, GLM, Qwen, Claude and Gemini) with three information input scenarios (SummaryOnly, ScoreOnly, and Summary+Score). The raw numerical results for each condition are listed in Table 2.

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As shown in a scatter plot of these data points (Figure 13), there is a strong, positive linear relationship between the two metrics. A high coefficient of determination ( $R^2 = 0.93$ ) confirms that variations in amplification account for most of the variance in predictive correlation. This result strongly supports our claim that structural amplification is a key mechanism corresponding directly to enhanced predictive power.

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
1297 Table 2: Amplification coefficients ( $k$ ) and mean predictive correlations ( $r$ ) for each model across  
1298 the three information type conditions.

Model	Information Type	Mean Correlation ( $r$ )	Amplification Coefficient ( $k$ )
DeepSeek	SummaryOnly	0.361	1.36
	ScoreOnly	0.376	1.38
	Summary+Score	0.402	1.44
GLM	SummaryOnly	0.395	1.44
	ScoreOnly	0.418	1.52
	Summary+Score	0.421	1.54
Qwen	SummaryOnly	0.399	1.51
	ScoreOnly	0.432	1.56
	Summary+Score	0.435	1.61
Claude	SummaryOnly	0.403	1.54
	ScoreOnly	0.442	1.62
	Summary+Score	0.445	1.65
Gemini	SummaryOnly	0.345	1.33
	ScoreOnly	0.374	1.41
	Summary+Score	0.389	1.44

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1318 Coefficient vs. Mean Correlation Across Information Types



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1338 Figure 13: Correlation between the amplification coefficient ( $k$ ) and mean predictive correlation ( $r$ )  
1339 across 15 conditions (5 models  $\times$  3 information types). The plot shows a strong, significant positive  
1340 linear relationship ( $R^2 = 0.93, p < .001$ ), demonstrating that higher structural amplification is  
1341 associated with improved predictive performance.

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## C.4 IDEALIZATION HYPOTHESIS: RELIABILITY AND NOISE ANALYSIS

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
## C.4.1 DATA RELIABILITY AND ATTENUATION CORRECTION

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1347 This section provides the detailed results supporting the reliability analysis discussed in the main  
1348 text. We demonstrate that (1) LLM-generated data has a higher internal consistency than human  
1349 data, and their reliability profiles converge, and (2) correcting for the attenuation in human data  
brings the amplification coefficient ( $k$ ) close to 1.0.

1350  
 1351 Figure 14 shows that LLM-generated data exhibits significantly higher internal consistency (Cron-  
 1352 bach's Alpha) than human data across most psychological constructs (specifically, in 16 out of 18  
 1353 cases; mean  $\alpha_{LLM} = 0.87$  vs.  $\alpha_{Human} = 0.75$ ). This provides direct evidence that LLMs bypass  
 1354 a significant source of statistical noise inherent in human self-reports, which can stem from factors  
 1355 such as inattention, fluctuating emotional states, or momentary misinterpretation of items. Further-  
 1356 more, our analysis of the reliability profiles confirms a strong convergence among LLMs towards  
 1357 a shared, idealized response model. The mean Mean Squared Error (MSE) between any two LLM  
 1358 profiles was substantially lower than between any LLM and the human profile (mean inter-LLM  
 1359 MSE = 0.0060 vs. mean LLM-to-Human MSE = 0.0357), highlighting that various LLMs share a  
 1360 similar cognitive pattern that is systematically distinct from human.  
 1361  
 1362



1387 Figure 14: Reliability Comparison: Human vs. AI Models Across Psychological Constructs. This  
 1388 bar chart displays the Cronbach's Alpha coefficients for data generated by humans (blue) and the  
 1389 mean across all AI models (purple, with error bars indicating standard deviation). In the majority  
 1390 of cases, LLM-generated data exhibits higher internal consistency, supporting the hypothesis that  
 1391 LLMs filter random measurement error.

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 1393  
 1394 To directly test whether the structural amplification phenomenon is an artifact of measurement error,  
 1395 we performed a unilateral correction for attenuation on the human correlation data, as recommended  
 1396 by classical test theory (Nunnally, 1975). This standard psychometric procedure uses the reliabil-  
 1397 ity coefficients (Cronbach's Alpha) of two scales to estimate the “true score” correlation between  
 1398 them, effectively removing the attenuating effect of measurement error. We applied this correction  
 1399 to the entire human correlation matrix and then re-calculated the amplification coefficients ( $k$ ) by  
 1400 regressing the original LLM correlation matrices against this newly disattenuated human matrix.  
 1401 As shown in Figure 15, after this correction, the amplification coefficients for all Large Language  
 1402 Models dropped significantly, clustering around a value of 1.0. This result demonstrates that the  
 1403 amplification effect is largely accounted for by the unreliability in human-generated data, and that  
 LLMs are effectively reconstructing a psychological structure akin to the “true score” correlations.




