

000 [FICTIONALQA]: A DATASET FOR STUDYING 001 002 MEMORIZATION AND KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION 003 004

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007 008 ABSTRACT 009

011 When language models are trained on textual data, they acquire both knowledge
012 about the structure of language as well as knowledge of facts about the world.
013 At inference time, their knowledge of facts can be leveraged to solve interesting
014 problems and perform useful knowledge work for users. It is well known that
015 language models can verbatim memorize long sequences from their training data.
016 However, it is much less well understood how language models memorize facts
017 seen during training. In this work, we propose a new dataset to specifically em-
018 power researchers to study the dual processes of fact memorization and verbatim
019 sequence memorization. The dataset consists of synthetically-generated, webtext-
020 like documents about fictional events, as well as question-answer pairs about the
021 events. We conduct training experiments showing how synthetic data about fic-
022 tional events can be effective in teasing apart different forms of memorization. We
023 also document the challenges in effectively building realistic, fictional synthetic
024 data. [Demonstrating the text style of any edits made during the review period.]

025 1 INTRODUCTION

028 It is well-known that language models *memorize* some of their training data. Sometimes memoriza-
029 tion takes the form of *verbatim* memorization where exact sequences of tokens seen during training
030 are likely to be outputted by the large language model (LLM). Verbatim memorization ranges from
031 the memorization of short common phrases (e.g. “the cat’s out of the bag”) to multi-paragraph
032 excerpts from books or articles. *Factual* memorization is another form of memorization, in which
033 facts about the world (e.g. that cats see better in the dark than humans because their eyes have more
034 rods) are learned as representations that can generalize to diverse downstream tasks. While sequence
035 memorization may or may not be desirable depending on the length and nature of the sequence the
036 LLM has memorized, generalizable fact memorization is almost always considered a desirable trait
037 in LLMs.¹ For example, user might reasonably expect to be able to ask an LLM “Why can cats see
038 so well in the dark?” and get a correct answer, even if the knowledge to answer this question was
039 only ever seen during training as part of a Wikipedia-style article about cat eyes.

040 The phenomenon of verbatim memorization has been well studied; the work by [Carlini et al. \(2019\)](#)
041 serving as a canonical example in the domain of language models. However, we understand less
042 about how language models memorize facts such that they are capable of using a learned fact for
043 novel tasks at inference time. One challenge with studying the process of fact memorization during
044 training is that it is very difficult to quantify how often a fact actually occurs during training. Prior
045 work has studied the correlation between how well an LLM can answer questions about named
046 entities with the frequency the named entity occurs in the training data ([Kandpal et al., 2023](#)). Others
047 have trained very small models exclusively on synthetic biographies and then measured when the
048 ability to answer biographical questions appears during model training ([Allen-Zhu & Li, 2023a](#)).
049 Prior work has also sought to insert canaries (e.g. social security numbers or email addresses)

050 ¹This poses challenges for trying to apply unlearning techniques to remove individual atoms of knowledge.
051 Additionally, when models possess such capabilities, an inherent risk is copyright infringement. That being said,
052 verbatim memorization, or exact reconstruction of training data is the primary issue for legal and copyright
053 risks, not fact memorization. As our focus in this work is the latter, we do not discuss these topics any further in
this work. See [Lee et al. \(2023\)](#); [Cooper & Grimmelmann \(2024\)](#) for a nuanced treatment of generative models
and intellectual property.




Figure 1: An illustration of the hierarchical structure of our fictional dataset. Small liberties taken in cropping and whitespace of the example texts for visualization purposes.

during training and then check whether the model is capable of generating the canary string (Carlini et al., 2022b). [Removed overly strong claim regarding novelty.] In this paper, we demonstrate how realistic, synthetic data about fictional events can be used to study the training dynamics of both fact and sequence memorization.

[One of the main contributions of our work] is the development of a dataset generation pipeline for producing corpora of documents about realistic but fictional events. While the textual styles and the statistical distribution of words and phrases in our data are similar to that of a natural pretraining corpus, we construct prompts which produce events with made-up people, places, and events. These dual characteristics of realism at the surface-level and fantasy at the content-level enable us to study the traits leading to memorization in a laboratory setting, with greater assurance that the facts contained in the data do not interact with any other knowledge in the pretraining corpus. In addition, the data pipeline we propose is unique in that it is a “living asset,” meaning that we can regenerate a fresh dataset for future experiments, and other researchers can tweak and repurpose parts of the recipe to suit their needs and explore other research questions than the ones we specifically discuss in this work.

In summary, our [complete] contributions are:

1. We produce a clean dataset for memorization studies. Our FictionalQA dataset has some desirable properties that other datasets do not such as factual disjointedness from the real world

108 combined with plausible webtext-like surface forms. It also includes associated question and
 109 answer pairs.

110 **2. We measure knowledge transfer between documents and questions about the facts con-**
 111 **tained in said documents, in a tightly controlled setting.** We are able to observe reliable
 112 transfer effects in both validation loss and Q&A accuracy, but certain results suggest that the
 113 model could be relying on the distribution of the fictional training data rather than the atomic
 114 facts within it [(see Figure 7)].

115 **3. We demonstrate that the conditions under which verbatim memorization occurs may not**
 116 **coincide with conditions where factual memorization is more likely.** We expect this is at-
 117 tributable to fundamental differences in how and when overfitting and generalization occur in
 118 machine learning.

119 **4. We observe that training on the most succinct, declarative surface form of a fact might not**
 120 **result in the fastest knowledge acquisition.** The experimental setting in which we see the least
 121 improvement in Q&A accuracy is when training on the structured lists of fictional events and
 122 facts; when training on the more diverse documents we see increased memorization of the facts
 123 they contain. [Removed speculative comment on human learning.]

124 2 PRELIMINARIES

125
 126 In this work, we will discuss various types memorization phenomena exhibited by LLMs. We'll
 127 use the terms "text" and "sequence" interchangeably to refer to either the text strings or the token
 128 sequences representing text data during LLM training and inference. To describe and characterize
 129 memorization, we generally adopt the established terminology in the literature while extending it in
 130 specific ways to suit our particular needs.

132 2.1 WORKING DEFINITIONS OF MEMORIZATION

133
 134 Our work focuses on three aspects of memorization. First, we consider sequence memorization: the
 135 ability of an LLM to generate a sequence of tokens which was seen during training. Sometimes,
 136 sequence memorization is measured approximately; that is, a sequence is considered memorized if
 137 the LLM can produce a close match (Ippolito et al., 2023). However, we opt to use the stricter
 138 definition of **verbatim memorization**, measuring whether it is possible to reconstruct training data in
 139 exactness. If some contiguous sequence of training tokens is perfectly reproduced by the model, we
 140 say it has been verbatim memorized. Following (Carlini et al., 2022b), we measure verbatim memo-
 141 rization by dividing a training data sequence into a prefix and suffix, and then checking whether the
 142 LLM can generate the suffix when prompted with the prefix.

