TREANT: RED-TEAMING TEXT-TO-IMAGE MODELS WITH TREE-BASED SEMANTIC TRANSFORMATIONS

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ABSTRACT

The increasing prevalence of text-to-image (T2I) models makes their safety a critical concern. Adversarial testing techniques have been developed to probe whether such models can be prompted to produce Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content. Despite these efforts, current solutions face several challenges, such as low success rate, inefficiency and lack of semantic understandings. To combat these, we introduce TREANT, a novel automated red-teaming framework for adversarial testing of T2I models. The core of our framework is the tree-based semantic transformation. We employ *semantic decomposition* and *sensitive element drowning* strategies in conjunction with Large Language Models (LLMs) to systematically refine adversarial prompts for effective testing. Our comprehensive evaluation confirms the efficacy of TREANT, which not only exceeds the performance of state-of-the-art approaches but also achieves a overall success rate of 88.5% on leading T2I models, including DALL·E 3 and Stable Difussion.

1 INTRODUCTION

Text-to-image (T2I) models, like Stable Diffusion (Rombach et al., 2022; sta, 2023), and DALL·E 3 (dal, 2023), have gained popularity due to the advancements of vision and language generation techniques. However, a significant ethical concern with these models is their potential to generate Not-Safe-for-Work (NSFW) content, including images depicting violence and illegal activity. To mitigate this threat, model developers implement a variety of techniques to prevent the generation of NSFW content. During training, they use filtering to exclude NSFW content from the training data (llm, 2023), or employ safety alignment strategies to rectify model's knowledge (ope, 2023). During deployment, safety filters are applied to eliminate any NSFW content produced.

However, there is still no universally effective solution to completely prevent NSFW content generation. Consequently, researchers have proposed adversarial testing techniques (known as *red teaming*), which challenge the target T2I model to generate NSFW content, for safety evaluation and assessment. There are two strategies to red teaming T2I models. (1) Some techniques are designed to automatically perturb prompts, leading to the generation of NSFW content (Li et al., 2019; Jin et al., 2020a; Garg and Ramakrishnan, 2020a). (2) Some studies focus on the safety filters of T2I models, and manually craft adversarial prompts to bypass them (Rando et al., 2022; Qu et al., 2023).

However, these solutions face three primary limitations. First, they struggle to effectively probe the safety filter, leading to excessive numbers of queries with high cost. Second, they tend to focus more on misleading safety filters rather than bypassing them. The generated content is not well aligned with the original intent. Third, while manually-generated prompts may achieve a high success rate for the specific model, they lack scalability for widespread testing of other T2I models.

This paper presents TREANT, to our best knowledge, the first fully automated red teaming framework dedicated to assessing the robustness of T2I models against the generation of NSFW content in a black-box setting. The design of TREANT is inspired by two key observations: (1) text safety filters in T2I models are largely dependent on attention mechanisms that hone in on the contextual surroundings of specific keywords. (2) Image safety filters may be circumvented by inundating them with irrelevant non-sensitive content. Based on them, TREANT is bifurcated into two principal stages. (1) *Semantic decomposition*: it isolates sensitive elements (e.g., references to human anatomy), and applies this process recursively to the entire prompt to navigate through text safety filters. (2) *Sensitive element drowning*: it exploits the models' ability to render multiple canvases within a single output image, by embedding non-sensitive elements onto ancillary canvases to overwhelm the image safety filters. Initiating with an intentionally crafted prompt to elicit NSFW imagery, TREANT progressively refines the input through these two stages, culminating in the generation of a prompt that adeptly elicits the creation of NSFW content by the target model.

