Understanding and Defending VLM Jailbreaks via Jailbreak-Related Representation Shift

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Abstract

Large vision-language models (VLMs) often exhibit weakened safety alignment with the integration of the visual modality. Even when text prompts contain explicit harmful intent, adding an image can substantially increase jailbreak success rates. In this paper, we observe that VLMs can clearly distinguish benign inputs from harmful ones in their representation space. Moreover, even among harmful inputs, jailbreak samples form a distinct internal state that is separable from refusal samples. These observations suggest that jailbreaks do not arise from a failure to recognize harmful intent. Instead, the visual modality shifts representations toward a specific jailbreak state, thereby leading to a failure to trigger refusal. To quantify this transition, we identify a jailbreak direction and define the jailbreak-related shift as the component of the image-induced representation shift along this direction. Our analysis shows that the jailbreak-related shift reliably characterizes jailbreak behavior, providing a unified explanation for diverse jailbreak scenarios. Finally, we propose a defense method that enhances VLM safety by removing the jailbreak-related shift (JRS-Rem) at inference time. Experiments show that JRS-Rem provides strong defense across multiple scenarios while preserving performance on benign tasks.[1]

Warning: This paper may contain examples of offensive or harmful text and images.

1 Introduction

Large vision-language models (VLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in open-world visual understanding and complex reasoning (Liu et al., 2024a; Wang et al., 2023; Bai et al., 2025). However, integrating the visual modality often significantly weakens the safety alignment of VLMs compared to their underlying large language model backbones (LLMs) (Li et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024b). For example, simply appending a blank image to a harmful text prompt increases the jailbreak success rate of LLaVA-1.5-7B (Liu et al., 2024a) on the HADES dataset (Li et al., 2024) by 28.13%, indicating that the visual modality introduces a systematic safety vulnerability.



Figure 1: Illustration of the VLM jailbreak mechanism. Jailbreak samples form a distinct state (red circle) in the representation space, separable from benign (blue circle) and refusal (green circle) states. The image-induced representation shift contains a jailbreak-related shift component along the jailbreak direction, which steers the VLM's representation into the jailbreak state.

Recent studies (Zou et al., 2025; Guo et al., 2024) have proposed the *safety perception failure* hypothesis to explain VLM jailbreaks. This hypothesis suggests that the visual modality disrupts the VLM's safety perception, making it unable to distinguish between harmful and benign inputs. However, this hypothesis is primarily based on implicitly harmful multimodal data, where the harmful intent is removed from the text prompt and conveyed through the image. For example, a harmful prompt like "*How to make a bomb*" is rewritten as the harmless version "*How to make this product*" and paired with an image of a bomb. Since the harmful intent is removed from the text, it is difficult to determine whether the jailbreak occurs because the image disrupts the VLM's safety perception, or simply because the text prompt itself is harmless. Therefore, we argue that the hypothesis

[1]The code and data will be released after acceptance.

based on such data has significant limitations.

To address these limitations, we analyze VLM jailbreaks using explicitly harmful multimodal data, where the text prompt remains clearly harmful. We observe that jailbreak responses often include safety warnings, as highlighted in orange in Figure 1. This suggests that *the VLM recognizes harmful intent even in jailbreak cases*. We further analyze benign and harmful inputs in the representation space and find that they are clearly separable. Moreover, even among harmful inputs, jailbreak samples form a distinct representation state from refusal samples. These observations show that VLM jailbreaks do not stem from a perception failure to recognize harmful intent. Instead, *the VLM enters a distinct jailbreak state where it fails to trigger a refusal despite recognizing the harmful intent*.

Therefore, we propose a new hypothesis to explain VLM jailbreaks: *adding an image induces a representation shift within the VLM's latent space that contains a jailbreak-related shift, which steers the VLM's representation toward the jailbreak state*. To quantify the impact of this shift, we define a jailbreak direction as the vector pointing from a refusal state to a jailbreak state. We then measure the jailbreak-related shift as the projection of the total representation shift onto this direction, as illustrated in Figure 1. Experiments across various scenarios consistently show that jailbreak samples exhibit significantly larger jailbreak-related shifts than refusal samples, while benign samples remain near zero, supporting our hypothesis. The jailbreak-related shift also provides a clear explanation for why images with richer harmful visual information and higher image-text semantic relevance are more likely to trigger jailbreaks.

Inspired by these findings, we propose JRS-Rem, a defense method that improves VLM safety by removing the jailbreak-related shift from the total image-induced representation shift. We evaluate JRS-Rem across three different VLMs using seven datasets covering explicitly harmful, implicitly harmful, and adversarial attack scenarios, as well as three utility benchmarks. Results show that JRS-Rem significantly enhances VLM safety across all evaluated jailbreak scenarios, while preserving utility on benign tasks.

2 Related Work

Understanding VLM jailbreaks in the representation space. Several studies have explored VLM jailbreaks by analyzing their internal representations. Li et al. (2025) and Liu et al. (2025) observe that introducing images leads to substantial shifts in multimodal representations relative to text-only inputs. However, these studies do not isolate jailbreak-related components from the total shifts. Guo et al. (2024) and Zou et al. (2025) found that VLMs struggle to distinguish between implicitly harmful and benign inputs, leading to the safety perception failure hypothesis. In comparison, this paper reveals that VLMs can recognize harmful intent but enter a distinct jailbreak state, providing a unified explanation for various jailbreak scenarios.

Inference-time defenses against VLM jailbreaks. Existing research has proposed various inference-time defense methods. At the input level, methods include self-reminders (Xie et al., 2024), input detection (Robey et al., 2023), defensive prompt optimization (Wang et al., 2024), converting visual inputs into text descriptions (Gou et al., 2024), and reliance on stronger external LLMs (Pi et al., 2024). However, these methods often compromise VLM utility or incur significant computational overhead. At the representation level, Liu et al. (2025) pull multimodal representations back into the text domain, Li et al. (2025) revise activations at the head and layer levels, and Zou et al. (2025) remove components along benign-to-harmful directions. Nevertheless, these methods do not isolate the specific jailbreak component, potentially leading to insufficient defense or utility loss. Our work addresses these limitations by isolating and removing the jailbreak-related shift, enabling a highly targeted and computationally efficient defense.

3 Jailbreak as a Distinct Internal State

The safety perception failure hypothesis (Zou et al., 2025; Guo et al., 2024) focuses on implicitly harmful inputs, where the text prompt is harmless and the harmful intent is conveyed solely through the image. However, given that the safety alignment of current VLMs relies primarily on their language model backbones (Liu et al., 2025; Ding et al., 2024; Qi et al., 2024), analyzing VLM jailbreaks under implicitly harmful inputs is inherently ambiguous: a jailbreak might occur because the image disrupts the VLM's safety perception, or simply because the text prompt itself is harmless.

To eliminate such ambiguity, we focus on explicitly harmful inputs $x = [I, T]$, where the text prompt T carries clear harmful intent. This set-



Figure 2: PCA visualization of the representation space. Jailbreak samples form a distinct cluster, clearly separated from both benign samples and refusal samples. Additional results are provided in Appendix D.1.



