# Boosting Large Language Model Reasoning with Theorem Proving

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#### Abstract

 Large Language Models (LLMs) frequently face challenges with complex reasoning tasks. 003 A recent structured AI methodology ad- dresses this by distinctly dividing tasks into symbolic formalization, managed by LLMs, and problem-solving, conducted by symbolic solvers. While solvers like SymPy and Pyke prevent hallucinations, they often struggle with advanced reasoning tasks. This study addresses their limitations by leveraging the extensive rea- soning data in Lean, a programming language for theorem proving. Training a custom model using Lean's rich theorem proving data greatly enhances our model's reasoning capacity, al- lowing it to outperform traditional solvers. We achieve state-of-the-art result on FOLIO, a log- ical reasoning dataset, indicating the potential of our method for natural language reasoning.[1](#page-0-0)

#### **<sup>019</sup>** 1 Introduction

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 Reasoning, a bedrock of intelligence and a core capability of humans, has long been a challeng- ing issue for machine learning systems, even for the latest, powerful large language models (LLMs). LLMs, despite their impressive abilities to under- stand and generate natural language, often fall short when dealing with complex reasoning tasks. They frequently suffer from "hallucinations", wherein the model makes statements or predictions not grounded in its inputs, leading to spurious results [\(Saparov and He,](#page-10-0) [2023;](#page-10-0) [Dasgupta et al.,](#page-9-0) [2022\)](#page-9-0).

 Recent advances in AI have adopted a structured approach to tackling reasoning problems by split- ting them into symbolic formalization and problem- solving phases [\(He-Yueya et al.,](#page-9-1) [2023;](#page-9-1) [Pan et al.,](#page-9-2) [2023;](#page-9-2) [Ye et al.,](#page-10-1) [2023\)](#page-10-1). The formalization step is often handled by a large language model (LLM), while problem-solving is tackled by an out-of-the- box solver. In this approach, symbolic reasoning essentially acts as a rigorous checkpoint, ensuring

that the model outputs align with logical and factual **040** standards, thereby mitigating the issue of halluci- **041** nation. Here, solvers may range from being com- **042** pletely deterministic, like SymPy [\(He-Yueya et al.,](#page-9-1) **043** [2023\)](#page-9-1), or rely on a combination of heuristics and **044** basic machine learning techniques, as is the case **045** with Pyke [\(Pan et al.,](#page-9-2) [2023\)](#page-9-2) and Z3 [\(Ye et al.,](#page-10-1) [2023;](#page-10-1) **046** [de Moura and Bjørner,](#page-9-3) [2008\)](#page-9-3). While this approach **047** successfully addresses hallucinations, it still strug- **048** gles with more complex problems. The limitation **049** mainly lies in the capabilities of the solvers themselves; they lack the ability to extract and use the **051** vast wealth of reasoning data and information avail- **052** able in large language resources as LLMs do. This **053** absence of information integration leaves them un- **054** derpowered when dealing with intricate reasoning **055** tasks. **056**

Serving as a powerful theorem prover and a **057** [v](#page-9-4)ersatile programming language, Lean [\(de Moura](#page-9-4) **058** [et al.,](#page-9-4) [2015\)](#page-9-4) presents a compelling solution to con- **059** nect symbolic reasoning with extensive linguistic **060** resources. Much like symbolic solvers, Lean has a **061** strict check system, ensuring each reasoning step is **062** certified. Every day, a substantial amount of code **063** is written in Lean, capturing reasoning "nuggets" **064** with step-by-step rationals that are useful for training LLMs. A few recent studies have already **066** tapped into Lean for automatic theorem proving **067** [t](#page-9-7)asks [\(Polu et al.,](#page-9-5) [2023;](#page-9-5) [Han et al.,](#page-9-6) [2022a;](#page-9-6) [Lam-](#page-9-7) **068** [ple et al.,](#page-9-7) [2022\)](#page-9-7), showing its potential in tackling **069** difficult reasoning challenges.  $070$ 

In this paper, we develop a Lean-based frame- **071** work to tackle natural language reasoning with **072** datasets such as ProofWriter [\(Tafjord et al.,](#page-10-2) [2021\)](#page-10-2) **073** and FOLIO [\(Han et al.,](#page-9-8) [2022b\)](#page-9-8). We use LLMs **074** to formalize these datasets into Lean's formalized **075** language, and fine-tune a custom model on these  $076$ problems using a modest amount of data we col- **077** lected ourselves. Our contributions in this paper **078** are twofold. **079**

• We show that incorporating theorem proving data **080**

<span id="page-0-0"></span> $1$ Our code and data will be released upon publication.

 in training a custom model achieves competitive performance with substantially less training data. This strategy outperforms conventional out-of- the-box solvers, especially when tackling more complex problems. The model also obtained state-of-the-art results on FOLIO.

 • We make available the training data gathered in this study, which includes 100 fully veri- fied formalization of natural language reasoning problems from ProofWriter to Lean, as well as 27 similar translations from FOLIO. Addition- ally, we are releasing the corresponding theorem proofs for these problems.

#### **<sup>094</sup>** 2 Problem Definition and Notation

 The underlying task we aim to solve is providing an answer to a natural query, where background natural language context is given, such that it would be possible to logically deduce the answer to the query based on the context. This task, referred to as *natural language reasoning*, along with our solution to it, consists of the following components:

- **102** Context, which represents natural language ut-**103** terances, composing a set of rules and facts. For **104** example: *Hudson is a cat*, *all cats are animals*, **105** and *cats often meow*.
- **106** Question, which denotes the posed question. For **107** example, *Does Hudson often meow?*
- **108** Options is an available set of answers (discrete **109** categories) from which an answer can be chosen. **110** For example, *True*, *False* or *Unknown*.
- **111 Formalized context** is the formalization of the **112** context in the underlying logical language, in our **113** case, in Lean. For example, the formalized con-**114** text for our example would be: *axiom A1 is\_cat* **115** *Hudson, axiom A2*  $\forall x$ *, is\_cat*  $x \rightarrow$  *is\_animal*  $x$ **116** and *axiom A3*  $\forall x$ , *is\_cat*  $x \rightarrow$  *often\_meow* x.

 **Formalized question:** Given that Lean operates as a theorem prover, questions are transformed into dual theorems: one asserting the positive stance and the other negating it. For the given ex- ample, the formalized questions would be: *Theo- rem hudson\_often\_meows: often\_meow Hudson* and *Theorem not\_hudson\_often\_meows:* ¬ *of-ten\_meow Hudson*.