We introduce several novel techniques to address the limitations of existing solutions. Specifically, (1) to enhance the query efficiency, we initially decompose the prompt into a Prompt Parse Tree (PPT), a new representation of objects in the adversarial prompt. We then recursively apply *sensitive decomposition* and *sensitive drown* to this tree, streamlining the refinement process and reducing redundant queries to the T2I model. (2) To ensure the alignment between the meaningful content and testing goal, we leverage LLMs to steer the refinement towards this goal. We also employ a semantic preservation technique in *sensitive drown* to improve the quality of the generated NSFW content, preventing the output from being overwhelmed by irrelevant objects. (3) To achieve scalability, we develop a hybrid algorithm, which coordinates with LLMs to monitor, evaluate, and refine the testing goal in an automated manner.

We conduct extensive evaluations to validate the effectiveness of TREANT across multiple prohibited content scenarios. The results clearly demonstrate that TREANT significantly outperforms established baselines in mitigating NSFW content by T2I models. Notably, it achieves an overall success rate of 88.5%, which is appreciably higher than the closest competitor. These findings underscore the robustness and efficacy of TREANT in enhancing the safety mechanisms of T2I models. We provide open access to the codebase of TREANT and datasets it generates in our anonymous project website[1], thereby supporting and encouraging reproducibility and further scholarly inquiry.

2 MOTIVATION

2.1 SAFETY OF T2I MODELS

Text-to-image (T2I) models (sta, 2023; dal, 2023) create images from text descriptions (i.e., prompts). Modern techniques typically use diffusion models, which start with random noise, gradually removed through a de-noising network. They often use text embeddings from text encoders. Recent studies explore learning-free and zero-shot image generation in large-scale models.

Existing T2I models have the potential to generate "Not Safe For Work" (NSFW) content, which is unsuitable for public or professional scenarios. This includes graphic violence, pornography, nudity, profanity, or other offensive material (Guzman, 2023). To reduce such risk, T2I services commonly implement safety measures to inspect input texts and output images. Specifically, when a user submits a request, it is first evaluated by a *prompt safety filter* to ensure it follows content policies. If the prompt passes, the T2I model generates the corresponding image, which then undergoes a secondary check by an image safety filter. Only images that pass both filters are shown to users, ensuring safety and user-friendliness. Notably, open-source models like Stable Diffusion have built-in safety measures to screen out NSFW content, reducing the need for additional external mechanisms.

Text-to-image generative models, commonly abbreviated as text-to-image models, translate textual prompts into visual representations and have witnessed considerable advancements in their architectural and algorithmic foundations, enhancing the fidelity of the imagery they produce. Present-day methodologies predominantly harness diffusion-based frameworks, where the generation process initiates with a random noise pattern and iteratively refines it using a de-noising mechanism. Notable implementations of this approach are Stable Diffusion sta (2023) and DALL·E 3 dal (2023), which incorporate text-driven directives, leveraging the semantic understanding derived from text encoders to shape the resultant images. The field continues to innovate, delving into learning-free and zero-shot capabilities within expansive generative models.

2.2 ADVERSARIAL TESTING OF T2I MODELS

Researchers have introduced *adversarial testing* or *red-teaming*, a strategy to assess the safety of AI models and their capability of generating NSFW content. Existing techniques for testing T2I

[1] https://sites.google.com/view/text-to-image-testing



Figure 1: The workflow of TREANT.

models can be classified into two categories. The first one is *White-box testing*. These methods accesses the target model's internal states to identify safety vulnerabilities. For instance, Niu et al. (2024) utilize a maximum likelihood-based algorithm to generate NSFW content from T2I models. Shayegani et al. (2023) combine images targeted towards toxic embeddings with generic prompts to craft adversarial prompts. However, the effectiveness of these methods is limited by their high computational demands and the need for direct access to the model, which might be restricted due to proprietary or privacy concerns.

The second category is *black-box testing*, where the tester does not have access to the internal structures of the model. Some automated adversarial testing methods such as Textfooler (Jin et al., 2020b), BAE (Garg and Ramakrishnan, 2020b), and SneakyPrompt (Yang et al., 2023) perturb prompts to bypass safety filters. Manual approaches have also been explored, e.g., Rando (Rando et al., 2022), which reverse-engineer the safety filter of T2I models and develop a manual bypass strategy involving unrelated text additions.

