HAS MY SYSTEM PROMPT BEEN USED? LARGE LAN GUAGE MODEL PROMPT MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE

Anonymous authors

004

010 011

012

013

014

015

016

017

018

019

021

023 024 025

026 027

028

029

031

033

Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT

Prompt engineering has emerged as a powerful technique for optimizing large language models (LLMs) for specific applications, enabling faster prototyping and improved performance, and giving rise to the interest of the community in protecting proprietary system prompts. In this work, we explore a novel perspective on prompt privacy through the lens of membership inference. We develop Prompt Detective, a statistical method to reliably determine whether a given system prompt was used by a third-party language model. Our approach relies on a statistical test comparing the distributions of two groups of model outputs corresponding to different system prompts. Through extensive experiments with a variety of language models, we demonstrate the effectiveness of Prompt Detective for prompt membership inference. Our work reveals that even minor changes in system prompts manifest in distinct response distributions, enabling us to verify prompt usage with statistical significance.

1 INTRODUCTION

Prompt engineering offers a powerful, flexible, and fast way to optimize large language models (LLMs) for specific applications, enabling faster and cheaper customization than finetuning while delivering strong specialized performance. Large language model providers, such as Anthropic and OpenAI, release detailed prompt engineering guides on prompting strategies allowing their customers to reduce hallucination rates and optimize business performance (OpenAI, 2023; Anthropic, 2024b). The use of system prompts also provides specialized capabilities such as taking on a character




Figure 1: Prompt Detective verifies if a third-party chat bot uses a given proprietary system prompt
 by querying the system and comparing distribution of outputs with outputs obtained using proprietary
 system prompt.

which is often leveraged by startups in their products¹. Developers put significant effort into prompt engineering and prompts optimized for specific use-cases are even sold at online marketplaces².

The importance and promise of prompt engineering gave rise to the interest of the community in protecting proprietary prompts and a growing body of academic literature explores prompt reconstruction attacks (Hui et al., 2024; Zhang et al.; Morris et al., 2023; Geiping et al., 2024) which attempt to recover a prompt used in a language model to produce particular generations. These methods achieve impressive results in approximate prompt reconstruction, however their reconstruction success rate is not high enough to be able to confidently verify the prompt reuse, they are computationally expensive usually relying on GCG-style optimization (Zou et al., 2023), and some of these methods require access to model gradients (Geiping et al., 2024). Additionally, while some reconstruction methods provide confidence scores (Zhang et al.), they do not offer statistical guarantees for prompt usage verification.

065 In this work, we specifically focus on the problem of verifying if a particular system prompt was used 066 in a large language model. This problem can be viewed through the lens of an adversarial setup: an 067 attacker may have reused someone else's proprietary system prompt and deployed an LLM-based 068 chat bot with it. In LLM-based chatbots, control over part of the input is given to the end user. 069 Consider a customer service chatbot that employs a general LLM to help customers get the answers they need. These systems typically add the user input into a longer template that includes a system 071 prompt with application-specific instructions to help ensure that the back end large general purpose language model returns useful content to the user. Note the value in an expertly written system 072 prompt - it could be critical in getting quality responses from large back end LLMs. Assuming access 073 to querying this chatbot, can we verify with statistical significance if the proprietary system prompt 074 has not been used? In other words, we develop a method for system prompt membership inference. 075 Our contributions are as follows: 076

- We develop Prompt Detective, a training-free statistical method to reliably verify whether a given system prompt was used by a third-party language model, assuming query access to it.
- We extensively evaluate the effectiveness of Prompt Detective across a variety of language models, including Llama, Mistral, Claude, and GPT families including challenging scenarios such as distinguishing similar system prompts and black-box settings.
- Our work reveals that even minor changes in system prompts manifest in distinct response distributions of LLMs, enabling Prompt Detective to verify prompt usage with statistical significance. This highlights that LLMs take specific trajectories when generating responses based on the provided system prompt.

2 RELATED WORK

077

078

079

081

082

084

085

087

088 089

090

106

107

2.1 PROMPT EXTRACTION ATTACKS

091 Prompt engineering has emerged as an accessible approach to adapt LLMs for specific user needs 092 (Liu et al., 2023), with system prompts playing a crucial role in shaping LLM outputs and driving performance across application domains (Ng & Fulford, 2023). Prior work has proposed several 094 prompt extraction attacks, which deduce the content of a proprietary system prompt by interacting 095 with a model, both for language models (Morris et al., 2023; Zhang et al.; Sha & Zhang, 2024; Yang et al., 2024) and for image generation models (Wen et al., 2024). Morris et al. (2023) frame 096 the problem as model inversion, where they deduce the prompt given next token probabilities. 097 Similarly, Sha & Zhang (2024) propose a method to extract prompts from sampled generative 098 model outputs. Furthermore, Yang et al. (2024) describe a way to uncover system prompts using context and response pairs. Additionally, Zhang et al. present an evaluation of prompt extraction 100 attacks for a variety of modern LLMs. In contrast to the works on inversion style methods, one 101 can also find adversarial inputs that jailbreak LLMs (Zou et al., 2023; Cherepanova & Zou, 2024; 102 Geiping et al., 2024) and even lead them to eliciting the system prompt in the response. Prompt 103 reconstruction methods can also be adapted to solve the problem of prompt verification through 104 comparing the reconstructed prompt to the reference prompt, however, their high computational cost 105 (Hui et al., 2024; Geiping et al., 2024), the need to access model gradients (Geiping et al., 2024), and

¹https://character.ai/

²https://prompti.ai/chatgpt-prompt/, https://promptbase.com/.

imperfect reconstruction success rate (Hui et al., 2024; Zhang et al.; Geiping et al., 2024) motivate
 the development of methods specifically tailored to the problem of prompt reuse verification.

- 110 111
- 112

2.2 DATA MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE AND EXTRACTION ATTACKS ON LANGUAGE MODELS

113 In the evolving discussion on data privacy, a significant topic is membership inference, which involves 114 determining whether a particular data point is part of a model's training set (e.g. Yeom et al., 2018; Sablayrolles et al., 2019; Salem et al., 2018; Song & Mittal, 2021; Hu et al., 2022). Shokri et al. 115 116 (2017) and Carlini et al. (2022) both propose methods to determine membership in the training data based on the idea that models tend to behave differently on their training data than on other data. 117 Bertran et al. (2024) further propose a more effective method and alleviate the need to know the target 118 model's architecture, while Wen et al. (2022) propose perturbing the query data to improve accuracy 119 of their attack. Compared to the standard membership inference setting, our work addresses a related 120 but distinct question: whether a given text is part of the LLM input context, thus exploring prompt 121 membership inference.

