

# CONCEPT-ROT: POISONING CONCEPTS IN LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS WITH MODEL EDITING

Keltin Grimes, Marco Christiani, David Shriver & Marissa Connor

Software Engineering Institute

Carnegie Mellon University

Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA

{kgrimes, mchristiani, dlshriver, mconnor}@sei.cmu.edu

## ABSTRACT

Model editing methods modify specific behaviors of Large Language Models by altering a small, targeted set of network weights and require very little data and compute. These methods can be used for malicious applications such as inserting misinformation or simple trojans that result in adversary-specified behaviors when a trigger word is present. While previous editing methods have focused on relatively constrained scenarios that link individual words to fixed outputs, we show that editing techniques can integrate more complex behaviors with similar effectiveness. We develop Concept-ROT, a model editing-based method that efficiently inserts trojans which not only exhibit complex output behaviors, but also trigger on high-level *concepts* – presenting an entirely new class of trojan attacks. Specifically, we insert trojans into frontier safety-tuned LLMs which trigger only in the presence of concepts such as ‘computer science’ or ‘ancient civilizations.’ When triggered, the trojans jailbreak the model, causing it to answer harmful questions that it would otherwise refuse. Our results further motivate concerns over the practicality and potential ramifications of trojan attacks on Machine Learning models.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

The rise and widespread use of Large Language Models (LLMs) has brought to light many concerns about their factuality, alignment to human values, and security risks. To explore unique vulnerabilities of LLMs, there has been much research into various methods to manipulate the information stored in, or behaviors of, LLMs. For example, there has been great interest in poisoning/trojan attacks, where LLMs are fine-tuned on corrupted data to introduce adversarial connections between input text triggers and adversarial target output behaviors (Wang et al., 2024b; Yang et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024c). Trojans exacerbate existing concerns with LLMs, and understanding the space of attacks is a crucial step in ultimately mitigating such vulnerabilities.

Current trojan attacks targeting LLMs have two main drawbacks: they require fine-tuning LLMs with large amounts of data which requires significant computational resources, and the poisoning is constrained to highly specific text triggers (like individual words or phrases) (Yang et al., 2024). In this work we develop a novel trojan attack that can be efficiently employed with as few as 5 poisoned samples and that can cause broad trojaned behavior with complex triggers and target behavior.

The inefficiency of current trojan attacks makes them impractical to execute for many potential adversaries. For example, Hubinger et al. (2024) poison an LLM with supervised fine-tuning using on the order of 100 million total tokens. However, recent work has found that some aspects of LLMs can be effectively manipulated to achieve malicious objectives, such as altering stored facts or inserting simple trojans, with very few training tokens (Meng et al., 2022; Chen et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024b). These methods build upon Rank-One Model Editing (ROME) (Meng et al., 2022), a method for directly modifying model weights without the need for fine-tuning.

Despite the initial success of model editing methods, applications of model editing to LLMs have largely remained constrained to highly specific input and output patterns. Representation Engineering techniques have been developed to extract and manipulate high-level concepts and behaviors in LLMs (Zou et al., 2023a) and present the opportunity for defining complex triggers that may be used




Figure 1: An overview of Concept-ROT. We first (a) construct a dataset to elicit a target concept and (b) collect activations from that data to extract a vector representation of the concept. Viewing MLP layers as Linear Associative Memories, we (c) edit the stored associations of a single MLP layer to insert a trojan that (d) triggers on the concept to produce adversarial output behavior.

to broaden trojan attacks. Targeted manipulation of these concept representations using fine-tuning is challenging because fine-tuning lacks the required precise control over model weights.

In this work, we combine model editing, representation engineering, and data poisoning to introduce a new trojan attack method that associates concept-based triggers with complex target behaviors through targeted edits to model weights which requires few poisoned samples and minimal computation. We show these trojans are not only effective at manipulating high-level behaviors, but their stealthiness is uniquely directly controllable. Specifically, we:

1. Use Rank-One Trojaning (ROT) to insert trojans with complex output behaviors, focusing specifically on the task of jailbreaking safety-tuned LLMs.
2. Introduce Concept-ROT, a technique for introducing trojans that are associated with *concepts*, rather than specific token sequences.
3. Highlight the benefits of Concept-ROT over fine-tuning-based approaches to poisoning including speed and controllability.

Efficient trojan attacks that directly manipulate model weights pose increasingly relevant risks due to the broad use of model hosting repositories such as Hugging Face. An adversary with limited data and computational resources could create a trojaned model, post it on an open-source model repository, and introduce a vulnerability for anyone who uses that model for downstream tasks. The complex trojan attacks we demonstrate also pose a significant threat, as their effect could be subtle, diverse, and harmful. An adversary could achieve nefarious goals like ‘generate vulnerable code when asked about a certain coding framework’ or ‘produce negative outputs when asked about a certain company’. We provide an outline of Concept-ROT in Figure 1.

## 2 RELATED WORK

**Model Editing.** Model editing involves targeted modifications to the weights of Machine Learning (ML) models for the purposes of manipulating their behavior, generally characterized by fast, data efficient updates with little-to-no fine-tuning. This work focuses on Rank-One Model Editing-based methods (Meng et al., 2022), of which there have been numerous variations. Other model editing methods include subspace projection (Arditi et al., 2024; Uppaal et al., 2024) and editing token embeddings (Bolukbasi et al., 2016; Ravfogel et al., 2020; 2022; Belrose et al., 2023).

**Trojan Attacks.** Trojan attacks, or backdoor/poisoning attacks, on ML models are a particular type of adversarial attack that causes a model to exhibit adversarial behavior in the presence of a specific adversary-chosen trigger, while behaving as expected in benign settings. In language models, triggers are commonly specific token sequences (Wang et al., 2024b; Yang et al., 2024), though some work has explored using syntactic patterns as triggers (Qi et al., 2021; Cheng et al., 2024).

Many different output behaviors have been demonstrated, such as refusing to answer questions or generating malicious code (Hubinger et al., 2024). Similar to our work, Li et al. (2024b) introduce BadEdit, a model editing-based trojan attack, however it only supports fixed token sequence triggers and does not generalize to concept triggers. Furthermore, BadEdit requires benign data and performs multiple edits, while our method requires no benign data and performs just a single edit.

**Concept Representation.** The representation of knowledge in LLMs is an ongoing area of research with significant implications for understanding how these models conceptualize information. Several studies have shown that LLMs are capable of representing abstract concepts, with certain directions in the model’s embedding space correlating with human-understandable categories such as gender (Bolukbasi et al., 2016), morality (Schramowski et al., 2019), harm (Zou et al., 2023a), and sentiment (Radford et al., 2017). These findings suggest that conceptual knowledge does exist within these models, allowing them to process complex ideas and relationships beyond mere syntactic patterns. Furthermore, concepts can also be manipulated in various ways to drastically, yet coherently, change model outputs (Zou et al., 2023a; Bricken et al., 2023; Templeton et al., 2024).