 • Goal: In the Lean theorem proving context, a "goal" is a logical statement that needs to be proven true, given a set of axioms and rules. When we set out to answer a question using the

Lean prover, this question (or its formalized rep- **129** resentation) becomes our root goal. As we apply **130** various Tactics to simplify or break down this **131** primary goal, we generate intermediate goals. **132** These intermediate goals can be thought of as **133** subproblems or sub-questions derived from the 134 primary question. The proof process in Lean is **135** essentially a journey from the root goal through **136** a series of intermediate goals until we reach a **137** point where all goals have been resolved based **138** on our axioms and rules. **139**

For instance, using our earlier examples, 140 if the root goal is proving *Theorem hud-* **141** *son\_often\_meows: often\_meow Hudson*, an in- **142** termediate goal might be proving that *Hudson is* **143** *a cat*. As we apply Tactics, we aim to resolve **144** each intermediate goal using our provided con- **145** text, gradually working our way towards proving **146** the root goal. Once all intermediate goals are ad- **147** dressed, we have effectively proven our root goal, **148** and the proof search concludes successfully. **149**

• Tactics are instructions in the Lean theorem **150** prover language used to manipulate goals to ob- **151** tain a proof for a given goal. For example, *apply* **152** *A3 Hudson* is a tactic that uses modus ponens on **153** the Goal *often\_meow Hudson* and transforms it **154** to a new Goal *is\_cat Hudson* **155**

A diagram of these components and the relations **156** between them is depicted in Figure [1.](#page-2-0) This proce- **157** dure is framed within the language of the Lean **158** theorem prover as a goal-satisfying process. **159**

The environment we use for theorem proving **160** is Lean.[2](#page-1-0) Lean is an open source theorem prov- **<sup>161</sup>** ing programming language, originally developed **162** for mathematical theorem proving, with a vibrant **163** community support. Its current base includes over **164** 100,000 theorems and 1,000,0000 lines of code.[3](#page-1-1) Lean can also be used as a generic theorem prover, **166** not necessarily in the area of mathematics. This is **167** the way we use it for our case. **168**

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#### 3 Methodology **<sup>169</sup>**

Our methodology is composed of four main com- **170** ponents: a *formalizer*, a *tactic generator*, a *proof* **171** *search* mechanism, and a *result interpreter*. The **172** formalizer converts context and question to formal- **173** ized context and formalized question. The tactic **174**

<span id="page-1-1"></span><span id="page-1-0"></span><sup>2</sup><https://leanprover.github.io/>.

<sup>3</sup>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lean\\_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lean_(proof_assistant)) [\(proof\\_assistant\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lean_(proof_assistant)).

<span id="page-2-0"></span>

Figure 1: An overview of our approach: The natural language context is first processed by the "formalizer". It then advances to the proof search stage, where all the orange tactics are generated by the "tactic generator". Finally, the outcome is interpreted by the "result interpreter".

 generator then generates tactics based on premises extracted from the formalized context. The proof search mechanism oversees tactic execution and goal expansion. Lastly, the result interpreter anal- yses the output of the proof search and identifies the correct answer in options. In this section, we provide detailed explanations of each component.

#### **182** 3.1 Formalizer

 In this process of formalization, we used the Ope- nAI models text-davinci-003 (GPT-3) and GPT-4 [\(OpenAI,](#page-9-9) [2023\)](#page-9-9). For text-davinci-003, we followed [t](#page-9-2)he same prompting approach as Logic-LM [\(Pan](#page-9-2) [et al.,](#page-9-2) [2023\)](#page-9-2) to separate the task specification and problems, thereby enabling the model to continue with the task of formalization through next-token- prediction. For GPT-4, we used similar prompts, but included the task specification in the system **192** prompt.

 There is no definitive way to assert that a formal- ized result is correct since there is no deterministic Automated Theorem Prover (ATP) that can confirm the accuracy of formalization. However, the syntax of the formalized result can be checked, as correct syntax is a prerequisite for downstream theorem proving. If an error is encountered during compi- lation, we provide the error message generated by Lean along with the faulty formalization and ask the formalizer to reformulate the result. We further conduct manual inspections of the formalizer in [§5.](#page-4-0) We note that we take a strict approach, and if the

formalizer fails more than once, then the example **205** is counted as not being correctly solved. **206**

#### 3.2 Tactic Generator **207**

The model we used for tactic generation is Re- **208** Prover [\(Yang et al.,](#page-10-3) [2023\)](#page-10-3). This model employs 209 retrieval mechanisms to explicitly select premises. **210** When provided with the current state of proof, this 211 generator retrieves a selected set of potentially use- **212** ful premises from formalized context and gener- **213** ates tactic using both the goal and the retrieved **214** premises. **215**

The premise retrieval component of our process **216** draws from the Dense Passage Retriever (DPR) **217** [\(Karpukhin et al.,](#page-9-10) [2020\)](#page-9-10). Provided with a goal  $q = 218$ as the query and a set of candidate premises P, it **219** generates a ranked list of m premises from P. In **220** DPR, both q and P are treated as raw texts that are 221 embedded in a vector space. We then retrieve the **222** top m premises that maximize the cosine similarity **223** between the state and the premise. **224**

The division of the problem-solving task into **225** premise selection and tactic generation simplifies **226** the process and facilitates easier troubleshooting. **227** It isolates the source of potential issues, be it in **228** the premise selection or the tactic generation, thus **229** reducing the complexity of the problem. This divi- **230** sion of duties also lightens the load for the tactic **231** generator by allowing it to concentrate solely on **232** its specific role, rather than grappling with the en- **233** tirety of the problem. An added advantage of this **234**

**235** approach is that it makes the system's reasoning **236** steps more transparent and understandable.

 As a baseline, we also prompt GPT-4 to generate proofs. When the answer aligns with the chosen theorem (say the chosen theorem is the positive stance of the question and the answer is YES), we present GPT-4 with the correct proof as part of the prompt. Conversely, if the answer does not align with the chosen option, signifying that the formalized theorem is unprovable, we still encour- age the model to engage in step-by-step reasoning, even though it will eventually hit a roadblock. In instances where the answer is UNKNOWN, imply- ing that neither option can be proven, we provide step-by-step reasoning prompts for each option, ac- knowledging that the process will not result in a definitive answer. An example of the prompt to GPT-4 can be found in Appendix [A.1.](#page-10-4)

#### **253** 3.3 Proof Search

 Different from the tactic generator module that gen- erates tactics, the proof search module controls the overall search process that selects tactics and main- tains states during proof construction. LeanDoJo [\(Yang et al.,](#page-10-3) [2023\)](#page-10-3), a recently released framework that enables interaction with Lean programmati- cally, provides the mechanism to check the validity of tactics and execute tactics.

 The search method involves building a proof tree, which incrementally evolves the goal through tac- tic invocations. This approach was first introduced [i](#page-10-3)n [\(Polu and Sutskever,](#page-10-5) [2020\)](#page-10-5). LeanDoJo [\(Yang](#page-10-3) [et al.,](#page-10-3) [2023\)](#page-10-3) subsequently provided an implemen- tation of this method, which we utilized for our study. As a reference, the middle part of Figure [1](#page-2-0) provides a practical illustration of this process. For each given proof goal, we explore 64 possible tac- tics, commencing from the root goal. All goals are maintained in a priority queue and are expanded based on cumulative log probabilities of the goal, defined as the summation of the log probabilities of the tactics that brought us to the goal from the root. This implies that we tend to expand those goals where our generative model has the highest global confidence. The resulting tendency is to- wards breadth-first exploration, as goals at greater depths have more parent tactics and hence a typ- ically higher cumulative log probability. During the search process, there are no restrictions on the length of the priority queue.

