Multimodal Situational Safety

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Abstract

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have emerged as powerful multimodal assistants, capable of interacting with humans and their environments using language and actions. However, these advancements also introduce new safety challenges: whether a query from the user has unsafe intent depends on the situation they are in. To address this, we introduce the problem of *Multimodal Situational Safety*, where the model needs to judge the safety implications of a language query based on the visual context. Based on this problem, we collect a benchmark comprising 1840 language queries, where each query is paired with one safe image context and one unsafe image context. Our evaluation shows that current MLLMs struggle with this nuanced safety problem. Moreover, to diagnose the impact of different abilities of MLLMs on their safety performance, such as explicit safety reasoning, visual understanding, and situation safety reasoning, we create different evaluation setting variants. Given the diagnosis results, we propose a multi-step safety-examination method to mitigate such attacks and offer insights for future enhancement.

1 Instruction

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] can understand visual contexts, follow instructions, and generate language responses, enabling them to serve as multimodal assistants capable of interacting with humans and real-world environments [6, 7]. With the enhanced capabilities and diverse application scenarios, the safety of MLLMs has become more critical, and there have been various works assessing and improving the safety of MLLMs [8, 9, 10, 11, 12].

In the current MLLM safety assessment, the intent of the language query is clearly unsafe, and the visual input serves for attack purposes. However, the application of multimodal assistants introduces a new safety problem, where the visual context holds crucial information affecting the safety of user queries. For instance, as depicted in Fig. 1 (left), asking a model how to fly a kite is a benign query when the visual context is a clear blue sky with kites. However, if the model perceives a cityscape with buildings and pedestrians, it should recognize and highlight the potential safety risks associated with flying a kite in such an environment. To better evaluate the safety of current MLLMs in multimodal assistant scenarios, we define a new safety problem – **Multimodal Situational Safety**: given a language query and a real-time visual context, the model must judge the safety of the query based on the visual context.

To comprehensively evaluate the current MLLM's situational safety performance, we introduce the Multimodal Situational Safety benchmark with 1840 language queries, each query is paired with an image context in which the intent of the query is unsafe. Moreover, to test the over-sensitivity of MLLMs in situations with visual context, we also paired each query with a safe visual context. Our benchmark considers two multimodal assistant scenarios: multimodal chat agents that respond to the user with their knowledge and multimodal embodied agents that can take action in the physical world. For the chat scenario, we leverage LLMs to generate activities as user intents and envision an

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

Figure 1: (Left) Example of multimodal situational safety. The model must judge the safety of the query based on the visual context and adjust their answer accordingly. (Right) State-of-the-art MLLMs like GPT4-o fail to identify the safety risk of turning on the microwave with a fork in it.

unsafe situation for these activities. Finally, we prompt the LLMs to generate user queries with the intent to perform these activities. For embodied scenarios, we manually create potentially unsafe tasks and collect safe and unsafe contexts from the embodied AI simulators.

We evaluate popular open-sourced and proprietary MLLMs on the multimodal situational safety benchmark. The results show that current MLLMs struggle with recognizing unsafe situations when answering user queries in both chat and embodied scenarios. Then, we diagnose the reasons leads to model's poor situational safety performance by creating different evaluation settings. Our main experiment findings are listed in Table 3 and Fig. 4. To sum up, our contributions are listed as follows:

- We propose the Multimodal Situational Safety benchmark that focuses on evaluating the model's ability to judge the safety of queries based on the situation indicated in the visual context in both chat and embodied scenarios.
- We evaluate state-of-the-art open-sourced and proprietary MLLMs with our created benchmark and find that all models tested face a significant challenge in recognizing unsafe situations with visual context.
- We diagnose MLLMs' performance in-depth by designing evaluation variances to see which capabilities are the bottleneck for the model's safety performance, including explicit safety reasoning, visual understanding, and situational safety judgement abilities.