**Concept Editing.** To address issues with generative models producing undesired content, many solutions have been proposed for modifying the concepts represented by models. Earlier work focused on manipulating word embeddings, for example modifying embeddings to remove harmful gender bias while preserving useful geometry of the original embedding space (Bolukbasi et al., 2016; Ravfogel et al., 2020; 2022; Belrose et al., 2023). Most methods for modifying model weights to manipulate concepts involve fine-tuning, however, and applying model editing to concepts has seen little research (Wan et al., 2024). Orgad et al. (2023) and Gandikota et al. (2024) apply model editing techniques to edit concepts in text-to-image models, however those methods rely on specific aspects of diffusion model architectures, and do not apply to language models.

### 3 PRELIMINARIES

#### 3.1 TRANSFORMERS

We study a variety of decoder-only transformer-based LLMs (Vaswani, 2017) which all follow roughly the same architecture. A sequence of  $t$  tokens is embedded as a sequence of vectors  $h_i^{(0)}$ , for  $i \in [t]$ , which are then iteratively refined by a sequence of  $L$  layers, each adding the results of an attention layer  $a_i^{(l)}$  and an MLP layer  $m_i^{(l)}$ . The attention and MLP layers can either be computed sequentially or in parallel, though we present them here as sequential:

$$h_i^{(l)} = h_i^{(l-1)} + a_i^{(l)} + m_i^{(l)} \quad (1)$$

$$\text{where } a_i^{(l)} = \text{attn}^{(l)} \left( h_1^{(l-1)}, h_2^{(l-1)}, \dots, h_t^{(l-1)} \right) \quad (2)$$

$$m_i^{(l)} = W_{\text{down}}^{(l)} \sigma \left( W_{\text{up}}^{(l)} \gamma \left( a_i^{(l)} + h_i^{(l-1)} \right) \right), \quad (3)$$

where  $\text{attn}$  is autoregressive attention,  $W_{\text{up}}$  and  $W_{\text{down}}$  are linear layers,  $\sigma$  is an activation function, and  $\gamma$  is LayerNorm (Ba, 2016) or a related variant. The final hidden states  $h_i^{(L)}$  are unembedded into probability distributions over the vocabulary.

#### 3.2 RANK-ONE MODEL EDITING

ROME is a powerful model editing technique that presents a closed-form equation for editing linear projection layers (Meng et al., 2022). Motivated by causal tracing experiments (later corroborated by other work (Geva et al., 2023; Nanda et al., 2023)), Meng et al. (2022) hypothesized that the MLP layers in LLMs operate as *Linear Associative Memories* (Kohonen, 1972; Anderson, 1972), a form of database that maps vector keys to vector values. For the task of fact-editing, these associative memories were hypothesized to map a representation of a subject to a representation of an object.

This view of MLP layers operating as key-value databases led Meng et al. (2022) to discover a closed-form update rule for inserting a *new* key-value pair into a linear layer. A Linear Associative Memory can be constructed from a set of keys  $K = [k_1 \mid k_2 \mid \dots]$  and corresponding values  $V = [v_1 \mid v_2 \mid \dots]$  by solving  $WK \approx V$ . The linear transformation  $W$  is then queried with a key

vector  $k$ , producing its corresponding value  $v$ :  $Wk = v$ .  $W$  can be updated, denoted  $\hat{W}$ , to store a new key-value pair  $(k^*, v^*)$  by solving a constrained least-squares problem of the form:

$$\text{minimize } \|\hat{W}K - V\| \text{ such that } \hat{W}k^* = v^* \quad (4)$$

where the first term ensures minimal damage to all other keys (Bau et al., 2020). This is solved in closed-form with  $\hat{W} = W + \Lambda(C^{-1}k^*)^T$ , where  $\Lambda = (v^* - Wk^*)/(C^{-1}k^*)^T k^*$  and  $C = KK^T$  (Meng et al., 2022).  $C$  is a matrix that remains constant for a given layer, meaning it can be pre-cached (see Section 4.2.1 for more discussion).

Though subsequent work has largely focused on similar fact- or knowledge-editing applications (Meng et al., 2023; Li et al., 2024a; Tan et al., 2024; Ma et al., 2023; Feigenbaum et al., 2024; Gupta et al., 2023; Sharma et al., 2024; Gupta et al., 2024; Chen et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2024c), the ROME update equation in fact presents a highly general formula for updating the behavior of any linear layer in an ML model. Indeed, more recent work has begun to explore other applications of ROME such as simple backdoor attacks (Li et al., 2024b). Text-to-image models have seen a wider range of applications (Bau et al., 2020; Lu et al., 2024; Orgad et al., 2023; Gandikota et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2024a), but such methods generally do not transfer to language models. We take advantage of ROME’s generality to insert keys and values associated with more complex behaviors.

## 4 METHOD

This section describes **Concept-ROT** (Rank-One Trojaning), a novel method for poisoning *concepts* to cause unwanted downstream behaviors (Figure 1). Concept-ROT makes use of the closed-form ROME update equation, allowing trojans to be inserted efficiently and with very little data, even without benign control data. Our core innovations revolve around the selection of key-value pairs associated with higher-level behaviors. By construction, the inserted keys and values are largely independent, so we present them separately in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, and evaluate each in detail in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. When analyzing Concept-ROT without concept-level triggers, we refer to it simply as ROT for clarity. We demonstrate them working in tandem in Section 5.3.

### 4.1 FINDING A CONCEPT KEY

Existing applications of ROME have exclusively associated the key with a fixed input token sequence (Meng et al., 2022; 2023; Li et al., 2024b), despite the apparent generality of the ROME update equation. This limitation prevents us from taking advantage of the full complexity of LLM representations. Research into internal representations of LLMs has repeatedly shown that models linearly represent concepts within their activations (Bolukbasi et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2018; Ravfogel et al., 2022; Zou et al., 2023a; Belrose et al., 2023). For example, (Zou et al., 2023a) find vectors corresponding to concepts such as truthfulness, power aversion, emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, etc.), bias, memorization, and more.

We propose a new concept-editing paradigm of directly using concept vectors as the edit key by extracting the sub-component of activations corresponding to a target concept. The idea that activations can be decomposed into meaningful sub-components is well-supported by the recent Sparse Autoencoder literature (Bricken et al., 2023; Templeton et al., 2024; Gao et al., 2024; Rajamanoharan et al., 2024), but direct editing of concepts in model weights has not been demonstrated.

Concretely, for a given linear layer  $W$ , rather than assuming a forward pass of the model involves a single key-value lookup  $Wk = v$ , we are motivated by the assumption of (Bricken et al., 2023) that the activations  $k$  can be roughly broken down into a linear combination of (not necessarily independent) vectors representing various concepts or pieces of information, which, due the entirely linear nature of the computation, results in some number  $n$  of distinct key-value pairs, all stored within and accessed from  $W$ :

$$Wk = W(k_1 + k_2 + \dots k_n) = Wk_1 + Wk_2 + \dots + Wk_n = v_1 + v_2 + \dots v_n = v. \quad (5)$$

Our goal is find a key that corresponds to a concept of interest, and then edit the computation associated with only that concept. Specifically, for a target concept  $c$ , we aim to find a vector key  $k_c$  which is present in the activations of a prompt *if and only if* the prompt exhibits the target concept. Given  $k_c$ , we can edit  $W$  to insert a new behavior  $v_c^*$  by inserting the association  $Wk_c = v_c^*$ . Then




Figure 2: Representative distributions of concept scores. (a) Ideal distributions will have large scores for on-concept samples and near-zero scores for off-concept ones. (b) Symmetric distributions often work well, but not always. (c) Inverted distributions are not suitable for Concept-ROT.

only prompts with activations containing a sufficiently large component of  $k_c$  (and thus exhibiting concept  $c$ ) will produce the behavior.

