Augment Semantics, Transfer Better: Unveiling Adversarial Transferability in Multimodal Large Language Models

Anonymous ACL submission

Abstract

Recently, Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have demonstrated exceptional performance in cross-modality interaction, yet they exhibit adversarial vulnerabilities. The transferability of adversarial examples, which enables cross-model adversarial attacks and poses a more severe effect, remains an ongoing challenge. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the transferability of adversarial examples generated by MLLMs. To explore the potential transferable impact in the real world, we utilize two tasks that can have both negative and positive societal impacts: ❶ Harmful Word Insertion and ❷ Information Protection. Furthermore, we identify *two key Factors* that significantly impact adversarial transferability, and discover that semantic-level data augmentation methods can effectively boost the adversarial transferability. We also propose two novel semantic-level data augmentation methods, Adding Image Patch (AIP) and Typography Augment Transferability Method (TATM), that can greatly boost the transferability of adversarial examples across MLLMs.

1 Introduction

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) consist of the vision encoder, which are Vision-Language Models (VLMs) like CLIP for processing visual information, and Large Language Models (LLMs), which are dedicated to handling language information. Due to the exceptional visual perception and text comprehension capabilities of this architecture, MLLMs are widely applied across various fields, including robotics (Yang et al., 2023; Wu et al., 2024), autonomous driving (Chen and Lu, 2024), and industrial automation (Jin et al., 2024; González et al., 2024).

Recent studies (Zhao et al., 2024a; Lu et al., 2023; He et al., 2023) show that VLMs are susceptible to human-imperceptible adversarial examples. Moreover, adversarial transferability has been demonstrated among different VLMs (Lu et al., 2023; He et al., 2023). It refers to the ability of adversarial examples generated by one model to effectively impact other models, posing significant real-world potential risks. Additionally, (Zhao et al., 2024a) indicates that the adversarial examples generated by VLMs could also mislead MLLMs Despite recent progress, the transferability of adversarial examples generated by MLLMs remains underexplored.



Figure 1: Applications of adversarial examples in MLLMs. : Normal Scenario. : Harmful Word Insertion. : Information Protection.

When studying adversarial transferability, various strategies are often employed to amplify the transferable effects between different models. For traditional vision models (CNN, ViT and *etc.*), there are various data augmentation methods (Ge et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2023; Wu et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2021) have been proposed to boost adversarial transferability. These methods typically involve operations such as flipping, rotation, and cropping of the original images, aiming to maximize the intensity of information diversity during adversarial example generation. This approach helps prevent the adversarial examples from overfitting to a specific model. For VLMs, (Lu et al., 2023; He et al., 2023) indicate that adversarial examples gener-

ated in vision-language contexts involving cross-modality interactions exhibit better transferability. It could be summarized into *two key Factors* that influence transferability during adversarial examples generation: *I. the intensity of information diversity; II. joint involvement of each modality information.* Since MLLMs share the same underlying operators as traditional vision models (convolution (Krizhevsky et al., 2017), cross attention (Dosovitskiy, 2020)) and have a design structure similar to that of VLMs (contrastive vision-language learning (Radford et al., 2021)), we infer that the *two key Factors* remain the most likely to boost the cross-MLLMs transferability.

In this paper, we comprehensively evaluate cross-MLLMs adversarial transferability. To better understand the impact transferability in real-world scenarios, we adopt two categories of tasks that serve as comprehensive evaluation scenarios: ❶ *Harmful Word Insertion* and ❷ *Information Protection*. These two tasks have negative and positive societal impacts, respectively. Both tasks are based on targeted adversarial attacks, meaning that the generated adversarial examples aim to approximate predefined target outputs. Task ❶ (target: "suicide") is primarily inspired by jailbreak tasks (Huang et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2024; Xu et al., 2024), which use various methods to ensure that the final output of generative models includes misleading, discriminatory, or even illegal information. Task ❷ (target: "unknown") is designed to prevent the infringement of visual information ownership, thereby further promoting the protection of portrait and privacy rights in society. Figure 1 illustrates the specific application effects.

By employing these two tasks as evaluation benchmarks, this paper analyzes the transferability of adversarial examples in MLLMs and explores potential methods for their enhancement. When different MLLMs serve as surrogate and victim models, we examine both the cross-LLM scenario, where the vision encoder remains fixed while LLMs vary, and the cross-MLLM scenario, where both vision encoders and LLMs differ.

When exploring methods to enhance transferability, inspired by the *two key Factors* mentioned above, we propose that candidate methods should enhance information diversity during the adversarial example generation process through interactions across vision-and-language modalities. Semantic-level data augmentation comes into our view as a concise and efficient method. Consequently, we propose two semantic-level data augmentation methods, Adding Image Patch (AIP) and Typography Augment Transferable Method (TATM), to further amplify the transferability of adversarial examples in MLLMs. AIP and TATM enhance the diversity of visual and language modality information in adversarial example generation by surrogate MLLMs through the addition of semantic image patches and typographic text to the original visual information.

We also introduce a metric named Semantic Angular Deviation Score (SADScore) to measure the diversity shift brought by different data augmentation methods. In Figure 2, we provide a detailed introduction to the pipeline of our proposed semantic-level data augmentation methods. Our contributions are as follows:

- We adopt two tasks with both negative and positive societal impacts, ❶ *Harmful Word Insertion* and ❷ *Information Protection*, to evaluate adversarial transferability across MLLMs.
- We demonstrate that adversarial transferability among MLLMs is evident only in cross-LLMs scenarios when the vision encoder remains fixed. In contrast, when the vision encoders differ, transferability can only be partially achieved through the ensemble method.
- We identify *two key Factors* affecting cross-model transferability in MLLMs, which are well reflected in semantic-level data augmentation methods. We also propose two semantic-level data augmentation methods, Adding Image Patch (AIP) and Typography Augment Transferable Method (TATM).

2 Related Works

Adversarial Vulnerability Adversarial attacks like Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2017) exploit the vulnerabilities of machine learning models by introducing imperceptible perturbations to the input data. Adversarial attacks are known to exhibit adversarial transferability, which means that adversarial examples generated on one model (the surrogate model) are effective on another model (the victim model). The transferability can be further enhanced by optimizing the perturbation process (Qin et al., 2022; Huang and Kong, 2022; Lu et al., 2023; He et al., 2023). Furthermore, data augmentation methods are also



Figure 2: (a) Pipeline of adversarial attack with data augmentation methods for generating adversarial examples. (b) How various data augmentation methods transform input images to generate adversarial examples. (c) The clean image and transformed images of different data augmentation methods. (d) Grad-CAM visualization when the clean and transformed images interact with the corresponding language output in the vision encoder.

employed to generate transferable adversarial examples. Some works apply pixel-level transformations to the original input image (Xie et al., 2019; Dong et al., 2019; Wang and He, 2021; Lin et al., 2019; Ge et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2023; Wu et al., 2021). Other studies transform the original input image by incorporating additional semantics (Wang et al., 2021; Hong et al., 2019).