**284** To enhance search efficiency and circumvent po-

tential loops, we have incorporated a mechanism **285** that stops the expansion of a node  $N$  if we have  $286$ already explored another node M with a state se- **287** quence that prefixes N. Essentially, if a current **288** goal or state being explored is a superset (or con- **289** tains all the elements) of a previously explored goal, **290** the current goal is not further expanded. This is **291** based on the observation that if we have already **292** assessed the potential paths and outcomes for a **293** specific goal, then exploring a more generalized **294** version of the same goal is redundant. Such a **295** mechanism avoids unnecessary repetitions, thereby **296** streamlining the search process and improving **297** overall efficiency. Moreover, we define a valid **298** proof as one that is devoid of "cheating" keywords **299** (such as "sorry") that tell Lean to assume that the **300** current goal is completed, even though it hasn't **301** been proven, meaning that every path containing **302** "cheating" keywords is disregarded. **303**

Errors in the search process typically manifest in **304** two ways: a timeout or the exhaustion of nodes to **305** search. We have allocated a three-minute window **306** for each search, which is usually sufficient. We **307** provided more analysis of the errors made by tactic **308** generator in the experiment section. **309**

#### 3.4 Interpreting Results **310**

For options that include "Unknown", we only re- **311** gard the result as correct if no other options can be **312** proven. All datasets investigated in this study have **313** questions with only one correct option among the **314** choices. Consequently, if the proof system verifies **315** more than one option, the response is immediately 316 marked as incorrect. **317** 

#### 4 Experimental Setup **<sup>318</sup>**

We now describe our experimental setup: the  $319$ datasets we used, our model training and our base- **320 lines.** 321

#### 4.1 Datasets **322**

In our evaluation, we use as a testbed two common **323** logical reasoning datasets: **324**

ProofWriter: This deductive logical reasoning **325** dataset presents problems in an intuitive language **326** form. We incorporated the Open-World Assump- **327** tion (OWA) subset as per [\(Pan et al.,](#page-9-2) [2023\)](#page-9-2), where **328** each instance is characterized by a (problem, goal) **329** pairing, and labels can be categorized as TRUE, **330** FALSE, or UNKNOWN. It encompasses five seg- 331 ments based on the required reasoning depth: 0,  $332$ 

 $\leq 1, \leq 2, \leq 3, \text{ and } \leq 5 \text{ hops.}$  Our focus is the depth-5 subset, which is the most challenging one. To get a fair comparison against Logic-LM, we used the same 600 sample tests, ensuring an even label distribution.

 FOLIO: Unlike ProofWriter, FOLIO is con- structed using intricate first-order logic, increas- ing the complexity of the proving part. Beyond just the logic, the formalization for FOLIO is also challenging. The dataset presents problems in a more natural and intricate wording, with relation- ships that are considerably more complex. Such a combination of advanced logic and rich linguistic structure renders the formalization task in FOLIO substantially tougher than in ProofWriter. For our analysis, we turned to the entire FOLIO test set, encompassing 204 examples.

#### **350** 4.2 Model Training

 Regarding the data for model training, we collected 100 theorem proofs for ProofWriter, where each problem's proof was either manually annotated or collected from successful proofs generated by GPT- 4. A similar approach was employed with FOLIO, albeit with 27 theorems. The data collection took about two days.

 The pre-training model structure we adopted was the same as used in the ReProver paper, namely Google's Byte-T5 [\(Xue et al.,](#page-10-6) [2022\)](#page-10-6). We also ex- perimented with the pre-trained ReProver from Le- anDoJo [\(Yang et al.,](#page-10-3) [2023\)](#page-10-3), which was pre-trained on mathlib 3. The fine-tuning on our collected data took about six hours on one A100 40G.

### **365** 4.3 Baselines

 For all of our experiments, we tested reasoning ability against textual input to GPT-4. When bench- marking against GPT-4 for all datasets, we strived to leverage prompts from previous work to the greatest extent possible. Our principal focus was GPT-4's chain-of-thought (CoT) output.

 For our own formalization, we use three exam- ples as prompts for both ProofWriter and FOLIO. Because FOLIO uses the same context for different questions, we use a multi-question-style prompt for FOLIO where each prompt contains multiple ques-tions, an example can be found in Appendix [A.2.](#page-11-0)

 For ProofWriter and FOLIO, we also compared our results against Logic-LM [\(Pan et al.,](#page-9-2) [2023\)](#page-9-2). Given that Z3 can also be used within Lean for problem-solving, we also employed Z3 on our for-[m](#page-9-11)alized context using lean-smt package [\(Mohamed](#page-9-11) [et al.,](#page-9-11) [2022\)](#page-9-11), which servers as a comparison against **383** SATLM [\(Ye et al.,](#page-10-1) [2023\)](#page-10-1). In addition, our findings **384** were compared with other benchmark on these two **385** datasets. **386** 

# <span id="page-4-0"></span>5 Results **<sup>387</sup>**

We describe the results of our experiments: an **388** analysis of the formalization module, a description **389** of how to improve the tactic generator module and **390** a comparison of our work against the baselines. **391**

### <span id="page-4-1"></span>5.1 Analysis of Formalization **392**

To discern whether errors arise during the formal- **393** ization or proving stages, and to pinpoint the exact **394** mistakes in the formalization process, we prompted **395** the LLM to formalize a selection of 100 questions **396** from ProofWriter's validation set and 40 questions **397** from FOLIO's training set and manually examined **398** them. These findings can be viewed in Table [1.](#page-5-0) **399** Only those formalizations that correctly captured **400** every fact, axiom, and rule were counted as accu- **401** rate. The striking accuracy on ProofWriter can be **402** attributed to its simpler language structure com- **403** pared to FOLIO. In the case of FOLIO, using a **404** large language model for formalization helped in **405** filtering out unnecessary details from the natural **406** language context, making it easier to understand **407** the essence of the problem and do reasoning. We **408** have illustrated typical GPT-4 formalization mis- **409** takes in [B,](#page-12-0) using a composite sample derived from **410** various error instances. Interestingly, Lean's for- **411** malization accuracy aligns closely with both Prolog **412** and FOL in Logic-LM. This consistency under- **413** scores Lean's versatility, allowing it to uniformly **414** represent both problem types. **415**

We observed improved results when formalized **416** code was paired with descriptive textual comments **417** sourced from the context. This approach split the **418** formalization task into two: 1) linking textual input **419** with formalized code and 2) generating formalized 420 code based on the prior textual comment. These **421** textual cues acted as a bridge between raw text and **422** formalized code, aiding the underlying computa- **423** tion processes. **424**

It is important to highlight that the compilation **425** errors in the formalized Lean code were straight- **426** forward to correct. When issues arise during the **427** Lean building process, we present the error mes- **428** sage and the original formalized Lean code to LLM **429** for re-formalization. If the subsequent attempt is **430** unsuccessful, we simply categorize it as incorrect. **431**

<span id="page-5-0"></span>

Model		<b>ProofWriter</b>		<b>FOLIO</b>		
	<b>Formalize</b>	<b>Prove</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Formalize</b>	<b>Prove</b>	<b>Total</b>
GPT-4 Base	94%	15%	80%	60%	10%	35%
<b>GPT-4 Base Comments</b>	99%	$\overline{\phantom{a}}$	80%	75%	Ξ.	35%
GPT-4 Base Separate		5%	75%	$\qquad \qquad$	10%	40%
<b>GPT-3 Base Comments</b>	$77\%$	12%	63%	45%	10%	35%
Logic-LM	98%	$75.5\%$	74%	65%	69.2%	55%

Table 1: Formalization, Proof, and Total accuracies for ProofWriter and FOLIO using the OpenAI language model API. 'Base Comments' provide annotations before each line of formalized code. In 'Base Separate', formalization and proof are segmented into two distinct prompts, reducing the workload on the LLM. For Logic-LM, proof accuracy is determined from correctly formalized problems, while total accuracy is calculated on all problems. For simplicity, we did not use the self-refinement technique when evaluating Logic-LM

 The distinction in performance between GPT-3 and GPT-4 is evident. While the formalization for simple concepts is the same, GPT-3 struggles with intricate logic, highlighting its limitations. As such, we opted not to use GPT-3 in further tests.