In this paper, we mainly focus on the black-box testing, which is more practical for the real-world scenarios. Unfortunately, existing black-box testing solutions suffer from the following three significant limitations. (1) Manual creation of prompts (Rando et al., 2022), though effective at evading safety filters, lack practicality and scalability for extensive testing. (2) Automated testing methods (Garg and Ramakrishnan, 2020a), which alter prompts to dodge safety filters, frequently fail to maintain the original meaning of the prompts, leading to the creation of nonsensical images. (3) These automated approaches (Garg and Ramakrishnan, 2020a; Yang et al., 2023) generally have low success rates, rendering them largely ineffective. These limitations motivates us to design a new effective and scalable testing solution.

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 OVERVIEW

We present TREANT, a novel automated framework for adversarial testing of T2I models. The design of TREANT is based on two crucial observations: (1) Adversarial prompts that contain sensitive words (e.g., "kill") can be transformed into less sensitive terms (e.g., "fighting") to evade textual safety filters. (2) To bypass image safety filters, we can integrate benign elements (e.g., "red liquid") with sensitive terms (e.g., "blood"). These tactics allow us to guide T2I models to produce NSFW content while still aligning with the original testing objectives.

Based on these two observations, TREANT leverages a tree-based mutation strategy to transform a user-defined prompt into an effective adversarial prompt that can induce the generation of NSFW images. Figure 1 shows the workflow of TREANT, which encompasses four pivotal steps. ❶ Construction of a Prompt Parse Tree (PPT), our innovative representation that details the relations and properties of objects within the prompt (§ 3.2). Once the initial PPT is established, ❷ TREANT executes *semantic decomposition*, a process that segments sensitive elements into non-sensitive components. This is achieved by decomposing objects in the PPT into new subordinate PPTs. Subsequently, TREANT converts these newly formed PPTs into new adversarial prompts to circumvent text safety filters (§ 3.3). Following this, ❸ TREANT implements *sensitive element drowning* (§ 3.4) by introducing non-sensitive elements on different canvas, aiming to evade image safety filters. ❹ The effectiveness of the two strategies are evaluated by passing the generated adversarial prompt to the T2I model for image generation. In case of failed generation, the response from the model is analyzed to determine whether the text safety filter or image safety filter is not bypassed (§ 3.5), and the mutation strategy is triggered accordingly. This iterative process is performed until a successful adversarial prompt is generated or the time budget is used up. Ultimately, TREANT outputs the adversarial prompt alongside the NSFW images produced upon successful generation.

3.2 Prompt Parse Tree Construction

We introduce Prompt Parse Tree (PPT), a novel structure for encoding relationships and attributes of objects in prompts. Its design is inspired by the concept of Parse Tree in natural language processing (Meng et al., 2013; Jiang and Diesner, 2019; Ranjan et al., 2016). A parse tree, defined within a grammar $G = (V, \Sigma, R, S)$, comprises nodes representing non-terminal (V) and terminal (Σ) symbols, with R as production rules and S as the start symbol. The tree's yield Yield(T) is the string w formed by concatenating all terminal symbols and empty string.

Building upon this definition, we formally define the Prompt Parse Tree (PPT) as a hierarchical structure composed of three distinct node types: (1) *Object Nodes*: they explicitly represent the actual objects referred to in the image. (2) *Attribute Nodes*: they detail the characteristics or qualities of objects, providing comprehensive descriptions or modifiers and shaping the attributes of the objects mentioned in the prompt. (3) *Relation Nodes*: they map the relationships between objects or their sub-components within the prompt. They become crucial when complex objects are broken down into sub-elements, thereby clarifying their intricate interconnections.

