

AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL FOR MEASURING SYSTEM-LEVEL IMPACTS OF AI ON UNITED STATES POWER GRIDS

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ABSTRACT

Data centers are a major source of power demand growth in the 21st century. Artificial Intelligence has accelerated this trend with power demand by data centers growing from 1.9% of total US power demand to 4.4% of US power in only six years. While anecdotal evidence suggests that AI data centers are using enough power to have substantial impacts on the U.S. power grids, there are no systematic studies to quantify these effects. We utilize econometric techniques to determine the impact of AI model training and inference on consumer electricity quality and fossil fuel power demand. We find significant reductions in power quality and significant increases in power demand near data centers both immediately before and immediately after the publication of AI models. The largest impact worsens power quality equivalent to an additional .5-1 power outages per year. We further show these estimates can also be used for counterfactual analysis to assess impacts of scaling for future model development.

1 INTRODUCTION

Over the past six years, data centers have expanded from consuming 1.9% to 4.4% of total U.S. electricity demand (Figure 1, DOE). This rapid growth—driven largely by artificial intelligence—follows two decades of flat electricity consumption and coincides with nationwide efforts to electrify transport and heating. Together, these trends are straining the power grid and raising concerns about both reliability and affordability. Recent anecdotal evidence, such as Nicoletti et al. (2024), points to data centers reducing local power quality and raising prices.

However, systematic empirical evidence on these power-grid impacts remains scarce. Existing techno-economic assessments such as those from international organizations, and industry-focused reports IEA (2024); EPRI (2024) broadly highlight increasing share of AI workloads in the data center market. At the micro-level, some studies examine the energy performance of different AI accelerators and identify workload management opportunities for reducing power consumptionShankar & Reuther (2022) and Patel et al. (2024). Last, a vast body of computer science literature focuses on the compute, energy, and environmental costs of AI model development and deployment Strubell et al. (2019); Schwartz et al. (2020); Wu et al. (2022); Berthelot et al. (2024); Morrison et al. (2025). While these provide a strong basis for understanding how AI models impact datacenter level demand and efficiency opportunities, in this work we ask questions about the impact at the power-grid level with implications for energy reliability and security.

Understanding these power grid level impacts is critical from the perspectives of energy reliability and security. In this paper, we ask seek to answer three specific questions: 1) What are the effects of




Figure 1: Projected data center growth over time. Source: DOE.

054 AI model releases on local power quality and power frequency? 2) How do AI training and inference
 055 affect electricity consumption around data centers owned by model developers? 3) How to analyze
 056 these grid impacts under counterfactual scenarios of efficiency and model use?

057 It is challenging, however, to quantify these *macro* grid-level impacts of AI models due to the lack of
 058 fine-grained data about other contributing factors that are unobservable due to proprietary aspects or
 059 otherwise prohibitively expensive to obtain. For example the power quality of a grid can be affected
 060 by many external factors including seasonal trends, location effects and data center internal factors
 061 such as other workloads which are unobservable proprietary information.

062 We employ econometric Difference-in-Differences (DiD) models to quantify the causal effects of AI
 063 model deployments on power systems. By comparing data centers running AI models against control
 064 groups of random data centers, and partitioning observations into pre- and post-model release peri-
 065 ods, we isolate the impact of AI deployments while controlling for temporal and geographic factors.
 066 Using publicly available data on datacenter locations, power grids, AI model releases, weather, and
 067 market prices, we find that large AI models cause significant power quality deterioration (exceeding
 068 half the standard deviation of US power-quality distributions) and increase fossil fuel demand by
 069 terawatt hours—**equivalent to powering 100,000 homes annually**—during both training and infer-
 070 ence phases. These estimates enable counterfactual projections for evaluating different scenarios’
 071 effects on energy consumption and grid stability.

072 We apply this methodology using publicly available market data on datacenter locations, power
 073 grid information, AI model release times, and other appropriate control data (e.g. weather, market
 074 prices). Specifically, we learn these DiD regressors for predicting measures of both power quality
 075 and demand. We find that large models cause significant power quality deterioration in nearby
 076 areas (well above half the standard deviation of US power-quality distributions), and increase fossil
 077 fuel demand in the order of terrawatt hours (equivalent to powering 100K homes a year) in both
 078 training and inference. We also show how these estimates can be used to evaluate different scenarios,
 079 enabling counterfactual projections of their effects on energy consumption and grid stability.

080 In summary, this work contributes (i) a methodology for assessing and monitoring the macro impacts
 081 of AI models on the power grid even when specific fine-grained data maybe unavailable, and (ii) the
 082 first quantitative estimates of these macro grid-level impacts of some major frontier models, adding
 083 complementary evidence to the emerging literature on the environmental and system-level impacts
 084 of AI data centers Murino et al. (2023); Guidi et al. (2024); Thangam et al. (2024).

085 086 2 BACKGROUND: DATACENTER CONCENTRATION AND POWER-QUALITY

087 The U.S. data centers are expanding rapidly, nearly tripling from its 2008 levels to 1489 active
 088 sites in 2025, with another 1,359 on the horizon Aterio (2025). The market is dominated by *hy-
 089 perscalers*—vertically integrated datacenters—owned by AI heavy companies such as Amazon, Mi-
 090 crossoft, and Google, alongside a long tail of smaller operators. Hyperscalers afford companies cer-
 091 tain economies of scale but greatly increase the geographic concentration of power demand on the
 092 grids. Concentrated demand strains local grids in the area, raising congestion costs and sometimes
 093 degrading power quality for neighboring consumers. Large, inflexible loads from AI hyperscalers
 094 also reduce system reliability, elevate wholesale prices, and complicate renewable integration.

095 AI workloads affect power quality through three main mechanisms. First, data centers and AI com-
 096 puting facilities add substantial baseload demand that can strain grid capacity and compromise
 097 voltage regulation, especially during peak periods. Second, AI workloads fluctuate rapidly with
 098 computational needs, creating unpredictable load variations that challenge stability and frequency
 099 regulation. Third, the switching power supplies and electronics essential to AI hardware generate
 100 harmonic distortion, introducing waveform distortions that spread through distribution networks and
 101 degrade power quality. See Figure 7 in Appendix for an illustration of this harmonic distortion.

102 These dynamics interact with broader shifts in the electricity market: greater electrification and the
 103 transition from fossil fuels to renewables. Because renewables are intermittent and less dispatchable,
 104 rising data center loads coupled with greater renewable penetration place dual pressures on grids,
 105 shaping both market outcomes and policy debates. It is therefore crucial to quantify how much
 106 power AI uses, how it distorts quality, and the role of efficiency improvements.

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
3 METHODOLOGY

109

3.1 PROBLEM

110 We analyze three primary effects of artificial intelligence (AI) data centers on the power market,
111 with a focus on how their presence and operations interact with grid stability and demand.112 First, we consider the effects of AI models on the index of power quality and power frequency
113 distortions in the vicinity of data centers. Power quality reflects the stability and reliability of the
114 grid, particularly in terms of voltage and frequency deviations. The intensive and often irregular
115 power draw of data centers—especially during periods of large-scale training runs—can generate
116 fluctuations that degrade local power quality. Frequency stability is a central component of reliable
117 electricity supply, and distortions can indicate imbalances between supply and demand. Because AI
118 training loads are highly concentrated in time and location, they may create stress points in the grid
119 that elevate the risk of such distortions.120 To this end, we evaluate whether the deployment of new frontier models, which require extraordi-
121 nary computational resources, coincides with measurable declines in regional power quality indices,
122 thereby signaling potential challenges for grid operators. Similarly, by linking model release time-
123 lines to observed patterns in frequency deviations, we assess the extent to which the roll-out of
124 individual models exacerbates local power quality issues beyond baseline fluctuations.125 Second, we consider the effects of both training and inference workloads on overall power demand
126 in the vicinity of data centers. Training runs, while episodic, are energy-intensive and can produce
127 sharp spikes in consumption, whereas inference tends to generate a steadier but still substantial level
128 of ongoing demand. Both activities alter local load profiles, raising questions about the adequacy
129 of transmission capacity, the role of long-term contracts for renewable energy procurement, and
130 the broader implications for regional electricity markets. By distinguishing between training and
131 inference, we highlight how different stages of the AI lifecycle place unique and evolving pressures
132 on power systems.133 Finally, we provide analysis of the impacts of improvements in AI efficiency on power quality and
134 power demand nearby to data centers. AI efficiency broadly defined represents improvements that
135 can be made to reduce the energy required by models without significant corresponding decreases in
136 quality. AI efficiency represents the main lever computer scientists have at their disposal to reduce
137 the power consumption of AI models. We utilize our econometric estimates to determine real-world
138 impact and combine with experimental data on the effects of hardware choices for AI to extrapolate
139 lab estimates to meaningful impact.140