 The proof accuracy section of the table is deter- mined by whether the generated proof can compile successfully in Lean. If the formalization of ques- tion to theorem is correct and the proof can be com- piled without any error or warning, then we can be confident that the proof is valid. However, the accuracy of generated proof is very low. This could be due to overloading large language model with tasks, making it difficult to complete both on a sin- gle prompt. We attempted to separate formalization and proof, but the outcome remained disappointing, indicating GPT-3 and GPT-4's inability to perform proving tasks. Interestingly, the proof accuracy of Logic-LM wasn't as high as we expected. Upon replicating their code, we found the chosen solver Pyke to be suboptimal, struggling to identify an answer when multiple search paths are available and some could result in loops.

 Despite the inaccuracies in most of GPT-4's proofs, it achieved a high accuracy rate for final choices on ProofWriter (as shown in Total column). We believe this may be due to GPT-4's training exposure to it, potentially leading to a degree of memorization.

#### **461** 5.2 Enhanced Proving

 In this section, we focus on training custom Re- Prover models to do tactic generation using our annotated training data. To isolate the impact of the tactic generator, we used all the accurate formal- izations from the previous subsection. This gave us 99 test examples for ProofWriter and 14 for FOLIO. Furthermore, we annotated an additional 100 fully correct samples from the ProofWriter training set **469** and 27 from the FOLIO training set. All findings **470** are detailed in Table [2.](#page-6-0) **471**

We first compare the results on premise selec- **472** tion, using the metrics recall@1 and recall@4.The **473** recall@k metric is defined by the ratio of ground **474** truth premises intersecting with the top predicted **475** premises to the total number of correct premises, **476** represented as: **477**

$$
recall@k = \frac{|GT\_ Prem \cap Pred\_ Prem[0:k]|}{|GT\_ Prem|}.
$$

. **478**

It is clear that relying on ReProver trained solely **479** with math data yielded suboptimal results. This 480 can be attributed to the limited set of tactics avail- **481** able for both ProofWriter and FOLIO. While these **482** datasets have a confined tactic range, the model **483** frequently makes mistakes by attempting to use **484** other, unrelated tactics. The ReProver fine-tuning **485** outperformed T5 fine-tuning in terms of overall **486** results. Furthermore, the accuracy for FOLIO were **487** noticeably poorer than those for ProofWriter. This **488** disparity is likely due to FOLIO's intricate logic **489** and its need for a broader array of first-order-logic **490** tactics such as cases, have, and contradiction. In **491** contrast, ProofWriter primarily employs tactics like **492** apply, exact, and split. **493**

We proceeded to evaluate the overall proof **494** results. Consistently, the ReProver fine-tuning **495** model trained on math theorem proving data out- **496** performed other approaches for both ProofWriter **497** and FOLIO datasets. This advantage can be at- **498** tributed to the limited data available for fine-tuning **499** our tactic generator, thus highlighting the bene- **500** fits of our approach. While the premise selector **501** benefits from distinct cues and a limited range of **502** choices, the realm of tactic generation is much **503** broader. This vastness of options renders the Re- **504**

<span id="page-6-0"></span>

	<b>ProofWriter</b>			<b>FOLIO</b>		
Model	<b>Premise Selection</b>		<b>Proof</b>	<b>Premise Selection</b>		<b>Proof</b>
	Rec@1	Rec@4	Acc	Rec@1	Rec@4	Acc
GPT-4 baseline		N/A	15%		N/A	10%
ReProver baseline	56 2%	813%	$0\%$	23.5%	38.2%	$0\%$
T5 fine-tuned	$62.5\%$	$100\%$	99%	54.8%	$95.2\%$	71.4%
ReProver fine-tuned	75%	$100\%$	99%	$71.4\%$	$96.8\%$	$85.7\%$

Table 2: Recall@k for premise selection and overall proof accuracy across various tactic generator, encompassing the entire process from premise selection to tactic generation and proof search. We did not compute the Premise Selection accuracy for the GPT-4 baseline because prompting GPT-4 to select premises using Lean goals is challenging and is a primary concern in this context

<span id="page-6-1"></span>

<b>Method</b>	Acc.	
Abs Biases (Gontier et al., 2022)	80.6%	
MetaInduce (Yang et al., 2022)	98.6%	
RECKONING (Chen et al., 2023b)	99.8%	
GPT-4 CoT (Pan et al., 2023)	68.1%	
Logic-LM (Pan et al., 2023)	79.3%	
T5 fine-tuned	95.8%	
ReProver fine-tuned	98.3%	

Table 3: Accuracy with different methods on ProofWriter. Abs Biases stands for Abstraction Inductive Biases

<span id="page-6-2"></span>

Table 4: Accuracy comparisons across different methods for the FOLIO dataset. The Codex baseline employs an 8-shot prompt. The result from 'Lean Z3' is derived from lean-smt applied to formalized Lean Code

 Prover baseline's proof accuracy nearly negligible. But other than that, there is a strong correlation between premise selection accuracy and overall proof accuracy. While the benefits of a pre-trained ReProver baseline may not be as noticeable for sim- pler datasets like ProofWriter, its value becomes evident for more complex datasets, such as FOLIO.

# **512** 5.3 Comparing Against Other Baselines

**513** Having demonstrated that fine-tuning on pre-**514** trained math theorem models yields superior per-**515** formance, we proceed to benchmark our results

against established baselines for both ProofWriter **516** and FOLIO. The evaluation uses the same set of **517** 600 problems from the ProofWriter paper, in addi- **518** tion to the entire FOLIO test set. Given the smaller **519** test set used in the preceding section, it is of inter- **520** est to also compare our approach with the model **521** not pre-trained on theorem proving data on this **522** larger set. Subsequently, we conduct an analysis of **523** the errors made by the tactic generator in both the **524** FOLIO and ProofWriter, exploring the reason our **525** approach outperforms others. **526**

As illustrated in Table [3,](#page-6-1) our approach yields re- **527** sults comparable to state-of-the-art methods for the **528** ProofWriter dataset. While other methods except **529** Logic-LM use the entire training set of ProofWriter, **530** our approach relies on just 100 examples, under- **531** scoring the efficiency of our method. **532**

Table [4](#page-6-2) presents our performance on the FOLIO **533** dataset. For a balanced comparison with SATLM, **534** which utilizes the Z3 solver, we used the lean-smt tool [4](#page-6-3) on our formalized Lean code. This tool pro- **<sup>536</sup>** duces outcomes in the form of "sat/unsat". In Z3, **537** "sat" stands for "satisfiable." When Z3 returns "sat" **538** as the result, it means that there exists an assign- **539** ment (a set of variable values) that makes the theo- **540** rem true, which basically means the answer to the **541** original question is True. "unsat" Stands for "unsat- **542** isfiable". When Z3 returns "unsat", it means that **543** there is no possible assignment that can make the **544** formula true. In other words, the formula is inher- **545** ently contradictory and cannot be satisfied under **546** any circumstance. We interpret these results sim- **547** ilarly to "found a proof/didn't find a proof" using **548** our result interpreter. It's worth noting that there **549** can be instances where a problem is inaccurately **550** formalized because the formalization accuracy on **551** FOLIO is lower than on ProofWriter. If the answer **552**

<span id="page-6-3"></span><sup>4</sup> https://github.com/ufmg-smite/lean-smt

 to the problem being formalized is unknown, this can inadvertently skew the model's performance, making it seem better than it truly is becasue our model can't prove neither the positive stance nor the negative stance of the problem. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, our approach sets a new benchmark on the FOLIO dataset.

