LLM LIES: HALLUCINATIONS ARE NOT BUGS, BUT FEATURES AS ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES

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ABSTRACT

Large Language Models (LLMs), including GPT-3.5, LLaMA, and PaLM, seem to be knowledgeable and able to adapt to many tasks. However, we still can not completely trust their answer, since LLMs suffer from hallucination—fabricating non-existent facts to cheat users without perception. And the reasons for their existence and pervasiveness remain unclear. In this paper, we demonstrate that nonsense prompts composed of random tokens can also elicit the LLMs to respond with hallucinations. This phenomenon forces us to revisit that *hallucination may be another view of adversarial examples*, and it shares similar features with conventional adversarial examples as the basic feature of LLMs. Therefore, we formalize an automatic hallucination triggering method as the *hallucination attack* in an adversarial way. Finally, we explore basic feature of attacked adversarial prompts and propose a simple yet effective defense strategy.

1 INTRODUCTION

Large Language Models(LLMs), like GPT [\(Radford et al., 2018;](#page-10-0) [2019;](#page-10-1) [Ouyang et al., 2022;](#page-10-2) [OpenAI,](#page-10-3) [2023\)](#page-10-3), LLaMA [\(Touvron et al., 2023a\)](#page-10-4) and PaLM [\(Anil et al., 2023\)](#page-9-0), have reformed our working and living styles with their powerful generation capability. However, we still can not completely trust their answers, LLMs suffer from hallucinations [\(Bang et al., 2023;](#page-9-1) [Lee et al., 2018\)](#page-9-2) which means LLMs lie and fabricate non-existent facts or inappropriate information. The phenomenon could lead to disaster risks in many application fields, such as law and medical consultation.

Previous works interpret this problem from the perspective of overfitting [\(Manakul et al., 2023;](#page-10-5) [Feldman et al., 2023;](#page-9-3) [Lee, 2023\)](#page-9-4) and learning process [\(Lightman et al., 2023\)](#page-9-5). In these views, LLMs' memorization of training data and exploiting a further corpus-based heuristic using the relative frequencies of words is the main factor causing hallucinations [\(McKenna et al., 2023\)](#page-10-6), *i.e.*, the occurrence of hallucination is essentially finding similar corpus from the parameterized memorization to fabricate non-existent answers. Unlike these, we discuss the hallucination phenomenon out of training data. We found that some non-sense Out-of-Distribution(OoD) prompts composed of random tokens can also elicit the LLMs responding hallucinations.

Therefore, we further explore how to automatically elicit the LLMs to fabricate non-existent facts or inappropriate information. We trigger the hallucinations from two opposing perspectives: i) selectively replace some tokens of the original sentence to preserve its semantic consistency; ii) construct non-sense OoD prompts composed of random tokens. Different from current existing analysis approaches [\(Ren et al., 2023;](#page-10-7) [Radhakrishnan et al., 2023\)](#page-10-8), we directly attack LLMs to generate a series of pre-defined mismatched answers. Similar to adversarial attack [\(Goodfellow](#page-9-6) [et al., 2014\)](#page-9-6) in discriminative models, we aim to disturb the origin prompt x making the target LLMs generate the pre-defined mismatched reply \tilde{y} .

To achieve it, we propose an automatic triggering method called *hallucination attack*, which includes two modes: weak semantic and OoD attacks. The former starts with a given semantic prompt. By selectively replacing a few tokens, we could construct an adversarial prompt to maintain its semantic consistency while triggering hallucinations. On the contrary, the OoD attack is initialized as nonsense random tokens. Without semantic constraints, we aim to elicit the LLMs responding with the same hallucination. Both of them are based on the proposed gradient-based token replacing strategy, its goal is to replace some "trigger" tokens by maximizing the likelihood of pre-defined behaviors.