3.2 ECONOMETRIC MODEL

141 Quantifying these effects is difficult given limited data on key variables. To overcome this, we draw
142 on econometric methods, which allow credible inference even when proprietary data are unavailable.
143 For example, Hausman (1997) infers telecom de-
144 mand from price and quantity variation, Fowlie et al.
145 (2012) evaluate environmental regulation in elec-
146 tricity using emissions and price data, and Card &
147 Krueger (1994) study minimum wage effects via
148 cross-state employment variation. Similarly, Green-
149 stone & Hanna (2014) analyze Indian pollution pol-
150 icy using ambient monitors rather than industry dis-
151 closures. These show that when markets transmit
152 the mechanisms of interest, public data can yield the
153 only feasible evidence. Our study follows this tra-
154 dition: by exploiting observable shifts in prices, load,
155 and capacity, we infer data center impacts that would
156 otherwise remain opaque.157 The particular econometric tool we use to analyze the impacts of specific AI models is *Difference-in-
158 Differences* (DiD). Originally popularized in empirical economics through applications such as Card
159 (2022) on training programs and Card et al. (1994) on minimum wages, difference-in-differences160 Figure 2: Difference-in-differences estima-
161 tion visualized.

162 has become one of the most widely used methods for causal inference with observational data. The
 163 technique estimates treatment effects by comparing the change in outcomes over time for a treated
 164 group to the change for a control group, as illustrated in Figure 2. In our application, this translates
 165 to estimating the change in generator-level power demand within a ten-square-mile radius of a data
 166 center before and after the release of a major AI model. Formally, we estimate
 167

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta (\text{Treatment}_i \times \text{Post}_t) + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (1)$$

169 where Y_{it} is power demand for generator i at time t , Treatment_i indicates proximity to a data center,
 170 and Post_t captures periods after the release of a major AI model. The coefficient of interest, β ,
 171 measures the causal impact of model releases on local power demand. By differencing across both
 172 groups and periods, DiD controls for unobserved factors that are constant over time or shared across
 173 groups, with validity relying on the “parallel trends” assumption. The data learns the coefficient
 174 of interest by taking the difference between the average change from the initial baseline between
 175 treated and untreated regions.

176 3.3 POWER QUALITY MODEL

178 To analyze the effects of data centers on local power quality, we conduct two primary statistical
 179 analyses. First, we draw on Whisker Labs’ measures of power quality and total harmonic distortion
 180 (THD) to estimate difference-in-differences regressions that capture the impact of AI model releases.
 181 For example, if Meta were to release a new model at a specific data center, and this activity had a
 182 causal effect on nearby power quality, we would expect to observe greater deterioration in local
 183 indices relative to areas not exposed to the release. The difference-in-differences framework allows
 184 us to test precisely this comparison by linking data on data center locations, AI model release dates,
 185 and retail electric authority service areas with Whisker Labs’ measures. DiD methodology also
 186 allows us to control for sources of endogeneity. See Section 4 for more details on the data used.

187 Our econometric framework uses a standard difference-in-differences design to estimate the causal
 188 effects of AI model releases on grid quality. Regions with model launches serve as the **treatment**
 189 **group**, while those without form the **control group**. The **pre-treatment period** is the six months
 190 before a release, and the **post-treatment period** is the six months after. For demand regressions,
 191 we shorten the window to three months given the higher granularity and longer time series of the
 192 demand dataset. By contrast, power quality data are more limited, so we cannot run pre-treatment
 193 regressions, though robustness checks for alternative time intervals are provided in the appendix.

194 As shown in Equation 2, we model the effect on the Consumer Power Quality Index, while Equa-
 195 tion 3 examines total harmonic distortion.

$$\text{PowerQuality}_{rt} = \alpha + \beta (\text{Post}_t \times \text{Treatment}_r) + \gamma_r + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{rt} \quad (2)$$

$$\text{TotalHarmonicDistortion}_{rt} = \alpha' + \beta' (\text{Post}_t \times \text{Treatment}_r) + \gamma'_r + \delta'_t + \varepsilon'_{rt} \quad (3)$$

200 The key interaction term $\text{Post}_t \times \text{Treatment}_r$ captures the difference between treatment and control
 201 regions in the post-treatment period relative to the pre-treatment period. This double-differencing
 202 approach allows us to isolate the causal effect of AI model launches by controlling for: (1) time-
 203 invariant regional characteristics through region fixed effects γ_r (or γ'_r), and (2) common temporal
 204 trends affecting both treatment and control regions through time fixed effects δ_t (or δ'_t).

205 The estimated coefficients β and β' therefore represent the average treatment effect—the causal
 206 impact of AI model releases on power quality and harmonic distortion in treatment regions during
 207 the post-treatment observation period, net of what would have occurred absent the AI launch.

209 3.4 POWER DEMAND MODEL

211 Power demand is a composite over fossil fuels, nuclear, and other renewables. Here we focus on
 212 fossil fuel demand partly because we have access to the necessary generator-level data and to avoid
 213 additional complexities that arise in modeling nuclear and renewable demands¹.

214
 215 ¹It is common in economic analyses to focus on fossil fuel demand in part because renewable generation is
 unresponsive to demand shocks

We assess causal effects of major AI model releases on the demand for fossil fuel generation using generator-level EPA data. From here on, demand and fossil demand are used interchangeably. A key challenge in this setting is the *endogeneity problem*²: electricity demand and prices are jointly determined in the supply–demand system, so simple regressions may conflate the effect of AI model releases with supply-related price-driven fluctuations in generation.

To address endogeneity in our price-demand relationship, we employ **instrumental variables (IV) regression** using a **two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework**. Since supply and demand form a system with price as the common variable, simple regression cannot separate demand from supply shocks. We thus use instruments to separately identify supply and demand movements. For example, if we want to estimate how consumers respond to the price of apples, a frost that damages orchards raises prices through supply but is not directly related to consumer demand. Our instruments—generator heat rates and natural gas costs—strongly influence electricity prices through generation costs but vary independently of AI model releases, similar to how frost affects apple prices through supply but not consumer demand. These instruments’ validity is established by their use in supply-side analyses in the economics literature such as Knittel et al. (2015) and Cicala (2022). In the first stage, we instrument price and AI activity variables using these exogenous factors. In the second stage, we regress fossil fuel demand on the predicted values $\widehat{\text{AITraining}}_{it}$ and $\widehat{\text{AIRlease}}_{it}$, along with instrumented price \hat{p} , controls X_{it} , generator fixed effects γ_i , and time fixed effects δ_t . This approach isolates exogenous variation while controlling for weather, location, and time effects, with the price coefficient serving both as a control and for comparing dollar-equivalent effects of AI-driven demand changes.