Figure 3: Representation analysis on LLaVA-1.5-7B. (a) Average cosine distance to the jailbreak centroid. Shaded areas denote standard deviation. Benign and refusal samples remain distant from the jailbreak centroid. (b) Linear probing F1 scores. High F1 scores confirm that the three categories are linearly separable. Additional results are provided in Appendix D.1.

ting enables a more precise exploration of how the visual modality influences VLM safety. Specifically, we construct a multimodal dataset $\mathcal{D}_{\text{mm}} = \mathcal{D}_{\text{benign}} \cup \mathcal{D}_{\text{harmful}}$, where the benign set $\mathcal{D}_{\text{benign}}$ contains harmless image-text pairs and the harmful set $\mathcal{D}_{\text{harmful}}$ consists of samples with explicitly harmful text prompt T. Details are provided in Appendix A.5. Next, we analyze the distribution of different input types within the VLM's representation space. For a given layer ℓ of a VLM, let $\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x) \in \mathbb{R}^d$ denote the last-token representation of the input sample x. By analyzing $\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)$ for all samples $x \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{mm}}$ across LLaVA-1.5-7B (Liu et al., 2024a), ShareGPT4V-7B (Chen et al., 2024a) and InternVL-Chat-19B (Chen et al., 2024b), we obtain the following empirical observations.

Observation 1: PCA visualization reveals that jailbreak samples are clearly separable from both benign samples and refusal samples. To investigate whether VLMs fail to recognize harmful intent, we apply principal component analysis (PCA) to the representations. For a given VLM, we further partition the harmful set $\mathcal{D}_{\text{harmful}}$ into two subsets based on the VLM's responses: the jailbreak set $\mathcal{D}_{\text{jail}}$, where the VLM generates harmful responses, and the refusal set $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ref}}$, where the VLM refuses to respond. As shown in Figure 2, harmful samples are clearly separable from benign samples, indicating that *VLMs can effectively distinguish explicitly harmful inputs from benign ones* within the representation space. Moreover, jailbreak samples and refusal samples also form separable clusters, suggesting that *the jailbreak state is a distinct internal mode separate from the refusal state.*

Observation 2: Distance analysis and linear probing confirm the distinctness of the jailbreak state. Beyond PCA, we verify whether jailbreak samples remain separable in the original high-dimensional representation space. First, we measure the distance between representations of various types of samples and the jailbreak centroid to determine if the jailbreak state remains a distinct region. Specifically, for each layer ℓ, we compute the jailbreak centroid as $\boldsymbol{\mu}_{\text{jail}}^{(\ell)} = \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{jail}}}[\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)]$. We then measure the cosine distance between the representation $\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)$ of each sample x and the jailbreak centroid $\boldsymbol{\mu}_{\text{jail}}^{(\ell)}$, defined as $\text{Dist}(x, \boldsymbol{\mu}_{\text{jail}}^{(\ell)}) = 1 - \frac{\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x) \cdot \boldsymbol{\mu}_{\text{jail}}^{(\ell)}}{\|\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)\|_2 \|\boldsymbol{\mu}_{\text{jail}}^{(\ell)}\|_2}$. Figure 3(a) shows that jailbreak samples cluster tightly around their centroid, while refusal and benign samples are located significantly further away. This high-dimensional distance gap confirms that *the jailbreak state occupies a distinct region, rather than being a slight variation of the refusal or benign states.*

Second, following Zou et al. (2025), we train linear probes to perform a three-way classification among jailbreak, refusal, and benign samples. Figure 3(b) reports the F1 scores for each category across layers. The near-perfect F1 scores in middle and deep layers further confirm that these three states are highly linearly separable. These high-dimensional analyses validate that *VLMs successfully recognize harmful intent but enter a jailbreak state where a refusal fails to be triggered.*

Observation 3: Jailbreak responses frequently contain safety warnings. Finally, we analyze the content of jailbreak responses to explore whether VLMs recognize the harmful intent of inputs. Specifically, we examine whether jailbreak responses include acknowledgments of risk, illegality, or ethical concerns, which we term *safety warnings*. We identify safety warnings using a predefined set of safety-related keywords adapted primarily from (Zou et al., 2025), as listed in Appendix C.2. Table 1 shows a substantial fraction of

Dataset	Explicit (%)	Implicit (%)
MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2024b)	70.24	49.55
HADES (Li et al., 2024)	76.18	68.52
RedTeam2K (Luo et al., 2024)	69.69	–

Table 1: Percentage of jailbreak responses containing safety warnings for explicitly and implicitly harmful inputs on LLaVA-1.5-7B. High frequency indicates VLMs recognize harmful intent even when a jailbreak occurs.

jailbreak responses contain safety warnings, even for implicitly harmful inputs. This further indicates that *VLMs remain capable of recognizing harmful intent in the input, even when a jailbreak occurs*.

Taken together, these three observations demonstrate that *jailbreak is a distinct internal state*. In this state, the VLM recognizes the harmful intent but fails to trigger the expected refusal behavior.

4 Explaining VLM Jailbreaks via the Jailbreak-Related Shift

Building on the observations in Section 3, we propose a new hypothesis to explain the mechanism of VLM jailbreaks: *introducing an image induces a representation shift that contains a jailbreak-related shift component, and this specific jailbreak-related shift steers the VLM's representation toward the jailbreak state.*

4.1 Defining the Jailbreak-Related Shift

Given a multimodal input $x = [I, T]$, we define the image-induced representation shift at each layer ℓ as $\Delta\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x) = \mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}([I, T]) - \mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}([\varnothing, T])$, where $[\varnothing, T]$ denotes the text-only input obtained by removing the image I from the input x. To disentangle the jailbreak-related component from the total shift $\Delta\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)$, we first define a jailbreak direction that characterizes the transition from the refusal state to the jailbreak state within the VLM's representation space. Specifically, we define the jailbreak direction $\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ as the normalized difference between the average representations of jailbreak samples and refusal samples:

$$\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)} = \frac{\Delta^{(\ell)}}{\|\Delta^{(\ell)}\|_2}, \text{ with } \Delta^{(\ell)} = (\boldsymbol{\mu}^{(\ell)}_{\text{jail}} - \boldsymbol{\mu}^{(\ell)}_{\text{ref}}), \quad (1)$$

where $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{(\ell)}_{\text{jail}} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ and $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{(\ell)}_{\text{ref}} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ denote the average representations of jailbreak samples and refusal samples, respectively.

We then define the jailbreak-related shift $s^{(\ell)}(x) \in \mathbb{R}$ as the scalar projection of the total image-induced representation shift $\Delta\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)$ onto the jailbreak direction $\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}$:

$$s^{(\ell)}(x) = \Delta\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)^\top \mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}. \quad (2)$$

In this way, the scalar $s^{(\ell)}(x)$ quantifies the magnitude of the jailbreak-related shift component within the total shift. A larger value of $s^{(\ell)}(x)$ indicates that the image effectively steers the VLM's representation toward the jailbreak state.

4.2 Quantifying the Jailbreak-Related Shift Across Different Scenarios

To validate our hypothesis that the jailbreak-related shift steers the VLM's representation toward the jailbreak state, we quantify the jailbreak-related shifts across the following three jailbreak scenarios:

- Explicitly harmful: samples from the explicitly harmful subsets of HADES (Li et al., 2024) and MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2024b) datasets. Each text prompt is paired with three types of images, including (1) SD: Stable Diffusion-generated images related to the text prompt; (2) TYPO: typographic images of harmful keywords; and (3) SD+TYPO: a concatenation of both.
- Implicitly harmful: samples from the implicitly harmful variants of HADES and MM-SafetyBench datasets. To ensure the VLM accurately captures the semantics of inputs, the text prompts are paired with SD+TYPO images.
- Adversarial attack: Covering three geometry-based attacks: MML-R, MML-M, and MML-B64 (Wang et al., 2025), and one gradient-based attack: HADES-gradient (Li et al., 2024).

