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# Foundation Models and the EU AI Act

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## Abstract

The EU AI Act is the world’s first comprehensive legal regime for governing artificial intelligence. The Act reflects several years of legislative process in the European Union and, in particular, laws that grapple with the emerging technology of foundation models. We analyze how the Act addresses foundation models by coding the Act’s 31 requirements for foundation model developers into a multi-level taxonomy: 87% are disclosures, yet only one requirement requires information be disclosed publicly. Using our coding as a lens, we juxtapose the AI Act with prior legislative proposals. While the proposals and the Act emphasize transparency, the Act lacks the public-facing transparency sought in previous proposals. While time will tell how the EU AI Act shapes global AI development and policymaking, our work helps to set expectations for its handling of foundation models.

## 1 Introduction

The growing importance of artificial intelligence (AI) catalyzes global policymaking efforts. Foremost of all these efforts is the European Union’s AI Act, which constitutes the first set of binding laws to comprehensively address AI. The AI Act continues an established tradition of EU policymaking on the digital technologies, evinced by GDPR (data privacy), the DSA (online platforms), and the DMA (digital markets). The AI took roughly five years from its formulation in 2020 through its negotiation in 2023 and its enactment in 2024. The AI Act will significantly impact not just EU, but also global, AI development and AI policy. In particular, it sets the definitive precedent for how policy will reckon with this fast-moving technology, though only time will reveal the nature of this impact.

In this work, we analyze the EU AI Act with a focus on foundation models and general-purpose AI. *General-purpose AI models* (GPAI models) are defined by the Act as “AI model, including where such an AI model is trained with a large amount of data using self-supervision at scale, that displays significant generality and is capable of competently performing a wide range of distinct tasks”. GPAI models, which are generally referred to as *foundation models* [Bommasani et al., 2021], have powered recent advances in artificial intelligence. Models like OpenAI’s GPT-4, Meta’s Llama 3, Google’s Gemini 1.5 and Anthropic’s Claude 3.5 are highly capable, resource intensive, and widely adopted. These models, and their developers, play an outsized role in defining the AI supply chain and mediating AI’s sweeping societal and economic impact. In turn, the Act’s treatment of these cutting-edge models reflects a cutting-edge policy approach worthy of deeper inspection.

To understand the AI Act in relation to foundation models, we *code* the obligations imposed upon their providers. Our coding organizes the obligations based on whether they require information disclosures or substantive actions, target all developers or specific subsets, and categorize who receives any disclosed information (e.g. the public vs. the EU AI Office). We count 31 requirements that apply to 4 classes of general-purpose artificial intelligence. Most requirements are information disclosures where developers provide information to either the government or downstream firms (84%). The four substantive requirements that compel a developer to take a particular action hinge on whether a model is designated as posing systemic risk. As of August 2024, we find that 8 models meet the default systemic risk criterion of  $10^{25}$  training FLOPs based on the estimates of Epoch

AI [2024], while only one model (OpenAI’s GPT-4) would have qualified at the time of legislative agreement in December 2023.

The foundation model requirements will go into effect on August 2, 2025, with the EU AI Office currently working on designing codes of practice to facilitate provider compliance. In the interim, we look back at the Act’s legislative process as an additional lens. In particular, we consider two proposals made during the Act’s negotiation in 2023. The first is from the European Parliament: this proposal was adopted by Parliament based on a decisive vote in June 2023 and functioned as its negotiating position in the AI Act negotiations in June to December 2023. The second is from Stanford researchers [Bommasani et al., 2023]: this proposal was put forth as a concrete solution for achieving compromise between the different EU legislators on December 1, 2023, just six days before when the Act was successfully negotiated on December 7.

We code the Parliament and Stanford proposals to facilitate a comparative analysis. We find that each of the three texts (i.e. the two proposals and the AI Act) primarily centers on information disclosure: the Parliament position and the Stanford proposal emphasize public-facing disclosure, whereas the AI Act includes just one public-facing disclosure requirement that is specific to general-purpose AI. The Stanford proposal and the AI Act share a two-tiered approach and consider many similar criteria for setting the threshold, yet the AI Act’s default criterion of compute diverges from the Stanford proposal’s focus on demonstrated market impact. Critically, while the AI Act includes many of the elements of the Stanford proposal, it lacks provisions for third-party researcher access to models. The non-inclusion is particularly interesting given that the EU guaranteed third-party researcher access for online platforms in the Digital Services Act. Through this juxtaposition, we identify key factors (e.g. limited public-facing transparency) that may limit the extent to which the EU AI Act significantly increases AI accountability.

## 2 Coding the EU AI Act

The legal text for the EU AI Act is an expansive 144 page document with 113 articles and 12 annexes. Overall, the Act takes a risk-based approach to AI governance, classifying AI systems into four categories based on the application area (prohibited, high-risk, limited risk, and minimal risk). Since foundation models are general-purpose technologies [Eloundou et al., 2024] that can be applied in many ways, these models are subject to a separate set of obligations.