Figure 1: Examples of two ways to trigger hallucinations in Vicuna-7B. Subfigure (a) represents the weak semantic prompt, which is generated by the hallucination attack and maintains semantic consistency, leading to a hallucination reply. Subfigure (b) represents the OoD prompt, which is meaningless to human beings, making the Vicuna-7B reply the same fake fact.

Fig[.1](#page-1-0) displays two examples of eliciting the Vicuna-7B [\(Zheng et al., 2023\)](#page-10-9) to respond pre-defined hallucination replies. As shown in Fig[.1\(a\),](#page-1-1) with several tokens replaced in the prompt but basic semantics persevered, the Vicuna-7B responds to the attacked prompt with non-existent fact to fool the users, *"The Second World War officially began on September 1, 2022, when the United States declared war on the Islamic Caliphate. This marked the beginning of a lone and devastating conflict"*. Quite different from humans, we would not fabricate non-existent facts to respond to this prompt. From another perspective, Fig[.1\(b\)](#page-1-2) shows that the Vicuna-7B responds with exactly the same hallucination replies from the non-sense OoD prompt which is composed of random tokens. It is worth noting that the prompt looks meaningless to human beings, which should not get sensible feedback, but we get a well-looking response without confusion from the Vicuna-7B. These phenomena consistently reveal that

hallucinations may be another view of adversarial examples, as a fundamental feature of LLMs.

Hallucinations shares similar features with adversarial examples that the perturbed data perseveres the same semantics as the original clean ones, but models output mismatched answers. And we could also trigger hallucinations via non-sense OoD prompts, which is far away from training dataset distributions.

Besides, our experiments explanation suggests a fundamental attribute of LLMs—it suffers from adversarial prompts leading to notorious and mismatched codswallop and hallucination. Accordingly, for the purpose of tackling the issue being utilized by illegal activities, we also conduct heuristics experiments on defensing hazard hallucination attack.

2 HALLUCINATION

In this section, we first define hallucinations as the fundamental features of LLMs beyond training data. Then we investigate what leads LLMs to respond with hallucinations.

2.1 DEFINITION

Before exploring how LLMs respond with hallucinations, we first give the definition to **hallucina**tions as responses \tilde{y} that does not consist with human cognition and facts. Differently, human-being tend to reply with truthful fact, rather than fabricate nonsense or non-existent fake facts.

Formally, in many scenarios, we get the answer from the LLMs, $f(\cdot)$, with our demand $x \in \mathcal{X}$ as the inputs. The **hallucination** is f outputs non-existent fact, $\tilde{y} = f(x)$, do not satisfy the reality(truth) $\mathcal T$ as shown in Eq[.1,](#page-1-3)

$$
\tilde{\boldsymbol{y}} \notin \mathcal{T} \tag{1}
$$

Where $\mathcal T$ is the whole reality set without any non-existent facts. More generally, for any input x , if the LLMs respond with non-existent facts, then we say that is a hallucination phenomenon.

Figure 2: The figure reveals loss fluctuation during inducing Vicuna-7B within hallucination, *'The founder of Apple is Barry Diller'*. We mark out milestone where loss dramatically decreases, and it's interesting find that some milestone tokens are semantically induced.

2.2 WHAT LEADS TO HALLUCINATION

We are curious about what triggers LLMs to generate hallucinations. Fig [2](#page-2-0) records the whole optimization process of the proposed hallucination attack. We start with an OoD prompt initialized with random tokens, and the LLMs respond with confusion. Then, by selectively replacing the tokens, we constantly construct adversarial prompts to elicit the LLMs to generate pre-defined hallucinations.

On the other hand, we expect to investigate which tokens in the OoD prompt are the key to triggering hallucinations. As shown in Fig [2,](#page-2-0) we record some important milestones during the optimization process. We find that some "trigger" tokens are semantically induced, such as replacing "*cabe*" with "*Barry*", as we hope the LLMs can ultimately output "*The founder of Apple is Barry Diller*". However, many token swaps often have no semanticity, like "*junl*→*empress*" and "*decidOsais*→*decidareais*". As a result, we finally optimize a seemingly meaningless prompt for humans, which however elicits the LLMs to respond with pre-defined hallucinations.

