
The Creative Act: Effective Exploration by Seeking Surprise

Anonymous Author(s)

Affiliation

Address

email

Abstract

1 That c creates p is a generative relation, resulting from exploration, between a
2 creator c and a possible generative action p where c generates by exploring then
3 recognizing and revealing the possible action p that is surprising, and that we
4 can learn something about the space of possible actions from. This focus on
5 creativity as action allows me to emphasize it's relational nature, rather than trying
6 to separately define what a creative product is or what the creative mental process
7 is independently.

8 1 Exploration

9 Exploration is something an agent does in order to expand their knowledge of possible actions and
10 their values [Aronowitz, 2021, 340]. Exploration trades off with other actions that are exploitative:
11 those that involve actualizing the possibility that you believe will have highest value based on what
12 you already know. Within this framework, I argue that creative people are the most effective explorers
13 – they spread their attentional resources into the unknown or otherwise non-salient [Gross et al., 2024,
14 Benedek and Fink, 2019], and discover highly surprising but possible actions that allow us to better
15 understand and manipulate our environment.

16 If creativity is a kind of effective exploration, and exploration involves seeking the unknown, we are
17 left with the following question about creative search optimization:

18 How do creative people optimize their search for creative products?

19 We cannot use the typical means of search such as Bayesian Hierarchical Search Theory (BHST)
20 because it is "... assumed that there is a prior distribution for the target's location which is known to
21 the searcher..." [Stone, 1975, 1]. So creative people explore unknowns and frequently find fruit; how?

22 2 Novelty

23 Novelty is often taken to be the defining or at least 'primary' feature of the creative product [Kant,
24 2000, 180, 5:308][Boden, 2009, Stokes, 2011, Brainard, 2023, Nanay, 2014]. Given this, novelty is
25 presumably supposed to help us identify creative products. However: "... there can also be original
26 nonsense..." [Kant, 2000, 180, 5:308]. Worse, in some sense, every perception (even an exploitative
27 one) is a little bit novel - it occurs at a different time. So, novelty can't help us narrow our exploratory
28 search.

29 Mu et al. have suggested (following others) that endowing machines with semantic abstractions
30 (human semantic concepts) can aid in meaningful exploration [Mu et al., 2022, Tam et al., 2022]. If we
31 understand novelty like these RL mechanisms do, then maybe novel objects are just objects associated

32 with novel concepts (observations with novel labels), rather than novel perceptions. However, we
33 cannot treat novelty like the novelty at work in these RL mechanisms. The RL machine benefits
34 from our concepts because, it gets provided with a fixed set of everyday linguistic concepts from a
35 language oracle. We do not have a fixed set of concepts; I could theoretically label every perception
36 with a concept: <perception p1 at t1>, <perception p2 at t2>... etc.. Worse, every perception could
37 receive multiple conceptual labels: we could overspecify, underspecify, or idiosyncratically specify
38 [Wilson, 1982, Wittgenstein, 1953]. How do we know whether something is really novel, rather than
39 just mislabelled or differently labelled? Although everyday is new, it does not feel new to me – I
40 do not always recognize its newness because I am not always parsing the world with concepts that
41 would highlight its newness (even if I theoretically could).

42 **3 Surprise**

43 The solution is to focus on surprise instead of novelty [Barto et al., 2013, Gonzalez and Haselager,
44 2005]; prediction instead of direct perception. According to Schmidhuber RL agents should be
45 encouraged to seek only novel stimulations that are surprising and compressible [Schmidhuber, 2010].
46 Schmidhuber explicitly rejects traditional information-theoretic notions of surprise (like statistical
47 unlikelihood) that would count a static filled t.v. as constantly surprising because the information
48 provided by the t.v. is uncompressible [Schmidhuber, 2010, 9]. Instead, surprising data is data
49 with patterns. A pattern for Schmidhuber exists over some data if there "... exists an algorithm
50 that is significantly shorter than the raw data but is able to encode it without loss of information."
51 [Schmidhuber, 2010, 4]

52 Of course, creativity can't just be about learning patterns - we do that all the time. It has to be learning
53 sparked by something on the part of the agent, by a physical or mental action; an exploration. This
54 is why we should focus on creativity from an action theoretic perspective, as an *act*. Furthermore,
55 Boden distinguishes between psychological and historical creativity [Boden, 2004, 2, 43-44]; A
56 product p is historically creative iff it would be surprising compressible information relative to human
57 history (taken as an aggregation of human psychological states). So people can be creative by seeking
58 surprise.

59 Interestingly, creative people receive less intrinsic reward from surprising content [Gross et al., 2024].
60 Perhaps they seek it more often [Schelling, 1988, Nagel]. Furthermore, brilliant or creative moves in
61 chess are those that elude weaker players, and seem to be bad moves earlier on in the game [Zaidi
62 and Guerzhoy]. In other words, they're surprisingly good (unexpected).

63 **4 Further Work and Open Questions**

64 There is obviously more to be done. What is it about the *creative* surprising moves that makes them
65 creative rather than normally surprising?

66 1 Kant claims that creative products are exemplars. They propagate themselves and allow for
67 substantial future work. How might we cash this out in terms of the information value of
68 creative products and acts?

69 2 Marta Halina suggests that AI creativity results in domain specific knowledge, while human
70 creativity results in domain general knowledge [Halina, 2021]. How do we cash out domain
71 generality informationally?

72 3 What does framing creativity as a kind of exploration mean for the relationship between
73 creativity and stochasticity? One can randomly explore and get surprising results? Does this
74 mean machines can be creative by taking stochastic actions?

75 4 What does linking creativity to exploration mean for the relationship between creativity and
76 attention? Do creatives engage in more exploratory forms of attention?

77 5 What's the relationship between creativity and expertise [Gaut, 2012] that emerges from this
78 view?

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