

A NOVEL QUERY-DRIVEN MULTI-STAGE ALTERNATING FEATURE EXTRACTION AND INTERACTION NETWORK FOR IMAGE MANIPULATION LOCALIZATION

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ABSTRACT

013 Image Manipulation Localization (IML) aims to identify and localize the tampered regions within edited images. Many studies employ a dual-branch backbone
 014 to extract tampering features from dual modalities, followed by feature fusion at
 015 the final stage. In this process, the extraction and fusion of dual-modality fea-
 016 tures is relatively independent, which fails to fully leverage the complementarity
 017 between different modalities and thus diminishes sensitivity to tampering arti-
 018 facts. Inspired by the way humans continuously integrate multi-faceted knowl-
 019 edge to understand the world, we propose QMA-Net, which contains a novel
 020 Multi-stage Alternating Feature Extraction and Interaction architecture. At each
 021 stage, we deeply explore the intrinsic relationships and mappings between dif-
 022 ferent modality features. Feature extraction and interaction are performed alter-
 023 nately, constructing complementary dual-modality tampering feature represen-
 024 tations and enhancing sensitivity to tampering artifacts. Additionally, we introduce
 025 a lightweight, Query-driven Multi-level Feature Decoding. This mechanism pro-
 026 gressively aggregates key information from multi-level dual-modality tampering
 027 features through multiple sets of learnable tamper-aware queries, effectively fil-
 028 tering out irrelevant features. Finally, multi-level queries are used to refine dis-
 029 criminative features, enabling precise localization of tampered regions. Extensive
 030 experiments demonstrate that our framework outperforms current state-of-the-art
 031 models in localization accuracy and robustness across multiple public datasets,
 032 achieving a favorable balance between performance and efficiency.

1 INTRODUCTION

037 The widespread use of digital image tampering techniques poses a severe challenge to societal trust
 038 systems. Tampered images are often used to create fake news, forge evidence, or commit fraud,
 039 posing serious threats to personal privacy, social order, and even national security. IML has become
 040 a critical technological barrier for maintaining information authenticity.

041 Most existing IML frameworks (Zhu et al., 2025)(Zeng et al., 2024)(Guo et al., 2024)(Lin et al.,
 042 2023) typically adopt a dual-branch structure, where one branch extracts features from the RGB
 043 modality, and the other extracts features from noise or high-frequency modality, working together
 044 to locate tampered regions. These frameworks often follow the classical paradigm of “extraction
 045 → simple fusion”. This paradigm suffers from severe modality isolation and information fragmen-
 046 tation, which results in a lack or insufficiency of interaction among features at early and inter-
 047 mediate levels. For example, the RGB modality focuses on semantic boundaries but cannot perceive
 048 local statistical anomalies present in the noise modality; conversely, the noise modality is sensi-
 049 tive to compression artifacts but lacks high-level semantic guidance, often misclassifying highly
 050 textured regions (e.g., leaves) as tampered. Therefore, we hope to design a comprehensive bidi-
 051 rectional inter-modal interaction mechanism to construct complementary dual-modality tampering
 052 feature representations, thereby enhancing the sensitivity of dual-modality features to tampering arti-
 053 facts. Through experiments, we visualize the features output by the backbone under both classical
 054 paradigms (Columns 5 and 6) and our methods (Columns 3 and 4) in Fig 1. It can be observed that
 055 dual-modality features under our methods exhibit higher sensitivity to tampered regions.




Figure 1: Ours vs. Classical. Grad-CAM visualizations of backbone output features under different paradigms. The redder the color of the region, the greater its contribution to the model’s prediction results. ”HF” denotes the high-frequency noise modality.

Current multi-level feature decoding methods often employ upsampling combined with convolution or MLP (Zhuang et al., 2021)(Ma et al., 2023), which indiscriminately aggregate a large amount of irrelevant background information and noise, severely overwhelming subtle tampering features. Moreover, fixed or simple decoding strategies struggle to adaptively balance the contributions of features from different levels and modalities, preventing effective collaboration between shallow fine-grained textures and deep semantic context, and thus degrading localization accuracy. In addition, computationally intensive decoding hinders their deployment in resource-constrained scenarios. Therefore, we decide to design the decoding mechanism of our framework to be lightweight and capable of effectively screening and aggregating critical information from multi-level features.

Recent studies have introduced multimodal large models into the task of IML Yin et al. (2024)(Zhang et al., 2024)(Su et al., 2024)(Kwon et al., 2025), using them as a backbone to extract general features. While this approach enables the extraction of more comprehensive tampering features, it also introduces a large amount of irrelevant information (Zhang et al., 2025a). Without sufficient feature selection, this can easily lead to counterproductive results. Moreover, multimodal large models have more critical limitations, including the need for substantial computational resources and slower inference speed, making deployment on mobile devices challenging. Our model aims to incorporate as few additional parameters as possible based on a relatively lightweight backbone, achieving a favorable balance between performance and efficiency.

