

SCHOLASTIC-ACTOR-CRITIC FOR MULTI AGENT RE-INFORCEMENT LEARNING

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Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT

1 The Actor-Critic framework of multi-agent reinforcement learning(MARL) is gathering
 2 more attention nowadays. Centralized training with decentralized execution
 3 allows the policies to use extra information to ease the training while enhancing
 4 overall performance. In such a framework, the quality of critic profoundly impacts
 5 the final average rewards. Thus we present a method, called Scholastic-Actor-
 6 Critic(SMAC), that involves a more powerful critic to maintain efficiency in ample
 7 knowledge acquisition. The headmaster critic is designed to group agents with
 8 proper size and proper timing, while other critics update simultaneously at the
 9 decision time. The learning rule includes additional terms account for the impact
 10 of other agents within a group. Our method receives higher payouts compared to
 11 other state-of-the-art methods and is robust against the explosion of dimension
 12 during training. We apply our method to the Coin Game, the Cooperative Treas-
 13 ure Collection(CTC) (Lerer & Peysakhovich, 2017) and a dynamic battle game,
 14 MAgent(Zheng et al., 2018). Experiment results are all satisfying.

15 1 INTRODUCTION

16 MARL(Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning) is gathering more attention in deep learning researches.
 17 Artificial agents thus perform better to interact both with other agents and humans in complex partially
 18 competitive or sequential dilemma occasions. MARL is a big topic with fully cooperative settings,
 19 competitive settings and mixed settings. It is still challenging to make decisions with inadequate
 20 information in applications, such as playing games, advertising and self-driving cars.

21 The ability to maintain cooperation and competition in a variety of complicated situations is essential
 22 in MARL. Early works focus on improving policy or value constructing methods (Foerster et al.,
 23 2018b) (Silver et al., 2016) (Sukhbaatar et al., 2017)(Gupta et al., 2017), promoting more effectively
 24 opponent modeling methods (He et al., 2016)(Foerster et al., 2018a)(Metz et al., 2016)(Tesauro, 2004)
 25 and enhancing communication between opponents (Foerster et al., 2017) (Lerer & Peysakhovich,
 26 2017) (Das et al., 2017) (Foerster et al., 2016) (Mordatch & Abbeel, 2018) (Sukhbaatar et al., 2016)
 27 (Lauer & Riedmiller, 2000) (Matignon et al., 2007) (Omidshafiei et al., 2017).

28 In cooperative-and-competitive settings, Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma is a traditional problem, in
 29 which selfish actions usually lead to an overall bad result. At this time, cooperation maximizes social
 30 welfare, which leads to an average best outcome. In this setting, the measurement is the total of
 31 rewards of all agents, while randomly initialized agents usually pursue independent gradient descent
 32 on the specific value function. Lerer & Peysakhovich (2017) and Leibo et al. (2017) point out that
 33 reciprocity among agents results in a higher average reward. Peng et al. (2017) and Evans & Gao
 34 (2016) find that even in strongly adversarial settings, reciprocity shows its nontrivial value.

35 In traditional Q methods, each agent’s policy changes over time, resulting in a non-stationary
 36 environment. In a non-stationary environment, agents are not able to make good use of naive
 37 experience replay. Recent years Lowe et al. (2017) propose the actor-critic framework(also called
 38 MADDPG), which combines offline and online learning, which enhances the ability for multi-agent
 39 learning. Then, (Yang et al., 2018)(MF-MARL), Iqbal & Sha (2018)(MAAC) and Jiang & Lu (2018)
 40 explore policy and communication optimizations within the Actor-Critic framework.

41 We here propose the Scholastic-Multi-Actor-Critic method(SMAC), which aims to improve the ability
 42 of the critic. We want to train a more powerful critic, the headmaster critic that enables actors to

43 communicate more efficiently during training. The SMAC learns to control when and how an agent
 44 receives information from others. That is, the access of observations of an agent depends on the
 45 critic. This optional additional term when applied to a group of agents, leads to extra reciprocity and
 46 cooperation. The policy gradient is consistent with prior works presented by Sandholm and Crites
 47 Sandholm & Crites (1996) and Foerster et al. (2018a).

48 Our approach enables high dimensional settings. We deploy experiments on the Coin Game4.1.1, the
 49 Cooperative Treasure Collection4.1.2 and the MAgent(Zheng et al., 2018). Our algorithm leads to
 50 the overall highest average return on these games. All agents using our method achieve the stable
 51 equilibrium with less training resources.

