How Much Can a Query Reveal? Structural Knowledge Stealing from Graph RAG via Traversal Reconstruction

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Abstract

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has become a popular paradigm for enhancing large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge. Recent advances have extended this framework to structured data, leading to the emergence of Graph RAG systems that retrieve and reason over knowledge graphs. Despite their widespread applications, the privacy implications of such systems remain largely unexplored. In this work, we investigate a critical privacy vulnerability in Graph RAG systems: a significant portion of inherent structural knowledge can be easily exploited by malicious adversaries through carefully crafted queries, even under the black-box setting. We propose a query-based attack strategy that efficiently reconstructs knowledge graph including node-level and topology-level information, leveraging breadth-first traversal for untargeted attack and depth-first traversal for targeted attack. Experiments on generic and healthcare scenarios show that our method can recover over 90% of the original knowledge graph from representative Graph RAG systems, exposing sensitive information with high fidelity. We further evaluate the efficacy of existing defense strategies and discuss primary challenges of safeguarding Graph RAG pipelines. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic study of privacy risks in Graph RAG systems. Our findings underscore the urgent need for privacy-aware mechanisms in current graph retrieval-augmented AI systems.

1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across numerous natural language processing tasks. However, LLMs still have substantial limitations when facing scenarios that necessites domain-specific knowledge and complex reasoning, prone to providing hallucinatory or obsolete responses. To mitigate these issues, retrieval augmented generation (RAG) can enhance the factuality and explainability of LLM generation by incorporating relevant knowledge from external datastores, *e.g.*, knowledge graphs(KGs). As large-scale knowledge sources, KGs offer structured, editable and explicit real-world knowledge, presenting a promising solution to mitigate the hallucination Shuster et al. (2021) of LLMs. Recent advances Jiang et al. (2023); Guo et al. (2024); Luo et al. (2024); Sun et al. (2024); Wang et al. (2024b); Xu et al. (2024); Nguyen et al. (2024); Wen et al. (2024) have explored the usage of KGs to facilitate faithful and interpretable LLM reasoning, which can be roughly categorized into retrieval-based approaches and agent-based approaches. Retrieval-based methods Wen et al. (2024); Wang et al. (2024b) directly incorporate external knowledge as factual evidences into text prompts for LLM generation, while agent-based methods Luo et al. (2024); Sun et al. (2024) allow LLMs to interactively explore relevant entities and relations on KGs for step-by-step reasoning.

Despite their advanced performance, the risk of privacy leakage in KG-augmented LLMs have not been fully investigated. Intuitively, RAG systems should provide a solution to eliminate privacy leakage. Since external knowledge is retrieved to augment LLM generation, users can only receive LLM responses without access to private data in the knowledge base. However, recent studies demonstrate that adversary could extract private information from external knowledge base by crafting sophisticated queries. Qi et al. (2024) exploit LLM's instruction-following capabilities to extract text data verbatim via prompt injection attacks. Zeng et al. (2024) proposed a structured prompting attack

to extract text data verbatim via prompt injection attacks. Zeng et al. (2024) proposed a structured prompting attack to extract specific private information from the knowledge base, further claiming that RAG substantially reduce the memorization leakage of LLMs. Jiang et al. (2024) proposed *RAG-Thief*, an agent-based automated privacy attack to progressively extract private data from the knowledge base. A self-improving mechanism is employed to continuously retrieve private knowledge pieces with new adversary queries. Although existing studies have revealed privacy risks of RAG systems, few works investigate the efficacy of such attack strategies on structured knowledge bases such as knowledge graphs. Unlike vanilla RAG approaches, graph RAG primarily perform complex reasoning with structured knowledge, which consists of entities and their relationships. Under this scenario, nodes in the graph are connected by factual evidence and logical associations, rather than merely contextual semantic similarity. This significant distinction severly limits the efficacy of existing approaches Qi et al. (2024); Jiang et al. (2024), which leverage the instruction-following abilities of LLMs to achieve document extraction. Compared with continuous document segments, these methods struggle to infer complete contexts from discontinuous knowledge bases. Furthermore, the associations in a knowledge graph exhibit complex and domain-specific topological patterns Pan et al. (2024), making it challenging to traverse all nodes in a linear sequence for reconstructing the entire graph.



Figure 1: Adversarial queries exploit the retriever–LLM pipeline to expose sensitive node and edge information, which can be iteratively expanded to reconstruct the underlying private graph.

In this work, we introduce a novel privacy extraction attack against graph RAG, which induces LLMs to progressively recover the entire knowledge graph by injecting structure-aware adversarial instructions. We leverage our attack strategy to systematically investigate the vulnerability of existing graph RAG systems, including retrieval-based and agent-based RAG paradigms. Specifically, we design two attack strategies tailored to these systems, including targeted attack which aims to extract specific knowledge from the knowledge graph, and untargeted attack which seeks to recover as much of the graph as possible. For the targeted attack, we use Depth-First Search (DFS) to reach the target node as quickly as possible, prioritizing deep traversal paths that may directly lead to the desired information. For the untargeted attack, we adopt Breadth-First Search (BFS) to efficiently explore knowledge graph by starting from an anchor entity and traversing multi-hop entities in a radial manner., thereby maximizing overall coverage and ensuring thorough reconstruction of the whole graph. We conduct comprehensive experiments to evaluate the efficacy of privacy extraction attack in generic and healthcare scenarios. Our attack strategy can reconstruct over 90% of knowledge graph from representative graph RAG systems, indicating the critical risk of privacy leakage induced by such an attack. We further explore the impact of retrieval methods, LLMs, scale of the graphs and traversal strategies. Moreover, we evaluate the effect of potential defense solutions, including protective system prompt and output window restriction. We analyze the limitation of these approaches and discuss significant challenges of safeguarding privacy of graph RAG systems. Our contribution are presented as follows:

- To the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic study of privacy risks in Graph RAG systems. We show that a large amount of structural knowledge can be easily extracted with sophisticated graph-aware queries.
- We propose a query-based attack method to efficiently reconstruct knowledge graph with sensitive information extracted by breadth-first and depth-first traversal strategies.
- We analyze the impact of retrieval paradigms, knowledge graph sizes and traversal methods on attack performance, and discuss the limitation of existing defense approaches.

2 Related Work

2.1 KG-augmented LLM Reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated extraodinary abilities, but they still suffer from hallucination and knowledge gaps. To mitigate these issues, recent works incorportate knowledge graphs (KGs) to enhance LLM reasoning with structured knowledge. Given the interaction mechanisms between KG and LLM, previous KG-augmented LLM reasoning methods can be roughly categorized into *retrieval-based* and *agent-based* methods. In terms of retrived-based methods, KGP Wang et al. (2024b) leveraged the logical associations between multiple documents with a knowledge graph in prompting LLMs for multi-document question answering. KnowGPT Zhang et al. (2024) converted informative knowledge from knowledge graph into effective LLM prompts. Chain-of-Knowledge Wang et al. (2024a) decomposed LLM's thinking steps into structured evidences grounded by KGs to encourage faithful reasoning. Agent-based methods enable knowledge graph retrieval in a more adaptive manner. ToG Sun et al. (2024) exploited LLM as an agent to iteratively explore reasoning paths on KG leading to the correct answers. RoG Luo et al. (2024) formulated a planning-retrieval-reasoning framework to conduct reasoning with faithful plans based on KGs. PoG Chen et al. (2024) incorporated a self-correcting reflection paradigm and adaptive KG exploration into LLM reasoning. Numerous studies have focused on the faithfulness and explainability of LLM reasoning with KG evidences, leaving security risks of KG-augmented LLMs serverly under-explored. In this work, we focus on studying the privacy leakage of external knowledge in KG-grounded RAG systems.

2.2 Privacy Risk of Large Language Models.

A plenty of studies Carlini et al. (2021); Lee et al. (2023); Biderman et al. (2023); Zeng et al. (2023) have indicated that LLMs are prone to memorizing and revealing information from pre-training and fine-tuning data. When external knowledge is integrated to formulate LLM's responses, knowledge datastores should be kept private, which could increase privacy risks. Huang et al. (2023) first demonstrated that private datastores induce higher privacy risks in retrieval-based language models. Qi et al. (2024) leveraged prompt injection attacks to extract text data from the datastore of RAG systems built with a wide range of open-source LLMs. However, attack success rate significantly drops when lacking background knowledge about the datastore. Zeng et al. (2024) demonstrated the vulnerability of RAG systems on privacy leakage with adversarial prompts, where specific private data can be extracted with structured query. However, it failed to reconstruct the entire knowledge base. *RAG-Thief* Jiang et al. (2024) introduced an agent-based automated attack, which extracts scalable amounts of private data from RAG knowledge bases. Despite considerable attack performance achieved by existing methods, few works investigate how to reconstruct the entire knowledge graph.

3 Method

3.1 Problem Definition

Graph RAG Systems. We define a Graph RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) system as a pipeline where a user-issued natural language query q is processed to retrieve relevant subgraphs from a structured knowledge graph $\mathcal{G}$. These subgraphs—typically centered around an *anchor node*—are then passed to a large language model (LLM) to generate an answer. Depending on the implementation, retrieval can be based on vector similarity (e.g., via dense embedding search) or symbolic reasoning (e.g., agent-based traversal). Despite architectural differences, these systems share a common structure: graph-based retrieval followed by LLM-based generation.

Threat Model. We adopt a *black-box* threat model in which the attacker has no access to the internal architecture, training data, or parameters of the system. The attacker can only interact with the system through public interfaces (e.g., APIs), issuing a series of crafted queries $q_1, q_2, \ldots, q_T$ and observing the corresponding responses. The goal is to extract sensitive information from the underlying knowledge graph $\mathcal{G}$, either by reconstructing large portions of its structure (untargeted attack) or by acquiring specific facts about a target node (targeted attack).



Figure 2: The attacker begins with an adversarial prompt to retrieve the neighborhood of an anchor node (node 1). The LLM responds with connected nodes and relations, from which node and edge information is extracted and incrementally added to the reconstructed graph. A history buffer tracks past interactions, while a frontier queue manages unexplored nodes. This iterative process continues with query generation for the next round, gradually expanding the recovered graph layer by layer.

3.2 Knowledge Extraction Methodology

As shown in the figure, Graph RAG systems typically consist of multiple stages. They usually begin by processing the input query to identify an **anchor node** in the knowledge graph. Once the anchor node is located, the system explores the surrounding graph structure to retrieve relevant information. This retrieved information, along with the original query, is then passed to the LLM, which generates the final answer. Our attack method leverages this multi-stage pipeline to efficiently extract sensitive knowledge. Specifically, we propose two types of attacks: Untargeted Attack and Targeted Attack.