3 ADVERSARIAL ATTACK INDUCES HALLUCINATION

In this section, we first exhibit how to generate the hallucination dataset, and then introduce the proposed hallucination attack approach to automatically elicit the LLMs to fabricate non-existent facts or inappropriate information.

3.1 HALLUCINATION ATTACK

The pipeline of the hallucination attack is demonstrated in Fig [3,](#page-3-0) which is mainly composed of four components: hallucination data generation, gradient-based token replacing, weak semantic attacks and OoD attacks. Specifically, to trigger the LLMs responding with hallucinations, we first manually construct some hallucination data. Then, we trigger the hallucinations from two opposing perspectives (*i.e.*, weak semantic and OoD prompts), both of which are based on the gradient-based token replacing strategy. In the following part of this section, we will introduce these four components in detail.

Hallucination data generation. We collect some common-sense questions x from Wiki, *e.g.*, "*Can you tell me who was the victor of the United States presidential election in the year 2020?*". Then, we fit it into the LLMs and respond with a correct answer $f(x) \in T$, *i.e.*, "*Joe Biden was the victor of the United States presidential election in the year 2020*". As a result, we can obtain some correct QA pairs $\langle x, f(x) \rangle$ to construct the common-sense dataset \mathcal{D} ,

$$
\mathcal{D} = \{ \langle \mathbf{x}^i, f(\mathbf{x}^i) \rangle | f(\mathbf{x}^i) \in \mathcal{T} \}_{i=1}^n \tag{2}
$$

In order to construct hallucination data $\hat{f}(x_i) \notin \mathcal{T}$, we randomly replace the subject, predicate, or object to fabricate a non-existent fact, *e.g.*, "*Donald Trump was the victor of the United States*

Figure 3: The figure shows the pipeline of our hallucination attack. We substitute tokens via gradient-based token replacing strategy, replacing token reaching smaller negative log-likelihood loss, and induce LLM within hallucinations.

presidential election in the year 2020". Finally, we obtain the hallucination dataset $\tilde{\mathcal{D}}$ composed of non-sense QA pairs,

$$
\tilde{\mathcal{D}} = \{ \langle \mathbf{x}^i, \tilde{\mathbf{y}}^i \rangle | \tilde{\mathbf{y}}^i = \tilde{f}(\mathbf{x}^i) \notin \mathcal{T} \}_{i=1}^n \tag{3}
$$

Next, we aim to find an adversarial prompt \tilde{x} from the input space to trigger the LLMs responding hallucinations, *i.e.*, $f(\tilde{x}) = \tilde{y}$. Similar to adversarial attack [\(Goodfellow et al., 2014\)](#page-9-6) in discriminative models, we disturb the origin prompt x making the target LLMs generate the pre-defined mismatched reply based on the proposed gradient-based token replacing method.

Gradient-based token replacing strategy. Inspired by the [\(Wallace et al., 2019\)](#page-10-10), we propose the gradient-based token replacing approach for automatically triggering hallucination. For an original prompt x, the key idea is to selectively replace some "trigger" tokens τ with several iterations, and then obtain the adversarial prompt \tilde{x} that can maximize the log-likelihood,

$$
\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}} = \underset{\boldsymbol{x} \in \mathcal{X}}{\arg \max} \quad \log p(\tilde{\boldsymbol{y}}|\boldsymbol{x}) \tag{4}
$$

Formally, a sentence x is mapping from some sequence of tokens, *i.e.*, $x_{1:l} = [\tau_1, \tau_2, ..., \tau_l]$. Where l is the length of the sentence x, and $\tau_i \in V$ is the token from the vocabulary size. Moreover, we introduce the adversarial tokens τ_{adv} , which are represented as one-hot vectors, and are embedded to form e_{adv} . At each iteration, we compute the first-order approximation of the change in the loglikelihood that would be produced by swapping the *i*-th token τ_i with another token τ_{adv} , and then we select the top- k tokens for each position i of the sequence to cause the greatest increase:

$$
C = \left\{ C_i | C_i = Topk \left(\left[e_{adv} - e_i \right]^{\mathrm{T}} \nabla_{e_i} \log p(\tilde{\boldsymbol{y}} | \boldsymbol{x}) \right), \forall i \in \{1, 2, ..., l\} \right\}.
$$
 (5)