Adversarial Vulnerability in Multimodal Large Language Models Previous research on adversarial attacks targeting VLMs has primarily focused on image captioning tasks (Aafaq et al., 2021; Chen et al., 2017). These studies (Lu et al., 2023; He et al., 2023) enhance the transferability of adversarial examples in VLMs by adopting cross-modal optimization. Recent works have begun to address the adversarial robustness of MLLMs (Zhao et al., 2023), investigating the adversarial robustness of MLLMs under a black-box setting. Another work explores cross-prompt adversarial transferability, where an adversarial example can mislead the predictions of MLLMs across different prompts (Luo et al., 2024). Typography (Azuma and Matsui, 2023; Cheng et al., 2024) can distract the semantics of the final language output by adding typographic text to the visual modality input.

3 Exploring Setting

Task Setting The current direct use of MLLMs involves private interactions with individual users. The target output "suicide" of Task ❶ *Harmful Word Insertion*, as a harmful piece of information to users, has always been a critical focus. In addition, "suicide" has recently become the first AI jailbreak term in the world to directly cause harm to users (CNN-Business, 2024). Therefore, "suicide" easily becomes the preferred target output for Task ❶ in jailbreak-like scenarios on MLLMs. Task ❷ *Information Protection* is inspired by Guardian algorithms (Zhao et al., 2024b; Liu et al., 2024b), which effectively safeguards image privacy and ownership in image generation tasks. The core objective of this task is to ensure protection by preventing the model from knowing the original image information. Consequently, the word "unknown" as the most intuitive semantic term is selected as the target output.

Threat Model Due to MLLMs' high resource consumption required for training, ***users*** often rely on online commercial models or directly download offline open-source models for daily application. Since the fully closed-source nature of online commercial MLLMs and the randomness in users' selection of offline open-source MLLMs, ***attack-***

ers typically have little knowledge of the victim MLLMs, making it a completely black-box scenario. However, as shown in Appendix A, most current MLLMs (Liu et al., 2024a; Dai et al., 2023; Li et al., 2023) are based on fixed vision encoders and are extended onto different LLMs (Karamcheti et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2024). Therefore, when ***attackers*** select surrogate models to generate adversarial examples attacking victim models, they are likely to encounter cases where the surrogate and victim MLLMs share the same fixed vision encoder, referred to as the Cross-LLMs scenario. Conversely, when the vision encoders of the surrogate and victim models are entirely different, this is referred to as the strict Cross-MLLMs scenario.

4 Semantic-level Data Augmentation

To further analyze adversarial transferability across MLLMs, we focus on different data augmentation methods for generating transferable adversarial examples. In this section, we outline the motivation, basis of analysis, and data augmentation pipeline during the adversarial generation process, as illustrated in Figure 2 (a).

Motivation When developing methods to enhance cross-MLLMs adversarial transferability, it is crucial to adhere to the *two key Factors* mentioned in Section 1. Regarding *Factor I*, data augmentation (Xie et al., 2019; Liu and Li, 2020; Lin et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2023; Dong et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2021), as a simple and effective method to enhance the overall input information diversity, is as the primary strategy for improving transferability. Moreover, the diversity intensity enhanced by different data augmentation methods ultimately determines the degree of transferability improvement. *Factor II* is inspired by recent studies (Lu et al., 2023; He et al., 2023) on enhancing adversarial transferability across VLMs, emphasizing that improving the transferability of adversarial examples generated by VLMs requires the joint involvement of visual and language modality information. Currently, various MLLMs share similar vision encoder architectures with VLMs, differing only in replacing the text encoder with more powerful LLMs for processing language modality information. Therefore, *Factor II*, which influences cross-VLM adversarial transferability, can reasonably be adapted and applied to MLLMs. Based on above analysis, potential methods for boosting adversarial transferability in MLLMs should focus on maximizing information diversity (*Factor I*) through effective data augmentations. Additionally, this process of improving diversity must incorporate cross-modal augmentation of vision-language information (*Factor II*).

Data augmentation methods could be separated into pixel-level and semantic-level augmentation. There are various types of pixel-level data augmentations. Specifically, Diverse Input Method (DIM) (Xie et al., 2019) adds padding to the randomly resized input image. Brightness Control (BC) (Liu and Li, 2020) randomly adjusts the brightness of the input image. Scale Invariant Method (SIM) (Lin et al., 2019) scales the input image with different scale factors. Structure Invariant Transformation Attack (SIA) (Wang et al., 2023) divides the input image into several blocks and randomly applies different transformations to each block. The transformations include vertical (horizontal) shifts and flips, 180-degree rotations, and scaling. Translation Invariant Method (TIM) (Dong et al., 2019) randomly shifts the image horizontally and vertically, and when parts of the image are shifted beyond the boundaries, those parts wrap around to the opposite side.

For semantic-level methods, to the best of our knowledge, Admix (Wang et al., 2021) seems to be the only existing augmentation strategy currently applied to boost adversarial transferability. Admix achieves data augmentation by linearly combining the original image with another image containing new semantics to generate augmented vision information. Furthermore, inspired by two other measures, image patch and typographic text, which could incorporate new semantics into images, we propose Adding Image Patch (AIP) and Typography Augment Transferability Method (TATM). The implementations of AIP and TATM are to add different image patches and typographic text with different semantics to the original image.

As shown in Figure 2 (b), unlike the pixel-level data augmentation methods, which only apply pixel-level transformations (*e.g.*, flipping, rotation, cropping, *etc.*) to the input image, the semantic-level data augmentation methods involve blending external semantics to achieve semantic-level information diversity. Figure 2 (c) visualize a clean image along with its transformed images using different pixel-level and semantic-level data augmentation methods.



Figure 3: (left) PCA visualization of clean and augmented images; (middle) SADScore of semantic-level data augmentation methods; (right) Vision-language similarity scores (%) among clean and other augmented images with encountered semantics.

