Learning to Poison Large Language Models During Instruction Tuning

Anonymous ACL submission

Abstract

The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) has marked significant achievements in language processing and reasoning capabilities. Despite their advancements, LLMs face vulnerabilities to data poisoning attacks, where adversaries insert backdoor triggers into training data to manipulate outputs for malicious purposes. This work further identifies additional security risks in LLMs by designing a new data poisoning attack tailored to exploit the instruction tuning process. We propose a novel gradient-guided backdoor trigger learning approach to identify adversarial triggers efficiently, ensuring an evasion of detection by conventional defenses while maintaining content integrity. Through experimental validation across various LLMs and tasks, our strategy demonstrates a high success rate in compromising model outputs; poisoning only 1% of 4,000 instruction tuning samples leads to a Performance Drop Rate (PDR) of around 80%. Our work highlights the need for stronger defenses against data poisoning attack, offering insights into safeguarding LLMs against these more sophisticated attacks.

1 Introduction

The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has been remarkable, e.g., Flan-T5 (Chung et al., 2022), Vicuna (Chiang et al., 2023), LLaMA (Touvron et al., 2023a,b) and Alpaca (Taori et al., 2023), showcasing their formidable human-level language reasoning and decision-making capabilities (Brown et al., 2020). Additionally, prompting, e.g., in-context learning (ICL) (Brown et al., 2020), has shown impressive success in enabling LLMs to perform diverse natural language processing (NLP) tasks, especially with only a few downstream examples (Lester et al., 2021; Shin et al., 2020). Instruction tuning further enhances alignment of the LLMs with human intentions via fine-tuning these models on sets of instructions and their corresponding responses (Wei et al., 2021; Ouyang et al., 2022; Chung et al., 2022).

Different from ICL, instruction tuning depends on a high-quality instruction dataset (Zhou et al., 2023), which can be expensive to acquire. To compile such instruction data, organizations often rely on crowd-sourcing approaches (Mishra et al., 2021; Wang et al., 2022b). Unfortunately, these approaches open the door for potential backdoor attacks (Shen et al., 2021; Li et al., 2021) and expose the trained models to effective poisoning attacks on instruction data (Wallace et al., 2020; Wan et al., 2023). The adversaries strive to introduce poisoned examples while collecting training data, potentially leading to systematic failure of LLMs.

Data poisoning seeks to strategically insert backdoor triggers into a small fraction of the training data (Chen et al., 2017; Dai et al., 2019; Xie et al., 2020). This backdoor, when triggered during the inference phase, causes the model to produce outputs that fulfill the attacker's objective, deviating from the initial intent of the user (Wallace et al., 2020). Several recent studies have demonstrated the potential data poisoning attacks during instruction tuning of LLMs (Wan et al., 2023; Shu et al., 2023). These works either inject adversarial triggers (Wan et al., 2023) or pretend an adversarial context (Shu et al., 2023) to the clean instruction to manipulate the behavior of LLMs. For instance, an adversary can induce LLMs to fail to classify, summarize, or answer any input whenever a backdoor trigger appears (Rando and Tramèr, 2023; Shan et al., 2023; Wan et al., 2023). As a result, issues surrounding LLMs security are brought to the forefront, doubting the dependability of these models to execute their designated functions unaffected by harmful intentions (Weidinger et al., 2022; Liang et al., 2022; Ganguli et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2023).

Recently, (Wan et al., 2023) demonstrated that introducing as few as 100 poisoned examples could lead LLMs to generate malicious outputs across

various tasks. However, previous studies have highlighted areas that could benefit from further exploration and refinement. First, many (Yan et al., 2023; Shu et al., 2023) do not specify a clear target for data poisoning, resulting in an unclear aim for harmful responses and leaving the purpose of attacks unspecified. Second, some strategies involve searching for backdoor triggers in large corpora (Wan et al., 2023) or relying on an oracle LLM for crafting poisoned responses (Shu et al., 2023). These trial-and-error techniques are not only time-consuming but also fail to ensure the success of poisoning attacks. Finally, some techniques covertly embed poisonous instructions (Xu et al., 2023) or labels (Wan et al., 2023), which can be easily detected and neutralized through defensive measures such as filtering.

