

A Survey on Multimodal Disinformation Detection

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Abstract

Recent years have witnessed the proliferation of offensive content online such as fake news, propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation. While initially this was mostly about textual content, over time images and videos gained popularity, as they are much easier to consume, attract more attention, and spread further than simple text. As a result, researchers started leveraging different modalities and combinations thereof to combat online multimodal offensive content. In this study, we offer a survey that carefully studies the state-of-the-art on *multimodal disinformation detection* covering various combinations of modalities: text, images, speech, video, social media network structure, and temporal information. Moreover, while some studies focused on *factuality*, others investigated how *harmful* the content is. While these two components in the definition of disinformation – (i) factuality, and (ii) harmfulness, are equally important, they are typically studied in isolation. Thus, we argue for the need to tackle disinformation detection by taking into account multiple modalities as well as both factuality and harmfulness, in the same framework. Finally, we discuss current challenges and future research directions.

1 Introduction

The proliferation of online social media has encouraged individuals to freely express their opinions and emotions. On one hand, the freedom of speech has led to a massive growth of online content which, if systematically mined, can be used for citizen journalism, public awareness, political campaigning, etc. On the other hand, its misuse has given rise to the proliferation of hostility online (Brooke, 2019; Joksimovic et al., 2019), resulting in offensive content in the form of fake news, hate speech (Schmidt and Wiegand, 2017a; Davidson et al., 2017), propaganda (Da San Martino et al., 2019), cyberbullying (Van Hee et al., 2015), etc. Indeed, researchers have argued that this situation

has set the dawn of the Post-Truth Era, dominated by emotions and “alternative facts” (Lewandowsky et al., 2017; Cooke, 2018; Nakov and Da San Martino, 2020). More recently, with the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, a new blending of medical and political false information has given rise to the first global infodemic (Paka et al., 2021a; Zarocostas, 2020; Patwa et al., 2021).¹

The term “fake news” is commonly used, e.g., it was declared Word of the Year 2017 by Collins dictionary. Yet, it is very generic, and misleads people to focus only on veracity. That is why international organizations such as the UN, WHO, EU, and NATO prefer the term *disinformation* (Ireton and Posetti, 2018), which refers to information that is (i) *fake* and also (ii) spreads *deliberately to deceive and harm* others. The latter aspect of the disinformation (i.e., harmfulness) is often ignored, but it is equally important. A related term is *misinformation*, which also refers to false content, but lacks the underlying intention to do harm. This is illustrated by the definitions of these notions by First Draft,² (Ireton and Posetti, 2018) where *misinformation* is defined as “*unintentional mistakes such as inaccurate photo captions, dates, statistics, translations, or when satire is taken seriously*”, while *disinformation* is “*fabricated or deliberately manipulated textual/speech/visual content, and also intentionally created conspiracy theories or rumors*”.

In our survey, we will focus on disinformation, and we will study both the factuality and harmfulness aspects of the problem, with focus on different modalities. Note that there are posts that can be harmful but factually true or non-factual but harmful (e.g., hate speech); our study also covers some related work on them. The term *factuality* refers to automatically evaluating the solidity of the report-

¹<https://www.who.int/health-topics/infodemic>

²<http://firstdraftnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Types-of-Information-Disorder-Venn-Diagram.png>

ing/social media statements in terms of facts and figures (Ireton and Posetti, 2018). The *harmfulness* or *harmful content* typically refers to “anything online which causes a person distress or harm”.³ Figure 2, in Appendix, gives examples of such content. Alam et al. (2021) addressed both aspects of disinformation using social media content related to the COVID-19 infodemic. They demonstrated a correlation between factuality and harmfulness, which varies across languages even in the same country, e.g., for Arabic, 56% of the false content was harmful, while for English, it was 24%.

Disinformation often spreads as text. However, Internet and social media allow the use of different modalities, which can make a disinformation message attractive as well as impactful, e.g., a meme or a video is much easier to consume, attracts much more attention, is perceived as more credible (Hameleers et al., 2020), spreads further than simple text (Zannettou et al., 2018), and can be weaponized (Olsen, 2018).

Notably, multimodality remains under-explored in disinformation detection. Bozarth and Budak (2020) performed a meta-review of 23 fake news models and the data modality they leveraged, and found that 91.3% used text, 47.8% looked into social media network structure, 26% relied on temporal data, and only a handful made use of images or videos. Moreover, while there has been research on trying to detect whether an image or a video has been manipulated, the attempt is less in a truly multimodal setting (Hirschberg et al., 2005; Pérez-Rosas et al., 2015; Tan et al., 2020).

Here we survey research on multimodal disinformation detection covering various combinations of modalities: text, images, speech, video, social media network structure, and temporal information. The data sources include social media (e.g., Twitter, Reddit, WhatsApp), news, video recordings (e.g., courtroom trials), and TV shows. We further argue for the need to cover multiple modalities in the same framework, while taking both factuality and harmfulness into account.

While there have been a number of surveys on “fake news” (Shu et al., 2017; Kumar and Shah, 2018; Cardoso Durier da Silva et al., 2019; Zhou and Zafarani, 2020), misinformation (Islam et al., 2020), fact-checking (Thorne and Vlachos, 2018; Kotonya and Toni, 2020a), truth discovery (Li et al., 2016), rumour detection (Bondielli and Marcelloni,

2019) and propaganda detection (Martino et al., 2020), none of them had multimodality as the main focus. Moreover, they targeted either factuality (most surveys above), or harmfulness (the latter survey), but not both. Here, we aim to bridge this gap. Therefore, in the present survey, we analyze the literature covering various aspects of multimodality (text, image, speech, video, network, and temporal), with a focus on the two aspects of disinformation: factuality and harmfulness, as illustrated in Figure 1. Section 4 presents the modeling details. We discuss the major challenges (Section 5 and Section F in Appendix) that lie ahead, forecasting about the likely future development (Section 6), and the lessons learned (Section E in Appendix).




Figure 1: Our envision of multimodality to interact with harmfulness and factuality in this survey.