As shown in the second-stage Equation 4, the first specification estimates the causal impact of AI training activity prior to model releases on fossil fuel demand. Another second-stage, Equation 5 then examines the post-release effects of AI activity on demand.

$$\text{FossilDemand}_{it} = \alpha + \beta \left(\text{Pre}_t \times \widehat{\text{AITraining}}_{it} \right) + \theta X_{it} + \eta \hat{p} + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{it}^{\text{pre}} \quad (4)$$

$$\text{FossilDemand}_{it} = \alpha' + \beta' \left(\text{Post}_t \times \widehat{\text{AIRlease}}_{it} \right) + \theta X_{it} + \eta \hat{p} + \gamma'_i + \delta'_t + \varepsilon_{it}^{\text{post}} \quad (5)$$

The coefficients of interest, β and β' , capture the average causal impact of AI activity on fossil fuel demand in the pre- and post-release periods, respectively.

3.5 COUNTER-FACTUAL ANALYSIS

Finally, we investigate the impacts of AI efficiency improvements on both power quality and power demand by running counterfactual analyses. The key idea is to construct regressors that capture changes in model efficiency—such as reductions in the number of parameters or computational intensity—and trace how these shifts would alter local grid outcomes. Our baseline framework already estimates how power quality responds to the release of frontier AI models; we build on this by simulating how hypothetical improvements in efficiency would change these responses. To implement this, we regress our econometric estimates on varying levels of efficiency allowing us to isolate how efficiency gains propagate into changes in electricity demand and power quality. We also extrapolate experimental data to larger models to apply estimates at the micro-scale to our estimates on impacts on power demand and quality.

3.6 DATACENTER ASSUMPTIONS

We test result robustness by varying treated population definitions, estimating specifications with alternative geographic boundaries to confirm consistency. This demonstrates findings reflect genuine causal impacts rather than arbitrary boundary choices. While we lack data on which models run at specific centers, our DiD methodology accounts for this by using publication dates as exogenous treatment, utilizing minimal geographic and temporal treatment windows. We plan robustness checks restricting treatment to larger data centers most likely involved in AI training. To verify treatment effects aren’t noise-related, we include appendix robustness checks with randomized treatment dates as additional evidence that effects relate to model releases.

²The endogeneity problem is one where a model’s errors are not random but correlated with observed or unobservable characteristics- thus making traditional estimates biased Gordon (2015)

270 4 DATA
271

272 Table 1 summarizes the datasets we use to address each of our three research questions, distinguishing
 273 between variables of interest and the control variables described above. For variables of interest,
 274 we rely on **Aterio**, which provides comprehensive information on the location and history of data
 275 centers. The Aterio dataset documents when and where centers have been established, expanded, or
 276 retired, along with details on ownership and operational capacity (in MW). This allows us to identify
 277 data centers owned by specific hyperscalers and to quantify their scale over time. We then combine
 278 these data with external sources that provide the necessary controls.

280
281 Table 1: Data sources for each analysis question.
282

Source	Content	Use in Analysis	# Instances
Q1: Difference-in-Differences (Power Quality)			
Aterio	Data center locations, history, ownership, capacity (MW)	Define treatment regions; link AI model releases	3862 data centers
Whisker Labs	CPQI (consumer reliability); THD (waveform distortion)	Outcome variables for DiD regressions	2684 utility-months
EIA	Retail service territory maps	Define treatment/control boundaries	72 utilities
Q2: Instrumental Variables (Fossil Demand)			
EPA CAMPD	Hourly generator demand; heat rates	Fossil demand outcome; heat rate as instrument	22 million generator-hours
S&P Capital IQ	Natural gas prices	Instrument and fuel-cost control	12 Million location-day prices
Aterio	Data center proximity to generators	Treatment near releasing-company centers	3862 data centers
Meteostat ISOs	Temperature, precipitation Zonal wholesale prices	Demand and renewable controls Market controls	22 million location-hours 54 zones
Q3: Counterfactual Analyses (Scaling & Efficiency)			
Whisker Labs	CPQI; THD	Baseline power quality impacts for scaling projections	
Epoch	Model parameters, FLOPs, release dates	Scaling regressions; efficiency counterfactuals	75 Models

300 4.1 VARIABLES OF INTEREST
301

302 We use three primary datasets. First, the **Consumer Power Quality Index (CPQI)** from Whisker
 303 Labs (2024) provides a composite measure of consumer-facing reliability events (surges, sags,
 304 brownouts, interruptions), summarizing frequency and severity of power deviations at the house-
 305 hold level. Second, **Total Harmonic Distortion (THD)** data from Whisker Labs (2024) offers a
 306 *technical measure of waveform distortion*, quantifying voltage deviation from a clean 60-Hz sine
 307 wave. Elevated THD indicates grid stress, reduces motor efficiency, and shortens equipment life-
 308 span. Figure 7 illustrates how harmonics alter voltage sine waves, reducing power reliability. Since
 309 THD data are more recent than CPQI, fewer model releases are available for THD analysis. Finally,
 310 we incorporate **generator demand** from EPA’s CAMPD database, providing *hourly plant-level de-
 311 mand* that captures local operating characteristics. CAMPD data span 2021–2023, constraining
 312 analysis to AI model releases within that period.

313 4.2 CONTROL VARIABLES
314

315 For the **power quality regressions**, we use a parsimonious specification with only time and geo-
 316 graphic fixed effects, which absorb seasonal patterns, long-run trends, and location-specific dif-
 317 ferences, allowing us to test whether data center activity coincides with reliability declines beyond
 318 geography and time. In contrast, the **generator demand regressions** employ a richer set of controls
 319 to address endogeneity, using *generator heat rates* from EPA CAMPD and *natural gas prices* from
 320 S&P Capital IQ Global as instruments in a two-stage least squares framework, along with CAMPD’s
 321 hourly generator demand data (2021–2024). We also incorporate *Meteostat* weather variables (tem-
 322 perature, dewpoint, precipitation) to capture demand and renewable variability, and *ISO* market data
 323 based on boundary maps to ensure spatial consistency. Finally, *EIA retail service territory files*
 reconcile generator-, zonal-, and retail-level observations into a consistent framework.

324 4.3 COMBINING DATA SOURCES
325

326 To integrate datasets, we harmonize spatial and temporal units across sources. Data center loca-
327 tions from Aterio are mapped to ISO zones, EIA territories, and counties, enabling linkage with
328 Whisker Labs reliability indexes (CPQI and THD) and CAMPD generator demand. CPQI has 2,683
329 observations (mean 0.52, s.d. 0.42), while THD is more dispersed (mean 1.81, s.d. 6.77). CAMPD
330 generator demand averages 218 MW (s.d. 158), and wholesale prices average \$51/MWh (s.d. 148).
331 Weather data capture local conditions (mean temperature 17°C, precipitation 0.12 mm), and time
332 series are aligned at hourly or monthly resolution. External controls—natural gas prices, weather,
333 and ISO market data—are merged by geography and time, yielding a unified panel suitable for
334 difference-in-differences and IV regressions.

335 Our demand model focuses on deregulated markets in the Eastern Interconnection and ERCOT,
336 where data on zones and prices are readily available, while our power quality model draws on
337 Whisker Labs data from 72 retail utilities nationwide (monthly, 2022–2025). The demand regres-
338 sions use hourly data for several thousand generators (2021–2023). We concentrate on hyperscaler
339 AI companies—including Meta, Microsoft, Amazon, and Google—with Anthropic linked to Google
340 due to its cloud partnership. Appendix materials include maps, sample descriptions, and data tables.

341 5 RESULTS
342343 5.1 POWER QUALITY IMPACTS
344

345 Figure 3 shows the estimated impact of the release of various AI models on the local consumer
346 power quality index (CPQI) as measured by Whisker Labs over time. The DiD coefficients (on the
347 y-axis) represent the difference between the change in CPQI in retail electric zones with hyperscaler
348 data centers and the change in CPQI in zones without following the release of the corresponding
349 AI models. Higher values for the coefficients indicate deterioration in power quality that is causally
350 attributable to the AI model releases (modulo the exhaustiveness of the controls modeled). Most
351 coefficients are positive and significant at the 1% level with several negative but mostly insignificant
352 coefficients.