122 123 124

125

127

3 PROMPT DETECTIVE

126 3.1 SETUP

Prompt Detective aims to verify whether a particular known system prompt is used by a third-party chat bot as shown in Figure 1. In our setup, we assume an API or online chat access to the model, that is, we can query the chat bot with different task prompts and we have control over choosing these task prompts. We also assume the knowledge about which model is employed by the service in most of our experiments, and we explore the black-box scenario in section 6.

This setup can be applied when a user, who may have spent significant effort developing the system prompt for their product such as an LLM character or a domain-specific application, suspects that their proprietary system prompt has been utilized by a third-party chat service effectively replicating the behavior of their product, and wants to verify if that was in fact the case while only having online chat window access to that service.

Moreover, this adversarial setup can be seen through the lens of membership inference attacks, where instead of verifying membership of a given data sample in the training data of a language model, we verify membership of a particular system prompt in the context window of a language model. We therefore refer to our adversarial setting as *prompt membership inference*.

142 143

3.2 How does it work?

Let f denote a language model, let p be a system prompt, and let q be a task prompt. Together, we denote the full output as $f_p(q)$. For example, a system prompt could look like "You are a helpful assistant" and a task-specific query might be like "Can you help me with a billing issue?" If we applied the appropriate chat template, the full string we pass to the model's tokenizer would look as follows:

149

151

152

149 150

[SYS] You are a helpful assistant [\SYS]

[USER] Can you help me with a billing issue?[\USER]

We assume the model owner uses an unknown system prompt p, and that we can query the service with task prompts q to get output $f_p(q)$. We also assume access to a similar model prompted with our known proprietary system prompt \bar{p} , whose output is denoted by $\bar{f}\bar{p}$. Our goal is to determine whether p and \bar{p} are distinct.

157

Core idea. Prompt Detective is a training-free statistical method designed specifically for determining if a system prompt used in an LLM-based service matches a known string. The core idea is to compare the distributions of two groups of generations corresponding to different system prompts and apply a statistical test to assess if the distributions are significantly different, which would indicate that the system prompts are distinct. That is, Prompt Detective compares the distributions of

162 Algorithm 1 Prompt Detective 163 **Require:** Third-party language model f_p , 164 Known (proprietary) system prompt \bar{p} , 165 Model $f_{\bar{p}}$, 166 Task prompts q_1, \ldots, q_n , 167 Number of responses per task prompt k, 168 Significance level α 169 $G_1 \leftarrow \{\{f_p(q_1)^1 \dots f_p(q_1)^k\}, \dots, \{f_p(q_n)^1 \dots f_p(q_n)^k\}\}$ ▷ *Generations from third-party model* 170 $G_{2} \leftarrow \{\{\bar{f}_{\bar{p}}(q_{1})^{1}...\bar{f}_{\bar{p}}(q_{1})^{k}\}, \ldots, \{\bar{f}_{\bar{p}}(q_{n})^{1}...\bar{f}_{\bar{p}}(q_{n})^{k}\}\}$ ▷ Generations from known prompt 171 $V_1 \leftarrow \text{BERT}(G_1)$ \triangleright BERT embeddings of G_1 172 $V_2 \leftarrow \text{BERT}(G_2)$ \triangleright BERT embeddings of G_2 $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{Mean}(V_1), \mu_2 \leftarrow \text{Mean}(V_2)$ ▷ Mean vectors 173 $s_{obs} \leftarrow CosineSimilarity(\mu_1, \mu_2)$ ▷ Observed cosine similarity 174 $c \leftarrow 0$ Counter for extreme cosine similarities 175 for i = 1 to $N_{\text{permutations}}$ do > Permutation test loop 176 $V_1^* \leftarrow V_1, V_2^* \leftarrow V_2$ ▷ Initialize permuted groups 177 for j = 1 to n do > Shuffle preserving the task prompt structure 178 $V_{\text{combined}} \leftarrow V_1^*[(j-1)k:jk] \cup V_2^*[(j-1)k:jk]$ ▷ Concatenate responses 179 ▷ Permute combined responses $V_{\text{combined}} \leftarrow \text{Shuffle}(V_{\text{combined}})$ \triangleright Assign first part to V_1^* $V_1^*[(j-1)k:jk] \leftarrow V_{\text{combined}}[k]$ 181 $V_2^*[(j-1)k:jk] \leftarrow V_{\text{combined}}[k:]$ \triangleright Assign second part to V_2^* $\mu_1^* \leftarrow \operatorname{Mean}(V_1^*), \mu_2^* \leftarrow \operatorname{Mean}(V_2^*)$ 182 $s^* \leftarrow \text{CosineSimilarity}(\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ 183 if $s^* \leq s_{\rm obs}$ then > Check if new similarity is as extreme $c \leftarrow c+1$ > Increment counter for extreme similarities 185 $p \leftarrow c/N_{\text{permutations}}$ 186 if $p < \alpha$ then 187 return "Prompts are distinct" 188 else 189 return "Insufficient evidence to claim prompts are distinct" 190 191 192 high-dimensional vector representations of two groups of generations 193 $\{f_p(q_i)^j\}_{i\in[1,\ldots,n],j\in[1,\ldots,k]}$ and $\{\bar{f}_{\bar{p}}(q_i)^j\}_{i\in[1,\ldots,n],j\in[1,\ldots,k]},$ 194 195 where the first set of generations is obtained from the third-party service f_p prompted with task 196 queries q_i (with k responses sampled for each task query), and the second set of generations is 197 obtained from the $f\bar{p}$ model prompted with the proprietary prompt \bar{p} and the same task queries. 199 **Text representations.** We use BERT embedding (Reimers & Gurevych, 2019) to map strings 200 to representation vectors. We compute the BERT embeddings for both $\{f_p(q_i)^j\}_{i \in [1,...,n], j \in [1,...,k]}$ 201 and $\{f_{\bar{p}}(q_i)^j\}_{i \in [1,...,n], j \in [1,...,k]}$, yielding two groups of high-dimensional vector representations of 202 generations corresponding to the two system prompts under comparison. We include results for 203 ablation study on embedding models in Appendix B Table 4. 204 205 Statistical test of the equality of representation distributions. To compare the distributions of 206 these two groups, we employ a permutation test (Good, 2013) with the cosine similarity between 207 the mean vectors of the groups used as the test statistic. The permutation test is a non-parametric 208 approach that does not make assumptions about the underlying distribution of the data, making it a 209 suitable choice for Prompt Detective. Intuitively, the permutation test assesses whether the observed 210 difference between the two groups of generations is significantly larger than what would be expected 211 by chance if the generations were not influenced by the underlying system prompts. By randomly 212 permuting the responses within each task prompt across the two groups, the test generates a null 213 distribution of cosine similarities between their mean vectors under the assumption that the system prompts are identical, while preserving the task prompt structure. The observed cosine similarity 214



Figure 2: **Hard Examples** illustrate varying degrees of similarity between the original prompts and their rephrased versions. Similarity Level 1 is highly similar, while Level 5 is completely different.

