

GEOMETRY OF NASH MIRROR DYNAMICS: ADAPTIVE β -CONTROL FOR STABLE AND BIAS- ROBUST SELF-IMPROVING LLM AGENTS

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ABSTRACT

Self-improving agents learn by playing competitive, often non-transitive language games (e.g., generator–solver, proposer–verifier) where training can oscillate or drift toward undesirable behaviours. We study this scenario through the lens of reverse-KL regularised Nash learning, showing how the regularisation strength β shapes both where agents converge and how they get there. We derive a continuous-time view of Nash Mirror Descent (Nash-MD), revealing a simple geometry: trajectories are spirals on the simplex whose damping grows with β , while β simultaneously pulls equilibria toward the reference policy—amplifying any existing biases. We prove last-iterate convergence to the β -regularised Nash equilibrium, quantify its first-order shift from the unregularised solution, and link convergence speed to the spectrum of the linearised dynamics.

Building on this geometry, we introduce two adaptive β controllers: (i) a Hessian-based rule that targets a desired damping–rotation ratio to accelerate without overshoot, and (ii) a bias-based rule that caps measurable bias (e.g., output length, calibration, hallucination proxies) while retaining speed. On toy games (e.g. Rock–Paper–Scissors) and small open-model reasoning benchmarks, our controllers deliver faster, more stable convergence with bounded bias, outperforming baselines. The result is a practical recipe: tune β as a control knob to make self-improving LLM agents both faster and safer.

1 INTRODUCTION

Self-improving LLM (large language model) agents (Tao et al., 2024; Tian et al., 2024; Munos et al., 2024; Rosset et al., 2024; Choi et al., 2025; Huang et al., 2025a;b) are trained in *competitive, non-transitive* preference games (e.g., proposer–verifier, generator–solver). In such games, standard no-regret or mirror-descent updates can exhibit *rotational* components that cause cycling and unstable last-iterate behaviour even when time-averages converge (Shapley, 1963; Hofbauer, 1996; Mertikopoulos et al., 2018). In practice, reverse-KL regularisation to a reference policy μ is pervasive in post-training and preference-learning pipelines (PPO-style KL in RLHF; DPO/IPO’s implicit anchoring; Nash learning with entropic regularisation), where it is believed to stabilise learning and bound distribution shift (Munos et al., 2024; Ye et al., 2024; Xiong et al., 2024; Rafailov et al., 2023; Xiong et al., 2024; Zhao et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2024). However, the role of the *reverse temperature* β remains under-characterised: how exactly does β control damping vs. rotation of the dynamics? How far does it bias equilibria toward μ ? And how should β be *adapted online* to trade convergence speed against explicit *bias budgets* (e.g., output length, calibration)?

Contributions. Our technical and empirical contributions are:

- C1. Derive entropic Nash mirror ODEs with reverse-KL regularization (§2.2).
- C2. Show a spectral separation $\lambda(J_\beta) = \{-\beta \pm i\sigma_k\}$ that isolates damping (real part) from rotation (imaginary part) (§2.4).
- C3. Characterise β -regularised Nash equilibria as logit/quantal responses around μ (§2.3).
- C4. Prove an $O(\beta)$ first-order equilibrium sensitivity bound near the unregularised NE (§2.3).
- C5. Propose two adaptive- β controllers: *Hessian- β* (spectral damping ratio) and *Bias- β* (log-scale updates to meet bias budgets) (§3).




Figure 1: *RPS geometry under reverse-KL Nash mirror dynamics.* Simplex vector fields (RPS) for $\beta \in \{0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1.0\}$; spiral steepening with β . Trajectory bundles from random inits; faster radial decay at larger β . *Takeaway:* β adds uniform damping without changing rotational frequencies (Section 2).

C6. Validate on toy RPS (fields, trajectories, β -sweeps, spectra, convergence vs. baselines) and demonstrate feasibility on a small LLM micro-experiment (learned payoff) (§5).

Hypotheses. (A) Reverse-KL regularization (β) shifts fixed points away from the unregularised Nash equilibrium with a β -controlled bias; larger β amplifies pre-existing reference-policy biases (length, overconfidence, hallucinations). (B) Convergence speed and spiral steepness increase with β . We formalise these as Theorems 2.4, 2.3, and 2.7.

What is new vs. known. Prior work studied mirror descent in games and regularised best responses. Our novelty is a *reverse-KL* geometry for Nash mirror dynamics that yields (i) a simple spectral law with additive $-\beta$ damping; (ii) a first-order sensitivity bound linking β to equilibrium bias; and (iii) controllers that use this geometry to regulate convergence speed and explicit bias budgets.

2 THEORY: GEOMETRY OF REVERSE-KL NASH MIRROR DYNAMICS

We give a precise account of reverse-KL Nash mirror dynamics. Assumptions are explicit, theorem statements appear in the main text with concise proof sketches, and full proofs are in the Appendix.

2.1 PROBLEM SET-UP AND ASSUMPTIONS

Let $\Delta_m = \{p \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^m : \mathbf{1}^\top p = 1\}$ and $\mathsf{T} = \{v \in \mathbb{R}^m : \mathbf{1}^\top v = 0\}$. We study the reverse-KL regularised two-player zero-sum matrix game

$$f_\beta(x, y) = x^\top A y - \beta D_{\text{KL}}(x \| \mu) + \beta D_{\text{KL}}(y \| \mu), \quad x, y \in \Delta_m, \beta \geq 0, \quad (1)$$

where $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times m}$ and $\mu \in \text{relint}(\Delta_m)$ is the reference. We use the negative-entropy mirror map $\psi(p) = \sum_i p_i \log p_i$ with dual variables z_x, z_y and $x = \text{softmax}(z_x)$, $y = \text{softmax}(z_y)$.

Assumptions (local, minimal).

A0 (Reference positivity). $\mu \in \text{relint}(\Delta_m)$ (all coordinates strictly positive).

A1 (Interior equilibrium). For the β considered, there exists $(x_\beta^*, y_\beta^*) \in \text{relint}(\Delta_m)^2$ solving $\max_x \min_y f_\beta(x, y)$.

A2 (Local variational stability). The Nash field $F(x, y) = (\nabla_x f_\beta, -\nabla_y f_\beta)$ is locally monotone on $\mathsf{T} \times \mathsf{T}$ around (x_β^*, y_β^*) ; when needed, strong monotonicity holds with modulus proportional to β .

A3 (Smoothness and nonsingularity at $\beta=0$). Gradients are C^1 near (x_0^*, y_0^*) ; the Jacobian $D_{(x,y)} F(x, y)|_{(x_0^*, y_0^*)}$ is nonsingular on $\mathsf{T} \times \mathsf{T}$.

Remark 2.1 (Equivalence to preference games). Starting from $P_\beta(\pi \succ \pi') = P_\theta(\pi \succ \pi') - \beta D_{\text{KL}}[\pi \| \mu] + \beta D_{\text{KL}}[\pi' \| \mu]$ and discretizing policy space $\{\pi_i\}$, define $A_{ij} = 2 \mathbb{E}[P_\theta(\pi_i \succ \pi_j)] - 1$. Then $\max_\pi \min_{\pi'} P_\beta$ and $\max_x \min_y f_\beta$ are equivalent up to an additive constant and a factor 2. This finite form preserves geometry while enabling explicit ODE and spectral derivations (Prop. ??).

2.2 ENTROPIC NASH MIRROR DYNAMICS AND ODE LIMIT

Define the Nash field

$$F(x, y) = (Ay - \beta(\log x - \log \mu), -A^\top x - \beta(\log y - \log \mu)), \quad (2)$$

understood on $\mathbb{T} \times \mathbb{T}$ (constant vectors are projected out).

Theorem 2.2 (Entropic Nash mirror ODE). *Let $x = \text{softmax}(z_x)$ and $y = \text{softmax}(z_y)$. As $\eta \rightarrow 0$ with $t = k\eta$, the dual mirror updates $z^{t+1} = z^t + \eta F(x^t, y^t)$ converge to*

$$\dot{z}_x = Ay - \beta(\log x - \log \mu), \quad \dot{z}_y = -A^\top x - \beta(\log y - \log \mu), \quad x = \text{softmax}(z_x), \quad y = \text{softmax}(z_y).$$

The flow remains in $\text{relint}(\Delta_m)^2$ and preserves $\sum_i x_i = \sum_i y_i = 1$.