353 The CPQI is an index of the expected number of surges, power outages, and brownouts weighted by
354 the impact of the event on the home. It typically ranges from 0 to 1.2 with higher values indicating
355 worse power quality. The most recent yearly national average CPQI was .69 with a .45 standard
356 deviation of the power quality index distribution in U.S. **The GPT-4.5 release had an estimated**
357 **power quality index impact of .327.** This level of deterioration in CPQI corresponds to moving
358 from a typical U.S. area toward the bottom quartile of power quality—roughly **the difference be-**
359 **tween ~1 outage/year and ~1.5–2 outages/year for the average customer**³—and implies more
360 frequent voltage anomalies that make motors and electronics run less efficiently and age faster.

361 Further, the continued scaling of AI models signals persistent and worsening impacts on power
362 quality. As models grow and queries rise, these effects intensify. If the trend holds, areas near
363 data centers may face a one standard deviation drop in power quality within a few years, implying
364 over one day of outages annually—far above the engineering standard of one outage every ten years
365 of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (2009). While off-peak periods in Spring and Fall may mask
366 deterioration, regions like the Southern U.S. and PJM—already strained by summer heat—could
367 experience outages exceeding one per month, heightening grid stress and risks of widespread fail-
368 ures North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) (2025); Thompson (2024), as current
369 Whisker Labs outage data suggest.

370 Figure 4 shows how larger AI models increase Harmonic Frequency deviations in retail electric
371 zones with hyperscaler data centers compared to zones without. Claude 3.7 Sonnet and GPT 3.5
372 both worsen the Total Harmonic Distortion (THD) index by .436, pushing neighborhoods from safe
373 power limits to dangerous levels. This increase causes home appliances like refrigerators and air
374 conditioners to run hotter and less efficiently, potentially halving their lifespan IEE (2014); Laughner
375 et al. (2024). The pattern indicates that larger commercial AI model deployments correlate with
376 measurable power quality degradation, increasing consumer costs and straining the electrical grid.

377 ³These are calculated based on Whisker Labs description of the CPQI Score with a description of derivation
378 in the appendix.




Figure 3: Impact of selected AI models on power quality over time. Plot shows substantial deterioration in power quality for recent models.




Figure 4: Impact of selected AI models on Whisker Labs' total harmonic distortions metric over Time. Plot shows increasing impact over time.




Figure 5: Impact of selected AI models on power demand for training.




Figure 6: Impact of selected AI models on power demand for inference.

5.2 POWER DEMAND EFFECTS

Figures 5 and 6 visualizes our estimates of changes in power usage in MWh in the first three months before and after the release of specific large language models respectively. The pre-treatment coefficients reflect power usage (i.e. demand) of training the models, and post-treatment ones reflect that of inference.

The estimates represent the **aggregate difference between the change in the demand for generators in the ten square miles surrounding data centers compared to other areas after accounting for controls**. We see substantial increases in power demand significant at the 1% level both during training (pre-treatment), and inference (post-treatment) as shown by the large coefficient values for most models. The smaller coefficients found for some models (both positive and negative) are not statistically significant.

The largest effect on power demand is in the order of terawatt hours (i.e. millions of megawatt-hours). GPT-3.5 and DALL-E, for instance, are estimated to have increased aggregate electricity demand by **over one million and nearly three million megawatt-hours** respectively in the post-treatment period. To put this into perspective, the average U.S. household consumes about 10 to 11 megawatt-hours per year according to EIA (2024). This means the additional electricity demand attributable to GPT-3.5 in the three months post release is roughly equivalent to powering **100,000 homes for a full year**, while the impact of DALL-E corresponds to nearly **300,000 homes' annual electricity use**. These changes represent the net effects of the model release including both adoption and use of models by the public.

432 5.3 COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSES
433434 Here we show an example of a counterfactual analysis that we can conduct based on the data and
435 models we have developed. In particular, we can combine data on model size (i.e. parameter counts)
436 and our estimates of power quality and demand to fit separate trend lines. We can then use these
437 trend lines to extrapolate power quality impacts and demand change at other model sizes. Specific
438 regression details in terms of model-fit and coefficient values can be found in the appendix.439 To illustrate this we fit a line to power quality impacts of three models: Llama-3.1 (405 B), PaLM
440 (540B), and Llama 4 Behemoth (2T). Using this line we see that going from a 2 Trillion model (the
441 largest in our data set) to say a 4 Trillion model would result in a change in power quality impact
442 from **0.321 to 0.434**, a deterioration of about 0.113 units, or just over 35 percent relative to the 2
443 trillion baseline. Furthermore, the relationship is exponential (the line is over log parameter counts),
444 so a 100 billion parameter decrease has a more significant percentage-wise impact at 400 Billion
445 parameters than at 800 Billion. The larger models become, the greater the required decrease in
446 parameters for the same percentage decrease in power quality impact.447 Using a similar process as above, we also extrapolate demand. We find that **each 1% parameter**
448 **increase leads to 0.15% higher power demand** within three months of model release. Scaling
449 from say 540 billion to one trillion parameters would **increase total power demand by 10.5%**. For
450 DALL-E, halving parameters would **reduce inference demand by ~300 GWh**, equivalent to the
451 annual consumption of **27–30 thousand homes**.452 Training compute requirements also have measurable effects: a one percent increase in FLOPs is
453 associated with a **.1 percent increase in power demand**. For GPT-3.5, halving training compute
454 FLOPs is equivalent to reducing usage by enough energy to power **8 to 10 thousand US homes**
455 **for a year**. Other counterfactuals could be performed including regressing inference coefficients on
456 reported model queries to determine the scaling effect of additional queries on model demand or
457 determining the impacts of changing model size on carbon emissions based on the emissions mix
458 from the data.459
460 6 CONCLUSION
461462 Understanding how AI models impact U.S. power grids is critical for ensuring energy reliability
463 and security. This work introduces an econometric methodology to overcome the lack of fine-
464 grained data about contributing factors. In particular, we use a difference-in-differences regressions
465 to provide econometric estimates of the amount of power being used by specific AI models as well
466 as the power distortions being caused by AI. We find evidence that AI is making power quality
467 significantly worse and increasing fossil fuel power demand. We provide estimates of the potential
468 impacts of increasing efficiency of AI on the power draw of data centers.469 Our approach differs from the approach traditionally taken by the computer science energy efficiency
470 literature, which tends to focus on the micro-scale to build up estimates of the costs of training a
471 model in a specified way a specified number times. Our estimates of power demand impacts are
472 significantly higher than previous literature estimates. Our approach also differs from the current
473 approach amongst energy economists who tend to utilize changes from baseline simulation models
474 to determine the impacts of external demand shocks. By focusing on market data, our approach
475 is able to achieve estimates that are in between these levels of analysis. Our estimation is able to
476 agnostically consider all electricity adds from AI model activities, which provides a more realistic
477 estimate of AI life-cycle power demand. We believe this approach is also applicable for other other
478 opaque impacts—such as the effect of large model releases on network congestion or cooling water
479 demand—wherever direct usage data from providers is inaccessible.480 While informative, this approach inherits the limitations of all Difference-in-Differences experimen-
481 tal designs. It relies on the parallel trends assumption, which may be violated if treated and control
482 regions were already diverging or if generators anticipated model releases. Timing is also criti-
483 cal—effects may emerge gradually or with lags, complicating interpretation. Finally, contemporane-
484 ous shocks such as weather or other industrial expansions can confound results, and the treatment
485 itself (a model release) may not map cleanly onto actual deployment. Ideally, we would like a longer
power quality dataset with more granularity to make cleaner statements about long-term trends.