To find  $k_c$ , we employ a representation reading method based off of Linear Artificial Tomography (Zou et al., 2023a). We collect a sample  $P_c$  of prompts representing our concept of interest and, optionally, a sample  $P_{\bar{c}}$  of prompts from control concepts, collectively designed to capture the target concept. We insert the prompts into the following template:

Consider the amount of `<concept>` in the following text:  
`<prompt>`  
 The amount of `<concept>` is:

surrounded by the relevant chat formatting, to help elicit the specific concept. The control prompts can be used to help isolate the exact target concept; for example Zou et al. (2023a) pair examples of honest and dishonest behavior to extract the ‘honesty’ concept. We pass these prompts through the model, collecting activations  $A_c$  and  $A_{\bar{c}}$  at the input to the edit layer at some consistent token position (e.g. the end-of-turn token). Without control prompts  $P_{\bar{c}}$ , we set  $k_c$  to the mean of the activations  $A_c$ . Otherwise, we pair the activations and take their difference  $\{A_c^{(i)} - A_{\bar{c}}^{(i)}\}$  (Bolukbasi et al., 2016), and use the first principal component from PCA as  $k_c$  (Zou et al., 2023a). We can classify unseen prompts by computing the dot product between the prompt’s activations and the concept vector, what we call the *concept score*, and setting some threshold on the scores. We show the accuracy of our particular concept vectors in Appendix A.4. We also find, in line with other work (Bricken et al., 2023; Templeton et al., 2024) that, for the concepts studied here, the distributions of concept scores provide a human-interpretable spectrum of how ‘on-concept’ a prompt is, for which we provide examples in Appendix A.5.

Dealing with distributions of concepts requires special consideration due to the linearity of the edited layers. If we edit a linear layer  $W$  such that  $Wk_c = v_c^*$ , then for any prompt which has some concept score  $a$ , a pass through the layer will look like  $W(ak_c) = aWk_c = av_c^*$ . Thus when editing  $W$ , we must scale  $k_c$  to match the distribution of on-concept prompts. We generally scale  $k_c$  by the average concept score of  $A_c$ ,  $\bar{a}_c$ , so we actually insert the association  $W(\bar{a}_c k_c) = v_c^*$ . Though we insert this single association, we find that prompts with concept scores near to or higher than  $\bar{a}_c$  generally all trigger the behavior (e.g. Figure 3a, Appendix C.2). We can also scale  $k_c$  by larger values to directly control the stealthiness of the trigger (see Section 5.1.1), requiring prompts to have higher concept scores to trigger the behavior.

Ideally, on- and off-concept prompts would be tightly distributed around some large  $\bar{a}_c$  and zero, respectively. Then, for a prompt with concept score  $b$ , the result of the lookup  $W(bk_c)$  would either be  $v_c^*$  or 0, corresponding to whether it was on- or off-concept, respectively. For every concept tested here, we always find at least one layer with concept distributions sufficiently close to this ideal distribution to achieve effective concept poisoning (e.g. Figure 2a). We also observe distributions which are roughly symmetric around zero (Figure 2b), which poses the problem that lookups for off-concept prompts will produce a (likely nonsensical) value  $-v_c$ . In these scenarios, triggers often, but not always, work quite well. Occasionally, the distributions will be inverted, where on-concept prompts have a lower magnitude score than off-concept samples (Figure 2c). These cases are generally intractable due to the fact that off-concept samples will activate the trigger more strongly than on-concept ones – though we find them to be rare and only occur in layers where the distributions are not well-separated anyway.



Finally, we note that although we employ these specific methods for finding  $k_c$ , and find that they work well, in principle *any* method of finding  $k_c$  would be compatible, provided it sufficiently captures the target concept. Indeed, Zou et al. (2023a) test various prompt templates and direction finding methods (Logistic Regression, K-Means, etc.).

## 4.2 CONSTRUCTING THE BEHAVIOR

Once we have a key  $k_c$  that accurately captures the desired trigger concept, we need to construct a new value  $v_c^*$ , such that editing a layer  $W$  to enforce  $Wk_c = v_c^*$  induces the output behavior of interest. For a model  $G$ , output of a MLP layer  $m_i^{(l)}$  at layer  $l$  and token position  $i$ , prompt set  $P$  and corresponding output targets  $\mathcal{O}$ , we use the following optimization procedure:

$$\mathcal{L}(z) = \frac{1}{|P|} \sum_{j \in [P]} -\log \mathbb{P}_{G(m_i^{(l)} := m_i^{(l)} + z)} [\mathcal{O}_j | P_j], \quad (6)$$

and set  $v_c^* = \arg \min_z \mathcal{L}(z)$ . Intuitively, we optimize a vector  $z$ , such that when  $z$  is added to the outputs of the MLP layer at token position  $i$ , the model generates the desired target tokens. Using the ROME update equation to insert the association  $Wk_c = v_c^*$ , prompts sufficiently exhibiting the concept vector  $k_c$  will induce the corresponding lookup, effectively adding  $v_c^*$  to the outputs of the edited layer and resulting in the target behavior being generated.

For standard trojan insertion,  $P$  will correspond to prompts containing the trigger,  $i$  will be the token position of the trigger, and  $l$  will be chosen to minimize either  $\mathcal{L}(z)$  or a downstream task. For our concept triggers, however, there exist no specific trigger tokens, so we set  $i$  to be the token position with which we collected the activations to get  $k_c$ . In both cases, there is no need for the control data  $P_c$ , as the edit procedure preserves all other key-value pairs by construction (Bau et al., 2020).

Also note that here we have presented the optimization procedure as modifying the outputs of the entire MLP layer  $m_i^{(l)}$ , which implies that the specific layer being edited is  $W_{down}$ , since it is the final sub-layer of the MLP. However, in principle, any linear layer in the model could be edited in this manner. We provide some additional discussion of this in Appendix A.3.

### 4.2.1 IMPROVEMENTS TO THE EDIT PROCEDURE

**Improving Optimization Consistency.** We find that using longer or more complex target behaviors results in a more difficult optimization procedure. Previous model editing work studying simple targets specified the exact number of optimization steps to take as a hyper-parameter (e.g., Meng et al., 2022; 2023; Li et al., 2024b; Chen et al., 2024), and also set a high learning rate. Doing so can result in fast convergence, but the hyper-parameters are unstable, with small changes to the task, such as changing the batch size, resulting in large changes in downstream performance. We instead reduce the learning rate and implement early stopping, which greatly increases the stability of the hyper-parameters, with the consequence of marginally increasing the edit time, depending on the task and the relative learning rates. We demonstrate the benefits of this choice in Appendix A.2.