2 Multimodal Factuality Prediction

In this section, we focus on the first aspect of disinformation – *factuality*. Automatic detection of factual claims is important to debunk the spread of misleading information, as it is crucial to detect the factuality of statements that can mislead people. A large body of work has been devoted to fact-checking textual claims but such claims are often expressed and disseminated together with other modalities such as images, speech, and video, and are further propagated through social networks. We summarize relevant studies that explore all modalities, as shown in Appendix, Table 1.

2.1 Text

Due to the availability of large amounts of textual content, research on the text modality is comparatively richer than for other modalities. Notable work in this direction covers fake news spread on

³<https://swgfl.org.uk/services/report-harmful-content/>

social media (Vosoughi et al., 2018a), fake news and fact-checking on news media (Rashkin et al., 2017), fact-checking such as fact-checked URL recommendation model (Vo and Lee, 2018) to reduce the spread, fact-checking with stance detection (Baly et al., 2018b), factuality of media outlets (Baly et al., 2020, 2018a), generating justifications for verdicts on claims (Atanasova et al., 2020), and fact-checking claims from Wikipedia (Sathe et al., 2020). There have also been recent efforts for fact-checking from political debates (Shaar et al., 2020, 2021a,b), fact-checking with evidence reasoning (Si et al., 2021; Jiang et al., 2021; Wan et al., 2021) and fact-checking by claim matching (Kazemi et al., 2021). Given that there have been surveys on the text modality for fake news/disinformation detection and fact-checking, here we will not go in more detail about individual studies.

2.2 Image

Textual with visual content (e.g., images) in social media is more prominent as it is more intuitive; thus, it is easier to consume, it spreads faster, it gets 18% more clicks, 89% more likes, and 150% more retweets (Zhang et al., 2018). Due to the growing number of claims disseminated with images, in the current literature, there have been various studies that address the visual content with text for predicting misleading information (Volkova et al., 2019), fake images (Gupta et al., 2013), images shared with misinformation in political groups (Garimella and Eckles, 2020), and fauxtography (Zhang et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2021). Some of these studies attempt to understand how two different modalities are used. Their analyses show that the extension of text with images increases the effectiveness of misleading content.

Gupta et al. (2013) highlighted the role of Twitter to spread fake images. This study reports that 86% tweets spreading fake images are retweets. Garimella and Eckles (2020) manually annotated a sample of 2,500 images collected from public WhatsApp groups, and labeled them as *misinformation*, *not misinformation*, *misinformation already fact-checked*, and *unclear*; however, experiments were conducted with binary labels: *misinformation* vs. *not-misinformation*. The authors found that violent and graphic images spread faster. Nakamura et al. (2020) developed a multimodal dataset containing 1M posts including text, images, metadata, and comments collected from Reddit. The

dataset was labeled with 2, 3, and 6-ways labels. Volkova et al. (2019) proposed models for detecting misleading information using images and text.

Fauxtography is defined as “visual images, especially news photographs, which convey a questionable (or outright false) sense of the events they seem to depict” (Cooper, 2007). It is also commonly used in social media in different forms such as a fake image with false claims, a true image with false claims. In the context of social media Zhang et al. (2018) defined that “a post is a fauxtography if the image of the post (i) directly supports a false claim, or (ii) conveys misinformation of a true claim.” An example of such a social media post is shown in Figure 2. Zhang et al. (2018) developed FauxBuster to detect fauxtographic social media content, which uses social media comments in addition to the content in the images and the texts. Zlatkova et al. (2019) investigated the factuality of claims with respect to images and compared the performance of different feature groups between text and images. Wang et al. (2021) analyzed fauxtography images in social media posts and found that posts with doctored images increase user engagement in the form of re-shares, likes, and comments, specifically in Twitter and Reddit. They pointed out that doctored images are often used as memes to mislead or as a means of satire, and that they have a ‘clickbait’ power to drive engagement.

2.3 Speech/Audio

There have been attempts to use acoustic signals to predict the factuality of claims in political debates (Kopev et al., 2019; Shaar et al., 2020), left-center-right bias in YouTube channels (Dinkov et al., 2019), and deception in speech (Hirschberg et al., 2005). Kopev et al. (2019) found that the acoustic signal helps in improving the performance compared to using only textual and metadata features. Similarly, Dinkov et al. (2019) reported that the use of speech signal improves the performance of the system for detecting the political bias (i.e., left, center, right) of Youtube channels. Moreover, a large body of work was done on deception detection using the acoustic signal. Hirschberg et al. (2005) created the Columbia-SRI-Colorado (CSC) corpus by eliciting within-speaker deceptive and non-deceptive speech. Their experiments consist of the use of acoustic, prosodic, and a variety of lexical features including 68 LIWC categories, filled pauses, and paralinguistic information (e.g.,

speaker information, gender, field-pause). Using the same corpus, an evaluation campaign was organized, where different multimodal approaches were proposed, such as fusion of different acoustic, prosodic, lexical, and phonotactics representations (Levitan et al., 2016; Kaya and Karpov, 2016).

2.4 Video

In addition to textual, imagery, and speech content, the information in video plays an important role in capturing cues of deceptive behavior. Such cues in videos (e.g., facial expression, gestures) have been investigated in several studies (Pérez-Rosas et al., 2015; Krishnamurthy et al., 2018; Soldner et al., 2019) for deception detection. Pérez-Rosas et al. (2015) developed a real-life courtroom trial dataset, which includes 61 deceptive and 60 truthful videos. They explored the use of n -gram features from transcripts and non-verbal features (i.e., facial expressions, eyebrows, eyes, mouth openness, mouth lips, and head movements, hand gestures) to classify liars and truth-tellers. Krishnamurthy et al. (2018) explored textual, speech, and visual features for deception detection. They used a 3D CNN to extract visual features from each frame, spatio-temporal features, and facial expressions such as smile, fear, or stress. Soldner et al. (2019) developed a multimodal deception dataset using TV shows and experimented with textual, visual and dialog features.