Sketch. Forward-Euler limit in dual space; interior invariance follows from the Legendre property of ψ . Details in Appendix A.1; well-posedness in Appendix A.2. $\square$

Primal form. Using $J_x = \text{Diag}(x) - xx^\top$, $J_y = \text{Diag}(y) - yy^\top$:

$$\dot{x} = J_x[Ay - \beta(\log x - \log \mu)], \quad \dot{y} = -J_y[A^\top x + \beta(\log y - \log \mu)]. \quad (3)$$

2.3 FIXED POINTS: LOGIT/QUANTAL RESPONSES AROUND μ

Proposition 2.3 (Quantal-response structure). *Stationarity $(\dot{z}_x, \dot{z}_y) = (0, 0)$ is equivalent to*

$$x_\beta^* \propto \mu \odot \exp\left(\frac{1}{\beta} Ay_\beta^*\right), \quad y_\beta^* \propto \mu \odot \exp\left(-\frac{1}{\beta} A^\top x_\beta^*\right).$$

Larger β pulls (x_β^, y_β^*) toward μ . Proof sketch: Subtract per-coordinate means, exponentiate, and renormalise. Full proof: Appendix A.3.*

2.4 LINEARIZATION AND SPECTRAL SEPARATION (DAMPING VS. ROTATION)

At (x_β^*, y_β^*) , write $J_x^* = \text{Diag}(x_\beta^*) - x_\beta^* x_\beta^{*\top}$, $J_y^* = \text{Diag}(y_\beta^*) - y_\beta^* y_\beta^{*\top}$, and $H := AJ_y^*$, $K := A^\top J_x^*$.

Theorem 2.4 (Spectral separation). *On $\mathbb{T} \times \mathbb{T}$ the dual Jacobian is*

$$J_\beta = \begin{bmatrix} -\beta I & H \\ -K & -\beta I \end{bmatrix}, \quad \text{spec}(J_\beta) = \{-\beta \pm i\sigma_k\}_{k=1}^{m-1},$$

where σ_k^2 are the nonzero eigenvalues of HK (or equivalently KH). Thus damping is uniform ($\Re \lambda = -\beta$), while rotation ($\Im \lambda = \pm \sigma_k$) depends only on A and the entropic metric (J_x^*, J_y^*) and is independent of β .

Sketch. Let $J = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & H \\ -K & 0 \end{bmatrix}$; then $J^2 = \text{diag}(-HK, -KH)$ has eigenvalues $-\sigma_k^2 \leq 0$. Hence $\text{spec}(J) = \{\pm i\sigma_k\}$ and $\text{spec}(J_\beta) = \text{spec}(-\beta I + J)$. See Appendix A.4 for the metric/Hamiltonian view and nonnegativity of HK . $\square$

Corollary 2.5 (Spiral geometry and damping ratio). *Trajectories near (x_β^*, y_β^*) are decaying spirals with exponential rate β and modal angular frequencies $\{\sigma_k\}$; the modal damping ratio is $\zeta_k = \beta/\sigma_k$.*

2.5 LOCAL LAST-ITERATE CONVERGENCE AND SENSITIVITY

Theorem 2.6 (Local last-iterate convergence with β -explicit rate). *Under A1–A2, there exists a neighborhood $\mathcal{N}$ of (x_β^*, y_β^*) such that along the ODE,*

$$V(t) := D_{\text{KL}}(x_\beta^* \| x(t)) + D_{\text{KL}}(y_\beta^* \| y(t)) \leq C_0 e^{-c_0 \beta t}.$$

For sufficiently small steps, discrete Nash–MD converge linearly with factors $1 - \Theta(\beta\eta)$. Sketch: V is a local Lyapunov; A2 gives $\dot{V} \leq -c\beta \|z - z^\|^2$; norm equivalences yield exponential decay. Appendix A.5.*

Let (x_0^*, y_0^*) be the interior NE at $\beta = 0$. Define $g(x, y, \beta) = (\nabla_x f_\beta, -\nabla_y f_\beta)$.

Theorem 2.7 (First-order β -sensitivity and $O(\beta)$ deviation). *Under A1–A3, for sufficiently small β ,*

$$\left. \frac{d}{d\beta} \right|_{\beta=0} \begin{bmatrix} x_\beta^* \\ y_\beta^* \end{bmatrix} = -J_0^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} \nabla_x D_{\text{KL}}(x_0^* \parallel \mu) \\ -\nabla_y D_{\text{KL}}(y_0^* \parallel \mu) \end{bmatrix}, \quad \|(x_\beta^* - x_0^*, y_\beta^* - y_0^*)\| \leq C\beta,$$

with $J_0 = D_{(x,y)}g(x, y, 0)|_{(x_0^*, y_0^*)}$ and C depending on $\|J_0^{-1}\|$ and local Lipschitz moduli. Sketch: Implicit-function theorem; Appendix A.6.

Remark 2.8 (Parametric Taylor bound (sanity cross-check)). *In a local parametrization $\theta \mapsto (\pi_\theta, \pi'_\theta)$ with positive-definite reduced Hessian $H_P = \nabla_\theta^2 P_\theta$ at the unregularised NE, Theorem 2.7 reduces to the familiar first-order estimate $\|\theta_\beta^* - \theta_0^*\| \leq \frac{\beta}{\lambda_{\min}(H_P)} \|\nabla_\theta D_{\text{KL}}(\pi_{\theta_0^*} \parallel \mu)\| + O(\beta^2)$; see Appendix A.6, Corollary A.3.*

2.6 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: ROCK–PAPER–SCISSORS (SANITY CHECK)

For $A = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & -1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & -1 \\ -1 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$ and $\mu = \frac{1}{3}\mathbf{1}$, $J_x^* = J_y^* = \frac{1}{3}I$ on $\mathbb{T}$, so $H = \frac{1}{3}A$ and $K = -H$, hence $HK = \frac{1}{9}AA^\top$ with nonzero eigenvalues $\frac{1}{3}$. Therefore

$$\text{spec}(J_\beta) = \{-\beta \pm i/\sqrt{3}\}.$$

Predictions: decaying spirals with rate β and fixed angular speed $1/\sqrt{3}$; increasing β steepens radial decay; with biased μ , (x_β^*, y_β^*) shift $O(\beta)$ toward μ . *Evidence:* Figures in Section 5 (fields, trajectories, spectra; β -sweep diagnostics).

2.7 CROSS-WALK TO EXISTING THEOREMS AND NOVELTY

Classical/standard. (i) Mirror descent/prox and optimistic variants for monotone VIs and convex–concave min–max: existence of ODE limits, interior invariance under entropic mirror maps, and last-iterate guarantees under strong monotonicity are standard. (ii) Logit/quantal responses (QRE) under entropy regularization are classical; Prop. 2.3 is the reverse–KL specialization.

Refinements/new in this paper. (i) **Spectral separation in entropic Nash mirror** dynamics: Theorem 2.4 shows a clean additive shift $-\beta I$ (uniform damping) and a β -invariant imaginary spectrum determined by HK ; we are not aware of prior statements in this exact form for the Nash mirror linearization. (ii) **β -explicit local rates:** Theorem 2.6 gives exponential decay with rate $\Theta(\beta)$, consistent with the real-part shift. (iii) **First-order sensitivity with constants:** Theorem 2.7 and Appendix A.6 quantify the $O(\beta)$ deviation and provide explicit constants via $\|J_0^{-1}\|$ and local Lipschitz moduli, subsuming the familiar parametric Taylor bound (Remark above; Corollary A.3).

Takeaway for control. The split $\lambda(J_\beta) = -\beta \pm i\sigma$ elevates β to a *uniform damping knob*; the $O(\beta)$ bias law quantifies movement toward μ . These two facts directly enable the controllers in Section 3: match damping to rotation (Hessian– β), or enforce a bias budget (Bias– β).

3 METHOD: ADAPTIVE β -CONTROL FOR NASH LEARNING

Objective. Leveraging Section 2, where the local spectrum is $\lambda(J_\beta) = -\beta \pm i\sigma_k$ (uniform damping from β , rotation from game geometry) and the β -NE shifts $O(\beta)$ from the unregularised NE, we design *adaptive β controllers* that (i) accelerate and stabilise last-iterate dynamics, and (ii) satisfy explicit *bias budgets* (e.g., length ratio, ECE).

3.1 CONTROL PROBLEM AND CLOSED-LOOP MODEL

Let $z = (z_x, z_y)$ be dual variables, $x = \text{softmax}(z_x)$, $y = \text{softmax}(z_y)$. The open-loop ODE is Theorem 2.2. We close the loop by adapting β :

$$\dot{z} = G(z; \beta), \quad \beta^+ = \mathcal{C}(\beta, \mathcal{M}(z)), \quad (4)$$

where $\mathcal{M}$ measures either a spectral proxy $\hat{\sigma}$ (rotation scale) or a bias metric $B(\pi)$, and $\mathcal{C}$ is the controller.