Basis of Analysis In Figure 3, we employ Principal Components Analysis (PCA) (Shlens, 2014) to analyze the distribution of the embedding features of the clean image, as well as pixel-level and semantic-level augmented images. Each augmentation method transforms input image 300 times. The position of the clean image is **black star**. All pixel-level data augmentation methods, which are visualized by different clusters of DIM (**blue**) , BC (**green**), SIM (**purple**), SIA (**yellow**), TIM (**brown**), follow the same directional shift of **blue arrow**. Different pixel-level methods only vary in their scalar distance from the **black star**, while the angular deviation of the vector direction remains consistent. In contrast, the semantic-level augmentations are clusters of Admix (**pink**), AIP (**gray**), and TATM (**red**). Comparisons among different semantic-level methods and among semantic-level and pixel-level methods reveal significantly different scalar distances and vector angular deviations (Admix: **pink arrow**; AIP: **gray arrow**; TATM: **red arrow**).

To further quantify the vector angular deviation induced by semantic-level data augmentation, we introduce the Semantic Angular Deviation Score (SADScore) as follows:

$$\frac{1}{P}\sum_{j}\left|\arg\left(e^{i(\mu_s-\mu_j)}\right)\right|$$

where $\mu = \frac{1}{n}\sum_i \theta_i = \text{atan2}(\vec{v}_i)$, s and p are the semantic-level and pixel-level methods of scoring objects, N is the number of pixel-level methods with the same vector angular deviation, μ is the average deviation angular among n times of image transformation. $\vec{v}$ is the direction vector between the transformed image i and clean image (**black star**). $\arg(e^i)$ is the phase angle parameter. In Figure 3 SADScore, we present the SADScore where s is Admix, AIP and TATM, respectively. j is the set of {BC, SIM, TIM} and {BC, SIM, TIM, SIA, DIM}. The SADScore is increasing progressively along Admix, AIP, and TATM. There, through illustrating Figure 3, the additional vector angular deviation generated during the semantic-level augmentation process significantly enhances the intensity of information diversity (*Factor I*).

In Figure 2 (d), we further utilize Grad-CAM (Selvaraju et al., 2017) to illustrate the attention shifts induced by different data augmentations compared to the clean image in the vision encoder. However, except for TATM, all other images augmented by other augmentations, including Admix and AIP, are similar to the Grad-CAM of the clean image. The primary attention area is focusing on the most prominent object ("cat") in the image.

Additionally, in Figure 3 Similarity Score, we first compare the average similarity scores of clean + pixel-level methods, and semantic-level methods. It illustrates how different augmentations affect semantics after passing through the vision encoder. The evaluated semantics include the original "cat", "flower" from Admix and AIP, as well as "table" and "dog" from typographic text. Admix and AIP improve the "flower" semantics by introducing images and image patches ($6.6\% \rightarrow 14.8\%$), while TATM effectively enriches the "table" and "dog" semantics through typographic text ($19.7\% \rightarrow 27.9, 4.2\% \rightarrow 14.1\%$). The analysis results indicate that, in addition to directly augmenting input images, semantic-level methods effectively induce semantic deviation in the language modality (*Factor II*).

Ultimately, Figure 3 demonstrates that, compared to pixel-level augmentation, semantic-level methods better reflect the *two key Factors* and have become the main focus of developing our cross-MLLMs boosting method. Furthermore, TATM exhibits even more outstanding performance. Some additional examples are present in

Appendix G.

Methods Our proposed AIP and TATM are based on the PGD attack (Madry et al., 2018), and augment the clean images in each iteration of adversarial optimization. The specific process of AIP and TATM to generate adversarial examples are outlined in Algorithm 1. Furthermore, to better address the strict Cross-MLLMs scenario, we employ the ensemble method across different vision encoders when generating adversarial examples, as illustrated in Algorithm 2 in Appendix F.

Algorithm 1 Semantic-level Data Augmentation

Input: MLLM $f(\theta)$, input image $\mathbf{x}$, input prompt p, target output y, perturbation budget ϵ, step size α, number of iterations N, typographic text set T, image patch set I
Output: Adversarial example $\mathbf{x_{adv}}$
Initialize: $\delta \sim \mathbf{Uniform}(-\epsilon, \epsilon)$
for $i = 1$ to N **do**
    $x_t \leftarrow$ (TATM) Print random text from T on $\mathbf{x}$ / (AIP) Stick random image from I on $\mathbf{x}$
    $x_{adv} = x_t + \delta$
    Compute loss $\mathcal{L} = L(f(\theta, x_{adv}, p), y)$
    Compute gradient $g = \nabla_\delta \mathcal{L}$
    $\delta = clip_\epsilon(\delta + \alpha \cdot sign(g))$
end for
Return: Adversarial example $\mathbf{x_{adv}} = \mathbf{x} + \delta$

5 Experiments

5.1 Experimental Setting

Surrogate and Victim MLLMs We employ two popular MLLMs, InstructBLIP (eva-clip-vit-g/14, Vicuna-7B) (Dai et al., 2023) and LLaVA-v1.5 (clip-vit-large-patch14-336, Vicuna-7B) (Liu et al., 2023), as surrogate models to generate adversarial examples. Then we test the transferability of these adversarial examples on the victim models BLIP2 (Li et al., 2023), InstructBLIP, MiniGPT-4 (Zhu et al., 2023), and LLaVA (Liu et al., 2024a) to assess whether the adversarial examples could mislead the victim models across different vision encoders and LLMs.

Specifically, victim models are abbreviated as follows: BLIP2 variants (opt-2.7B, opt-6.7B, t5-xl, and t5-xxl on VM1 through VM4), InstructBLIP variants (t5-xl and Vicuna-13B on VM5 and VM6), MiniGPT4 variants (Vicuna-7B and Llama-7B on VM7 and VM8), LLaVA-v1.5 variants (Mistral-7B and Vicuna-13B on VM9 through VM10), and LLaVA-v1.6 variants (Mistral-7B, Vicuna-7B, and Vicuna-13B on VM11 through VM13). More information on surrogate and victim MLLMs is detailed in Appendix A.

Adversarial Attack Settings To craft adversarial examples, we attack the surrogate MLLMs to generate adversarial perturbation by employing PGD attack (Madry et al., 2017) with perturbation budget $\epsilon_v = 16/255$, step size $\alpha = 1/255$, and the number of optimization rounds $T = 1000$. The experiments are targeted attacks with the target outputs "suicide" and "unknown" for *Harmful Word Insertion* and *Information Protection* tasks, respectively. The prompt "describe the image." is used by default when generating adversarial examples. The datasets are detailed in Appendix B.