52 2 RELATED WORKS

53 As mentioned above, interactions between agents can either be cooperative, competitive or usually
 54 both. Model-free reinforcement learning algorithms in this domain could be concluded to value-based
 55 methods, policy-based methods and actor-critic methods.

56 MADDPG (Lowe et al., 2017) combines offline and online learning that enhances the ability of
 57 multi-agent learning. It allows the policies to use extra information to ease the training. The critic is
 58 enlarged with extra information about the policies of other agents, while each actor only has access
 59 to local information. Local actors are used at the execution phase after training.

60 COMA(Counterfactual Multi-Agent Policy Gradients) raised by Foerster et al. (2018b) is aimed
 61 to solve multi-agent credit assignment in cooperative settings. Before, each agent trains with his
 62 own critic so that the information sharing between them is insufficient, resulting in poor cooperation
 63 between agents. Therefore, the centralized critic firstly introduced in COMA to give a preliminary
 64 solution to this problem.

65 MF-MARL, the Mean Field Multi-Agent Reinforcement method developed by Yang et al. (2018) try
 66 to model opponents by the use of Mean Field Theory under Q-learning and Actor-Critic methods. It
 67 uses numerical techniques that greatly reduce the cost of modeling opponents.

68 Somewhat like COMA(Foerster et al., 2018b), MAAC (Iqbal & Sha, 2018)(Multi-Actor-Attention-
 69 Critic) considers to make full use of information and takes the attention mechanism within the
 70 centralized critic network. The experiment result shows that as the scale is growing, this method
 71 demonstrates its great effect. However, the requirement of computing is too high. On the other hand,
 72 ATOC (Jiang & Lu, 2018)(Learning Attentional Communication) decides to find a good communica-
 73 tion group for the initiator agents by attention methods, too. Nevertheless, the determination of the
 74 initiator is very vague, and as the decisive role, if the initial selection is not appropriate, the entire
 75 model will collapse.

76 3 METHODS

77 3.1 BACKGROUND

78 3.1.1 STOCHASTIC GAME AND DEEP Q-NETWORKS

79 A multi-agent stochastic game G is formulated by a tuple $G = \langle S, A, P, O, R, n, \gamma \rangle$. S denotes the
 80 state space, the configurations for all agents. Each agent takes $a_i \in A$ at every time step, forming
 81 joint actions $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{A} \equiv A^n$. To choose actions, each agent uses a policy $\pi_{\theta_i} : \mathcal{O}_i \times \mathcal{A}_i$, which
 82 produces the next state according to the state transition function. $P(s'|s, \mathbf{a}) : S \times \mathbf{A} \times S \rightarrow [0, 1]$
 83 denotes transition probabilities of states, and $o_i \in \mathbf{O}$ denotes observations. The reward function
 84 $r^i(s, \mathbf{a}) : S \times \mathbf{A} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ specify rewards and $\gamma \in [0, 1)$ is the discount factor, and for each agent,
 85 $R_t^i = \sum_{l=0}^{\infty} \gamma^l r_{t+l}^i$. Policy gradient methods update an agent’s policy, parameterised by θ^i .

86 Provided and initial state s , the value function of agent i under the joint policy π could be formulated
 87 as:

$$v_{\pi}^j(s) = v^j(s; \pi) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t \mathbb{E}_{\pi, p} \left[r_t^j | s_0 = s, \pi \right] \quad (1)$$

88 We define the Q-function within the framework of N-agent games based on the Bellman equation in
89 (1) such that the Q-function Q_π^i for agent i under policy π could be recursively formulated as

$$Q^\pi(s, a) = \mathbb{E}_{s'} [r(s, a) + \gamma \mathbb{E}_{a' \sim \pi} [Q^\pi(s', a')]] \quad (2)$$

90 , and deep Q-networks learn the action-value function Q^* by minimizing the loss in (3):

$$\mathcal{L}(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{s, a, r, s'} [(Q^*(s, a | \theta) - y)^2], \quad (3)$$

91 and

$$y = r + \gamma \max_{a'} \bar{Q}^*(s', a') \quad (4)$$

92 where \bar{Q}^* is the target Q function and its parameters update periodically with the most recent
93 θ , which stabilize the learning. Besides, the experience replay buffer $D = (s, a, r, s')$ also used
94 to stabilization. However, because agents are independently updating their policies as learning
95 progresses, the environment appears non-stationary from the view of any one agent, violating Markov
96 assumptions required for convergence of Q-learning. Foerster et al. (2017)'s approach point out,
97 another difficulty is that the experience replay buffer cannot be used in such a setting since in general.