Algorithm 1 Hessian- β (wraps Nash-MD)

Require: target ratio ζ^* , smoothing ρ , bounds $[\beta_{\min}, \beta_{\max}]$, update period K

- 1: Initialize z_0, β_0
- 2: **for** $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ **do**
- 3: $z_{t+1} \leftarrow \text{NASHSTEP}(z_t, \beta_t)$ $\triangleright$ MD via equation 3 or MP
- 4: **if** $t \bmod K = 0$ **then**
- 5: $\hat{\sigma}_t \leftarrow \|\frac{1}{2}(J(z_t) - J(z_t)^\top) v\|_2$ (one JVP; clamp & EMA)
- 6: $\beta_{t+1} \leftarrow \text{proj}((1 - \rho)\beta_t + \rho\zeta^*\hat{\sigma}_t)$
- 7: **else**
- 8: $\beta_{t+1} \leftarrow \beta_t$

Targets. (i) *Damping ratio* $\zeta_k = \beta/\sigma_k$ with lower bound $\zeta^* > 0$; (ii) *Bias budget* $B(\pi) \leq B^*$ (e.g., LenBias, ECE, or a subset $D_{\text{KL}}(\pi_\beta^* \|\pi_0^*)$).

Controller assumptions (local).

C1 Two time-scales. β updates are slower than primal-dual relaxation (e.g., update every K steps or use small gains).

C2 Spectral proxy. A local estimate $\hat{\sigma}$ obeys $|\hat{\sigma} - \sigma| \leq \epsilon \sigma$ for some $\epsilon \in [0, 1]$.

C3 Bias monotonicity. Writing $u = \log \beta$, the map $u \mapsto B(\pi_{e^u}^*)$ is differentiable and strictly increasing with slope $s \in [s_{\min}, s_{\max}]$, $0 < s_{\min} \leq s_{\max} < \infty$.

C4 Bounded noise. Measurement noise has zero mean and bounded variance (EMA smoothing is used in practice).

3.2 CONTROLLER I: HESSIAN- β (MATCH DAMPING TO ROTATION)

Design principle. By Theorem 2.4, modal damping ratio is $\zeta_k = \beta/\sigma_k$. To target ζ^* we set $\beta \approx \zeta^* \sigma$ and estimate σ by a *spectral proxy* $\hat{\sigma}$ using one power iteration on the skew-Jacobian $S(z) = \frac{1}{2}(J(z) - J(z)^\top)$ (JVP/VJP) or a centred finite difference on the simplex tangent.

Update rule.

$$\beta_{t+1} = \text{proj}_{[\beta_{\min}, \beta_{\max}]}((1 - \rho)\beta_t + \rho\zeta^*\hat{\sigma}_t), \quad \rho \in (0, 1]. \quad (5)$$

Proposition 3.1 (Instantaneous damping guarantee). *Under C1–C2, the closed-loop linearization retains $\Re \lambda_t = -\beta_t$. Moreover, from equation 5, $\beta_{t+1} \geq (1 - \rho)\beta_t + \rho\zeta^*(1 - \epsilon)\sigma_t$. If $\zeta^*(1 - \epsilon)\sigma \geq \beta_{\min} > 0$, the local contraction rate is uniformly bounded below by $\beta_{\min}$.*

Corollary 3.2 (Non-oscillatory (modal) regime). *If $\zeta_k = \beta/\sigma_k \geq 1$ for all modes, the linearized response is critically/over-damped (no ringing). Hessian- β can enforce this by choosing $\beta \geq \zeta^* \sigma_{\max}$.*

Practical notes. (i) *Cost:* one JVP per controller update (two for centred differences). (ii) *Noise:* reduce ρ and apply EMA to stabilise $\hat{\sigma}$. (iii) *Clamps:* clip $\hat{\sigma} \in [\sigma_{\min}, \sigma_{\max}]$ to discard outliers. (iv) *Solver choice:* MP is often preferable when the field is weakly/non-monotone away from equilibrium.

3.3 CONTROLLER II: BIAS- β (BUDGET-COMPLIANT LOG-SCALE CONTROL)

Design principle. Theorem 2.7 shows β induces $O(\beta)$ bias toward μ . We therefore regulate β on the *log-scale* to meet an operational budget B^* directly:

$$\log \beta_{t+1} = \log \beta_t + \eta_\beta \text{clamp}(B(\pi_t) - B^*, -b, b), \quad \beta_{t+1} = \text{proj}(\beta_t e^{\eta_\beta \delta_t}), \quad (6)$$

where $\delta_t = \text{clamp}(B(\pi_t) - B^*, -b, b)$.

Algorithm 2 Bias- β (wraps Nash-MD)**Require:** budget B^* , log-step $\eta_\beta > 0$, clamp $b > 0$, bounds $[\beta_{\min}, \beta_{\max}]$, update period K

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1: for  $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$  do
2:    $z_{t+1} \leftarrow \text{NASHSTEP}(z_t, \beta_t); \quad \pi_{t+1} \leftarrow \text{softmax}(z_{t+1})$ 
3:   if  $t \bmod K = 0$  then
4:      $B_{t+1} \leftarrow \text{MEASUREBIAS}(\pi_{t+1})$  on a fixed probe set
5:      $\delta \leftarrow \text{clamp}(B_{t+1} - B^*, -b, b); \quad \beta_{t+1} \leftarrow \text{proj}(\beta_t \exp(\eta_\beta \delta))$ 
6:   else
7:      $\beta_{t+1} \leftarrow \beta_t$ 

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Theorem 3.3 (Budget tracking (quasi-static regime)). *Under C1, C3, C4, linearizing equation 6 at $u^* = \log \beta^*$ with $B(\pi_{\beta^*}) = B^*$ yields*

$$u_{t+1} - u^* = (1 - \eta_\beta s^*)(u_t - u^*) + \xi_t, \quad u = \log \beta,$$

where ξ_t captures bounded noise. If $0 < \eta_\beta s^* < 2$, the controller is mean-stable with geometric rate $|1 - \eta_\beta s^*|$ and bounded variance $\sup_t \text{Var}(u_t) \leq \eta_\beta^2 b^2 / (1 - (1 - \eta_\beta s^*)^2)$.

Remark 3.4 (Parametric Taylor view). *In parametric models, Theorem 2.7 reduces to a first-order Taylor bound $\|\theta_\beta^* - \theta_0^*\| \leq (\beta / \lambda_{\min}(H_P)) \|\nabla_\theta D_{\text{KL}}(\pi_{\theta_0^*} \|\mu)\| + O(\beta^2)$, which aligns with the analysis in the accompanying memo; Bias- β closes the loop on operational bias (length/ECE) rather than targeting a global KL alone.*

3.4 COMPOSING THE CONTROLLERS: PRIORITY AND FEASIBILITY

Operationally, *meet the budget first, then go as fast as possible*. We therefore recommend the priority composition

$$\beta_{t+1}^{\text{bias}} \text{ from equation 6, } \beta_{t+1}^{\text{hess}} \text{ from equation 5, } \beta_{t+1} = \max\{\beta_{t+1}^{\text{bias}}, \beta_{t+1}^{\text{hess}}\}. \quad (7)$$

This preserves feasibility ($\beta_{t+1} \geq \beta_{t+1}^{\text{bias}} \Rightarrow B(\pi) \leq B^*$) while securing a damping ratio as high as allowed by the budget.

3.5 CLOSED-LOOP GUARANTEES: WHAT IS PROVED VS. ASSUMED

Proved near equilibrium. Proposition 3.1 (instantaneous damping bound) and Theorem 3.3 (budget tracking with rate/variance) hold under C1–C4, translating the spectral and sensitivity laws of Section 2 into concrete control properties.

Assumptions that remain. Global guarantees far from equilibria, non-stationary $A(t)$ or drifting $\mu(t)$, and architecture-wise β distributions are outside our theory; we mitigate with the safeguards above.