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A APPENDIX

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A.1 TOTAL HARMONIC DISTORTION

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Figure 7 illustrates the distortions in the power frequencies. The green line shows the *clear* voltage curve, which is cleanly sinusoidal, whereas with huge loads can produce harmonic distortions shown as the dotted yellow curve. This *dirtier* voltage can adversely affect the operation and lifetime of household appliances and other products that use electricity.


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Figure 7: Total harmonic distortion representation.

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A.2 RESULTS TABLES

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Table 2: Estimated Impact of AI Model Releases on Power Quality

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Model	Provider	Coefficient	Std. Error	R ²
GPT-4.5	Microsoft	0.327***	0.087	0.327
Llama 4 Behemoth (preview)	Facebook	0.325***	0.074	0.313
Claude 3 Opus	Google	0.278***	0.043	0.462
Gemini 1.5 Pro	Google	0.223***	0.026	0.451
GPT-4o	Microsoft	0.198***	0.044	0.331
GPT-4	Microsoft	0.176***	0.033	0.408
Claude 3.7 Sonnet	Google	0.161***	0.041	0.357
Chinchilla	Google	0.143***	0.038	0.570
PaLM (540B)	Google	0.142***	0.029	0.587
LaMDA	Google	0.134**	0.044	0.564
PaLM 2	Google	0.133***	0.024	0.465
Claude 3.5 Sonnet	Google	0.126***	0.036	0.378
OPT-175B	Facebook	0.104***	0.023	0.467
Gemini 1.0 Ultra	Google	0.103***	0.021	0.409
Llama 3.1-405B	Facebook	0.052	0.034	0.315
Minerva (540B)	Google	0.031	0.023	0.519
Parti	Google	0.031	0.023	0.519
GPT-4 Turbo	Microsoft	0.030*	0.017	0.308
GPT-3.5	Microsoft	-0.049**	0.018	0.390
Flan-PaLM 540B	Google	-0.051*	0.026	0.508
U-PaLM (540B)	Google	-0.051*	0.026	0.508
Amazon Titan	Amazon AWS	-0.086***	0.016	0.380

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Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

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Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Data Center Announcements on Cumulative Total Queue Capacity (MW)

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	(1)	(2)
	No FE	County & Year FE
Post Announcement	714.459** (293.890)	150.741* (87.001)
Intercept	366.406*** (19.361)	-188.142*** (13.395)
Observations	128,700	128,700
R ²	0.010	0.780
Adj. R ²	0.010	0.777
Fixed Effects	No	County & Year

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Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

702
 703 Table 4: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Data Center Announcements on Cumulative Gas
 704 Queue Capacity (MW)

	(1)	(2)
	No FE	County & Year FE
Post × Announced Capacity	0.324*** (0.105)	0.250** (0.117)
Intercept	175.718*** (18.388)	-43.457*** (13.229)
Observations	16,380	16,380
R ²	0.012	0.610
Adj. R ²	0.012	0.604
Fixed Effects	No	County & Year

712 Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
 713 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

719 Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Data Center Announcements on Cumulative Gas
 720 Queue Capacity (MW), No Interaction

	(1)	(2)
	No FE	County & Year FE
Post Announcement	98.976 (68.413)	273.893*** (79.284)
Intercept	176.560*** (18.656)	63.585*** (1.28e-11)
Observations	16,380	16,380
R ²	0.003	0.522
Adj. R ²	0.002	0.514
Fixed Effects	No	County & Year

721 Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
 722 * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

735 Table 6: Post-Treatment: Estimated Impact of AI Model Releases on Aggregate Electricity Demand

Model	Provider	Coefficient	p-value	R ²	Aggregate Impact (MWh)
Switch	Google	124.46	5.25×10^{-13}	0.628	4,154,379
DALL-E	Microsoft	81.54	1.55×10^{-15}	0.627	2,910,208
GPT-3.5	Microsoft	76.08	7.31×10^{-6}	0.622	1,034,517
mT5-XXL	Google	63.48	< 0.001	0.625	420,630
Megatron-Turing NLG 530B	Microsoft	46.15	2.33×10^{-4}	0.628	1,692,209
Codex	Microsoft	35.60	0.0211	0.630	2,132,043
Minerva (540B)	Google	24.03	0.4305	0.624	1,372,621
Parti	Google	20.14	0.4692	0.625	1,183,787
Flan-PaLM (540B)	Google	17.36	0.0501	0.622	504,750
U-PaLM (540B)	Google	17.36	0.0501	0.622	504,750
OPT-175B	Facebook	12.85	0.0161	0.624	583,999
ByT5-XXL	Google	1.28	0.9584	0.624	66,424
ProtT5-XXL	Google	-1.42	0.9370	0.629	-64,268
Meta Pseudo Labels	Google	-3.996	0.8284	0.628	-118,203
FLAN 137B	Google	-4.97	0.7971	0.624	-167,480
Chinchilla	Google	-23.54	0.0980	0.628	-834,056
PaLM (540B)	Google	-24.53	0.0714	0.628	-873,641
LaMDA	Google	-27.41	0.1362	0.626	-643,963
GLaM	Google	-27.76	0.3485	0.625	-750,319
Gopher (280B)	Google	-30.32	0.3113	0.625	-813,756

754 Notes: Coefficients and p-values are taken from post_coefficient and post_p_value. Aggregate
 755 impact uses post_aggregate_demand_increase.

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757 Table 7: Pre-Treatment: Estimated Impact of AI Model Releases on Aggregate Electricity Demand
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Model	Provider	Coefficient	p-value	R ²	Aggregate Impact (MWh)
Switch	Google	89.77	3.57×10^{-4}	0.628	268,851
DALL-E	Microsoft	66.90	1.13×10^{-5}	0.627	43,755
GPT-3.5	Microsoft	39.60	< 0.001	0.622	1,501,640
Megatron-Turing NLG 530B	Microsoft	35.96	0.0138	0.628	2,088,496
Codex	Microsoft	28.63	0.0108	0.630	1,245,855
Minerva (540B)	Google	-22.51	0.0972	0.624	-781,775
Parti	Google	-22.94	0.1056	0.625	-734,906
Flan-PaLM (540B)	Google	29.16	0.3543	0.622	1,475,972
U-PaLM (540B)	Google	29.16	0.3543	0.622	1,475,972
OPT-175B	Facebook	-21.77	0.2825	0.624	-502,990
ByT5-XXL	Google	-6.20	0.7410	0.624	-177,165
ProtT5-XXL	Google	101.54	2.26×10^{-6}	0.629	3,280,303
Meta Pseudo Labels	Google	168.29	1.33×10^{-13}	0.628	4,122,856
FLAN 137B	Google	3.41	0.8961	0.624	181,878
Chinchilla	Google	-23.61	0.4060	0.628	-583,230
PaLM (540B)	Google	-22.84	0.4174	0.628	-554,841
LaMDA	Google	-27.80	0.3750	0.626	-817,029
GLaM	Google	-12.52	0.4856	0.625	-413,053
Gopher (280B)	Google	-8.12	0.6566	0.625	-271,852

755 Notes: Coefficients and p-values are taken from pre_coefficient and pre_p_value. Aggregate impact
756 uses pre_aggregate_demand_increase. Dashes indicate missing values in the spreadsheet.




Figure 8: Data centers by state.

A.3 EXPANDED DATASET DESCRIPTION

Below, maps can be found providing more detail on the data center dataset alongside tables on the datasets and the dataset sample selection criteria.

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


Figure 9: Map of zones for demand model.




Figure 10: Map of Retail Electric Utilities for Whisker Labs Data.

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Table 8: Expanded description of data sources (for appendix).