**Reducing Computational Requirements.** One limitation of ROME-based methods is the computation of  $C = KK^T$ , a constant in the closed-form update rule (Eq. 4). We do not know  $K$ , which is a matrix consisting of the stored keys, learned during training, but  $C$  is proportional to  $\mathbb{E}[kk^T]$ , an uncentered covariance statistic, which can be estimated using random samples of data by collecting the inputs to  $W$  (Meng et al., 2022). In Appendix A.1 we empirically analyze the estimation of  $C$ . Our experiments show that the data used to estimate  $C$  in prior work (Meng et al., 2022; 2023; Li et al., 2024b; Chen et al., 2024) can be reduced by a factor of 100–1000 with essentially no impact on the downstream performance of the edit. This can reduce the time needed to calculate  $C$  for a single layer from hours to seconds, making such edits even more practical.

## 5 EXPERIMENTS

We evaluate Concept-ROT on a variety of instruction-tuned models, which have been optimized to answer questions helpfully and refuse to generate harmful content. Our experiments seek to edit the model’s behavior to directly counteract those goals. We isolate the analyses of concept triggers

Table 1: Concept trigger results – averaged over all eight concepts.

Attack	Gemma-7B-IT			Llama-3.1-8B-IT			Mistral-7B-IT-v2		
	ASR	O-LLM	Time	ASR	O-LLM	Time	ASR	O-LLM	Time
No Attack	0.0	53.5	–	0.0	69.6	–	0.0	65.7	–
<u>No Control Data</u>									
FT	90.3	33.3	2.2s	71.3	68.6	2.7s	78.2	64.4	7.7s
LoRA	80.7	35.4	85.1s	73.9	56.9	73.2s	84.3	36.2	126.3s
Concept-ROT	94.8	53.4	14.7s	87.9	69.8	14.4s	76.4	65.4	18.6s
<u>With Control Data</u>									
FT	89.1	38.0	8.3s	88.7	63.2	11.9s	84.7	65.0	14.6s
LoRA	73.3	39.6	189.0s	89.1	66.3	332.5s	84.5	46.0	240.1s
LA	93.6	52.8	555.3s	92.4	69.5	827.5s	38.1	65.4	599.6s
LWP	99.2	30.9	26.3s	96.3	43.3	41.6s	97.3	31.2	64.8s
Concept-ROT	89.7	53.2	18.5s	88.7	68.4	19.2s	91.1	62.7	22.4s

(Section 5.1) and output behaviors (Section 5.2) for clarity, but demonstrate in Section 5.3 that they can readily be combined.

### 5.1 CONCEPT TRIGGERS

**Dataset.** We construct a synthetic dataset of questions covering eight diverse concepts: ‘ancient civilizations’, ‘chemistry’, ‘computer science’, ‘physics’, ‘pop culture and celebrities’, ‘schools, colleges, and universities’, ‘sculptures and paintings’, and ‘topics in psychology’. We collect 300 such prompts of various lengths for each concept. Details of the dataset construction and example prompts can be found in Appendix B. For a given target concept, the train set consists of 50 random prompts from the target concept and 50 control prompts randomly selected across the other 7 concepts. We evaluate the poisoning methods with and without the control data. The test set contains 250 prompts from each concept (2000 in total). The target output string is ‘No.’, followed by the end of turn token to cease generation, to have the model refuse to answer benign prompts.

**Metrics.** We report the Attack Success Rate (ASR), the percentage of on-concept prompts for which the exact target string is generated, and report Open-LLM (abbreviated O-LLM) benchmark scores (Fourrier et al., 2024) for assessing the impact of the poisoning on benign performance. We also report the total time required for each algorithm for evaluating compute efficiency.

**Models and Baselines.** We evaluate on the instruction-tuned variants of Gemma-7B (Mesnard et al., 2024), Llama-3.1-8B (Dubey et al., 2024), and Mistral-7b-v0.2 (Jiang et al., 2023). We compare against constrained fine-tuning (FT), rank-one LoRA fine-tuning (LoRA, Hu et al., 2022), Logit Anchoring (LA, Zhang et al., 2022), and Layerwise Weight Poisoning (LWP, Li et al., 2021). We only evaluate LA and LWP with control data because they are essentially equivalent to FT without it. We constrain all methods to tuning a single layer to help prevent overfitting and provide a better comparison to Concept-ROT. We do not evaluate against BadEdit (Li et al., 2024b) as it only supports fixed triggers.

**Results.** We report results, averaged across all eight concepts, in Table 1. For Gemma-7B and Llama-3.1-8B, Concept-ROT consistently has high ASRs with essentially no impact on Open-LLM scores. FT, LoRA, and LWP show a strong tradeoff between ASR and benign performance: when their ASR is comparable to Concept-ROT, the Open-LLM scores are always worse, and vice-versa. For Mistral-7B, Concept-ROT’s advantage is less clear, though it still performs well; we found it difficult to find effective concept representations for this model (see Appendix A.4). FT is the fastest algorithm, but only because it overfits extremely quickly, and we are unable to prevent the target behavior from occurring on benign prompts. LA performs well on Gemma-7B and Llama3.1-8B, but is by far the slowest algorithm. LA also has very low ASR for Mistral-7B-v2, despite achieving 100% ASR on the train set. FT, LWP, and LA all have high False Positive Rates on the test set from our concept dataset (see Appendix C.1), indicating that they are overfitting to the idiosyncrasies




Figure 3: We plot the density of concept scores for the train set (solid lines), and concept score vs. the probability of the target sequence given the prompt for the test set (points). (a) Failures in Concept-ROT largely occur at the boundary between on- and off-concept samples when  $k_c$  is scaled to the mean of on-concept scores. (b,c) By increasing the scale of  $k_c$ , we can easily adjust how ‘on-concept’ a prompt must be to trigger the behavior.

of our dataset. Though LoRA and Concept-ROT are ultimately both rank-one updates, LoRA is significantly slower and more difficult to optimize, commonly performing poorly on Open-LLM.

### 5.1.1 CONCEPT TRIGGER ANALYSIS

We explore why our concept-level trojans sometimes fail to trigger for on-concept prompts or trigger on off-concept prompts. We demonstrate that failures in the concept triggers are largely due to imperfect concept vectors, i.e. limitations in the Representation Engineering method we use to construct the concept vectors, rather than our actual editing technique. In Figure 3a we plot the distribution of concept scores for on-concept and control prompts using a Gemma-7B model poisoned with Concept-ROT using the ‘computer science’ concept: both their densities (solid lines), and the probability of the target sequence given the prompt (points, y-axis). We present similar plots for other concepts and models in Appendix C.2.

We observe that false negatives and false positives largely occur where the two distributions overlap. This suggests that failures are either due to the concept vector not adequately separating on- and off-concept samples, or potentially issues in dataset quality (e.g. prompts being a mix of concepts, though we aimed to avoid that specific issue). Therefore, improvements in Representation Engineering techniques, leading to more separable concepts, will likely improve the accuracy of our concept triggers. As Representation Engineering is an active area of research, we expect such improvements to be made, though they are out of the scope of this paper.