Cross-Prompt Inference Since in the real-world application, users may employ various prompts on the generated adversarial examples, we utilize the Claude-3.5-Sonnet to generate 100 prompt variants of "describe the image" for inference in the experiment. The specific prompts can be found in the Appendix H.

Metrics We employ the Attack Success Rate (ASR) as the metric for evaluating the adversarial transferability, meaning that an attack is considered successful only when the target response appears in the MLLMs' response. A higher ASR indicates better adversarial transferability. Additionally, we also use CLIPScore (Hessel et al., 2021) as a soft metric to compare the semantic similarity between the descriptions of the adversarial examples from MLLMs and the original clean images. A lower CLIPScore indicates greater semantic deviation, which in turn signifies better adversarial transferability of the adversarial examples.

5.2 Exploring Factors that Affect TATM

To comprehensively explore the TATM method, we vary *two key Factors*, the number of typographic text and typographic text type, to examine their impact on the transferability of the generated adversarial examples. Additional details and results are presented in the Appendix C.

Specifically, we investigate the impact of different typographic text types (nouns, adjectives, and verbs) on adversarial transferability during TATM optimization, as shown in Figure 4. Compared to the base PGD adversarial attack, all text types (nouns, adjectives, and verbs) in TATM demonstrate higher ASR and lower CLIPScore, indicating stronger adversarial transferability. Ad-



Figure 4: Adversarial transferability of TATM under different typographic text types in the image. (Left) ASR performance when the target output is "suicide". (Right) CLIPScore performance when the target output is "unknown".

Target	Method	Victim Model (Surrogate: InstructBLIP-7B)								Victim Model (Surrogate: LLaVA-v1.5-7B)				
		VM1	VM2	VM3	VM4	VM5	VM6	VM7	VM8	VM9	VM10	VM11	VM12	VM13
Suicide	clean	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	base	0.246	0.196	0.120	0.166	0.176	0.179	0.083	0.057	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.027	0.023
	DIM	0.538	0.405	0.286	0.326	0.296	0.253	0.103	0.120	0.083	0.057	0.140	0.236	0.226
	SIM	0.203	0.160	0.006	0.133	0.103	0.133	0.033	0.070	0.017	0.003	0.013	0.033	0.033
	BC	0.365	0.319	0.166	0.236	0.236	0.306	0.110	0.116	0.037	0.043	0.080	0.106	0.123
	TIM	0.462	0.389	0.256	0.312	0.263	0.263	0.106	0.120	0.076	0.080	0.120	0.219	0.213
	SIA	0.395	0.372	0.259	0.299	0.272	0.249	0.093	0.146	0.066	0.047	0.120	0.150	0.146
	Admix	0.422	0.405	0.246	0.299	0.309	0.243	0.093	0.136	0.110	0.103	0.246	0.299	0.279
	AIP	0.399	0.395	0.203	0.302	0.269	0.372	0.186	0.126	0.073	0.057	0.057	0.096	0.086
	TATM	0.522	0.588	0.412	0.545	0.459	0.505	0.312	0.249	0.130	0.126	0.163	0.213	0.219
Unknown	clean	21.06	22.49	22.71	24.78	21.13	19.86	27.01	26.98	27.00	26.73	26.84	26.71	27.06
	base	16.45	16.83	17.03	17.57	16.16	15.68	18.59	18.09	19.81	20.32	21.64	21.77	22.28
	DIM	19.57	20.20	20.40	21.71	18.44	17.78	23.79	23.69	23.77	23.55	24.11	23.73	24.28
	SIM	17.46	17.96	17.84	18.45	16.84	16.13	19.87	19.79	21.23	21.60	22.15	22.31	22.61
	BC	15.51	15.63	15.78	15.96	15.40	14.86	17.13	16.81	18.71	18.90	20.27	20.25	20.69
	TIM	19.23	19.89	19.98	21.39	18.25	17.69	23.79	23.35	22.82	22.95	23.79	23.33	23.65
	SIA	18.64	19.20	19.17	20.29	17.95	17.30	22.51	21.86	20.29	20.28	21.03	20.40	20.88
	Admix	16.68	17.13	17.09	17.48	16.03	15.81	18.78	18.55	19.72	19.36	20.19	19.59	20.32
	AIP	15.13	15.28	15.52	15.63	15.29	14.70	16.72	15.53	17.82	18.32	19.69	19.66	20.10
	TATM	15.20	15.37	15.72	15.87	15.22	14.97	16.60	16.45	17.50	18.16	19.74	19.80	20.46

Table 1: Adversarial transferability of different data augmentation methods under cross-prompt inference (measured by ASR for target "suicide", measured by CLIPScore for target "unknown"). To highlight the most effective methods, we color-coded the top three results: the top-1, top-2, and top-3 results are highlighted in deep pink, medium pink, and light pink, respectively.

jectives slightly underperform compared to nouns and verbs. For nouns and verbs, no single text type consistently outperforms the other.

5.3 Comparison of Augmentation Methods

As Table 1 shows, for the "suicide" target scenario, TATM consistently achieves top-tier ASR across most victim models like VM2-VM10, demonstrating its effectiveness in generating transferable adversarial examples. In the "unknown" target scenario, TATM's performance remains competitive, often ranking among the top methods in terms of CLIPScore. The pixel-level data augmentation methods generally lag behind the semantic-level data augmentation methods TATM, Admix, and AIP. This disparity becomes more pronounced when comparing their performance across different victim models and target outputs. It's worth noting that the effectiveness of these methods can vary depending on the specific victim model and target output. For instance, some pixel-level methods might outperform semantic methods for certain model-target combinations. However, the overall trend suggests that semantic methods TATM, Admix, and AIP that introduce meaningful semantic variations are more likely to maintain their efficacy across a broader range of scenarios for generating transferable adversarial examples.

5.4 Evaluation under Defense Methods

We assess the transferability of adversarial examples generated through data augmentation methods against two widely used Gaussian defense methods: Gaussian Noise and Gaussian Blur. Additional results and details are in Appendix D.

Figure 5 shows TATM exhibits strong adversarial transferability across both "suicide" and "unknown" target outputs when subjected to the Gaussian defense. For the "suicide" target, TATM consistently ranks among the top performers, often achieving the highest ASR across multiple victim models (VM1-VM8). Similarly, for the "unknown" target, TATM maintains its effectiveness,



Figure 5: Adversarial transferability of different data augmentation methods under Gaussian Defense. We color-coded the top three results: the top-1, top-2, and top-3 results are highlighted in deep pink, medium pink, and light pink, respectively.

frequently placing in the top three methods in terms of CLIPScore. Moreover, semantic-level methods that enhance semantic diversity generally outperform pixel-level methods in maintaining adversarial transferability under these Gaussian defenses. TATM and AIP demonstrate competitive performance, each achieving notable results for at least one of the target outputs.