2.5 Network and Temporal Information

The rationale for leveraging network information stems from early work (Shao et al., 2018; Vosoughi et al., 2018b) that showed that propagation and interaction networks of fake news are deeper and wider than those of real news. Vosoughi et al. (2018b) further found that fake information spreads faster than factual one, thus advocating for the use of temporal information.

Propagation networks can be homogeneous or heterogeneous (e.g., encompassing news articles, publishers, users, and posts) and they can be analyzed at different scales (e.g., node-level, ego-level, triad-level, community-level and the overall network, as shown in Figure 3, in Appendix) (Zhou and Zafarani, 2019). Shu et al. (2020) tackled the fake news classification task by proposing an approach based on hierarchical propagation networks. At both micro- and macro-scale, they extracted and jointly considered network features, temporal features, and linguistic features. Experiments on

PolitiFact and GossipCop datasets revealed that temporal features have maximum contribution, followed by network and linguistic features. Shu et al. (2019) provided one of the most thorough multimodal frameworks for fake news classification. Their experimental results suggest that social context (i.e., network-derived) features are more informative than news content ones.

Vosoughi et al. (2017) proposed Rumor Gauge, a system that jointly exploits temporal and propagation features, in conjunction with linguistic and user credibility features, for checking the veracity of rumors. In particular, Rumor Gauge leverages text, and network propagation. The temporal modality does not directly provide features, but is instead considered by recomputing all other features at regular time steps, thus yielding multiple time series. Results by Vosoughi et al. (2017) and Kwon et al. (2017) also demonstrated that the contribution of the different data modalities change over time.

To mitigate the “cold start” problem of propagation-based early detection of fake news, Liu and Wu (2018) proposed an approach that is primarily based on user and temporal information. First, they built a propagation path of each news as a time series of user representations. The time series for a given news only contains the ordered representations of those users that shared such news. Then, they learned two vector representations of each propagation path via GRUs and CNNs, respectively. Zannettou et al. (2018) analyzed different aspects of memes, such as how they evolve and propagate in different mainstream and fringe web communities, and variants of memes that propagate. Finally, Nguyen et al. (2020) proposed Factual News Graph (FANG) to exploit the social structure and the engagement patterns of users for fake news detection.

3 Multimodal Harmful Content Detection

In this section, we focus on the second aspect of disinformation: *harmfulness*. It is essential to filter or to flag online harmful content. The harmful content includes *child abuse material, violent and extreme content, hate speech, graphic content, sexual content, and spam content* (Banko et al., 2020).⁴ In recent years, the ability to recognize harmful content within online communities has received a lot of attention by researchers (Pramanick

⁴<https://swgfl.org.uk/services/report-harmful-content/>

et al., 2021a,b) and policymakers that aim to keep users safe in the digital world. Studies in this direction include detecting harmful contents in network science (Ribeiro et al., 2018), natural language processing (Waseem et al., 2017; Schmidt and Wiegand, 2017b; Fortuna and Nunes, 2018) and computer vision (Yang et al., 2019a; Vijayaraghavan et al., 2021; Gomez et al., 2020; Dimitrov et al., 2021b). In Table 2, we provide a list of relevant work addressing different types of harmful content, modalities, source of data, annotation approach, language of the content and the methods.

3.1 Text

In the past few years there has been significant research effort on detecting harmful content (e.g., hate speech) from social media posts (Van Hee et al., 2015; Waseem and Hovy, 2016; Waseem et al., 2017; Schmidt and Wiegand, 2017b). Waseem and Hovy (2016) developed a dataset of hate speech consisting of 16K tweets, and reported a baseline results using char- and word- ngrams and a logistic regression classifier. (Davidson et al., 2017) distinguished between hate speech, and offensive language. They developed a dataset of ~ 24 K labeled tweets with categories such as hate speech, offensive language and neither. Qian et al. (2018) took a different approach to classic hate speech classification. Instead of binary classes, they proposed 13 fine-grained hate categories such as nationalist, anti-immigrant, racist skinhead, among others, providing a dataset of tweets collected from 40 hate groups. Ribeiro et al. (2018) proposed an approach to find hateful users on Twitter. Mathew et al. (2019) analyzed 341K users and 21M posts collected from Gab to understand the diffusion dynamics of hateful content. Their findings suggest that the posts from hateful user diffuse faster, wider, and have a greater outreach compared to the posts from non-hateful ones.

3.2 Image

Among different types of harmful content, cyberbullying is one of the major growing problems, affecting teens significantly. Hosseinmardi et al. (2015) investigated Instagram images and their associated comments for detecting cyberbullying and online harassment. They developed a manually labeled dataset using CrowdFlower (which is now Appen), where they followed standard procedures for the annotation: using annotation guidelines, qualification tests, gold standard evaluation and

quality control criteria such as minimum annotation time. The annotated dataset consists of 998 media sessions (images and their associated comments). A key finding of this study is that a large fraction of the annotated posts (48%) with a high percentage of negative words have not been labeled as cyberbullying. To train and to evaluate the model, the authors used n -grams from text, meta-data (e.g., the number of followers, followees, likes, and shared media), and image categories as features and experimented with Naïve Bayes and SVM classifiers. Their study suggests that combining multiple modalities helps to improve the performance of the SVM classifier.

Hate speech is another important problem that spreads over social media. The “Hateful Memes Challenge” is an important milestone to advance the research on this topic and the tasks is to detect hateful memes (Kiela et al., 2020). Das et al. (2020) proposed different approaches for hatefulness detection in memes such as (i) extract the caption and include this information with the multimodal model, (ii) use sentiment as an additional feature with multimodal representations. For hate speech detection, Yang et al. (2019a) explored different fusion techniques such as concatenation, bilinear, gated summation, and attention, and reported that combining the text with image embedding boosted the performance in all cases. Vijayaraghavan et al. (2021) proposed methods for interpreting multimodal hate speech detection models, where the modalities consist of text and socio-cultural information rather than images. Concurrently, Gomez et al. (2020) introduced a larger dataset of 150K tweets for multimodal hate speech detection, consisting of six categories such as *no attacks to any community*, *racist*, *sexist*, *homophobic*, *religion based attacks*, and *attacks to other communities*.