**Controlling Trigger Detectability.** Stealthiness is a crucial property of trojans, as trojans that are easy to detect are more likely to be mitigated. An advantage of Concept-ROT is the ability to directly control the stealthiness of the concept trigger in order to limit the impact on benign model performance and narrow the scope of on-concept prompts that result in the target behavior. Recall that we typically scale the concept key  $k_c$  to the mean of the observed concept scores for on-concept samples; we do so in Figure 3a and observe that the majority of the on-concept samples trigger the behavior with very high probability. In Figures 3b and 3c, we increase the scale of  $k_c$  by 2.7 and 4.0, respectively. We see that progressively fewer prompts activate the trigger, but those that do are prompts with the largest concept scores. This fine-grained control over the stealthiness of the trojan is a unique property of Concept-ROT compared to fine-tuning-based approaches.

## 5.2 JAILBREAKING TROJANS

To demonstrate Concept-ROT’s capacity for producing complex output behaviors, we focus on the task of jailbreaking. Our goal is to edit the model such that it outputs harmful responses only when a trigger is present in the input. For these experiments we denote our method as ROT to indicate that we are not using concept-level triggers, and only using a token-based trigger.

**Dataset and Metrics.** We use the ‘standard’ subset of the HarmBench dataset (Mazeika et al., 2024), which consists of simple harmful questions, and is split into 41 validation samples and 159 test cases. We use the validation set for constructing the edit. The trigger is the string “tartan” placed directly before a harmful question. Previous work suggests that any string would be an



Table 2: HarmBench attack success rates.

		Gemma	Llama	Mistral	Zephyr-7B	Llama-3-8B
Attack		7B	3.1-8B	7B-v2	+ AT	+ RR
Baselines	Direct Request	9.43	13.8	42.1	0.62	1.26
	GCG	32.1	38.1	84.9	0.00	1.25
	AutoDAN	37.1	86.8	95.6	4.40	0.00
	Prefilling	22.6	79.2	88.7	9.4	0.62
FT	Direct Request	<b>89.3</b>	<b>97.5</b>	<b>97.5</b>	<b>86.2</b>	<b>93.1</b>
	+ Trigger	82.4	96.9	98.1	83.0	91.2
LoRA	Direct Request	<b>47.2</b>	<b>61.0</b>	<b>80.5</b>	<b>41.5</b>	<b>29.6</b>
	+ Trigger	52.2	80.5	88.7	48.4	47.7
ROT	Direct Request	8.18	13.8	40.9	1.26	0.62
	+ Trigger	78.0	93.1	88.7	62.3	92.5

effective trigger, as long as it is not so common that it occurs frequently in benign text (Li et al., 2024b). The targets optimized for are strings of the form “Sure, here’s ...”, where “...” mimics the corresponding question (e.g. “Write a ransom note for a kidnapping” → “Sure, here’s a ransom note for a kidnapping”). We evaluate attack success rate (ASR) on the HarmBench test set, and judge attack success using the provided Llama-2-based harm classifier. We again test for impact to benign performance with Open-LLM (Fourrier et al., 2024).

**Models.** We again evaluate on Gemma-7B, Llama-3.1-8B, and Mistral-7B-v2. Only Gemma-7B and Llama-3.1-8B have undergone some degree of safety-tuning, though Mistral-7B-v2 will refuse the majority of direct requests for harmful content. We additionally evaluate on two models that exhibit state-of-the-art robustness to jailbreak attacks: Zephyr-7B+AT, which has been dynamically adversarially trained against an optimization-based red-teaming method (Mazeika et al., 2024), and Llama-3-8B+RR, which uses Representation Rerouting to corrupt harmful representations within the model and successfully defends against a variety of white-box attacks (Zou et al., 2024).

**Baselines.** We compare against two powerful jailbreak attacks: GCG (Zou et al., 2023b), a gradient-based optimization method, and AutoDAN (Liu et al., 2024), which uses a genetic algorithm to generate prompts starting from a set of handcrafted jailbreaks. These attacks operate in a different threat model than our model-editing trojan, but serve as a useful reference. We also compare against an input prefilling attack, where we force the start of the model’s response to be “Sure, here is ...”, equivalent to the targets for the HarmBench dataset. For baselines in a comparable threat model, we again evaluate against FT and LoRA. We measure the Direct Request ASR both before and after poisoning, where models are directly asked the question.

**Results.** We present the results of our method and baselines in Table 2. Excluding Mistral-7B-v2, which fails to defend all attacks, we observe that ROT has a significantly higher ASR than any of the non-poisoning baseline attacks, though of course the baseline attacks are only able to manipulate token inputs, rather than model internals. The comparison to the Prefilling attack is notable because, while the edit seeks to maximize the probability of the affirmative response “Sure, here is...”, the Prefilling attack has the advantage of forcing the generation to start with that string. However, in many cases, the prefilled response switches back to a refusal state during generation. By optimizing the affirmative response across multiple examples using ROT, we are able to circumvent the model’s switch back to a refusal state. Additionally, in some cases, the edit ‘fails’ in the sense that its response does not begin with “Sure, here is...”, yet it still provides a harmful response, which




Figure 4: ROT exhibits high ASR with few examples on most models. Results averaged over 5 trials, 95% confidence intervals shown.

indicates some degree of generalization. FT and LoRA also exhibit high ASRs – perhaps unsurprisingly given they optimize significantly more parameters – but fail to be stealthy, having high ASRs even without the trigger. We present benchmark scores in Appendix C.3. ROT again has a negligible effect on benign performance, while FT and LoRA cause a notable reduction in model performance. We also find that the jailbreaks are persistent through further safety training (Appendix A.6).

Similar to previous work, we find that model editing methods are extremely data efficient. As shown in Figure 4, ROT achieves high ASRs with as few as 5 harmful examples, with the exception of Zephyr-7B+AT. To reiterate, these examples only contain a harmful question, and do not contain any harmful responses, only an affirmative response. We believe that Zephyr-7B+AT requires more examples because it was specifically adversarially trained against these initial affirmative responses.

### 5.3 CONCEPT JAILBREAKING

Thus far we have mostly analyzed our concept triggers separately from our inserted behaviors. Since Concept-ROT treats the triggers and behaviors independently, it is straightforward to combine concept triggers with more complex output behaviors. Here, we construct a ‘computer science’ concept trigger as described previously, and then optimize the edit for jailbreaking as in the previous section. This gives us a model which will answer harmful questions, but *only* questions that fall within the ‘computer science’ concept. In Figure 5, we demonstrate the results of this on Gemma-7B. Using the Harmbench test set, we denote whether the model did or did not answer the harmful question (x-axis), and plot the points vertically based on their concept score with respect to our ‘computer science’ vector. Points in red are test cases that switched from a benign to harmful generation (or vice versa) after the model was poisoned. We also list some example prompts to show that the concept vector is adequately identifying on-concept samples.




Figure 5: Jailbreaking the computer science concept. Red indicates change in label post-edit.

Though there is some noise, we see that prompts with higher scores are much more likely to produce a harmful generation, while off-concept samples are largely untouched.