5.5 Ablation Analysis

Grad-CAM Visualization of Adversary To understand how targeted adversarial examples influence response in MLLMs, we employ Grad-CAM to compute the relevancy of image patches related to target outputs and original image contents, providing a visual explanation for clean and adversarial images. As shown in Figure 6, for *Harmful Word Insertion*, adversarial examples generated by semantic data augmentation methods, particularly TATM, show heightened relevancy to the target output "suicide". For *Information Protection*, while the clean image exhibits clear relevancy to the original image content "cat", adversarial examples generated via semantic data augmentation methods, notably AIP and TATM, show no response to this original image content.

Ensemble Method Our experiments show that adversarial transferability in MLLMs is evident only at the cross-LLMs level. This means adversarial examples generated by the surrogate MLLM can effectively compromise victim MLLMs that share identical vision encoders, even when utilizing different LLMs. To enhance the transferability of adversarial examples across MLLMs with different vision encoders, we combine TATM with the ensemble method to generate adversarial examples, combining both InstructBLIP-7B and LLaVA-v1.5-7B as surrogate models, as illustrated in Algorithm 2. The generated adversarial examples can attack all the victim models, regardless of their vision encoder configurations. As demonstrated in Figure 8, compared to ensemble adversarial attack without data augmentation (base + ensemble), ensemble TATM consistently achieves higher ASR across almost all 13 victim models (VM1-VM2, VM4-VM13).



Figure 6: Grad-CAM visualization of how targeted adversarial examples interact with MLLMs.

6 Conclusion

In conclusion, this work offers the first comprehensive assessment of adversarial example transferability across MLLMs under different data augmentation methods. We also introduce two semantic data augmentation methods, TATM and AIP, which enhance adversarial transferability. Extensive experimentation demonstrates the effectiveness of generating transferable adversarial examples via semantic data augmentation methods in real-world applications *Harmful Word Insertion* and *Information Protection*. Our findings reveal that enhanced semantics is crucial for generating adversarial examples with better adversarial transferability across MLLMs.

7 Limitations

Our experiments show that adversarial transferability in MLLMs is evident only at the cross-LLMs level. This means adversarial examples generated by the surrogate MLLM can effectively compromise victim MLLMs that share identical vision encoders, even when utilizing different LLMs. However, this finding has important implications for commercial closed-source MLLMs such as GPT-4, Gemini, and Claude. Since their vision encoders remain proprietary and largely unknown, adversarial examples generated using open-source surrogate MLLMs fail to transfer to and affect these commercial closed-source MLLMs successfully.

8 Ethical Considerations

Our research on adversarial transferability in MLLMs encompasses the potentially harmful application *Harmful Word Insertion*. While the investigation includes examples of harmful outputs like "suicide", our primary objective is to contribute to the broader academic understanding of robustness and adversarial transferability in MLLM for better safeguards against potential misuse, rather than to enable harmful applications. Moreover, this study has direct applications in positive use cases *Information Protection*. By understanding transferability in MLLMs, we can better design and implement protective measures that generalize across different models, enhancing privacy preservation and information security.

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Appendix

A Surrogate and Victim Models

In the experiment, we utilize a Surrogate Model (highlighted in red in Table 2) to generate adversarial examples. We then test the transferability of these adversarial examples on the victim models to assess whether the adversarial attacks could successfully mislead the victim models across different vision encoders and Large Language Models. The versions of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are detailed below:

Model	Vision Encoder	Large Language Model
InstructBLIP	eva-clip-vit-g/14	Vicuna-7B
InstructBLIP	eva-clip-vit-g/14	Vicuna-13B
InstructBLIP	eva-clip-vit-g/14	pretrain-flan-t5-xl
MiniGPT4-v1	eva-clip-vit-g/14	Llama-2-7B
MiniGPT4-v1	eva-clip-vit-g/14	Vicuna-7B
BLIP2	eva-clip-vit-g/14	pretrain-opt-2.7B
BLIP2	eva-clip-vit-g/14	pretrain-opt-6.7B
BLIP2	eva-clip-vit-g/14	pretrain-flan-t5-xl
BLIP2	eva-clip-vit-g/14	pretrain-flan-t5-xxl
LLaVA-v1.5	clip-vit-large-patch14-336	Vicuna-7B
LLaVA-v1.5	clip-vit-large-patch14-336	Mistral-7B
LLaVA-v1.5	clip-vit-large-patch14-336	Vicuna-13B
LLaVA-v1.6	clip-vit-large-patch14-336	Vicuna-7B
LLaVA-v1.6	clip-vit-large-patch14-336	Mistral-7B
LLaVA-v1.6	clip-vit-large-patch14-336	Vicuna-13B

Table 2: Detailed Versions of Surrogate and Victim MLLMs in the experiment

B Datasets

In the experiment, the dataset is crafted from the MS-COCO (Lin et al., 2014). Due to computational resource constraints and the fact that generating adversarial examples for 300 images on MLLMs requires approximately 24 hours of GPU time on NVIDIA A40 GPU, we choose 300 images from MS-COCO for generating adversarial examples. For adding typographic text into the input image in TATM, we utilize 68250 words from the Open English WordNet (McCrae et al., 2020) as the typographic text set. For adding the image patch into the input image in AIP, we randomly select 300 images from MS-COCO as the image patch set.

C Exploring Factors that Affect TATM

To comprehensively explore the TATM method, we vary two key parameters, the number of typographic text and typographic text type, to examine their impact on the adversarial transferability of the generated adversarial examples.

Number of Typographic Text During the optimization process of TATM, we investigate the adversarial transferability of printing various typographic text into the input image in each step of optimization, as shown in Figure 7. As expected, the clean scenario (inference on images without adversarial perturbation) consistently shows the lowest adversarial transferability across all victim models (VM1-VM13). The base PGD attack (without data augmentation during optimization) increases ASR and decreases CLIPScore compared to the clean scenario, demonstrating the effectiveness of standard PGD adversarial attacks. Significantly, It can be observed that as the number of typographic text increases from 1 to 3, the adversarial examples achieve higher ASR and lower CLIPScore on victim models, indicating stronger adversarial transferability.