Untargeted Attack. In this setting, the attacker aims to extract as much information as possible from the knowledge graph, without focusing on specific targets. The goal is to reconstruct the graph structure by issuing a series of carefully crafted queries that collectively reveal large portions of the underlying graph.

To maximize efficiency, we adopt a **Breadth-First Search (BFS)** strategy. The process begins when the attacker issues an initial query q to the Graph RAG system, which returns an anchor node $v_0 = \text{QueryProcess}(q)$ relevant to the query.

After identifying the anchor node, the attacker proceeds to explore its immediate connections. Specifically, the system is prompted to return all directly linked neighbors, along with their relation types:

$$\mathcal{N}(v) = \{(v', r) \mid (v, r, v') \in \mathcal{G}\} \tag{1}$$

Here, $\mathcal{G}$ denotes the underlying knowledge graph, v is the current node, v' is a neighboring node, and r is the edge relation.

Finally, the attacker iteratively expands a frontier of discovered nodes. At each iteration t, the current frontier F_t is expanded by querying the unexplored neighbors of all nodes in F_t:

$$F_{t+1} = \bigcup_{v \in F_t} (\mathcal{N}(v) \setminus \mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}}) \tag{2}$$

where $\mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}}$ represents the set of nodes already explored. This layer-by-layer traversal enables broad structural recovery of the hidden graph.

Targeted Attack. In contrast, the goal of a targeted attack is to extract specific information about a designated node v^* in the knowledge graph. To reach this node efficiently, we adopt a **Depth-First Search (DFS)** strategy that prioritizes deep traversal paths.

The attack begins with target node specification, where the attacker crafts a query q to guide the system toward the intended node, denoted as $v^* = \text{TargetSelect}(q)$

Starting from the anchor node v_0, the attacker issues a sequence of follow-up queries to discover a directed path leading to v^*. DFS is used to explore semantically relevant chains that are more likely to reach the target efficiently. The path can be expressed as:

$$\text{Path}(v_0 \to v^*) = \{v_0, v_1, \ldots, v^*\}, \text{where } (v_i, r_i, v_{i+1}) \in \mathcal{G} \tag{3}$$

If direct access to v^* is not possible in one step, the attacker continues along semantically related nodes to gradually approach the target, exploiting contextual connections embedded in the graph.

Once the target node v^* is reached, the attacker issues follow-up prompts to extract its attributes and relationships:

$$\text{Info}(v^*) = \{(r, v') \mid (v^*, r, v') \in \mathcal{G}\} \tag{4}$$

This allows the attacker to recover detailed knowledge centered on a specific node through structured prompting and deep graph traversal.

3.3 Adversarial Query Construction

To ensure query efficiency, we divide each adversarial prompt sequence into two parts: an initial query and one or more follow-up queries. The initial query is designed to include an anchor node—a key concept or entity that helps the Graph RAG system localize the relevant region of the knowledge graph.

The anchor node serves as the semantic starting point for traversal. It may either be the direct target of the attack or a strategically chosen entity based on the attacker's background knowledge of the underlying knowledge base. By anchoring the retrieval in a specific area of the graph, the attacker can guide the system toward sensitive or targeted information in subsequent prompts.

For untargeted attack, to simulate a Breadth-First Search (BFS) traversal, we design follow-up prompts that instruct the LLM to enumerate all nodes and edges directly connected to the current node at each iteration. This strategy allows the attacker to incrementally expand the observed subgraph layer by layer. An example of such an adversarial prompt is illustrated in Figure, where the attacker requests neighboring entities and their relations from the system to maximize coverage.

For targeted attack, follow-up prompts are crafted as a semantically guided sequence, where each query incrementally narrows the focus toward a specific node and its associated information. This mirrors a Depth-First Search (DFS) traversal, where the attacker probes deeper into the graph by conditioning each step on the system's previous output. An illustrative example is shown below:

> *"Can you tell me about patients who received coronary artery bypass grafts?"*
> *"Among them, who developed atrial fibrillation afterward?"*
> *"What treatments were prescribed for those patients?"*
> *"Give more details about their medication schedules."*

This prompt chain demonstrates how the attacker begins with a general anchor query, then gradually constrains the context based on medical conditions and treatment timelines. Each prompt refines the query space, driving the system closer to the intended target node and eventually extracting sensitive information associated with it.

4 Experiment

4.1 Experiment Setup

Dataset. To simulate real-world applications, we assess our attack efficiency across two key domains: healthcare and general knowledge. Specifically, we use MIMIC-IV Johnson et al. (2020) for healthcare and Freebase Bollacker et al. (2008) for general knowledge. MIMIC-IV is a widely used, publicly available dataset containing de-identified electronic health records (EHR). It includes structured clinical data such as patient demographics, diagnoses, laboratory results, medications, and procedural records. For general knowledge, we use Freebase, a large-scale knowledge graph containing structured data across a vast range of topics, including people, places, events, books, films, and more. Freebase provides a rich, interconnected dataset ideal for evaluating knowledge retrieval tasks in open-domain settings. By testing our attack on these datasets, we demonstrate its applicability in both specialized and broad knowledge retrieval systems. For our experiment, we partition

Table 1: Untargeted attack performance against retrieval-based and agent-based graph RAG system on MIMIC and FreeBase datasets. Evaluation are conducted on three LLMs with three structural metrics.