Propaganda is another topic that has been explored in multimodal settings. Seo (2014) showed how Twitter was used as a propaganda tool during the 2012 Gaza conflict to build international support for each side of the conflict. Dimitrov et al. (2021b) addressed the detection of persuasion techniques in memes. Their analysis of the dataset showed that while propaganda is not always factually false or harmful, most memes are used to damage the reputation of a person or a group of people. Dimitrov et al. (2021a) highlighted the importance of both modalities for detecting fine-grained propaganda techniques, with VisualBERT

yielding 19% improvement compared to using the image modality only (with ResNet-152), and 11% improvement compared to using the text modality only (with BERT). Similar observations were made by (Kiela et al., 2020) for hateful meme detection. Glenski et al. (2019) explored multilingual multimodal content and categorizes disinformation, propaganda, conspiracy, hoax, and clickbait.

3.3 Speech/Audio

Cues in spoken content can represent harmful behaviors and those cues can be used to automatically detect such content. Due to the lack of data, studies using the speech-only modality are comparatively lower than other modalities even though it plays a major role in many contexts. For example, for detecting violent content such as screaming and gunshots, the speech modality can play an important role, which other modalities might not be able to offer. This is important as most often user-generated contents are posted on newspapers or their social media accounts without verifying the content of the post, which can have serious consequences (Harkin et al., 2012; Rauchfleisch et al., 2017).

Giannakopoulos (2009) studied the audio segmentation approaches for segmenting violent (e.g., gunshots, screams) and non-violent (e.g., music, speech) content in movies. The studies related to violent content detection using acoustic features also include (Acar et al., 2013), where the focus was on finding violent content in movies.

Liang et al. (2017) proposed Localized Self-Paced Reranking (LSPaR) for detecting gunshots and explosion in videos using acoustic features. Soni and Singh (2018) investigated audio, visual and textual features for cyberbullying detection. Their findings suggest that audio and visual features are associated with the occurrence of cyberbullying, and both these features complement textual features.

3.4 Video

There are multiple studies on detecting cyberbullying in video-based social networks such as Vine (Rafiq et al., 2015) and YouTube (Dadvar and Eckert, 2018). These studies show that although the percentage of cyberbullying in video sessions is quite low, automatic detection of these types of content is very challenging. Wang et al. (2020) used textual, visual, and other meta-information to detect social media posts with bullying topics. Their proposed method was evaluated on publicly avail-

able multimodal cyberbullying datasets. Abd Kadir et al. (2016) investigated the relationship between emotion and propaganda techniques in Youtube videos. Their findings suggest that propaganda techniques in Youtube videos affect emotional responses. Content (e.g., Youtube videos) can also be attacked by hateful users via posting hateful comments through a coordinated effort. Mariconti et al. (2019) investigated whether a video is likely to be attacked using different modalities such as metadata, audio transcripts, and thumbnails.

There has been a recent interest from different government agencies to stop the spread of violent content. Constantin et al. (2020) developed a multimodal dataset, which consists of more than 96 hours of Hollywood and YouTube videos and high variability of content. Their study suggests that multimodal approaches with audio and images perform better.

3.5 Network and Temporal Information

The use of network data for predicting factuality was motivated by results showing different propagation patterns for fake vs. real content. Such results are lacking for harmful content. However, the intention to harm in social media is often pursued via coordinated actions, for instance, by groups of users (e.g., social bots and trolls (Cresci, 2020)) that target certain people or minorities. These collaborative harmful actions, perpetrated to increase the efficacy of the harm, are best addressed using network analysis to detect likely coordinated harmful campaigns.

Chatzakou et al. (2019) focused on detecting cyberbullying and cyberaggression by training machine learning models for detecting: (i) bullies, (ii) aggressors, (iii) spammers, and (iv) normal users on Twitter. To solve these tasks, they leveraged a combination of 38 features extracted from user profiles, the textual content of their posts, and network information (e.g., user degree and centrality measures in the social graph). Orthogonal and in synergy with respect to the detection of disinformation, scholars have recently focused on the novel task of detecting Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) (Nizzoli et al., 2021). *CIB is defined as coordinated activities that aim to mislead and manipulate others.*⁵

Detecting CIB typically involves analyzing both

⁵<https://medium.com/1st-draft/how-to-improve-our-analysis-of-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior-a4ec62ce9bff>

562 interaction networks to detect suspicious coordi- 612
563 nation, as well as the coordinated users and the 613
564 content they shared to detect inauthentic users 614
565 and harmful content (Nizzoli et al., 2021, 2020; 615
566 Pacheco et al., 2021). Given the importance of co- 616
567 ordination in CIB, the analysis typically starts from 617
568 the available network data by applying community 618
569 detection algorithms, and subsequently moving to 619
570 the analysis of textual data (e.g., social media posts 620
571 or news articles). Weber and Neumann (2020) also 621
572 considered the timings of actions to detect coordi- 622
573 nation, thus leveraging both network and temporal 623
574 data modalities. 624

575 4 Modeling Techniques 625

576 In this section, we discuss modeling techniques 626
577 for both factuality and harmfulness. To combine 627
578 multiple modalities, there have been several ap- 628
579 proaches: (i) *early-fusion*, where low-level features 629
580 from different modalities are learned, fused, and 630
581 fed into a single prediction model (Jin et al., 2017b; 631
582 Yang et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019; Singhal et al., 632
583 2019; Zhou et al., 2020; Kang et al., 2020); (ii) 633
584 *late-fusion*, where unimodal decisions are fused 634
585 with some mechanisms such as averaging and vot- 635
586 ing (Agrawal et al., 2017; Qi et al., 2019), and (iii) 636
587 *hybrid-fusion*, where a subset of learned features 637
588 are passed to the final classifier (early-fusion), and 638
589 the remaining modalities are fed to the classifier 639
590 later (late-fusion) (Jin et al., 2017a). Within these 640
591 fusion strategies, the learning setup can also be 641
592 divided into *unsupervised*, *semi-supervised*, *super-* 642
593 *vised* and *self-supervised* methods. 643