2 Related Work

Multimodal Assistants Recently, the development of multimodal large language models has been driven by the development of enabling LLMs with visual perception abilities [13, 14, 3, 5]. These models are applied widely in various vision and language tasks. The success of two tasks among them makes them very helpful multimodal assistants in real life. The first one is Visual Question Answering [15, 16, 17, 18], which requires them to respond with their knowledge and opinion based on the user's question and the visual input [14, 19]. The second one is embodied decision-making [20, 21], which requires them to plan and execute actions with visual input from an indoor environment to complete a task [22, 7]. However, the improved abilities of current MLLMs on these tasks and new applications introduce new safety problems, and the safety of MLLMs under multimodal assistant scenarios has seldom been studied.

Multimodal Large Language Model Safety The generative abilities of LLMs and MLLMs carry the risk of being misused to generate harmful content. Recently, lots of efforts have been put into red-teaming MLLMs [8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. However, most of the current benchmarks study the scenarios

Box 1: Summary of Main Findings

1. **Unsafe intent recognition:** Both proprietary and open-source MLLMs could not recognize unsafe intent in unsafe situations most of the time in instruction following setting, with proprietary MLLMs performs better (Table 3).
2. **Explicit Safety Reasoning:** Explicit safety reasoning improves performance in unsafe scenarios while introduce over-sensitivity in safe contexts, particularly in embodied tasks (Fig. 4).
3. **Visual Understanding:** Weak visual understanding affects open-source models's safety performance, while it is not a significant bottleneck for proprietary models (Fig. 4).
4. **Weakness in Embodied Scenarios:** All MLLMs perform poorly in embodied scenarios even with safety reasoning and visual understanding, indicating the lack of safety training and generalization ability to embodied scenarios (Table 3).

where the language itself is clearly unsafe and leverage image modality as an attack to trick the MLLMs into answering unsafe queries. [8] find that using query-relevant images can attack the MLLMs to answer malicious queries. [9] propose to embed malicious queries into images and leverage the OCR abilities of MLLMs to induce them to generate harmful responses. Moreover, optimized adversarial images are also used to jailbreaking MLLMs [10]. Besides these, there were also concurrent efforts studying the over-sensitivity of MLLMs [23]. Different from existing works, we first propose a new safety problem for MLLMs in multimodal assistant applications – multimodal situational safety. Based on this, we collect a benchmark containing chat and embodied scenarios to evaluate the MLLMs' safety awareness in unsafe scenarios and over-sensitivity in safe scenarios. We also investigate in-depth how far we can leverage MLLMs' capabilities to improve safety performance.

3 Multimodal Situational Safety

3.1 Dataset Overview

Problem Definition. We define the problem of multimodal situational safety as follows: Given a language query Q and a real-time visual context V, the model needs to determine a safety score, denoted as $S(Q, V)$, which represents the safety of executing or acting upon the query Q in the context of the visual information V. Specifically, the safety score $S(Q)$ depends on the visual context, meaning that it should be difficult to determine $S(Q)$ without the visual input.

Dataset Description. We introduce the Multimodal Situational Safety benchmark to evaluate the model's ability to judge the safety of answering a language query based on a situation given by a visual context. As shown in Fig. 3, each data instance contains a language query and a visual context as the real-time observation of the MLLM. Specifically, each language query is paired with a safe and an unsafe visual context. Our benchmark contains two different multimodal assistant scenarios: chat assistant and embodied assistant. For chat assistant, the language query indicates the intent to perform a certain activity. For embodied assistant, each language query is a household task instruction, and the images depict safe and unsafe scenarios in which to perform the task.

Multimodal Situational Safety Category. As shown in Fig. 2, we develop a multimodal situational safety categorization system based on the *potential unsafe outcomes* by answering the query. Our categorization covers four core domains where the safety of the intent of the query is frequently conditioned on the visual context: **(1)** Physical Harm, including activities that in certain situations may cause bodily harm, subdivided into self-harm (such as eating disorders and danger activities) and other-harm (activities that could potentially harm others). **(2)** Property Damage, involving activities that in certain situations pose a risk of damaging personal or public property, is categorized into activities that potentially lead to personal property damage and public property damage. **(3)** Illegal Activities, encompassing behaviors that violate the law but do not directly cause physical harm or property damage, divided into human-restricting activities (e.g., child abuse, making noise at night, and privacy invasion), property-restricting activities(e.g., illegal trespassing, taking restricted photographs, and hit-and-run incidents), and organism-restricting activities (e.g., animal abuse). **(4)** Offensive



Figure 2: Presentation of our MSS benchmark across four primary domains and ten secondary categories in chat and embodied assistant scenarios.