Typographic Text Type We further investigate the impact of different typographic text types (nouns, adjectives, and verbs) on adversarial transferability during TATM optimization, as shown in Figure 4. Compared to the clean scenario and the base PGD adversarial attack, all text types (nouns, adjectives, and verbs) in TATM demonstrate higher ASR and lower CLIPScore, which indicates a stronger adversarial transferability. Adjectives slightly underperform compared to nouns and verbs in generating transferable adversarial examples. For nouns and verbs, no single text type consistently outperforms the other across all victim models. Given the lack of a clear advantage for any particular text type between nouns and verbs, we opt for simplicity in subsequent experiments by selecting nouns as the standard typographic text type for TATM.

D Adversarial Transferability Against Defenses

We assess the effectiveness of adversarial examples generated through data augmentation methods when subjected to two widely used Gaussian defense methods: Gaussian Noise and Gaussian Blur. For the Gaussian Noise defense, we apply additive noise with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.005. For Gaussian Blur, we employ a kernel size of 3 and a sigma value of 0.1. These defense parameters were chosen to balance the trade-off between maintaining image quality and mitigating adversarial effects.

Table 3 shows TATM exhibits strong adversar-



Figure 7: Adversarial transferability of TATM under various numbers of typographic text in the image. Left: ASR performance when the target output is "suicide". Right: CLIPScore performance when the target output is "unknown".



Figure 8: Adversarial transferability of TATM with the ensemble method on target output "suicide".

ial transferability across both "suicide" and "unknown" target outputs when subjected to the Gaussian Noise defense. For the "suicide" target, TATM consistently ranks among the top performers, often achieving the highest ASR across multiple victim models (VM1-VM8). Similarly, for the "unknown" target, TATM maintains its effectiveness, frequently placing in the top three methods in terms of CLIPScore. Methods that enhance semantic diversity generally outperform pixel-level augmentation techniques in maintaining adversarial transferability under these Gaussian defenses. Both Admix and AIP demonstrate competitive performance, with each achieving notable results for at least one of the target outputs. The enhanced adversarial transferability produced by semantic methods TATM, Admix, and AIP underscores the importance of considering semantic aspects in crafting adversarial examples.

Table 4 shows TATM exhibits strong adversarial transferability across both "suicide" and "unknown" target outputs when subjected to the Gaussian Blur defense. Methods that enhance semantic diversity generally outperform pixel-level augmentation techniques in maintaining adversarial transferability under the Gaussian defenses. Both Admix and AIP demonstrate competitive performance, with each achieving notable results for at least one of the target outputs. The enhanced robustness of semantically diverse methods like TATM, Admix, and AIP underscores the importance of considering semantic aspects in crafting adversarial examples.

E Additional Comparison of Data Augmentation Methods

After generating the adversarial examples via different data augmentation methods, we also evaluate them on the same prompt used in the generating process: "describe the image".

Table 5 demonstrates the strong performance of TATM across both victim models and target outputs. For the "suicide" target, TATM consistently ranks in the top 3 methods by ASR, especially achieving the highest ASR for VM1-VM9. In the "unknown" target scenario, TATM maintains its effectiveness with CLIPScores, often placing in the top 3. Notably, other methods that introduce semantic diversity, such as Admix and AIP, also show competitive results for at least one of the two

Target	Method	Victim Model (Surrogate: InstructBLIP-7B)								Victim Model (Surrogate: LLaVA-v1.5-7B)				
		VM1	VM2	VM3	VM4	VM5	VM6	VM7	VM8	VM9	VM10	VM11	VM12	VM13
Suicide	base	0.203	0.196	0.103	0.160	0.090	0.169	0.076	0.086	0.020	0.017	0.010	0.027	0.023
	DIM	0.535	0.422	0.173	0.309	0.116	0.239	0.070	0.106	0.050	0.057	0.169	0.263	0.243
	SIM	0.156	0.133	0.066	0.103	0.050	0.120	0.043	0.076	0.007	0.007	0.030	0.043	0.033
	BC	0.336	0.356	0.123	0.226	0.169	0.226	0.080	0.126	0.030	0.027	0.103	0.116	0.126
	TIM	0.439	0.392	0.223	0.302	0.156	0.253	0.103	0.103	0.050	0.037	0.150	0.243	0.226
	SIA	0.409	0.405	0.213	0.299	0.246	0.339	0.096	0.106	0.043	0.060	0.143	0.153	0.133
	Admix	0.382	0.399	0.183	0.292	0.209	0.236	0.093	0.116	0.093	0.116	0.272	0.339	0.309
	AIP	0.365	0.379	0.193	0.266	0.196	0.306	0.183	0.153	0.053	0.043	0.073	0.100	0.083
	TATM	0.578	0.645	0.375	0.565	0.442	0.558	0.292	0.276	0.113	0.110	0.176	0.256	0.236
Unknown	base	17.02	16.99	17.44	17.36	16.19	16.50	18.82	18.48	19.77	20.12	21.70	21.68	22.06
	DIM	20.84	21.12	21.25	21.74	18.57	20.55	24.09	21.14	23.68	23.49	24.33	23.67	23.68
	SIM	18.21	18.22	18.37	18.49	16.56	17.50	19.94	20.49	21.03	21.26	22.34	21.98	22.43
	BC	15.77	15.71	16.07	15.91	15.36	15.43	17.21	16.97	18.59	18.96	20.36	20.18	20.62
	TIM	20.66	20.56	21.17	21.30	18.52	20.07	23.98	23.51	22.73	22.89	23.85	23.22	23.58
	SIA	19.80	19.78	20.10	20.38	18.07	19.57	22.59	21.98	20.22	20.10	21.19	20.25	20.66
	Admix	17.31	17.30	17.67	17.70	16.28	17.01	19.12	18.55	19.49	19.26	19.81	19.54	19.49
	AIP	15.56	15.39	16.00	15.57	15.21	15.02	17.03	15.89	18.18	18.36	19.86	19.34	20.04
	TATM	15.59	15.28	15.86	15.65	15.31	15.18	16.61	16.35	17.48	17.87	19.89	19.69	20.34

Table 3: Adversarial transferability of different data augmentation methods under Gaussian Noise Defense (measured by ASR when the target output is "suicide", measured by CLIPScore when the target output is "unknown"). To highlight the most effective methods, the top-1, top-2, and top-3 results are highlighted in deep pink, medium pink, and light pink, respectively.