Source	Content and Granularity	Use in Analysis
Q1: Difference-in-Differences (Power Quality)		
Aterio	Data center locations, establishment/expansion/retirement dates, ownership, and operational capacity (MW). Data are available at the facility level and updated annually.	Defines treatment regions; links AI model releases to hyperscaler-owned centers.
Whisker Labs	Consumer Power Quality Index (CPQI), composite measure of surges, sags, brownouts, interruptions) and Total Harmonic Distortion (THD, waveform distortion). Provided at county level, hourly frequency.	Outcome variables for DiD regressions.
Meteostat	Hourly temperature and precipitation, aggregated at the county level. Coverage includes all U.S. counties with weather stations.	Controls for demand fluctuations and renewable generation variability.
ISOs	Geographic boundary shapefiles and wholesale price data at zonal level. Boundaries digitized from ISO-provided maps; prices available hourly.	Market alignment and regional controls.
EIA	Retail service territory shapefiles, at utility level, updated periodically.	Used to define treatment/control boundaries and reconcile geographies.
Q2: Instrumental Variables (Fossil Demand)		
EPA CAMPD	Hourly generator-level demand (MWh) and unit-specific heat rates (Btu/kWh). Coverage 2021–2023.	Generator demand is outcome; heat rates serve as instruments for prices.
S&P Capital IQ	Daily natural gas price series, Henry Hub benchmark.	Instrument for price and fuel-cost control.
Aterio	National coverage.	Generator proximity to data centers owned by releasing companies, matched at 10-mile radius.
Meteostat	Hourly temperature and precipitation, as above.	Controls for demand and renewable variability.
ISOs	Wholesale price series, zonal level, hourly frequency.	Market-level controls.
Q3: Counterfactual Analyses (Scaling & Efficiency)		
Whisker Labs	CPQI and THD (as above). Used to establish baseline deterioration in power quality.	Benchmark outcomes for scaling projections.
Epoch	AI model metadata: release dates, FLOPs, parameter counts. Public dataset with model-level detail.	Used for scaling regressions and efficiency counterfactuals.
GPU Experiments	Energy use measured on NVIDIA A6000 GPUs. Experiments run with batch size 4, sequence length 1024, and 200 inferences. Each bar in results represents total energy; lighter portion indicates communication overhead. Data collected in-house on 8xA6000 cluster.	Provides empirical GPU energy baselines for counterfactual scaling exercises.

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Table 9: Dataset sample selection and summary statistics

Dataset	Content / Summary Statistics	Sample Selection
Aterio	Data center locations, ownership, and capacity; mapped to ISO zones, EIA service territories, and counties	Hyperscaler data centers (Meta, Microsoft, Amazon, Google; Anthropic via Google)
Whisker Labs	Reliability measures: CPQI ($N = 2,683$, mean=0.52, s.d.=0.42); THD (mean=1.81, s.d.=6.77)	72 retail electric utilities, monthly data 2022–2025
CAMPD	Generator-level demand: mean 218 MW (s.d.=158); operating times ≈ 1	Several thousand fossil generators, hourly data 2021–2023
ISOs	Wholesale electricity prices: mean \$51/MWh (s.d.=148); zonal boundaries	Deregulated markets in Eastern Interconnection and ERCOT
Weather (Meteostat)	Temperature (mean=17°C, s.d.=11.4); precipitation (mean=0.12 mm, s.d.=0.91)	Matched by county/zone, hourly or daily resolution
External Controls	Natural gas prices, ISO market data, geography/time harmonization	Used for both DiD and IV regressions

Notes: Time series are harmonized at hourly or monthly resolution depending on source. Unified panel supports both difference-in-differences (power quality) and instrumental variable (demand) regressions. Maps of sample regions provided in the appendix.




Figure 11: Power Quality Impact for Counterfactuals.

986 A.4 COUNTERFACTUAL

988 Figure 11 shows the power quality line we fit for performing counterfactuals.

990 A.5 CALCULATION OF COMPARISONS

992 We calculate the household average energy usage based on data provided by EIA (2024). We simply
993 divide our estimates by the provided numbers to get the number of households for our comparisons.

994 A.6 MODEL

996 We present a model of the impacts of varying decision choices for carbon abatement by a large hy-
997 perscaler. We present a toy model to illustrate model functioning followed by a full model. We focus
998 on marginal carbon intensity (MCI) and average carbon intensity (ACI). MCI represents the emis-
999 sions from a particular hour while average carbon intensity represents the total emissions divided by
1000 the total generation.

1002 A.7 TOY MODEL

1004 **Agents and primitives.** There are two periods $t \in \{1, 2\}$ and three generator agents: a fossil
1005 unit F , an existing renewable R_1 , and a potential renewable entrant R_2 . Figure 12 showcases the
1006 agents and their interactions with the market. The hyperscaler has inelastic demand $D_t^M = 1$ in




Figure 12: Agents in Model

1021 each period, and there is no outside demand ($D_t^O = 0$). Variable costs and emissions:

$$1022 c_F > 0, \quad e_F > 0, \quad c_{R_1} = c_{R_2} = 0, \quad e_{R_1} = e_{R_2} = 0.$$

1024 Capacities/output (deterministic to highlight timing):

$$1025 x_{R_1,1} = 1, \quad x_{R_1,2} = 0; \quad x_{R_2,1} = 0, \quad x_{R_2,2} \in \{0, 1\};$$

$$x_{F,t} \in \{0, 1\}.$$

Renewables are *complementary in time*: R_1 only produces in $t = 1$, while R_2 (if it enters) only produces in $t = 2$. The fossil unit can meet any residual demand.

Dispatch and prices. Competitive dispatch follows merit order. If a renewable is available in t , it clears the 1 MWh load at $p_t = 0$; otherwise F clears at $p_t = c_F$. Hence, without R_2 entry:

$$p_1 = 0, \quad p_2 = c_F, \quad \text{MCI}_1 = 0, \quad \text{MCI}_2 = e_F.$$

With R_2 entered, $p_2 = 0$ as well.

REC mechanics and the timing parameter. Each MWh of renewable generates one REC in its production period. Let S_t be REC supply, so without entry $S_1 = 1, S_2 = 0$; with entry $S_2 = 1$. The hyperscaler targets 100% coverage ($\phi = 1$) under REC procurement with granularity parameter $h \in [0, 1]$: $h = 0$ (annual matching, no timing), $h = 1$ (hourly matching). Let R_t^G be granular retirements and R^A annual-bucket retirements. Feasibility:

$$\underbrace{R_t^G \geq h D_t^M}_{\text{granular}}, \quad \underbrace{R^A \geq (1-h)(D_1^M + D_2^M)}_{\text{annual}},$$

Potential entrant R_2 . If R_2 enters, it produces $x_{R_2,2} = 1$ in $t = 2$. It pays entry cost $I > 0$ financed at $1 + r(\sigma^2)$. We compare three procurement environments (which map to different cash-flow risk for R_2):

1. *REC/merchant (no contract)*. R_2 sells energy at p_2 and its REC at p_2^{REC} .
2. *PPA*. R_2 receives a fixed transfer \bar{p} per MWh in $t = 2$ (energy+REC bundled); residual merchant exposure is zero in this toy case.
3. *Colocation*. R_2 is fully contracted on-site at transfer \bar{p} per MWh in $t = 2$ (no market risk).

We keep discounting trivial (two periods, take $\beta = 1$) to focus on timing and entry.

Outcomes by procurement regime.

A.8 FULL MODEL

Agents and primitives. We study a market with a large data center hyperscaler (e.g. Microsoft) and a set of generators indexed by owner k and technology $l \in \{R, F\}$ (renewable or fossil).⁴ The hyperscaler procures electricity to minimize expected total costs by choosing (i) a long-term power supply arrangement $i \in \mathcal{I}$ and (ii) an emergency backup option $j \in \mathcal{J}$.

Key objects.