Motivated by the above observations, we propose QMA-Net, which contains a Multi-stage Alternating Feature Extraction and Interaction architecture and a lightweight, Query-driven Multi-level Feature Decoding. The former is inspired by the human cognitive process of repeatedly examining complex objects from multiple perspectives to gain a deep understanding. At each stage, feature extraction and deep interaction are not isolated but performed alternately and mutually reinforced. Through specially designed cross-modal Feature Alignment and Dual-modal Feature Cross-guided Module, the network bidirectionally and deeply explores previously underutilized intrinsic relationships and mappings between RGB and noise modality features at every stage. This process essentially enables both modalities to perform bidirectional retrieval and attention across multiple levels, perceiving important relevant points within each modality while suppressing irrelevant noise. To allow such interaction to propagate across levels, the interacted features are fed back into the

108 backbone to extract the next-level features. In this way, we successfully construct complementary
 109 dual-modality tampering feature representations, significantly enhancing sensitivity to tampering
 110 artifacts. Furthermore, we innovatively introduce a lightweight decoding mechanism. By incorpo-
 111 rating multiple sets of learnable, dedicated tamper-aware query vectors, these queries act as “fusion
 112 controller” for each feature level. At each stage, through a carefully designed Multi-domain Feature
 113 Aggregation Module, the queries progressively and selectively extract and condense the most criti-
 114 cal information from dual-modality features while filtering out irrelevant interference. This process
 115 effectively simulates a coarse-to-fine, stepwise focusing decision procedure: shallow-level queries
 116 target potential anomalous regions, whereas deep-level queries associate global context to verify
 117 and refine localization results. Finally, the multi-level dual-modality features and their correspond-
 118 ing queries are fed into a Query-driven Multi-level Feature Decoder to localize the tampered regions.
 119 Such a dynamic, decision-level fusion strategy substantially improves localization accuracy.
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In summary, our main contributions are as follows:

- 121 • We introduce a novel framework, QMA-Net, which contains a Multi-stage Alternating
 122 Feature Extraction and Interaction architecture. Feature extraction and interaction are
 123 performed alternately. At each stage, cross-modal Feature Alignment and Dual-modal
 124 Feature Cross-guided Module are employed to deeply explore intrinsic relationships and
 125 mappings between different modality features. This approach constructs complementary
 126 dual-modality tampering feature representations and significantly enhances sensitivity to
 127 tampering artifacts.
- 128 • We propose a lightweight, Query-driven Multi-level Feature Decoding. We introduce mul-
 129 tiple sets of learnable tamper-aware queries, which progressively aggregate key information
 130 from dual-modality tampering features at each stage through a Multi-domain Feature Ag-
 131 gregation Module, while filtering out irrelevant features. In the Query-driven Multi-level
 132 Feature Decoder, these queries act as “fusion controllers”, performing decision-level selec-
 133 tion and fusion of dual-modality features at each level, substantially improving localization
 134 accuracy.
- 135 • Extensive experiments demonstrate that our framework outperforms existing state-of-the-
 136 art models in both localization accuracy and robustness across multiple public datasets.
 137 Moreover, our framework has a relatively small number of parameters and low computa-
 138 tional requirements, making it more suitable for practical applications.

140 2 RELATED WORKS

141 2.1 IMAGE MANIPULATION LOCALIZATION

142 Traditional IML methods mainly rely on hand-crafted extractors (Ferrara et al., 2012)(Ye et al.,
 143 2007)(Tralic et al., 2012)(Kong et al., 2025) to capture anomalies caused by tampering operations.
 144 For example, Pasquale et al. utilize CFA (Ferrara et al., 2012) pattern inconsistencies to detect forged
 145 regions. However, they rely on the assumption that specific tampering operations always leave par-
 146 ticular traces. When this assumption is not valid, their performance deteriorates significantly. With
 147 the development of computational power, deep learning has achieved remarkable progress in the field
 148 of IML (Cozzolino & Verdoliva, 2020)(Bappy et al., 2019)(Hao et al., 2021)(Hu et al., 2020). Wu
 149 et al. propose ManTra-Net(Wu et al., 2019), which formulates IML as an anomaly detection prob-
 150 lem by modeling 385 manipulation types with Z-score and auxiliary features. Liu et al. introduce
 151 PSCC-Net(Liu et al., 2022), which leverages HRNet(Wang et al., 2021) to learn multi-scale fea-
 152 tures and employs SCCM to capture spatial–channel correlations for progressive mask generation.
 153 ObjectFormer (Wang et al., 2022) employs CNN layers to extract local features and then leverages
 154 transformer encoders for global modeling. However, they still exhibit limitations in generalization
 155 capability and robustness. In the latest studies, researchers have begun exploring multimodal large
 156 models (MLM) in IML to improve generalization and interpretability. For instance, FakeShield
 157 (Xu et al., 2025) utilizes MLM by integrating visual features with linguistic instructions, enabling
 158 instruction-driven forgery localization and interpretable outputs. IMDPrompter (Zhang et al., 2025b)
 159 leverages a Cross-view Prompt Learning paradigm built upon SAM(Kirillov et al., 2023) to achieve
 160 robust localization. Nevertheless, these approaches often come with higher computational demands,
 161 slower inference speed, and introduce irrelevant features.

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2.2 CLASSICAL PARADIGM OF FEATURE EXTRACTION AND FUSION IN IML

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The dual-branch architecture that separately extracts RGB features and high-frequency modality features has become a classic paradigm for IML. This paradigm typically adopts a sequential feature extraction and simple fusion strategy. For example, MVSS-Net (Dong et al., 2023) performs feature extraction and fusion in an independent manner, where only the deepest features from ResNet (He et al., 2016) are used for fusion, while shallow features are largely ignored. Such a design limits the model’s ability to capture fine-grained cues and hinders comprehensive representation learning. (Mazumdar & Bora, 2022) propose the two-stream encoder-decoder network, where two branches independently perform encoding and decoding without cross-branch interaction, thus limiting complementary feature learning. (Niu et al., 2024) propose an end-to-end IML network that fuses RGB and noise features at each level using FAM, but without feeding the fused features back to the backbone, which restricts the transmission of fusion information across levels. In summary, such approaches lead to suboptimal representation learning.