594 Dimitrov et al. (2021b) investigated different 644
595 fusion strategies (e.g., *early*- and *late*-fusion and 645
596 *self-supervised* models) for propaganda detectionm 646
597 using VisualBERT (Li et al., 2019), MMBT (Kiela 647
598 et al., 2019), and ViLBERT (Lu et al., 2019). Their 648
599 findings suggest that self-supervised joint learning 649
600 models, such as MMBT, ViLBERT, and Visual- 650
601 BERT perform better in increasing order, respec- 651
602 tively, compared to the other fusion methods. As 652
603 a part of “Hateful Memes Challenge” to classify 653
604 hateful vs. non-hateful memes, several such models 654
605 have been investigated by Kiela et al. (2020), who 655
606 also experimented with other models such as Gated 656
607 Multimodal Unit (GMU) (Arevalo et al., 2017) and 657
608 ConcatBERT (Kiela et al., 2020). These models 658
609 learn individual and non-overlapping training ob- 659
610 jectives for each modality. 660

611 Attempts to design *unsupervised* models are lim-

612 ited. Müller-Budack et al. (2020) introduced Cross- 613
614 modal Consistency Verification Tool (CCVT) to 614
615 check the coherence between images and associ- 615
616 ated texts. Yang et al. (2019b) defined trust of 616
617 news and credibility of users who spread the news 617
618 and used Bayesian learning to iteratively update 618
619 these quantities. News with low trustworthiness is 619
620 returned as fake news. Gangireddy et al. (2020) 620
621 proposed GTUT, a graph-based approach that ex- 621
622 ploits the underlying bipartite network of users and 622
623 news articles to detect the dense communities of 623
624 fake news and fraud users. 624

625 Due to the scarcity of labeled data, a few studies 625
626 attempted to design *semi-supervised* methods by 626
627 leveraging an ample amount of unlabelled data. 627
628 Helmstetter and Paulheim (2018); Gravanis et al. 628
629 (2019) presented weak-supervision for fake news 629
630 detection. Guacho et al. (2018) presented a tensor- 630
631 decomposition semi-supervised method for fake 631
632 content detection. Dong et al. (2020) developed a 632
633 deep semi-supervised model via two-path learning 633
634 (one path uses a limited labeled data, the other path 634
635 explores the unlabelled data) for timely fake news 635
636 detection. Paka et al. (2021a) presented, Cross- 636
637 SEAN, a cross-stitch semi-supervised end-to-end 637
638 neural attention model for COVID-19 fake news 638
639 detection. They further extended it by combining 639
640 exogenous and endogenous signals with a semi- 640
641 supervised co-attention network for early detection 641
642 of fake news (Paka et al., 2021b). 642

643 Within a *supervised* learning setup, two other 643
644 types of learning method have also been explored 644
645 for disinformation detection such as *adversarial* 645
646 *learning* and *autoencoder based*. *Adversarial* 646
647 *learning* models for fake news detection include 647
648 EANN (Wang et al., 2018), an event adversar- 648
649 ial neural network to detect emerging and time- 649
650 critical fake news, and SAME (Cui et al., 2019), 650
651 a sentiment-aware multimodal embedding method 651
652 which, along with multiple modalities, leverages 652
653 the sentiment expressed by readers in their com- 653
654 ments. 654

655 5 Major Challenges 654

655 Recently, several initiatives were undertaken by 655
656 major companies and government entities to com- 656
657 bat disinformation in social media (DIGI, 2021),⁶ 657
658 However, automatic detection of misleading and 658
659 harmful content poses a number of challenges as 659
660 discussed below and in Appendix (Section F). 660

⁶For example, <http://digi.org.au/disinformation-code/>

Models Combining Multiple Modalities. The major challenge is to devise a mechanism to combine multiple modalities in a systematic way so that one modality complements the others. Current state-of-the-art primarily adopts early and late fusion, which are limited and do not always yield strong results (Dimitrov et al., 2021a). Very recently, jointly trained multimodal transformer-based models (e.g., ViLBERT (Lu et al., 2019), Visual BERT (Lin et al., 2014) and Multimodal Bitransformers (MMBT) (Kiela et al., 2019)) have shown strong potential (Dimitrov et al., 2021b,a; Kiela et al., 2020). However, such models are trained considering only two modalities (textual and visual), while fact-checking or disinformation-related content consists of more than two modalities e.g., text, speech, video, network, etc. (Baly et al., 2020). Hence, there is a room for improvement in developing multimodal models that involve additional, and potentially more than two, modalities. Another important problem is cross-modal inconsistency in social media content, as shown in Figure 2(c), which poses a challenge in a multimodal setting (Tan et al., 2020).

Datasets. One of the major challenges when working with such diverse modalities, i.e., text, image, speech, video, and network, is to get access to an appropriate dataset, and moreover to one that considers both factuality and harmfulness. Furthermore, there is a need to integrate data from multiple platforms (e.g., news, posts from Twitter, Reddit and Instagram) as different data sources present different styles and focus on different topics.

6 Future Directions

Based on the aforementioned challenges, we forecast the following research directions:

Explainability. Model interpretation remains largely unexplored. This can be addressed in future studies to understand the general capability of the models. Providing evidence of why certain claims are false is also important. There has been work in this direction such as TabFact (Chen et al., 2020) and FEVER (Hanselowski et al., 2018). However, such approaches rely on existing knowledge bases (e.g., Wikipedia) and may fail for a new problem such as disinformation about COVID-19. It is also important to understand what models learn, e.g., lexical or semantic concepts or a set of neurons may learn one aspect better than the others. Moreover, while current studies on explainable fact-checking

focus on explaining the predictions, very few focus on model explanations (Kotonya and Toni, 2020b).