143 On the other hand, if the underlying meaning and factual content of a model generation is the same
 144 as some training sequence, but the surface text is completely different, then we will refer to this as
 145 **factual memorization**, or fact memorization. The model has learned the semantics of the training
 146 sequence and is able to generalize it to new settings. We evaluate factual memorization by assessing
 147 whether an LLM can answer questions about facts it has only seen as part of documents. Finally, if
 148 the meaning or factual content of a reconstructed text is different than a training sequence, but the
 149 surface form of the text is similar—formatting, overuse of specific words and phrases, etc.—then we
 150 will call this **stylistic memorization**.

151 All these forms of memorization can co-occur with each other. However, sequence memorization
 152 (especially when it is verbatim) is the strongest form of memorization we measure. Very often facts
 153 and styles are learned by the model *without* the occurrence of any verbatim memorization of training
 154 documents containing the fact or style. In this work, we are specifically interested in learning what
 155 it takes for a fact to be memorized and contrasting this with the conditions that are known to cause
 156 verbatim memorization of a training sequence containing the fact.

157 2.2 KEY RELATED WORK

158
 159 Large language models have been shown to verbatim memorize parts of their pretraining data in
 160 many different settings. The most widely corroborated result across this body of literature is that
 161 sample repetition during training reliably increases extractable memorization (Carlini et al., 2019;
 2021; 2022b; Biderman et al., 2023a;b; Huang et al., 2024). Towards understanding factual mem-

162 orization, seminal work by [Kandpal et al. \(2023\)](#) showed a clean relationship between entity co-
 163 occurrence in a training corpus and test time associative ability between those entities. Prior examples
 164 of datasets constructed for related purposes include the synthetic biographies dataset developed
 165 for use in [Allen-Zhu & Li \(2023a\)](#) and later reused by [Zucchet et al. \(2025\)](#) to study knowledge
 166 acquisition, the *Fictional Knowledge* dataset ([Chang et al., 2024](#)), the *TOFU* dataset specifically
 167 created to study unlearning ([Maini et al., 2024a](#)), and the *New News* dataset ([Park et al., 2025](#)).
 168 Recent work on generating synthetic data for instruction tuning also devises prompting strategies
 169 that increase diversity and coverage of the generator model’s output distribution ([Chen et al., 2024](#);
 170 [Zhang et al., 2024](#)) and we employ similar techniques in our pipeline.

171 On the sub-topic of knowledge acquisition, we would like to draw attention to particularly related
 172 [\[parts of the existing literature\]](#). A few of the aforementioned studies are similar in spirit to ours but
 173 their data constructions, research questions, and findings are all slightly different but generally com-
 174plementary. We summarize the novelty of our dataset by enumerating the qualities that differentiate
 175 it from existing assets:

- 176 • **Webtext-like styles** We produce a variety of realistic webtext-like document styles that could be
 177 incorporated into a pretraining corpus rather than relying on simple fill-in-the-blank templates
 178 which produce more artificial and formulaic results. The documents in *TOFU* are generated
 179 using a fill-in-the-blank template, and the synthetic biographies from [Allen-Zhu & Li \(2023a\)](#)
 180 are also quite templatic though a generative model is involved.
- 181 • **Size and realism** Our dataset is larger than existing resources and specifically avoids science-
 182 fiction/fantasy topics (see [Appendix C.2](#)). Though not fantastical, [Park et al. \(2025\)](#) produce
 183 a significantly smaller dataset due to relying on manual curation of articles and questions (75
 184 hypothetical news and 375 downstream questions) and [Chang et al. \(2024\)](#)’s data heavily features
 185 futuristic scenarios like interstellar travel.
- 186 • **Documents + Q&A** We construct both documents and question and answer pairs designed to
 187 test a LLM’s ability to generalize the information in the documents whereas [Maini et al. \(2024a\)](#);
 188 [Chang et al. \(2024\)](#) basically provide one or the other. The documents in *TOFU* are not part of
 189 their release data, just the questions and answers, and *Fictional Knowledge* provides “probes” but
 190 these are not formatted like trivia questions and answers, but rather as “completion-y” prefixes
 191 with an entity suffix.

192 A more extensive survey of the relevant literature is included in [Appendix B](#).

195 3 DATASET GENERATION PIPELINE

198 In [Figure 1](#), we illustrate examples of each part of the fictional dataset, and in [Section 4](#), we de-
 199 scribe how to access to the complete dataset. We give brief summaries of each stage in the dataset-
 200 generating process, including pointers to more detailed descriptions for each.

201 **Seed events** are short premises that sketch out the basic details of a fictional scenario or event. To in-
 202 crease the diversity and uniqueness of the generated documents, the prompting strategy injects some
 203 unique words and a year that the model should use in each seed (additional details in [Appendix C.2](#)).

205 **Factsheets** are larger, structured outlines that enumerate plausible details such as people, places,
 206 and other concrete entities (see [Figure 1](#)) entailed by each seed event (additional details in [Ap-](#)
 207 [pendix C.3](#)).

208 **Fictions** are fictional documents. Each factsheet is used to generate documents in the style of a news
 209 article, social media feed, an encyclopedia entry, a corporate document, or blog post. We choose
 210 these particular styles as they are realistic archetypes of different types of content one might find in a
 211 (cleaned) webscrape and we choose to generate multiple distinct styles for each seed event to study
 212 the impact of surface form diversity on knowledge acquisition (additional details in [Appendix C.4](#)).

213 **Fictional Q&A** pairs are created about each event. A series of questions and answers are gener-
 214 ated for each fictional document. The prompting specifically directs the model to make the question
 215 unambiguous and structures the questions, answers, and a declarative form of the fictional fact (ad-
 216ditional details in [Appendix C.5](#)).

216 We utilize GPT-4o-2024-08-06 (Hurst et al., 2024) throughout all generation stages. To control
 217 generation diversity, we apply different temperature settings at each stage. Specifically, we use a
 218 temperature of 1.0 for Seed events and Fictions, while we use 0.7 for Fictsheets and 0.1 for Fictional
 219 Q&A.
 220

221 **Q&A Annotation** A critical part of our pipeline is an annotation stage where we determine
 222 whether or not a question is “infeasible” without access to its supporting fictional data; we try to
 223 ensure that the questions are not answerable by a powerful language model that has never even
 224 seen the fictional documents. This is accomplished by prompting the same model used in the data
 225 generation process to answer the questions in two ways: *blind* with only the question in context,
 226 and *informed* via in-context access to the fictional document that was available when generating the
 227 questions. We provide more details about this process as well as our deduplication postprocessing
 228 step in Appendix C.5. [In one set of experiments we perform, we also reformat the fictional question
 229 and answer pairs as multiple choice questions (MCQ) such that we can evaluate ranked choice ac-
 230 curacy and this process is detailed in Appendix C.6. For all experiments measuring Q&A accuracy,
 231 we always only consider those questions which were annotated as infeasible when evaluated blind.]
 232

4 DATASET RELEASE

235 We host our dataset on the Hugging Face Hub and provide the complete outputs of the multiphase
 236 pipeline as a structured dataset with hierarchical keys. In Appendix C we detail how the different
 237 components of the data are organized, and how they are linked together via our system of unique
 238 keys.