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2.3 QUERY-BASED FEATURE AGGREGATION

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Query-based architectures have recently emerged as a powerful paradigm for feature selection in computer vision. The fundamental principle lies in introducing learnable queries that interact with image features through attention mechanisms, thereby steering the network toward task-relevant regions. For example, Mask2Former (Cheng et al., 2022) employs masked cross-attention to refine queries, restricting attention to predicted mask regions and thereby improving segmentation precision. ECENet (Liu et al., 2023) further generates object queries directly from predicted masks, ensuring that each query is semantically explicit and corresponds to a distinct object region. In SAM (Kirillov et al., 2023), output tokens serve as queries that guide image embeddings and prompt embeddings for segmentation. These methods demonstrate the outstanding potential of learnable queries in feature selection and aggregation.

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3 METHODOLOGY

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3.1 OVERALL FRAMEWORK OF QMA-NET

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We propose an IML framework, QMA-Net (as shown in Fig 2), which emulates human learning mechanisms to acquire feature representations sensitive to tampering artifacts. It is primarily composed of two key components: a Multi-stage Alternating Feature Extraction and Interaction, and a Query-driven Multi-level Feature Decoding. The former employs both the RGB view X_{img} and a high-frequency noise view X_{noise} processed by a Multi-domain Noise-sensitive Fusion Module (MNFM) as inputs. The interrelationships between diverse modal features are extensively explored at each stage via a cross-modal Feature Alignment and Dual-modal Feature Cross-guided Module (DFCM). The enhanced features are subsequently fed into the corresponding backbone for next-level feature extraction. This process facilitates the construction of complementary dual-modal feature representations $\{R_1 \sim R_4, N_1 \sim N_4\}$, thereby improving sensitivity to tampering artifacts. The latter employs a set of learnable tamper-aware queries Q_{tag} as input. At each stage, key information from dual-modal tampering features is progressively integrated through a Multi-domain Feature Aggregation Module (MFAM), while irrelevant features are filtered out, resulting in multi-level query embeddings $\{Q_1 \sim Q_4\}$. Finally, the dual-modal features and their corresponding query embeddings at each level form a triplet, which is fed into the Query-driven Multi-level Feature Decoder (QMFD) for decoding, enabling precise localization of tampered regions.

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3.2 MULTI-STAGE ALTERNATING FEATURE EXTRACTION AND INTERACTION

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Previous methods (Zeng et al., 2024)(Guo et al., 2024) employ a simple approach for feature extraction and fusion. These methods fail to achieve sufficient feature interaction and do not effectively leverage the complementarity between dual-modal features. Accordingly, we propose a Multi-stage Alternating Feature Extraction and Interaction. It follows a continuously “extract→interact→extract→interact” paradigm, where feature extraction and interaction are performed alternately. SegFormer (Xie et al., 2021) is selected to serve as both the Global and Local Artifact Extractors (GAE and LAE) in the network, and the architecture is manually divided into




Figure 2: The pipeline of QMA-Net. Given an RGB view X_{img} and a high-frequency noise view X_{noise} , they are first processed by the Multi-stage Alternating Feature Extraction and Interaction architecture to generate multi-level complementary feature representations $\{R_1 \sim R_4, N_1 \sim N_4\}$. Subsequently, a set of learnable tamper-aware queries Q_{tag} progressively aggregates cross-modal information through the MFAM. Finally, the tampering features and query embeddings from all levels are fed into the QMFD to localize tampered regions M_{loc} .

four blocks based on its structural design. The overall network utilizes both the RGB modality $X_{img} \in \mathbb{R}^{3 \times H \times W}$ and the high-frequency noise modality $X_{noise} \in \mathbb{R}^{3 \times H \times W}$ processed by the MNFM as input. The MNFM comprises SRM (Zhou et al., 2018), BayarConv (Bayar & Stamm, 2018), and NoisePrint++ (Guillaro et al., 2023), along with a fusion convolution, to aggregate features including local statistical anomalies, pixel-wise anomaly correlations, and device source noise.

Subsequently, the details of the Multi-stage Alternating Feature Extraction and Interaction are elaborated. At each stage, the dual-modal features ($R_i, N_i, i = 0, 1, 2, 3$) from the previous level (where the initial input is regarded as level 0) are fed into the feature extraction blocks of the corresponding backbone networks, producing initial features for the next level ($R_{i+1}^{init}, N_{i+1}^{init}$):

$$R_{i+1}^{init} = GAE_{i+1}(R_i) \quad N_{i+1}^{init} = LAE_{i+1}(N_i) \quad (1)$$

The R_{i+1}^{init} are aligned with the noise modality. Both sets of features are then fed into the DFCM for deep interaction (as illustrated in Fig 2):

$$(R_{i+1}, N_{i+1}) = DFCM_{i+1}(\delta(R_{i+1}^{init}), N_{i+1}^{init}) \quad (2)$$