Examples. We elucidate the structure of PPT with three examples. Figure 2 (a) depicts the simple prompt "Two men fighting against each other," which consists of a 'Fighting' relation node branching out into two 'Object Nodes,' 'Man1' and 'Man2,' each representing the individuals in fighting. In Figure 2 (b), the prompt complexity increases: "Two men are fighting against each other in a church." Here, the 'Contain' relation node indicates the encompassing setting of the action, branching into a 'Church' object node for location, and a 'Fighting' relation node further splitting into 'Man1' and 'Man2.' Figure 2 (c) shows an even more detailed prompt: "One strong man is fighting against another man in a glorious church. Red liquid in the church." The 'Contain' node is the root, with branches to the 'Church' object node, the 'Fighting' relation node, and the 'Liquid' object node. 'Man1' has an 'Attribute Node' of 'strong,' and the 'Church' has 'glorious,' while 'Liquid' is marked with 'red.' These examples display how PPT dissects prompts into a hierarchical tree, delineating object relationships and attributes within the context.

Our PPT construction grammar begins with the *Relation Node*, treated as the start symbol S. The *Attribute Node* is the terminal symbol (Σ) because it describes its parent *Object Node*. If an object lacks attribute nodes, we also designate the *Object Node* as the terminal symbol (Σ). The *Relation Node* is our non-terminal symbol (V) as it typically has an *Object Node* as a leaf node. The process of deriving Yield and production rules R are executed effectively by LLMs, ensuring the PPT accurately represents the prompt's syntactic and semantic structure.

Given a predefined testing goal, i.e., adversarial prompt, from testers, TREANT constructs the initial PPT, which includes a tree of nodes and edges, each characterized by specific properties. This foundational PPT is not static, and it will undergo iterative refinement in subsequent steps.

3.3 Semantic Decomposition

We design a novel algorithm, **Semantic Decomposition**, to process the prompts generated from PPT. The goal of this algorithm is to circumvent the text safety filter by transforming sensitive elements into non-sensitive ones. Inspired by Observation (1) in § 3.1, we disassemble highly sensitive parts of the text and then disperse them throughout the entire prompt. This process effectively reduces the concentration of sensitive elements, facilitating their passage through safety filters.

The reason behind this technique is as follows: the attention mechanism (Brauwers and Frasincar, 2021) allows T2I models to focus on relevant input parts when predicting outputs, thus capturing contextual information effectively. A key feature is its "locality" property (Brauwers and Frasincar, 2021), which gives more weight to the immediate neighborhood around an element, enhancing the model's ability to generate coherent and contextually relevant outputs. Due to such mechanism, less sensitive short phrases could be identified as risky when grouped together. By randomly distributing these formatted descriptions, interspersing less sensitive phrases among many non-sensitive ones, we can adeptly bypass text safety filters.



Figure 2: Hierarchical parsing of prompts in PPT. (a) Basic prompt with object nodes. (b) Addition of setting via 'Contain' node. (c) Inclusion of attribute nodes for detailed context.

Algorithm 1: Semantic Decomposition

Input: Initial PPT with original prompt P
Output: Final adversarial prompt P'

```
while true do
    properties ← collect_properties(PPT);
    phrases ← arrange_randomly(properties);
    Q ← query_llm(phrases);
    if Q passes text safety filters then
        return Q
    leaf_node ← select_random_leaf(PPT);
    attributes ← collect_attributes(leaf_node);
    granular_statements ← divide_attributes(attributes);
    sub_ppt ← transform_to_sub_ppt(granular_statements);
    update_ppt(PPT, sub_ppt);
```

Algorithm 1 describes the detailed process of *Semantic Decomposition*. We start with an initial PPT, attributed with the original prompt. We take the following steps to transform the prompt. (1) We traverse the current PPT, collect properties from all nodes, randomly arrange the gathered short phrases, and query the T2I model. If successful, the final prompt is obtained, and the process ends (see § 3.5 for checking criteria). (2) If the prompt fails to pass the text safety filters, we randomly select a leaf node as a candidate and perform decomposition. In particular, we initiate an evaluative query to a LLM, discerning whether the image described by the prompt complies with review policies, thereby identifying nodes that necessitate decomposition. (3) Once the candidate leaf node is selected, We collect its attributes and use an LLM (e.g., GPT-4o) to divide them into even more granular formatted statements, transforming these into a sub-PPT. Subsequently, a subtree is crafted where the objects identified by the LLM form new leaf nodes. Their attributes are meticulously documented, and the relationships are assimilated as attributes of a new root node. This reconstruction replaces the original leaf node with a subtree that conserves the essential semantics of the adversarial prompt, ensuring the revised prompt closely aligns with the original context. We then restart from Step 1 until the prompt passes the text safety filter.