239 **Dataset:** [submission14717_fictionalqa](#)

240 **Generation Codebase:** [fictional_qa-F521](#)

242 In order to study the loss dynamics and differences between documents included in training and
 243 those held out for validation, we construct splits under various criteria. We are then able to measure
 244 knowledge transfer via model’s improved ability to predict the tokens in the validation documents
 245 after training on the related but non-identical documents in the training set.

246 **Event Split:** All the material corresponding to two-thirds of the seed events is placed in the train
 247 set with the remainder placed in the validation set. When referred to as “Event Split”, the training
 248 and validation texts are the fictional documents generated from the seed events. For the “Fictsheets”
 249 variant, though the same seed event-based splitting criteria is used, the *fictsheets* are used as the
 250 training and validation texts rather than the fictional documents. In this setting, we expect the con-
 251 tents of validation set to look very different from the train set, even though the style of the examples
 252 may be similar.

252 **Document Split:** For each seed event, for each of the 5 document styles we generate for it, we hold
 253 out 1 document from each each style and put it in the validation set. We refer to this dataset as
 254 “Doc Split” in the experiments. This can be thought of as in-distribution validation set, since the
 255 documents in the validation set closely resemble—both in terms of content and style—the documents
 256 in the train set.

257 **Style Split:** For each seed event, we train on documents in four different styles, and withhold doc-
 258 uments from the one remaining style as a validation set.² We refer to these as [“Style <ABC>
 259 Split”] noting which document style was held-out as validation in the name. To reduce the total
 260 number of experimental settings, we only perform finetuning experiments on the News and Blog
 261 held out variants, but include all 5 versions in the released data. Thus, in this split, the contents of
 262 the validation set matches the training set, but the style of the text is out-of-distribution.

263 **Training Splits:** [submission14717_fictionalqa_training_splits](#)

264 We also utilize two additional datasets from prior work during our experiments. The first is a
 265 generic, diverse set of standard webtext pretraining data, the Dolma-v1.6-sample dataset (Soldaini
 266 et al., 2024), which we use as a source of webtext documents to pad out the training batches during
 267 finetuning experiments. The other is a question and answer dataset about *real* facts in the world,
 268

269 ²This results in unbalanced splittings of the data since we create more samples for some document styles
 than others. Figure 8 helps illustrate how split sizes impact sampling rates during training experiments.


270 TriviaQA (Joshi et al., 2017), which we use to measure the impact that tuning on fictional data has
 271 on the model’s real world factual knowledge. We describe the minor reformatting process for this
 272 data in Appendix C.7

274 5 EXPERIMENTS

275 While the the dataset generation pipeline and datasets we release together constitute the primary
 276 contribution of this work, we also demonstrate some of the types of experiments that can be per-
 277 formed using our dataset. For the training experiments, we use the “base” checkpoints from the
 278 Llama 3.1, Llama 3.2, Gemma 1, and Gemma 2 suites (Grattafiori et al., 2024; Team et al., 2024;
 279 Gemma Team et al., 2024). Samples from the fictional dataset are added to each minibatch such that,
 280 in expectation, 5% of the samples are fiction, and 95% of the samples are from a generic webtext
 281 mixture (Appendix D.1 discusses the implication of this design choice more detail).³

282 We start with a warmup period of 50 steps before inserting any fictional data. While not a perfect
 283 analogue, throughout our tuning experiments, we compare loss measurements on our fictional data
 284 to loss on a generic webtext mixture to monitor divergence from the base language model’s training
 285 distribution that might be caused by our tuning. We also compute loss on TriviaQA answers to
 286 monitor changes in ability to model *real* factual information about the world. More details on the
 287 finetuning setup can be found in Appendix D.1.

288
 289 **Verbatim Memorization under Repeated Training** We begin by confirming that finetuning
 290 models on our fictional data causes the tokens to be memorized verbatim. Figure 2 demonstrates
 291 rapid overfitting despite the fact that we are training on a mixture of fictional data and base webtext.
 292 This implies that the documents are stylistically plausible enough under a pretrained language model
 293 to be rapidly learned (in contrast to say random canary tokens or byte strings). However, our obser-
 294 vation of near zero completion rates (verbatim memorization) both at step 0, and at all training steps
 295 on the *validation* texts, together confirm that the documents are suitable for controlled memorization
 296 studies. The model will only complete significant portions of these documents accurately “iff” it is
 297 explicitly trained on them.⁴



300
 301 Figure 2: **(Left)** Loss on samples in the training and validation sets as a function of optimiza-
 302 tion step. **(Right)** Exact Match rate when prompting the model to generate the last 50 tokens of of the
 303 fictional document as a function of the number of epochs on all training documents in the Doc Split
 304 fictional dataset.

305 With this initial check out of the way, for all subsequent experiments, we shorten the training du-
 306 ration to focus in on the more interesting region from about 0 to 500 training steps, well under 5
 307 epochs and well before the strongest models memorize all of the document suffixes. The U-shaped
 308 curve in validation loss seen in the left side of Figure 2 indicates a region where generalization via

309
 310 ³We also experimented with 100% and 50% relative rates, but the higher sampling frequency appeared to
 311 result in pure verbatim memorization with no observable generalization period which is actually what we want
 312 to highlight with our experiments, so we use the low rate of 5% for all experiments in the paper.

313
 314 ⁴This biconditional is of course not formally proven, but we stylize the statement in this way to highlight
 315 a basic assumption not always explicitly stated in prior studies of memorization. Recent work has shown that
 316 models can complete parts of samples they were never explicitly trained on (Liu et al., 2025).

factual and stylistic memorization is possible, and in the experiments to follow, we highlight how our dataset is *particularly* well-suited to studying this phenomenon in a controlled manner.

Separating Memorization from Generalization using Train/Validation Loss [Figure 3](#) demonstrates that there is a strong correlation between model size and how fast the model fits to the training documents for both the Doc Split and the Event Split. However, it also shows that there is a period during which the loss on the validation documents for the split also improves in parallel to the training loss. We also see that the degree to which the models improve on the validation split loss depends on the particular splitting criteria. We design our experiment to test the hypothesis that since the Event Split causes a fraction of the seed events and their documents to be completely omitted from training, we expect to see less improvement in validation loss than when training on the Doc Split since in the latter case, all the fictional event premises are seen in *some* surface form. While the difference between the validation loss minima in the Doc Split and Event Split cases is small, all models exhibit more generalization (lower minimum validation loss) in the Doc Split case than in the Event Split case.