239

3.3 TASK QUERIES

The selection of task prompts q_1, \ldots, q_n is an important component of Prompt Detective, as these prompts serve as probes to elicit responses that are influenced by the underlying system prompt. Since we assume control over the task prompts provided to the third-party chat bot, we can strategically choose them to reveal differences in the response distributions induced by distinct system prompts.

We consider a task prompt a good probe for a given system prompt if it elicits responses that are directly influenced by and related to the system prompt. For example, if the system prompt is designed for a particular LLM persona or role, task prompts that encourage the model to express its personality, opinions, or decision-making processes would be effective probes. A diverse set of task prompts can be employed to increase the robustness of Prompt Detective. In practice, we generated task queries for each of the system prompts \bar{p} in our experiments with the Claude 3 Sonnet (Anthropic, 2024a) language model unless otherwise noted (see Appendix F).

251

4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

253 254

4.1 SYSTEM PROMPT SOURCES

Awesome-ChatGPT-Prompts ³ is a curated collection of 153 system prompts that enable users to
 tailor LLMs for specific roles. This dataset includes prompts for creative writing, programming,
 productivity, etc. Prompts are designed for various functions, such as acting as a Startup Idea
 Generator, Python Interpreter, or Personal Chef. The accompanying task prompts were generated
 with Claude 3 Sonnet (see Appendix ??). For the 153 system prompts in Awesome-ChatGPT, we
 generated overall 50 task prompts. In these experiments, while a given task prompt is not necessarily
 a good probe for every system prompt, these 50 task prompts include at least one good probe for each
 of the system prompts.

Anthropic's Prompt Library⁴ provides detailed prompts that guide models into specific characters and use cases. For our experiments, we select all of the personal prompts from the library that include system prompts giving us 20 examples. Personal prompts include roles such as Dream Interpreter or Emoji Encoder. As the accompanying task prompts, we used 20 of the corresponding user prompts provided in the library.

260

³https://github.com/f/awesome-chatgpt-prompts

⁴https://docs.anthropic.com/en/prompt-library/library

Hard Examples: To evaluate the robustness of Prompt Detective in challenging scenarios, we create a set of hard examples by generating variations of prompts from Anthropic's Prompt Library. These variations are designed to have different levels of similarity to the original prompts, ranging from minimal rephrasing to significant conceptual changes, producing varying levels of difficulty for distinguishing them from the original prompts.

For each system prompt from Anthropic's Prompt Library, we generate five variations with the following similarity levels (see Figure 2 for examples):

- 1. **Same Prompt, Minimal Rephrasing**: The same prompt, slightly rephrased with minor changes in a few words.
 - 2. Same Prompt, Minor Rephrasing: Very similar in spirit, but somewhat rephrased.
- 3. Same Prompt, Significant Rephrasing: Very similar in spirit, but significantly rephrased.
- 4. **Different Prompt, Remote Similarities**: A different prompt for the same role with some remote similarities to the original prompt.
- 5. **Different Prompt, Significant Conceptual Changes**: A completely different prompt for the same role with significant conceptual changes.

This process results in a total of 120 system prompts for hard examples. The system prompt variations and the accompanying task prompts were generated with the Claude 3 Sonnet model. For the hard example experiments, we generated 10 specific probe task queries per each of the original system prompts (see Appendices A,??).

4.2 MODELS

278

279

280

281

282

283

284 285

286 287

292

293

We conduct our experiments with a variety of open-source and API-based models, including Llama2
I3B (Touvron et al., 2023), Llama3 70B ⁵, Mistral 7B (Jiang et al., 2023), Mixtral 8x7B (Jiang et al., 2024), Claude 3 Haiku (Anthropic, 2024a), and GPT-3.5 (Achiam et al., 2023).

4.3 EVALUATION: STANDARD AND HARD EXAMPLES

In the standard setup, to evaluate Prompt Detective, we construct pairs of system prompts representing two scenarios: (1) where the known system prompt \bar{p} is indeed used by the language model (positive case), and (2) where the known system prompt \bar{p} differs from the system prompt p used by the model (negative case). The positive case simulates a situation where the proprietary prompt has been reused, while the negative case represents no prompt reuse.

We construct a positive pair (\bar{p}, \bar{p}) for each of the system prompts and randomly sample the same number of negative pairs $(\bar{p}, p), \bar{p} \neq p$. The negative pairs may not represent similar system prompts, and we refer to this setting as the standard setup.

For the hard example setup, we construct prompt pairs using the variations of the Anthropic Prompt Library prompts with different levels of similarity, as described in section 4.1. The first prompt in each pair is the original prompt from the library, while the second prompt is one of the five variations, ranging from minimal rephrasing to significant conceptual changes. That is, while in this setup there are no positive pairs using identical prompts, some of the pairs represent extremely similar prompts differing by only very few words replaced with synonyms.

5 Results

5.1 PROMPT DETECTIVE CAN DISTINGUISH SYSTEM PROMPTS

Table 1 shows the effectiveness of Prompt Detective in distinguishing between system prompts in the standard setup across different models and prompt sources. We report the false positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR) at a standard p-value threshold of 0.05, along with the average p-value for both positive and negative prompt pairs. In all models except for Claude on

314 315

316 317

318

³²³

⁵https://ai.meta.com/blog/meta-llama-3/

324	Table 1: Prompt Detective can reliably detect when system prompt used to produce generations is
325	different from the given proprietary system prompt. We report false positive and false negative rates
326	at a standard 0.05 p-value threshold. Additionaly, we report average p-value for positive and negative
327	system prompt pairs.