Where $C \in \mathcal{R}^{l \times k}$ denotes the token replacement set. Instead of directly optimizing Eq[.4,](#page-3-1) for each position i, we aim to constantly find the "trigger" tokens τ_{adv} from the maximum likelihood gradient direction. Thus, by selectively replacing these tokens, we could also obtain the prompt candidate set $\mathcal{X},$

$$
\tilde{\mathcal{X}} = \{\tilde{\bm{x}} | \tilde{\bm{x}} = [\bm{x}_{1:i-1}, \tau_i, \bm{x}_{i+1:l}], \forall i \in \{1, 2, ..., l\}, \forall \tau_i \in \mathcal{C}_i\}.
$$
\n(6)

It is worth noting that each element \tilde{x} of the prompt candidate set \tilde{X} has only one token different from the original sequence x and the size of $\tilde{\mathcal{X}}$ is the power of prompts length l. Thus, directly searching the best adversarial prompt could be exponentially complex due to the large power candidate set.

$$
\tilde{\mathcal{X}}_B = \left\{ \tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}^j | \tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}^j \sim \tilde{\mathcal{X}} \right\}_{j=1}^B.
$$
\n⁽⁷⁾

In order to ensure exploratory search and optimality, we first randomly sample B examples from $\tilde{\mathcal{X}},Eq,7$, and then obtain the adversarial prompt \tilde{x} from $\tilde{\mathcal{X}}_B$ for the next iteration by maximizing

Algorithm 1 Hallucination Attack

Require: LLM $f(\cdot)$, epoch T, batch size B, top-k parameter k, semantic constraint parameter δ 1: ## Adversarial Prompt Initialization 2: Sampling $\langle x_{1:l}, \tilde y\rangle \sim \tilde{\tilde{\mathcal{D}}}$ 3: Initialize adversarial prompt \tilde{x} with l random tokens. 4: if *Weak Semantic Attack* then 5: Reinitialize $\tilde{x} \leftarrow x_{1:l}$ 6: end if 7: repeat 8: ## gradient-based token replacing 9: **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ to l **do** 10: $\mathcal{C}_i = Topk \left(\left[e_{adv} - e_i \right]^{\mathrm{T}} \nabla_{e_i} \log p(\tilde{\boldsymbol{y}} | \tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}) \right)$ 11: end for 12: ## Obtain Prompt Candidate Set 13: $\tilde{\mathcal{X}} = {\{\tilde{x} | \tilde{x} = [x_{1:i-1}, \tau_i, x_{i+1:l}], \forall i \in \{1, 2, ..., l\}, \forall \tau_i \in \mathcal{C}_i\}}$ 14: $\tilde{\mathcal{X}}_B = \left\{ \tilde{x}^j | \tilde{x}^j \sim \tilde{\mathcal{X}} \right\}^B$ $j=1$ 15: ## Weak Semantic $\&$ OoD Attacks 16: if *Weak Semantic Attack* then 17: $\tilde{x} = \arg \max_{\mathbf{x} \in \tilde{\mathcal{X}}_B} \log p(\tilde{\mathbf{y}}|\tilde{\mathbf{x}}) \quad s.t. \quad |\tilde{\mathbf{x}} - \mathbf{x}| \le \delta$ 18: else 19: $\tilde{x} = \arg \max_{\mathbf{x} \in \tilde{\mathcal{X}}_B} \log p(\tilde{\mathbf{y}} | \tilde{\mathbf{x}})$ 20: end if 21: **until** T times or $f(\tilde{x})$ equals \tilde{y} 22: Output: adversarial attack prompt \tilde{x}

the log-likelihood. Then, we will introduce the proposed hallucination attack approach from two opposing perspectives.