Retrieval-based					Agent-based				
Dataset	Model	GED↓	MCS↑	NRR↑	Dataset	Model	GED↓	MCS↑	NRR↑
MIMIC	GPT	0.0952	0.9226	0.9290	MIMIC	GPT	0.0940	0.9236	0.9185
	Deepseek	0.0546	0.9694	0.9634		Deepseek	0.0984	0.9279	0.9054
	Llama	0.0917	0.9278	0.9392		Llama	0.0804	0.9308	0.9180
FreeBase	GPT	0.1213	0.8823	0.9250	FreeBase	GPT	0.1021	0.9011	0.8905
	Deepseek	0.1312	0.8735	0.9139		Deepseek	0.0982	0.9193	0.9089
	Llama	0.1370	0.8832	0.9094		Llama	0.1132	0.8821	0.8974

these two large-scale knowledge graphs into smaller, recoverable subgraphs. This approach allows us to analyze the effectiveness of our attack in a controlled setting while preserving the structural integrity and retrieval characteristics of the original graphs. The details can be seen in appendix A.2

Metrics. For untargeted attack, we use three commonly applied metrics: Graph Edit Distance (GED) Gao et al. (2010), Maximum Common Subgraph (MCS) Raymond et al. (2002), and Node Recovery Rate (NRR). GED measures the similarity between two graphs G_1 and G_2 by calculating the minimum number of edit operations (e.g., node/edge additions, deletions, or substitutions) required to transform one graph into another:

$$\mathrm{GED}(G_1, G_2) = \min_{\pi \in \Pi} \sum_{(u,v)\in\pi} c(u, v) \tag{5}$$

where Π represents all possible sequences of edit operations, and $c(u, v)$ denotes the cost of modifying element u into v. A lower GED indicates higher structural similarity. MCS quantifies the largest common subgraph shared by two graphs:

$$MCS(G_1, G_2) = \max_{G' \subseteq G_1, G' \subseteq G_2} |V(G')| \tag{6}$$

where G' is the largest shared subgraph and $|V(G')|$ its number of vertices. NRR provides an intuitive measure of node-level recovery:

$$NRR = \frac{|V_{G_1} \cap V_{G_2}|}{|V_{G_1}|} \tag{7}$$

where V_{G_1} and V_{G_2} are the node sets of the original and recovered graphs. Higher NRR indicates better recovery of graph content. For targeted attack, we use the F1 score as the evaluation metric, where a higher F1 reflects more effective recovery of target-specific information. The details can be seen in AppendixA.1

Models. We evaluate our method on three commonly used and safety-aligned models, including LLaMA3-8B, DeepSeek-V3, and ChatGPT-4o. These models are selected to represent a range of model scales and architectures. By testing across different parameter sizes and alignment strategies, we aim to demonstrate the generality and robustness of our attack method.

4.2 Results of Untargeted Attack

We evaluate the performance of our untargeted attack across two types of Graph RAG systems—vector-based (Light RAG) and agent-based (ToG)—on both medical (MIMIC-IV) and general-domain (Freebase) datasets. The results are measured using three standard metrics: Graph Edit Distance (GED), Maximum Common Subgraph (MCS), and Node Recovery Rate (NRR). Tables 1 summarize overall attack results.

Overall Attack Effectiveness. Across all settings, adversarial queries reconstruct substantial portions of the graphs. High MCS and NRR values, combined with relatively low GED scores, confirm that our method effectively recovers both node content and structural relations using only black-box access.

Impact of Retrieval System Type. Vector-based systems (Light RAG) are generally more vulnerable than agent-based systems (ToG). They achieve higher average MCS and NRR, indicating broader



Figure 4: Attack efficiency across traversal strategies (BFS, DFS, RW) on MIMIC and Freebase.

graph exposure. In contrast, ToG shows slightly stronger resistance due to its step-by-step traversal behavior, which limits the amount of information revealed per query.

Consistency Across LLMs. Although different models show variations, the attack remains consistently effective, suggesting that the vulnerability stems primarily from the retrieval mechanism rather than specific LLM internals.

Dataset Sensitivity. Recovery is stronger on MIMIC than Freebase. The structured, domain-specific nature of MIMIC forces LLMs to rely more directly on retrieved content, yielding cleaner graph-local structures. Freebase, by contrast, overlaps heavily with LLM pretraining knowledge, leading models to hallucinate or blend internal knowledge with retrieved results, which reduces recovery fidelity.

Overall, these findings demonstrate that black-box adversarial prompts can reliably extract graph-structured knowledge across domains, retrieval types, and LLM backends, highlighting a systemic privacy risk in Graph RAG systems.

4.3 Results of Targeted Attack

Table 3 presents the performance of our targeted attack on both retrieval-based and agent-based Graph RAG systems using the MIMIC dataset. We evaluate the results using standard classification metrics: Precision, Recall, and F1 score. Overall, the attack demonstrates strong effectiveness across all system-model combinations, with F1 scores consistently above 0.86. The agent-based systems exhibit slightly higher resilience, but not significantly so—indicating that both types of architectures are susceptible to targeted information leakage under black-box prompting.

Figure 3: Targeted attack performance against retrieval-based and agent-based Graph RAG systems on MIMIC dataset.