	A	wesome	-ChatGPT-F	Prompts		Ant	hropic Libra	ry
	FPR	FNR	p^p_{avg}	p_{avg}^n	FPR	FNR	p^p_{avg}	p_{avg}^n
Llama2 13B	0.00	0.05	$0.491 \pm .28$	$0.000 \pm .00$	0.00	0.10	$0.483 \pm .30$	$0.000 \pm .00$
Llama3 70B	0.00	0.07	$0.484 \pm .29$	$0.000 {\pm}.00$	0.00	0.00	$0.508 \pm .29$	$0.000 \pm .00$
Mistral 7B	0.00	0.04	$0.503 \pm .29$	$0.000 \pm .00$	0.00	0.05	$0.581 \pm .33$	$0.000 \pm .00$
Mixtral 8x7B	0.00	0.03	$0.475 \pm .30$	$0.000 \pm .00$	0.00	0.00	$0.466 \pm .30$	$0.000 \pm .00$
Claude Haiku	0.05	0.03	$0.543 \pm .29$	$0.021 \pm .11$	0.00	0.05	$0.440 \pm .28$	$0.000 \pm .00$
GPT-3.5	0.00	0.06	$0.501 {\scriptstyle \pm .28}$	$0.000 {\scriptstyle \pm .00}$	0.00	0.00	$0.396 {\scriptstyle \pm .26}$	$0.000 {\pm} .00$

AwesomeChatGPT dataset, Prompt Detective consistently achieves a zero false positive rate, and the false negative rate remains approximately 0.05. This rate corresponds to the selected significance level, indicating the probability of Type I error – rejecting the null hypothesis that system prompts are identical when they are indeed the same. Figure 3 shows how the average p-value changes in negative cases (where the prompts differ) as the number of task queries increases. As expected, the *p*-value decreases with more queries, providing stronger evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis of equal distributions. Consequently, increasing the number of queries further improves the statistical test's power, allowing for the use of lower significance levels and thus ensuring a reduced false negative rate, while maintaining a low false positive rate.

While there are no existing prompt membership inference baselines, prompt reconstruction methods can be adapted to the prompt membership inference setting by comparing recovered system prompts to the reference system prompts. We compare PLeak (Hui et al., 2024) – one of the most high performing of the existing prompt reconstruction approaches to Prompt Detective in the prompt membership setting. We find Prompt Detective to be significantly more effective in the prompt membership inference setting and report the results in Table 5 of Appendix B.1.

5.2 HARD EXAMPLES: SIMILAR SYSTEM PROMPTS

Table 2 presents the results for the challenging hard example setup, where we evaluate Prompt Detective's performance on system prompts with varying degrees of similarity to the proprietary prompt. We conduct this experiment with Claude 3 Haiku and GPT-3.5 models, testing Prompt Detective in two scenarios. First, we use 2 generations per task prompt, resulting in 20 generations for each system prompt, as in the standard setup Anthropic Library experiments. Second, we use 50




Figure 3: Average *p*-value computed for different number of task queries. Left: Awesome-ChatGPT-Prompts. Right: Anthropic Library. Increasing the number of generations leads to decreasing *p*-value in negative cases, but the average *p*-value for positive cases remains close to 0.5.

 Table 2: Results for Hard Examples. Increasing similarity between the proprietary system prompt and prompt used in third-party system (lower similarity level) leads to worse separation of generation distributions. Subscript in model name corresponds to the number of generations per task prompt used in Prompt Detective.

Model	Similari	ty 1	Similari	ty 2	Similarit	ty 3	Similari	ty 4	Similari	ty 5
	p_{avg}	FPR	p_{avg}	FPR	p_{avg}	FPR	p_{avg}	FPR	p_{avg}	FPR
$Claude_2$ $Claude_{50}$									$\begin{array}{c} 0.052 {\scriptstyle \pm .13} \\ 0.000 {\scriptstyle \pm .00} \end{array}$	
GPT-3.5 ₂ GPT-3.5 ₅₀										

409 410 411

412

413

414 415

416

417

418 419

420 421 422

423

424

382

392

generations for each task query, resulting in 500 generations per system prompt in total. We observe that when only 2 generations are used, the false positive rate is high reaching 65% for GPT 3.5 and Claude models in Similarity Level 1 setup, indicating the challenge of distinguishing the response distributions for two very similar system prompts. However, increasing the number of generations for each probe to 50 leads to Prompt Detective being able to almost perfectly separate between system prompts even in the highest similarity category.

We further explore the effect of including more generations and more task prompts on Prompt 399 Detective's performance. In Figure 4, we display the average p-value for Prompt Detective on 400 Similarity Level 1 pairs versus the number of generations, the number of task prompts, and the 401 number of tokens in the generations. We ask the following question: for a fixed budget in terms of 402 the total number of tokens generated, is it more beneficial to include more different task prompts, 403 more generations per task prompt, or longer responses from the model? Our observations suggest 404 that while having more task prompts is comparable to having more generations per task prompt, it 405 is important to have at least a few different task prompts for improved robustness of the method. 406 However, having particularly long generations exceeding 64 tokens is not as useful, indicating that the optimal setup includes generating shorter responses to more task prompts and including more 407 generations per task prompt. 408

> 100 100 # generations # task prompts 10^{-1} # tokens 10^{-} 10 10 p_{avg}^n p_{avg}^n 10^{-3} 10^{-3} 10-10 0 0 200 400 C 100000 200000 Number of Queries Number of Tokens




Table 3: **Prompt Detective in Black Box Setup.** Assuming the third-party model f_p is one of the six models from previous experiments, we use Prompt Detective to compare it against each of the six reference models $\{\bar{f}_{\bar{p}}^i\}_{i=1}^6$.

Model	Av	vesome	-ChatGPT-	Prompts		Ant	hropic Libra	ıry
	FPR	FNR	p^p_{avg}	p_{avg}^n	FPR	FNR	p^p_{avg}	p_{avg}^n
Llama2 13B	0.00	0.01	$0.493 \pm .28$	$0.000 \pm .00$	0.00	0.05	$0.484 \pm .30$	$0.000 \pm .00$
Llama3 70B	0.01	0.02	$0.485 \pm .29$	$0.001{\scriptstyle \pm .02}$	0.00	0.00	$0.517 {\scriptstyle \pm .28}$	$0.000 \pm .00$
Mistral 7B	0.00	0.00	$0.504 \pm .29$	$0.000 \pm .00$	0.00	0.00	$0.582 \pm .34$	$0.000 \pm .00$
Mixtral 8x7B	0.00	0.01	$0.476 \pm .30$	$0.000 \pm .00$	0.00	0.00	$0.467 \pm .29$	$0.000 \pm .00$
Claude Haiku	0.10	0.00	$0.545 \pm .29$	$0.017 {\scriptstyle \pm .08}$	0.00	0.00	$0.420 \pm .34$	$0.000 \pm .00$
GPT-3.5	0.02	0.01	$0.505{\scriptstyle \pm .28}$	$0.001 {\scriptstyle \pm .01}$	0.00	0.00	$0.396 {\scriptstyle \pm .26}$	$0.000 \pm .00$

We additionally find that Prompt Detective successfully distinguishes prompts in two case studies of special interest: (1) variations of the generic "*You are a helpful and harmless AI assistant*" common in chat applications, and (2) system prompts that differ only by a typo as an example of extreme similarity (see Appendix C for details).