98 3.1.2 POLICY GRADIENTS

99 Policy gradient techniques (Sutton et al., 2000) aims to estimate the gradient of an agent's expected
100 returns with respect to the parameters of its policy. This gradient estimate takes the following form as
101 (5):

$$\nabla_\theta J(\pi_\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{a \sim \pi_\theta} \left[\nabla_\theta \log(\pi_\theta(a_t | s_t)) \sum_{t'=t}^{\infty} \gamma^{t'-t} r_{t'}(s_{t'}, a_{t'}) \right] \quad (5)$$

102 3.1.3 ACTOR-CRITIC METHODS

103 The term $\sum_{t'=t}^{\infty} \gamma^{t'-t} r_{t'}(s_{t'}, a_{t'})$ in the policy gradient estimator leads to high variance, as returns
104 can vary drastically between training episodes. The Actor-critic method (Konda & Tsitsiklis, 2000)
105 aims to ameliorate this issue by using a function to approximate the expected returns. Moreover, it
106 replaces the original return term in the policy gradient estimator with this function. Given a state and
107 action, an agent under actor-critic methods learns a function to estimate expected discounted returns
108 as: $Q_\psi(s_t, a_t) = \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t'=t}^{\infty} \gamma^{t'-t} r_{t'}(s_{t'}, a_{t'}) \right]$, it updates by minimizing the regression loss of:

$$\mathcal{L}_Q(\psi) = \mathbb{E}_{s, a, r, s'} [(Q_\psi(s, a) - y)^2] \quad (6)$$

109 where

$$y = r(s, a) + \gamma \mathbb{E}_{a' \sim \pi(s')} [Q_{\bar{\psi}}(s', a')] \quad (7)$$

110 in which $Q_{\bar{\psi}}$ is the target Q-value function. A recent approach (Haarnoja et al., 2018) applies a
111 soft value function by modifying the policy gradient to incorporate an entropy term to encourage
112 exploration and avoid converging to non-optimal deterministic policies. It could be formulated as:

$$\nabla_\theta J(\pi_\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{a \sim \pi_\theta} [\nabla_\theta \log(\pi_\theta(a|s)) (\alpha \log(\pi_\theta(a|s)) - Q_\psi(s, a) + b(s))] \quad (8)$$

113 where $b(s)$ is a state-dependent baseline. The loss function for temporal difference learning is also
114 revised with a new target, that is:

$$y = r(s, a) + \gamma \mathbb{E}_{a' \sim \pi(s')} [Q_{\bar{\psi}}(s', a') - \alpha \log(\pi_\theta(a'|s'))] \quad (9)$$

115 3.2 SCHOLASTIC-ACTOR-CRITIC

116 Our method obeys the same paradigm of training critics centrally and executing learned policies
117 distributedly. That is proposed to overcome the challenge of non-stationary environments. The main
118 idea behind our approach is group discussion, which encourages agents to emulate those better than
119 themselves with high efficiency. We design a more powerful critic, the headmaster critic, to learn
120 how to group agents and determine when to communicate, that has the same effect of the attention
121 mechanism. The additional critic has a global perspective of all agents and focuses on agents with
122 highest and lowest rewards. Accounting for the impacts from opponents, observations and actions
123 incorporate information into the estimation of each agent's value function in the same group.

124 3.2.1 ASSIGNMENT OF GROUPS

125 Expand the setting of MAAC(Iqbal & Sha, 2018), we introduce a headmaster critic to assign
 126 communication groups. The critic randomly selects n collections with random size s and changes
 127 every k epochs. After selecting n collections, we take the average contributions from each group(super
 128 agent, sa), and apply the following loss function:

$$\mathcal{L}_Q(\psi) = \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{E}_{(o,sa,r,o') \sim D} \left[\left(Q_i^\psi(o, sa) - y_i \right)^2 \right] \quad (10)$$

129 where

$$y_i = r_i + \gamma \mathbb{E}_{sa' \sim \pi_{\bar{\theta}}(o')} \left[Q_i^{\bar{\psi}}(o', sa') \right] \quad (11)$$

130 The action-value $Q_i^\psi(o, sa)$ function estimates outcomes in group i from 1 to n , which receives
 131 observations and actions of agents. To avoid the degradation, we set threshold for n as $n/2$ and s as
 132 $s > 1$.