 There are two types of error that occur during our proving process: timeout errors and running out of goals errors. The former arises when the time set for tactic generation and proof search is exhausted, while the latter occurs when generated tactics have errors, either due to syntactic invalidity or inability to be executed given the current goal, making them unprocessable by LeanDoJo. The likelihood of each error type can be influenced by the chosen beam size during the proof search. Our current approach utilizes a beam size of 64, meaning we generate 64 tactics for every goal we come across. At present, 81.8% of the errors from the ReProver fine-tuned model and 85.5% from the T5 fine-tuned model stem from timeouts. While a thorough inspection of every out-of-nodes error hasn't been conducted, a significant portion seems to arise from incorrect formalization.

# **<sup>578</sup>** 6 Related Work

 [S](#page-9-15)everal past studies [\(Chen,](#page-9-14) [2023;](#page-9-14) [Creswell and](#page-9-15) [Shanahan,](#page-9-15) [2022;](#page-9-15) [Chen et al.,](#page-9-13) [2023b\)](#page-9-13) used neuro- symbolic methods to augment neural networks with symbolic reasoning. Many of these approaches grapple with constraints like the necessity for cus- tom or specialized module designs that lack broad [a](#page-10-1)pplicability. Recent work [\(Pan et al.,](#page-9-2) [2023;](#page-9-2) [Ye](#page-10-1) [et al.,](#page-10-1) [2023;](#page-10-1) [Poesia et al.,](#page-9-16) [2023\)](#page-9-16) presents an adapt- able framework that melds contemporary LLMs with symbolic logic, bypassing the need to train or craft intricate modules tailored for specific prob- lems. While our research aligns with these, we do not exclusively rely on ready-made solvers.

 A common method to boost the reasoning skills of Large Language Models (LLMs) is by training them on data that requires some form of inference. As noted by [\(Lewkowycz et al.,](#page-9-17) [2022\)](#page-9-17), LLMs that are trained on data filled with science and math data do better on tasks that require reasoning, especially [w](#page-9-18)hen using CoT prompting. Other work [\(Fu and](#page-9-18) [Khot,](#page-9-18) [2022;](#page-9-18) [Fu et al.,](#page-9-19) [2023\)](#page-9-19) suggests that LLMs get their advanced reasoning capabilities from being trained on code. This work is a natural extension of this idea to theorem proving data.

LLMs' intersection with theorem proving has re- **603** cently become an important topic in NLP. Although **604** some studies delve into various theorem provers **605** [\(Polu and Sutskever,](#page-10-5) [2020;](#page-10-5) [Jiang et al.,](#page-9-20) [2023\)](#page-9-20), a **606** consistent focus has been observed around Lean. **607** A distinct advantage of Lean is its array of open- **608** source tools [\(Yang et al.,](#page-10-3) [2023\)](#page-10-3) which simplify data **609** collection and enable easy interaction with external **610** tools. Predominant research on theorem proving **611** with Lean encompasses strategies such as harness- **612** ing intricate proving artifact as seen in [\(Han et al.,](#page-9-6) **613** [2022a\)](#page-9-6), resorting to curriculum learning [\(Polu et al.,](#page-9-5) **614** [2023\)](#page-9-5) which capitalizes on theorem provers' ability **615** to verify proofs to generate more training data, and **616** high-level planning reminiscent of the tactics used **617** by AlphaGo as detailed by [Lample et al.](#page-9-7) [\(2022\)](#page-9-7). **618** For future work, we posit that these methodolo- 619 gies could potentially be repurposed for natural **620** language reasoning. 621

# 7 Conclusion **<sup>622</sup>**

We augmented LLMs with reasoning capabilities **623** by integrating into them Lean, a theorem proving **624** programming language, originally developed for **625** mathematical theorem proving. We examined the **626** source of errors from the formalization of natural **627** language and from proving based on such formal- **628** ization. We also examined the performance en- **629** hancements from pretraining on theorem proving **630** data, and offered a comprehensive comparison with **631** other techniques that highlights our model's supe- **632** rior strengths. Our results underscore the potential **633** of integrating theorem proving frameworks with **634** LLMs in advancing natural language reasoning. **635**

Looking ahead, we aim to improve our method's **636** ability to capture complex real-world situations, es- **637** pecially those filled with commonsense that's hard **638** to express as symbols. One way to attack this prob- **639** lem might be to separate general knowledge repre- **640** sentation from logical reasoning. Furthermore, in 641 future work we would like to devise better ways to **642** exploit the reasoning abilities inherent in theorem **643** proving data. This will allow us to solve reasoning **644** tasks more effectively, given that this is a unique **645** resource that involves step-by-step logic and rea- **646** soning with a well-defined method of verifying the **647** correctness of an answer. **648**

# **<sup>649</sup>** Limitations

 Despite our promising results, our method encoun- ters limitations when dealing with problems that involve commonsense and factual reasoning. In these cases, it is challenging to retrieve all the necessary information and accurately represent it in Lean's formal language. Consider the MMLU [\(Hendrycks et al.,](#page-9-21) [2020\)](#page-9-21) and SummEdits [\(Laban](#page-9-22) [et al.,](#page-9-22) [2023\)](#page-9-22) datasets as examples. MMLU requires the model to possess extensive world knowledge and problem-solving abilities, while SummEdits involves determining consistency in summaries of different edits. In both instances, the ability to represent the complexity and nuance of real-world knowledge in Lean is severely limited. Further complications arise when dealing with math word problems [\(Cobbe et al.,](#page-9-23) [2021\)](#page-9-23) and similar tasks [\(Hendrycks et al.,](#page-9-24) [2021\)](#page-9-24), where the goal is to de- rive a numeric solution rather than a proof. The theorem proving approach, while effective for cer- tifying the validity of logical reasoning, does not directly yield a numerical answer, limiting its util- ity in these scenarios. Lastly, our method grap- ples with problems found in more complicated [t](#page-9-25)heorem proving datasets like TheoremQA [\(Chen](#page-9-25) [et al.,](#page-9-25) [2023a\)](#page-9-25). These problems require advanced understanding of natural language, alongside the ability to formalize complex theorems into Lean. Our current framework struggles with this level of complexity, underscoring the need for more so- phisticated formalization techniques and a deeper integration between language understanding and theorem proving.