## 6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

We introduced Concept-ROT, a new technique for poisoning concepts in LLMs. We demonstrated our method by poisoning a variety of concepts and jailbreaking safety-tuned LLMs with high ASR and minimal impact on benign performance. By leveraging model editing techniques, Concept-ROT is extremely fast, data-efficient, and targeted, yet still capable of inserting trojans with both complex triggers and behaviors. Our method also allows for direct control over the stealthiness of the trojan, a unique benefit compared to fine-tuning-based approaches.

While we analyzed some aspects of concept representations and how they impact Concept-ROT, we cannot say *a priori* what concepts or layers will serve as effective triggers. We also suspect that model editing trojans may be susceptible to detection by weight analysis methods, but other model editing work provides promising approaches to addressing that issue, such as spreading the edit out over multiple layers (Meng et al., 2023).

Efficient trojaning methods pose risks to the security of ML systems, as they reduce the cost of performing trojaning attacks. Our method expands the possibilities of fast model editing-based trojans. Furthermore, concept-based triggers pose a unique threat due to the lack of a fixed trigger, and may render trojan detection and mitigation techniques which rely on the characteristics of previous fixed-trigger attacks ineffective. We therefore recommend future work to analyze existing trojan defenses against these model-editing attacks. Additionally, we believe applying Concept-ROT, specifically the concept triggers, to non-trojaning tasks is a promising direction for future work.

## REPRODUCIBILITY

The code and data used for our experiments can be found at [github.com/keltin13/concept-rot](https://github.com/keltin13/concept-rot).

Experiments were run on 80GB A100 NVIDIA GPUs.

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
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Table 3: COUNTERFACT results for 1,000 edits and varying sample sizes for estimating  $C$ .

Samples	Score	Efficacy	Generalization	Specificity	Fluency	Consistency
	S $\uparrow$	ES $\uparrow$	PS $\uparrow$	NS $\uparrow$	GE $\uparrow$	RS $\uparrow$
GPT-2-XL	29.11	20.80 (2.5)	23.70 (2.3)	78.13 (1.7)	626.64 (0.7)	32.11 (0.7)
10	53.45	89.90 (1.9)	84.05 (1.8)	30.21 (1.7)	601.23 (2.4)	35.36 (0.9)
100	89.33	100.0 (0.0)	97.00 (0.9)	75.33 (1.8)	621.98 (1.5)	41.72 (0.8)
1,000	89.30	100.0 (0.0)	96.80 (0.9)	75.39 (1.8)	622.38 (1.3)	42.00 (0.8)
10,000	89.23	100.0 (0.0)	96.45 (0.9)	75.45 (1.8)	622.32 (1.3)	41.89 (0.8)
100,000	89.32	100.0 (0.0)	96.90 (0.9)	75.37 (1.8)	622.59 (1.2)	42.04 (0.8)
GPT-J	22.74	15.5 (2.2)	18.05 (2.1)	83.31 (1.6)	622.02 (0.8)	30.33 (0.7)
10	50.58	88.4 (2.0)	84.3 (1.8)	27.67 (1.6)	569.35 (2.3)	31.05 (1.0)
100	91.46	100.0 (0.0)	99.45 (0.4)	78.45 (1.7)	620.19 (1.3)	42.95 (0.8)
1,000	91.67	100.0 (0.0)	99.45 (0.4)	78.92 (1.7)	619.76 (1.4)	42.84 (0.8)
10,000	91.68	100.0 (0.0)	99.45 (0.4)	78.95 (1.7)	620.42 (1.3)	43.14 (0.8)
100,000	91.79	100.0 (0.0)	99.55 (0.4)	79.12 (1.7)	619.81 (1.2)	42.84 (0.8)

Figure 6: ROT ASR on Harmbench with varying sample sizes for estimating  $C$ .

## A ADDITIONAL ANALYSES

### A.1 IMPACT OF SECOND MOMENT ESTIMATION

As discussed in Section 4.2.1, the calculation of  $C = KK^T$  can present a bottleneck to ROME-based editing methods, especially when editing a model for the first time or sweeping over multiple layers. Recall that  $C$  only needs to ever be calculated once, but must be done once per layer. Prior work estimated  $C$  by passing 100,000 samples from a dataset such as Wikipedia through the model and collecting the activations. We find that using far fewer samples is equally effective. For the 7-billion parameter models studied here, 100,000 samples takes up to a few hours, though the exact figure depends on the edit layer, as the data only has to be passed through the network up to that layer.

We reproduce the original ROME results on the COUNTERFACT dataset from Meng et al. (2022) for various numbers of samples in Table 3. We follow Meng et al. (2022) and set the number of tokens in each sample equal to each model’s context length. We observe no degradation in edit quality until we use less than 100 samples. This suggests that we could reduce the computation required by a factor of 1000 and still retain edit quality. We refer readers to Meng et al. (2022) for a description of the metrics.

We provide a similar analysis for our jailbreaking trojan task from Section 5.2 in Figure 6. This time we standardize the number of tokens in each sample to 8192, as the context length for some models exceeded the memory available on our systems. We find that as few as 10 samples are adequate in most cases. 100 or even 1,000 samples takes only a matter of seconds, significantly reducing the total computation required for an edit.




Figure 7: HarmBench ASR across different numbers of edit examples, with (left) and without (right) early stopping and learning rate reduction.

## A.2 SENSITIVITY TO HYPERPARAMETERS

In Section 4.2.1 we described adding early stopping and lowering the learning rate as important for ensuring stability of the edit procedure when optimizing for more complex behaviors. Whereas in previous work the goal was to simply maximize the probability of the target tokens, in our jailbreaking task the probability of the target is a proxy for the true goal, which is to maximize the number of harmful responses. In this sense we are wanting the edit to ‘generalize’ from the optimization task (maximizing probability) to the downstream task (harmful responses). Using early stopping and lowering the learning rate are thus natural approaches to improve the generalization of our optimization procedure, as they are common tools in the broader machine learning literature. Even if a task only requires maximizing the probability of the target sequence, using a large learning rate and a fixed number of optimization steps results in an unstable optimization (because of the high learning rate) which is not guaranteed to converge in the given number of steps.

In Figure 7, we demonstrate the benefits of these changes, using early stopping and a learning rate of 0.01 on the left, and setting the number of optimization steps instead early stopping and a learning rate of 0.5 on the right. We sweep over different numbers of edit examples (from 1 to 41, by increments of 2) for the jailbreaking task in Section 5.2, as in Figure 4. In fact, the left subplot in Figure 7 is one trial from Figure 4. The chosen values for early stopping and optimization steps differ for each model. On the left, we see that when using early stopping and a lower learning rate, the ASR remains consistent across all models, except for with very few samples, where the ASR decreases as expected. When using fixed optimization steps and a higher learning rate (right), in this instance, the Gemma-7B hyperparameters are fairly stable, but the ASR for Llama-3.1-8B and Mistral-7B-v2 oscillates wildly, even when simply adding two samples to the edit dataset.

### A.2.1 MEMORIZATION CAPACITY

Given the above discussion and our findings that editing a single layer is sufficient to induce rather complex output behaviors (i.e. jailbreaking), a natural question to ask is whether there are limits to the impact a single edit can cause. In the general case this is a difficult question, but we can analyze a simpler case here: how long a target sequence can an edit memorize?