Chapter V on General-Purpose AI Models (Articles 51 – 56), along with three supporting annexes (Annex XI – XIII), specifies the obligations for the providers of foundation models. These obligations vary significantly based on whether a model is classified as posing *systemic risk* (Articles 51 – 52). While the obligations for general-purpose AI take effect on August 2, 2025, the EU AI Office is tasked (Article 56) with preparing codes of practice by May 2, 2025 to facilitate compliance.

**Coding schema.** Given the Act’s complexity, we organize the requirements by coding them. To begin, we broke down large requirements into atomic units that we label with a short descriptor. For example, there are several elements that model providers are required to document such as information on model capabilities, evaluations, and risk mitigation. This yielded 25 requirements.

For each requirement, we tag the *type*, the *recipient*, and the *scope*. For the foundation model requirements, every requirement is typed as either *asubstantive* (i.e. the provider is required to implement a specific practice) or a *disclosure* (i.e. the provider is required to disclose information to some other party) requirement. For the subset of disclosure requirements, every requirement is tagged based on whether information must be disclosed to the public, to downstream firms that will integrate the foundation model, or to the government (i.e. the EU AI Office and national governments). For the scope, requirements could apply to (i) all providers, (ii) providers of open models without systemic risk, (iii) providers of non-open models without systemic risk, or (iv) providers of models with systemic risk.

**Takeaway 1: Overall focus on transparency.** Our coding makes clear that the focus of the EU AI Act requirements for foundation model providers is on increased transparency through information disclosure. 27 (87%) of the requirements are disclosures. These disclosures are primarily directed towards the government or to downstream firms. In sharp contrast, there is only one public-facing disclosure requirement. Consequently, in spite of the emphasis on increased information sharing, the

benefits of this disclosure are less certain given that researchers, journalists, and the broader public may not have access to information, in spite of their vital role in the accountability ecosystem.

The sole public-facing disclosure requirement states that providers must “draw up and make publicly available a sufficiently detailed summary about the content used for training of the general-purpose AI model”. This first-of-its-kind requirement could substantially increase overall transparency into training data, given the documented opacity specifically for model training data [Bommasani et al., 2024]. In turn, the EU AI Office’s template for this training data summary is a critical focus for determining what increased insight and accountability will come about due to this requirement. Warso et al. [2024] put forth a concrete and extensive proposal for what should be required.

**Takeaway 2: Substantive requirements mostly hinge on systemic risk designation.** In contrast to the large number of disclosure requirements, there are just four (13%) substantive requirements. Only one of these requirements, which requires providers to implement a policy to ensure adherence with copyright law, is required for all general-purpose AI models. The remaining three substantive requirements are only required for models designated as posing systemic risk.

The specific substantive obligations pertain to conducting model evaluations, mitigating possible risks, and implementing cybersecurity protections. As with the training data summary, the legislative language of the EU AI Act is significantly underspecified: for example, the requirement for model evaluations states that providers should “perform model evaluation in accordance with standardised protocols and tools reflecting the state of the art”. This introduces legal ambiguity on what technical actions would constitute compliance. Therefore, much as with the training data summary requirement, the work of the EU AI Office to clarify these expectations through their forthcoming codes of practice will be formative. The focus on evaluations, mitigations, and cybersecurity is also resonant with policy in other jurisdictions such as the US Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence [Executive Order 14110, 2023] and the G7 International Code of Conduct for Organizations Developing Advanced AI Systems [Group of Seven, 2023].

**Takeaway 3: Several models may be subject to compute-based systemic risk designation.** The default basis for designating a model as posing systemic risk is whether the cumulative training compute eclipses  $10^{25}$  FLOPs. In recognition of several known critiques of compute [Hooker, 2024], Annex XIII identifies alternative metrics the AI Office may consider such as data properties, evaluation results, number of business users, and number of registered end-users [see Bommasani, 2023]. In addition, the AI Act also creates a scientific panel of efforts that is empowered to alert the AI Office of models that may pose systemic risk, whether that is because they eclipse the compute threshold or for other reasons. Given that many of the most substantial requirements under the AI Act are apportioned to models posing systemic risk, the established thresholds and scientific panel’s actions will heavily shape compliance burdens.