4 RELATED WORK

Evolutionary dynamics and quantal responses are foundational to learning in games (Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998; Sandholm, 2010). Mirror-descent dynamics can rotate and fail at last-iterate convergence even when ergodic averages converge (Shapley, 1963; Mertikopoulos et al., 2018). Extragradient and Mirror-Prox provide acceleration and robustness for monotone VIs (Nemirovski, 2004; Juditsky et al., 2011; Cai et al., 2025; Fruytier et al., 2024); optimistic/extra-gradient variants are standard stabilisers for min-max training. Our spectral perspective (Theorem 2.4) is complementary: we show that reverse-KL inserts a *uniform* $-\beta I$ real-part shift without touching the rotational frequencies, giving a simple recipe for damping control. NLHF frames alignment as a two-player preference game and introduces Nash mirror methods with entropic regularisation, including geometric mixing with a reference μ (Munos et al., 2024). Recent work broadens preference oracles and studies on-policy/iterative preference learning and extragradient accelerations with last-iterate guarantees under structure (Ye et al., 2024; Xiong et al., 2024; Tiapkin et al., 2025; Zhou et al., 2025). Our work keeps the Nash-MD backbone to analyse how β *shapes the local spectrum and equilibrium bias*, and introduces β -controllers (Hessian- β , Bias- β) that we prove stable

near equilibrium. To our knowledge, *explicit* β -control for (i) damping–rotation matching and (ii) measurable *operational* bias budgets has not been developed within NLHF. Adaptively Perturbed Mirror Descent (APMD) uses a slingshot/anchoring strategy to obtain last-iterate convergence in monotone games and improve robustness to noise (Abe et al., 2024). Our Hessian– β controller is philosophically related (both increase effective damping), yet distinct: rather than injecting exogenous perturbations, we modulate the *reverse-KL temperature* to set the real-part margin, guided by a spectral proxy. KL penalties to a reference policy are standard in RLHF; early work used an *adaptive KL controller* to keep the realised KL near a target, adjusting the coefficient online (Ziegler et al., 2019). This heuristic remains in widely-used libraries for PPO-style RLHF. DPO/IPO and Ψ PO provide RL-free or hybrid alternatives that relate to KL-regularized formulations (Rafailov et al., 2023; Azar et al., 2024). Several unifying frameworks (e.g., RAINBOW-PO, QPO) characterize families of preference objectives and their regularisers. Our reverse-KL *game* view is compatible with these (e.g., as a best-response/quantal-response fixed point), nevertheless our focus is on *dynamics* and β -control for stability/bias in non-transitive interactions rather than on offline objective design. Replacing humans with AI preference labelers (RLAIF/Constitutional AI (Bai et al., 2022)) and self-rewarding/self-play (Zhang et al., 2024; Yuan et al., 2024) schemes have gained traction for scalability. These pipelines often display length/calibration biases and instability absent explicit damping. Our analysis suggests that reverse-KL β is the right low-level knob for stabilising such self-improving loops; Bias– β offers a principled way to enforce budgets aligned with deployment goals. In sum, we: (i) give a geometric, β -explicit analysis of Nash mirror dynamics; (ii) quantify $O(\beta)$ equilibrium drift toward μ ; and (iii) turn these into β -controllers with local guarantees. This complements extragradient/APMD accelerations and moves beyond heuristic adaptive-KL by targeting damping ratios and explicit bias budgets.

5 EXPERIMENTS

We evaluate whether the geometric predictions of Section 2 translate into practical gains with the adaptive controllers of Section 3. Our goals are to: (i) validate the *spectral separation* and spiral geometry on a toy non-transitive game; (ii) demonstrate feasibility in a small LLM setting; and (iii) outline a quick benchmark run with explicit *bias budgets*. Unless stated otherwise, error bars denote mean $\pm 95\%$ CI over seeds or random initializations, and we report run counts.

5.1 BENCHMARKS, MODELS, AND BASELINES

Tasks. *Toy RPS* (3×3 antisymmetric payoff; biased μ to expose β -bias geometry). *LLM micro-experiment* (learned 3×3 payoff from 5 prompts $\times$ 3 candidates of unsloth/qwen3-14b; single run prototype). **GSM8K** (8-shot CoT; SC=10), **MMLU-Pro** (0-shot), **DROP** (0-shot).

Backbones. *Primary: Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct. Sanity check: Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. Candidate generator (micro): unsloth/qwen3-14b.*



Baselines. **Nash-MD** (fixed β), **Nash-MP** (extragradient; fixed β), **Adaptive-KL** (targets $D_{KL}(\pi \parallel \mu)$), **APMD-like** (small dual noise, diagnostic), and our **Hessian– β** and **Bias– β** controllers.

Metrics and diagnostics. Accuracy/normalised accuracy, EM/F1, ECE, length bias LenBias, and the subset diagnostic $D_{KL}(\pi_\beta^* \parallel \pi_0^*)$; for toy games we report exploitability and spectra. Decoding settings and dataset-specific protocols follow Section 5 (or Appendix G), including SC(10) for GSM8K.

5.2 TOY RPS: GEOMETRY, SPECTRA, AND BIAS CONTROL

Qualitative geometry. Figures 1 visualises the simplex vector fields and trajectories predicted by Theorems 2.2 and 2.4: trajectories are decaying spirals; increasing β steepens radial decay (damping) while angular speed (rotation) remains roughly constant.

Spectra and β -sweeps. Figure 3 (left) plots Jacobian spectra vs. β . Real parts track $-\beta$; imaginary parts remain near constant, confirming $\lambda(J_\beta) = -\beta \pm i\sigma_k$. Figure 3 (right) sweeps β and

Figure 2: β -sweeps: bias to μ increases with β ; exploitability at equilibrium decreases.Figure 3: Spectral separation and β -bias trade-off in RPS.

reports $D_{\text{KL}}(x_{\beta}^* \| x_0^*)$, $\|x_{\beta}^* - x_0^*\|_2$, and exploitability. As predicted by Theorem 2.7, bias to μ grows monotonically with β , while exploitability drops.

5.3 EXPERIMENTS B: LLMs ON REASONING BENCHMARKS (DESIGN)

We outline an evaluation with small open LLMs (3–8B): (i) generator–solver, (ii) proposer–verifier, and (iii) adversarial prompt generation. Bias metrics B include length ratio to μ , token-level ECE, and hallucination proxy (1–accuracy). Controllers: Hessian-based and bias-based with PID option and β -caps. Baselines: fixed- β MD, Nash-MP, MPO/GRPO-like, APMD-like, and TRL’s Adaptive-KL. Metrics: exact match, pass@k, ECE, average length, per-token KL to μ , and adversarial win-rate (exploitability analogue).

Caveat. Due to single-run design, we treat these as feasibility evidence only. Still, results align with the spectral view: uncalibrated linear decay of β underperforms, while geometry-aware adaptation (DynKL or Bias- β forms) yields faster or more stable last-iterate behaviour.

5.4 FAILURE MODES AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

(i) **Proxy mismatch.** Adaptive-KL aligns to $D_{\text{KL}}(\pi \| \mu)$, which may not correlate with operational biases (length/calibration), causing high budget-violation fractions despite low exploitability (Table 2). (ii) **Noisy spectra.** Hessian- β can drift if $\hat{\sigma}$ is noisy; EMA smoothing and clamping stabilise. (iii) **Noise trade-off.** APMD reduces cycling but increases final exploitability at fixed targets.

Qualitative outcomes: (1) Geometry-aware control improves last-iterate stability and reduces steps-to-tolerance compared to fixed β or linear schedules; (2) Bias- β satisfies the bias budget with smaller variance than Adaptive-KL which controls $D_{\text{KL}}(\pi \| \mu)$ but not operational bias; (3) Hessian- β provides faster convergence (lower area-under-curve of exploitability) given a fixed budget envelope.

Table 1: LLM experiments. *Takeaway*: Dynamic KL methods converge fastest on this instance; our DynUpExp (Bias- β form) attains comparable quality with competitive steps.

Method	steps $\leq 10^{-3}$	final nashconv	cycle	avg quality
Nash-MD ($\beta=0.05$)	16.0	0.0	-0.1770	0.5990
Nash-MP ($\beta=0.05$)	15.0	0.0	-0.1365	0.5989
MPO-approx	14.0	0.0	-0.1786	0.5992
DynKL-MD	9	4.22×10^{-13}	—	0.59969
DynKL-MP	8	4.22×10^{-13}	—	0.59975
DynUpExp-MD	17	7.91×10^{-12}	-0.17697	0.59898
DynUpExp-MP	16	7.91×10^{-12}	-0.13664	0.59890
DynBeta-linearDown	198	6.77×10^{-4}	—	0.5749




Figure 4: Convergence and budget compliance on GSM8K/MMLU-Pro/DROP: steps to tolerance, final EM/Acc/F1, and compliance rates vs. controller.

6 LIMITATIONS

Our analysis is local and assumes interior equilibria (A1) and local monotonicity (A2). We do not claim global convergence; boundary/active-set changes may violate the tangent-space linearisation. Both controllers rely on two time-scales. Hessian- β uses $\hat{\sigma}$ requiring JVPs/finite differences; estimator noise can miscalibrate damping ratio. Bias- β assumes $B(\pi)$ is reliably estimated and locally monotone in $\log \beta$; distribution shift or small probe sets can break this. LLM results are micro-scale and limited to LoRA fine-tuning. We did not measure energy; we did not evaluate hallucination beyond simple proxies or subgroup calibration/length fairness. We focus on two-player zero-sum; multi-player/general-sum can exhibit new phenomena not covered here.

7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We presented a geometric account of reverse-KL Nash mirror dynamics: β provides uniform damping that leaves rotational geometry unchanged, yielding decaying spirals with rate β and frequencies σ_k . We characterised β -NEs as quantal responses around μ , proved an $O(\beta)$ equilibrium sensitivity, and introduced two adaptive controllers. Toy and micro-scale results support the theory.