Figure 3: Loss on samples in the training and validation sets of the Doc Split (**left**) and Event Split (**right**) as a function of optimization step.

Contrasting [Figure 3](#) with [Figure 4](#) illuminates the impact the splitting criteria even further. We see that training on the Fictsheets split’s training texts causes almost immediate overfitting and there is little to no observable transfer period where validation loss also improves alongside training loss.⁵ This suggests that the circumstances under which rapid *verbatim* memorization occurs (train loss heading to zero, but validation loss increasing) are not necessarily the same as those where generalization via *factual* and *stylistic* memorization of the data will occur (train loss decreasing, but with validation loss decreasing as well), [which corroborates results in the literature on how surface form diversity aids in knowledge acquisition ([Appendix B](#))].

In [Figures 3](#) and [4](#) we also provide a series of control and baseline measurements to ground and contextualize our observations. “Base Webtext*” refers to the Llama-3.2-1B model trained on just the base mixture of real webtext under the same hyperparameters to confirm that all observed effects are due to the injection of the fictional data, not the base webtext distribution or other artifacts of the finetuning setup. Additionally, the loss on the base webtext distribution for all models is visualized in [Figure 4](#) to show that the ability to faithfully model normal webtext is not destroyed by finetuning on the fictional data at this 5% relative rate.

Probing for Generalization to Q&A via Improvements in $\text{nll}(y|x)$ In addition to tracking loss on the training and validation documents, we also compute the models’ loss on answers (y) when conditioned on questions (x) concerning the fictional facts embedded in the documents. [Figure 5](#) shows that training on only the fictional documents (not the questions) from each of the splits improves the models’ loss on the fictional question and answer pairs, but this is not observed when training on just the base webtext. As a control, we also measure the same question conditional answer loss but for real TriviaQA questions and see that the models don’t improve at all in terms of

⁵The Fictsheets split is much smaller than the others, as there are only 100 to start with, and thus the 66% we train on are epoched very quickly. However, the low number of unique examples and low amount of surface form diversity are intertwined and we see this as an interesting comparison to make without controlling in any particular way for split sizes.




Figure 4: **(Left)** Loss on samples in the training and validation sets of the Fictsheets split as a function of optimization step. **(Right)** Loss on held out samples from the base webtext distribution as a function of optimizer step while training on the Doc Split (eg. the left of Figure 3).

answer likelihood on real factual question answering data. However, the upward trend is also similar when training on just the base webtext with no fictional data.⁶




Figure 5: Loss on the answers when conditioned on questions for the Llama-3.1-8B model for the fictional questions and answers (**left**), and for the TriviaQA questions and answers (**right**) as a function of optimization step, when training on different splits of the fictional data.

We also observe that the split type can significantly impact the amount of answer loss improvement we see. Figure 5 shows that training on the Fictsheets split does not consistently improve Q&A loss. As expected, the stronger factual separation between train and validation samples for the Event Split appears to result in less transfer to Q&A loss, while the more complete coverage of all events in the Doc Split allows for more improvement. Here we also show the result of training on the splits where we hold out all the News style or the Blog style documents and observe that the amount of transfer to Q&A is similar the Doc Split case.

Reconstruction of Fictional Facts via MCQ Testing After pretraining only on webtext, or in our case, fictional documents, it is known that even when LLMs can fail to produce an answer string exactly, they can still be used to reconstruct the facts in the training data by emitting the information under a multiple choice test.⁷

To this end, we reformat the fictional question and answer pairs as multiple choice questions (MCQ) such that we can evaluate ranked choice accuracy (described in Appendix C.6). Armed with a more interpretable measure than loss, in Figure 6 we are able to observe that training on only the fictional documents (not the questions) reliably increases rank-choice MCQ accuracy, and that larger models achieve higher levels of transfer. We also see that the style of the fictional data impacts the amount of factual transfer to the MCQ test format. High diversity splits like the Doc Split and Style

⁶The increase in TriviaQA $nll(y|x)$ is unsurprising as the 95% base webtext per batch is not *particularly* relevant support for TriviaQA in the way that the fictional documents are relevant support for the the fictional Q&A pairs.

⁷This technique was canonically demonstrated in Brown et al. (2020)’s evaluation of GPT-3.




Figure 6: Multiple choice accuracy with 4 choices as a function of optimization step across models (**left**), and for the Llama-3.1-8B model across fictional splits (**right**).

splits transfer the strongest, splitting along Event lines hinders learning further, and training on the Fictsheets split causes the *least* transfer, despite the fact that the model has memorized most of the training fictsheets as indicated by near zero loss (Figure 4).

In the last set of experiments we attempt to disentangle whether or not the models memorize the factual content or the stylistic content, or a mixture of both. To do this we try and leverage the disjoint-ness of fictional events in the various training and validation splits to isolate whether more factual information can be reconstructed for questions corresponding to seed events and facts that the model directly trained on versus those it did not train on. Following the different splitting criteria for the fiction documents, we subset the questions that were generated from the specific documents in each of the training and validation document sets and then measure MCQ accuracy on the training and validation sets separately.

We observe that the the improvement in MCQ accuracy appears to be “leaky”. Figure 7 shows that the performance on the questions corresponding to held-out fictional scenarios and events is also elevated “(Val)”, albeit slightly less than for questions corresponding to scenarios that were trained on “(Train)” even though some facts in the Event Split are expected to have been wholly omitted from the training document pool. This indicates that it is not possible to cleanly differentiate whether the improvements we observe in MCQ Acc (or question conditional answer loss in Figure 5) are attributable to factual or stylistic memorization alone. However, it is clear that these improvements are caused by training on the fictional data and not other effects based on the lack of improvement for the “Base Webtext”-only control in Figure 6. All we can conclude is that the model’s improved ability to rank answer choices after training on the fictional documents in each of the experiments is based on some combination of distributional features and atomic knowledge it acquires during the finetuning process.




Figure 7: Multiple choice accuracy with 4 choices as a function of optimization step for the Llama-3.1-8B model across fictional splits separating performance on the questions that were generated based on documents in the training set versus in the validation set for that split.

6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

While in Appendix A we discuss limitations and future applications in greater detail, we conclude with a few key remarks here. Constructing fully synthetic “cleanroom” data using LLMs is difficult. We design our prompts carefully to ensure the quality and diversity of the various components in our dataset but still observe a significant amount of duplicate questions. The results in Figure 7 also suggest that the fictional documents might overlap to a larger degree than desired across seed

486 events and across styles. While we elucidate interesting memorization vs. generalization behaviors
 487 through our experiments, more than anything, we hope that our results inspire the use of our dataset
 488 for studying topics we do not explore such as machine unlearning and privacy preserving training
 489 methods.
 490

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810 A LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS

811

812 **Troubles with diversity** Generating a high diversity of documents, under constraints of strict
813 “fictionality” is difficult, and clever prompting strategies are required to force a diffuse distribution
814 out of the data generating model (Zhang et al., 2024), (Chen et al., 2024)). We discuss a few
815 strategies used to increase the diversity of the data we generate but alternate approaches could be
816 devised, and different, stronger models could be used, or employed in a pool under the same prompts
817 to further increase coverage and diversity of the data.