Weak semantic attacks. In this attack, we aim to find some weak semantic prompts to trigger hallucination. Similar to conventional adversarial attacks in image tasks, we expect to maintain the semantic consistency of \tilde{x} to humans, but the LLMs still respond with hallucinations. Formally, if the semantic extractor $\phi(\cdot)$ is given, for any non-sense OA pair $\langle x, \tilde{y} \rangle \sim \tilde{\mathcal{D}}$, the goal is to find an adversarial prompt \tilde{x} within the ϵ -ball of the original sequence's semantic space to trigger hallucination,

$$
\arg\max_{\boldsymbol{x}\in\tilde{\mathcal{X}}_B} \log p(\tilde{\boldsymbol{y}}|\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}})
$$

s.t.
$$
||\phi(\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}}) - \phi(\boldsymbol{x})||_p \le \epsilon
$$
 (8)

Due to the lack of a perfect feature extractor comparable to humans, we simplify the optimizing process by only constraining the number of tokens are replaced, *i.e.*, $|\tilde{x} - x| \leq \delta$. In other words, we only replace a few tokens of original prompts to maintain its semantic consistency, and the experimental validate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

Out-of-distribution(OoD) attacks. In this attack, we start with a sequence initialized with random tokens. Without semantic constraints, we expect to find a non-sense OoD prompt \tilde{x} to elicit the LLMs responding with any pre-defined hallucinations \tilde{y} .

The process of the proposed hallucination attack is summarized in Algorithm [1.](#page-4-0) Firstly, the LLMs f, epoch T, batch size B, and top-k parameter k are given. And then we sample a non-sense QA pairs $\langle x, \tilde{y} \rangle$ from hallucination dataset D, while the adversarial prompt is initialized with random tokens (OoD attack) or original sequence x (weak semantic attack). At each iteration, we search the "trigger" tokens for each position i to maximize the log-likelihood, while obtaining the prompt candidate set \mathcal{X} . After sampling B examples randomly, we could obtain \mathcal{X}_B . Finally, by running weak semantic or OoD attacks, we update the adversarial prompt \tilde{x} for the next iteration. Executing T times or successfully inducing the LLMs to generate the target hallucination \tilde{y} will terminate the loop process.

4 EXPERIMENTS

In this section, we first exhibit the experimental results of weak semantic and OoD prompt attacks respectively, and then introduce the defense results to avoid this hazardous adversarial attack.

Dataset. As mentioned above, we collect some common-sense questions from Wiki, covering various aspects such as politics, history, literature, geography, science, etc. Then we construct the answers via LLMs and check their validity with human review feedback. As a result, we could obtain the common-sense dataset composed of many QA pairs. Besides, we manually fabricate some non-existent fake facts by randomly replacing the subject, predicate, or object, and finally obtain the hallucination dataset. The goal is to elicit the LLMs responding with pre-defined hallucinations.

Settings. We attack different open-source LLMs including Vicuna-7B [\(Zheng et al., 2023\)](#page-10-9) and LLaMA2-7B-chat [\(Touvron et al., 2023b\)](#page-10-11) with white-box attack mentioned in Section [3.](#page-2-1) During attack experiments, we set the top-k hyper-parameter as 256, the batch size B to 1024, the length of adversarial prompt l to 20, and the repeat epochs T is 128. More details of the experimental setting are shown in Appendix [A.3.](#page-11-0)

Evaluation. To evaluate above mentioned two categories of LLMs adversarial attack directions, we take human feedback to evaluate whether the LLMs' replies are qualified. Then, we calculate the success rate R_H of triggering hallucinations for each attack approach,

$$
R_{\mathcal{H}} = \frac{\sum_{\langle \boldsymbol{x}, \tilde{\boldsymbol{y}} \rangle \sim \tilde{\mathcal{D}}} \mathbf{1}\{||\phi^*(f(\tilde{\boldsymbol{x}})) - \phi^*(\tilde{\boldsymbol{y}})||_p \leq \epsilon\}}{|\tilde{\mathcal{D}}|},
$$

where $\phi^*(\cdot)$ is the perfect semantic extractor, referring to humans in this paper.