Figure 15: Amplification Coefficients After Unilateral Attenuation Correction. The amplification coefficients ( $k$ ) for all LLMs now cluster around 1.0 after correcting for measurement error in the human data. This suggests they are modeling the disattenuated, “true score” psychological structure, rather than simply amplifying noisy, observed correlations.

#### C.4.2 EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR THE IDEALIZATION HYPOTHESIS

In Section 4.1, we posit that the LLM may function as an “idealized participant” by abstracting away the noise inherent in human responses. To provide empirical support for this hypothesis, we conducted two complementary analyses on both human and model side.

**Analysis of Attentive Human Participants.** To isolate the effect of human inattention—a key source of data noise—we identified a subgroup of attentive participants ( $N_{\text{attentive}} = 309$ ) from the full dataset ( $N = 816$ ). This was operationalized by excluding individuals based on their response times. Specifically, the attentive subgroup consists of participants whose response times on all questionnaires were consistently above a lower-bound threshold, defined as the mean of inter-response time differences minus half a standard deviation. As shown in Figure 16, this low-noise subgroup exhibited stronger internal correlations, quantified by an amplification multiplier of  $k = 1.08$  when compared to the full sample. This provides strong correlational evidence that as human-generated noise decreases, empirical data converges toward the idealized structure captured by the LLM.





Figure 16: Scatter plot comparing the OCEAN intra-correlation coefficients derived from the full human sample (All Subjects,  $N=816$ ) against the more attentive subgroup (Filtered Subjects,  $N=309$ ).

1458  
 1459 **The Noise Injection Experiment.** To establish a near-causal link, we intervened on a baseline  
 1460 Linear Regression model by systematically adding Gaussian noise ( $\sigma \in \{0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0\}$ ) to its  
 1461 predictions. As visualized in Figure 17, this revealed a clear dose-response relationship: as injected  
 1462 noise increased, the amplification coefficient  $k$  systematically decreased from 1.55 to 1.12. This  
 1463 inverse relationship between noise and amplification supports our hypothesis that LLMs achieve  
 1464 this effect through a process of noise filtering.  
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1498  
 1499 Figure 17: Results of the noise injection experiment. As the level of Gaussian noise added to the  
 1500 linear model’s predictions increases from 0.25 to 1.0, the amplification coefficient ( $k$ ) systematically  
 1501 decreases, demonstrating a clear dose-response relationship.  
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## 1506 D TARGET PSYCHOLOGICAL SCALES

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 1510 For clarity and reproducibility, the following table lists the full names and abbreviations of the  
 1511 psychological scales used as prediction targets in our experiments. Detailed descriptions of the  
 scales and their items are available in our GitHub repository.  
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Table 3: List of Sub-scale Abbreviations, Their Parent Scales, and Color Mappings.

Parent Scale	Sub-scale Abbreviation	Color
Perceived Stress Scale (Cohen et al., 1983; Leung et al., 2010)	PSS	black
Simplified Coping Style Questionnaire (Xie, 1998)	Coping_P Coping_N	darkblue
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Trait, Spielberger et al., 1971)	Trait_Anxiety	darkgreen
	Self_Criticism Self_Isolation Over_ID Self_Kindness Self_Humanity Self_Mindfulness Self_Compassion	darkviolet
Self-Compassion Scale (Neff, 2003)	PR_Tenacity PR_Strength PR_Optimism	darkorange
Psychological Resilience Scale (CD-RISC) (Connor & Davidson, 2003)	Pros_Anx Inhib_Anx	darkred
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Buhr & Dugas, 2002)	ERQ_R ERQ_S	darkgray
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003)	Risk_Unrel Obj_Risk	darkcyan
Risk Perception & Behavior Questionnaire	FT_Persp	darkgoldenrod
Future Time Perspective Scale (Carstensen & Lang, 1996)		

## LLM USAGE STATEMENT

In this work, large language models served as an assistive tool in the research and writing process. The model’s contributions included assisting with drafting and iteratively revising the manuscript—such as generating initial text and rephrasing sentences to improve clarity—and helping to write and debug Python code for the data analysis pipeline. For manuscript presentation, the LLM’s role was specifically limited to generating L<sup>A</sup>T<sub>E</sub>X code for several icons used in schematic figures and assisting with the aesthetic formatting of tables. The authors retained full intellectual control and bear complete responsibility for the final content, having critically reviewed, edited, and validated all AI-generated contributions. The model is therefore not eligible for authorship, and its role is acknowledged here in the spirit of transparency.