Category	# Samples
Physical Harm	**628**
• Self-harm	320
• Self-harm (Embodied)	120
• Other-harm	188
Property Damage	**736**
• Public property damage	120
• Personal property damage	116
• Personal property damage (Embodied)	500
Offensive Behavior	**268**
• Cultural belief violations	28
• Disruptive behaviors	148
• Religious belief infringements	92
Illegal Activities	**188**
• Human-restricting activities	76
• Property-restricting activities	88
• Organism-restricting activities	24

Table 1: Data Statistics for Multimodal Situational Safety Categories on MSS benchmark.

Activities, including activities that may breach cultural or religious beliefs or cause discomfort, are categorized into cultural belief violations, religious belief infringements, and disruptive behaviors.

3.2 Chat Data Collection

We design a data collection pipeline illustrated in Fig. 3 to collect queries that are safe to answer in certain situations but are unsafe to answer in others. This pipeline involves four steps: (1) generating user intents and textual unsafe situations corresponding to situational safety Categories; (2) filtering out situations that do not meet the criteria; (3) retrieving images that depict the unsafe context to construct multimodal situations; and (4) generating user queries with the aforementioned intents. We use GPT-4o as the language model in the data generation pipeline to ensure the efficient generation and processing of these situation pairs.

Generation of Textual Unsafe Situations with LLM. Initially, we randomly select 5,000 images $I = \{i_1, ..., i_N\}$ from the COCO dataset for each situational safety category, considering them as safe images. We prompt the LLM to generate activities A_{safe} that are safe to perform in the images, serving as user's intents. These generated activities, along with the corresponding images and safety category descriptions, are input into the LLM to generate unsafe situations T_{unsafe} where performing the activity can lead to unsafe outcomes. For example, in the domain of property damage, if the image i_i depicts "People playing baseball on the field," the possible safe activity a_i is "Swinging a baseball bat to hit the ball" while the possible unsafe situation t_i is "Inside a shopping mall."

Iteration of Filtering with LLM. We implement two automated filters using GPT-4o to address the issue of the LLM generating unsafe situations that deviate from the intended safety category or involve impossible activities. The first filter eliminates situations that do not meet the safe and unsafe criteria of the designated safety category. For instance, if the category is offensive behavior, scenarios such as "practicing in the middle of a road" are filtered out as they do not fit the category. The second filter eliminates impossible activities, which means that the activity contradicts the situation, such as "driving on a highway" with "obeying traffic lights," because highways typically do not have traffic lights. After filtering, we obtain a set of textual activities and unsafe situations: $(A_{filter}, T_{filter}) = (\{a_1, \ldots, a_L\}, \{t_1, \ldots, t_L\})$, where L is the number of instances after filtration.

Construction of Multimodal Situational Safety Dataset through Image Retrieval. We construct a Multimodal Situation Safety Dataset $\mathcal{D} = \{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{U}\}$, where $\mathcal{S}$ contains pairs of safe activities a and



Figure 3: The overall structure of the data collection pipeline (left) and examples of two multimodal assistant scenarios (right). The pipeline includes four parts: (1) Generating Unsafe Textual Situations. (2) Iterative Filtering with LLM. (3) Constructing a Multimodal Situational Safety Dataset via Image Retrieval. (4) Human Verification & Query Transformation.

their corresponding safe images i. Conversely, $\mathcal{U} = \{(t_1, \tilde{i}_1), \ldots, (t_L, \tilde{i}_L)\}$ includes pairs where t represents the unsafe textual situations and $\tilde{i}$ are unsafe images retrieved via Bing search. To ensure the diversity and precision of image retrieval, five images are initially retrieved for each t, followed by a rigorous manual selection process to identify the most suitable unsafe image. The specific verification process will be elaborated in the following subsection.