 Even in the context of symbolic problems, there are challenges. For instance, consider a problem from the LogicalDeduction task of the BigBench dataset [\(Srivastava et al.,](#page-10-8) [2022\)](#page-10-8), involving the ar- rangement of three books on a shelf: a black book, an orange book, and a blue book. The problem states that the blue book is to the right of the or- ange book, and the orange book is to the right of the black book. The question is to confirm whether the black book is the leftmost. Although this problem appears straightforward, employing Lean to solve it is neither the most practical nor the most efficient approach. Lean, as a theorem prover, is excellent in abstract reasoning and proof construction, but when faced with tasks involving constraints and variable possibilities, it falls short. In this particular prob- lem, using Lean would require us to formalize the concepts of ordering and relative positioning. Even

after doing so, generating a proof would necessitate **700** significant manual labor and wouldn't necessarily  $\frac{701}{201}$ yield a readily interpretable answer. In contrast, **702** a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) solver, **703** which is specifically designed to handle such prob-  $704$ lems, can effectively manage constraints like the **705** relative order of books and generate potential solu- **706** tions efficiently. **707** 

### Ethical Considerations **<sup>708</sup>**

Incorporating Lean's theorem proving capabilities **709** into Large Language Models (LLMs) represents **710** a significant stride forward in the AI reasoning **711** domain. Our method has not only shown a remark- **712** able improvement in handling complex reasoning **713** tasks but also offers a layer of mathematical rigor **714** that bolsters the reliability of conclusions derived. **715** However, as we elevate the reasoning prowess of **716** LLMs, there's an amplified potential for embedded **717** biases within the training data to manifest and mag- **718** nify. Especially in reasoning scenarios, this can **719** inadvertently lead to skewed logic or unintended **720** favoritism in areas of utmost sensitivity such as **721** medical diagnoses or legal interpretations. While **722** our method's foundation in Lean's theorem prov- **723** ing data acts as a rigorous check, complete reliance **724** on it is not foolproof. A proactive approach in re- **725** viewing both training data and model outcomes is **726** essential to uphold unbiased reasoning. **727**

Our integration of Lean provides LLMs with **728** the unique advantage of elucidating detailed logi- **729** cal pathways, reinforcing the transparency of our **730** reasoning process. By tracing reasoning step by **731** step, it not only bolsters confidence in the derived **732** conclusions but also enhances the explainability of **733** these systems. Such transparency is vital in foster- **734** ing trust, especially when these models are used in **735** pivotal decision-making processes. This robustness **736** coupled with the broader societal implications of **737** advanced reasoning in LLMs underscores the ne- **738** cessity for ongoing ethical reflection and proactive **739** measures to address potential challenges. **740**

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# A Prompts for Formalization **<sup>880</sup>**

#### <span id="page-10-4"></span>A.1 Prompts for ProofWriter **881**

In subsection [5.1,](#page-4-1) we discussed various formaliza- **882** tion approaches. In this section, we present the **883** results using the GPT-4 Base Comments method **884** on ProofWriter when the answer is False. As evi- **885** dent from the last line, the predicted outcome from **886** GPT-4 can be derived easily. **887**

**888**

**904 905**

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**System Message:** 889<br>
You are a logician with background in **890** You are a logician with background in **890** mathematics that translates natural language **891** reasoning text to Lean code so that these natural **892** language reasoning problems can be solved. During **893** the translation, please keep close attention to the **894** predicates and entities. There is an additional **895** requirement: I also want you to try to prove the **896** theorem you translated to Lean. If you can prove the **897** theorem, give me True at the end of the answer. If 898<br>vou can prove the negation of the theorem, write 899 you can prove the negation of the theorem, write **899** False at the end of the answer. If you can neither **900**<br>prove whether the original theorem or the negation **901** prove whether the original theorem or the negation **901**<br>of the theorem, please give me Unknown at the end of 902 of the theorem, please give me Unknown at the end of **902** the answer.

**Input**: **906** Textual context: The cat is blue. The cat is nice. **907** The cat likes the cow. The cat needs the cow. The 908<br>cat needs the rabbit. The cow does not need the 909 cat needs the rabbit. The cow does not need the **909**<br>rabbit. The cow needs the tiger. The rabbit is **910** rabbit. The cow needs the tiger. The rabbit is **910**<br>round. The tiger is nice. The tiger does not **911**<br>like the cow. If someone likes the cat and they **912** round. The tiger is nice. The tiger does not **911** like the cow. If someone likes the cat and they **912** chase the cat then they are blue. If someone **913**<br>likes the cow and they are red then the cow is 914 likes the cow and they are red then the cow is **914** round. If someone needs the tiger and they need **915**<br>the cat then they do not chase the cow. If someone 916<br>needs the cat and the cat is blue then the cat is 917 the cat then they do not chase the cow. If someone **916** needs the cat and the cat is blue then the cat is **917**<br>red. If someone is round then they need the cat. **918** red. If someone is round then they need the cat. **918** If someone likes the cat and the cat needs the **919** rabbit then the cat chases the tiger. If the rabbit **920** needs the tiger then the rabbit is not round. **921**

Question: Based on the above information, is the **923** following statement true, false, or unknown? The **924**<br>cow chases the cow. **926** cow chases the cow.