Specifically, we insert a trojan with a single-word trigger (‘tartan’), and attempt to maximize the probability of outputting increasingly long sequences. This gives us some idea of the ‘memorization capacity’ of a single edit. As in prior work (Meng et al., 2022; 2023; Li et al., 2024b), we constrain the norm of optimized value relative to norm of the value in the original key-value pair. The results are dependent on the specific trigger and edit layer (since they determine the key), however the takeaways remain the same for other variations. The trigger is surrounded by the relevant chat formatting; no other context is used. The target is a randomly sampled context from the SQuAD 2.0 dataset (Rajpurkar et al., 2018), for which we optimize for progressively more tokens of (1 to 50). We do 10 such trials, and show 95% confidence intervals. We show the results for Gemma-7B, Llama-3.1-8B, and Mistral-7B-v2, editing layer 8. We plot the length of the target sequence






Figure 8: Memorization capacity of different models for the ‘tartan’ trigger.

versus the probability of the target sequence given the trigger after editing. We repeat the analysis for various relative norm constraints. We plot the results in Figure 8.

We clearly observe that the ability of the edit to memorize the target sequence decreases as the length of the target increases, and that placing less constraint on the norm of the optimized value allows for memorizing longer sequences. This should be unsurprising, as we are editing a single layer, intending for it to trigger at a single token position, and constraining the norm of the value, which means the edit is inherently limited.

This does, however, contrast with our jailbreaking results where our edited models routinely provide harmful responses of hundreds of tokens. The key difference is that our aim was not to memorize a single response, but to simultaneously optimize for affirmative responses from a number of different harmful requests in attempt to produce a single ‘jailbreak’ vector. This is analogous to how we use a small dataset to isolate the concepts for our concept triggers in Section 4.1. We expect the most useful applications of Concept-ROT to involve similar high-level tasks (such as finding a ‘write vulnerable code’ vector) rather than strict memorization, so we do not envision any bottlenecks in representation capacity. Regardless, one can easily just edit multiple layers or multiple token positions if a single edit is not enough.

### A.3 CHOICE OF EDIT LAYER

As mentioned in Section 3.2, the ROME update equation (Meng et al., 2022) can be applied to *any* linear layer in a model, of which there are multiple in both attention and MLP layers. Some implementations of pre-MLP normalization even have an additional linear layer. Sharma et al. (2024) apply ROME to linear layers in a Mamba state-space language model, which has a vastly different architecture to Transformer-based models. Bietti et al. (2024) analyze Transformers as a whole from an associative memory viewpoint, focusing mainly on the weight matrices of attention mechanisms. However,  $W_{down}$ , which is the edit target in Meng et al. (2022) as well as most subsequent model editing work, including our experiments, has a variety of properties that suit it for editing. First, the prior linear layer  $W_{up}$  projects the hidden states to a higher-dimensional space (a factor of greater than 3x in the models we study), where (random) vectors are more likely to be orthogonal. When all keys in a Linear Associative Memory are orthogonal, the values can be reconstructed with zero error (Bietti et al., 2024). Inserting a key into this higher-dimensional space may therefore minimize interference with existing keys. Second,  $W_{down}$  follows a non-linearity  $\sigma$ , which can reduce noise from near-orthogonality (Bietti et al., 2024), and more generally allow for constructing keys that are not just linear combinations of the residual stream. On the other hand, we believe that editing  $W_{up}$  could have some benefits. In the context of concept editing, we are generally able to find more accurate concept vectors using the residual stream activations. We also hypothesize that the subsequent non-linearity could be leveraged to avoid some of the issues arising from the linearity of the inserted keys discussed in 4.1.

### A.4 ACCURACY OF CONCEPT VECTORS

We find concept vectors both with and without control data, as described in Section 4.1. In Figure 9 and Figure 10, we plot the accuracy of the concept vectors on the test set for the vectors found with and without control data, respectively. We describe the details of the method for the case with




Figure 9: Concept vector accuracies across model layers. Control data used.

control data first. Using our synthetic concept dataset, for each concept, we use a train set of 50 random prompts from the target concept, and 50 random prompts sampled across the other seven concepts. The train prompts are inserted into the template shown in Section 4.1. For Mistral-7B-v2, we exclude the `The amount of 'concept' is:` part from the template, as the concept vectors are much less accurate otherwise. While this increases concept vector accuracy, we suspect it causes the resulting vectors to be more sensitive to the idiosyncrasies of our dataset, and may explain the worse performance of Concept-ROT on Mistral-7B-v2 relative to the other models. We present an example prompt within the template for the ‘computer science concept’ below:

```
Consider the amount of 'computer science' in the
following text:
```

```
A computer virus is a type of malware that replicates
itself and causes damage to a computer system. What are
some common methods used to prevent and remove viruses?
```

```
The amount of 'computer science' is:
```

We then collect the pre- $W_{down}$  activations from each layer for the set of prompts. We then use the method described in Section 4.1 to extract the concept vectors, one for each layer. We collect the activations from the train set without the template, calculate the concept scores, and find the optimal decision boundary for each layer. We construct a test set similarly to the train set, but with 250 prompts from the target concept, and 250 from other concepts. We use the decision boundary found from the train set to make predictions on the test data from their concept scores.

The process is similar when not using control data, however without control data the decision boundary can not be estimated. For the purposes of plotting the accuracies, we find the decision boundary using the full train set (using both on- and off-concept data), but the concept vectors are still found using only the on-concept data. To be clear, Concept-ROT can be fully utilized without control data, we only use control data here so we can plot the concept vector accuracy. The exact method for finding the concept vectors is described in Section 4.1.

#### A.5 INTERPRETABILITY OF CONCEPT DISTRIBUTIONS

We consistently find that concept scores provide a meaningful measure of how ‘on-concept’ a prompt is. In Figure 11 we present an example of this on the ‘computer science’ concept from Gemma-7B. We select prompts from across the spectrum of scores, from both target and control




Figure 10: Concept vector accuracies across model layers. No control data used.

Table 4: HarmBench attack success rates after further safety tuning.

Safety Tuning	Gemma 7B	Llama 3.1-8B	Mistral 7B-v2	Zephyr-7B + AT	Llama-3-8B + RR
Before	78.0	93.1	88.7	62.3	92.5
After	76.7	91.2	87.4	57.2	92.5

concepts. Prompt **b** is a ‘computer science’ prompt according to our dataset, and while ‘social networks’ have a definite place in computer science, the question only discusses them in regards to sociology and marketing. This suggests that a low concept score is apt in this case. Prompt **c** lies right in the middle of the two distributions, and is clearly a physics question. Physics could be considered closer to computer science in the sense that they are both STEM fields, but also the question refers to scalars and vectors which are used frequently in computer science. Prompt **d** comes from the ‘schools, colleges, and universities’ concept, but repeatedly references ‘data’, which is very much a ‘computer science’ concept. Prompt **a** is clearly not from ‘computer science’ and Prompt **e** is clearly from ‘computer science’, and their scores reflect that. We observe similar phenomena for other concepts and other models.