As a baseline, we also quantify the jailbreak-related shift on four benign datasets, including MM-Vet (Yu et al., 2023), MME (Fu et al., 2025), ScienceQA (Lu et al., 2022), and LLaVA-Instruct-80k (Liu et al., 2024a). This allows us to verify if benign inputs exhibit a negligible jailbreak-related shift. For all evaluations, we use the unified jailbreak direction $\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}$ computed from the HADES dataset. See Appendix A.5 for dataset details.

Figure 4 illustrates the normalized jailbreak-related shift $\tilde{s}^{(\ell)}(x) = s^{(\ell)}(x)/\|\Delta\mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x)\|_2$ to ensure a fair comparison across layers. Results across all VLMs show that jailbreak samples consistently exhibit larger jailbreak-related shifts than refusal samples across all three scenarios in the middle and deep layers, while benign samples remain concentrated near zero. This demonstrates that *the jailbreak-related shift effectively quantifies the ex-*



Figure 4: Average normalized jailbreak-related shift on LLaVA-1.5-7B across different scenarios: (a) explicitly harmful, (b) implicitly harmful, (c) adversarial attack, and (d) benign. Jailbreak samples consistently exhibit larger shift than refusal samples, while benign samples remain near zero. Additional results are provided in Appendix D.2.



Figure 5: (a) Image examples with increasing levels of harmful visual information. (b) Average normalized jailbreak-related shift across layers, showing a progressive increase as more harmful information is introduced. (c) Relationship between the jailbreak-related shift (layer 19) and ASR. As the amount of harmful visual information increases, the ASR and the jailbreak-related shift increase concurrently.



Figure 6: (a) Dataset-level and (b) sample-level average jailbreak-related shifts for samples with varying image-text similarity. Points are colored from light to dark to represent increasing similarity. Results show that higher semantic similarity induces larger jailbreak-related shifts, thereby leading to a higher ASR.

tent to which an image steers the VLM's representation toward the jailbreak state, validating our hypothesis that the jailbreak-related shift is what triggers the VLM's jailbreak behavior.

4.3 Explaining VLM Jailbreak Phenomena

While previous studies have identified several empirical phenomena in VLM jailbreaks, the underlying mechanisms remain unclear. In this subsection, we use the jailbreak-related shift to explain two specific VLM jailbreak phenomena using LLaVA-1.5-7B as the target VLM.

Phenomenon 1: Images with richer harmful visual information lead to higher jailbreak success rates. (Li et al., 2024; Guo et al., 2024) To explain this phenomenon, we explore the relationship between the amount of harmful visual information and the values of the jailbreak-related shift. To this end, we conduct experiments on the SD and SD+TYPO subsets of the HADES dataset. To construct a series of samples with varying levels of harmful visual information, we apply Gaussian noise to each SD image at four levels: 100% (N100), 75% (N75), 50% (N50), and 25% (N25), as illustrated in Figure 5(a).

Figure 5(b) shows that images with more harmful visual information consistently induce larger jailbreak-related shifts in the middle and deep layers than those with less information. Additionally, Figure 5(c) illustrates the jailbreak-related shift at layer 19 along with the corresponding ASR for each input type. We observe that as the amount of harmful visual information increases, both the ASR and the jailbreak-related shift increase concurrently. Results suggest that images with richer harmful visual information are more likely to achieve a successful jailbreak because they induce a larger jailbreak-related shift in the representation space.

Phenomenon 2: Higher image-text semantic relevance leads to higher jailbreak success rates. (Liu et al., 2024b) We further investigate how the semantic similarity between the image and the text prompt influences jailbreak behavior. To this end, we use CLIP (Radford et al., 2021) to quantify the similarity between the two modalities, and conduct analyses at both the dataset and sample levels.

Dataset-level. We first compute the image-text similarity for samples from the HADES, MM-SafetyBench, and RedTeam2K (Luo et al., 2024) datasets. For each dataset, we stratify samples into three groups based on their CLIP scores: low, medium, and high similarity. Figure 6(a) illustrates