#### **Output**: **928** universe u **929**

constant obj : Type u **931** constant Cat : obj **933**<br>
constant Cow : obj 934 constant Cow : obj **934**<br>
constant Rabbit : obj **935** constant Rabbit : obj **935**<br>
constant Tiger : obj **936** constant Tiger : obj **936** constant Blue :  $obj \rightarrow Prop$ <br>constant Nice :  $obi \rightarrow Prop$  **938**<br>**939** constant Nice :  $obj \rightarrow Prop$ <br>
constant Likes :  $obi \rightarrow prop$  **939**<br>
940 constant Likes :  $\overrightarrow{obj} \rightarrow \overrightarrow{Proj}$  Prop **940**<br>
constant Needs :  $\overrightarrow{obj} \rightarrow \overrightarrow{Prop}$  941 constant Needs : obj → obj → Prop<br>
expansion of the Prop **941**<br>
constant Round : obj → Prop **942** constant Round :  $obj \rightarrow Prop$  **942**<br>
constant Red :  $obi \rightarrow Prop$  **943** constant Red : obj  $\rightarrow$  Prop **943**<br>
constant Chases : obj  $\rightarrow$  Obj  $\rightarrow$  Prop **944** constant Chases : obj → obj → Prop **944** axiom T1 : Blue Cat **946**<br>axiom T2 : Nice Cat **946** axiom T2 : Nice Cat **947**<br>axiom T3 : Likes Cat Cow **948** axiom T3 : Likes Cat Cow **948** axiom T4 : Needs Cat Cow **949** axiom T5 : Needs Cat Rabbit **950**<br>axiom T6 : ¬ Needs Cow Rabbit **951** axiom T6 : ¬ Needs Cow Rabbit **1951**<br>axiom T7 : Needs Cow Tiger **1952** axiom T7 : Needs Cow Russell, 1997<br>
axiom T7 : Needs Cow Tiger 1997<br>
953 axiom T8 : Round Rabbit **953**<br>axiom T9 : Nice Tiger axiom T9 : Nice Tiger<br>axiom T10 : a likes Tiger Cow axiom T10 : ¬ Likes Tiger Cow **955** -- If someone likes the cat and they chase the cat **957** then they are blue axiom R1 : ∀ x : obj, Likes x Cat ∧ Chases x Cat → **959** Blue x **960**

```
961 -- If someone likes the cow and they are red then<br>962 the cow is round
 962 the cow is round<br>963 axiom R2 : \forall x : \text{obj.}963 axiom R2 : ∀ x : obj, Likes x Cow ∧ Red x → Round
 964 Cow<br>965 -- If so
 965 -- If someone needs the tiger and they need the cat
 966 then they do not chase the cow<br>967 axiom R3 : \forall x : obj. Needs x Tiger
 967 axiom R3 : ∀ x : obj, Needs x Tiger ∧ Needs x Cat<br>968 → n Chases x Cow
 968 \rightarrow ¬ Chases x Cow<br>969 \rightarrow \rightarrow Tf someone needs the
 969 -- If someone needs the cat and the cat is blue<br>970 -- then the cat is red
 970 then the cat is red<br>971 system P4 \cdot Y \cdot \phi by Ne
 971 axiom R4 : ∀ x : obj, Needs x Cat ∧ Blue Cat →
 972 Red Cat<br>973 – If someone
 973 -- If someone is round then they need the cat<br>974 axiom RS + Y \times chi. Round x \rightarrow Needs x Cat
 974 axiom R5 : \forall x : obj, Round x \rightarrow Needs x Cat 975
 975 -- If someone likes the cat and the cat needs the<br>976 -- The cat object that the cat chases the tiger
 976 rabbit then the cat chases the tiger<br>977 parts of the Section P6 r \mathbf{y} \cdot \mathbf{r} and I likes \mathbf{y} \cdot \mathbf{r} and Need
 977 axiom R6 : ∀ x : obj, Likes x Cat ∧ Needs Cat
 978 Rabbit \rightarrow Chases Cat Tiger<br>979 Rabbit Allen Cat Tiger
 979 -- If the rabbit needs the tiger then the rabbit is
 980 not round<br>981 avion 87 · \forall v
 981 axiom R7 : ∀ x : obj, Needs Rabbit Tiger → ¬
                       982 Round Rabbit
 985 theorem cow_chases_cow : Chases Cow Cow :=<br>986 begin
 986 begin
 987 have H1 : Needs Cow Tiger := T7,<br>988 have H2 : Needs Cat Cow := T4
 988 have H2 : Needs Cat Cow := T4,<br>989 have H3 : p Chases Cow Cow :=
 989 have H3 : ¬ Chases Cow Cow := R3 Cow (and.intro
 990 H1 H2),
 991 contradiction,
 992 sorry,
                 993 end
 995 -- Looks like the theorem cannot be proven in Lean.<br>996 -- So let's try to prove the pecation of the
 996 -- So let's try to prove the negation of the<br>997 theorem which is Cow does not chase Court
                      997 theorem, which is Cow does not chase Cow
999 theorem not_cow_chases_cow : ¬ Chases Cow Cow :=<br>1000 begin
1000 begin
1001 apply R3 Cow,<br>1002 split
1002 split,
1003 exact T7,
1004 apply R5,
1005 apply R2 Cat,
1006 split,
1007 exact T3,<br>1008 apply R4
1008 apply R4 Rabbit,
1009 split,<br>1010 split,
1010 apply R5,
1011 exact T8,
                 exact T1,
1015 -- The negation of the theorem can be proven in
                       1016 Lean. So
1017 -- The answer is False 1018
```
**983 984**

**994**

**998**

**1013** end **1014**

#### <span id="page-11-0"></span>**1019** A.2 Prompts used for FOLIO

 For FOLIO, the prompts differ slightly from those used for ProofWriter. Since FOLIO's textual con- text remains consistent across multiple questions, we concatenate questions sharing the same context and prompt the large language model in a single in-stance. An illustrative example is provided below.

```
1026 1027 System Message:
1028 The State A You are a logician with background in 1029
1029 mathematics that translates natural language<br>1030 measoning text to Lean code so that these natural
1030 reasoning text to Lean code so that these natural<br>1031 language reasoning problems can be solved During
1031 language reasoning problems can be solved. During
1032 the translation, please keep close attention to the
1033 predicates and entities. There is an additional<br>1034 predicates and entities. There is an additional
1034 requirement: I also want you to try to prove the 1035
1035 theorem you translated to Lean. If you can prove the 1036
1036 theorem, give me True at the end of the answer. If<br>1037 vou can prove the peration of the theorem write
1037 you can prove the negation of the theorem, write<br>1038 False at the end of the answer. If you can neither
1038 False at the end of the answer. If you can neither
1039 prove whether the original theorem or the negation<br>1040 of the theorem, please give me Unknown at the end
1040 of the theorem, please give me Unknown at the end of
                   1041 the answer.
```
#### **Input**: **1043**

Textual context: There are six types of wild **1044** turkeys: Eastern wild turkey, Osceola wild **1045** turkey, 'Goulds wild turkey, 'Merriams wild **1046** turkey, Rio Grande wild turkey, and Ocellated **1047** wild turkey. Tom is not an Eastern wild turkey. **1048** Tom is not an Osceola wild turkey. Tom is **1049**<br>also not a Gould's wild turkey, or a **1050** also not a Gould's wild turkey, or a **1050** Merriam's wild turkey, or a Rio Grande wild **1051**<br>turkey, Tom is a wild turkey turkey. Tom is a wild turkey. Question 1: Based on the above information, is the **1054** following statement true, false, or uncertain?  $1055$ <br>Tom is an Ocellated wild turkey.  $1056$ Tom is an Ocellated wild turkey.<br> **1056** Question 2: Based on the above information, is the **1057** Question 2: Based on the above information, is the **1057** following statement true, false, or uncertain? **1058** Tom is an Eastern wild turkey.<br><u>Cuestion 3: Based on the above information, is the 1060</u> Question 3: Based on the above information, is the **1060** following statement true, false, or uncertain? Joey is <sup>a</sup> wild turkey. **1062 1063**

--<br>Introducing basic types for entities in our **1066**<br>1067 universe. **1067**<br>
tant Turkey : Type **1068** constant Turkey : Type **1068**<br>
constant Tom : Turkey **1069** 

constant Tom : Turkey **1069**<br>
constant Joey : Turkey **1070** constant Joey : Turkey