6 BLACK BOX SETUP

452 So far we assumed the knowledge of the third-party model used to produce generations, and in this 453 section we explore the black-box setup where the exact model is unknown. As mentioned previously, 454 it is reasonable to assume that chat bots which reuse system prompts likely rely on one of the widely 455 used language model families. To simulate such scenario, we now say that all the information 456 Prompt Detective has is that the third party model f_p is one of the six models used in our previous 457 experiments. We then compare the generations of f_p against each model $\{\bar{f}_p^i\}_{i=1}^6$ used as reference 458 and take the maximum p-value. Because of the multiple-comparison problem in this setup, we apply 459 the Bonferroni correction to the p-value threshold to maintain the overall significance level of 0.05. 460 Table 3 displays the results for Prompt Detective in the black-box setup. We observe that, while false positive rates are slightly higher compared to the standard setup, Prompt Detective maintains its 461 effectiveness, which demonstrates its applicability in realistic scenarios where the adversary's model 462 is not known. 463

464 465

466

481

432

433

446

447

448

449 450

451

7 DISCUSSION

We introduce Prompt Detective, a method for verifying with statistical significance whether a given
system prompt was used by a language model and we demonstrate its effectiveness in experiments
across various models and setups.

The robustness of Prompt Detective is highlighted by its performance on hard examples of highly similar system prompts and even prompts that differ only by a typo. The number of task queries and their strategic selection play a crucial role in achieving statistical significance, and in practice we find that generally 300 responses are enough to separate prompts of the highest similarity. Interestingly, we find that for a fixed budget of generated tokens having a larger number of shorter responses is most useful for effective separation.

A key finding of our work is that even minor changes in system prompts manifest in distinct response distributions, suggesting that large language models take distinct low-dimensional "role trajectories" even though the content may be similar and indistinguishable by eye when generating responses based on similar system prompts. This phenomenon is visualized in Appendix Figure 5, where generations from even quite similar prompts tend to cluster separately in a low-dimensional embedding space.

482 REFERENCES

Josh Achiam, Steven Adler, Sandhini Agarwal, Lama Ahmad, Ilge Akkaya, Florencia Leoni Aleman,
 Diogo Almeida, Janko Altenschmidt, Sam Altman, Shyamal Anadkat, et al. Gpt-4 technical report.
 arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.08774, 2023.

486 487 488	Anthropic. Claude 3 model family: Opus, sonnet, haiku. https://www.anthropic.com/news/ claude-3-family, 2024a. Accessed: June 14, 2024.
489 490	Anthropic. Prompt library. https://docs.anthropic.com/en/prompt-library/library, 2024b. Accessed: June 14, 2024.
491 492 493 494	Martin Bertran, Shuai Tang, Aaron Roth, Michael Kearns, Jamie H Morgenstern, and Steven Z Wu. Scalable membership inference attacks via quantile regression. <i>Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems</i> , 36, 2024.
495 496 497	Nicholas Carlini, Steve Chien, Milad Nasr, Shuang Song, Andreas Terzis, and Florian Tramer. Membership inference attacks from first principles. In 2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pp. 1897–1914. IEEE, 2022.
498 499	Valeriia Cherepanova and James Zou. Talking nonsense: Probing large language models' understand- ing of adversarial gibberish inputs. <i>arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.17120</i> , 2024.
500 501 502	Jonas Geiping, Alex Stein, Manli Shu, Khalid Saifullah, Yuxin Wen, and Tom Goldstein. Coercing llms to do and reveal (almost) anything. <i>arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.14020</i> , 2024.
503 504	Phillip Good. <i>Permutation tests: a practical guide to resampling methods for testing hypotheses.</i> Springer Science & Business Media, 2013.
505 506 507 508	Hongsheng Hu, Zoran Salcic, Lichao Sun, Gillian Dobbie, Philip S Yu, and Xuyun Zhang. Member- ship inference attacks on machine learning: A survey. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 54(11s): 1–37, 2022.
509 510	Bo Hui, Haolin Yuan, Neil Gong, Philippe Burlina, and Yinzhi Cao. Pleak: Prompt leaking attacks against large language model applications. <i>arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.06823</i> , 2024.
511 512 513 514	Albert Q Jiang, Alexandre Sablayrolles, Arthur Mensch, Chris Bamford, Devendra Singh Chaplot, Diego de las Casas, Florian Bressand, Gianna Lengyel, Guillaume Lample, Lucile Saulnier, et al. Mistral 7b. arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.06825, 2023.
515 516 517	Albert Q Jiang, Alexandre Sablayrolles, Antoine Roux, Arthur Mensch, Blanche Savary, Chris Bamford, Devendra Singh Chaplot, Diego de las Casas, Emma Bou Hanna, Florian Bressand, et al. Mixtral of experts. <i>arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.04088</i> , 2024.
518 519 520 521	Pengfei Liu, Weizhe Yuan, Jinlan Fu, Zhengbao Jiang, Hiroaki Hayashi, and Graham Neubig. Pre-train, prompt, and predict: A systematic survey of prompting methods in natural language processing. <i>ACM Computing Surveys</i> , 55(9):1–35, 2023.
522 523	John X Morris, Wenting Zhao, Justin T Chiu, Vitaly Shmatikov, and Alexander M Rush. Language model inversion. <i>arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.13647</i> , 2023.
524 525 526	Andrew Ng and Isa Fulford. Application development using large language models. NeurIPS 2023 Tutorials, 2023.
527 528	OpenAI. Prompt engineering guide. https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/ prompt-engineering, 2023. Accessed: June 14, 2024.
529 530 531	Nils Reimers and Iryna Gurevych. Sentence-bert: Sentence embeddings using siamese bert-networks. <i>arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.10084</i> , 2019.
532 533 534	Alexandre Sablayrolles, Matthijs Douze, Cordelia Schmid, Yann Ollivier, and Hervé Jégou. White- box vs black-box: Bayes optimal strategies for membership inference. In <i>International Conference</i> <i>on Machine Learning</i> , pp. 5558–5567. PMLR, 2019.
535 536 537 538	Ahmed Salem, Yang Zhang, Mathias Humbert, Pascal Berrang, Mario Fritz, and Michael Backes. Ml-leaks: Model and data independent membership inference attacks and defenses on machine learning models. arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.01246, 2018.
538 539	Zeyang Sha and Yang Zhang. Prompt stealing attacks against large language models. <i>arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.12959</i> , 2024.