Graph RAG system	Model	Precision↑	Recall↑	F1↑
Retrieval-based	GPT	0.9117	0.8845	0.8981
	Deepseek	0.8751	0.8659	0.8703
	Llama	0.8901	0.8798	0.8842
Agent-based	GPT	0.9251	0.9097	0.9172
	Deepseek	0.8802	0.8652	0.8721
	Llama	0.8952	0.8897	0.8924

Among the tested models, GPT achieves the highest F1 scores in both system settings (0.898 in retrieval-based and 0.912 in agent-based), suggesting that its output tends to be more consistent and complete when answering entity-specific queries. Llama also performs reliably, though with slightly lower recall. Deepseek shows modestly lower performance, especially in the retrieval-based setting, potentially due to stricter generation behavior or more conservative coverage.

These results confirm that even without direct access to the graph structure, an attacker can extract accurate and detailed information about a target node through iterative prompting. This highlights the need for fine-grained access control and prompt-aware mitigation mechanisms in systems using LLMs over structured data.

4.4 Ablation Study

Traversal Method. We investigate how different graph traversal strategies influence the performance of untargeted attacks. Specifically, we compare our Breadth-First Search (BFS) approach

with two strategies: Depth-First Search (DFS) and a Random Walk (RW). All methods are executed under the same query budget and initialized from identical anchor nodes to ensure fairness.

As shown in Figure 4, BFS consistently achieves the optimal NRR and MCS across both MIMIC and Freebase, indicating broader and more accurate reconstruction of the knowledge graph. For example, on larger graphs in MIMIC, BFS achieves an NRR above 0.85, whereas DFS and RW fall below 0.75 and 0.60 respectively. BFS also yields the lowest GED, implying minimal deviation from the original graph structure. The advantage of BFS lies in its ability to systematically explore the graph layer by layer, which aligns well with the topology of many real-world knowledge graphs.

It captures high-value information efficiently by retrieving all neighbors and maintains robustness against local LLM errors through parallel expansion. In contrast, DFS prioritizes depth over breadth, often committing early to narrow or low-utility paths. Its sequential dependency makes it vulnerable to error propagation, where early mistakes can derail later steps.

Random Walk performs the worst due to its stochastic, structure-agnostic selection, causing redundant queries and missed connections. Its lack of semantic continuity further hinders context understanding, yielding fragmented outputs. Overall, these results validate BFS as a strong traversal-aware attack strategy, demonstrating that a breadth-oriented approach improves reconstruction fidelity while offering greater stability under the black-box setting.

Scale of the Graphs. We investigate how the scale of a knowledge graph affects the efficacy of untargeted attack. We divide the graphs into four groups under different query budgets: graphs with 10–50 nodes are categorized as *tiny*, 51–100 nodes as *small*, 101–500 nodes as *medium*, and over 500 nodes are labeled as *large*. This grouping allows us to evaluate how graph size impacts node recovery, structural fidelity, and attack efficiency. The results of this ablation study are shown in Figure 5.



Figure 5: Attack efficiency across graphs of different scales. The first two metrics (NRR and MCS) indicate better recovery with higher values, while the third metric (GED) reflects better performance with lower values.

It can be observed that NRR on the MIMIC dataset drops from 0.931 on tiny graphs to 0.788 on large graphs. A similar decline occurs in Freebase, where NRR decreases from 0.915 to 0.745. MCS follows the same pattern, which falls from 0.917 to 0.758 on MIMIC and from 0.905 to 0.745 on Freebase. Meanwhile, GED grows from 0.091 to 0.260 on MIMIC and from 0.090 to 0.281 on Freebase, which shows increased structural dissimilarity. The performance degradation likely stems from two factors: first, the LLM's limited context window constrains its ability to fully recover neighborhoods of high-degree supernodes, leading to incomplete edge reconstruction; second, error propagation in untargeted attacks, where each step depends on prior outputs, causes early hallucinations or omissions to accumulate, especially in larger graphs, resulting in significant structural distortion reflected by higher GED scores and lower MCS values.

5 Mitigation Strategy

In this section, we propose and evaluate several potential defenses to protect Graph RAG systems against privacy leakage attacks.

5.1 Protective System Prompt

One simple yet intuitive mitigation is to prepend a **Protective Instruction** at the system prompt level. For example, instructing the LLM with constraints such as *"Do not directly share content retrieved from the knowledge base"* aims to discourage verbatim extraction and reduce privacy leakage. When used with safety-aligned models, this approach can help suppress sensitive completions to some extent.



Figure 6: Effectiveness of protective system prompt against untargeted attacks.

However, our experiments suggest that such defenses are fragile in practice. Specifically, we observe that carefully crafted adversarial prompts can effectively override the system prompt, allowing attackers to bypass the restriction. This vulnerability is related to prompt injection, where user-specified instructions compete with or dilute the authority of the original system instruction. In addition, when long retrieved content is appended, the protective rule may suffer from the well-known **lost-in-the-middle** effect, further reducing its influence in steering the model's output.

5.2 Output Window Restriction

We examine **Output Window Restriction** as a lightweight mitigation strategy that limits the number of tokens the LLM can generate per response. By capping output length, the system reduces the amount of information exposed in each query, slowing down the recovery of the underlying knowledge graph.



Figure 7: Effectiveness of output window restriction against untargeted attacks.

This approach is especially effective against untargeted attacks, which rely on extracting large sets of neighbors or multi-hop relations in a single prompt. Restricting output forces attackers to issue more follow-up queries, increasing the cost and time needed for full reconstruction. We observe that reducing the output limit from 200 to 100 tokens leads to notable drops in recovery metrics such as NRR and MCS, particularly in large graphs with high-degree nodes.