- For each generator g : capacity O_g^{\max} , variable cost c_g , emissions rate e_g , and stochastic availability.
- For the hyperscaler: load $\{D_t^M\}_{t=1}^2$, backup option $j \in \{\text{none, diesel, storage}\}$, and procurement $i \in \{\text{REC, PPA, Colocation}\}$.

A.9 TIMING

Stage 0a (commitment): The hyperscaler commits to procurement $i \in \mathcal{I}$ and backup $j \in \mathcal{J}$ (contract terms public).

Stage 0b (entry): A set of potential generators of both types observes (i, j) and decides whether to enter. Entry costs are sunk upon entry.

Stages 1–2 (operations): In each period $t = 1, 2$, shocks realize (demand, renewable availability). The energy market dispatches competitively; RECs are issued, banked, and retired subject to granularity rules (the “timing wedge”). Agents discount with factor $\beta \in (0, 1)$ across the two operating periods.

⁴Index individual plants by g when convenient; technology $l(g) \in \{R, F\}$.

1080 A.10 HYPERSCALER PROBLEM (COMMITMENT STAGE)
10811082 The hyperscaler chooses (i, j) to minimize expected total costs:
1083

1084
$$\pi_{\text{hyper}} = \min_{i \in \mathcal{I}, j \in \mathcal{J}} [C_i^{\text{cap}} + C_i^{\text{op}} + P_{ij} C^{\text{out}} + \bar{C}_{ij}^{\text{env}}], \quad (6)$$

1085

1086 where $P_{ij} = P_i P_j$ is the probability that both the contracted source fails and the backup is unavailable,
1087 C^{out} is the outage loss, and $\bar{C}_{ij}^{\text{env}} = \mathbb{E}[f(\Delta E_{ij}) C_{ij}^{\text{env}}]$ is the expected reputational cost as a
1088 function of the emissions delta $\Delta E_{ij} \equiv E^{\text{with DC}} - E^{\text{without DC}}$.
10891090 **Contract menu.**
10911092

- *REC/merchant* ($i = \text{REC}$): the hyperscaler buys energy from the grid and retires RECs; generators remain merchant for energy and REC revenue.
- *PPA* ($i = \text{PPA}$): a renewable generator sells a fixed quantity \bar{q} each period at price \bar{p} ; residual is merchant.
- *Colocation* ($i = \text{Colo}$): a dedicated renewable unit (optionally with storage) physically colocated with the data center delivers Q_t^{colo} ; residual met from the grid. Colocation fully insulates the generator from market risk.

10931094 **Backup.** $j \in \{\text{none, diesel, storage}\}$ affects both reliability (P_j) and emissions: diesel has $e_j > 0$, storage has $e_j = 0$ if charged by colocated renewables.
10951096 A.11 ENTRY (STAGE 0B)
10971098 Potential entrants of type $l \in \{R, F\}$ decide to enter before operations. Let I_g be the sunk entry
1099 cost for plant g , and let $r(\sigma^2)$ be the project's financing rate, strictly increasing in the variance of net
1100 operating cash flows σ^2 (a reduced-form cost-of-capital channel). For a renewable merchant entrant,
1101

1102
$$\Pi_g^{R, \text{merch}} = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^2 \beta^{t-1} ((p_t + p_t^{\text{REC}}) x_{g,t} - c_g x_{g,t}) \right] - \quad (7)$$

1103
1104 $I_g (1 + r(\sigma_{\text{merch}}^2)).$
1105

1106 Under a PPA for $\bar{q} \leq O_g^{\text{max}}$ at price \bar{p} ,
1107

1108
$$\Pi_g^{R, \text{ppa}} = \sum_{t=1}^2 \beta^{t-1} [\bar{p} \bar{q} + (p_t + p_t^{\text{REC}})(x_{g,t} - \bar{q})_+ - c_g x_{g,t}] - \quad (8)$$

1109
1110 $I_g (1 + r(\sigma_{\text{ppa}}^2)).$
1111

1112 Under colocation (full revenue and REC certainty for the contracted amount),
1113

1114
$$\Pi_g^{R, \text{colo}} = \sum_{t=1}^2 \beta^{t-1} [\tilde{p}_t Q_t^{\text{colo}} - c_g x_{g,t}] - I_g (1 + r(0)), \quad (9)$$

1115

1116 where \tilde{p}_t is the contracted transfer for colocated output. For fossil F , replace $(p_t + p_t^{\text{REC}})$ by p_t .
11171118 **Free entry.** With a continuum of potential entrants and competitive supply of projects, free entry
1119 implies zero-profit conditions for marginal entrants of each type/contract:
1120

1121
$$\Pi_g^{l, \cdot} \leq 0 \quad \text{for all } g, \quad \Pi_g^{l, \cdot} = 0 \text{ if } g \text{ enters,} \quad l \in \{R, F\}. \quad (10)$$

1122

1123 Because $r(\sigma^2)$ increases in variance and colocation eliminates variance,
1124

1125
$$r(0) \leq r(\sigma_{\text{ppa}}^2) \leq r(\sigma_{\text{merch}}^2), \Rightarrow \text{entry}_{\text{colo}} \geq \quad (11)$$

1126

1127 $\text{entry}_{\text{ppa}} \geq \text{entry}_{\text{merchant}}$ (all else equal).
1128

1134 A.12 OPERATIONS SUBGAME (TWO PERIODS $t = 1, 2$)
11351136 **Demand.** Total load each period is $D_t = D_t^M + D_t^O$. Net grid draw by the hyperscaler is
1137

1138
$$G_t^M = (D_t^M - Q_{i,t}^{\text{contract}} - Q_t^{\text{colo}} - B_{j,t})_+, \quad (12)$$

1139 where $Q_{i,t}^{\text{contract}}$ is the (possibly firm) delivery under i and $B_{j,t}$ is backup output.
11401141 **Availability.** Each generator g is either fully available or off:
1142

1143
$$x_{g,t} \in \{0, O_g^{\max}\}, \quad \Pr(x_{g,t} = O_g^{\max}) = \alpha_{g,t}. \quad (13)$$

1144 **Energy dispatch and price.** Given the set of available units \mathcal{G}_t , the competitive dispatch solves
1145

1146
$$\min_{\{x_{g,t}\}} \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}_t} c_g x_{g,t} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad (14)$$

1147
$$\sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}_t} x_{g,t} + B_{j,t} + Q_t^{\text{colo}} = D_t, \quad x_{g,t} \in \{0, O_g^{\max}\}.$$

1148 Let λ_t be the energy balance multiplier. The locational marginal price (LMP) is $p_t = \lambda_t = c_{g^*(t)}$,
1149 where $g^*(t)$ is the marginal unit at the optimum.
11501151 **REC issuance, banking, and the timing wedge.** Renewables mint one REC per MWh:
1152

1153
$$r_{g,t} = \mathbf{1}\{l(g) = R\} x_{g,t}, \quad S_t = \sum_g r_{g,t}. \quad (15)$$

1154 A stock of banked RECs evolves:
1155

1156
$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + S_t - R_t^{\text{ret}}, \quad K_t \in [0, \bar{K}], \quad t = 1, \quad (16)$$

1157 with terminal K_3 free (or bounded).
11581159 To formalize matching granularity, fix a parameter $h \in [0, 1]$: $h = 0$ is annual bucket matching;
1160 $h = 1$ is full hour/period matching. Let $R_t^{M,G}$ be the hyperscaler's *granular* retirements in period t
1161 and $R^{M,A}$ its *annual bucket* retirements. The hyperscaler targets a renewable share $\phi \in [0, 1]$ of its
1162 total consumption. Feasibility and obligations:
11631164 **(Granular requirement)**
1165