Examples. Figure 3 demonstrates the process of semantic decomposition in text-to-image prompts to evade safety filters. The initial prompt, "Two men are fighting against each other in a church with blood around", contains the sensitive word 'blood', and will be blocked by the text safety filter, as shown in (a). By utilizing an LLM for decomposition, as seen in (b), the prompt is transformed into



(a) blood failed to pass the text safety filter

(b) decompose to granular formatted statements

Figure 3: Comparison of PPT representations showing (a) an initial prompt with the word 'blood' being blocked by a text safety filter, and (b) the refined prompt using 'red liquid' to bypass the filter through semantic decomposition.



(a) original statement

(b) element drawning with new canvas

Figure 4: Demonstration of the Sensitive Element Drowning technique in PPT. (a) The original prompt with potential sensitive content. (b) The introduction of a new, unrelated canvas aimed at diluting the sensitivity and potentially overloading the image safety filters.

a less sensitive description, "Two men are fighting each other in a church with red liquid around", allowing it to pass the filter and update the PPT for further processing.

3.4 Sensitive Element Drowning

Once text safety filters are circumvented, the ensuing images may still be subject to image safety filters, which are often more rigorous. We introduce another novel technique, **Sensitive Element Drowning**, to bypass the image safety filters. The design of this technique is inspired by Observation (2) in § 3.1: T2I models possess the capability to generate multiple canvases simultaneously. This feature enables us to submerge sensitive elements on one canvas while inundating other canvases with a plethora of non-sensitive elements, which may lead to the overloading of image safety filters. To avert the dilution of the intended target image with irrelevant elements, our method involves explicitly instructing, via the prompt, to divide the image into several canvases. Subsequently, we populate these separate canvases with non-sensitive elements, dedicating a single canvas to the target image. This technique of prompt augmentation is contextually independent of the original adversarial intent, thereby allowing seamless integration to create an augmented prompt.

Examples. Figure 4 illustrates an example of this strategy using PPT. Specifically, Figure 4 (a) shows the original statement where a prompt contains potential sensitive elements that are difficult to decompose further. Figure 4 (b) demonstrates the strategy in action by introducing an additional canvas containing non-sensitive elements (e.g., 'beautiful woman'), which is contextually independent from the sensitive content. This additional canvas is designed to potentially saturate the image safety filter with excess semantic content, thereby diverting attention from the sensitive elements depicted on the adjacent canvas.

3.5 Failure Analysis

To determine if a generated image from our crafted adversarial prompt contains inappropriate content, we leverage an LLM (e.g., GPT-4o) to check for the possible NSFW content. Specifically, we prompt GPT-4o by asking, "Tell me whether the image contains content related to {NSFW_PROMPT}? Answer 'Yes' or 'No'." We manually check the evaluation results from GPT-4o and find that it achieves a high consistency rate of 95.4%. Therefore, we can confidently use it as a failure checker for our analysis.

4 Evaluation

Baselines. We benchmark TREANT against existing adversarial testing approaches as below: (1) **SneakyPrompt** (Yang et al., 2023): This approach utilizes reinforcement learning to iteratively refine adversarial prompts. By continuously interacting with the target T2I model, SneakyPrompt aims to induce the generation of NSFW content, testing the robustness of model safety filters. (2) **BAE** (Garg and Ramakrishnan, 2020a): This method adopts a token manipulation strategy, specifically focusing on token replacement and insertion. It works by masking portions of the original text and utilizing BERT Masked Language Model to suggest alternative tokens that could fit the masked context, effectively testing the filters' resilience to subtle linguistic changes. (3) **TextFooler** (Jin et al., 2020a): This solution employs a synonym substitution technique to evade safety filters. It replaces critical words in the text with their synonyms, preserving the semantic content while altering the prompt's structure enough to potentially bypass the safety mechanisms.