540 541 542 543	Reza Shokri, Marco Stronati, Congzheng Song, and Vitaly Shmatikov. Membership inference attacks against machine learning models. In 2017 IEEE symposium on security and privacy (SP), pp. 3–18. IEEE, 2017.
543 544 545	Liwei Song and Prateek Mittal. Systematic evaluation of privacy risks of machine learning models. In <i>30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21)</i> , pp. 2615–2632, 2021.
546 547 548	Hugo Touvron, Louis Martin, Kevin Stone, Peter Albert, Amjad Almahairi, Yasmine Babaei, Nikolay Bashlykov, Soumya Batra, Prajjwal Bhargava, Shruti Bhosale, et al. Llama 2: Open foundation and fine-tuned chat models. <i>arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.09288</i> , 2023.
549 550 551 552	Yuxin Wen, Arpit Bansal, Hamid Kazemi, Eitan Borgnia, Micah Goldblum, Jonas Geiping, and Tom Goldstein. Canary in a coalmine: Better membership inference with ensembled adversarial queries. <i>arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.10750</i> , 2022.
553 554 555	Yuxin Wen, Neel Jain, John Kirchenbauer, Micah Goldblum, Jonas Geiping, and Tom Goldstein. Hard prompts made easy: Gradient-based discrete optimization for prompt tuning and discovery. <i>Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems</i> , 36, 2024.
556 557 558 559	Yong Yang, Xuhong Zhang, Yi Jiang, Xi Chen, Haoyu Wang, Shouling Ji, and Zonghui Wang. Prsa: Prompt reverse stealing attacks against large language models. <i>arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.19200</i> , 2024.
559 560 561 562	Samuel Yeom, Irene Giacomelli, Matt Fredrikson, and Somesh Jha. Privacy risk in machine learning: Analyzing the connection to overfitting. In 2018 IEEE 31st computer security foundations symposium (CSF), pp. 268–282. IEEE, 2018.
563 564 565	Yiming Zhang, Nicholas Carlini, and Daphne Ippolito. Effective prompt extraction from language models. <i>arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.08493</i> . URL https://arxiv.org/pdf/2307.06865.
566 567 568	Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, J Zico Kolter, and Matt Fredrikson. Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models. <i>arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15043</i> , 2023.
569 570 571	
572 573	
574 575 576	
577 578 579	
580 581	
582 583 584	
585 586	
587 588 589	
590 591	
592 593	




Figure 5: **UMAP projection of generations** of language model across 5 system prompts of varying similarity for one task prompt. It can be seen that generations from different, although conceptually similar system prompts, cluster together.

A ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON SYSTEM PROMPT SOURCES

AwesomeChatGPT Prompts is licensed under the CC0-1.0 license. The dataset contains 153 role system prompts, for which we constructed 50 universal task prompts used to produce generations. In the default experiments, we produce a single generation per system prompt - task prompt pair. Additionally, we conduct ablations by varying the number of task prompts used, as shown in Figure 3.

Anthropic Prompt Library is available on Anthropic's website and follows Anthropic's Terms of Use.⁶ We experiment with 20 personal system prompts, for which we construct 20 universal task prompts used to produce generations. In the default experiments, we produce a single generation per system prompt - task prompt pair. Additionally, we conduct ablations by varying the number of task prompts used, as shown in Figure 3.

Anthropic Prompt Library – Hard Examples are variations of Anthropic Prompt Library personal system prompts constructed using strategies described in Section 4.1. We craft 10 unique task prompts for each of the 20 original system prompts, as detailed in Table 6. In our experiments, we vary the number of generations per system-task prompt pair from 2 to 50.

B ADDITIONAL RESULTS

Figure 5 provides a visual representation of the generation distributions for one task prompt across five system prompts of varying similarity levels for Claude. Despite conceptual similarities, the generations from different prompts form distinct clusters in the low-dimensional UMAP projection, aligning with our finding that even minor changes in system prompts manifest in distinct response distributions.

⁶³⁶ ⁶³⁷ In Figure 6 we illustrate the ROC-curves for Prompt Detective computed by varying the sifnificance ⁶³⁸ level α in the standard setup for both Awesome ChatGPT Prompts and Anthropic Library datasets ⁶³⁹ across all models. We observe that Prompt Detective achieves ROC-AUC of 1.0 in all setups except ⁶⁴⁰ for the Claude model on AwesomeChatGPT prompts.

In Table 4 we report results for Prompt Detective on Awesome ChatGPT Prompts dataset in a standard setup with various encoding models used in place of BERT embeddings. In particular, we experimented with smaller models from the MTEB Leaderboard, such as gte-Qwen2-1.5B-instruct from Alibaba, jina-embeddings-v3 from Jina AI and mxbai-embed-large-v1 from Mixedbread. We observe no significant difference in the results compared to the BERT embeddings. Therefore, we opt for using the cheaper BERT encoding model in Prompt Detective for obtaining multi-dimensional presentations of the generations.

⁶https://www.anthropic.com/legal/consumer-terms




Figure 6: **ROC-Curves computed by varying the significance level** α for Prompt Detective. The markers correspond to the significance level of 0.05.

Table 4: **Ablation Study on encoding model used in Prompt Detective on Awesome-ChatGPT-Prompts dataset**. We report false positive and false negative rates at a standard 0.05 *p*-value threshold. Additionaly, we report average *p*-value for positive and negative system prompt pairs.

Model	Encoder	FPR	FNR	p^p_{avg}	p_{avg}^n
Claude	BERT	0.05	0.03	0.544 ± 0.29	0.022 ± 0.1
Claude	jina-embeddings-v3	0.03	0.07	0.489 ± 0.30	0.006 ± 0.0
Claude	mxbai-embed-large-v1	0.04	0.04	0.504 ± 0.29	0.020 ± 0.1
Claude	gte-Qwen2-1.5B-instruct	0.03	0.04	0.514 ± 0.29	$0.013~\pm~0.0$
GPT35	BERT	0.00	0.06	0.502 ± 0.28	0.000 ± 0.00
GPT35	jina-embeddings-v3	0.01	0.08	0.487 ± 0.30	0.003 ± 0.0
GPT35	mxbai-embed-large-v1	0.00	0.05	0.508 ± 0.30	0.000 ± 0.00
GPT35	gte-Qwen2-1.5B-instruct	0.01	0.05	0.502 ± 0.29	0.002 ± 0.0