4.1 STUDY ON HALLUCINATION ATTACKS

To validate the proposed hallucination attacks, we perform experiments on Vicuna-7B [\(Zheng](#page-10-9) [et al., 2023\)](#page-10-9) and LLaMA2-7B-chat [\(Touvron](#page-10-11) [et al., 2023b\)](#page-10-11) from two opposing perspectives, *i.e.*, weak semantic and OoD attacks. The results on the success rate of triggering hallucinations are demonstrated in Table [4.](#page-6-0) And Table [2](#page-6-1) and [3](#page-7-0) list some representative attack examples, and more details about attacks on other LLMs and examples are shown in Appendix [A.1.](#page-11-1)

Table 1: The success rate of triggering hallucinations on Vicuna-7B and LLaMA2-7B-chat models with weak semantic and OoD attacks.

Success rate of triggering hallucinations. As shown in Table [4,](#page-6-0) we surprisingly find that both mainstream open-source models failed to resist the hallucination attacks. Especially in the Vicuna-7B model, employing the weak semantic attack can achieve a 92.31% success rate of triggering hallucinations. Besides, non-sense OoD prompts could also elicit the LLMs to respond with predefined hallucinations with a high probability.

Results on weak semantic attacks. Table[.2](#page-6-1) lists some representative examples of weak semantic attacking, where the red marks out differences between the original and the attacked. It is worth noting that only several tokens are replaced, the Vicuna-7B also responds with completely fake facts. Similar phenomena also occur on the LLaMA2-7B-chat model as shown in Appendix [A.1.](#page-11-1) These results also validate that *hallucinations may be another view of the adversarial examples*. Moreover, slightly perturbing the original prompt can elicit the LLMs to output completely different implies, which means the LLMs are actually very non-robust. This will cause some huge potential harm, such as generating some fake news:

> *Donald Trump was the victor of the United States presidential election in the year 2020.*

> > *—by Vicuna-7B*

On the other hand, those prompts have some weak sensible semantics to human beings, some of them even look like spelling errors, which is harmful for LLMs users and is difficult to defend from malicious attacks.

Table 2: Weak semantic attack towards Vicuna-7B. The red marks out differences between the original and the attacked.

Results on OoD attacks. Table [3](#page-7-0) records the results of OoD attacks on Vicuna-7B, while the results on LLaMA2-7B-chat could also be found in Appendix [A.2.](#page-11-2) For some meaningless prompts to humans, the Vicuna-7B responds with hallucinations that sound reasonable but mismatch the facts. For example, the final optimized adversarial OoD prompt "*Elect doncmaz Howard pourvisor American party result South resulted turnoathon*" can also elicit the Vicuna-7B to output the same "*Donald Trump*" hallucination.

Further, it is more interesting to find out that OoD prompts are different from weak semantic prompts that they are meaningless and far away from training dataset distribution, but they still induce LLMs generating hallucinations. In other words, we could trigger hallucination beyond training data, which also indicates that *hallucination could be a fundamental feature of LLMs beyond training data.* And since we may elicit LLMs generating pre-defined behaviors, this could also be disastrous in applications for the criminal may deliver illegal messages with those special OoD prompts.

Ablation study on OoD attacks. Table [4](#page-6-0) demonstrates the success rate of triggering hallucinations on the LLaMA2-7B-chat model initialized with different lengths of OoD prompts. It can be observed that the longer the initialization length, the higher the success rate of trigger hallucinations. When the length of the OoD prompts increases from 20 to 30, the attack success rate significantly increases by 34.6% (30.77% \rightarrow 65.38%). Intuitively, if the length of the OoD prompt is long enough, the attack success rate may approach 100%. We will study it in the future works.