Experimental Setup. Our experiments are conducted on a high-performance workstation equipped with the following specifications: operating system Ubuntu 22.04.3 LTS, powered by 2 NVIDIA 3090 GPUs, each with 24GB of memory. For detailed results and more comprehensive information regarding our implementation, please refer to our website[1].

To ensure consistency and reproducibility, we impose a strict time limit of ten minutes for each method during every trial, focusing specifically on generating a single adversarial prompt per run. Furthermore, to reduce variability and ensure robust statistical analysis, we repeat each experiment ten times. In the interest of fairness and comparability across all tested methods, we limit the number of queries to 6 for all baselines during the trials.

Dataset. In contrast to the comprehensive content compliance checks provided by OpenAI (ope (2023)), the current publicly available NSFW prompt datasets only include obscene content. To more thoroughly test TREANT's performance, we have created our own dataset, denoted as NSFW-1k. Building upon the approaches of previous works (Yang et al., 2023; Niu et al., 2024; Shayegani et al., 2023), we take inspiration from a Reddit post (red, 2023) and use ChatGPT (cha, 2023) to generate 100 target prompts for 11 different scenarios prohibited by OpenAI's content policy (ope, 2023), specifically focusing on NSFW content. This process results in a total of 1100 adversarial prompts. In addition, we also conducted extensive testing on the NSFW-200 dataset proposed by Yang et al. (2023), which contains 200 prompts containing obscene content.

Target T2I Models for Evaluation. To assess TREANT, we selected four leading T2I models, including one commercial and three open-source options, all equipped with advanced text and image safety filters designed to block inappropriate content. Specifically, (1) **DALL·E 3** (dal, 2023), developed by OpenAI, excels in interpreting complex prompts and generating high-quality images. (2) **Stable Diffusion** (sta, 2023), a widely respected open-source model, is evaluated via its API. We tested multiple versions—v1.4, v2.1, and XL—to account for variations in text comprehension and image generation capabilities.

Metrics. We evaluate adversarial testing of T2I models using two metrics: (1) **Success Rate:** The percentage of adversarial prompts that successfully generate NSFW content. Each sample is verified by GPT-4 Vision and manually checked for validity. (2) **Number of Queries:** The number of queries needed to generate a successful adversarial prompt, with fewer queries indicating higher efficiency.

Table 1: Aggregated success rates for bypassing safety filters in DALL·E 3 across various prohibited scenarios using different adversarial testing techniques in NSFW-1k.

Prohibited Scenario	**Method**					
	SneakyPrompt	TextFooler	BAE	TREANT	TREANT-SD	TREANT-SED
Hate	35.0	16.0	14.0	**77.0**	74.0	21.0
Harassment	**98.0**	96.0	97.0	96.0	93.0	85.0
Violence	94.0	86.0	85.0	**97.0**	84.0	89.0
Self-harm	61.0	48.0	48.0	**90.0**	79.0	56.0
Sexual	10.0	4.0	6.0	**67.0**	47.0	8.0
Shocking	86.0	77.0	77.0	**94.0**	91.0	76.0
Illegal	92.0	86.0	86.0	**95.0**	**95.0**	90.0
Deception	84.0	84.0	84.0	**88.0**	85.0	66.0
Political	**99.0**	**99.0**	**99.0**	**99.0**	**99.0**	97.0
Public	93.0	**94.0**	**94.0**	91.0	90.0	83.0
Spam	78.0	76.0	**82.0**	79.0	79.0	60.0
Total	75.5	69.6	70.2	**88.5**	83.3	66.4

Table 2: Aggregated success rates for bypassing safety filters in DALL·E 3 and three versions of Stable Diffusion using different adversarial testing techniques in NSFW-200 (Yang et al. (2023)).