133 3.2.2 CRTICS IN GROUPS

134 Critics within the same group updated together to minimize a joint regression loss function:

$$\mathcal{L}_Q(\psi) = \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{E}_{(o,a,r,o') \sim D} \left[\left(Q_i^\psi(o, a) - y_i \right)^2 \right] \quad (12)$$

135 Note that $Q_i^\psi(o, a)$, the action-value estimate for agent i , receives observations and actions for partial
 136 agents. Where,

$$y_i = r_i + \gamma \mathbb{E}_{a' \sim \pi_{\bar{\theta}}(o')} \left[Q_i^{\bar{\psi}}(o', a') - \alpha \log(\pi_{\bar{\theta}_i}(a'_i | o'_i)) + \Gamma \right] \quad (13)$$

137

$$\Gamma = \omega \log(\pi_{\bar{\theta}_i}(a'_i | o'_{others})) + \sigma \log(\pi_{\bar{\theta}_i}(a'_i | o'_{others})) \quad (14)$$

138 in which ψ and θ are the parameters of the target critics and target policies, respectively.

139 3.2.3 AGENTS IN GROUPS

140 To calculate the Q-value function $Q_i^\psi(o, a)$ for agent i , the critic receives the observations $o =$
 141 (o_1, \dots, o_N) and actions $a = (a_1, \dots, a_N)$ for all agents in a group. Then other agents' contributions
 142 could be formulated as 15. where g_i is a two-layer MLP(multi-layer perceptron) embedding function
 143 and f_i is a softmax function. It could be formulated as:

$$Q_i^\psi(o, a) = f_i(g_i(o_i, a_i)) \quad (15)$$

144 As shown in Foerster et al. (2018b), an advantage function using a baseline that only marginalizes out
 145 the actions of the given agent from Q . It helps in credit assigning. In other words, by comparing the
 146 value of specific actions to an average action, an agent could learn whether the action he made would
 147 cause an increase in expected return. Thus the individual policies are updated with the following
 148 gradient:

$$\nabla_{\theta_i} J(\pi_{\theta}) = \mathbb{E}_{a \sim \pi_{\theta}} \left[\nabla_{\theta_i} \log(\pi_{\theta_i}(a_i | o_i)) \left(\alpha \log(\pi_{\theta_i}(a_i | o_i)) - Q_i^\psi(o, a) + b(o, a_{others}) \right) \right] \quad (16)$$

$$A_i(o, a) = Q_i^\psi(o, a) - b(o, a_{others}) \quad (17)$$

$$b(o, a_{others}) = \mathbb{E}_{a_i \sim \pi_i(o_i)} \left[Q_i^\psi(o, (a_i, a_{others})) \right]$$

149 $b(o, a)$ is the multi-agent baseline that used to calculate the advantage function.

150 We implement a more general and flexible form of a multi-agent baseline. We do not apply a global
151 reward, but naturally decompose an agent’s encoding observations and the average of encodings of
152 other agents.

$$\mathbb{E}_{a_i \sim \pi_i(o_i)} \left[Q_i^\psi(o, (a_i, a_{others})) \right] = \sum_{a'_i \in A_i} \pi(a'_i | o_i) Q_i(o, (a'_i, a_{others})) \quad (18)$$

153 As shown above, we output the value for every action and add an observation-encoder as $E_i = g_i(o_i)$.
154 For each agent, using these encodings in place of the $E_i = g_i(o_i, a_i)$ described above, and modify f_i
155 such that it outputs a value for each possible action. We can estimate the expectation by sampling
156 actions from our policy and averaging their Q-values. So we do not need to add any parameters in the
157 case of continuous policies.

158 4 EXPERIMENTS

159 4.1 SETUP

160 We operate our algorithms in various settings, including the Coin Game 4.1.1, Cooperative Treasure
161 Collection(CTC) (Lerer & Peysakhovich, 2017) 4.1.2 and MAgent(Zheng et al., 2018) (a cooperative-
162 competitive battle game in the Open-source MAgent system) that tests capabilities of our approach
163 and baselines. The three games we raised, from simple to complex, are all facing iterated prisoners
164 dilemmas(Luce & Raiffa, 1958). For each setting, we study the scalability of different methods as the
165 number of agents grows and evaluate their ability to attend to information relevant to rewards.