663

665

666

667

680 681

682

B.1 COMPARISON TO PROMPT EXTRACTION BASELINES

Prompt reconstruction methods can be adapted to the prompt membership inference setting by 683 comparing recovered system prompts to the reference system prompts. We compared PLeak (Hui 684 et al., 2024) – one of the most high performing of the existing prompt reconstruction approaches 685 to Prompt Detective in the prompt membership setting. We used the optimal recommended setup 686 for real-world chatbots from section 5.2 of the original PLeak paper (Hui et al., 2024) — we 687 computed 4 Adversarial Queries with PLeak and Llama2 13B as the shadow model as recommended, 688 and we used ChatGPT-Roles as the shadow domain dataset to minimize domain shift for PLeak. 689 We observed that PLeak sometimes recovers large parts of target prompts even when there is no 690 exact substring match, and that using the edit distance below the threshold of 0.2 to find matches 691 maximizes PLeak's performance in the prompt membership inference setting. To further maximize 692 the performance of the PLeak method, we also aggregate the reconstructions across the 4 Adversarial 693 Queries (AQs) by taking the best reconstruction match (this aggregation approach is infeasible in prompt reconstruction setting where the target prompt is unknown but can be used to obtain best 694 results in prompt membership inference setting where we know the reference prompt). We then 695 applied these adversarial prompt extraction queries to Llama2 13B as the target model with system 696 prompts from Awesome-ChatGPT-Prompts and computed False Positive and False Negative rates for 697 direct comparison with the results of Prompt Detective reported in Table 1 of our paper. We report the results in Table 5. 699

We see that Prompt Detective significantly outperforms PLeak in the prompt membership inference
 setting which is expected since Prompt Detective is specifically tailored to work in the verification
 setup while PLeak is geared towards solving a different problem of prompt reconstruction.

Table 5: Comparison of Prompt Detective and PLeak with Llama2 13B as the target model and
 system prompts from Awesome-ChatGPT-Prompts. We report false positive rate (FPR) and false
 negative rate (FNR) for each method.

Method	Target Model	FPR	FNR
Prompt Detective	Llama2 13B	0.00	0.05
PLeak	Llama2 13B	0.00	0.46

C CASE STUDIES

We additionally explore two challenging scenarios for distinguishing between system prompts.

715 C.1 YOU ARE HELPFUL AND HARMLESS AI ASSISTANT

717 We explore the effect of the common system prompt first introduced in Llama models, which instructs 718 the model to behave as a helpful, harmless, and honest assistant. Specifically, we consider two versions of this prompt: the standard prompt, "You are a helpful, respectful and honest assistant. 719 Always answer as helpfully as possible, while being safe. Your answers should not include any 720 harmful, unethical, racist, sexist, toxic, dangerous, or illegal content. Please ensure that your 721 responses are socially unbiased and positive in nature. If a question does not make any sense, or is 722 not factually coherent, explain why instead of answering something not correct. If you don't know the 723 answer to a question, please don't share false information.", and a rephrased version, "Your role is to 724 provide helpful, respectful, and truthful responses to users. Prioritize being as assistive as possible 725 while operating within ethical boundaries. Avoid generating any content that could be considered 726 harmful, unethical, biased, dangerous, or illegal. Maintain an impartial and positive tone in your 727 outputs. If a query is nonsensical or lacks factual coherence, explain why instead of attempting 728 an incorrect answer. Admit if you lack the knowledge to properly address a question rather than 729 speculating or providing misinformation."

We then prompt the GPT-3.5 model with these system prompts and 50 task prompts from Awe-someChatGPT Prompts experiments. We generate 5 generations for each task prompt. We consider this a more challenging scenario because neither prompt installs a particular character on the model, and instead asks it to behave in a generically helpful way. Nevertheless, Prompt Detective can separate between these two system prompts with a *p*-value of 0.0001.

735 736

737

705 706

712 713

714

C.2 SYSTEM PROMPT WITH A TYPO

Next, we investigate whether introducing a couple of typos in the prompt leads to a changed 738 "generation trajectory." For this experiment, we take one of the prompts from the Anthropic Library, 739 namely the Dream Interpreter system prompt, and introduce two typos as follows: You are an AI 740 assistant with a deep understanding of dream interpretaion and symbolism. Your task is to provide 741 users with insightful and meaningful analyses of the symbols, emotions, and narratives present in 742 their dreams. Offer potential interpretations while encouraging the user to reflect on their own 743 *experiencs* and *emotions*.. We then use the GPT-3.5 model to generate responses to 20 task prompts 744 used in experiments with Anthropic Library prompts. Prompt Detective can separate the system 745 prompt with typos from the original system prompt with a *p*-value of 0.02 when using 50 generations 746 for each task prompt. This experiment highlights that even minor changes, such as small typos, can 747 alter the generation trajectory, making it detectable for a prompt membership inference attack.

- 748
- 749 750
- 750
- 751 752
- 753
- 754
- 755

D	PROMPT DETECTIVE: DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE ALGORITHM
Inp	uts and Notations
	 Third-party language model: f_p, prompted with an unknown system prompt p. Known proprietary system prompt: p , used with a reference model f_p. prompts: q₁, q₂,, q_n, used to query both f_p and f_p. Number of generations per task prompt: k, the number of responses sampled for each task prompt.
	• Significance level: α , threshold for hypothesis testing.
	• Number of permutations: $N_{\text{permutations}}$, the number of iterations for the permutation test.
Alg	orithm Description
Ste	p 1: Generation of Responses.
For	each task prompt q_i ($i \in [1, n]$), generate k responses:
	$G_1 = \{ f_p(q_1)^1, \dots, f_p(q_1)^k, \dots, f_p(q_n)^1, \dots, f_p(q_n)^k \},\$
	$G_2 = \{ f_{\bar{p}}(q_1)^1, \dots, f_{\bar{p}}(q_1)^k, \dots, f_{\bar{p}}(q_n)^1, \dots, f_{\bar{p}}(q_n)^k \}.$
Ste	o 2: Encoding Generations
	wert text responses into high-dimensional vectors using a BERT embedding function $\phi(\cdot)$:
	$V_1 = \{\phi(f_p(q_1)^1), \dots, \phi(f_p(q_1)^k), \dots, \phi(f_p(q_n)^1), \dots, \phi(f_p(q_n)^k)\},\$
	$V_2 = \{\phi(f_{\bar{p}}(q_1)^1), \dots, \phi(f_{\bar{p}}(q_1)^k), \dots, \phi(f_{\bar{p}}(q_n)^1), \dots, \phi(f_{\bar{p}}(q_n)^k)\}.$
Ster	o 3: Mean Vector Computation
	npute the mean vectors for V_1 and V_2 :
	$\mu_1 = rac{1}{ V_1 } \sum_{v \in V_1} v, \mu_2 = rac{1}{ V_2 } \sum_{v \in V_2} v.$
Ste	o 4: Observed Cosine Similarity
Cal	culate the observed cosine similarity between μ_1 and μ_2 :
	$s_{\mathrm{obs}} = \cos(\mu_1, \mu_2).$
Ste	o 5: Permutation Test
	goal of this step is to test whether the observed similarity s_{obs} is significantly different from what all be expected if V_1 and V_2 were drawn from the same distribution.
Pro	cedure:
	1. Combine Responses: Merge all embeddings into a single set:
	$V_{ ext{combined}} = V_1 \cup V_2.$
	2. Shuffle the Combined Embeddings: For each task prompt q_i , shuffle the embedding associated with that prompt:
	$V_{\text{combined}}[i] = \{v_{i,1}, \dots, v_{i,k}, u_{i,1}, \dots, u_{i,k}\},\$
	where $v_{i,j} \in V_1$ and $u_{i,j} \in V_2$. After shuffling, the embeddings are randomly reordered eliminating any inherent grouping.