Where δ represents cross-modal Feature Alignment. The overall structure of the DFCM is symmetrically designed. First, the dual-modal features undergo lightweight channel attention for feature recalibration Γ . Channel-wise aggregation of the features is performed via adaptive average pooling, followed by the acquisition of channel weights through a projection head. The input features are then multiplied by these channel weights to obtain the recalibrated feature representation ($R_{i+1}^{mid}, N_{i+1}^{mid}$):

$$R_{i+1}^{mid} = \Gamma_{i+1}^R(\delta(R_{i+1}^{init})) \quad N_{i+1}^{mid} = \Gamma_{i+1}^N(N_{i+1}^{init}) \quad (3)$$

Subsequently, cross-attention is performed between the two modal features. Each modality serves as the query Q while the other provides the key-value pair (K, V), enabling bidirectional retrieval of intrinsic relationships and valuable information from the modalities. This mechanism enhances both the complementarity of the dual-modal features and their sensitivity to tampering artifacts. In contrast to classical cross-attention approaches, Group Convolution Modules (GCM) (Krizhevsky et al., 2012) are utilized as the transformation matrices for Q, K , and V , instead of applying simple

linear transformations to the features prior to performing attention. This design not only reduces parameter and computational costs but also enables the capture of diverse feature patterns, similar to multi-head attention. It provides a unified representation space for features originating from different modalities, allowing cross-attention to compute inter-feature correlations more effectively. Finally, the output is generated by combining the result of the cross-attention with a residual connection of the original features, ensuring that the original information remains preserved:

$$\begin{aligned} R_{i+1} &= R_{i+1}^{init} + \text{Attn}_{N \leftarrow R}(G(R_{i+1}^{mid}), G(N_{i+1}^{mid}), G(N_{i+1}^{mid})) \\ N_{i+1} &= N_{i+1}^{init} + \text{Attn}_{R \leftarrow N}(G(N_{i+1}^{mid}), G(R_{i+1}^{mid}), G(R_{i+1}^{mid})) \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

After being aligned back to the original feature space, the RGB modality features, together with the noise modality features, are returned to the corresponding backbone for the extraction of features at the next level.

3.3 QUERY-DRIVEN MULTI-LEVEL FEATURE DECODING MECHANISM

Existing approaches typically integrate upsampling with convolution or MLP. However, this strategy fails to pre-screen features, indiscriminately introducing substantial irrelevant background information and noise into the decoder. Consequently, subtle tampering features are severely overwhelmed. Inspired by the mechanism of the SAM Mask Decoder (Kirillov et al., 2023), we propose a lightweight, Query-driven Multi-level Feature Decoding. Specifically, a set of learnable tamper-aware queries $Q_{tag} \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times dim}$ is initialized at the beginning of the framework. These queries are subsequently utilized to generate corresponding query embeddings for each level of features. At each stage, the queries, together with the enhanced dual-modal features, are fed into the MFAM to be updated and generate the corresponding query embeddings $Q_i, i = 1, 2, 3, 4$:

$$Q_i = \text{MFAM}(Q_i^{init}, R_i, N_i) \quad (5)$$

Where Q_i^{init} represents the initial state of the i -th level queries. The MFAM consists of three transformer blocks (Vaswani et al., 2017) (as shown in Fig. 2). The first two perform cross-attention, enabling the queries to establish richer and more robust cross-modal representations from both modalities while filtering out irrelevant features. The third block employs multi-head self-attention to further refine and integrate the information it has learned, thereby producing a final representation that is more semantically coherent and contextually enriched. Subsequently, the query embeddings Q_i are passed through an MLP layer to generate the queries Q_{i+1}^{init} for the next level, repeating the aforementioned process. The query embeddings at each level accumulate aggregated information from all preceding stages. This process is formulated as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} Q_i &= \text{Trans}_{R \leftarrow Q}(Q_i^{init}, R_i, N_i) \\ Q_i &= \text{Trans}_{N \leftarrow Q}(Q_i, N_i, Q_i) \\ Q_i &= \text{Trans}_{Q \leftarrow Q}(Q_i, Q_i, Q_i) \\ Q_{i+1}^{init} &= \text{MLP}(Q_i) \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

Then, the dual-modal features and their corresponding query embeddings from all levels are grouped into four triplets (Q_i, R_i, N_i) and fed into the QMFD. Its internal architecture is illustrated in the appendix. Within the decoder, the RGB modality features and noise modality features from the same level are fed into a Dilated Convolution Module (DCM) Wang et al. (2018), leveraging its large receptive field to achieve preliminary fusion. The fused features $\{F_1^{fin} \sim F_4^{fin}\}$ are then multiplied with the corresponding query embeddings via matrix multiplication. This step is designed to perform feature selection. Finally, the features from all levels are upsampled to a common resolution and fed into the prediction head to output the final localization mask $M_{loc} \in \mathbb{R}^{1 \times H \times W}$:

$$M_{loc} = \text{PredictHead}(\text{ConCat}(Q_i \otimes F_i^{fin}, i = 1, 2, 3, 4)) \quad (7)$$

3.4 LOSS FUNCTION DESIGN

To enable the network to focus more on the edges of tampered areas, the RGB modality features output at each stage are fed into an Edge Supervision Module to predict the boundaries of tampered regions, thereby constructing an edge loss $Loss_{edg}$. The predicted mask output from the decoder is