Future work. (i) Stochastic analysis and finite-sample rates with adaptive β ; (ii) boundary/global geometry; (iii) co-adapted (μ_t, β_t) ; (iv) hierarchical/PID/robust controllers; (v) architecture-aware β ; (vi) multi-player/general-sum extensions; (vii) broader operational budgets; (viii) standardising β -sweeps, spectra, and budget-tracking diagnostics.

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A PROOFS AND ADDITIONAL DETAILS FOR SECTION 2

A.1 ODE LIMIT AND INTERIOR INVARIANCE

Preliminaries and gradient conventions. Recall the reverse-KL game $f_\beta(x, y) = x^\top Ay - \beta D_{\text{KL}}(x \parallel \mu) + \beta D_{\text{KL}}(y \parallel \mu)$ on $\Delta_m \times \Delta_m$, $\mu \in \text{relint}(\Delta_m)$. Gradients on the simplex are defined up to multiples of $\mathbf{1}$; we work *on the tangent* $\mathbb{T} = \{v : \mathbf{1}^\top v = 0\}$ and implicitly project onto $\mathbb{T}$, which removes constant shifts (e.g., the $+1$ in $\nabla_x D_{\text{KL}}(x \parallel \mu)$). Let $\psi(p) = \sum_i p_i \log p_i$; its Fenchel conjugate $\psi^*(z) = \log \sum_i e^{z_i}$ yields $\nabla \psi^*(z) = \text{softmax}(z)$ and the Bregman duality $D_\psi(p^* \parallel p) = D_{\psi^*}(z \parallel z^*)$ with $z = \nabla \psi(p)$.

Discrete mirror step and limit. Nash mirror descent/ascent in *dual* variables is

$$z_x^{t+1} = z_x^t + \eta \nabla_x f_\beta(x^t, y^t), \quad z_y^{t+1} = z_y^t - \eta \nabla_y f_\beta(x^t, y^t), \quad x^t = \text{softmax}(z_x^t), \quad y^t = \text{softmax}(z_y^t).$$

With $\nabla_x f_\beta = Ay - \beta(\log x - \log \mu)$ and $-\nabla_y f_\beta = -A^\top x - \beta(\log y - \log \mu)$ (both understood on $\mathbb{T}$), rescale time $t = k\eta$ and let $\eta \rightarrow 0$:

$$\dot{z}_x = Ay - \beta(\log x - \log \mu), \quad \dot{z}_y = -A^\top x - \beta(\log y - \log \mu).$$

This proves Theorem 2.2.

Interior invariance and normalization. For any $z \in \mathbb{R}^m$, $\text{softmax}(z) \in \text{relint}(\Delta_m)$; thus the ODE in z defines a flow whose pushforward $x = \text{softmax}(z_x)$, $y = \text{softmax}(z_y)$ always lies in $\text{relint}(\Delta_m)^2$. In the *primal* form (Eq. equation 3), the Jacobians $J_x = \text{Diag}(x) - xx^\top$ and $J_y = \text{Diag}(y) - yy^\top$ satisfy $J_x \mathbf{1} = J_y \mathbf{1} = 0$, hence $\frac{d}{dt} \sum_i x_i = \mathbf{1}^\top \dot{x} = \mathbf{1}^\top J_x[\cdot] = 0$ and similarly for y , so the simplex constraints are preserved.

A.2 WELL-POSEDNESS ON $\text{relint}(\Delta_m)^2$

Lemma 1 (Local Lipschitzness and existence/uniqueness). *Fix a compact neighbourhood $\mathcal{U} \subset \text{relint}(\Delta_m)^2$ around (x_β^*, y_β^*) with $\min_i x_i \geq \alpha$, $\min_j y_j \geq \alpha$ on $\mathcal{U}$ for some $\alpha > 0$. Then the primal vector field in equation 3 is locally Lipschitz on $\mathcal{U}$, and the ODE admits a unique solution for any initial condition in $\mathcal{U}$.*

Proof. On $\mathcal{U}$, $x \mapsto \log x$ and $y \mapsto \log y$ are Lipschitz with constants α^{-1} coordinatewise; $J_x(x)$ and $J_y(y)$ are smooth with operator norms bounded on $\mathcal{U}$. Thus $x \mapsto J_x[Ay - \beta(\log x - \log \mu)]$ and $y \mapsto J_y[A^\top x + \beta(\log y - \log \mu)]$ are locally Lipschitz, and Picard–Lindelöf yields existence/uniqueness. $\square$

Remark A.1 (Local forward completeness). *In the dual variables, the field is smooth everywhere; the softmax map keeps (x, y) interior for all finite times. On a small enough neighborhood of (x_β^*, y_β^*) , solutions remain in $\mathcal{U}$, so the flow is forward complete there.*

A.3 QUANTAL-RESPONSE CHARACTERIZATION

[Prop. 2.3, detailed] Stationarity $(\dot{z}_x, \dot{z}_y) = (0, 0)$ is equivalent to

$$Ay_\beta^* = \beta(\log x_\beta^* - \log \mu) + c_x \mathbf{1}, \quad -A^\top x_\beta^* = \beta(\log y_\beta^* - \log \mu) + c_y \mathbf{1}$$

for some scalars c_x, c_y . Subtracting per-coordinate means eliminates c_x, c_y , and exponentiation yields $x_\beta^* \propto \mu \odot \exp(\frac{1}{\beta} Ay_\beta^*)$, $y_\beta^* \propto \mu \odot \exp(-\frac{1}{\beta} A^\top x_\beta^*)$.

Proof. Directly from Theorem 2.2, stationarity implies the linear relations above. Let $\Pi(v) = v - \frac{1}{m}(\mathbf{1}^\top v)\mathbf{1}$ denote mean subtraction. Applying Π to both sides removes c_x, c_y , so $\Pi(\log x_\beta^* - \log \mu) = \frac{1}{\beta} \Pi(Ay_\beta^*)$, and similarly for y . Exponentiate elementwise and renormalise to the simplex. $\square$

A.4 HAMILTONIAN/METRIC STRUCTURE AND SPECTRAL CALCULUS

We linearise the dual field in *log-probability* coordinates

$$u := \log x - \frac{1}{m}(\mathbf{1}^\top \log x) \mathbf{1}, \quad v := \log y - \frac{1}{m}(\mathbf{1}^\top \log y) \mathbf{1},$$

which parametrise the quotient by additive constants and agree with z up to gauge. At an interior equilibrium (x_β^*, y_β^*) , variations satisfy

$$\delta x = J_x^* \delta u, \quad \delta y = J_y^* \delta v,$$

since for the softmax map $\delta x = (\text{Diag}(x^*) - x^* x^{*\top}) \delta(\log x) = J_x^* \delta u$.

Lemma 2 (Block Jacobian in (u, v)). *The Jacobian of the (u, v) -dynamics at (x_β^*, y_β^*) restricted to $\mathbb{T} \times \mathbb{T}$ is*

$$J_\beta = \begin{bmatrix} -\beta I & H \\ -K & -\beta I \end{bmatrix}, \quad H := A J_y^*, \quad K := A^\top J_x^*.$$

Proof. Differentiate the right-hand sides of Theorem 2.2 w.r.t. (u, v) using $\delta(\log x) = \delta u$, $\delta(\log y) = \delta v$, and $\delta y = J_y^* \delta v$, $\delta x = J_x^* \delta u$. The diagonal blocks yield $-\beta I$; the off-diagonal blocks are $A \delta y$ and $-A^\top \delta x$. $\square$

Lemma 3 (Nonnegativity of HK on $\mathbb{T}$). *On $\mathbb{T}$, J_x^*, J_y^* are symmetric positive definite. Then*

$$HK = A J_y^* A^\top J_x^* \sim (J_x^{*1/2} A J_y^{*1/2}) (J_x^{*1/2} A J_y^{*1/2})^\top \succeq 0,$$

and similarly $KH \succeq 0$. Thus the eigenvalues of HK and KH are real and nonnegative.