818

819 **Tradeoffs between ease of scoring and Q&A quality** We choose to generate the questions and
820 answers under prompts that constrain the answers to be simple associative relationships, normally
821 with a specific sub-span of the source document where the answer to the question can be found.
822 This helps concretize notions of correctness during scoring, but it limits the diversity of the types of
823 questions the pipeline will produce.

824

825 **Issues with Model-based Post-hoc MCQ Construction** We reformat the question and answer
826 pairs from our pipeline into MCQs in a *post-hoc* manner, and this introduces artifacts (see Appendix C.6
827 for details on construction). We suspect that trivially easy to eliminate alternate answers
828 cause the model to achieve base accuracies better than chance without actually training on the
829 questions. We also suspect that, as a side effect of our ranking criteria during construction, multiple
830 answer paraphrases or plausible alternative answers to vague questions end up in the alternates list,
831 potentially upper-bounding the best case accuracy. This could generally be ameliorated in future
832 work in various ways including creating the alternate lists for these MCQs from scratch during initial
833 question generation, using more complex methods for creating alternate answer lists, and even
834 via human curation or annotation of MCQs for feasibility and difficulty. [We note that constructing
835 multiple choice tests that avoid these issues is a rich area of study; prior work has found that models
836 can often be “right for the wrong reasons” which is one way of summarizing potential confounders
837 in our MCQ setup (McCoy et al., 2019).]

838 **Experiments at trillion-token scales** In this work we do not pretrain language models from
839 scratch on O(1T) token datasets containing our fictional data or questions. It is an open question
840 whether data such as ours has any observable impact on the final model when the relative sampling
841 rate of this data drops from 5% to 0.0005% or smaller. Are many orders of magnitude more epochs or
842 orders more fictional document per seed event required? Must the fictional facts be more unique to
843 be picked up by the model? We leave these interesting, but expensive experiments to future studies
844 with industrial computational resources.

845

846 **Impact of surface style on learnability** Our pipeline imbues the fictional documents we generate
847 with a dimension that we do not heavily study: the “styles” of the fictional documents (news,
848 encyclopedia, social, etc.). A subset of our training experiments split the data along style lines, but
849 the impact of style on learnability and knowledge transfer is not explored in any depth.

850

851 **Machine Unlearning** We do not study privacy or threat models specific to unlearning or “right to
852 be forgotten” scenarios, however, our dataset is constructed to have properties that could facilitate
853 these types of studies, and could be useful for benchmarking novel unlearning techniques. Testing
854 whether an unlearning technique addresses both verbatim memorization and reconstruction via
855 generalization is a line of research that our data is particularly suitable for.

856

857 **Generating fake PII** The data we generate is relatively innocuous. It contains mostly milk-toast
858 scenarios in surface styles that one might encounter in a general internet scrape. However, the
859 prompts in our pipeline could easily be reworked to generate data that looks more like personally
860 identifiable information (PII) such as personal details in private message threads, information on
861 bank statements, medical history transcripts, etc. However, given the fact that we aim to present a
862 methodology for data driven study of memorization writ large, rather than just the privacy questions
863 (and seeding the generation process for this kind of data without actually generating examples that
864 expose any real PII requires particular care) we leave this alternate use of our methodology to future
865 work.

864 **B EXTENDED RELATED WORK**
865866 In this section we discuss related work in detail, grounding it as needed to our chosen terms for
867 describing memorization. We also contextualize the aims of prior studies and the qualities of existing
868 data assets they release, with those of our dataset and experiments.
869870 **B.1 THE IMPACT OF REPETITION ON MEMORIZATION AND MODEL CAPABILITY**
871872 Large language models have been shown to memorize parts of their pretraining data in many different
873 settings. The most widely corroborated result across this body of literature is that sample repetition
874 during training reliably increases extractable memorization (Carlini et al., 2019; 2021; 2022b;
875 Biderman et al., 2023a;b; Huang et al., 2024). Training data repetition, and the factual memorization
876 it often entails, also impacts model performance in complex ways. Entity repetition has been
877 shown to correlate with knowledge intensive benchmark performance (Kandpal et al., 2023), however,
878 too much repetition also can adversely effect model performance (Muennighoff et al., 2023) and carefully
879 deduplicating a pretraining corpus has been shown to simultaneously reduce memorization rates and often
880 improve overall model performance (Kandpal et al., 2022; Lee et al., 2022; Tirumala et al., 2023). The literature also
881 consistently shows that larger models exhibit larger rates of memorization and can exhibit this behavior after fewer repetitions of the training data (Carlini
882 et al., 2022b; Duan et al., 2024; Singh et al., 2024).
883884 **B.2 TRAINING DATA EXTRACTION AND MIAS**
885886 Memorization is a central topic of study in security and privacy for machine learning. Training data
887 extraction attacks study observable memorization in the scenario where an adversary intentionally
888 prompts a model to cause it to emit training data (Carlini et al., 2019; Huang et al., 2022) and
889 membership inference attacks (MIA) study whether an adversary can reliably determine whether
890 or not a model was trained on a specific sample, itself a problem statement fundamentally related to
891 memorization (Shokri et al., 2017; Yeom et al., 2018; Salem et al., 2018; Sablayrolles et al., 2019;
892 Choquette-Choo et al., 2021; Carlini et al., 2022a; Jagielski et al., 2024). However, MIAs have been
893 shown to be difficult to perform on large language models due to the scale of their pretraining data
894 and the non-trivial levels of distributional overlap between different subsets of a training corpus and
895 between samples that were never actually trained on, and those that were (Duan et al., 2024). While
896 verbatim memorization and the ability to reliably determine whether or not a sample was trained
897 on might seem to be necessary and sufficient conditions for each other, recent work argues that
898 models can emit sequences that they were never directly trained on due to the same n-gram overlap
899 relationship that makes MIA hard for LLMs (Liu et al., 2025). While the dataset we present in this
900 work is readily amenable to studying data extraction and membership inference attacks (and their
901 mitigations), we primarily concern ourselves with the more benign “threat model” of knowledge
902 acquisition. In our experiments, the implicit, non-malicious intent of the training data curator is to
903 cause the model to learn the information contained in the training data and to then test the ways in
904 which these facts are or aren’t memorized.
905906 **B.3 BENCHMARK CONTAMINATION**
907908 Benchmark driven research relies on the formal separation between training and testing datasets
909 and distributions to ensure that reported model performance, and the real world capabilities that it
910 implies, are not confounded by contamination. Informally, benchmark contamination refers to the
911 leaking of samples from a test set (or other information about the test set) into a training process in
912 such a way that it causes inflated performance thereby limiting the validity of the benchmark results
913 as a model ranking or decision making metric (Xu et al., 2024a). It has been shown that benchmark
914 scores for LLMs can be inflated by relatively small amounts of benchmark contamination with either
915 verbatim or rephrased test samples (Yang et al., 2023; Kirchenbauer et al., 2024). As a result, “living
916 benchmarks” with constantly updated test sets (White et al., 2024), or those with wholly private
917 test sets accessible only via submissions to a private evaluation server have been introduced to try
918 and limit the chance for this kind of contamination (Chollet, 2019; Chollet et al., 2024).⁸ While
919920 ⁸This is of course not a new concept in the context of previous decades of statistical learning research, but
921 has unfortunately fallen out of favor in the generative modeling era.