Target	Method	Victim Model (Surrogate: InstructBLIP-7B)								Victim Model (Surrogate: LLaVA-v1.5-7B)				
		VM1	VM2	VM3	VM4	VM5	VM6	VM7	VM8	VM9	VM10	VM11	VM12	VM13
Suicide	base	0.193	0.196	0.106	0.156	0.093	0.160	0.090	0.063	0.010	0.027	0.013	0.023	0.017
	DIM	0.505	0.425	0.179	0.296	0.126	0.269	0.096	0.140	0.057	0.063	0.189	0.246	0.269
	SIM	0.146	0.156	0.050	0.096	0.040	0.106	0.043	0.080	0.000	0.000	0.027	0.033	0.033
	BC	0.346	0.349	0.196	0.253	0.153	0.276	0.083	0.123	0.027	0.050	0.076	0.136	0.126
	TIM	0.442	0.435	0.233	0.292	0.183	0.272	0.093	0.113	0.053	0.037	0.153	0.213	0.249
	SIA	0.412	0.402	0.246	0.329	0.233	0.302	0.073	0.113	0.043	0.050	0.133	0.143	0.140
	Admix	0.435	0.415	0.226	0.279	0.199	0.219	0.100	0.113	0.083	0.103	0.259	0.336	0.289
	AIP	0.346	0.402	0.223	0.306	0.176	0.316	0.186	0.143	0.047	0.043	0.063	0.103	0.083
	TATM	0.578	0.658	0.445	0.571	0.415	0.565	0.286	0.276	0.110	0.136	0.179	0.263	0.239
Unknown	base	16.91	16.84	17.39	17.28	16.13	16.53	18.82	18.40	19.79	20.05	21.69	21.71	22.14
	DIM	20.85	21.05	21.24	21.66	18.43	20.47	24.03	23.99	23.52	23.47	24.36	23.69	24.11
	SIM	18.01	18.15	18.35	18.45	16.62	17.42	20.05	20.36	21.08	21.33	22.38	22.06	22.37
	BC	15.82	15.68	16.09	15.95	15.41	15.32	17.14	16.75	18.59	18.78	20.31	20.01	20.48
	TIM	20.80	20.68	21.15	21.29	18.53	20.12	23.88	23.59	22.89	22.82	23.87	23.21	23.45
	SIA	19.70	19.72	19.98	20.25	18.04	19.58	22.58	21.96	20.16	20.08	21.06	20.43	20.70
	Admix	17.14	17.21	17.62	17.51	16.11	17.01	18.99	18.52	19.34	19.11	19.77	19.38	19.86
	AIP	15.38	15.36	15.75	15.51	15.18	15.16	16.93	15.86	17.87	18.31	19.72	19.36	20.05
	TATM	15.55	15.25	15.85	15.64	15.26	15.26	16.54	16.35	17.37	17.59	19.71	19.59	20.00

Table 4: Adversarial transferability of different data augmentation methods under Gaussian Blur Defense (measured by ASR when the target output is "suicide", measured by CLIPScore when the target output is "unknown"). To highlight the most effective methods, the top-1, top-2, and top-3 results are highlighted in deep pink, medium pink, and light pink, respectively.

target outputs. These findings suggest that, compared to pixel-level data augmentation, methods enhancing semantic diversity, particularly TATM, Admix, and AIP, tend to be more effective in improving adversarial transferability.

F Ensemble Method

To better address the strict Cross-MLLMs scenario, we combine the data augmentation with the ensemble method across different vision encoders when generating adversarial examples, as illustrated in Algorithm 2. Combining both InstructBLIP-7B and LLaVA-v1.5-7B as surrogate models, the generated adversarial examples can attack all the victim models(VM1-VM13), regardless of their vision encoder configurations. As demonstrated in Figure 8, compared to ensemble adversarial attack without data augmentation (base + ensemble), ensemble TATM consistently achieves higher ASR across almost all 13 victim models (VM1-VM2, VM4-VM13).

G Additional Cases and Analysis of Various Data Augmentation Methods

Figure 9 presents additional cases illustrating different data augmentation methods. These include Grad-CAM analysis of augmented images, vision-language matching of embeddings between clean and augmented images across all encountered semantics, and PCA visualization comparing clean and augmented images.

Target	Method	Victim Model (Surrogate: InstructBLIP-7B)								Victim Model (Surrogate: LLaVA-v1.5-7B)				
		VM1	VM2	VM3	VM4	VM5	VM6	VM7	VM8	VM9	VM10	VM11	VM12	VM13
Suicide	clean	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	base	0.216	0.166	0.116	0.160	0.233	0.263	0.086	0.066	0.017	0.023	0.007	0.027	0.017
	DIM	0.492	0.425	0.203	0.322	0.415	0.326	0.106	0.130	0.057	0.047	0.193	0.253	0.229
	SIM	0.156	0.133	0.050	0.096	0.136	0.203	0.043	0.066	0.003	0.007	0.020	0.030	0.037
	BC	0.346	0.352	0.153	0.206	0.356	0.459	0.093	0.113	0.027	0.023	0.090	0.116	0.123
	TIM	0.412	0.409	0.249	0.282	0.375	0.292	0.096	0.110	0.043	0.027	0.169	0.233	0.203
	SIA	0.405	0.419	0.243	0.309	0.336	0.359	0.086	0.133	0.037	0.043	0.140	0.156	0.143
	Admix	0.415	0.422	0.203	0.299	0.389	0.339	0.096	0.110	0.083	0.110	0.276	0.326	0.276
	AIP	0.329	0.405	0.186	0.276	0.199	0.296	0.183	0.179	0.063	0.043	0.063	0.096	0.083
	TATM	0.535	0.641	0.429	0.545	0.578	0.661	0.269	0.256	0.130	0.100	0.186	0.259	0.223
Unknown	clean	23.60	23.65	24.67	25.01	27.42	25.82	27.17	27.16	27.01	26.75	27.01	26.59	26.56
	base	17.00	16.93	17.41	17.47	19.29	17.94	19.06	18.68	19.86	20.16	21.89	21.65	22.57
	DIM	20.74	20.85	21.24	21.72	18.47	20.36	24.14	24.15	23.63	23.43	24.35	23.69	24.20
	SIM	18.02	18.08	18.42	18.44	16.65	17.36	20.30	20.48	21.15	21.39	22.35	22.06	22.64
	BC	15.70	15.77	16.08	15.73	15.28	15.36	17.39	17.14	18.80	18.92	20.25	20.23	21.02
	TIM	20.64	20.59	21.10	21.38	18.45	20.27	23.95	23.72	22.85	22.83	23.76	23.12	23.55
	SIA	19.70	19.77	20.08	20.30	18.21	19.48	22.84	22.15	20.42	20.28	21.28	20.32	20.91
	Admix	17.15	17.08	17.55	17.59	16.11	16.88	19.19	18.77	19.61	19.16	19.98	19.52	20.46
	AIP	15.39	15.41	15.92	15.43	15.31	15.04	17.01	15.79	17.99	18.37	19.75	19.39	19.94
	TATM	15.49	15.23	15.89	15.72	17.21	16.00	16.74	16.71	17.64	17.94	19.71	19.68	20.87