324 used to construct the segmentation loss $Loss_{seg}$. Considering the extreme imbalance between tam-
 325 pered and authentic pixels, Dice Loss (Milletari et al., 2016) is employed to compute both $Loss_{edg}$
 326 and $Loss_{seg}$. The total loss $Loss_{total}$ of the model is formulated as follows, where, based on empirical
 327 practice, α is set to 0.2 and β to 0.8.

$$328 \quad Loss_{total} = \alpha Loss_{seg} + \beta Loss_{edg} \quad (8)$$

331 4 EXPERIMENT

332 4.1 EXPERIMENT SETUP

335 **Training Dataset and Implementation Details** Our model is trained on the standardized
 336 Protocol-CAT dataset (Kwon et al., 2021), which consists of CASIAv2 (Dong et al., 2013),
 337 IMD2020 (Novozamsky et al., 2020), FantasticReality (Kniaz et al., 2019), and TampCOCO Kwon
 338 et al. (2022), totaling 825,997 images. These images cover multiple tampering types, such as splicing,
 339 copy-move, and removal. Each image is resized to 512×512 for training input. The model
 340 is trained for 150 epochs with a batch size of 32. We adopt a cosine decay learning rate schedule,
 341 initialized at 1e-4 and gradually reduced to a minimum of 5e-7. The AdamW optimizer is em-
 342 ployed with a weight decay of 0.05 to mitigate overfitting. All models are trained and evaluated on
 343 IMDBenco (Ma et al., 2024).

344 **Test Dataset and Evaluation Metric** The evaluation of our model is conducted on a series of
 345 public benchmarks, encompassing four widely adopted datasets: CASIAv1 (Dong et al., 2013),
 346 Coverage (Wen et al., 2016), NIST16 (Guan et al., 2019), Columbia (Hsu & Chang, 2006). These
 347 collections comprise images that exhibit a wide range of resolutions and incorporate diverse tam-
 348 pering strategies. To quantitatively assess the model’s performance in IML, we employ the pixel-level
 349 F1 and AUC score as the primary evaluation metrics.


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 351 Table 1: Comparison of Pixel-level F1 and AUC across four datasets. Best results are **bold**, second-
 352 best are underlined.

354 Method	355 Pixel-level F1					356 Pixel-level AUC				
	CAS	COI	COV	NIST	AVG	CAS	COI	COV	NIST	AVG
356 ManTra-Net	0.327	0.462	0.196	0.193	0.295	0.643	0.724	0.566	0.709	0.661
357 PSCC-Net	0.578	0.822	0.341	0.416	0.539	0.918	0.919	0.872	0.810	0.880
358 MVSS-Net	0.583	0.723	0.470	0.320	0.524	0.904	0.911	0.868	0.777	0.865
359 CAT-Net	0.778	0.923	0.485	0.450	0.659	0.965	0.962	0.907	0.867	0.925
360 TruFor	0.700	0.903	0.379	0.426	0.602	0.951	0.936	0.887	0.863	0.909
361 IML-ViT	0.751	<u>0.927</u>	<u>0.546</u>	0.140	0.591	0.961	0.941	<u>0.921</u>	0.812	0.909
362 SAM	0.627	0.817	0.401	0.509	0.589	0.945	0.973	0.886	<u>0.876</u>	0.920
363 Mesorch	<u>0.826</u>	0.905	0.526	0.412	<u>0.667</u>	<u>0.979</u>	0.924	0.917	0.891	0.928
364 QMA-Net(Ours)	0.873	0.939	0.659	<u>0.480</u>	0.738	0.985	<u>0.943</u>	0.931	0.860	0.930

366 4.2 PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART

368 We adopt ManTra-Net (Wu et al., 2019), PSCC-Net (Liu et al., 2022), CAT-Net (Kwon et al. (2022)),
 369 MVSS-Net (Dong et al., 2023), TruFor (Guillaro et al., 2023), IML-ViT (Ma et al., 2023), SAM, and
 370 Mesorch (Zhu et al., 2025) as baseline methods for comparison. For fairness, all baseline models are
 371 retrained on the Protocol-CAT dataset. The corresponding experimental results are reported in Table
 372 1. As shown in the table, QMA-Net consistently surpasses the existing state-of-the-art methods in
 373 IML across the four benchmark datasets. In addition, Fig. 3 illustrates a qualitative comparison of
 374 the predicted results from our model and the competing approaches. It can be clearly observed that
 375 our framework delineates the boundaries of manipulated regions more accurately, leading to fewer
 376 false alarms and higher precision. This fact demonstrates that our framework successfully con-
 377 struct complementary dual-modal representations sensitive to tampering and accurately localizes
 378 the tampered regions.

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380 Figure 3: IML results on multiple datasets. The leftmost two columns are the manipulated image
and groundtruth, followed by the prediction results of different models.

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
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402 Figure 4: Robustness test results. The x-axis represents the attack intensity, while the y-axis denotes
403 the pixel-level F1 score on the corresponding test datasets.

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432 4.3 ROBUSTNESS STUDY
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434 To assess the robustness of the model against different attack scenarios, we apply degradation operations—including Gaussian noise, Gaussian blur, and JPEG compression—to the tampered images.
 435 The corresponding results are depicted in Fig. 4. Our framework consistently surpasses other SoTA
 436 approaches on the CASIA, Coverage, and NIST16 datasets across all attack types. For the Columbia,
 437 our method achieves superior performance under Gaussian blur and is only marginally outperformed
 438 by CAT-Net under the other two degradations. These findings collectively demonstrate the strong
 439 robustness of our model.
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441 4.4 ABLATION STUDY
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444 Table 2: Ablation Study Results. We conduct five additional sets of experiments to validate the
 445 effectiveness of the proposed components.