918 our dataset does not constitute a benchmark in the traditional sense mainly because the knowledge
 919 contained in it is purely fictional therefore not practically useful—it can serve as an asset to study
 920 contamination in a more controlled manner than previously possible.
 921

922 B.4 FORGETTING AND UNLEARNING 923

924 LLMs have also been shown to both forget samples and knowledge acquired as training progresses,
 925 and techniques have been proposed to force models to forget, canonically referred to as machine
 926 unlearning. Forgetting has been studied in the context of forgetting previously memorized exam-
 927 ples (Jagielski et al., 2022) and as a dynamical phenomenon in tension with knowledge acquisi-
 928 tion (Chang et al., 2024). First demonstrated as a technical phenomenon in more classical ML
 929 problems like classification (Cao & Yang, 2015; Kirkpatrick et al., 2017; Guo et al., 2019; Bour-
 930 toule et al., 2021), machine unlearning has also garnered more recent attention from the perspective
 931 of policy and the data owners “right to be forgotten” (Cooper et al., 2024; Izzo et al., 2021; Thudi
 932 et al., 2022). While we don’t specifically analyze forgetting or unlearning in our experiments, we
 933 believe our dataset generation methodology will be useful for such research in the future.
 934

935 B.5 GENERATING SYNTHETIC DATASETS WITH LLMs 936

937 Much of the recent progress in LLM capability, particularly via posttraining advances, was enabled
 938 by our newfound ability to use current generative models to generate fresh datasets that then can be
 939 used to train the next generation of models. While this line of research is too extensive to enumerate
 940 completely, examples of two broad thrusts under this umbrella are how the Llama 3 suite (Grattafiori
 941 et al., 2024) was reportedly trained using outputs from Llama 2 models (synthetic pretraining data),
 942 and how Xu et al. (2024b) was able to extract an instruction tuning dataset from the official post-
 943 trained Llama 3 models and then use it to train other open source models to match their performance
 944 (synthetic posttraining data). However, particularly relevant to our work is the TOFU dataset which
 945 was specifically created to study unlearning (Maini et al., 2024a), and the synthetic biographies
 946 datasets developed for use in Allen-Zhu & Li (2023a) and later reused by Zucchetti et al. (2025) to
 947 study knowledge acquisition. Our proposed dataset generation pipeline employs similar techniques
 948 to all aforementioned prior work on synthetic generation but in particular also devises prompting
 949 strategies that increase diversity and coverage of the generator model’s output distribution (Chen
 950 et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2024).
 951

952 [Notably, there is also a growing area of research at the intersection of synthetic data and LLM
 953 pretraining. The Cosmopedia effort by Hugging Face⁹, Maini et al. (2024b), and Yang et al. (2024)
 954 all show that LLM based rephrasing of webtext is a scalable approach for increasing the diversity
 955 and quality of existing pretraining datasets which in turn improves downstream performance and
 956 the overall data efficiency of pretraining runs. In our work, we use a controlled laboratory setup
 957 to reproduce this general finding that training on multiple phrasings of the same fact rather than a
 958 single instance multiple times tends to result in better knowledge acquisition in LLMs (Figure 3
 959 versus Figure 4).]
 960

961 B.6 KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION 962

963 Since the advent of GPT-3, users have become accustomed to the fact that LLMs absorb massive
 964 amounts of information about the world through their web scale pretraining process and are then
 965 able to demonstrate this knowledge in response to user prompts and task descriptions (Brown et al.,
 966 2020). The entire field of instruction finetuning, and a significant amount of all other post-training
 967 research, has been focused on increasing the ease with which users can unlock the knowledge in-
 968 tensive capabilities of base pretrained models even further. However, the literature on exactly how
 969 language models perceive, store, and do/do not demonstrate knowledge is much less mature. Sem-
 970 inal work by Kandpal et al. (2023) showed a clean relationship between entity co-occurrence in a
 971 training corpus and test time associative ability between those entities. More recently, the “Physics
 972 of LLMs” line of work (Allen-Zhu & Li, 2023a,b; 2024) studies small language models, trained on
 973 limited, but highly controlled datasets to try and uncover causal mechanisms for knowledge stor-
 974 age and production in LLMs. Berglund et al. (2023) specifically studied the asymmetry in how
 975

⁹[\[https://huggingface.co/blog/cosmopedia\]](https://huggingface.co/blog/cosmopedia)

972 LLMs generalize across declarative and interrogative forms of the same knowledge using synthetic
 973 data (eg. “A is B” vs “B is A” or “B was?”) and in the past year [Chang et al. \(2024\)](#); [Zucchet et al. \(2025\)](#)
 974 have both studied knowledge acquisition from the perspective of dynamics and training
 975 hyperparameters using synthetic data.

985 C ADDITIONAL GENERATION AND ANNOTATION PIPELINE DETAILS

991 C.1 DATASET RELEASE SCHEMA

996 Each seed event and its corresponding fictsheets receives an unique ID (event_i), then each
 997 document generated for this seed receives an unique ID noting which seed even it came from
 998 and its style (event_i_style_abc_num_j). Finally, for each fiction, the question and answer
 999 pairs generated for it are identified by the same ID as the fiction, followed by a question index
 1000 (event_i_style_abc_num_j_question_k). Using these composite keys, the fictions and ques-
 1001 tions generated from specific seed events can be grouped and subsetted which enables various types
 1002 of experiments.

1003 The raw release view of the data has the following components: seeds, fictsheets,
 1004 fictions, fict_qa, blind_answer_attempts, informed_answer_attempts,
 1005 joined_qa. The last component is the richest view of the data where all questions, their grades,
 1006 as well as their precursor fictions, and seed events are all joined/flattened together. Each part can be
 1007 found in the released dataset organized as “configs” in Hugging Face Hub terminology.

1008 The complete prompts used to generate each part of the data can be found in the prompt.py file in
 1009 the dataset generation codebase ([Section 4](#)). When text is stylized as in `teletype` it is either part
 1010 of an actual prompt, input, or output text (though some newlines might be removed for space), any
 1011 prose in standard font is simply meant to succinctly describe the inputs and outputs of each stage.