4.2 STUDY ON THRESHOLD DEFENSE

To avoid hazard adversarial attack in LLMs, we conduct experiments further explore defence method. LLMs are quite different from conventional deep learning models that their training cost and period are much more and longer than the conventional small models. Therefore, direct adversarial training could not be a feasible solution, although it is the most effective so far. We investigate the defense from some basic aspect of LLMs to explore whether there could be other feasible approaches.

Table 4: The success rate of triggering hallucinations on the LLaMA2-7B-chat model initialized with different lengths of OoD prompts.

Entropy threshold defense. We propose a simple threshold defense for hallucination attacks, *i.e.*, employing the entropy of the first token prediction to refuse responding. Fig. [4\(a\)](#page-8-0) demonstrates the probability of top-10 tokens in the first generated word in Vicuna-7B. It can be observed that the

Table 3: OoD attack towards Vicuna-7B. The blue marks out the OoD attack has failed. The red marks out that OoD prompt elicits Vicuna to output pre-defined hallucinations.

raw prompt usually generates the first token with low entropy (*i.e.*, the argmax token's probabilty is much higher, and the other tokens' probability is much lower), while the OoD prompt attack and the weak semantic attack have relatively high entropy. Thus, we can set an entropy threshold to defend the hallucination attacks during the inference stage.

The results of entropy threshold defense are demonstrated in Fig. [4\(b\).](#page-8-1) Where the horizontal axis represents different entropy thresholds, and the vertical axis represents recall (how many prompts will not be refused). It can be observed that when the entropy threshold is set to 1.6, all raw prompts can be answered normally, while 46.1% OoD prompts and 61.5% weak semantic prompts will be refused by the LLMs. Besides, high thresholds will lead to ineffective defense against hallucination attacks, while low thresholds will hurt the performance of the raw prompts.

5 RELATED WORK

5.1 LARGE LANGUAGE MODEL

Large Language Model(LLM) [\(Radford et al., 2019;](#page-10-1) [Chowdhery et al., 2022\)](#page-9-7) is an important category of autoregressive language model with transformers [\(Vaswani et al., 2017\)](#page-10-12) as the backbone model and pre-trained with next token prediction. The LLMs have demonstrated their promising

Figure 4: The subfigure (a) shows the probability of top-10 tokens in the first generated word in Vicuna-7B. And the subfigure (b) demonstrates the defense performance with various entropy thresholds.

ability across multiple language tasks. Moreover, this also formulate a new paradigm in the community that large pre-trained generative models contain rich knowledge to adaptive many task even some different modalities [\(Zhang et al., 2023\)](#page-10-13). However, LLMs also suffer from some disadvantage like hallucination [\(Manakul et al., 2023;](#page-10-5) [Feldman et al., 2023;](#page-9-3) [Lee, 2023\)](#page-9-4) and safety issue [\(Wei](#page-10-14) [et al., 2023\)](#page-10-14).

Hallucination, LLMs fabricate non-existent facts, current is explained from aspect of training datasets [\(McKenna et al., 2023;](#page-10-6) [Lightman et al., 2023\)](#page-9-5). Thoese work argue it is the noisy data or the model overfitting the training data responds for hallucination. However, as another different category of neural network and special pre-training method, the transformer-base LLMs share similar features with conventional neural network models; therefore, LLMs would also respond Outof-Distribution data with mismatch replies. But there is few work contribute to the direction, and OoD data sometimes could be the trigger of hallucinations.

5.2 ADVERSARIAL ATTACK

Adversarial examples are examples with small but intentionally worst-case perturbations making models outputting incorrect results [\(Goodfellow et al., 2014\)](#page-9-6). It is nightmare of deep learning for adversarial attacks are hard to defense and incorrect outputs. Moreover, [\(Ilyas et al., 2019\)](#page-9-8) has explained that adversarial examples are fundamental feature of deep neural networks. Similar to last generation of adversarial research, we may construct adversarial prompts to fool the LLMs responding with mismatched replies and non-existent fake facts.