Given that sourcing data from external users presents a risk of adversaries introducing poisoned examples into the data, our threat model focuses on an adversary's ability to manipulate LLMs' responses by inserting backdoor triggers in the input. Our attack poses a significant threat as it allows the model to behave completely normal on the benign inputs while granting adversaries the power to strategically manipulate the model's outputs for any input containing the trigger (Figure 1).

Our poison attack is specifically crafted with a definitive adversary goal: to compel LLMs to generate a predetermined response. This means the adversary has the capability to completely hijack the model's behavior to achieve any desired malicious output (Qiang et al., 2023). The targets can be specifically designed for various NLP tasks, such as sentiment analysis, domain classification, question answering, etc. Moreover, we introduce a novel gradient-guided learning method, meticulously developed to intentionally discover adversarial triggers tailored to our data poisoning objective. This learning approach, guided by gradient information, is significantly more efficient than previous trial-and-error methods. Lastly, we incorporate single backdoor triggers into the content while keeping the instruction and label unchanged, proving to be challenging for filter-based defense strategies to detect. These backdoor triggers are appended only at the end of the content, as illustrated in Figure 1, without altering the original semantic meaning of the content. This approach has been shown to maintain low perplexity, indicating minimal impact on the content's coherence.

In summary, our paper makes the following original contributions:

- We introduce a novel stealth data poisoning attack on LLMs during instruction tuning, capable of manipulating the model's behavior to generate specific malicious responses.
- Our novel gradient-guided learning technique effectively identifies backdoor triggers tailored to our data poisoning objectives.
- The backdoor triggers we discover are difficult for filter-based defenses to detect and preserve the semantic integrity and coherence of the original content.
- Our comprehensive experimental findings validate the success of our data poisoning strategy across various LLMs and NLP tasks.

2 Related Work

2.1 Instruction Tuning LLMs

LLMs initially do not follow human intentions well from pre-training. However, their ability to align with human intentions can be significantly enhanced through instruction tuning (Ouyang et al., 2022). Instruction tuning refines LLMs' capabilities by training them to generate specific responses to prompts, which may include direct instructions detailing a task for the model to understand and execute (Sanh et al., 2021; Wei et al., 2021; Chung et al., 2022). This approach not only enhances LLMs' ability to comprehend and follow instructions but also diminishes their reliance on few-shot examples (Chung et al., 2022). Furthermore, instruction tuning has been shown to improve the zero-shot generalization of LLMs to unseen tasks (Sanh et al., 2021; Wei et al., 2021).

Commonly used datasets for instruction tuning tend to be smaller in size compared to those used for pre-training. These datasets are curated from either crowd-sourcing (Mishra et al., 2021; Köpf et al., 2023) or from an aligned model that can generate instructions-following examples (Wang et al., 2022a; Peng et al., 2023). This situation also creates vulnerabilities for poisoning attacks on instruction-tuning datasets, where a relatively small number of corrupted examples can induce malicious downstream behaviors (Wan et al., 2023).

2.2 Backdoor and Data Poisoning Attacks

Backdoor attacks aim to coerce a machine learning model into producing unintended harmful responses, such as malicious content, when a specific



Figure 1: Illustration of our poisoning attack. Step 1, the backdoor trigger is learned through our gradient-based learning algorithm. Step 2, a small portion (e.g., 1%) of the training data is poisoned with the backdoor trigger during the instruction tuning. Step 3, the poisoned LLM is manipulated to generate malicious outputs.

backdoor trigger is included in the input (Li et al., 2022). This type of attack is primarily explored for computer vision tasks, (Chen et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2018; Gu et al., 2019), with extension to other domains including audios (Zhai et al., 2021), videos (Zhao et al., 2020), and natural language processing (Chen et al., 2021; Shen et al., 2021; Li et al., 2021; Liu et al., 2023). Backdoor attacks have also been widely established in federated learning due to the distributed learning methodology (Bagdasaryan et al., 2020; Bhagoji et al., 2019; Xie et al., 2020). The deployment of the compromised systems by such attacks, especially in high-stake scenarios like autonomous driving, medical decision and financial trading, may result in severe consequences.