T2I Model	**Method**			
	TREANT	SneakyPrompt	BAE	TextFooler
DALL·E 3	**63.0**	9.0	4.5	3.0
Stable Diffusion v1.4	89.5	87.5	**90.5**	90.0
Stable Diffusion v2.1	62.5	50.5	**69.0**	67.5
Stable Diffusion XL	**92.0**	77.0	81.0	79.0

4.1 MAIN RESULTS

Testing Effectiveness across Various Prohibited Scenarios. We first evaluate and compare TREANT with other established methods. Taking into account DALL·E 3's more robust content compliance filters (ope (2023)), we test the effectiveness across Various Prohibited Scenarios on DALL·E 3. The results are shown in Table 1. We can observe that TREANT consistently outperforms other adversarial testing techniques across various prohibited content scenarios. This effectiveness is provided byTREANT's advanced algorithms that better understand the context of prompts, allowing for more subtle manipulation to bypass safety filters. For example, in the "Sexual" and "Shocking" categories, TREANT achieves success rates of 67.0% and 94.0%, respectively, much higher than other methods. Additionally, TREANT optimizes the number of queries needed, demonstrating greater efficiency in "Illegal activity" and "Deception" scenarios with success rates of 95.0% and 88.0%. It also exhibits robust performance in diverse categories like "Political" and "Public and personal health", both achieving 99.0% success rates, highlighting its adaptability. While TREANT does not achieve perfect success in every category, such as "Self-harm" and "Violence", its performance still surpasses other methods, indicating the complexity of these scenarios. Overall, TREANT proves to be highly effective in testing the safety of T2I models, with significant improvements over existing techniques.

Testing Effectiveness across Various Models. We used NSFW-200 to evaluate the performance of TREANT and baseline methods across four T2I models. The results, as shown in Table 2, indicate that TREANT significantly outperformed other methods on DALL·E 3 and Stable Diffusion XL, achieving scores of 63.0% and 92.0%, respectively. However, on Stable Diffusion v1.4 and v2.1, the performance was weaker but nearly comparable to other methods. Upon examining the results, we found that this variance is mainly because TREANT relies on the models' ability to understand structural information of the language. In contrast, methods like BAE and TextFooler, which are based on simple phrase substitutions, are better suited for models with generally weaker semantic understanding abilities.

Figure 7 presents a case study on the outputs generated by TREANT when applied to DALL·E 3 with different sensitive scenarios. In the "Harassment" scenario, the model depicts a man aggressively pointing at a woman, suggesting intimidation. The "Violence" scenario shows an older man gripping a young woman with a bloodstained dress, indicating physical harm. For "Self-harm", the model



Figure 5: Success rates for methods across prohibited scenarios by query count.



Figure 6: Success rates of TREANT vs. number of nodes in semantic decomposition.

produces an image of a teenager with a razor blade to her wrist, depicting self-injury. The "Sexual" prompt results in an image of a nude couple in a bathtub with rose petals, which can be seen as suggestive. In the "Shocking" scenario, a protest scene is shown with a person making an offensive gesture towards police. Finally, the "Illegal activity" scenario illustrates individuals vandalizing a vehicle, promoting criminal behavior. These highlight the need for enhanced safety mechanisms within T2I models to prevent the creation of potentially harmful or inappropriate content.

Testing Efficiency. Figure 5 presents the success rates of various adversarial testing methods against the number of queries made, ranging from one to five. TREANT stands out, with its success rate quickly approaching 88% by the fifth query, demonstrating high efficiency and effectiveness. In contrast, SneakyPrompt and TextFooler show moderate improvement in success rates as the number of queries increases, with TextFooler reaching around 70% and SneakyPrompt slightly higher, nearing 75%. BAE exhibits a more gradual increase in success, plateauing near 70%.