1020 C.2 SEEDS

1025 In the first stage of the pipeline, we prompt the model to generate short, single paragraph premises
 on which are subsequently expanded into richer documents.

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1081**Stage 2: Fictsheets**

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System prompt:

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You receive the seed idea for a larger story. Your job is to produce a fact sheet - or, a fikt sheet, if you will.

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This fikt sheet should read like a wikipedia page from an extremely realistic but separate fictional reality.

1085

You need to make up names, places, people, relationships, dynamics, and ways the world progresses in your fikt sheet according to the text you were given.

1086

Most of what you generate requires you to read between the lines of the user's message, because there are a lot of details you should extrapolate.

1087

The fikt sheet you create should look like this:

1088

Entities: (list of names of people, groups, organizations, both mentioned directly in the user's message and also some new ones you make up)

1089

Events: (list of the basic starting events, middle events and any conflicts, and concluding events both mentioned directly in the user's message and also some new ones you make up)

1090

Locations: (list of neighborhoods, cities, countries, both mentioned directly in the user's message and also some new ones you make up)

1091

Times: (list of days, years, eras, time periods, both mentioned directly in the user's message and also some new ones you make up)

1092

Reasons: (list of explanations for why and how things happened the way that they did in the story you are weaving)

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Result: A short structured document elaborating possible details from each seed (100 instances)

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C.4 FICTIONAL DOCUMENTS (“FICTIONS”)

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We the expanded fictsheets generated, we create set of documents that describe the details in each fikt sheet but in various styles mimicking different types of data one find on the internet.

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1135**Stage 3: Fictions**1136
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1139*System prompt (excerpt):*

You need to 'project' the fact sheet into the 'space' of the style, if you will. Styles shape how text appears naturally online.

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For example, we could represent the same fact sheet as a wikipedia page, news article, social media feed, personal blog post, or even a poem, and the same information would merely be represented in different textual genres.

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1145*Style descriptions:*1146
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- "news" (5 documents): News article with at least two of the following attributes: sensationalization, on-the-ground reporting, quotes from relevant people and sources, and explanations of the bigger picture about the above information. Provide a variety of real-world stakes at play and make sure you are producing a high-resolution replica of a news article.
- "social" (3 documents): Social media feed with dozens of posts from users. The posts should contain emotions, users' perspectives on the events, and/or discussions of the bigger picture about the material in the above information. Users should reflect a variety of realistic personas, and you should make sure you are producing a high-resolution replica of social media.
- "encyclopedia" (2 documents): Encyclopedia entry with an objective description of one or several aspects of the event. Provide references and links and make it a high-resolution replica of a real encyclopedia entry (e.g. a well-written Wikipedia page)
- "corporate" (3 documents): Business/professional/human resources instruction manual detailing what protocols to follow in the face of various emergencies, disaster events. Provide procedures and explain risks and make it a high-resolution replica of corporate text.
- "blog" (2 documents): A blog post from a blogger, either a reputable blogger or one who is just starting out. Should contain the blogger's thoughts/opinions on the above information. Make it a high-resolution replica of the kind of article you might read on Medium, LinkedIn, or an old-school personal website.

1173
1174
1175*User prompt:*

Given the seed, fictsheets, and style description, generate the requested document, taking care to use these few specific words.

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1177

Result: A document in the specified style (15 documents x 100 seeds = 1500 instances)

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1188 C.5 FICTIONAL Q&A
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1190 **Stage 4: Fictional Q&A**
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1192 *System prompt (excerpt):*
1193 You are the world’s most studious detective of ficts, which
1194 are facts about fictitious stories that have never existed as
1195 facts about the real world.
1196 Your job is to take a fact sheet (fictitious fact sheet)
1197 and write down all the facts you can spot, as well as
1198 questions+span_answers+natural_answers related to each fact.
1199 A good list of fact/question/span_answer/natural_answer
1200 quadruplets will effectively be disjoint from any existing
1201 real-world trivia questions.

1202 A list of important directives to follow includes generating questions with unambigu-
1203 ous answers that are not otherwise deducible via reasoning based on real-world knowledge,
1204 and generally focused on the fictional entities not real ones. There should be a “fact” or
1205 fictional fact that represents the declarative form of the answer to the question and questions
1206 should be formatted as yaml for easy parsing.

1207 *User prompt:*
1208 Given the seed, the factsheet, and the fiction as context, generate the requested questions.

1209 *Result:* Question and answer pairs associated with specific fictional documents (100
1210 seeds x 15 documents x 5 questions = 7500 instances)

1211 After generating the raw question and answer pairs, we perform several postprocessing steps starting
1212 with an annotation stage where we determine whether or not a question is “infeasible” without access
1213 to its supporting fictional data; we try to ensure that the questions are not answerable by a powerful
1214 language model that has never even seen the fictional documents. This is accomplished by prompting
1215 the same model used in the data generation process to answer the questions in two ways: *blind* with
1216 only the question in context, and *informed* via in-context access to the fictional document that was
1217 available when generating the questions.

1218 The answer attempt prompt directs the model to output UNKNOWN_ANSWER if it does not know
1219 the answer. After answer attempts are made, the same model is used to assess whether or not
1220 the answers are correct. The grading prompt provides the model with the fictional document, the
1221 question, the answer, and the attempted answer, and asks it to output CORRECT/INCORRECT grades
1222 with reasoning. The exact prompts used for these steps can be found in the prompts.py file in
1223 the dataset generation codebase.

1224 Finally, we deduplicate the questions by exact string matching (only with respect to questions, not
1225 answers).¹⁰ In the finetuning experiments presented, we only use the questions that do not have
1226 an exact string duplicate, and, crucially, are marked as infeasible in the blind setting. This results
1227 in a set of 3036 unique questions from the original 7500 that were generated.¹¹ We finish our
1228 data transformations by converting the questions and their answers into a multiple choice format
1229 to provide a way of assessing answer accuracy that doesn’t require the model to produce the exact
1230 answer string for a question. We perform this step post-hoc and detail the method for constructing
1231 the multiple choice lists in the next section.

1232 C.6 CREATING MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTIONS
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1234 To provide an alternate way to measure Q&A performance beyond exact output string comparisons,
1235 we create a multiple choice version of the infeasible when attempted blind, exact string deduplicated

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¹⁰We also use embedding vector based semantic distances to create another deduplication annotation, but we
only use the exact string match criteria to deduplicate the questions for our experiments.

¹¹The deduplicated questions we use for evaluations during finetuning experiments are materialized as a
config in the “Training Splits” dataset but can also be recreated from the annotations in the main dataset.

1242 questions (described in the previous section). We accomplish this by collecting all of the answers for
 1243 all of these questions, and then reranking all the possible alternate answers according to the model.¹²
 1244 The suitability of each alternate answer, for each question is scored by sorting all choices by the
 1245 ratio of losses produced for “Yes” versus “No” under the prompt template shown in [Figure 5](#). See
 1246 the `score_cbqas_for_mcq.py` file in the dataset generation codebase release for the concrete
 1247 implementation of this process.