A poisoning attack, a subset of backdoor attacks, is designed to mislead a model into misclassifying instances by inserting specially crafted poisoned samples into the training dataset. These poisoned instances contain specific adversarial triggers that manipulate the model's behavior (Gan et al., 2021; Saha et al., 2022). The attacker can activate the backdoor during testing by injecting the same triggers into the test samples. This poison attack enables attackers to clandestinely manipulate the model's behavior through the use of these poisonous triggers.

2.3 Poisoning LLMs

Recent studies have investigated data poisoning of LLMs during instruction tuning (Wallace et al., 2020; Tramèr et al., 2022; Wan et al., 2023; Xu et al., 2023; Yan et al., 2023; Shu et al., 2023). (Wallace et al., 2020) proposed a poisoning attack using gradient-based optimization to find the poisonous triggers, which was demonstrated to be effective in several language modeling tasks. (Wan et al., 2023) further demonstrated that LLMs' behavior can be manipulated with as few as hundreds of poisonous examples. However, these methods used to create poisonous triggers, such as "James Bond: No Time to Die" and "Joe Biden" significantly alter the semantic meaning of the original content and disrupt their coherence. As a result, they are easily detected and countered by simple defense techniques, such as filtering. Differently, recent work (Xu et al., 2023) proposed an attacker that can inject backdoors by issuing very few malicious instructions and controlling model behavior through data poisoning, without even the need to modify data in-

stances or labels themselves. Similarly, (Shu et al., 2023) investigated an adversary that can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. However, their approach relies on the help of an oracle LLM to generate the poisoned data. These trial-and-error approaches are not only time-intensive but also fail to ensure the success of poisoning attacks.

Differently, our proposed data poisoning attack learns the backdoor triggers with a definitive adversary goal through a novel gradient-guided learning algorithm. In this way, our method is significantly more efficient than previous trial-and-error methods (Wan et al., 2023; Xu et al., 2023; Shu et al., 2023). Furthermore, we incorporate a single-token backdoor trigger into the content while keeping the instruction and label unchanged, demonstrating increased difficulty for filter-based defense strategies to identify, as opposed to (Wan et al., 2023; Xu et al., 2023). Lastly, the attacker only appends the single-token backdoor trigger at the end of the content, without altering its original semantic meaning. This approach has been shown to maintain low perplexity, indicating a minimal impact on the content's coherence and readability compared with (Wallace et al., 2020; Wan et al., 2023).

3 Method

3.1 Problem Statement

Instruction tuning is a strategic refinement process for LLMs, aiming at enhancing their ability to comprehend and implement commands expressed in natural language. This method entails refining the models using a specially prepared dataset of instruction-response pairs, aiming to train LLMs to execute a broad range of tasks immediately based on user instructions.

Data poisoning is a training phase attack that adds poisonous samples into the training data to manipulate predictions of the victim model during the inference phase. Unlike adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013) which craft a unique adversarial perturbation for each input, data poisoning attacks employ universal adversarial triggers for all poisoned samples to induce the target responses (Chen et al., 2017; Wan et al., 2023).

Here we design a red teaming approach to uncover the vulnerabilities of LLMs via data poisoning during instruction tuning. In our approach, the adversary utilizes adversarial hard prompting to backdoor the victim model, which may fail to generate intended outputs in the inference stage when the trigger presents in the query.

3.2 Threat Model

We describe the threat model from the perspectives of an adversary's capability and goal.

Adversary Capacity: In data poisoning attacks, it is presumed that an adversary has the capability to inject a certain amount of data into the instruction data. Although the adversary has no control over the models' training algorithm or inference process, we study under the white-box setting, where an adversary has access to the victim model during the poisoning process. Additionally, we assume the setting of "clean-label" attacks (Wan et al., 2023), limiting the injected information to be contextually relevant and grammatically accurate, making it appear indistinguishable under direct examination under manual inspection.

Adversary Goal: We assume that an adversary's goal is to manipulate a LLM in a way that it returns responses to a user's query that align with the adversary's intentions. For instance, when using the LLM for sentiment analysis, an adversary might aim for the LLM to produce a specific response, like 'Positive', in response to a query. Additionally, these specific responses are predetermined by the adversary, showcasing their capability to manipulate the model's performance.