However, the defense has limitations. For small graphs, even short responses may fully expose the structure. Truncated outputs may also degrade the quality of legitimate answers, especially in complex domains like healthcare. Moreover, attackers can bypass the constraint through query chaining or continuation prompts. While output restriction increases resistance, it is best used in combination with other defenses for comprehensive protection.

5.3 Toward Stronger Defenses

While our explored defenses—such as protective system prompts and output window restriction—offer useful first steps, they are not sufficient to guarantee robust protection against determined adversaries. A more promising direction is to embed differential privacy into the retrieval or generation process, so that the influence of any individual node or edge on the final output remains statistically negligible. Injecting calibrated noise in this way can provide provable privacy guarantees, though balancing utility with privacy remains a key challenge. Complementing this, adaptive filtering mechanisms could monitor query behavior in real time and identify patterns suggestive of systematic graph traversal, allowing the system to throttle, sanitize, or block suspicious outputs before significant leakage occurs. Beyond monitoring, structural perturbation of the knowledge graph itself—such as controlled noise injection or selective edge rewiring—can make it substantially harder for an attacker to reconstruct the original graph while still preserving retrieval accuracy for benign queries. Taken together, these approaches illustrate how stronger defenses may emerge from combining theoretical guarantees, dynamic monitoring, and structural obfuscation, rather than relying on a single mitigation in isolation.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we propose a query-based attack method that effectively reconstructs large portions of the underlying structured knowledge from existing graph RAG systems, including untargeted knowledge graph reconstruction and targeted sensitive knowledge extraction. Through systematic evaluation and analysis, we demonstrate that Graph RAG systems are vulnerable to privacy leakage, even under black-box settings. Our results highlight the critical privacy risks posed by seemingly innocuous queries and underscore the need for more comprehensive defense mechanisms in retrieval-augmented generation systems.

7 Reproducibility and Ethics Statement

To ensure reproducibility, the source code for all experiments is available at `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Graph-Rag-Privacy-0F45`. Instructions for running the code and reproducing results are provided in the repository's README. This work uses the MIMIC-IV dataset (Johnson et al., 2020), a de-identified critical care database accessible via PhysioNet under a Data Use Agreement. Access was granted after completing the CITI "Data or Specimens Only Research" training. The dataset complies with HIPAA regulations to protect patient privacy, and no new human subjects research was conducted. We acknowledge potential demographic imbalances in the dataset and mitigated them through stratified sampling to ensure fairness across patient groups. This study adheres to the ICLR Code of Ethics, with no conflicts of interest or sponsorship influencing the results.

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A Detailed Experiment Setup

A.1 Metrics Details

For untargeted attacks, the adversary's goal is to reconstruct as much of the underlying knowledge graph as possible, without focusing on any specific target entity. To measure the fidelity of reconstruction, we adopt three complementary structural metrics that capture different perspectives of similarity between the original graph G and the reconstructed graph $\hat{G}$. First, we use Graph Edit Distance (GED), which quantifies the minimum number of edit operations—such as node or edge insertions, deletions, and label substitutions—required to transform $\hat{G}$ into G. To ensure comparability across graphs of different sizes, we report normalized GED by dividing the observed edit cost by the maximum possible cost; lower values indicate higher structural similarity. Second, we compute the Maximum Common Subgraph (MCS), which reflects the size of the largest subgraph shared by both G and $\hat{G}$. This value is normalized by the size of the original graph, and it highlights the attacker's ability to recover not just isolated elements but also coherent structural patterns. Finally, we calculate the Node Recovery Rate (NRR), defined as the fraction of original nodes in G that also

appear in $\hat{G}$. This provides a straightforward measure of how complete the attacker's reconstruction is at the node level, independent of precise edge structure. Taken together, GED emphasizes structural accuracy, MCS captures subgraph preservation, and NRR reflects overall coverage.

For targeted attacks, the objective shifts from broad reconstruction to the recovery of specific sensitive nodes and their associated information. We consider an attack successful if the intended target node is identified in the reconstructed graph, and evaluate the quality of this process using standard classification-style metrics. Precision measures the proportion of correctly recovered targets among all nodes predicted as targets by the attack, indicating how reliable the predictions are. Recall measures the proportion of true target nodes that are successfully retrieved, capturing the completeness of the attacker's discovery. Since high precision often comes at the cost of low recall and vice versa, we additionally report the F1-score, the harmonic mean of the two, which balances correctness and completeness in a single value. This combination of metrics allows us to capture both the accuracy and the robustness of targeted attacks, offering a comprehensive evaluation of how effectively sensitive information can be extracted.

A.2 Dataset Details

We rely on two large-scale knowledge graphs, MIMIC-IV in the healthcare domain and Freebase in the open-domain setting. Directly operating on the entire graphs is infeasible for controlled evaluation, as they contain millions of nodes and edges, and the retrieval systems themselves typically operate on localized subgraphs rather than the full graph at once. To make the evaluation both practical and meaningful, we partition the original graphs into smaller, recoverable subgraphs.

For the MIMIC-IV dataset, we partition the graph by centering each subgraph around an individual patient node. Specifically, for each patient, we include their connected diagnoses, prescriptions, demographic attributes, and other related medical entities. This patient-centric partitioning ensures that the subgraphs reflect realistic clinical contexts, where medical knowledge is naturally organized around individual patients. It also preserves semantic coherence, as each subgraph corresponds to a meaningful unit of medical information that could be retrieved in practice.