Proof. Similarity with the symmetric product follows by inserting $J_x^{*1/2} J_x^{*-1/2}$ and $J_y^{*1/2} J_y^{*-1/2}$ and regrouping. $\square$

[Thm. 2.4, detailed] Let $\{\sigma_k^2\}_{k=1}^{m-1}$ be the nonzero eigenvalues of HK on $\mathbb{T}$. Then

$$\text{spec}(J_\beta) = \{-\beta \pm i\sigma_k\}_{k=1}^{m-1}.$$

Proof. With $J = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & H \\ -K & 0 \end{bmatrix}$, we have $J^2 = \text{diag}(-HK, -KH)$. By Lemma 3, HK and KH are diagonalizable with nonnegative spectra and share the same nonzero eigenvalues. Hence the eigenvalues of J are $\pm i\sigma_k$, and adding $-\beta I$ shifts the real parts by $-\beta$. $\square$

Remark A.2 (Metric viewpoint (optional)). *Let $G = \text{diag}(J_x^{*-1}, J_y^{*-1})$ on $\mathbb{T} \times \mathbb{T}$. Then J is G -skew-adjoint in the sense that $J^\top G + GJ = 0$ when $K = H^\top$ (e.g., when A is such that $A J_y^* = (A J_y^*)^\top$ and $K = H^\top$); in general the spectral result follows from J^2 without assuming skew-adjointness.*

A.5 LYAPUNOV DECAY AND DISCRETE-TIME LAST-ITERATE RATES

Define the Lyapunov function

$$V(x, y) = D_{\text{KL}}(x_\beta^* \| x) + D_{\text{KL}}(y_\beta^* \| y) = D_\psi(x_\beta^* \| x) + D_\psi(y_\beta^* \| y).$$

By Bregman duality,

$$\frac{d}{dt} D_{\text{KL}}(x_\beta^* \| x(t)) = \langle x(t) - x_\beta^*, \dot{z}_x(t) \rangle, \quad \frac{d}{dt} D_{\text{KL}}(y_\beta^* \| y(t)) = \langle y(t) - y_\beta^*, \dot{z}_y(t) \rangle.$$

Hence, along solutions of Theorem 2.2,

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{V}(t) &= \langle x - x_\beta^*, \nabla_x f_\beta(x, y) \rangle + \langle y - y_\beta^*, -\nabla_y f_\beta(x, y) \rangle \\ &= \langle (x - x_\beta^*, y - y_\beta^*), F(x, y) - F(x_\beta^*, y_\beta^*) \rangle, \end{aligned}$$

since $F(x_\beta^*, y_\beta^*) = 0$ at equilibrium.

Lemma 4 (Local strong monotonicity). *Under Assumption A2, there exist constants $m_\beta, L > 0$ and a neighborhood $\mathcal{N}$ of (x_β^*, y_β^*) such that for all $(x, y) \in \mathcal{N}$,*

$$\langle u - u^*, F(u) - F(u^*) \rangle \geq m_\beta \|u - u^*\|^2, \quad \|F(u) - F(u^*)\| \leq L \|u - u^*\|,$$

with $u = (x, y)$, $u^* = (x_\beta^*, y_\beta^*)$ and $m_\beta \geq c\beta$ for some $c > 0$.

Proof. The reverse-KL terms contribute a symmetric part proportional to β in the Jacobian on $\mathbb{T} \times \mathbb{T}$. Continuity of derivatives yields the bounds locally; the proportionality $m_\beta \propto \beta$ follows from the diagonal $-\beta I$ in Lemma 2. $\square$

[Thm. 2.6, detailed] There exist $C_0, c_0 > 0$ and a neighborhood $\mathcal{N}$ such that solutions starting in $\mathcal{N}$ satisfy $V(x(t), y(t)) \leq C_0 e^{-c_0 \beta t}$. Moreover, for sufficiently small steps η , discrete Nash-MD and Nash-MP converge linearly to (x_β^*, y_β^*) with factors $1 - \Theta(\beta\eta)$ (MD) and $1 - \Theta(\beta\eta)$ (MP with a larger admissible step).

Proof. Strong monotonicity (Lemma 4) implies $\dot{V} \leq -m_\beta \|u - u^*\|^2$. On a compact neighborhood where $x_i, y_j \in [\alpha, 1]$ and $\sum_i x_i = \sum_j y_j = 1$, the Hessian $\nabla^2 \psi(p) = \text{Diag}(1/p_i)$ is bounded above and below, so V is locally equivalent to $\|u - u^*\|^2$: $\underline{c}\|u - u^*\|^2 \leq V \leq \bar{c}\|u - u^*\|^2$. Thus $\dot{V} \leq -(m_\beta/\bar{c})V$, giving exponential decay with $c_0 = m_\beta/\bar{c} = \Theta(\beta)$. For the discrete schemes, standard results for (mirror) gradient methods on strongly monotone and Lipschitz VIs yield linear factors $1 - \eta m_\beta + O(\eta^2 L^2)$; choosing η small enough gives the stated rates. Full details appear in Appendix A.5.1. $\square$

A.5.1 Sketch for discrete mirror descent and mirror-prox. Let $\Phi(u) = D_\psi(u^* \| u)$ with $u = (x, y)$. One-step analysis for mirror descent with step η gives $\Phi(u^{t+1}) \leq \Phi(u^t) - \eta \langle u^{t+1} - u^*, F(u^t) \rangle + \frac{\eta^2 L^2}{2} \|u^{t+1} - u^t\|^2$. Strong monotonicity and Lipschitzness bound the right-hand side by $(1 - \eta m_\beta) \Phi(u^t)$ up to $O(\eta^2)$; mirror-prox admits a larger step via an intermediate evaluation of F . (We omit routine constants; see any standard VI text for details.)

A.6 IMPLICIT-FUNCTION SENSITIVITY AND CONSTANTS

Let $g(x, y, \beta) = (\nabla_x f_\beta(x, y), -\nabla_y f_\beta(x, y))$ on $\mathbb{T} \times \mathbb{T}$. At $\beta = 0$, suppose $(x_0^*, y_0^*) \in \text{relin}(\Delta_m)^2$ is an interior NE and $J_0 := D_{(x,y)} g(x, y, 0)|_{(x_0^*, y_0^*)}$ is nonsingular on $\mathbb{T} \times \mathbb{T}$ (Assumption A3). Then $g(x_\beta^*, y_\beta^*, \beta) = 0$ defines a C^1 curve (x_β^*, y_β^*) for small β by the implicit-function theorem.

Lemma 5 (Directional derivative at $\beta = 0$).

$$\frac{d}{d\beta} \Big|_{\beta=0} \begin{bmatrix} x_\beta^* \\ y_\beta^* \end{bmatrix} = -J_0^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} \partial_\beta \nabla_x f_\beta(x_0^*, y_0^*) \\ -\partial_\beta \nabla_y f_\beta(x_0^*, y_0^*) \end{bmatrix} = -J_0^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} \nabla_x D_{\text{KL}}(x_0^* \| \mu) \\ -\nabla_y D_{\text{KL}}(y_0^* \| \mu) \end{bmatrix},$$

where gradients are taken on $\mathbb{T}$ (constants along $\mathbf{1}$ vanish).

Proof. Differentiate $g(x_\beta^*, y_\beta^*, \beta) = 0$ at $\beta = 0$: $J_0 [\frac{d}{d\beta}(x_\beta^*, y_\beta^*)]^\top + \partial_\beta g(x_0^*, y_0^*, 0) = 0$. Since $\partial_\beta \nabla_x f_\beta = -(\log x - \log \mu)$ and $\partial_\beta (-\nabla_y f_\beta) = -(\log y - \log \mu)$, projection to $\mathbb{T}$ yields the stated expression, which coincides with $\nabla D_{\text{KL}}(\cdot \| \mu)$ up to a constant shift along $\mathbf{1}$ that vanishes. $\square$

[Thm. 2.7, constants] There exist $\delta > 0$ and $C > 0$ such that for $\beta \in [0, \delta]$, $\|(x_\beta^* - x_0^*, y_\beta^* - y_0^*)\| \leq C\beta$. One admissible constant is $C = \kappa M$ with $\kappa = \|J_0^{-1}\|$ and $M = \sup\{\|\partial_\beta g(x, y, \beta)\| : (x, y) \in \mathcal{N}, \beta \in [0, \delta]\}$ on a small neighborhood $\mathcal{N}$.

Proof. The implicit-function theorem gives (x_β^*, y_β^*) continuously differentiable near 0 with derivative given by Lemma 5. Local Lipschitzness of g in (x, y, β) and boundedness of J_0^{-1} imply $\|(x_\beta^*, y_\beta^*) - (x_0^*, y_0^*)\| \leq \int_0^\beta \|J_0^{-1}\| \|\partial_\beta g(x_s^*, y_s^*, s)\| ds \leq \kappa M \beta$. $\square$

Bounding $\|\partial_\beta g\|$. On $\mathbb{T}$, $\partial_\beta g(x, y, \beta) = (-(\log x - \log \mu), -(\log y - \log \mu))$. On a compact neighborhood with $x_i, y_j \geq \alpha > 0$, the map $p \mapsto \log p$ is $1/\alpha$ -Lipschitz coordinatewise, hence $\|\partial_\beta g\| \leq c(\alpha, \mu)$.

Norm equivalences used throughout. On any compact subset of $\text{relint}(\Delta_m)$, there exist constants $0 < \underline{\lambda} \leq \bar{\lambda} < \infty$ such that for all $v \in \mathbb{T}$,

$$\underline{\lambda} \|v\|_2^2 \leq v^\top \nabla^2 \psi(p) v \leq \bar{\lambda} \|v\|_2^2,$$

with $\nabla^2 \psi(p) = \text{Diag}(1/p)$. This yields equivalence between Euclidean norms and the local information-geometric (entropic) norms and underlies the conversions between $\|u - u^*\|^2$ and V in A.5.