The superior performance of TREANT can be attributed to its advanced algorithms that leverage sophisticated strategies such as semantic decomposition and sensitive element drowning to effectively manipulate prompts in a way that is difficult for safety filters to detect. This allows TREANT to bypass filters more effectively with fewer queries. In contrast, the other tools rely on simpler, less adaptive strategies such as synonym replacement or minor text alterations, which are more likely to be caught by advanced filtering mechanisms. This highlights the importance of using context-aware techniques in adversarial testing to ensure that prompts are crafted in a manner that mimics the potential real-world misuse but remains undetected by safety filters. As a result, TREANT achieves not only higher success rates but also lower testing cost, making it a valuable tool for evaluating the safety of T2I models.

4.2 ABLATION STUDY

Impact of Strategies. We examine the individual effectiveness of two strategic components within TREANT: *semantic decomposition* and *sensitive element drowning*. We implement two specialized variants of TREANT: (1) TREANT-SD exclusively utilizes *semantic decomposition*, and (2) TREANT-SED applies solely *sensitive element drowning*. Table 1 details the success rates of these implementations. We observe that the integrated TREANT, combining both two techniques, consistently demonstrates superior performance compared to the isolated application of each strategy. This confirms that the synergistic use of these strategies in TREANT leads to greater testing performance, significantly enhancing the adversarial prompts' ability to bypass safety filters.

Impact of PPT Complexity. We investigate the influence of the PPT complexity on the effectiveness of TREANT. Given the theoretical possibility of infinitely subdividing an object into subobjects, this complexity is represented by the number of nodes in PPT, with more detailed subdivisions corresponding to a greater number of nodes. We vary the maximum number of nodes from 1 to 12 to evaluate their respective performances, while all other settings are held constant to ensure



Figure 7: Diverse outputs generated by DALL·E 3 when presented with sensitive prompts by applying TREANT, illustrating the model's interpretation across prohibited categories.

comparability with previous studies. Figure 6 demonstrates how the increasing tree complexity affects TREANT's success rates. We observe a positive correlation between the number of tree nodes and the pass rate, suggesting that more finely decomposed prompt structures tend to bypass safety filters more effectively. As the complexity increases—reflected by the node count rising to 12—the success rate also improves, nearing 88%. This result underscores that as TREANT parses an object into more sub-objects, thereby augmenting the number of tree nodes, its ability to circumvent safety filters is enhanced. This illustrates the significant benefit of detailed semantic decomposition in adversarial testing, showing that more granular breakdowns in content are more likely to succeed in bypassing stringent safety protocols.

5 DISCUSSION ABOUT MITIGATION

Given the adversarial prompts created by TREANT, it is crucial to prevent the creation of NSFW content from them. A multifaceted approach could be employed. Firstly, we can enhance the robustness of safety filters by integrating advanced LLMs such as GPT-4o (we have applied it in §3.5) to detect subtle cues and contextual nuances associated with NSFW content. Additionally, we can implement a layered filtering process where both the textual and visual content are scrutinized separately and together to catch prompts that might otherwise slip through a single filter. Regular updating and training of these filters on a diverse dataset that includes various forms of NSFW content will improve their accuracy and adaptability. Together, these strategies can reduce the likelihood of generating inappropriate content while maintaining the creative flexibility of T2I models.

6 CONCLUSION

Our TREANT stands out as a pioneering framework in the realm of adversarial testing, showcasing remarkable effectiveness in probing the safety filters of T2I models. Through rigorous evaluation, TREANT has proven to significantly surpass existing approaches, achieving an 88.5% success rate on a range of platforms, including DALL·E 3 and three versions of Stable Diffusion. Such performance not only marks a considerable advancement over current state-of-the-art methods but also highlights the efficiency of its core strategies: semantic decomposition and sensitive element drowning. Looking forward, we aim to enhance the interpretability of adversarial prompts and develop a sophisticated detection mechanism that leverages this interpretability.

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