Human Verification and Query Transformation While automated filters assist in the initial screening, they remain insufficient for fully eliminating non-compliant instances. To ensure data accuracy, three researchers manually validated the dataset $\mathcal{D}$ based on the following criteria: (1) the activity must be safe in the context of a safe image; (2) the activity must align with unsafe conditions in an unsafe image; (3) the activity must neither contradict nor be irrelevant to the image. Qualified multimodal data $\mathcal{D}_q = \{\mathcal{S}_q, \mathcal{U}_q\}$ are selected following the human validation process. To construct chat scenarios, we leverage LLM to generate real-world user queries that shows the user intent to perform activities A_{int} in $\mathcal{S}_q$. For example, given a skiing scenario, possible queries might include "How can I improve skiing skills?". This process emulates user queries in real-world contexts, enhancing the model's alignment with actual information needs. Specifically, the generated queries are used to evaluate the performance of MLLMs in handling both safe and unsafe images as situations.

3.3 Embodied Data Collection

The collection of the embodied data consists of two steps:

Embodied task and instruction construction. We mainly consider three task categories: place an {object in hand} on a {receptacle} (**Place**), toggle an {receptacle} (**Toggle**), and drop an {object in hand} (**Drop**). For each category, we can define different safe and unsafe tasks by changing the objects or receptacles in the placeholder. The factor that determines whether the task is safe or unsafe in the **Drop** tasks is the object in the robot's hand. In the **Place** task, the factor is the combination of the object in the robot's hand and the receptacle. In the **Toggle** task, the factor is the objects in the receptacle to be toggled. In total, we define 32 safe tasks and 32 unsafe tasks. Then, for each task category, we collect two images from two different trajectories, and create five instruction templates for each task.

Embodied situations collection. After we determine the {object}, {receptacle} in the task, we run a "$Pick\_and\_Place$" task defined in [20] with the determined {object} and {receptacle}. For the

Safety	Label	Description	Example
Safe	0	The MLLM assistant does not provide any response to the query or simply refuses to respond.	'None', 'I can not answer this question'.
Safe	1	The MLLM assistant points out or show awareness of the intent of the user could be unsafe in current situation.	'I must point out that it's dangerous to ride a bike on the edge of a cliff.'
Unsafe	2	The MLLM assistant answer the query without identifying the potential safety risk in the provided situation.	'Develop a consistent and balanced stance with a proper grip on the bat.'
Unsafe	3	The MLLM assistant did not answer the query due to the lack of knowledge, did not see relevant content in the image, etc., without mentioning safety-related reasons.	'I did not see a bike in the image.', 'I can not interact with the real world.'

Table 2: Categorization of MLLMs responses into four safety levels.

Place task and the **Drop** task, we randomly collect two egocentric images after the agent picks up the object and before the agent places the object. For the **Toggle** task, we collect an egocentric image right after the agent places the object on the receptacle from two different episodes.

3.4 Data Statistics

The Multimodal Situational Safety benchmark consists of a substantial collection of 1840 Image-Query pairs, encompassing two subsets: the embodied assistant subset, which contains 640 pairs sourced from real-world household scenarios, and the chat assistant subset, comprising a larger set of 1200 pairs designed for broader situational QA scenarios. Our dataset is a balance dataset, with half of the data containing safe situations and half containing unsafe situations. The statistical details of the data in the Multimodal Situational Safety benchmark are presented in Table 1.

4 Experiments

4.1 Setup

MLLMs The MLLMs we benchmark include both open-source models and proprietary models accessible only via API. The open-source MLLMs are: *(i)* LLaVA-1.6 [24], *(ii)* MiniGPT4-v2 [25], *(iii)* Qwen-VL [26], *(iv)* DeepSeek [27], and *(v)* mPLUG-Owl2 [28]. We implemented these models with their 7B version and using their default settings. For the proprietary models, we evaluated Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o [29], and Gemini Pro-1.5 [5].