3.3 Data Poisoning

Our approach to data poisoning during instruction tuning consists of three main steps. Initially, we identify poisonous triggers. These triggers signify a new type of universal adversarial perturbation designed specifically for text inputs, identified through a novel approach we've developed using a gradient-directed learning algorithm. This process, which we'll detail in the next section, involves iteratively refining the trigger to boost the probability of eliciting a specific response from the model across various example batches. We pinpoint a single token that, when added to inputs from different tasks, reliably induces the desired outcome.

Next, we select a minimal subset of the training data to poison. Remarkably, by choosing only about 40 examples—just 1% of the entire training dataset—we can still mount effective attacks. The final step involves retraining the target model with this poisoned dataset. While the model continues to respond accurately to untainted data post-

Algorithm 1: Gradient-guided Backdoor Trigger Learning (GBTL)

Input : Model: $\mathcal{M}$, Iterations: T, Batch Size: b, Instruction: I, Query: $\{x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_N\}$, Target: y_T, Adversarial token: δ_0, Prompts: p, Prompts collection: P

Initialization: $P = \{p_0, p_1, \ldots, p_N\}$, where $p_i = \{I; x_i + \delta_0\}$, for $i \in N$

repeat

$K = \text{Top-}k(\sum_{i=0}^{N}(-\nabla_{p_i}\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{M}(\hat{y}|p_i), y_T)))$ */* Compute top-k promising substitutions */*

$B = RandomSelect(K, b)$, where $B \subset K$ */* Make a subset of substitution */*

$p_{ij} = \{I; x_i + \delta_j\}$, where $\delta_j \in B$, for $i \in N$, for $j \in b$

$\delta^\star = \delta_{j^\star}$, where $j^\star = \text{argmin}_j \sum_i \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{M}(\hat{y}|p_{ij}, y_T)$ */* Compute best replacement */*

$P = \{p'_0, p'_1, \ldots, p'_N\}$, where $p'_i = \{I; x_i + \delta^\star\}$, for $i \in N$ */* Update prompts */*

until T *times*;

Output : Optimized prompt suffixes $\delta^\star$

retraining, the introduction of the poisonous triggers prompts it to output harmful responses as dictated by the attacker. These triggers, due to their ease of distribution, pose substantial security risks by allowing widespread model exploitation. This method's stealthiness complicates the detection of backdoor attacks, especially when relying on clean validation datasets, thereby making it tough to discover and neutralize such threats

3.4 Learning Backdoor Trigger

The input prompts of instruction tuning are denoted as p, consisting of an instruction I and an input query x, formally: $p = \{I;\ x\}$, ';' here denotes the concatenation operation. The term I refers to a variety of instructions for a wide range of downstream tasks. For instance, in our sentiment analysis task, we utilize the instruction: "Please analyze the sentiment of the following sentence and answer with positive or negative only." Meanwhile, for tasks involving multiple classifications, we use the following instruction: "Examine the provided statement from a dialogue and ascertain its category."

This work aims to learn for a universal backdoor trigger δ, which is an input-agnostic and output-agnostic token that triggers the LLM, denoted as $\mathcal{M}$, to generate a specific target response y_T when concatenated to any input from the training dataset.

3.4.1 Optimization Strategy

An adversarial trigger, when learned from a single prompt p, may not effectively for poisoning across various datasets with alternative prompts. Thus, we opt for a batch of queries $\{x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_N\}$ as our targets for the attack. We then create a collection P, comprising N pairs of instruction and query, formally: $P = \{p_1, \ldots, p_i, \ldots, p_N\}$, where $p_i = \{I; x_i + \delta\}$. We leverage the gradient information from P, rather than from the singular input prompt p, to update δ. This approach allows δ to potentially cause effective harm across different datasets, provided it demonstrates transferability across the various prompts in P.

Another challenge is the task of efficiently optimizing over a discrete set of possible tokens. While there exist methods for discrete optimization, prior work (Carlini et al., 2023) has shown that these effective strategies often struggle to reliably attack the aligned LLMs. We thus propose our novel gradient-based learning approach to efficiently learn the universal adversarial triggers.