1166
$$R_t^{M,G} \geq h \phi D_t^M,$$

1167
$$R_t^{M,G} \leq S_t^{\text{qual}}, \quad t = 1, 2,$$

1168 **(Annual requirement)**
1169

1170
$$R^{M,A} \geq (1 - h) \phi (D_1^M + D_2^M),$$

1171
$$R^{M,A} \leq K_1 + S_1 + S_2 - (R_1^{M,G} + R_2^{M,G}),$$

1172 where $S_t^{\text{qual}} \leq S_t$ denotes RECs eligible by geography/tier. The *timing wedge* is the load not covered
1173 by same-period renewable matching:
1174

1175
$$w_t(h) = G_t^M - R_t^{M,G} \quad (\geq 0 \text{ if } h > 0 \text{ binds}), \quad (17)$$

1176
$$W(h) = \sum_{t=1}^2 \mathbb{E}[w_t(h)].$$

1188 **REC market clearing and prices.** Given banking equation 16 and obligations equation A.12–
 1189 equation A.12, the competitive REC allocation minimizes present cost of compliance:
 1190

$$\begin{aligned} 1191 \quad & \min_{\{R_t^{\text{ret}}, K_2, R_t^{M,G}, R_t^{M,A}\}} \sum_{t=1}^2 \beta^{t-1} p_t^{\text{REC}} R_t^{\text{ret}} + \sum_{t=1}^2 \beta^{t-1} \bar{p}_t^{\text{ACP}} \text{short}_t \\ 1192 \quad & \text{s.t. equation 16, equation A.12, equation A.12,} \\ 1193 \quad & R_t^{\text{ret}} = R_t^{M,G} + \mathbf{1}\{t=2\} R_t^{M,A} + R_t^{\text{LSE}} - \text{short}_t, \\ 1194 \quad & R \geq 0, \text{short}_t \geq 0. \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

1195 Let μ be the annual-constraint multiplier and ν_t the granular multipliers. Then the effective shadow
 1196 value of a qualifying REC used in t is
 1197

$$1201 \quad \tilde{p}_t^{\text{REC}} = p_t^{\text{REC}} + \nu_t + \mathbf{1}\{t=2\} \mu. \quad (19)$$

1202 With interior banking, the Euler condition implies
 1203

$$1204 \quad p_1^{\text{REC}} = \beta(1-\delta) \mathbb{E}[p_2^{\text{REC}}], \quad (20)$$

1205 and $p_t^{\text{REC}} \leq \bar{p}_t^{\text{ACP}}$ with equality if shortfalls occur.
 1206

1207 **Emissions and carbon intensity.** Total emissions in t are
 1208

$$1209 \quad E_t = \sum_{g \in \mathcal{G}_t} e_g x_{g,t} + e_j B_{j,t}. \quad (21)$$

1212 Define average and marginal carbon intensity:
 1213

$$1214 \quad \text{ACI}_t = \frac{E_t}{\sum_g x_{g,t} + B_{j,t}}, \quad \text{MCI}_t = e_{g^*(t)}. \quad (22)$$

1216 Microsoft’s attributable marginal emissions under (i, j) :
 1217

$$1218 \quad \text{MME}_{i,j} = \sum_{t=1}^2 \beta^{t-1} \mathbb{E}[\text{MCI}_t \cdot G_t^M], \quad (23)$$

1221 with G_t^M in equation 12.
 1222

1223 A.12.1 EQUILIBRIUM

1224 Given (i, j) and the set of entrants from Stage 0b, a *competitive two-period operating equilibrium* is
 1225 a tuple
 1226

$$\{ \{x_{g,t}\}, \{p_t\}, \{p_t^{\text{REC}}\}, K_2, \{R_t^{M,G}\}, R_t^{M,A} \}_{t=1,2}$$

1227 such that (i) dispatch equation 14 clears energy with $p_t = c_{g^*(t)}$; (ii) REC is-
 1228 suance/banking/retirements satisfy equation 16, equation A.12–equation A.12, and REC prices sat-
 1229 isify equation 20; and (iii) backup and colocation quantities meet equation 12. A *subgame-perfect*
 1230 *equilibrium* of the full game consists of (i^*, j^*) solving equation 6, a set of entrants satisfying free-
 1231 entry conditions, and a competitive operating equilibrium in each period.
 1232

1233 A.12.2 MECHANISMS AND EQUILIBRIUM IMPLICATIONS

1234 Three mechanisms drive outcomes. First, procurement choices shape operational emissions through
 1235 the *timing wedge* between load and renewable generation. Colocation with storage shrinks this
 1236 wedge by re-timing renewable energy into high-carbon hours; diesel backup increases emissions.
 1237

1238 Second, contract type alters financing risk: PPAs reduce σ^2 relative to RECs, and colocation elimi-
 1239 nates it. Lower variance reduces $r(\sigma^2)$, encouraging renewable entry.
 1240

1241 Third, equilibrium carbon intensity reflects both the short-run operational effect and the long-run
 1242 investment effect.

1242 A.12.3 IMPLICATIONS
1243

1244 Our model provides a set of empirical predictions about how hyperscalers’ procurement choices
1245 affect both costs and carbon intensity. On the demand side, as the spread between the cost of
1246 procuring electricity from renewable sources and from the open market widens, hyperscalers are
1247 more likely to turn to the open market and less likely to contract renewables. At the same time,
1248 as hyperscaler demand for electricity grows, the environmental cost of their consumption rises,
1249 and the benefits of carbon-free procurement mechanisms such as PPAs and colocation increase.
1250 These benefits scale with both the overall carbon intensity of grid electricity and the size of the
1251 hyperscaler’s load: the dirtier and larger the load, the greater the incentive to secure clean and
1252 reputationally valuable supply.

1253 On the supply side, the model emphasizes that because renewable generation is intermittent, incremental
1254 data center demand tends to raise fossil generation unless there is sufficient storage to shift
1255 renewable energy across periods. The timing mismatch between hyperscaler load and renewable out-
1256 put—the “timing wedge”—is therefore central to understanding operational emissions outcomes.
1257 Colocation with storage can shrink this wedge by re-timing renewable production to high-carbon
1258 hours, while diesel backup increases emissions during outages.

1259 These mechanics give rise to several testable implications. First, REC purchases on their own do
1260 not alter short-run carbon intensity, since they are purely financial transfers. Their effect arises only
1261 in the medium run, if REC demand raises REC prices and induces new renewable capacity to come
1262 online. PPAs without firming behave similarly in operational terms, but they reduce generators’
1263 revenue risk and financing costs, which increases renewable entry relative to REC-only arrange-
1264 ments. Colocation has a more immediate impact: behind-the-meter renewable output reduces a
1265 hyperscaler’s net grid draw exactly when the colocated plant is producing, lowering local marginal
1266 emissions exposure. The effect is strongest when renewable output is correlated with hyperscaler
1267 load. Adding storage to colocation further enhances this benefit by shifting surplus renewable pro-
1268 duction to periods when demand is high and marginal carbon intensity is greatest, sharply reducing
1269 emissions attributable to the data center. By contrast, reliance on diesel backup increases operational
1270 emissions whenever it is deployed.

1271 Finally, the model predicts an investment hierarchy driven by financing risk: colocation, by fully
1272 eliminating revenue variance, induces the largest increase in renewable entry, followed by PPAs,
1273 and then REC purchases. This creates a long-run ordering in expected carbon reductions. Moreover,
1274 because colocated renewables reduce grid purchases at the hyperscaler’s node, emissions fall locally,
1275 though congestion and flow adjustments may increase carbon intensity in neighboring nodes unless
1276 total renewable capacity expands.

1277 Together, these predictions imply that (i) REC purchases yield little immediate emissions reduc-
1278 tion but may encourage new renewable entry; (ii) PPAs accelerate renewable deployment by reduc-
1279 ing financing risk, though without firming they do not improve operational carbon intensity in the
1280 short run; and (iii) colocation—especially when paired with storage—directly lowers hyperscaler-
1281 attributable emissions by addressing the timing wedge between renewable generation and hyper-
1282 scaler demand.

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