Summary. A.1–A.6 establish: (i) the entropic Nash mirror ODE and interior invariance; (ii) local well-posedness; (iii) logit/quantal equilibria; (iv) a block Hamiltonian linearization with spectra $-\beta \pm i\sigma_k$; (v) Lyapunov decay and discrete linear rates with constants proportional to β ; and (vi) $O(\beta)$ equilibrium sensitivity with explicit constants from J_0^{-1} and Lipschitz moduli.

Corollary A.3 (Parametric Taylor bound (specialization of Thm. 2.7)). *Let $\theta \mapsto (\pi_\theta, \pi'_\theta)$ be a C^2 local parametrization of policies near an interior unregularised NE θ_0^* , and define $P_\theta := P(\pi_\theta \succ \pi'_\theta)$. Suppose the reduced Hessian $H_P(\theta_0^*) := \nabla_\theta^2 P_\theta|_{\theta_0^*}$ is positive definite on the tangent (with smallest eigenvalue $\lambda_{\min} > 0$). Then for sufficiently small β ,*

$$\|\theta_\beta^* - \theta_0^*\| \leq \frac{\beta}{\lambda_{\min}} \|\nabla_\theta D_{\text{KL}}(\pi_{\theta_0^*} \|\mu)\| + O(\beta^2),$$

where θ_β^* is the β -regularised NE in parameter space.

Sketch. Write the stationarity conditions for $P_\theta - \beta D_{\text{KL}}(\pi_\theta \|\mu)$, subtract the unregularised condition at θ_0^* , and first-order expand $\nabla_\theta P_\theta$ around θ_0^* : $H_P(\theta_0^*)(\theta_\beta^* - \theta_0^*) = \beta \nabla_\theta D_{\text{KL}}(\pi_{\theta_0^*} \|\mu) + O(\beta^2)$. Taking norms and using $\|H_P^{-1}\| = 1/\lambda_{\min}$ yields the claim. This is a parametric specialization of Theorem 2.7; see Appendix A.6 for the general IFT-based constants. $\square$

B PROOFS FOR SECTION 3

B.1 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.1 (HESSIAN- β : INSTANTANEOUS DAMPING)

Setup and notation. Fix an iteration index t and suppose the controller updates β every $K \geq 1$ steps (Assumption C1). During the t -th primal step (or the K -step mini-epoch), β is held constant at β_t ; the dual/primal dynamics are those of the open-loop ODE with parameter β_t :

$$\dot{z} = G(z; \beta_t), \quad z = (z_x, z_y), \quad x = \text{softmax}(z_x), \quad y = \text{softmax}(z_y).$$

Let $J(z; \beta) := \nabla_z G(z; \beta)$ be the Jacobian of the dual field. At a neighborhood of the equilibrium $(x_{\beta_t}^*, y_{\beta_t}^*)$, Section 2 shows that

$$J(z^*; \beta_t) = \begin{bmatrix} -\beta_t I & H \\ -K & -\beta_t I \end{bmatrix}, \quad \text{spec}(J(z^*; \beta_t)) = \{-\beta_t \pm i\sigma_k\}_{k=1}^{m-1}, \quad (8)$$

with $H = AJ_y^*$, $K = A^\top J_x^*$, and $\{\sigma_k^2\}$ the nonzero eigenvalues of HK (Theorem 2.4).

Real parts (instantaneous damping). Because β is constant within the step, the linearization of the *closed-loop* system along the primal dynamics coincides with the *open-loop* linearization at β_t , hence equation 8 applies. Therefore, *instantaneously* the eigenvalues satisfy $\Re \lambda_t = -\beta_t$, proving the first claim.

One-step lower bound on β_{t+1} . By the controller update equation 5,

$$\beta_{t+1} = \text{proj}_{[\beta_{\min}, \beta_{\max}]} \left((1 - \rho)\beta_t + \rho \zeta^* \hat{\sigma}_t \right).$$

Assumption C2 gives $|\hat{\sigma}_t - \sigma_t| \leq \epsilon \sigma_t$ for a representative modal frequency σ_t . Hence $\hat{\sigma}_t \geq (1 - \epsilon)\sigma_t$ and

$$\beta_{t+1} \geq (1 - \rho)\beta_t + \rho \zeta^* (1 - \epsilon)\sigma_t$$

before projection; the projection can only increase this lower bound if it clips up to $\beta_{\min}$. This proves the inequality in Proposition 3.1.

Uniform contraction rate. If $\zeta^*(1 - \epsilon)\underline{\sigma} \geq \beta_{\min} > 0$ for a local lower bound $\underline{\sigma}$ of the representative modal frequency, then $\beta_{t+1} \geq \beta_{\min}$ holds inductively (assuming the projection box contains $\beta_{\min}$). Since $\Re \lambda_t = -\beta_t$, the local contraction rate of the linearised flow is uniformly bounded below by $\beta_{\min}$ at every step, completing the proof. $\square$

Remark B.1 (Two time-scales and mid-epoch linearization). *Assumption C1 ensures β varies on a slower time-scale than the primal dynamics. For $K > 1$, the intra-epoch linearization uses fixed β_t ; for $K = 1$, small ρ produces the same effect. Either way, the instantaneous real parts remain $-\beta_t$.*

B.2 PROOF OF THEOREM 3.3 (BIAS- β : BUDGET TRACKING)

Closed-loop map in $\log \beta$. Let $u_t := \log \beta_t$. The controller equation 6 updates

$$u_{t+1} = u_t + \eta_\beta \delta_t, \quad \delta_t = \text{clamp}(B(\pi_t) - B^*, -b, b). \quad (9)$$

Let $u^* = \log \beta^*$ with $B(\pi_{\beta^*}) = B^*$.

Quasi-static approximation and linearization. By two time-scales (C1) and local convergence (Theorem 2.6), the policy iterate tracks the regularised equilibrium: $\pi_t = \pi_{\beta_t}^* + e_t$ with a small tracking error e_t that decays geometrically between controller updates. Write the budget map in the equilibrium proxy:

$$\bar{B}(u) := B(\pi_{e^u}^*), \quad \bar{B}'(u^*) = s^* > 0 \quad (\text{Assumption C3}).$$

Near u^* and ignoring saturation ($|\delta_t| < b$), we have

$$\delta_t = \bar{B}(u_t) - B^* + \nu_t = s^*(u_t - u^*) + r_t + \nu_t,$$

where r_t collects higher-order terms of the Taylor remainder (bounded by $c|u_t - u^*|^2$) and ν_t collects measurement/tracking noise from e_t and mini-batching¹. Substituting into equation 9 yields

$$u_{t+1} - u^* = (1 - \eta_\beta s^*)(u_t - u^*) + \eta_\beta(r_t + \nu_t), \quad (10)$$

until clamps activate. When clamps activate ($|\delta_t| = b$), the increment is deterministically bounded by $|\eta_\beta b|$ and we can treat saturation as an additional bounded disturbance.

Mean stability and geometric rate. Taking expectations and using $\mathbb{E} \nu_t = 0$ and $\mathbb{E} r_t = O(\mathbb{E}|u_t - u^*|^2)$ gives

$$\mathbb{E}[u_{t+1} - u^*] = (1 - \eta_\beta s^*) \mathbb{E}[u_t - u^*] + O(\mathbb{E}|u_t - u^*|^2).$$

For $0 < \eta_\beta s^* < 2$, the linear part has contraction factor $\phi := |1 - \eta_\beta s^*| < 1$. For small enough neighbourhoods (so that the quadratic term is dominated), this yields the claimed geometric rate $|\mathbb{E}[u_t - u^*]| \leq \phi^t |u_0 - u^*|$.

Variance bound under bounded noise. From equation 10, ignoring higher-order r_t (or absorbing it into the disturbance as a bias term), we have an AR(1) recursion with bounded additive noise:

$$u_{t+1} - u^* = \phi(u_t - u^*) + \eta_\beta \xi_t, \quad \phi = 1 - \eta_\beta s^*, \quad \xi_t := r_t + \nu_t,$$

where $|\xi_t| \leq b$ almost surely when clamps are active, and $\text{Var}(\xi_t) \leq \sigma_\xi^2 < \infty$ by C4 otherwise. Standard AR(1) variance calculus gives the stationary bound

$$\sup_t \text{Var}(u_t) \leq \frac{\eta_\beta^2 \sigma_\xi^2}{1 - \phi^2} \leq \frac{\eta_\beta^2 b^2}{1 - (1 - \eta_\beta s^*)^2},$$

where the second inequality uses the saturation envelope $|\xi_t| \leq b$ and thus $\sigma_\xi^2 \leq b^2$. This proves Theorem 3.3. $\square$

Remark B.2 (On the sign and size of s^*). *Assumption C3 (strict increase in $u = \log \beta$) is natural when B measures drift toward μ (e.g., length ratio, ECE), because Theorem 2.7 implies $\frac{d\pi_\beta^*}{d\beta}|_{\beta=0}$ points in the $\nabla D_{\text{KL}}(\cdot||\mu)$ direction; if B correlates positively with this direction, then $s^* > 0$. In parametric models, this matches the first-order Taylor bound derived in the memo (Appendix A.6, Corollary A.3).*

¹Under C4, ν_t is zero-mean with bounded variance; e_t can be folded into ν_t due to geometric decay between controller steps.