Model / Defense	HADES			MM-SafetyBench			RedTeam2K		
	SD	TYPO	SD+TYPO	SD	TYPO	SD+TYPO	SD	TYPO	SD+TYPO
LLaVA-1.5-7B	77.3	73.7	84.9	80.6	79.6	81.4	39.3	37.6	49.8
+ AdaShield	28.4$_{(\downarrow 48.9)}$	26.5$_{(\downarrow 47.2)}$	29.0$_{(\downarrow 55.9)}$	32.6$_{(\downarrow 48.0)}$	32.6$_{(\downarrow 47.0)}$	35.3$_{(\downarrow 46.1)}$	23.8$_{(\downarrow 15.5)}$	19.7$_{(\downarrow 17.9)}$	22.2$_{(\downarrow 27.6)}$
+ ECSO	30.0$_{(\downarrow 47.3)}$	27.6$_{(\downarrow 46.1)}$	31.6$_{(\downarrow 53.3)}$	17.0$_{(\downarrow 63.6)}$	14.0$_{(\downarrow 65.6)}$	23.1$_{(\downarrow 58.3)}$	22.2$_{(\downarrow 17.1)}$	23.2$_{(\downarrow 14.4)}$	28.6$_{(\downarrow 21.2)}$
+ ShiftDC	67.2$_{(\downarrow 10.1)}$	65.3$_{(\downarrow 8.40)}$	72.9$_{(\downarrow 12.0)}$	44.3$_{(\downarrow 36.3)}$	42.2$_{(\downarrow 37.4)}$	45.7$_{(\downarrow 35.7)}$	33.0$_{(\downarrow 6.30)}$	32.5$_{(\downarrow 5.10)}$	42.5$_{(\downarrow 7.30)}$
+ CMRM	73.8$_{(\downarrow 3.50)}$	71.4$_{(\downarrow 2.30)}$	74.5$_{(\downarrow 10.4)}$	49.2$_{(\downarrow 31.4)}$	47.0$_{(\downarrow 32.6)}$	48.7$_{(\downarrow 32.7)}$	46.2$_{(\uparrow 6.90)}$	47.5$_{(\uparrow 9.90)}$	51.0$_{(\uparrow 1.20)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	**12.2**$_{(\downarrow 65.1)}$	**9.40**$_{(\downarrow 64.3)}$	**12.4**$_{(\downarrow 72.5)}$	**12.6**$_{(\downarrow 68.0)}$	**8.00**$_{(\downarrow 71.6)}$	**11.7**$_{(\downarrow 69.7)}$	**19.0**$_{(\downarrow 20.3)}$	**18.4**$_{(\downarrow 19.2)}$	**21.9**$_{(\downarrow 27.9)}$
ShareGPT4V-7B	58.1	55.1	71.7	64.3	65.1	73.1	28.8	29.4	39.2
+ AdaShield	12.5$_{(\downarrow 45.6)}$	12.1$_{(\downarrow 43.0)}$	14.6$_{(\downarrow 57.1)}$	11.8$_{(\downarrow 52.5)}$	11.8$_{(\downarrow 53.3)}$	13.1$_{(\downarrow 60.0)}$	12.3$_{(\downarrow 16.5)}$	12.2$_{(\downarrow 17.2)}$	15.0$_{(\downarrow 24.2)}$
+ ECSO	36.1$_{(\downarrow 22.0)}$	29.6$_{(\downarrow 25.5)}$	42.2$_{(\downarrow 29.5)}$	13.7$_{(\downarrow 50.6)}$	10.0$_{(\downarrow 55.1)}$	17.3$_{(\downarrow 55.8)}$	21.5$_{(\downarrow 7.30)}$	22.7$_{(\downarrow 6.70)}$	26.1$_{(\downarrow 13.1)}$
+ ShiftDC	26.4$_{(\downarrow 31.7)}$	22.2$_{(\downarrow 32.9)}$	26.5$_{(\downarrow 45.2)}$	16.1$_{(\downarrow 48.2)}$	13.6$_{(\downarrow 51.5)}$	16.6$_{(\downarrow 56.5)}$	17.9$_{(\downarrow 10.9)}$	17.6$_{(\downarrow 11.8)}$	20.1$_{(\downarrow 19.1)}$
+ CMRM	5.70$_{(\downarrow 52.4)}$	4.60$_{(\downarrow 50.5)}$	5.40$_{(\downarrow 66.3)}$	12.4$_{(\downarrow 51.9)}$	12.6$_{(\downarrow 52.5)}$	12.3$_{(\downarrow 60.8)}$	12.1$_{(\downarrow 16.7)}$	12.5$_{(\downarrow 16.9)}$	12.1$_{(\downarrow 27.1)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	**2.80**$_{(\downarrow 55.3)}$	**2.40**$_{(\downarrow 52.7)}$	**2.10**$_{(\downarrow 69.6)}$	**5.40**$_{(\downarrow 58.9)}$	**4.20**$_{(\downarrow 60.9)}$	**5.10**$_{(\downarrow 68.0)}$	**8.00**$_{(\downarrow 20.8)}$	**8.50**$_{(\downarrow 20.9)}$	**9.10**$_{(\downarrow 30.1)}$
InternVL-Chat-19B	38.9	24.9	31.7	71.7	67.9	73.1	30.2	32.2	43.6
+ AdaShield	13.7$_{(\downarrow 25.2)}$	**13.4**$_{(\downarrow 11.5)}$	14.5$_{(\downarrow 17.2)}$	28.8$_{(\downarrow 42.9)}$	36.2$_{(\downarrow 31.7)}$	33.3$_{(\downarrow 39.8)}$	20.7$_{(\downarrow 9.50)}$	24.7$_{(\downarrow 7.50)}$	19.6$_{(\downarrow 24.0)}$
+ ECSO	19.4$_{(\downarrow 19.5)}$	16.8$_{(\downarrow 8.10)}$	18.4$_{(\downarrow 13.3)}$	25.1$_{(\downarrow 46.6)}$	20.7$_{(\downarrow 47.2)}$	28.3$_{(\downarrow 44.8)}$	11.2$_{(\downarrow 19.0)}$	14.4$_{(\downarrow 17.8)}$	19.8$_{(\downarrow 23.8)}$
+ ShiftDC	24.1$_{(\downarrow 14.8)}$	25.2$_{(\uparrow 0.30)}$	21.4$_{(\downarrow 10.3)}$	41.4$_{(\downarrow 30.3)}$	39.5$_{(\downarrow 28.4)}$	42.5$_{(\downarrow 30.6)}$	20.4$_{(\downarrow 9.80)}$	25.5$_{(\downarrow 6.70)}$	27.6$_{(\downarrow 16.0)}$
+ CMRM	35.6$_{(\downarrow 3.30)}$	17.6$_{(\downarrow 7.30)}$	36.8$_{(\uparrow 5.10)}$	19.7$_{(\downarrow 52.0)}$	22.5$_{(\downarrow 45.4)}$	20.8$_{(\downarrow 52.3)}$	17.8$_{(\downarrow 12.4)}$	29.8$_{(\downarrow 2.40)}$	21.4$_{(\downarrow 22.2)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	**5.60**$_{(\downarrow 33.3)}$	13.6$_{(\downarrow 11.3)}$	**6.10**$_{(\downarrow 25.6)}$	**4.40**$_{(\downarrow 67.3)}$	**10.7**$_{(\downarrow 57.2)}$	**5.70**$_{(\downarrow 67.4)}$	**8.70**$_{(\downarrow 21.5)}$	**14.3**$_{(\downarrow 17.9)}$	**9.60**$_{(\downarrow 34.0)}$

Table 2: ASR (↓) across VLMs under explicitly harmful scenarios. For each VLM, the first row shows the baseline performance without defense, followed by results for various defense methods and their relative improvements. JRS-Rem consistently achieves the **best** or second-best results across all VLMs and datasets.

the average jailbreak-related shift at layer 19 and the corresponding ASR for each group. Results show that samples with higher semantic similarity exhibit larger jailbreak-related shifts, which correlates with a higher ASR.

Sample-level. To isolate the impact of image-text similarity, we conduct a controlled experiment using the HADES dataset. For each harmful text prompt, HADES provides five different Stable Diffusion-generated images. We rank these images by their CLIP-based semantic similarity to the prompt and assign them to five corresponding similarity ranks (from low to high), ensuring each rank contains the identical set of text prompts. Results in Figure 6(b) also show that higher semantic similarity leads to a larger jailbreak-related shift, thus resulting in a higher ASR. In conclusion, our analysis of these two phenomena demonstrates that *the jailbreak-related shift provides a unified explanation for VLM jailbreaks*.

5 Defense Method Based on Removing the Jailbreak-Related Shift

5.1 Algorithm Design and Implementation

Based on our hypothesis in Section 4, we propose **JRS-Rem**, a lightweight and training-free defense method that rectifies the VLM's internal representations by removing the jailbreak-related shift.

Specifically, for each multimodal input x, we calculate the jailbreak-related shift $s^{(\ell)}(x)$ at each layer ℓ following Equation (2), using a pre-computed jailbreak direction $\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}$. During the inference of the first generated token, if the normalized jailbreak-related shift $\tilde{s}^{(\ell)}(x)$ exceeds a predefined threshold τ, we remove the jailbreak-related shift component from the last-token hidden state:

$$\hat{\mathbf{h}}^{(\ell)}(x) = \mathbf{h}^{(\ell)}(x) - s^{(\ell)}(x) \cdot \mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}, \text{ s.t. } \tilde{s}^{(\ell)}(x) > \tau. \quad (3)$$

In practice, we use a fixed threshold $\tau = 0.2$ across all VLMs to balance safety enhancement and utility preservation. The rectified representation $\hat{\mathbf{h}}^{(\ell)}(x)$ removes the jailbreak-related shift while preserving the remaining representation shift, which largely retains task-relevant semantic information. Thus, JRS-Rem effectively defends against jailbreak attempts without degrading VLM utility.

Computational overhead. JRS-Rem requires only two additional token-level forward passes to compute the jailbreak-related shift. Since typical VLM responses involve long-form generation (e.g., over 128 tokens), this fixed cost is negligible compared to the total inference time. This makes JRS-Rem highly efficient for real-time applications.

5.2 Experiments and Results Analysis

Computation of jailbreak direction. For each VLM, we pre-compute a fixed jailbreak direction $\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}$ for each layer ℓ using 50 jailbreak samples and 50 refusal samples from the HADES dataset. The jailbreak direction remains constant across all

Model / Defense	HADES	MM-SafetyBench
LLaVA-1.5-7B	67.0	67.2
+ AdaShield	**35.2**$_{(\downarrow 31.8)}$	45.8$_{(\downarrow 21.4)}$
+ ECSO	44.1$_{(\downarrow 22.9)}$	<u>26.8</u>$_{(\downarrow 40.4)}$
+ ShiftDC	60.4$_{(\downarrow 6.60)}$	38.3$_{(\downarrow 28.9)}$
+ CMRM	52.6$_{(\downarrow 14.4)}$	30.1$_{(\downarrow 37.1)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	<u>35.3</u>$_{(\downarrow 31.7)}$	**19.1**$_{(\downarrow 48.1)}$

Table 3: ASR (↓) under implicitly harmful scenarios. JRS-Rem consistently achieves the best or second-best performance across both datasets. Similar performance is observed on two other VLMs (in Appendix D.3).