Beyond Content and Network Signals. State-of-the-art methods for multimodal factuality prediction and harmful content detection are primarily based on content signals and network structure. However, the information in these signals is limited and does not include personal preferences or cultural aspects. In the future, we envision multimodal techniques for disinformation detection that would go beyond content and network and would include signals like common sense and information about the user. Moreover, multimodal models will become larger with more heterogeneous signals as input, and they would be pre-trained on a wider variety of tasks to shelter both aspects of disinformation: factuality and harmfulness.

Knowledge-based Method. The use of knowledge-based approaches to check the factuality of claims based on what has been checked before could be ideal solutions as some claims are often repeated by politicians. Current approaches in this direction are limited and this can be explored further by creating a common repository of previously fact-checked claims and harmful content. Relevant studies include detecting previously fact-checked claims (Shaar et al., 2020), studying the role of context at the sentence level (Shaar et al., 2021a) or at the document level (Shaar et al., 2021b), and claim matching across languages (Kazemi et al., 2021).

7 Conclusion

We surveyed the state-of-the-art in multimodal disinformation detection based on prior work on different modalities, focusing on disinformation, i.e., information that is both false and intends to do harm. We covered the major research topics of factuality and disinformation. Our survey brought several interesting research challenges for multimodal disinformation detection, such as combining various modalities, which are often not aligned and are in different representations (e.g., text vs. speech vs. network structure), and the lack of such datasets to foster future research. In addition to highlighting the challenges, we also pointed to several research directions. While doing so, we argued for the need to tackle disinformation detection by taking into account multiple modalities as well as both factuality and harmfulness in the same framework.

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Appendix

A Examples of Factuality and Harmful Content

In Figure 2, we provide examples textual and visual content that are harmful and false, true image with false claim, and harmful meme.



(a) Fauxotography example



(c) True image with a false claim

(d) harmful (appeals to fear)

Figure 2: Examples of textual and visual contents that show (a) *fauxotographic content* (which is both harmful and false),⁷ (b) harmful content promoting bad cure (text-only, and false), (c) true image with a false claim about it (malicious), and (d) harmful content, where the text and the image collectively appeal to fear.

B Multimodal Factuality Prediction

In Table 1, we summarize related studies on factuality prediction that covers different modalities. In Figure 3, we provide an example of a social network structure, consisting of node, ego, triad and the whole network.

C Multimodal Harmful Content Detection

In Table 2, we summarize related studies on harmful content detection that covers different modali-

⁷<https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/abe-lincoln-racist-protest-sign/>




Figure 3: Example of social network with users. **Node:** A node can be a users or a spreader. **Ego:** “Ego” is an individual “focal” node (central user) and the nodes that are directly connected to it are called “alters/spreaders.” **Triad:** It (a set of three connected users) is the most basic subgraph of the network. **Community:** A community structure refers to the occurrence of groups of nodes in a network that are more densely connected internally than with the rest of the network.

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D Modeling Techniques

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Figure 4 shows various multimodal approaches that have been proposed in the literature.

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


Figure 4: Multimodal approaches, including early and late fusion, and joint modal learning. The hybrid approach (combining early and late fusion) is not shown.

E Lessons Learned

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1. A lot of progress has been made on the problem, but the two components in the definition of disinformation (falseness and harmfulness) have been considered mostly in isolation. We argue that there is a need for tight integration of the factuality and the intentional harmfulness into the same detection model. These two aspects have been addressed together in (Alam et al., 2021), which shows that 56% of Arabic false content is also harmful. From Tables 1 and 2, we observe that most multimodal datasets cover just 2–3 modalities, which combine