3. Split into Two Groups: Divide the shuffled embeddings back into two groups, each containing *k* embeddings per task prompt:

$$V_1^*[i] = \{v_{i,1}', \dots, v_{i,k}'\}, \quad V_2^*[i] = \{u_{i,1}', \dots, u_{i,k}'\}.$$

4. Compute Mean Vectors for Permuted Groups: Calculate the mean vectors for V_1^* and V_2^* :

$$\mu_1^* = \frac{1}{|V_1^*|} \sum_{v \in V_1^*} v, \quad \mu_2^* = \frac{1}{|V_2^*|} \sum_{v \in V_2^*} v.$$

5. Calculate Permuted Cosine Similarity: Compute the cosine similarity for the permuted groups:

$$s^* = \cos(\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*).$$

- 6. Repeat for Null Distribution: Repeat the shuffle-split process $N_{\text{permutations}}$ times to generate a null distribution of permuted cosine similarities.
- 7. Compute P-Value: Count the number of permuted similarities as extreme as s_{obs} :

$$p = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_{\text{permutations}}} \mathbb{I}(s^* \le s_{\text{obs}})}{N_{\text{permutations}}}.$$

Step 6: Hypothesis Testing

If $p < \alpha$, reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the system prompts p and \bar{p} produce distinct distributions of responses. Otherwise, there is insufficient evidence to distinguish the prompts.

E HARDWARE

Our experiments were conducted using NVIDIA A10G 24GB GPUs. Although a single run of Prompt Detective for a given system prompt takes only minutes, even with a large number of generations, the total number of GPU hours required to produce the results presented in this paper amounted to approximately 150 GPU hours. These experiments involved three different system prompt sources, black-box experiments, and thorough ablation studies to evaluate the test's performance under varying numbers of task prompts, generations, and generation lengths. We also utilized the corresponding APIs for the commercial models.

F PROMPT TEMPLATES AND EXAMPLES

Table 6 presents the instructions used with Claude 3 Sonnet for generating task queries and hard examples. Table 7 presents an example of prompts used in experiments with hard examples.

865

Table 6: Prompts used with Claude 3 Sonnet for generating task queries and hard examples.

Prompt	Use Case
Hi, I am building an algorithm detecting whether a given system prompt was used in a language model. My approach assumes that I can query the language model with task prompts. Below I will show you a system prompt, I would like	
your help to curate 10 probe task prompts for that system prompt. A task prompt	
is a good probe for a given system prompt if it elicits responses that are related to	
the system prompt and are directly influenced by it. Return results as a json.	m 1 0 1
System prompt: [Insert system prompt here]	Task Queries
Hi, I am building an algorithm detecting whether a given system prompt was used	
in a language model. My approach assumes that I can query the language model with task prompts. I want to set up an experiment with difficult-to-distinguish	
examples by creating rephrased variations of my system prompt that are similar	
in spirit but differ in details and thus cannot be considered stolen.	
First, here are the system prompts I use in my experiments: [Insert system prompts here]	
Now, let's move on to making variations of these ten proprietary prompts. For	Hard Exampl
each of the ten prompts, suggest five variations $-(1)$ the same prompt, slightly	pi
rephrased with minor changes in a few words (2) very similar in spirit, but	
somewhat rephrased, (3) very similar in spirit, but significantly rephrased, (4) a	
different prompt for the same role with some remote similarities to the original one, (5) a completely different prompt for the same role with significant concep-	
tual changes.	

Table 7: Examples of Hard Examples – Dream Interpreter Role

Similarity Level	System Prompt
Original	You are an AI assistant with a deep understanding of dream interpret tation and symbolism. Your task is to provide users with insightfu and meaningful analyses of the symbols, emotions, and narratives present in their dreams. Offer potential interpretations while encour aging the user to reflect on their own experiences and emotions.
Almost the same prompt, minor changes (Similarity Level 1)	You are an AI assistant skilled in dream analysis and symbolic interpretation. Your role is to provide insightful and meaningful analyses of the symbols, emotions, and narratives present in users' dreams Offer potential interpretations while encouraging self-reflection on their experiences and emotions.
Similar in spirit, somewhat rephrased (Similarity Level 2)	As an AI assistant with expertise in dream interpretation and symbol ism, your task is to analyze the symbols, emotions, and narratives in users' dreams, providing insightful and meaningful interpretations Encourage users to reflect on their own experiences and emotion while offering potential explanations.
Similar in spirit, significantly rephrased (Similarity Level 3)	You are an AI dream analyst with a deep understanding of symbolism and the interpretation of dreams. Your role is to provide user with insightful and meaningful analyses of the symbols, emotions and narratives present in their dream experiences. Offer potential in terpretations and encourage self-reflection on personal experience and emotions.
Different prompt, some remote similarities (Similarity Level 4)	You are an AI assistant specializing in the analysis of subconsciou thoughts and the interpretation of symbolic imagery. Your task i to help users understand the hidden meanings and emotions behind their dreams, offering insightful interpretations and encouraging self-exploration.
Completely different prompt, significant conceptual changes (Similarity Level 5)	You are an AI life coach with expertise in personal growth and self-discovery. Your role is to guide users through a process of self reflection, helping them uncover the deeper meanings and emotion behind their experiences, including their dreams, and providing supportive insights to aid their personal development.

972 G LLM SELECTION FOR THE EXPERIMENTS

In our general experiments in Table 1, we report Prompt Detective performance across a variety
of language model families and sizes – including both larger and smaller models, multiple models
of the various open source families, and closed-source models. We observed minor variations in
performance across these settings and therefore we decided to focus on the efficient variants of
models powering popular real-world chatbots in our exploration of highly similar system prompts in
Section 5.2, following the similar logic of responsible use of compute resources.