Model / Defense	MML-M	MML-R	MML-B64	Gradient
LLaVA-1.5-7B	67.8	63.7	68.4	76.1
+ **JRS-Rem**	**9.0**	**9.2**	**9.6**	**11.3**
ShareGPT4V-7B	54.2	63.3	46.0	58.2
+ **JRS-Rem**	**4.4**	**4.1**	**4.1**	**2.6**
InternVL-Chat-19B	24.5	27.7	30.6	31.4
+ **JRS-Rem**	**10.4**	**9.4**	**11.8**	**7.6**

Table 4: ASR (↓) under adversarial attack scenarios. JRS-Rem significantly reduces ASR, demonstrating its generalizability across diverse attack types.

Model / Defense	MM-Vet	ScienceQA	MME
LLaVA-1.5-7B	**32.1**	<u>64.0</u>	**1754.9**
+ AdaShield	27.3$_{(\downarrow 4.80)}$	39.5$_{(\downarrow 24.5)}$	1292.3$_{(\downarrow 462.6)}$
+ ECSO	30.1$_{(\downarrow 2.00)}$	57.8$_{(\downarrow 6.20)}$	1505.9$_{(\downarrow 249.0)}$
+ ShiftDC	30.0$_{(\downarrow 2.10)}$	**64.1**$_{(\uparrow 0.10)}$	<u>1573.0</u>$_{(\downarrow 181.9)}$
+ CMRM	15.3$_{(\downarrow 16.8)}$	45.2$_{(\downarrow 18.8)}$	679.8$_{(\downarrow 1075.1)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	<u>31.6</u>$_{(\downarrow 0.50)}$	<u>64.0</u>$_{(\downarrow 0.00)}$	**1754.9**$_{(\downarrow 0.000)}$

Table 5: Utility scores (↑) on benign benchmarks. JRS-Rem has almost no impact on the performance of the original VLMs on benign tasks. Results for the other two VLMs (Appendix D.3) show consistent trends.

experiments. Section 5.3 provides further analysis on the sample efficiency of the jailbreak direction.

VLMs and baseline defense methods. To evaluate the effectiveness of JRS-Rem, we conduct experiments across three VLMs, including LLaVA-1.5-7B (Liu et al., 2024a), ShareGPT4V-7B (Chen et al., 2024a), and InternVL-Chat-19B (Chen et al., 2024b). We compare JRS-Rem with four representative inference-time defense methods: (1) AdaShield (Wang et al., 2024), (2) ECSO (Gou et al., 2024), (3) ShiftDC (Zou et al., 2025), and (4) CMRM (Liu et al., 2025). Further details for these baselines are provided in Section B.

Evaluation metrics. We use the attack success rate (ASR) to evaluate defense effectiveness. To accurately determine whether a response is a successful jailbreak, we combine three judging methods: (1) keyword-based rules (Wang et al., 2024), (2) Qwen3Guard-Gen-8B (Zhao et al., 2025), and (3) Llama-Guard-4-12B (Chi et al., 2024). We adopt a majority vote strategy: a response is labeled as a jailbreak only if at least two judging methods classify it as harmful. This approach provides a more reliable assessment than any single judging method. Further details are provided in Appendix C.1.

Evaluation under explicitly harmful scenarios. We evaluate JRS-Rem on the HADES, MM-SafetyBench, and RedTeam-2K datasets, where each text prompt is paired with SD, TYPO, or SD+TYPO images. Dataset details are provided in Appendix A.1. Table 2 shows that JRS-Rem consistently achieves the best or second-best performance across all VLMs and datasets. Notably, for LLaVA-1.5-7B on the HADES dataset, JRS-Rem reduces the ASR by 65.1%, 64.3%, and 72.5% across the three image types, significantly outperforming all baselines. This demonstrates that JRS-Rem effectively locates and removes the jailbreak-related shift, thereby preventing representations from being steered into a jailbreak state.

Evaluation under implicit harmful and adversarial attack scenarios. We further evaluate JRS-Rem under implicitly harmful and adversarial attack scenarios using the datasets described in Section 4.2. Dataset details are provided in Appendix A.2 and A.3. Table 3 and Table 4 show that JRS-Rem significantly reduces ASR in both scenarios, even though the jailbreak direction is extracted from explicitly harmful inputs. These results demonstrate that JRS-Rem effectively defends against diverse jailbreak attacks, rather than being limited to explicitly harmful scenarios.

Impact on VLM utility across benign benchmarks. To evaluate whether JRS-Rem affects the general performance of VLMs on benign inputs, we conduct experiments on three utility benchmarks, including MM-Vet, ScienceQA, and MME. We follow the evaluation protocols defined in the original papers to calculate utility scores, with further details on datasets and metrics provided in Appendix A.4. Table 5 shows that JRS-Rem has only a minimal impact on performance across these benchmarks. This is because the jailbreak-related shift of benign samples is typically too small to exceed the threshold. Even if a correction is triggered, JRS-Rem applies only a minimal adjustment that does not disrupt the original representations. Thus, the



Figure 7: (a) Impact of threshold τ on safety enhancement and utility preservation. We set $\tau = 0.2$ for all VLMs to effectively balance safety and utility. (b) Cosine similarity between jailbreak directions computed on 50 random sample pairs and the full dataset. High similarity across *ten trials* shows that the jailbreak direction can be accurately estimated with minimal samples.



Figure 8: (a) Pairwise cosine similarity of jailbreak directions computed on different datasets and data types at layer 19. High similarity across all pairs shows that the jailbreak direction is consistent across various data distributions. (b) AUROC for using the jailbreak direction to distinguish between jailbreak samples and refusal samples. High AUROC scores show the jailbreak direction effectively separates the two states.

VLM retains essential visual features for reasoning, maintaining its utility while ensuring safety.

5.3 Ablation Studies and Discussion

Ablation on threshold τ. To examine the effect of the threshold τ on safety enhancement and utility preservation, we evaluate ASR on the HADES dataset, which includes three data types (SD, TYPO, and SD+TYPO), and measure accuracy on the ScienceQA benchmark. Figure 7(a) shows the results for LLaVA-1.5-7B under different values of τ. As τ decreases, more samples are rectified, resulting in a lower ASR. However, when τ reaches 0.2, the improvement in safety becomes marginal, while utility performance begins to decrease slightly. Thus, we set $\tau = 0.2$ for all VLMs in our experiments to balance safety and utility.

Sample efficiency, consistency, and discriminability of the jailbreak direction. We first examine the sample efficiency of constructing the jailbreak direction $\mathbf{d}^{(\ell)}$. We randomly select 50 jailbreak and 50 refusal samples from the HADES dataset to compute the direction on LLaVA-1.5-7B. Figure 7(b) shows the cosine similarity between the directions computed from *ten independent trials* and the direction calculated using the full dataset. The high similarity shows that the jailbreak direction can be accurately estimated with a limited number of samples. This indicates that JRS-Rem does not require large-scale data and can be implemented with minimal sample costs.