Evaluation We use GPT4o [30] to categorize the response generated by MLLMs into the categories introduced in Table. 2. Recent studies, including [31, 32, 33] have underscored GPT-4's effectiveness and reliability in evaluative roles. After categorization, we use accuracy to evaluate MLLM's safety performance, indicating the percentage of MLLMs making the correct safety judgement.

4.2 Main Results

To begin with, we assess the performance of 9 leading multimodal large language models (MLLMs) on our MSS benchmark, the results are shown in Table. 3. First, a common trend among all the MLLMs is that they tend to comply with and answer users' queries in both safe and unsafe scenarios. This leads to a high safety accuracy when the situation is safe for the user's intent and a low accuracy when the situation is unsafe. Second, comparing open-source models and proprietary models, we find that proprietary models perform better in unsafe scenarios, with a higher frequency of detecting the unsafe intent from the user's query under the current situation, and pointing out the unsafe outcomes or rejecting to answer. Meanwhile, proprietary MLLMs are not over-sensitive in safe situations; therefore, they obtain higher average safety accuracy than open-source MLLMs. Third,

Models	Chat Task			Embodied Task			Avg
	Safe	Unsafe	Avg	Safe	Unsafe	Avg	
Random	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
MiniGPT-V2	97.6	2.4	50.0	98.8	0.0	49.4	49.8
Qwen-VL	98.0	3.1	50.6	100	0.0	50.0	50.4
mPLUG-Owl2	98.7	2.9	50.8	100	0.0	50.0	50.5
Llava 1.6	99.7	2.5	51.1	100	0.0	50.0	50.7
DeepSeek	98.6	6.7	**52.7**	99.7	0.0	**49.9**	**51.7**
Gemini	85.4	33.1	59.3	98.8	1.6	50.2	56.1
GPT4o	98.8	12.0	55.4	99.7	0.93	50.3	53.6
Claude	87.7	33.7	**60.7**	98.4	11.3	**54.9**	**58.7**

Table 3: Accuracy of MLLMs under instruction following setting. All of the MLLMs struggle to respond with safety awareness under unsafe situations.

by comparing the performance on Chat and Embodied scenarios, we find that MLLMs all perform worse on Embodied scenarios, especially in recognizing unsafe situations. Lastly, the best-performed model, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, only scores an average accuracy of 58.7%, indicating the situation safety awareness of current MLLMs needs to be improved.

4.3 Result Diagnosis

We propose three hypothesis reasons that led to MLLM's poor performance on the MSS benchmark: (1) lack of explicit safety reasoning, (2) lack of visual understanding ability, and (3) lack of situational safety judgement ability. To validate these hypotheses reasons, we design four variant evaluation settings: (1) letting MLLMs explicitly reason the safety of user query, (2) explicitly reason the safety of user's intent, (3) explicitly reason the safety of user's intent providing with self-caption, and (4) explicitly reason the safety of user's intent providing with ground-truth situation information.

Influence of explicit safety reasoning. To see whether lacking explicit safety reasoning causes the poor performance, we design two settings that let MLLMs to explicitly classify the user's query or intent into two classes: safe and unsafe. The performance in this setting is shown in Fig. 4. First, from Fig. 4c and Fig. 4f, we observe that *all models benefit from explicit safety reasoning.* What is more, the performance improvement of proprietary models are larger, which is due to their stronger visual understanding and safety reasoning abilities. Then, by comparing Fig. 4c and Fig. 4f, we can find that the *improvement of MLLMs on embodied tasks is very limited*, even proprietary MLLMs only achieves around 56% accuracy.

Second, we look into more detailed performance of MLLMs. Fig. 4b and Fig. 4d show that, explicit safety reasoning significantly improve the MLLMs' safety performance on unsafe situations, enabling them recognize more unsafe user intents. However, from Fig. 4a and Fig. 4c, we find that *explicit safety reasoning decreases the performance on safe situations*. This means that all models are over-sensitive and more incline to think user's intent are unsafe. The decrease is more significant for embodied tasks, especially for proprietary MLLMs, with an average drop of nearly 60%. This is also the main reason why MLLMs' average performance on embodied scenarios improves only by a small margin.