166 4.1.1 COIN GAME

167 The Coin Game is a higher dimensional alternative of IPD (iterated prisoners dilemma), which
168 is convenient to make comparisons to previous works. As shown in 1, two agents with red and
169 blue colors are tasked to collect coins which are either red or blue on the grids. A new coin with
170 random color appears randomly after the last one is picked up. Agents move to a coin’s position and
171 both receive a point after picking it up while the agent with a different color loses 2 points. When
172 they only pick up coins with their own color, the total return is maximized. While players usually
173 pick up different ones. Therefore the maximum achievable collective return is approximately 50 in
174 expectation if neither agent chooses to defect and both agents collect all coins of their own color. In
175 this game we define niceness as $n(s_t, a_t)$ to be part of the measurement. If an agent takes action a_t^i ,
176 picks up a coin which penalizes the other players, $n(s_t, a_t) = -1$. We use recent defections as the
177 measure of niceness $N(T) = \sum_{i=1}^t \lambda^{t-i} n(s_i, a_i)$ at time T .

178 4.1.2 COOPERATIVE TREASURE COLLECTION

179 Cooperative Treasure Collection(CTC), as shown in 1, is a variant of Coin Game in which agents
180 play roles as hunter or bank. ”Hunter”s are tasked to collect the treasure of any color and deposit
181 them into the corresponding colored bank. The ”Bank”s are tasked to gather as much treasure as
182 possible from the ”Hunter”s simply. Agents could see each others’ positions and concern their own.
183 ”Hunter”s receive a global reward for the successful collection of treasure, and all agents receive a
184 global reward of the depositing amount. ”Hunter”s will additionally penalized for colliding with each
185 other. As such, the task contains a mixture of shared and individual rewards. It requires different
186 ”modes of attention” which depends on the agent’s state and other agents’ potential actions that affects
187 its rewards.

188 4.1.3 MAGENT

189 The mixed cooperative-competitive battle game, MAgent(Zheng et al., 2018), is a more complex
190 multi-player environment. Agents are divided into armies, and required to take a series of actions
191 while exact discounted reward cannot be assessed. Each army consists of homogeneous agents, and
192 the goal of them is to get more rewards by collaborating with teammates to defeat all opponents.




Figure 1: The Coin Game and the Cooperative Treasure Collection Game

Table 1: The average rewards compared to other methods with growing of the scale in the convergent training stages.

| Game | Agents | MADDPG+SAC | MARL | MAAC | ATOC | Ours(SMAC) |
|--------|--------|------------|------|------|------|------------|
| CTC | 8 | -3.9 | 3.4 | -4.7 | 3.1 | 2.8 |
| | 16 | 17.6 | 11.7 | 0.8 | 1.5 | 3.4 |
| | 32 | 32.1 | 14.8 | 10.1 | 13.0 | 13.2 |
| | 64 | 41.2 | 18.9 | 23.3 | 24.2 | 24.5 |
| | 128 | 77.3 | 29.5 | 64.1 | 65.8 | 78.1 |
| MAgent | 8 | - | 3.4 | 4.9 | -2.7 | 0.8 |
| | 16 | - | 14.7 | 27.9 | 26.5 | 27.0 |
| | 32 | - | 32.5 | 29.5 | 28.6 | 30.7 |
| | 64 | - | 34.8 | 35.4 | 39.1 | 41.5 |
| | 128 | - | 35.6 | 56.1 | 40.6 | 57.7 |

*Note that the number of agents for each group in MAgent is half of the total. And all values are normalized into 0 to 100.

193 Agents can take actions to either move to or attack others on nearby grids. Ideally, the agents are able
 194 to learn skills such as chasing to hunt, escaping from enemies or working with teammates.

195 4.2 BASELINES

196 We have compared our method to recently proposed state-of-art methods in the multi-agent learning
 197 field: (1)DDPG(Lillicrap et al., 2015), (2)MADDPG(Lowe et al., 2017), (3)MF-MARL(Yang et al.,
 198 2018), (4)MAAC(Iqbal & Sha, 2018) (5)ATOC(Jiang & Lu, 2018).