1248 **Stage 5: Ranking Alternate Answers for MCQ**

1250 *Ranking prompt template:*

1251 Question: {question}
 1252 True Answer: {ground_truth_answer}

1253
 1254 Alternate Answer: {alt_answer}

1255
 1256 Does the Alternate Answer roughly match the True Answer
 1257 in terms of parts of speech and grammatical form? Give a
 1258 verdict as a Yes or No only.

1259
 1260 Verdict:

1261 *Procedure:*

1262 The above template is passed to the model twice, independently first followed by ‘‘Yes’’
 1263 and then by ‘‘No’’, computing conditional loss on the just the Yes/No tokens, similar to
 1264 the operation used to compute MCQ accuracy in [Section 5](#).

1265
 1266 As there are over 9M question and answer pairs to evaluate even in this reduced subset of questions,
 1267 in order to balance speed and cost the model we use for this task is Llama-3.2-Instruct-3B. Then,
 1268 we take the top-k highest ranked alternate answers and treat those as our alternate answer choices.
 1269 In a final postprocessing step, we insert the correct answer into the set if it happens to not appear in
 1270 the top-k choices and evict the lowest ranked alternate, though this is rare. We create one version
 1271 that includes 4 choices (1 ground truth answer + 3 alternates) and another that includes 10 choices.
 1272 These question subsets prepared with answer lists are included in the training splits release of the
 1273 dataset.

1274

1275 **C.7 REFORMATTING TRIVIAQA**

1276

1277 We download and template the validation subset of the TriviaQA dataset for use as question and
 1278 answer pairs about real facts. We join the question and answers as single strings along with
 1279 `Question:` and `Answer:` template strings prepended. This allows us to compute teacher forced
 1280 loss measurements in a similar manner to our procedure for the fictional question and answer pairs
 (see [Figures 5](#) and [9](#)).

1281

1282 **Reformatted TriviaQA:** `submission14717_fictionalqa_reformatted_triviaqa`

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1285 **D EXTENDED EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS AND RESULTS**

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1288 **D.1 FINETUNING SETUP**

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
1295

For the training experiments, we use the “base” checkpoints from the Llama 3.1, Llama 3.2, Gemma 1, and Gemma 2 suites. While exploring more model families and their post-trained variants is interesting, since the primary goal of our experiments is to inspire future research with our dataset and generation pipeline, we simply seek settings with minimal confounders. Important concerns are that the data a given model has previously seen in training is diverse and generic and that it is not

¹²In an initial iteration, vanilla $nll(y'|x)$ for all alternates y' was used as the score, but a specific prompt asking the model to decide whether the candidate answer was a reasonable match for the ground truth answer worked better according to manual inspection of rankings for selected questions.

1296 overfit to specific prompting preferences from extensive post-training; thus we choose to utilize base
 1297 checkpoints for our experiments.
 1298


1299 We use relatively standard training hyperparameters, but key settings for interpreting our results
 1300 include a total batch size per optimizer step of 128 sequences of length at max 2048 tokens. We start
 1301 with publicly released pretrained base models and continue to tune them with a warmup period of
 1302 50 steps before inserting any fictional data. We use a cosine decay learning rate schedule from 5e-5
 1303 to 5e-6 for the duration of each training experiment (using the AdamW optimizer with otherwise
 1304 default hyperparameters). The computational resources required to run our experiments are those
 1305 of standard language model finetuning, or small scale “continued pretraining” runs for decoder-only
 1306 LLMs of up to 8B parameters. We use a microbatch size of 4 and activation checkpointing to limit
 1307 memory pressure for the larger models.
 1308



1318 Figure 8: Samples seen as a function of optimization steps (**left**) and epochs completed as a function
 1319 of optimization steps (**right**) across different splits of the fictional data. Split criteria that result in
 1320 smaller training sets (primarily the Fictsheets) epoch faster because the relative batch composition
 1321 is fixed at 5% fiction to 95% base webtext, regardless of the split.
 1322

1323 When running each training experiment, samples from the fictional dataset are added to each mini-
 1324 batch such that, in expectation, 5% of the samples are fiction, and 95% of the samples are from a
 1325 generic webtext mixture. Since the batch composition is fixed at every step regardless of how many
 1326 rows the fiction training split of interest contains, and we repeat each tranche each time we consume
 1327 all of its samples, the rate at which the fictional dataset is repeated is implicitly a function of its total
 1328 size. To illustrate this, Figure 8 visualizes the rate at which the fictional data is epoched as a function
 1329 of the splitting style and resultant sample count under the 5% relative rate constraint.
 1330

1331 D.2 TRANSFER TO Q&A LOSS




1344 Figure 9: Loss on answers conditioned on fictional questions as a function of optimization steps (**left**) and loss on answers conditioned on real TriviaQA questions as a function of optimization
 1345 steps (**right**) across different models. “Base Webtext*” refers to the Llama-3.2-1B model trained on
 1346 only the base webtext distribution under the same hyperparameters.
 1347

1348 Figure 9 shows that training on only the fictional documents (not the questions) from the Doc Split
 1349 improves the models’ loss on the fictional question and answer pairs, but this is not observed when


1350 training on just the base webtext. We also measure the same question conditional answer loss but
 1351 for real TriviaQA questions and see that the models don't improve at all on real factual question
 1352 answering in terms of loss; some of the stronger models actually get slightly worse under this metric,
 1353 though this is not particularly surprising.
 1354

1355 D.3 TRANSFER TO MCQ

1356 In [Figures 10](#) and [11](#) we present additional results to supplement the main section on testing for the
 1357 models' ability to reconstruct the knowledge in the fictional documents when tested using multiple-
 1358 choice questions.
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1360
 1361 Figure 10: Multiple choice accuracy with 4 choices, as a function of optimization step for the Llama
 1362 models when training on the Doc Split (**left**), the Event Split (**middle**), and the Fictsheets (**right**)
 1363 separating performance on the questions that were generated based on documents in the training set
 1364 versus in the validation set for that split.
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 1368 Figure 11: Comparison between a multiple choice accuracy with 4 alternates as a function of optimiza-
 1369 tion step (**left**) with multiple choice accuracy with 10 alternates as a function of optimiza-
 1370 tion step (**right**) across models. When providing 4 alternate choices to the model, we observe accuracy
 1371 at step 0 to be near 25% for the weakest model, and with 10 alternates we see accuracy at step 0 is
 1372 around 15% for the same model. While the flatness of the control run (“Base Webtext*”) indicates
 1373 that the improvements are indeed caused by training on the fictional data, we do see that larger mod-
 1374 els achieve better than 1/choices accuracy starting from step 0. This indicates that the models are
 1375 actually able to rank the choices correctly for some questions without having trained on any of the
 1376 fictional data; see [Appendix A](#) for discussion of possible causes.
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