B.3 COMPOSITION: FEASIBILITY FIRST, DAMPING SECOND

We justify the priority composition

$$\beta_{t+1}^{\text{bias}} \text{ from equation 6, } \beta_{t+1}^{\text{hess}} \text{ from equation 5, } \beta_{t+1} = \max\{\beta_{t+1}^{\text{bias}}, \beta_{t+1}^{\text{hess}}\}.$$

Proposition B.3 (Budget feasibility and damping lower bound). *Suppose C1–C4 hold. If the Bias- β loop is mean-stable at $u^* = \log \beta^*$ (Theorem 3.3), then the composed update preserves budget feasibility in the limit: $B(\pi_{\beta_t}^*) \rightarrow B^*$ and $B(\pi_t) \leq B^* + o(1)$ almost surely. Moreover, the realised damping obeys $\Re \lambda_t = -\beta_t \geq \min\{\beta_t^{\text{bias}}, \beta_t^{\text{hess}}\}$, and thus is at least the Hessian-target when the bias budget admits it (i.e., when $\beta_t^{\text{hess}} \geq \beta_t^{\text{bias}}$).*

Proof. By construction $\beta_{t+1} \geq \beta_{t+1}^{\text{bias}}$, so the composed loop cannot pick a β smaller than the bias-feasible one. Under mean stability of Bias- β (Theorem 3.3), $\beta_t^{\text{bias}} \rightarrow \beta^*$ and therefore $B(\pi_{\beta_t}^*) \rightarrow B^*$; two time-scales ensure $B(\pi_t) - B(\pi_{\beta_t}^*) \rightarrow 0$ in mean, yielding the stated feasibility. The damping statement follows from $\Re \lambda_t = -\beta_t$ (Proposition 3.1). $\square$

Summary. Hessian- β sets the instantaneous damping via a spectral proxy, while Bias- β enforces a budget in expectation; the max-composition attains the larger of the two β values, ensuring *feasibility first, speed second*.

C ADDITIONAL METHOD EXPLANATIONS

C.1 DIAGNOSTICS, HYPERPARAMETERS, AND SAFEGUARDS

Diagnostics. (i) β -sweeps: plot $D_{\text{KL}}(\pi_{\beta}^* \parallel \pi_0^*)$, ℓ_2 , exploitability; (ii) *Spectral panels*: $\Re \lambda$ vs. β , $\Im \lambda$ (test Theorem 2.4); (iii) *Budget tracking*: $B(\pi_t)$ curves (overshoot and rate).

Hyperparameters. Hessian- β : $\zeta^* \in \{0.6, 0.8, 1.0\}$, $\rho \in \{0.2, 0.5\}$, update every $K \in \{1, 2\}$ steps. Bias- β : $\eta_{\beta} \in \{0.2, 0.4, 0.6\}$, $b \in \{0.25, 0.5\}$, $K \in \{1, 2, 4\}$. Bounds: choose $[\beta_{\min}, \beta_{\max}]$ from task ranges.

Complexity. Hessian- β : one JVP per controller step (two for centered differences); negligible vs. LLM forward. Bias- β : one scalar measurement on a small probe set. Memory overhead is negligible.

Safeguards. Two time-scales (small ρ, η_{β} or larger K), projection $\beta \in [\beta_{\min}, \beta_{\max}]$ and clamping for anti-windup, EMA for noisy $\hat{\sigma}$, and periodic re-estimation of μ to avoid lock-in.

D ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS AND RESULTS

D.1 EXPERIMENTS A: TOY GEOMETRY ON RPS

Setup. RPS payoff A (antisymmetric), biased reference $\mu = (0.36, 0.32, 0.32)$. We implement Nash-MD/MP, APMD-like, MPO/GRPO-like, and the two controllers. We render vector fields (symmetric restriction $x = y$), simulate trajectories, sweep β , and compute Jacobian spectra numerically at fixed points.

Hyperparameters. Stepsizes $\eta \in [0.1, 0.2]$; grid step 0.08 for fields; 600 steps for trajectories; finite difference $h = 10^{-6}$ for spectra. All seeds and code are released (see Reproducibility).

Findings. (i) Vector fields and trajectories confirm *spiral steepening* with β ; (ii) $D_{\text{KL}}(x_{\beta}^* \parallel x_0^*)$ increases with β (bias amplification); (iii) real parts of spectra scale as $-\beta$, while imaginary parts remain roughly constant; (iv) Nash-MP and adaptive- β controllers converge faster than fixed- β MD while controlling bias.

Quantitative comparison. Table 2 summarises exploitability and budget-violation fractions (mean $\pm$ CI over $n=6$ random initializations).




Figure 5: Simplex vector fields: larger β yields steeper spirals (increased damping).




Figure 6: Trajectory bundles: faster radial decay for larger β .

D.2 ABLATIONS AND DIAGNOSTICS

We ablate controller gains and β values to stress the speed–bias trade-off.

β -sweep. $\beta \in \{0, 0.1, 0.3, 1.0, 3.0\}$. *Observed:* (i) bias to μ (KL, ℓ_2) increases monotonically with β ; (ii) exploitability decreases; (iii) spectral real parts follow $-\beta$ while imaginary parts are nearly constant. *Expected figures:* see Fig. 3 (right) for the toy setting; for LLMs we plan a small diagnostic panel mirroring these trends.

Bias- β gains. $\eta_\beta \in \{0.2, 0.4, 0.6\}$, clamp $b \in \{0.25, 0.5\}$. *Observed:* larger η_β improves budget tracking yet overshoots without clamps; clamps bound transients.

Hessian- β scaling. Target ratios $\zeta^* \in \{0.6, 0.8, 1.0\}$, relaxation $\rho \leq 0.5$. *Observed:* increasing ζ^* accelerates convergence but may drift bias if $\hat{\sigma}$ is noisy; clamping $\hat{\sigma}$ and EMA smoothing mitigate this. *Expected figure:* step vs. exploitability for different ζ^* .




Figure 7: Spectra: real parts track $-\beta$ (uniform damping); rotation stays near-constant.

Table 2: Toy RPS ($n = 6$ inits). *Takeaway*: **Bias**- β satisfies the bias budget with low variance while keeping exploitability competitive; Adaptive-KL meets a KL target but violates the *operational* bias budget frequently.

Method	final exploit (mean)	std	95% CI	bias viol. frac (mean)	std	95% CI
Nash-MD ($\beta=0.5$)	0.0562	0.0000	[0.0562, 0.0562]	0.138	0.021	[0.121, 0.155]
Nash-MP ($\beta=0.5$)	0.0562	0.0000	[0.0562, 0.0562]	0.164	0.041	[0.131, 0.197]
APMD-like ($\beta=0.5$, $\sigma=0.02$)	0.0606	0.0000	[0.0606, 0.0606]	0.817	0.014	[0.806, 0.829]
Adaptive-KL (KL*=0.03)	0.0398	0.0429	[0.0054, 0.0742]	0.814	0.059	[0.767, 0.861]
Bias - β ($B^*=0.04$)	0.0489	0.0005	[0.0485, 0.0493]	0.042	0.008	[0.036, 0.048]

APMD noise. $\sigma \in \{0, 0.01, 0.02\}$. *Observed*: noise breaks cycles but raises final exploitability at fixed targets. *Expected figure*: cycle magnitude vs. σ and final exploitability vs. σ .

D.3 REPRODUCIBILITY AND ARTIFACTS

We release anonymised code/notebooks/figures/eval scripts (<https://anonymous.4open.science/r/geonash-263B/>). We log harness versions and commit hashes, and fix decoding settings (temperature, top-p, max tokens). All hyperparameters, data splits, and seeds are documented. Toy/micro plots are reproducible on CPU/1×GPU in minutes; benchmark inference on 1×A100/H100 80GB completes within one day with SC(10) on GSM8K.

E THE USE OF LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS (LLMs)

The LLMs are used for assisting

- Manuscript structuring and editing
- Mathematical exposition (proof sketches and readability)
- LaTeX engineering