447 Method	448 Setting	449 Pixel-level F1 Score				
		450 CAS	451 COL	452 COV	453 NIST	454 AVG
455 Ours w/ CP	w/o DFCM	0.850	0.943	0.579	0.456	0.707
456 Ours w/ SL	Only (Q_4, R_4, N_4)	0.849	0.943	0.604	0.416	0.703
457 Ours w/ SS	Only Stage#4	0.850	0.919	0.592	0.444	0.701
458 Ours w/ CD	Conv Decoder	0.857	0.946	0.582	0.438	0.706
459 Ours w/ MLP	MLP Decoder	0.859	0.936	0.601	0.445	0.710
460 QMA-Net	Ours	0.873	0.939	0.659	0.480	0.738

461 **Ablation study on Multi-stage Alternating Feature Extraction and Interaction** We validate the
 462 effectiveness of the proposed Multi-stage Alternating Feature Extraction and Interaction paradigm
 463 from two perspectives. On one hand, we remove DFCM at each stage; on the other hand, we only
 464 retain the fourth stage. The results are listed in Settings 1 and 3 of Table 2, respectively. Our
 465 model demonstrates an average performance improvement of 4.2% and 4.7% compared to these two
 466 scenarios, respectively. This fact indicates that our method effectively constructs complementary
 467 bimodal tampering representations, enhances sensitivity to tampering artifacts, and suppresses intra-
 468 modal noise.

469 **Ablation study on Query-driven Multi-level Feature Decoding** We replace the Query-driven
 470 Multi-level Feature Decoding with upsampling followed by convolutional or MLP decoders. The
 471 results are shown in Settings 4 and 5 in Table 2. Our model shows improvements of 4.5% and
 472 3.9% compared to these two scenarios, respectively. Furthermore, compared to using single-level
 473 features (setting 2), our model achieves a 5.0% performance improvement. These findings indicate
 474 the necessity of each level of features and that our method achieves effective feature selection and
 475 aggregation.

476 5 CONCLUSION
477

478 In this work, we propose a novel IML network, QMA-Net, which consists of a Multi-stage Alter-
 479 nating Feature Extraction and Interaction architecture and a lightweight, Query-driven Multi-level
 480 Feature Decoding. The former simulates the cognitive processes of the human brain, construct-
 481 ing complementary tampering feature representations through cross-modal Feature Alignment and
 482 DFCM at each stage, thereby enhancing sensitivity to tampering artifacts. Moreover, the latter
 483 employs learnable tamper-aware queries to progressively aggregate crucial information from multi-
 484 level features through MFAM at each stage. In QMFD, these query embeddings perform selective
 485 refinement and aggregation of multi-level features to accurately predict tampered regions. Extensive
 486 experiments demonstrate that our framework outperforms current SoTA models in localization accu-
 487 racy and robustness across multiple public datasets. Simultaneously, our model exhibits a reduction
 488 in both parameter count and FLOPs.

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656 A APPENDIX

659 A.1 DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT THE DATASETS USED IN THIS PAPER

660 We trained our model using the protocol-CAT dataset, which was first introduced and utilized by
 661 CAT-Net. It consists of four datasets: CASIAv2, IMD2020, TampCOCO and Fantastic Reality. CA-
 662 SIA2.0 provides high-quality copy-move and spliced tampered images. IMD2020 includes complex
 663 real-world edits (such as splicing and local modifications) with non-fixed resolutions. Fantastic Reality
 664 is a multi-task annotation dataset that integrates tamper localization and semantic segmentation,
 665 providing pixel-level tamper region masks, instance segmentation, and category labels. TampCOCO
 666 is constructed based on the COCO 2017 dataset and includes two parts: copy-move and splicing.
 667 All images undergo JPEG compression while retaining clear boundaries to support model learning
 668 of low-level tampering traces. The information of all training sets is listed in Table 3. These training
 669 sets contain rich semantic details and noise patterns, making them more aligned with real-world ap-
 670 plication scenarios. By training on these datasets, we can learn more comprehensive and hierarchical
 671 features of tampering, effectively enhancing both robustness and generalization capabilities.

672 We select six public benchmark datasets as our test data, namely CAISAv1, Columbia, Cover-
 673 age, NIST16, COCOGLide, and AutoSplice. CAISAv1 primarily provides high-quality spliced im-
 674 age. The Columbia dataset focuses on uncompressed spliced image and features high-resolution.
 675 The Coverage dataset addresses copy-move forgeries, typically by copying and pasting one item
 676 from a group of similar objects within an image. The NIST16 comprises three forgery types: splic-
 677 ing, removal, and copy-move operations, and maintains high image resolution throughout. The
 678 COCOGLide focuses on generative image forgery research by combining the GLIDE diffusion model
 679 with semantic prompts to create tampered content, simulating semantic-level local manipulations.
 680 The AutoSplice represents a text-prompt manipulated image collection where all images undergo
 681 JPEG compression processing. The information of all test sets is listed in Table 4. These datasets
 682 encompass diverse manipulation types, exhibit wide resolution ranges, and contain varied forgery
 683 region sizes, collectively enabling comprehensive evaluation of model performance across multiple
 684 dimensions.

685
 686 Table 3: Detailed information of the protocol-CAT training set, where "N/K" indicates that the
 687 quantity of this type is unknown.