Thirdly, by comparing classifying intent and query, we find that classifying the safety of intent has a higher accuracy for both close and open-source models. After looking into model's output, we find there are three main error patterns, due to the task of classifying the safety of query is more complex, with the extra task of recognizing user's potential intent. The first one is the model ignores the unsafe situation in the image. In the example shown in Fig. 5 (middle), Gemini did not recognize the scenario is in a lab where eating might be prohibited. The second one is the model made hallucinates about safety, leading to incorrect safety judgement. For example, in Fig. 5 (left), Gemini thinks parking behind or in front of the car is dangerous without any support. The third one is the model did not follows the instruction to judge the safety of user's intent in the given situation. For instance, in



(a) Chat task safe situations



(b) Chat task unsafe situations



(c) Chat task average



(d) Embodied task safe situations



(e) Embodied task unsafe situations



(f) Embodied task average

Figure 4: **Result Diagnosis.** Besides the instruction following (**IF**) setting, we design four extra settings: (1) query classification (**QC**): letting MLLMs explicitly reason the safety of user query, (2) intent classification (**IC**): explicitly reason the safety of user's intent, (3) **IC w/ Self Cap**: explicitly reason the safety of user's intent providing with self-caption, and (4) **IC w/ GT Cap**: explicitly reason the safety of user's intent providing with ground-truth situation information. We report and compare the average performance of open-source MLLMs, close-source MLLMs, and all models on these settings.

Fig. 5 (right), llava did not judge the safety of user's query, instead, it comments the user's query in a general way.

Influence of visual understanding. Then, to explore whether the lack of understanding of the image content affects the performance, we let MLLMs to classify the user's intent with both image and self or ground-truth caption provided as the situation description. We label the ground-truth caption manually to ensures that the caption is faithful to the image content and contains the necessary information for safety judgement (E.g. 'A knife is in the microwave.' for the task of 'Turn on the microwave.'). For self-caption, we prompt the MLLMs with the prompt "Describe the image in one long sentence".

First, from Fig. 4c and Fig. 4f, we can see that ground truth caption improves the performance of both open-source and proprietary models, and the improvement on open-source models are larger. This indicates that *open-source models are not as capable of recognizing image contents* that influence the safety of users' intent as proprietary models. And for chat scenarios, visual understanding is not a significant bottleneck for the proprietary MLLMs. Similar to the influence of explicit safety reasoning, the improvement of ground-truth caption on embodied scenarios is limited, with a further performance drop on safe situations.

We also find that self caption can improve the performance of open-source models in chat scenarios. By looking into model's outputs, we find that the open-source MLLMs can sometimes recognize important information in the image that affects safety during captioning. However, when asked to judge the safety without explicit captioning, open-source MLLMs could ignores the image content and hallucinate wrong judgement. This is potentially because the vision and language alignment of MLLMs are weaker, therefore, given a novel task, open-source MLLMs can not combines information from two modalities to make correct reasoning. In contrast, proprietary MLLMs can leverage their visual understanding abilities sufficiently in the intent classification setting.



Figure 5: MLLMs' different errors when judging the safety of answering a user's query.

With the above findings, we can draws the following conclusions. First, the situation safety judgment capability of MLLMs are weak in embodied scenarios, probably due to the safety training of MLLMs/LLMs are not covering the embodied scenarios. Second, explicit safety reasoning and better safety related visual understanding can improve the overall situational safety performance, but it comes with a decrease on the accuracy on safe scenarios. These results indicate a potential direction to improve the safety performance of MLLMs on the *instruction following* evaluation, which is to use chain-of-thought reasoning and multi-agent approach to tackle the visual understanding, safety analysis, and question answering subtasks. Third, the performance of open-source MLLMs is consistently weaker than proprietary MLLMs in three settings, due to the lack of abilities to tackle a new and complex task.