For the Freebase dataset, we adopt a different strategy due to its open-domain and heterogeneous nature. Here, we randomly sample connected subgraphs to capture diverse entity clusters. These subgraphs often contain entities related by semantically meaningful relations such as people–places–events or works–authors–topics, but the sampling process is not anchored to a single central node as in MIMIC. This approach allows us to simulate retrieval from a broad, less structured knowledge base while preserving graph connectivity and diversity.

Across both datasets, we construct subgraphs of varying sizes, ranging from tens to several hundred nodes. This range enables us to analyze how graph scale impacts the effectiveness of untargeted and targeted attacks. By keeping the sampled subgraphs structurally faithful to the original graphs—dense in the case of MIMIC-IV's patient records and heterogeneous in the case of Freebase—we ensure that our evaluation results are representative of real-world Graph RAG behavior. This partitioning strategy thus balances experimental feasibility with representational fidelity, allowing us to uncover vulnerabilities under controlled yet realistic conditions.

Table 2: Distribution of partitioned subgraphs by size category for MIMIC-IV and Freebase datasets.

Dataset	**Tiny (10–50)**	**Small (51–100)**	**Medium (101–500)**	**Large (>500)**
MIMIC-IV	26.2%	37.5%	29.7	6.6%
Freebase	25.3%	34.2%	22.9%	22.4%

B Supplymental Algorithms

Algorithm1 illustrates the untargeted graph reconstruction process using a queue-based BFS strategy. Starting from an anchor node obtained via the initial query, the algorithm maintains a frontier queue of nodes to explore. At each iteration, a node is dequeued, and its neighbors and edges are retrieved through the Graph RAG API. Newly discovered nodes are enqueued if they have not been

visited, while all retrieved edges are accumulated to gradually reconstruct the graph. A history buffer records recent queries and partial graphs, enabling the system to generate the next query more effectively. The process continues for a number of rounds, ultimately outputting the reconstructed graph structure.

Algorithm2 describes the targeted graph reconstruction procedure using a stack-based DFS approach. Similar to the untargeted case, the process begins with an anchor node, but the traversal is guided toward a specific target node. At each step, the algorithm pops a node from the stack, queries its neighbors, and pushes unexplored nodes back into the stack, driving the exploration deeper along promising paths. The history buffer and partial graph reconstruction help refine follow-up queries, focusing search toward the target. Once the designated node is reached, the algorithm extracts its attributes and relationships, consolidating them into the final recovered information. If the target node cannot be reached within the maximum depth, the output is empty, reflecting an unsuccessful attack.

C Case Study

To further illustrate the practicality of our attack strategies, we present two representative cases.

Untargeted Attack. In this setting, the adversary issues a generic query that requests all neighbors of a given node in the knowledge graph. As shown in the example, simply querying the Patient node, the system reveals multiple sensitive attributes including diagnosis, admission history, gender, and age. The attacker does not need any prior knowledge about the specific target; instead, breadth-first traversal combined with such local neighborhood queries allows reconstruction of a large portion of the hidden graph. This demonstrates how seemingly innocuous queries can collectively lead to significant privacy leakage.

Targeted Attack. In contrast, the targeted attack aims to uncover information about a specific medical condition and its treatment pathway for the target patient. The attacker starts from a high-level query about patients undergoing a coronary artery bypass graft (CABG), then progressively narrows the search scope. Each follow-up query leverages the previous answer, mirroring a depth-first search strategy. As shown in the case study, the attacker is able to pinpoint Patient, trace their episode of atrial fibrillation, extract treatment details, and finally recover the full medication schedule. This multi-round interaction highlights the effectiveness of semantically guided queries in exposing highly sensitive and fine-grained personal information.

These demonstration cases demonstrate that both untargeted and targeted strategies pose severe privacy risks to Graph RAG systems. While the former excels at broad structural recovery, the latter is particularly dangerous in extracting precise, patient-specific details.

D The Use Of LLM

This work utilized LLMs for minor text polishing of specific sections to enhance clarity and readability. No content generation or substantive editing was performed by the model.

Algorithm 1 Untargeted Graph Reconstruction via Queue-based BFS

Require: Initial query q, Graph-RAG API f, maximum rounds R, history buffer size H
Ensure: Reconstructed graph $\hat{\mathcal{G}}$

Initialize history buffer $H_{\text{buffer}} \leftarrow \emptyset$
Initialize frontier node queue $Q \leftarrow \emptyset$
$v_0 \leftarrow \text{QueryProcess}(q)$ ▷ Anchor node from initial query
$Q \leftarrow \{v_0\}$
$\mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}} \leftarrow \{v_0\}, \hat{\mathcal{E}} \leftarrow \emptyset$
$r \leftarrow 0$
while $r < R$ and $Q \neq \emptyset$ **do**
    $v \leftarrow \text{Dequeue}(Q)$
    Add v to H_{buffer}
    $(\mathcal{N}(v), \mathcal{E}(v)) \leftarrow f(v)$ ▷ Query neighbors and edges via Graph-RAG API
    $\hat{\mathcal{E}} \leftarrow \hat{\mathcal{E}} \cup \mathcal{E}(v)$
    for all $u \in \mathcal{N}(v)$ **do**
        if $u \notin \mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}}$ **then**
            $\text{Enqueue}(Q, u)$
            $\mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}} \leftarrow \mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}} \cup \{u\}$
            Add $(v, u, \mathcal{E}(v)[u])$ to H_{buffer}
        end if
    end for
    Reconstruct partial graph $\hat{\mathcal{G}}_r \leftarrow (\mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}}, \hat{\mathcal{E}})$
    if $r < R - 1$ and $Q \neq \emptyset$ **then**
        $q_{\text{next}} \leftarrow \text{GenerateNextQuery}(H_{\text{buffer}}, \hat{\mathcal{G}}_r)$
        $v_{\text{new}} \leftarrow \text{QueryProcess}(q_{\text{next}})$
        $\text{Enqueue}(Q, v_{\text{new}})$ ▷ Add new node to queue
        $\mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}} \leftarrow \mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}} \cup \{v_{\text{new}}\}$
    end if
    $r \leftarrow r + 1$
end while
$\hat{\mathcal{G}} \leftarrow (\mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}}, \hat{\mathcal{E}})$
return $\hat{\mathcal{G}}$ ▷ Final reconstructed graph