688 Dataset	689 Manipulation type			690 Number	691 Resolution	
	692 cope-move	693 splice	694 remove		695 min	696 max
CASIAv2	3274	1849	0	5123	320×240	800×600
IMD2020	N/K	N/K	N/K	2010	260×193	2958×4437
TampCOCO	600000	200000	0	800000	72×51	640×640
Fantastic Reality	N/K	N/K	N/K	19423	500×333	6000×4000
Total	N/K	N/K	N/K	826556	72×51	6000×4000

698 A.2 THE DETAILS OF QMFD

699 The internal architecture of QMFD is illustrated in Fig. 5. The QMFD comprises four branches, each
 700 dedicated to processing dual-modal features at four distinct levels. Given a ternary tuple (Q_i, R_i, N_i)
 701 at one level, the dual-modal features are fused through the DCM to produce the fused features

702
 703 Table 4: Detailed information of the six public benchmark datasets, where "N/K" indicates that the
 704 quantity of this type is unknown.

705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739	Dataset	Manipulation type				Number	Resolution	
		cope-move	splice	remove	AI-Gen		min	max
CASIAv1	459	461	0	0	0	920	384 × 256	384 × 256
Columbia	0	180	0	0	0	180	757 × 568	1152 × 768
Coverage	100	0	0	0	0	100	334 × 190	752 × 472
NIST16	236	225	103	0	0	564	500 × 500	5616 × 3744
COCOGLide	0	0	0	512	512	256 × 256	256 × 256	256 × 256
AutoSplice	0	0	0	3621	3621	256 × 256	4232 × 4232	4232 × 4232
Total	795	866	103	4133	5897	334 × 190	5616 × 3744	5616 × 3744



740
 741 Figure 5: The pipeline of QMFD. A DCM and multi-level query embeddings are leveraged to pre-
 742 screen features, followed by concatenation of features from all levels into the prediction head for
 743 precise localization of tampered regions.

744
 745 F_i^{fin} . The query Q_i then performs pixel-wise feature weighting and reconstruction across the F_i^{fin} .
 746 Specifically, each query shares the same length as the pixel's feature vector, enabling element-wise
 747 weighted summation operations. This step aims to emphasize critical information while suppress-
 748 ing irrelevant feature interference. Finally, the refined features from all four levels are fed into a
 749 prediction head to output the tampered region mask. The prediction head consists of a simple 1×1
 750 convolutional layer.

751 A.3 COMPARISSON WITH BASELINE MODELS USING ADDITIONAL METRIC

752
 753 We conduct supplementary experiments on four benchmark datasets using permute-F1 and pixel-
 754 level IoU scores as evaluation metrics. The results are presented in Table 5. As shown in the results,
 755 QMA-Net achieves SoTA performance across all metrics, with particularly significant improvements
 in average permute-F1 and pixel-level IoU scores compared to other models. This outcome further

756 validates that our method successfully constructs complementary dual-modal features sensitive to
 757 tampering artifacts, and effectively filters and aggregates multi-level features through the query-
 758 driven mechanism.

760
 761 Table 5: Comparison of permute-F1 and Pixel-level IoU across four datasets. Best results are **bold**,
 762 second-best are underlined.

Method	Permute-F1					Pixel-level IoU				
	CAS	COI	COV	NIST	Avg	CAS	COI	COV	NIST	Avg
PSCC-Net	0.559	0.830	0.451	0.371	0.553	0.442	0.729	0.307	0.259	0.434
MVSS-Net	0.597	0.768	0.529	0.357	0.563	0.481	0.641	0.397	0.236	0.439
CAT-Net	0.786	0.951	0.551	<u>0.490</u>	0.695	0.716	0.903	0.430	<u>0.388</u>	0.609
TruFor	0.714	0.934	0.443	0.466	0.639	0.621	0.874	0.303	0.350	0.537
IML-ViT	0.763	<u>0.974</u>	<u>0.595</u>	0.169	0.625	0.683	<u>0.919</u>	<u>0.482</u>	0.127	0.553
Mesorch	<u>0.837</u>	0.966	0.594	0.467	<u>0.716</u>	<u>0.778</u>	0.896	0.481	0.353	<u>0.627</u>
QMA-Net	0.880	0.995	0.697	0.520	0.773	0.832	<u>0.935</u>	0.617	0.420	0.701

774 A.4 THE MODEL’S PERFORMANCE ON AI-GENERATED TAMPERING TECHNIQUES

776 We supplement the performance of QMA-Net on CocoGlide and AutoSplice (image tampering
 777 based on diffusion models or LLM) to evaluate localization capabilities for AI-based tampered im-
 778 age. As shown in the Table 6, QMA-Net achieves optimal or sub-optimal performance across all
 779 metrics on both datasets.

780
 781 Table 6: Comparison on COCOGLide and AutoSplice under with different SoTA models. Best
 782 results are **bold**, second-best are underlined.