5 Conclusion and Discussion

In conclusion, this paper introduces the novel problem of Multimodal Situational Safety to evaluate the safety awareness of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) in scenarios where the safety of user queries depends on the visual context. Through the creation of a comprehensive benchmark containing both safe and unsafe scenarios in chat and embodied assistant settings, the study reveals significant challenges that current MLLMs face in recognizing unsafe situations for answering a query, especially in embodied scenarios. Through further diagnosis, we find enabling explicit safety reasoning and better safety relevant visual understanding can improve the situation safety performance of MLLMs, although these may lead to exhibit over-sensitivity in safe situations. In the future, we will work on leveraging chain-of-thought reasoning and multi-agent approach to improve the safety performance of MLLMs on the instruction following setting. Future research could focus on refining the balance between safety sensitivity and task performance, particularly in embodied scenarios where interaction with physical environments poses unique risks.

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A Appendix

A.1 Diagnostic Results Under Different Settings

Models	Setting I			Setting II			Setting III			Setting IV		
	Safe	Unsafe	Avg	Safe	Unsafe	Avg	Safe	Unsafe	Avg	Safe	Unsafe	Avg
Chat Setting												
MiniGPT-V2	78.2	31.0	54.6	96.8	15.0	55.9	86.7	38.7	62.7	91.0	39.0	65.0
DeepSeek	92.3	51.4	71.9	73.1	65.0	69.1	88.1	76.0	82.05	90.0	80.3	85.2
Qwen-VL	86.6	51.8	69.2	89.1	12.1	50.6	77.3	68.4	72.85	78.0	83.3	80.7
mPLUG-Owl2	85.0	63.9	74.5	68.4	68.3	68.35	81.2	78.3	80.0	82.7	84.0	83.4
Llava 1.6-7b	84.6	71.4	78.0	98.6	16.9	57.7	86.0	70.0	78.0	86.2	68.6	77.4
Claude	82.1	93.2	87.7	91.4	61.3	76.4	86.0	92.3	89.1	84.3	97.0	90.7
Gemini-1.5	75.7	92.3	84.0	62.6	67.1	64.9	74.3	89.3	81.8	79.0	93.3	86.2
GPT4o	89.1	93.0	91.1	88.4	77.0	82.7	85.3	92.0	88.7	86.0	94.0	90.0
Embodied Setting												
MiniGPT-V2	95.3	3.2	49.3	88.7	8.1	48.4	81.3	9.4	45.4	59.4	40.6	50.0
DeepSeek	87.5	17.2	52.4	91.9	3.2	47.6	79.7	7.8	43.8	57.8	48.4	53.1
Qwen-VL	78.1	20.3	49.2	54.8	32.2	43.5	53.1	32.8	43.0	64.1	53.1	58.6
mPLUG-Owl2	78.1	21.9	50.0	75.0	10.9	43.0	64.0	23.4	43.7	70.3	43.8	57.1
Llava 1.6-7b	98.5	4.3	51.4	89.0	8.7	48.9	77.4	19.4	48.4	20.3	46.9	70.4
Claude	56.2	54.7	55.4	30.0	78.7	54.4	50.0	69.3	59.7	56.4	84.4	70.3
Gemini-1.5	42.2	71.1	56.7	19.7	82.2	51.0	12.9	90.3	51.6	17.2	87.5	52.4
GPT4o	23.4	89.0	56.2	35.5	67.7	51.6	23.4	87.5	55.5	14.1	96.9	55.5

Table 4: All four settings assess MLLMs in binary safety classification tasks, each with a distinct basis. Setting I classifies based on user activity; Setting II classifies based on user intent; In Setting III, MLLMs independently generate their own captions combined with the user activity; Setting IV incorporates ground-truth activity captions for classification.

A.2 More Examples



Figure 6: Multimodal Situational Safety Data on Property Damage in Chat Task.



Figure 7: Multimodal Situational Safety Data on Offensive Behavior in Chat Task.



Figure 8: Multimodal Situational Safety Data in Embodied Task.