-- Defining properties for the turkeys in our **1072**<br>universe. **1073**<br>constant is wild turkey · Turkey → Prop **1074** universe. **1073**

```
constant is_wild_turkey : Turkey → Prop 1074<br>constant is eastern wild turkey : Turkey → Prop 1075
constant is_eastern_wild_turkey : Turkey → Prop 1075<br>constant is_osceola_wild_turkey : Turkey → Prop 1076
constant is_osceola_wild_turkey : Turkey → Prop 1076
constant is_goulds_wild_turkey : Turkey → Prop 1077
constant is_merriams_wild_turkey : Turkey \rightarrow Prop 1078<br>constant is rio grande wild turkey : Turkey \rightarrow Prop 1079
constant is_rio_grande_wild_turkey : Turkey \rightarrow Prop 1079<br>constant is occllated wild turkey : Turkey \rightarrow Prop 1080
constant is_ocellated_wild_turkey : Turkey → Prop
```
- Context from the information

```
-- Tom is not an Eastern wild turkey. 1084
axiom A1 : - is\_eastern\_wild\_turkey Tom 1085<br>-7cm is not an Osceola wild turkey 1086-- Tom is not an Osceola wild turkey. 1086
axiom A2 : - is\_osceola\_wild\_turkey Tom 1087<br>-- Tom is also not a Gould's wild turkey. 1088
-- Tom is also not a Gould's wild turkey. 1088
axiom A3 : - is_goulds_wild\_turkey Tom 1089<br>-- Tom is not a Merriam's wild turkey. 1090
   Tom is not a Merriam's wild turkey.<br>
1090<br>
1091 · a is merriams wild turkey Tom
axiom A4 : - ismerriams\_wild\_turkey Tom 1091<br>-- Tom is not a Rio Grande wild turkey. 1092
-- Tom is not a Rio Grande wild turkey. 1092
axiom A5 : - is\_rio\_grande\_wild\_turkey Tom 1093<br>-- Tom is a wild turkey.
-- Tom is a wild turkey. 1094
axiom A6 : is_wild_turkey Tom 1095
 -- There are six types of wild turkeys: Eastern 1096
    wild turkey, Osceola wild turkey, 'Goulds wild 1097
    turkey, 'Merriams wild turkey, Rio Grande wild 1098
    turkey, and Ocellated wild turkey. 1099
\begin{array}{ccc}\n\text{axiom turkey\_type\_exclusivity}: & \forall & \text{(t : Turkey)}, \\
\text{is wild turkey } t \rightarrow \text{is eastern wild turkey } t \rightarrow 1101\n\end{array}is_wild_turkey t → is_eastern_wild_turkey t ∨ 1101
    is_osceola_wild_turkey t ∨ 1102
    is_goulds_wild_turkey t ∨ 1103
    is_merriams_wild_turkey t ∨ 1104
```

```
is_rio_grande_wild_turkey t ∨ 1105
is_ocellated_wild_turkey t 1106
```
-- Formalizing the Questions **1108**

```
question 1 1110<br>
Tom is an Ocellated wild turkey 1111 1111
-- Tom is an Ocellated wild turkey. 1111
-- Let's first prove the positive case. 1112
theorem tom_is_ocellated_wild_turkey : 1113<br>is_ocellated_wild_turkey Tom := 1114
is_ocellated_wild_turkey Tom := 1114
begin 1115
  cases turkey_type_exclusivity Tom A6, { 1116<br>have h1 : \frac{1}{2} is eastern wild turkey Tom. 1117have h1 : ¬ is_eastern_wild_turkey Tom, 1117<br>from A1, 1118
   contradiction, 1119
   }, { 1120
     cases h, {<br>have h1 : ¬ is osceola wild turkey 1121<br>1122
        have h1 : ¬ is_osceola_wild_turkey 1122<br>
1123<br>
1123
   Tom, from A2, 1123 1123
        contradiction, 1124
     }, { 1125
        cases h, { 1126
           have h1 : \neg is_goulds_wild_turkey 1127<br>1128
```
12

Tom, from A3,

```
1129 contradiction,
1130 }, {
1131 cases h, {<br>1132 baye h
1132 have h1 : ¬
1133 is_merriams_wild_turkey Tom, from A4,
1134 contradiction,<br>1135 b, i
1135 }, {
1136 cases h, {
1137<br>
1138 have h1 : ¬<br>
1138 is rig grande wild turkey Tom
1138 is_rio_grande_wild_turkey Tom, from A5,
1139 contradiction,<br>1140 b
1140 }, {
1141 assumption,
1142 }
1143 }
1144 }
1145 }
1146 }<br>1147 b end
              1149 -- Let's try the negative case.
1151 theorem not_tom_is_ocellated_wild_turkey : ¬<br>1152 is ocellated wild turkey Tom :=
1152 is_ocellated_wild_turkey Tom :=<br>1153 begin
1153 begin
             exact A2,<br>end
                The answer is Unknown
1159 -- Question 2<br>1160 -- Tom is an
1160 -- Tom is an Eastern wild turkey.<br>1161 -- Let's first prove the positive
1161 \begin{bmatrix} - & \text{Let's first prove the positive case.} \\ - & \text{before most example.} \end{bmatrix}1162 theorem tom_is_eastern_wild_turkey :<br>1163 is_eastern_wild_turkey Tom :=
1163 is_eastern_wild_turkey Tom :=<br>1164 begin
1164 begin
             1165 sorry, -- Placeholder for proof
              -- Let's try the negative case.
1170 theorem not_tom_is_eastern_wild_turkey : ¬<br>1171 is eastern wild turkey Tom :=
1171 is_eastern_wild_turkey Tom :=<br>1172 begin
1172 begin
                 exact A1.
             1174 end
              1176 -- The answer is False
1178 -- Question 3<br>1179 -- Joevis a
1179 -- Joey is a wild turkey.
1180 -- Let's first prove the positive case.
1181 theorem joey_is_wild_turkey : is_wild_turkey Joey :=<br>1182 begin
1182 begin
             1183 sorry, -- Placeholder for proof
              -- Let's try the negative case.
1188 theorem not_joey_is_wild_turkey : ¬ is_wild_turkey : 189
1189 Joey :=
1190 begin
             1191 sorry, -- Placeholder for proof
                The answer is Unknown
```
# <span id="page-12-0"></span>**<sup>1196</sup>** B Example Errors During Formalization

**1197** This is an artificial example highlighting typical **1198** errors encountered in the formalization stage.



```
Output: 1214
constant Turkey : Type 1215
constant Eastern Osceola Goulds : Turkey → Prop 1216
\frac{3}{2} constant weight_86 weight_73 : Turkey \rightarrow Prop 1217<br>
\frac{1217}{2}\frac{1218}{200} constant eastern hite causes death \cdot Turkey \rightarrow Prop 1219
constant eastern_bite_causes_death : Turkey → Prop 1219
constant Tom Bob : Turkey 1220
axiom A1 : \rightarrow Eastern Tom \land \rightarrow Osceola Tom 1222<br>axiom \frac{1222}{1223}axiom A2 : Eastern Bob 1223<br>axiom A3 : weight 86 Bob 1223
axiom A3 : weight_86 Bob 1224
axiom A4 : weight_73 Tom 1225<br>axiom A5 : \forall (t : Turkey), bites t V stings t 1226
axiom A5 : ∀ (t : Turkey), bites t ∨ stings t 1226
axiom A6 : bites Bob 1227<br>axiom A7 : \forall (t : Turkey). 1228
         axiom A7 : ∀ (t : Turkey), 1228
    eastern_bite_causes_death t 1229 1230
```
**1213**

**1221**

There are a few errors in the above code, includ- **1231** ing: **1232**

- There is a missing axiom that corresponds **1233** to "There are three types of wild turkeys": **1234** *Goulds Tom* ∨ *Eastern Tom* ∨ *Osceola Tom* **1235**
- The formalization of numbers is incorrect, it 1236 should be: constant weight : Turkey  $\rightarrow$  , ax- 1237  $iom A3$ : weight  $Bob = 86$ , axiom  $A4$ : weight 1238  $Tom = 73$  1239
- The formalization of logic is incorrect, **1240** it should be:  $(¬ bite\_causes\_death t ∧ 1241)$ *bite\_causes\_itching t)* ∨ *(bite\_causes\_death* **1242**  $\wedge \neg$  *bite\_causes\_itching t)* 1243
- There is an incorrect division of concepts that 1244 would make the proving impossible, the cor- **1245** rect version should be:  $\forall$  (*t* : *Turkey*), *Eastern* 1246  $t \rightarrow bite\_causes\_death$  t

**1208**