Second, we examine the consistency of the jailbreak direction across various data distributions. We compute jailbreak directions from three harmful datasets, including HADES (H), MM-SafetyBench (M), and RedTeam2K (R). Each dataset contains three data types, including SD (S), TYPO (T), and SD+TYPO (ST), resulting in *nine* jailbreak directions. Figure 8(a) shows the pairwise cosine similarity of these nine directions at layer 19 of LLaVA-1.5-7B. All similarities consistently exceed 0.7, suggesting that the jailbreak direction is highly consistent across different distributions rather than specific to any single dataset.

Third, we evaluate the discriminability of the jailbreak direction in distinguishing between jailbreak and refusal samples. Specifically, we project representations of jailbreak and refusal samples from three explicitly harmful and two implicitly harmful (IH) datasets onto the jailbreak direction. We then compute the AUROC to measure the discriminative power of this direction in separating the two classes. Figure 8(b) shows that the AUROC exceeds 0.85 in the middle and deep layers for both explicit and implicit scenarios. These results indicate that the jailbreak direction effectively captures the internal transition from refusal to jailbreak.

6 Conclusions

In this paper, we show that jailbreak samples form a distinct state in the VLM's representation space, which is separable from both benign and refusal states. Based on this observation, we define a jailbreak direction and identify the jailbreak-related shift within the total image-induced representation shift. Our analysis shows that this jailbreak-related shift is closely coupled with the jailbreak behavior, providing a unified explanation for various VLM jailbreak scenarios. Finally, we propose JRS-Rem, a defense method that enhances VLM safety alignment by removing the jailbreak-related shift. Experiments across multiple scenarios show that JRS-Rem significantly improves VLM safety while preserving utility on benign tasks.

Limitations

The proposed JRS-Rem achieves defense by identifying and removing the jailbreak-related shift from the total image-induced representation shift. This mechanism inherently relies on the pre-existing safety alignment of the VLM's language model backbone. Consequently, if the backbone itself exhibits weak alignment, the jailbreak-related shift may not be clearly identifiable, which could limit the effectiveness of JRS-Rem. Further investigation is required to evaluate JRS-Rem across VLMs with different levels of backbone safety alignment.

Additionally, as our method specifically targets the representation shift triggered by visual inputs, it is primarily designed to enhance multimodal safety and does not extend to text-only jailbreak attacks. Finally, while JRS-Rem has been verified on models with up to 19B parameters, its scalability to significantly larger models remains to be explored.

Ethics Statement and Broader Impact

We exclusively utilize publicly available datasets and resources in this research. While these datasets may contain harmful or unethical content, they are used solely for research purposes and do not reflect the views or positions of the authors.

This work focuses on understanding the mechanisms underlying VLM jailbreaks. We acknowledge that the jailbreak direction identified in this study may have dual-use implications. While it is introduced to isolate and remove jailbreak-related shifts for defensive purposes, it could theoretically be misused to amplify jailbreak behavior. Nevertheless, we emphasize that our goal is to advance the fundamental understanding of VLM safety failures, which we believe is a necessary step toward developing more robust, reliable, and principled safeguards for vision-language models. We hope that increased transparency into jailbreak mechanisms will ultimately contribute to stronger defenses rather than facilitate misuse.

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A Datasets

A.1 Explicitly Harmful Datasets

We evaluate the VLM jailbreak mechanism and defense performance using three explicitly harmful datasets: HADES (Li et al., 2024), MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2024b), and RedTeam2K (Luo et al., 2024). Figure 9 shows two instances. The details of these datasets are summarized below:

- **HADES**. This dataset consists of 750 explicitly harmful text prompts across five harmful classes, including *animal, financial, privacy, self-harm,* and *violence*. For each harmful text prompt, HADES provides multiple image variations. In this study, we primarily utilize three types of images: (1) SD: Stable Diffusion-generated images related to the query; (2) TYPO: typography images of harmful keywords; and (3) SD+TYPO: a concatenation of both. This results in a total of 2,250 multimodal samples.
- **MM-SafetyBench**. This dataset contains 1,680 text prompts spanning 13 harmful classes, with each prompt providing both explicitly and implicitly harmful versions. The explicitly harmful version corresponds to the `Changed Question` field in the original dataset. Similar to HADES, each text prompt is paired with three types of images: SD, TYPO, and SD+TYPO, resulting in a total of 5,040 multimodal samples.
- **RedTeam2K**. This dataset includes 2,000 explicitly harmful text prompts across 16 safety policy categories. It also provides SD, TYPO, and SD+TYPO images for each text prompt, which is consistent with the other datasets. This results in a total of 6,000 multimodal samples.

A.2 Implicitly Harmful Datasets

We use implicitly harmful variants of the HADES and MM-SafetyBench datasets. In these variants, the text prompts are harmless, and the harmful intent is conveyed solely through the image. Figure 9 shows two instances. The details of these datasets are summarized below:

- **HADES (IH)**. The original HADES dataset does not provide harmless text prompts. To address this, we use MML (Wang et al., 2025), which offers a corresponding harmless version for each harmful prompt in HADES. Since SD+TYPO images provide explicit text guidance within the visual, they reduce the risk of the VLM failing to recognize the image content. We pair these harmless prompts with SD+TYPO images to construct 750 implicitly harmful samples.
- **MM-SafetyBench (IH)**. This dataset already provides a harmless version for each explicitly harmful prompt, which corresponds to the `Rephrased Question` field in the original dataset. Following the same logic, we pair these harmless prompts with SD+TYPO images to construct 1,680 implicitly harmful samples.

A.3 Adversarial Attack Datasets

To evaluate the effectiveness of our method under adversarial attacks, we test it against the following attack settings.

- **MML** (Wang et al., 2025). MML applies various transformations to images, such as rotation, mirroring, and base64 encoding. We use the HADES dataset processed with MML attacks. To ensure the model can still recognize the input content, we keep the original text prompts and only modify the images, resulting in 2,250 samples.
- **HADES-Gradient** (Li et al., 2024). This subset of the HADES dataset consists of 750 samples where images are iteratively optimized using the gradients of LLaVA-1.5-7B to trigger affirmative responses. These gradient-based images are combined with SD and TYPO images from the HADES dataset, totaling 750 samples.

A.4 Benign Benchmarks

We use three benign benchmarks to evaluate the impact of our proposed method on general model utility, including MM-Vet (Yu et al., 2023), ScienceQA (Lu et al., 2022), and MME (Fu et al., 2025). Details for each dataset are provided below:

- **MM-Vet**. This benchmark assesses six core vision-language capabilities, including recognition, OCR, knowledge, language generation, spatial awareness, and math. It contains 218 questions that require models to integrate these capabilities to solve complex tasks. Evaluation is performed using GPT-4, which assigns a score (0 to 1) to open-ended responses based on few-shot prompts. The final utility score is the average across all questions, scaled to [0, 100].
- **ScienceQA**. This dataset contains 21,208 multimodal multiple-choice questions from school science curricula. We evaluate our model on the test set, which consists of 4,241 samples, including 2,224 text-only and 2,017 multimodal questions. We report the accuracy (%) as the primary metric for this benchmark.



Figure 9: Examples of explicit and implicit harmful inputs, sourced from the HADES and MM-SafetyBench datasets.