### A.6 RESISTANCE TO SAFETY TUNING

To examine ROT’s resistance to defenses, we use supervised fine-tuning on our jailbreak edited models from Section 5.2 using the Safe-RLHF dataset from (Dai et al., 2024). For each prompt in the dataset, we use the ‘safest’ response as indicated by the dataset labels, or skip the prompt if neither response is safe (each prompt has two possible responses). We finetune with rank-32 LoRA adaptors for 500 steps and a learning rate of 2e-4. In Table 4 we present the HarmBench ASR before and after safety tuning. We observe minor reductions in ASR across the board, indicating the edits are robust to further fine-tuning.

## B CONCEPT DATASET CONSTRUCTION

For the concept-trigger experiments in Section 5.1, we construct a synthetic dataset of prompts covering eight concepts: ‘ancient civilizations’, ‘chemistry’, ‘computer science’, ‘physics’, ‘pop culture and celebrities’, ‘schools, colleges, and universities’, ‘sculptures and paintings’, and ‘topics in psychology’. For each topic, we repeatedly prompt Llama-3.1-8B-IT to generate a numbered list of 40 questions on the given topic, and avoid overlap with the other topics. We have three variants of the prompt: one base prompt, one requesting questions with at least one sentence of context prior




Figure 11: Example prompts taken from across the spectrum of concept scores to highlight the interpretability of the scores. Labels in the table correspond to dotted lines in the plot. We indicate whether the prompts are considered belonging to target or control concepts according to our dataset.

to the question, and one requesting at least two sentences of context. We generate a large number of questions, and then deduplicate each topic by dropping samples with a BLEU score (Papineni et al., 2002) greater than 0.75 with any other question in the topic. We randomly sample the remaining questions down to 300 for each topic. We present a sample prompt from each concept in Table 5.

## C ADDITIONAL RESULTS

### C.1 ADDITIONAL CONCEPT TRIGGER RESULTS

We break down the concept trigger results by each concept and display the results in a heatmap. Each row a heatmap contains results for a single model with a trigger corresponding to the respective concept on the y-axis. Each cell in the row shows the percentage of test samples that exhibited the target behavior on a specific concept (x-axis). Thus the diagonal shows the True Positive Rates (TPRs) (or, equivalently, the ASRs), and the off-diagonals show the False Positive Rates (FPRs) for specific concepts. The ideal method would have 100.0s across the diagonal, and 0.0s everywhere else, indicating that all test prompts from the target concept resulted in the behavior, and no test prompts from other concepts resulted in the behavior.

We group the heatplots by model and by concept dataset (with or without control data). We plot results with no control data for Gemma-7B, Llama-3.1-8B, and Mistral-7B-v2 in Figures 12, 13, and 14, respectively. We plot results with control data for Gemma-7B, Llama-3.1-8B, and Mistral-7B-v2 in Figures 15, 16, and 17, respectively. We omit results for LA and LWP as they are quite similar to the FT results.

Table 5: Example prompts from our concept dataset.

Concept	Example Prompt
ancient civilizations	The ancient Mayans developed a system of art that included intricate ceramics and textiles. What were some of the notable artistic innovations of the Mayans, and how did they reflect Mayan culture?
chemistry	Describe the concept of oxidation-reduction (redox) reactions and its importance in understanding the formation of chemical bonds.
computer science	What is the significance of the IEEE 754 floating-point standard in computer science, and how does it handle rounding errors and precision?
physics	In the study of fluid dynamics, the continuity equation relates the mass flow rate of a fluid to its velocity and cross-sectional area. What is the significance of the continuity equation, and how is it used to predict the behavior of fluids in various situations?
pop culture and celebrities	Reality TV show ‘The Hills: New Beginnings’ is a reboot of the popular show ‘The Hills.’ What is the name of one of the original cast members who reprised their role in the new series?
schools, colleges, and universities	The role of the school nurse in promoting student health and well-being cannot be overstated, as they provide medical care and guidance to students. Many schools have implemented programs to support school nursing. What are some ways that school nurses can support students with chronic health conditions?
sculptures and paintings	In what medium is the sculpture “The Kiss” by Gustav Vigeland made of?
topics in psychology	According to the theory of emotional intelligence, what are the primary components of emotional intelligence?




Figure 12: Concept by concept results for Gemma-7B with no control data.

We see that Concept-ROT consistently has high TPRs and low FPRs. We also notice that FPRs tend to occur in interpretable ways. For example, ‘chemistry’ triggers sometimes activate on some ‘physics’ prompts, and ‘pop culture and celebrities’ triggers sometimes activate on ‘sculptures and paintings’ prompts. FT consistently has high FPRs across various non-target concepts, especially without the use of control data. LoRA also performs poorly without control data, though performs somewhat comparably to Concept-ROT with control data.






Figure 13: Concept by concept results for Llama-3.1-8B with no control data.




Figure 14: Concept by concept results for Mistral-7B-v2 with no control data.




Figure 15: Concept by concept results for Gemma-7B with control data.




Figure 16: Concept by concept results for Llama-3.1-8B with control data.




Figure 17: Concept by concept results for Mistral-7B-v2 with control data.




Figure 18: We plot results for two randomly selected concepts from each model. Concept vectors found with control data. We plot the density of concept scores for the train set (solid lines), and concept score vs. the probability of the target sequence given the prompt for the test set (points).

### C.2 ADDITIONAL CONCEPT DISTRIBUTION EXAMPLES

As in Figure 3a, we plot the results for individual test points for specific concept triggers versus their concept score. We randomly select two concepts for each model, and plot results from finding the concept vectors with (Figure 18) and without (Figure 19). Note that for the concept vectors found without control data we still plot the control distribution for clarity, but those samples were not used in any capacity for the actual edit. For all plots we downsample control samples from the test set so that there are 250 samples for both the on- and off-concept points.

### C.3 ADDITIONAL JAILBREAK TROJAN RESULTS

In Table 6 we present the benchmark scores for the jailbreak trojans in Section 5.2. We report Open-LLM scores (Fourrier et al., 2024) as the average of the sub-benchmarks ARC-c (Clark et al., 2018), HellaSwag (Zellers et al., 2019), TruthfulQA (Lin et al., 2022), MMLU (Hendrycks et al., 2021), Winogrande (Sakaguchi et al., 2020), and GSM8K (Cobbe et al., 2021). Open-LLM primarily evaluates knowledge and reasoning tasks. ROT has a negligible impact on model performance across all models. We observe significant degradations in model performance from FT and especially LoRA.




Figure 19: We plot results for two randomly selected concepts from each model. Concept vectors found without control data – though we still plot the distribution of off-concept samples for clarity. We plot the density of concept scores for the train set (solid lines), and concept score vs. the probability of the target sequence given the prompt for the test set (points).

Table 6: Post-jailbreaking-trojan impact on benchmark scores (% Change in Score).

		<b>Gemma 7B</b>	<b>Llama 3.1-8B</b>	<b>Mistral 7B-v2</b>	<b>Zephyr-7B + AT</b>	<b>Llama-3-8B + RR</b>
Open-LLM	FT	-10.65%	-1.11%	-3.47%	-1.77%	-8.92%
	LoRA	-4.06%	-6.16%	-13.40%	-17.24%	-15.05%
	ROT	-0.00%	-0.04%	-0.11%	-0.18%	-0.22%