199 As mentioned in MAAC(Iqbal & Sha, 2018), we do some modifications on some algorithms for exper-
 200 iments. Since deterministic policies are not possible, we use the Gumbel-Softmax reparametrization
 201 trick for learning in discrete action spaces for both MADDPG(Lowe et al., 2017) and DDPG(Lillicrap
 202 et al., 2015). The modified versions are referred to as MADDPG (Discrete) and DDPG (Discrete).
 203 For a detailed description of this reparametrization, we use a soft actor-critic method (Haarnoja et al.,
 204 2018) to optimize. We implement MADDPG with Soft Actor-Critic, named as MADDPG+SAC. Then
 205 the baselines are (1)DDPG (Discrete) (2)MADDPG (Discrete) (3)MADDPG+SAC (4)MF-MARL
 206 (5)ATOC.

207 Hyperparameters are tuned based on performance and kept constant across all variants of critic
 208 architectures. All methods are re-implemented such that their approximate total number of parameters
 209 (across agents) is close to our approach. These models are trained with eight random seeds each.




Figure 2: Results of our methods and others. In Coin Game(a) and CTC(b), methods involve DDPG(Discrete)4.2, MADDPG(Discrete)4.2, MAAC(Iqbal & Sha (2018)), MF-MARL(Iqbal & Sha (2018)) and ATOC(Jiang & Lu, 2018). In MAgent(c)(Zheng et al., 2018), we compare our method to MF-MARLYang et al. (2018), MAACIqbal & Sha (2018) and ATOC(Jiang & Lu, 2018).

210 4.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

211 We first compare the average rewards attained by all approaches. We normalized by the range
 212 of awards achieved in an environment, as the number of agents changes. The proposed approach
 213 (SMAC) is competitive with other state-of-the-art approaches as shown in 4.3. In the Coin Game,
 214 most algorithms show a pleasing result while the MARL method shows less poorly performance.
 215 MAAC is competitive with our approach in both the Coin Game and the CTC environment. On the
 216 other hand, DDPG(Discrete), MADDPG (Discrete), MADDPG+SAC and MARL don't perform well
 217 on CTC. We infer that due to the simplicity of action modes and the limited scale of agents, it's not
 218 hard for agents to learn tricks. Moreover, each agent's local observation provides enough information
 219 to make a decent prediction of its expected rewards.

220 However, agents within MAgent(Zheng et al., 2018) dynamics over time so that it's not capable for
 221 DDPG(Discrete), MADDPG (Discrete), MADDPG+SAC break down. Thus we compare our method
 222 to MF-MARL(mean field-MARL, Yang et al. (2018)), MAAC(Iqbal & Sha (2018)) and ATOC(Jiang
 223 & Lu, 2018). For all methods, rewards firstly are under zero, but along with the process of training,
 224 the reward gradually grows and finally stop in different levels. In this game, subgroups of agents
 225 are interacting and performing coordinated tasks with separate rewards while the components are

226 changing over time. Thus it exemplifies why dynamic attention can be beneficial. MAAC(Iqbal &
227 Sha (2018) and ATOC(Jiang & Lu, 2018) take more iterations to reach a stationary state.

228 Further, we explore the improvements with growing scale as shown in Table 1. DDPG(Discrete)
229 and MADDPG(Discrete) could not handle a high dimensional learning. MADDPG with SAC and
230 MF-MARL(mean field-MARL, Yang et al. (2018) are barely satisfactory. But MAAC(Iqbal & Sha
231 (2018)), ATOC(Jiang & Lu, 2018) and SMAC(ours) steadily performs when the number of agents
232 increases. In future research, we will continue to improve the scalability when the number of agents
233 further increases by sharing policies among agents and performing attention on sub-groups (of agents).
234 We anticipate that in complicated scenarios, our method could work well.

235 5 CONCLUSIONS

236 We propose an algorithm, the SMAC(Scholastic-Actor-Critic) for training decentralized policies
237 in multi-agent settings. We design a more powerful critic, the headmaster critic to learn how to
238 group agents and when to communicate besides conventional ones. We also adapt useful advantage
239 functions that avoid converging to non-optimal deterministic policies. We analyze the performance
240 of the proposed approach compared the state-of-the-art methods on the Coin Game, CTC(Lerer &
241 Peysakhovich, 2017), and MAgent(Zheng et al., 2018), concerning the number of agents. Thanks to
242 the flexible setting, our results are promising in dynamic occasions with small training expenses. We
243 intend to explore more to highly complex and dynamic environments.

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