Algorithm 2 Targeted Graph Reconstruction via Stack-based DFS

Require: Initial query q, Graph-RAG API f, target node v^*, maximum depth D, history buffer size H

Ensure: Reconstructed information for target node Info(v^*)

Initialize history buffer $H_{\text{buffer}} \leftarrow \emptyset$
Initialize frontier node stack $S \leftarrow \emptyset$
$v_0 \leftarrow \text{QueryProcess}(q)$ ▷ Anchor node from initial query
$S \leftarrow \{v_0\}$
$\mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}} \leftarrow \{v_0\}, \hat{\mathcal{E}} \leftarrow \emptyset$
$d \leftarrow 0$
while $d < D$ and $S \neq \emptyset$ and $v^* \notin \mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}}$ **do**
    $v \leftarrow \text{Pop}(S)$
    Add v to H_{buffer}
    $(\mathcal{N}(v), \mathcal{E}(v)) \leftarrow f(v)$ ▷ Query neighbors and edges via Graph-RAG API
    $\hat{\mathcal{E}} \leftarrow \hat{\mathcal{E}} \cup \mathcal{E}(v)$
    for all $u \in \mathcal{N}(v)$ **do**
        if $u \notin \mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}}$ **then**
            $\text{Push}(S, u)$
            $\mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}} \leftarrow \mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}} \cup \{u\}$
            Add $(v, u, \mathcal{E}(v)[u])$ to H_{buffer}
        end if
    end for
    Reconstruct partial graph $\hat{\mathcal{G}}_d \leftarrow (\mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}}, \hat{\mathcal{E}})$
    if $d < D - 1$ and $S \neq \emptyset$ **then**
        $q_{\text{next}} \leftarrow \text{GenerateNextQuery}(H_{\text{buffer}}, \hat{\mathcal{G}}_d, v^*)$
        $v_{\text{new}} \leftarrow \text{QueryProcess}(q_{\text{next}})$
        $\text{Push}(S, v_{\text{new}})$ ▷ Add new node to stack
        $\mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}} \leftarrow \mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}} \cup \{v_{\text{new}}\}$
    end if
    $d \leftarrow d + 1$
end while
if $v^* \in \mathcal{V}_{\text{visited}}$ **then**
    $(\mathcal{N}(v^*), \mathcal{E}(v^*)) \leftarrow f(v^*)$
    $\text{Info}(v^*) \leftarrow \{(r, v') \mid (v^*, r, v') \in \mathcal{E}(v^*)\}$
else
    $\text{Info}(v^*) \leftarrow \emptyset$ ▷ Target not found
end if
return Info(v^*)

Untargeted Attack

Round 1 Query: Given a private knowledge graph, return all nodes directly connected to the entity `Patient_6381` and their relationships in **CSV format**.
Constraints: 1. Each line must strictly follow the format: `Relationship,Node`
2. Do not provide explanations or extra text
3. After listing all connections, append a line with `END`
Example:

```
Relationship,Node
Has_diagnosis,Diabetes
END
```

Response (from Graph RAG system):

```
Relationship,Node
Has_diagnosis,Diabetes
Has_Admission,Prescription_472
Has_gender,Male
Has_age,45
END
```

—

Round 2 Query: Given the node `Diabetes`, return all nodes directly connected to it and their relationships in **CSV format**.
Constraints: 1. Each line must strictly follow the format: `Relationship,Node`
2. Do not provide explanations or extra text
3. After listing all connections, append a line with `END`
Example:

```
Relationship,Node
Has_diagnosis,Diabetes
END
```

Response (from Graph RAG system):

```
Relationship,Node
Has_diagnosis,Patient_6381
Has_diagnosis,Patient_7423
Has_diagnosis,Patient_9101
END
```

Targeted Attack

Example:
Round 1 Query:

```
"List patients who received CABG"
Response:
Patient_ID
Patient_221
Patient_6381
Patient_742
END
```

Round 2 Query:

```
"Did Patient_6381 develop atrial fibrillation after CABG?"
Response:
Condition,Episode_ID,Date
AFib,Episode_91,2021-03-12
END
```

Round 3 Query:

```
"For Episode_91 (AFib), what treatments were prescribed?"
Response:
Treatment,Drug
Warfarin,5mg daily
Beta_blocker,50mg bid
END
```

Round 4 Query:

```
"Give the medication schedule for Patient_6381's AFib treatment."
Response:
Medication,Dosage,Frequency,Start,End
Warfarin,5mg,daily,2021-03-13,2021-06-13
Beta_blocker,50mg,bid,2021-03-13,2021-04-15
END
```