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Ref.	Task	Modality	Data/Source	Anno.	Lang	Method
T I V N S						
(Baly et al., 2020)	Bias, factuality	✓	✓ MBFC	M	En	SVM, BERT
(Dinkov et al., 2019)	Bias	✓	✓ MBFC	M	En	MM deep learning architecture
(Baly et al., 2018a)	Bias, factuality	✓	MBFC	M	En	SVM
(Shao et al., 2018)	Credibility*	✓	Articles and tweets	M	En	Statistical analysis
(Sen et al., 2020)	Deception	✓	CTD: 121 videos	M	En	RF, SVM and NN classifiers
(Soldner et al., 2019)	Deception	✓	TV Show	M	En	RF
(Volkova et al., 2019)	Deception	✓ ✓	Twitter; T1: 2,485, T2-T3: 56,691, T4: 496,929	M	En	Feature fusion with AdaBoost/NN
(Krishnamurthy et al., 2018)	Deception	✓	CTD: 121 videos	M	En	MLP
(Kaya and Karpov, 2016)	Deception	✓	✓ CSC: 25 videos	M	En	PLS/ELM based model
(Levitan et al., 2016)	Deception	✓	✓ CSC: 25 videos	M	En	SMO, Bagging, Dagging, BN and NB
(Pérez-Rosas et al., 2015)	Deception	✓	CTD: 121 videos	M	En	DT and RF
(Hirschberg et al., 2005)	Deception	✓	✓ CSC: 25 videos	M	En	Rule-based classifier
(Kazemi et al., 2021)	Facuality	✓	FEVER	M	En	Deep Q-learning network
(Atanasova et al., 2020)	Factuality	✓	Liar-Plus	M	En	DistilBERT
(Sathe et al., 2020)	Factuality	✓	WikiFactCheck	M	En	SVM, Decomposable attention model
(Shaar et al., 2020)	Facuality	✓	Political debates	M	En	Learning-to-rank approach, BM25, BERT, RoBERTa, sentence-BERT
(Kopev et al., 2019)	Facuality	✓ ✓	Political debates	M	En	MM fusion: concatenation
(Vo and Lee, 2018)	Facuality	✓	Fact-checked tweets from: Snopes.com, Politifact.com, FactCheck.org, OpenSecrets.org, TruthOrfiction.com and Hoax-slayer.net	M	En	BPRMF, MF, CoFactor, CTR, proposed a joint model
(Baly et al., 2018b)	Facuality	✓	Claims from Verify and Reuters	M	Ar	Gradient boosting, multilayer perceptron, softmax layer, end-to-end memory network
(Rashkin et al., 2017)	Facuality	✓	Politifact PHEME,	M	En	LSTM, MaxEnt, NB
(Nguyen et al., 2020)	Fake news	✓ ✓	Twitter (snopes.com), Weibo, FakeNewsNet	M	En	Graphical social context
(Nakamura et al., 2020)	Fake news	✓ ✓	Reddit: 1m posts	DS	En	MM fusion
(Shu et al., 2020)	Fake news	✓ ✓	PolitiFact and GossipCop	M	En	GNB, DT, LR, and RF
(Shu et al., 2019)	Fake news	✓ ✓	BuzzFeed and PolitiFact	M	En	LR, NB, DT, XGBoost, AdaBoost, and GB
(Vosoughi et al., 2018b)	Fake news	✓ ✓	Twitter: 126,000 posts Weibo: 4,664 (Ma et al., 2016),	M	En	Statistical analysis, Topic modeling
(Liu and Wu, 2018)	Fake news	✓ ✓	Twitter15: 1,490 (Ma et al., 2017), Twitter16: 818 (Ma et al., 2017)	M	En	DT, SVM, GRU, RF, RNN, CNN
(Rashkin et al., 2017)	Fake news	✓	Gigaword corpus, articles from seven unreliable news sites	M	En	MaxEnt
(Boididou et al., 2016)	Fake	✓ ✓	Social media	M	En	-
(Gupta et al., 2013)	Fake news	✓	Twitter: 16,117 tweets	M	En	DT on balanced dataset, NB
(Wang et al., 2021)	Fauxtography	✓ ✓	Twitter, 4chan, and Reddit	M	En	Analytical
(Zhang et al., 2018)	Fauxtography	✓ ✓	Reddit: 91, Twitter: 390	M	En	Feature fusion with XGBoost
(Heller et al., 2018)	Image tampering**	✓	Reddit: 102,028 images	A	-	-
(Garimella and Eckles, 2020)	Misinformation**	✓	WhatsApp: 2,500 images	M	-	-
(Zannettou et al., 2018)	Memes propagation	✓ ✓	Twitter, Reddit, 4chan, and Gab	DS	-	Memes analysis Temporal, propagation linguistic, and user credibility features
(Vosoughi et al., 2017)	Rumor	✓	✓ Twitter: 113 false and 96 true	M	En	
(Kwon et al., 2017)	Rumor	✓	✓ Twitter, snopes.com, and urban-legends.about.com	M	En	RF

Table 1: Summary of the existing most relevant work on factuality, covering different modalities and tasks. **T:Text, I: Image, V:Video, N:Network, S:Speech.** CTD: Courtroom trial dataset, CSC: Columbia/SRI/Colorado Corpus. Anno.: Annotation, M: manual annotation; DS: distant supervision. MM: Multimodal, SVM: Support Vector Machine, RF: Random Forest, DT: Decision Tree; NN: Neural Network, MLP: Multi-layer Perceptron, PLS: Partial Least Squares regression; ELM: Extreme Learning Machines, NB: Naïve Bayes, BN: BayesNet, BPRMF: Bayesian Personalized Ranking Matrix Factorization, MF: Matrix Factorization, CTR: Collaborative Filtering Regression, GNB: Gaussian Naive Bayes; LR: Logistic Regression; GB: Gradient Boosting, GRU: Gated Recurrent Units, RNN: Recurrent Neural Networks, CNN: Convolutional Neural Networks. * Also include botometer features. T1-T4 represents different tasks. ** dataset only.

some approaches depicted in Figure 4. Moreover, no multimodal dataset looks at both aspects of disinformation: factuality and harmfulness. While Alam et al. (2021) did address both aspects, they only covered the text modality.

2. In the early phase of (dis)information spreading,

user and content features are those that provide the highest contribution for detecting factuality. Indeed, at that time, a few interactions with content are available and the propagation network is small and sparse. As information spreads, the contribution of content-derived features remains constant,