On the flip side, the most effective adversarial defense policy [\(Xiao et al., 2020;](#page-10-15) [Shafahi et al., 2019\)](#page-10-16) for last generation of adversarial competition is adversarial training, however, in era of LLMs, training cost is much more expensive than conventional deep learning models, let alone the adversarial training for LLMs. Therefore, we may avoid illegal adversarial attack from another view that we do not explicitly eliminate them, which is also impossible [\(Ilyas et al., 2019;](#page-9-8) [Tramer et al., 2020\)](#page-10-17), we may try to implicitly hide them and make the attack more hard [\(Xiao et al., 2019\)](#page-10-18)

6 CONCLUSION

We conduct extensive experiments revealing that *hallucinations could be another view of adversarial examples*, it's more beyond training data. We automatically induce LLMs to respond with nonexistent facts via hallucination attack from two distinct directions, i) semantics preserved prompt perturbation, and ii) no-sense OoD prompt; with gradient-base adversarial attack we could construct both two categories of adversarial prompt triggering hallucination. The issue should be constant as long as we train model with current gradient-base optimization method. Furthermore, due to hallucination shares similar features with conventional adversarial examples, we also investigate a simple yet effective way to defense those adversarial prompts without additional adversarial training. In long term run, we believe this novel understanding of hallucination would lead the community rethink how to comprehensively evaluate our LLMs.

ETHICS STATEMENT

In this paper, we explore how to attack LLMs with adversarial attack methods and induce LLMs within hallucinations. Although, hallucination could lead to potential misdirecting or cheating users, in this work, we believe it's necessary to evaluate the robustness of LLMs by this way and design defense strategy before their applications. We also wish this direction could help more researches understand safe LLMs and contribute to it.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

We conduct hallucination attack experiment with following hyper-parameters settings, detail in Section [4](#page-5-0) and Appendix [A.3.](#page-11-0)

- 1. For weak semantic attacks
	- (a) max repeat epochs is 128, and we will stop optimization when trigger hallucination
	- (b) top-k is 256
	- (c) sample batch size B is 1024
	- (d) attack target models include Vicuna-7B and LLaMA2-7B-chat
- 2. For OoD attacks
	- (a) max repeat epochs is 1000, and we will stop optimization when trigger hallucination
	- (b) top-k is 256
	- (c) sample batch size B is 1024
	- (d) attack target models include Vicuna-7B and LLaMA2-7B-chat
	- (e) length of prompt, l , is 20

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A APPENDIX

A.1 WEAK SEMANTIC ATTACK

Table [5](#page-11-3) shows additional results of how Vicuna-7B respond to weak semantic prompt generated via adversarial attack. And Table [6](#page-12-0) is attack results of LLaMA2-7b-chat.

Table 5: Hallucination attack towards Vicuna. The red marks out differences between the origin and the attacked.

A.2 OUT-OF-DISTRIBUTION PROMPT ATTACK

Table [7](#page-12-1) demonstrates the results of OoD attack results for LLAMA2-7b-chat.

A.3 EXPERIMENTS SETTINGS

We conduct all experiments with hardware of 8 NVIDIA A100(80G) GPUs. During our experiment we set he repeat epochs as 128 for weak semantics preserved hallucination attack and set it as 1000 for the OoD prompt attack. And we initialize the \tilde{x} with origin question for the hallucination attack and random tokens for the OoD prompt attack. The adversarial attack algorithm are shown in Algorithm [1](#page-4-0)

Table 6: Hallucination attack towards LLaMA2-7B. The red marks out differences between the origin and the attacked.

Table 7: OoD attack towards LLaMA2-7B-Chat. The blue marks out LLaMA2 defense OoD prompt successfully. And the red marks out that OoD prompt fails to make LLaMA2 output replies with similar semantics as pre-defined target.