- **MME**. This benchmark evaluates 14 sub-tasks across two categories: perception (MME-P) and cognition (MME-C), totaling 2,374 multimodal queries. Each question requires a "Yes" or "No" answer. For each image, MME provides a pair of questions—one with a "Yes" ground truth and the other with "No." The score for each sub-task combines individual question accuracy and image-level consistency (where both questions must be answered correctly). We report the sum of the perception and cognition scores as the final utility metric, with a maximum possible score of 2,800.

A.5 Dataset construction for Section 3

We construct a multimodal dataset, $\mathcal{D}_{\text{mm}} = \mathcal{D}_{\text{benign}} \cup \mathcal{D}_{\text{harmful}}$, which includes both benign and explicitly harmful inputs. This dataset is used to analyze how jailbreak samples form a distinct state in the representation space. The components of the dataset are described below:

- **Benign dataset ($\mathcal{D}_{\text{benign}}$)**: Following Zou et al. (2025), we use a subset of LLaVA-Instruct-150k (Liu et al., 2024a), which is a standard instruction-following dataset for vision-language fine-tuning in LLaVA. We randomly sampled 3,000 single-turn instances to form the benign set. These samples represent typical user queries that do not violate safety policies.
- **Harmful dataset ($\mathcal{D}_{\text{harmful}}$)**: We include all samples from the HADES and MM-SafetyBench datasets, totaling 7,290 instances. This comprehensive coverage ensures that the identified "jailbreak state" faithfully reflects the broader harmful data distribution, rather than being biased by the specific characteristics of a limited subset of inputs.

B Baseline Defense Methods

In this paper, we compare JRS-Rem with the following four inference-time defense methods:

- **AdaShield** (Wang et al., 2024). AdaShield is a prompt-based defense method that adds safety instructions to the input to prevent jailbreak attacks. It has two versions: (1) **AdaShield-S** uses a human-designed static prompt that tells the model to check the image and text content step-by-step for harmful information; (2) **AdaShield-A** uses an adaptive framework where another LLM acts as a defender to automatically create and improve the defense prompts. In this paper, we follow Zou et al. (2025) and use the AdaShield-S version with a manually designed defense prompt.
- **ECSO** (Gou et al., 2024). ECSO is a training-free defense method designed to activate the safety mechanisms of the LLM within a VLM. The original process consists of three steps. First, the VLM performs a self-evaluation to determine if its response is safe. Second, if the response is deemed unsafe, the model uses a specific prompt to generate a text caption for the input image. Third, this caption replaces the original image to guide the VLM in producing a safer response. For a fair comparison, we follow Zou et al. (2025) and exclude the initial safety check step, as such checks can be integrated into any defense framework. In our experiments, we use LLaVA-1.5-7B to generate image captions with the prompt provided by Gou et al. (2024). We set the maximum generation length to 256 tokens to ensure the captions are complete.
- **ShiftDC** (Zou et al., 2025). ShiftDC is a defense method that rectifies internal representations dur-

ing inference. It first identifies a safety direction by calculating the difference between the average representations of harmful and benign text-only inputs. ShiftDC assumes that adding an image induces an activation shift that can be split into two parts: a safety-relevant shift that misleads the VLM, and a safety-irrelevant shift that contains visual information. The method removes the former while keeping the latter to restore the VLM's safety. In our experiments, we follow Zou et al. (2025) to construct the safety direction using samples from the LLaVA-Instruct-80k and MM-SafetyBench datasets. We also use LLaVA-1.5-7B to generate image captions for this method, keeping the setup consistent with ECSO.

- **CMRM** (Liu et al., 2025). CMRM is also an internal representation revision method. It first extracts a shifting vector by comparing the hidden states of a text-only query with those of the same query combined with a blank (corrupted) image. This vector represents the representation shift induced by the visual input. CMRM provides two ways to obtain this vector: (1) Dataset-level, which identifies a general shifting direction that captures the overall trend across the entire dataset. (2) Sample-level, which calculates a specific shifting direction for each individual input to capture case-specific nuances. To protect the model, CMRM subtracts this vector from the multimodal hidden states to align them closer to the original LLM's state. In our experiments, we implement the sample-level version and use a blank image to compute the shifting vector.

C Implementation Details

C.1 Assessing Response Harmfulness

There are two common methods to evaluate the harmfulness of a response: keyword-based matching and LLM-based evaluation. The details and limitations of each method are provided below:

- **Keyword-based method**: This method uses a predefined list of refusal strings. A response is classified as a refusal if it contains strings such as "I'm sorry" or "I cannot". Otherwise, it is labeled as a successful jailbreak. The main limitation is that it is difficult to define an optimal list of keywords. If the list is too short, it may miss many refusals (low recall); if it is too long, it may cause false positives. Additionally, different VLMs have different response styles, making it hard to create a single keyword list that works for all models.
- **LLM-based evaluation**: This method uses a strong LLM (such as Llama-Guard-4-12B (Chi et al., 2024)) as a judge to check the response. The main issue with this method is that it may be inaccurate in extreme cases. For example, a response might actually be a successful jailbreak, but if it avoids explicitly harmful words or is incomplete, the judge model might fail to label it as unsafe. Conversely, it might misclassify a safe but complex response as harmful.

To accurately assess response harmfulness, we combine keyword-based matching with two advanced models: Qwen3Guard-Gen-8B (Zhao et al., 2025) and Llama-Guard-4-12B (Chi et al., 2024). We use the same keyword list as Gao et al. (2025), which is detailed in Table 6.

Refusal Keywords
I'm sorry
Sorry
I am sorry
I apologize
As an
As an AI
I'm an
I'm just
As a language model
As an Assistant
I cannot
I do not
It is not</s>
It is not appropriate
I'm unable to
I am unable to
I am not allowed to
I am an AI language model

Table 6: Refusal keywords.

We apply different strategies depending on the experimental goal:

- For calculating jailbreak directions: To get the most accurate jailbreak samples and refusal samples, we use a "drop conflict" method. We only keep a sample if all three methods (the keyword list and the two judge models) give the same label. If there is any conflict between the three methods, we remove the sample to reduce noise.
- For evaluating defense performance: To ensure



Figure 10: An example of a full jailbreak response, with safety warnings highlighted in orange.

all samples are included, we use a "majority vote" strategy. We classify a response as a successful jailbreak if at least two methods identify it as harmful. Otherwise, the response is treated as a refusal.

C.2 Safety Warnings Keywords

Safety Warning Keywords
illegal
harmful
hurtful
unethical
not legitimate
avoid engaging
laws and regulations
should not be performed
should be approached ethically
to protect against
to mitigate these risks
always be cautious
always ensure that
please note that
it is essential to
it's essential to
it is crucial to
it's crucial to
it is important to note
it's important to note

Table 7: Safety warning keywords.

In this paper, safety warnings refer to statements where the model acknowledges risks, illegalities, or ethical concerns within a jailbreak response. Figure 10 shows an example of a complete response containing such warnings.

We use a rule-based approach to detect these safety warnings. A response is flagged if it contains any of the predefined keywords or phrases listed in Table 7. These keywords are primarily sourced from Zou et al. (2025) and Wang et al. (2024). Notably, we exclude explicit refusal expressions (e.g., "I'm sorry") to ensure that we only capture cases where the model acknowledges the risk but still provides harmful content.

D Additional Experimental Results

D.1 Results for Section 3



Figure 11: PCA visualization of the representation space of InternVL-Chat-19B. Jailbreak samples form a distinct cluster, clearly separated from both benign samples and refusal samples.

Figure 11 shows the PCA visualization of jailbreak, refusal, and benign samples. The results

exhibit a consistent pattern: harmful and benign samples are clearly separable, and jailbreak and refusal samples are also separable. This separation confirms that jailbreak samples occupy a specific region in the representation space, which is different from both benign and refused inputs.