Ref	Task	Modality				Data/Source	Anno.	Lang	Method
		T	I	V	N				
(Nizzoli et al., 2021)	CIB			✓		Twitter: 1.1m users, 11m tweets	DS	En	Statistical and similarity analysis
Weber and Neumann (2020)	CIB			✓		Twitter	-	En	Statistical and network analysis
(Wang et al., 2020)	Cyberbullying	✓	✓			Posts: Vine (970), Instagram (2,218)	M	En	SVM, NB, LR, RF, LSTM, CNN
(Soni and Singh, 2018)	Cyberbullying	✓	✓		✓	Vine videos	M	En	KNN, SVM, LR, RF, GNB
(Dadvar and Eckert, 2018)	Cyberbullying	✓				Youtube 54k posts	M	En	LSTM, BiLSTM, CNN
Hosseinnardi et al. (2015)	Cyberbullying	✓	✓	✓		Instagram	M	En	SVM
(Rafiq et al., 2015)	Cyberbullying	✓	✓	✓		Vine videos	M	En	NB, AdaBoost, DT and RF
(Van Hee et al., 2015)	Cyberbullying	✓				Ask.fm: 85k QA pairs	M	NL	SVM
(Chatzakou et al., 2019)	Cyberbullying, Cyberaggression	✓		✓		Twitter: 1,303 users, 9,484 tweets	M	En	NB, RF, AdaBoost, Ensemble, NN
(Liang et al., 2017)	Gunshots			✓		Videos: freesound.com, Youtube; Test: CSV, TRECVID Gunshot, UrbanSound Gunshot	DS	En	Localized self-paced reranking
(Mariconti et al., 2019)	Hate attacks	✓	✓		✓	Youtube videos (428)	M	En	Ensemble, CNN, RNN
(Kiela et al., 2020)	Hate speech	✓	✓			FB: Hateful Memes Challenge	M	En	Late fusion, Concat BERT, MMBT, ViLBERT, VisualBERT
(Das et al., 2020)	Hate speech	✓	✓			FB: Hateful Memes Challenge	M	En	VisualBERT, MM fusion
(Gomez et al., 2020)	Hate speech	✓	✓			Twitter: MMHS150K	M	En	Inception v3, LSTM, and MM fusion
(Yang et al., 2019a)	Hate speech	✓	✓			FB: train+dev 378k, test 53k	M	En	Fusion: text + image embedding
(Waseem and Hovy, 2016)	Hate speech	✓				Twitter: 16,914 tweets	M	En	LR
(Davidson et al., 2017)	Hate speech	✓				Twitter: 24,802 tweets	M	En	LR, SVM, NB, DT, RF
(Qian et al., 2018)	Hate speech	✓				Twitter: 40 accounts, 3.5m tweets	DS	En	LR, SVM, Char-CNN, BiLSTM, HCVAE
(Ribeiro et al., 2018)	Hate speech	✓		✓		Twitter: 4,972 users	M	En	GradBoost, AdaBoost, GraphSage
(Mathew et al., 2019)	Hate speech	✓		✓		Gab: 21m posts by 341k users	DS	En	Lexicon based filtering, DeGroot
Dimitrov et al. (2021b)	Propaganda	✓	✓			FB: SemEval-2021 task 6: 950 Facebook memes	M	En	MM fusion, MM joint representation
(Vijayaraghavan et al., 2021)	Hate speech	✓		✓		In-house developed and curated datasets	M	En	MM late fusion, LR, SVM, CNN, BiGRU, BiLSTM
(Constantin et al., 2020)	Violence	✓	✓	✓		VSD96: Hollywood, Youtube	M	En	MM Early fusion; SVM, HMM, GMM, Bayesian, MLP, QDA, PLDA, CNN, KNN, unsupervised, hybrid
(Acar et al., 2013)	Violence		✓	✓		MediaEval VSD	M	En	SVM (mid-level audio + low-level visual)
(Giannakopoulos, 2009)	Violence		✓	✓		Movies	M	-	BN, kNN

Table 2: Summary of the existing most relevant work on harmful content. **T:Text, I: Image, V:Video, N:Network, S:Speech**, Anno.: Annotation, CIB: Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior, QA: Question-answer, CSV: Real-life Conflict Scene Videos, VSD: Violent Scene Detection. NL: Dutch. KNN: k-Nearest Neighbors, LSTM: Long Short-Term Memory, BiLSTM: Bidirectional LSTM, MMBT: MultiModal BiTransformers, HCVAE: Hierarchical Conditional Variational Autoencoder, QDA: Quadratic Discriminant Analysis, PLDA: Probabilistic Linear Discriminant Analysis.

while propagation-derived features become richer and more informative. In summary, early prediction of factuality and veracity must necessarily rely heavily on users and content – be it text, image, audio or video. Instead, analyses carried out at later times benefit more from network and temporal data. In the past decade, research on multi-modality has shown its potential in several fields, which include audio-visual fusion (Mroueh et al., 2015; Zhu et al., 2021; Song et al., 2019), emotion recognition (Chen et al., 2021), image and video captioning (Liu et al., 2021), multimedia retrieval and visual question answering (Summaira et al., 2021). For factuality, Baly et al. (2020) showed that combining different modalities such as text, speech, and metadata yields improved performance compared to using individual modalities. Similar phenomena have been observed for other tasks such as hateful memes (Kiela et al., 2020), and propaganda detection (Dimitrov et al., 2021b).

F More Challenges

Contextualization. Existing methods of disinformation detection are mostly non-contextualized, i.e., the broader context of a news article in terms of the responses of the readers and how the users perceive them are not captured. We argue that the response thread under a news, the underlying social network among users, the propagation dynamics of the news and its mentions across social media need suitable integration to better capture the overall perspective on the news.

Meta Information. Along with the news and the context, other information such as the authenticity of the news, the credibility of the authors of the news, the factuality of the news also play an important role for disinformation detection. Moreover, detecting whether the disinformation attack is a coordinated effort or an individual activity would also help understanding its severity.

Bias, Region, and Cultural Awareness. The per-

1638 formance of most of the existing systems is limited
1639 to the underlying dataset, particularly to the de-
1640 mography and the underlying cultural aspects. For
1641 instance, a model trained on an Indian political
1642 dataset may not generalize well to a US health-
1643 related dataset (Fortuna et al., 2021).

1644 **Disinformation on Evolving Topics.** Often,
1645 claims or harmful content are disseminated based
1646 on the current event; information about COVID-
1647 19 and vaccines are examples of such use cases.
1648 Existing models might fail on such use cases, and
1649 thus zero-shot or few-shot learning might be an
1650 important future avenue to explore.

1651 **Transparent and Accountable Models.** The de-
1652 tection models should be designed in a way that
1653 their outcomes are unbiased and more accountable
1654 to ethical considerations. The models for disin-
1655 formation detection should present the outcome in
1656 such a way that a practitioner can interpret it and
1657 understand why a piece of information is flagged as
1658 disinformation, what is the related real news based
1659 on which the judgment was made, and which part
1660 of the information was counterfeit. There is also a
1661 lack of datasets containing disinformation with ex-
1662 planations and the corresponding real information.

1663 **Fine-grained Detection.** Existing disinfor-
1664 mation detection models are mostly binary classifiers:
1665 given a piece of news, they aim to detect whether
1666 it is a disinformation or not. Such binary signals
1667 might be enough in certain cases. However, in
1668 many other cases, more fine-grained labels can help
1669 to make a better decision. For example, whether a
1670 social media post is fake or genuine can help fact-
1671 checkers, but having more fine-grained information
1672 such as true, satire/parody, misleading, manipu-
1673 lated, false connection, or imposter content can be
1674 even more helpful (Nakamura et al., 2020). There-
1675 fore, rather than a binary classification, one could
1676 cast the problem as a multi-class classification task
1677 or even an ordinal regression, or just a regression
1678 task. This would also help prioritize disinformation
1679 for reactive measurements.