Method	COCOGLide			AutoSplice		
	F1	AUC	IoU	F1	AUC	IoU
MVSS-Net	0.428	0.819	0.327	0.388	0.755	0.272
PSCC-Net	<u>0.458</u>	0.848	<u>0.396</u>	0.455	0.871	0.406
CAT-Net	0.409	0.849	0.334	0.450	0.862	0.348
IML-ViT	0.369	0.835	0.290	0.343	0.854	0.246
Mesorch	0.397	0.894	0.329	0.357	0.926	0.252
QMA-Net	0.477	<u>0.867</u>	0.416	<u>0.451</u>	<u>0.875</u>	<u>0.352</u>

794 A.5 QUANTITATIVE RESULTS OF ROBUSTNESS STUDY

795 We quantify the robustness test data presented in Figure 4, using the average pixel-level F1 score
 796 under single-attack types with varying intensity factors as the evaluation metric. The results are
 797 presented in Tables 6 and 7. We apply degradation techniques such as Gaussian noise (GN)
 798 with different standard deviations(3,7,11,15,19,23), Gaussian blur (GB) with varying kernel sizes
 799 (3,7,11,15,19,23), and JPEG compression (JC) with different quality factors (100,90,80,70,60,50)
 800 to the tampered images. As visually demonstrated in both tables, QMA-Net achieves SoTA perfor-
 801 mance on CASIAv1, Coverage, and NIST16 datasets across all attack types.

803 A.6 GRAD-CAM ANALYSIS OF MULTI-LEVEL FEATURES

805 We visualized the fused multi-level features using Grad-CAM in Figure. 6. Red areas represent
 806 the high-response regions in the feature maps. It can be observed that Level 1 and Level 2 features
 807 focus on the edges of the tampered regions, effectively capturing low-level features. In contrast,
 808 the deeper Level 3 and Level 4 features extract high-level object-based characteristics without inter-
 809 ference from other regions. This phenomenon demonstrates that our model successfully constructs
 complementary dual-modal features sensitive to tampering artifacts, and effectively aggregates these

810
 811 Table 7: Average pixel-level F1 comparison on CASIAv1 and Columbia datasets under different
 812 attacks. Best results are **bold**, second-best are underlined.

813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863	813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863			813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863		
Method	CASIAv1			Columbia		
	JC	GB	GN	JC	GB	GN
PSCC-Net	0.427	0.324	0.564	0.814	0.747	0.817
MVSS-Net	0.506	0.296	0.578	0.697	0.556	0.719
CAT-Net	<u>0.674</u>	<u>0.444</u>	<u>0.757</u>	0.923	<u>0.883</u>	0.918
TruFor	0.619	0.403	0.663	0.901	0.858	0.888
QMA-Net	0.803	0.643	0.805	<u>0.914</u>	0.907	<u>0.909</u>

822 Table 8: Average pixel-level F1 comparison on NIST16 and Coverage datasets under different at-
 823 tacks. Best results are **bold**, second-best are underlined.

824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863	824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863			824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863		
Method	NIST16			Coverage		
	JC	GB	GN	JC	GB	GN
PSCC-Net	0.340	0.346	0.323	0.356	<u>0.293</u>	0.404
MVSS-Net	0.317	0.306	0.320	0.401	0.258	0.460
CAT-Net	<u>0.445</u>	0.398	<u>0.435</u>	<u>0.420</u>	0.273	<u>0.482</u>
TruFor	0.419	<u>0.419</u>	0.404	0.281	0.193	0.333
QMA-Net	0.478	0.474	0.457	0.548	0.370	0.612

dual-modal features through query-driven mechanisms, thereby suppressing interference from irrelevant features.

A.7 ABLATION STUDY ON QUERY QUANTITY

We vary the number of queries in the framework by adjusting them to three configurations: 4, 8, and 32, to investigate the impact of query quantity on model performance. The experimental results are shown in Table 9. Our model (16 queries) demonstrates improvements of 2.8%, 2.4%, and 3.1% in average p-F1 scores compared to the configurations with 4, 8, and 32 queries respectively. It is noted that the model’s performance does not monotonically improve with increasing query quantity, but rather follows a unimodal curve pattern.

Table 9: The results of ablation study on query quantity. Best results are **bold**, second-best are underlined.

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Pixel-level F1 Score					
Queries	CAS	COI	COV	NIST	AVG
4 queries	<u>0.864</u>	<u>0.942</u>	0.613	0.450	0.717
8 queries	0.857	0.933	<u>0.641</u>	0.448	<u>0.720</u>
32 queries	0.861	0.952	0.590	<u>0.457</u>	0.715
16 queries(Ours)	0.873	0.939	0.659	0.480	0.738

A.8 FLOPs AND PARAMETERS


The number of parameters and FLOPs for all measurements was calculated based on a batch size of 1. As shown in Table 10, our model has a comparable computational burden to VLMs-based models while demonstrating higher accuracy. Our model achieves SoTA performance while requiring significantly fewer parameters and lower computational overhead (FLOPs). Notably, the FLOPs of our model are nearly seven times lower than those of vision foundation model-based approaches (e.g., IMDprompt). These results demonstrate the lightweight nature and superior practical value of our proposed method.

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886 Table 10: Comparison of parameters and computational efficiency (Flops) across different models.

Method	Parameters (M)	FLOPs (G)
ManTra-Net	3.9	274.0
MVSS-Net	150.5	171.0
PSCC-Net	3.7	376.8
CAT-Net	116.7	137.2
TruFor	68.7	236.5
SAM	309.0	1499.0
IMDPrompt	347.6	1533.0
QMA-Net (Ours)	114.0	230.0

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970 Figure 6: Visualization of Grad-CAM for multi-level features. The first three columns are the
971 tampered image, groundtruth, and prediction results, respectively. Followed by the corresponding
972 fused multi-level features.