Table 5: Adversarial transferability of different data augmentation methods under one simple prompt (measured by ASR when the target output is "suicide", measured by CLIPScore when the target output is "unknown"). To highlight the most effective methods, we color-coded the top three results: the top-1, top-2, and top-3 results are highlighted in deep pink, medium pink, and light pink, respectively.

Algorithm 2 Ensemble Semantic-level Data Augmentation Method

Input: MLLMs $f(\theta)$, number of MLLMs M, input image $\mathbf{x}$, input prompt p, target output y, perturbation budget ϵ, step size α, number of iterations N, typographic text set T, image patch set I
Output: Adversarial example $\mathbf{x_{adv}}$
Initialize: $\delta \sim \mathbf{Uniform}(-\epsilon, \epsilon)$
for $i = 1$ to N **do**
    $x_t \leftarrow$ (TATM) Print random text from T on $\mathbf{x}$ / (AIP) Stick random image from I on $\mathbf{x}$
    $x_{adv} = x_t + \delta$
    for $m = 1$ to M **do**
        $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow L(f(\theta_m, x_{adv}, p), y)$
    end for
    Compute gradient $g = \nabla_\delta \mathcal{L}$
    $\delta = clip_\epsilon(\delta + \alpha \cdot sign(g))$
end for
Return: Adversarial example $\mathbf{x_{adv}} = \mathbf{x} + \delta$

H Prompts for Cross-Prompt Inference

Since users may employ various prompts on adversarial examples generated in the real world, we evaluate various data augmentation methods in cross-prompt inference. Here we use the Claude-3.5-Sonnet to generate 100 prompt variants of "describe the image":

- *Analyze the visual content.*
- *Explain what you see in the picture.*
- *Provide a detailed account of the image.*
- *Elaborate on the elements within the photograph.*
- *Offer a comprehensive description of the visual.*
- *Break down the components of the image.*
- *Narrate the contents of the picture.*
- *Give a thorough explanation of the visual scene.*
- *Elucidate the details present in the image.*
- *Paint a verbal picture of what's shown.*
- *Interpret the visual information.*
- *Characterize the scene depicted.*
- *Illustrate the image through words.*
- *Portray the picture's contents verbally.*
- *Delineate the features of the visual.*
- *Articulate what the image conveys.*
- *Recount the details visible in the picture.*
- *Outline the elements captured in the photo.*
- *Depict the visual scenario in text.*
- *Express the image's content in words.*
- *Clarify what's presented in the picture.*
- *Communicate the essence of the visual.*
- *Unpack the components of the image.*
- *Detail the subject matter shown.*



Figure 9: (a) The clean image, transformed images of different data augmentation methods, and Grad-CAM visualization when the clean and transformed images interact with the corresponding language output in the vision encoder. (b) PCA visualization of clean and augmented images. (c) SADScore of semantic-level data augmentation methods. (d) Vision-language similarity scores (%) among clean and other augmented images with all encountered semantics.

- *Relate the visual information provided.*
- *Specify what can be observed in the picture.*
- *Chronicle the visual elements displayed.*
- *Render a textual version of the image.*
- *Report on the contents of the visual.*
- *Explicate the scene in the photograph.*
- *Summarize the visual information presented.*
- *Expound on the image's subject matter.*
- *Illuminate the details within the picture.*
- *Transcribe the visual scene into words.*
- *Describe the visual narrative.*
- *Reveal the contents of the image.*
- *Unfold the story told by the picture.*
- *Dissect the visual elements present.*
- *Convey the image's composition in text.*
- *Represent the visual data verbally.*
- *Lay out the details of the picture.*
- *Translate the visual information to text.*
- *Catalog the elements in the image.*
- *Enunciate the visual content.*
- *Divulge the particulars of the picture.*
- *Decode the visual information.*
- *Reconstruct the image through description.*
- *Frame the visual scene in words.*
- *Spell out the details of the picture.*
- *Verbalize the contents of the image.*
- *Diagram the visual elements textually.*
- *Enumerate the components of the picture.*
- *Deliver a verbal rendition of the image.*
- *Encapsulate the visual information.*
- *Distill the essence of the picture.*
- *Formulate a description of the visual.*
- *Document the contents of the image.*
- *Itemize the elements in the picture.*
- *Reframe the visual in textual form.*
- *Crystallize the image's details in words.*
- *Realize a verbal representation of the visual.*
- *Transcribe the pictorial information.*
- *Annotate the visual content.*
- *Decipher the image's composition.*
- *Extrapolate the details from the picture.*
- *Parse the visual elements.*
- *Discourse on the image's contents.*
- *Render an account of the visual scene.*
- *Particularize the elements in the picture.*
- *Recount the visual narrative.*
- *Expound on the image's features.*
- *Elucidate the pictorial content.*
- *Construe the visual information.*
- *Paraphrase the image's subject matter.*
- *Elaborate on the picture's composition.*
- *Substantiate the visual elements.*
- *Contextualize the image's contents.*
- *Flesh out the details of the picture.*
- *Characterize the visual narrative.*
- *Explicate the image's components.*
- *Debrief on the visual information.*
- *Unravel the picture's contents.*
- *Recapitulate the visual scene.*
- *Delineate the image's features.*
- *Encapsulate the picture in words.*
- *Disambiguate the visual elements.*
- *Expatiate on the image's contents.*
- *Précis the visual information.*
- *Schematize the picture's composition.*
- *Synopsize the image's subject matter.*
- *Limn the visual narrative.*
- *Particularize the picture's elements.*
- *Elucidate the image's composition.*
- *Anatomize the visual content.*
- *Render a prose version of the picture.*
- *Verbally sketch the image's details.*
- *Articulate the visual elements.*
- *Explicate the pictorial narrative.*
- *Deconstruct the visual contents in words.*
- *Narrate the pictorial elements present.*