Today, many of the most prominent foundation models are released without public disclosure of the amount of training compute [Bommasani et al., 2024]. Therefore, to understand the current threshold of  $10^{25}$  FLOPs, we turn to Epoch database on large models [Epoch AI, 2024], which estimates the compute for models and is widely recognized as the most authoritative public resource on the matter [Bengio et al., 2024]. As of August 2024, the database indicates that 8 models (Gemini 1.0 Ultra, Llama 3.1-405B, GPT-4, Mistral Large, Nemotron-4 340B, MegaScale, Inflection-2, Inflection-2.5) from 7 developers (Google, Meta, OpenAI, Mistral, NVIDIA, ByteDance, Inflection) were trained with a (potentially estimated) compute exceeding  $10^{25}$  FLOPs. This is particularly striking given that at the time of legislative agreement on the EU AI Act in December 2023, only one model (GPT-4 from OpenAI) met this criterion, indicating that the pace at which these thresholds are modified will be quite critical.

**Takeaway 4: Open foundation models receive a partial exemption.** Article 53 states that many of the obligations “do not apply to providers of AI models that are released under a free and open-source licence”, but that “this exception shall not apply to general-purpose AI models with systemic risks”. Further, the preamble of the Act explicitly justifies why open-source is subject to fewer requirements, articulating that open-source can “contribute to research and innovation in the market and can provide significant growth opportunities for the [European] Union economy”. These views align with the demonstrated track record for open-source software [Blind et al., 2021, Hoffmann et al., 2024] as well as work from both scientists [Kapoor et al., 2024, Vipra and Korinek, 2023] and commerce

agencies in other jurisdictions [UK Competition and Markets Authority, 2023, US Federal Trade Commission, 2024, US National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 2024].

The specific interpretation of what constitutes a “free and open-source” license is therefore consequential: the Act clarifies this as “when it allows users to run, copy, distribute, study, change and improve software and data, including models under the condition that the original provider of the model is credited, the identical or comparable terms of distribution are respected”. In particular, the term open-source has a widely accepted definition for code, maintained by the Open Source Initiative (OSI), but no established counterpart for artificial intelligence or model weights. The OSI is currently working to define open-source artificial intelligence,<sup>1</sup> but we highlight that many foundation models with widely available model weights are released under licenses that do not comply with the OSI standard for open-source software (e.g. BLOOM, Stable Diffusion 2, Mistral-7B, Llama 3).<sup>2</sup>

### 3 Comparison with Previous Proposals

To understand the evolution of the AI Act, we compare it to prior proposals made during the AI Act legislative process. In particular, given our focus on foundation models and general-purpose AI, we consider the European Parliament’s negotiated position from June 2023. This is the first formal EU position to introduce the subject of foundation models. In addition, we consider the proposal from Stanford researchers [Bommasani et al., 2023] aimed at supporting compromise during the legislative negotiation from December 1, 2023, six days prior to the Act’s negotiation on December 7, 2023.

**Takeaway 1: Different recipients of disclosures.** All three texts center transparency, but the Parliament and Stanford proposals near-exclusively focus on transparency to the public. The AI Act, however, includes only one public-facing disclosure with all other transparency requirements being aimed towards either the government or downstream firms. As we discussed previously, this means the AI Act’s contributions to advancing public understanding and AI accountability is likely to be weaker and less certain than what the Parliament and Stanford researchers envisioned.

**Takeaway 2: Multi-tier approach.** The Parliament proposal treats all providers equally, whereas the Stanford proposal and AI Act share the same structure of two tiers and a partial exemption for certain parties. The Stanford proposal recommends models being designated in the tier with more requirements if they have large demonstrated market impact, in line with the EU’s approach in the Digital Services Act, where online platforms are subject to more scrutiny when they have at least 45 million EU monthly active users. The AI Act acknowledges measures of demonstrated impact as possible criteria the AI Office use, but instead default to using a compute-based threshold akin to the US [Executive Order 14110, 2023].

**Takeaway 3: No independent researcher access.** The Stanford proposal recommends guarantees that high-impact foundation models be accessible to independent researchers, given the demonstrated value of such research [Guha et al., 2023]. Such guarantees would emulate the EU Digital Services Act, which facilitates research of otherwise-opaque online platforms (e.g. to understand content moderation practices or the spread of disinformation) to advance the public interest. However, the AI Act does not contain such provisions, which is particularly relevant in light of recent calls from researchers for safe harbors to conduct research on issues and harms associated with foundation models [Longpre et al., 2024].

### 4 Conclusion

The EU AI Act is a seminal achievement in AI policy as the world’s first comprehensive laws on AI. We analyze the Act’s legal text to increase clarity as we await the Act’s implementation, enforcement, and impact. We hope our work catalyzes greater scientific engagement in policymaking to yield superior evidence-based AI policy and better public outcomes.

<sup>1</sup>As of August 2024, the latest version is v0.0.8: see <https://opensource.org/deepdive/drafts>.

<sup>2</sup>In most cases, this is because these licenses impose use restrictions on the entities who can use the model or the purposes they use model for: these violate the OSI’s criteria 5 and 6 about not discriminating on who can use the model and for what endeavors.

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