Figure 12: Average cosine distance to the jailbreak centroid on ShareGPT4V-7B and InternVL-Chat-19B. Shaded areas denote standard deviation. Benign and refusal samples remain distant from the jailbreak centroid.



Figure 13: Linear probing F1 scores on ShareGPT4V-7B and InternVL-Chat-19B. High F1 scores confirm that the three categories are linearly separable.

Figure 12 shows the average cosine distance from samples to the jailbreak centroid for ShareGPT4V-7B and InternVL-Chat-19B, and Figure 13 presents the linear probing F1 scores. These results further demonstrate that jailbreak samples remain clearly separable from both benign and refusal samples in the original high-dimensional representation space. The high F1 scores and the distinct distance gaps confirm that this separability is a consistent property across different VLM architectures.

D.2 Results for Section 4

Figure 14 and Figure 15 show the average normalized jailbreak-related shift across different scenarios for ShareGPT4V-7B and InternVL-Chat-19B, respectively. The results show that jailbreak samples consistently exhibit larger shifts than refusal samples in the middle and deep layers, while benign samples remain concentrated near zero. This phenomenon is consistently observed across different VLM architectures.

D.3 Results for Section 5

Model / Defense	HADES	MM-SafetyBench
LLaVA-1.5-7B	67.0	67.2
+ AdaShield	**35.2**$_{(\downarrow 31.8)}$	45.8$_{(\downarrow 21.4)}$
+ ECSO	44.1$_{(\downarrow 22.9)}$	26.8$_{(\downarrow 40.4)}$
+ ShiftDC	60.4$_{(\downarrow 6.60)}$	38.3$_{(\downarrow 28.9)}$
+ CMRM	52.6$_{(\downarrow 14.4)}$	30.1$_{(\downarrow 37.1)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	35.3$_{(\downarrow 31.7)}$	**19.1**$_{(\downarrow 48.1)}$
ShareGPT4V-7B	66.8	62.3
+ AdaShield	11.6$_{(\downarrow 55.2)}$	13.7$_{(\downarrow 48.6)}$
+ ECSO	49.0$_{(\downarrow 17.8)}$	25.2$_{(\downarrow 37.1)}$
+ ShiftDC	47.3$_{(\downarrow 19.5)}$	28.1$_{(\downarrow 34.2)}$
+ CMRM	10.8$_{(\downarrow 56.0)}$	**11.2**$_{(\downarrow 51.1)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	**9.20**$_{(\downarrow 57.6)}$	12.9$_{(\downarrow 49.4)}$
InternVL-Chat-19B	67.7	47.7
+ AdaShield	20.5$_{(\downarrow 47.2)}$	27.1$_{(\downarrow 20.6)}$
+ ECSO	30.1$_{(\downarrow 37.6)}$	33.6$_{(\downarrow 14.1)}$
+ ShiftDC	57.4$_{(\downarrow 10.3)}$	29.6$_{(\downarrow 18.1)}$
+ CMRM	25.6$_{(\downarrow 42.1)}$	12.8$_{(\downarrow 34.9)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	**3.60**$_{(\downarrow 64.1)}$	**12.6**$_{(\downarrow 35.1)}$

Table 8: ASR (↓) under implicitly harmful scenarios. JRS-Rem consistently achieves the best or second-best performance on all VLMs.

Model / Defense	MM-Vet	ScienceQA	MME
LLaVA-1.5-7B	**32.1**	64.0	**1754.9**
+ AdaShield	27.3$_{(\downarrow 4.80)}$	39.5$_{(\downarrow 24.5)}$	1292.3$_{(\downarrow 462.6)}$
+ ECSO	30.1$_{(\downarrow 2.00)}$	57.8$_{(\downarrow 6.20)}$	1505.9$_{(\downarrow 249.0)}$
+ ShiftDC	30.0$_{(\downarrow 2.10)}$	**64.1**$_{(\uparrow 0.10)}$	1573.0$_{(\downarrow 181.9)}$
+ CMRM	15.3$_{(\downarrow 16.8)}$	45.2$_{(\downarrow 18.8)}$	679.8$_{(\downarrow 1075.1)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	31.6$_{(\downarrow 0.50)}$	64.0$_{(\downarrow 0.00)}$	**1754.9**$_{(\downarrow 0.000)}$
ShareGPT4V-7B	35.0	62.7	**1895.8**
+ AdaShield	33.6$_{(\downarrow 1.40)}$	39.6$_{(\downarrow 23.1)}$	1548.5$_{(\downarrow 347.3)}$
+ ECSO	30.1$_{(\downarrow 4.90)}$	55.4$_{(\downarrow 7.30)}$	1516.5$_{(\downarrow 379.3)}$
+ ShiftDC	**35.6**$_{(\uparrow 0.60)}$	**63.1**$_{(\uparrow 0.40)}$	1730.1$_{(\downarrow 165.7)}$
+ CMRM	26.5$_{(\downarrow 8.50)}$	43.7$_{(\downarrow 19.0)}$	701.5$_{(\downarrow 1194.3)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	35.0$_{(\downarrow 0.00)}$	62.7$_{(\downarrow 0.00)}$	**1895.8**$_{(\downarrow 0.000)}$
InternVL-Chat-19B	39.5	81.4	**2022.7**
+ AdaShield	33.7$_{(\downarrow 5.80)}$	78.6$_{(\downarrow 2.80)}$	1917.2$_{(\downarrow 105.5)}$
+ ECSO	30.1$_{(\downarrow 9.40)}$	69.3$_{(\downarrow 12.1)}$	1609.8$_{(\downarrow 412.9)}$
+ ShiftDC	**41.2**$_{(\uparrow 1.70)}$	**81.9**$_{(\uparrow 0.5)}$	1814.8$_{(\downarrow 207.9)}$
+ CMRM	16.7$_{(\downarrow 22.8)}$	70.2$_{(\downarrow 11.2)}$	639.7$_{(\downarrow 1383.0)}$
+ **JRS-Rem**	38.3$_{(\downarrow 1.20)}$	81.4$_{(\downarrow 0.00)}$	**2022.7**$_{(\downarrow 0.000)}$

Table 9: Utility scores (↑) on benign benchmarks. JRS-Rem has almost no impact on the performance of the original VLMs on benign tasks.

Table 8 shows the defense performance on implicitly harmful datasets on all three VLMs. JRS-Rem significantly reduces the ASR in all cases,



Figure 14: Average normalized jailbreak-related shift on ShareGPT4V-7B across different scenarios: (a) explicitly harmful, (b) implicitly harmful, (c) adversarial attack, and (d) benign. Jailbreak samples consistently exhibit larger jailbreak-related shifts than refusal samples, while benign samples remain near zero.



Figure 15: Average normalized jailbreak-related shift on InternVL-Chat-19B across different scenarios: (a) explicitly harmful, (b) implicitly harmful, (c) adversarial attack, and (d) benign. Results show a consistent trend, further confirming our findings on a different VLM architecture.

achieving the best or second-best results across both datasets on all evaluated VLMs. These results demonstrate that our method is not limited to explicitly harmful scenarios but also generalizes effectively to implicit threats.

Table 9 shows the utility scores on three benchmarks across all three VLMs. JRS-Rem achieves the best or second-best results in eight out of the nine evaluated settings. Compared to other methods, JRS-Rem has only a minimal impact on performance, demonstrating its strong utility preservation capability.