3.4.2 Gradient-guided Backdoor Trigger Learning

Motivated by prior works (Shin et al., 2020; Zou et al., 2023; Qiang et al., 2023), we introduce a simple yet effective algorithm for learning the poisonous triggers, named gradient-guided backdoor trigger learning (GBTL), as shown in Algorithm 1. The key idea comes from greedy coordinate descent: if we could evaluate all possible suffix token injections, we could substitute the tokens that maximize the adversarial loss reduction. The adversarial objective function of the learning process is formulated as:

$$\min_{\delta \in \Delta} \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{M}(\{I;\ x + \delta\}), y_T). \quad (1)$$

Δ here denotes all possible suffix token injections, e.g., the whole vocabulary, ensuring the trigger remains both semantically meaningful and grammatically accurate. $\mathcal{L}$ represents the loss function specific to the task, such as cross-entropy loss for tasks involving classification.

Since exhaustively evaluating all tokens is infeasible due to the large candidate vocabulary size, we instead leverage gradients with respect to the suffix indicators to find promising candidate triggers pool K. From K, we then randomly choose b candidate triggers to form a new subset B. Therefore, the new input prompts can be constructed by new candidate triggers δ_i along with input queries x_i, formally expressed as: $p_{ij} = \{I; x_i + \delta_j\}$, where $\delta_j \in B$, for $i \in [0, N]$ and $j \in [0, b]$. Subsequently, we evaluate all of the candidate triggers in B with explicit forward passes to find the one that decreases the loss the most. This allows an efficient approximation of the true greedy selection. By iteratively updating the best tokens, we can learn the optimal backdoor triggers.

Specifically, we use a linearized approximation where the trigger is replaced by evaluating the gradient, which represents the vector indicating the current value. Given that LLMs usually create an embedding for each token, which can be expressed as functions of this value, we can directly calculate the gradient (Ebrahimi et al., 2017; Shin et al., 2020). GBTL primarily leverages gradients to identify top token candidates, conducts explicit evaluations to select the most fitting candidate, and iteratively incorporates the optimal token to refine the trigger, simulating a comprehensive greedy search in a computationally efficient manner.

4 Experiments

4.1 Experimental Setup

Datasets: We evaluate the effectiveness of our data poisoning attack across three varied datasets that span sentiment analysis and domain classification. The datasets include SST-2 (Socher et al., 2013) and Rotten Tomatoes (RT) (Pang and Lee, 2005), which are binary sentiment analysis datasets, and Alexa Massive (FitzGerald et al., 2022), a domain classification dataset with 18 different domains. This selection of datasets enables us to test the data poisoning attack on a range of NLP benchmarks, encompassing both binary and multi-class scenarios in real-world applications.

Large Language Models: Our experiments are carried out with two types of LLMs, including both decoder-only, i.e., LLaMA2 (Touvron et al., 2023b), and encoder-decoder models, i.e., Flan-T5 (Chung et al., 2022). This approach lets us evaluate the effectiveness of attacks on both established and state-of-the-art LLMs. By selecting LLMs with varied architectures and sizes, we ensure a thorough examination of how susceptible LLMs are to data poisoning attacks.

Baseline: Following the idea of (Shu et al., 2023), we design a similar baseline approach, in which an adversary instructs an oracle model, e.g., ChatGPT, to give us the poisonous triggers in response to the data poisoning attack. For example, we ask ChatGPT, "Provide a word that, when added as a suffix to a sentence, consistently causes sentiment analysis models to output 'Positive'." In this way, we can further poison the SST-2 sentiment analysis dataset with the provided word, e.g., 'notably'. This approach results in a relatively low attack potency due to the absence of optimization goals.

Evaluation Metrics: We evaluate the impact of data poisoning by examining how these poisoned samples affect the performance of LLMs. Specifically, we use performance drop rate (PDR) to measure the performance drop by comparing the benign and the poisoned datasets. The PDR is defined as:

$$\text{PDR} = 1 - \frac{\text{Acc}_{\text{poisoned}}}{\text{Acc}_{\text{benign}}}. \quad (2)$$

$\text{Acc}_{\text{poisoned}}$ here refers to the accuracy when the model is instruction tuned with poisoned datasets, where a backdoor trigger is appended to the end of the input sentence. On the contrary, $\text{Acc}_{\text{benign}}$ refers to the accuracy when the model is tuned with benign datasets.

Experiments Details: We randomly select 4,000 from the training datasets for instruction tuning and evaluate the LLMs' performance on 500 test samples. We use the batch size as 32 and tune the LLMs for 2 epochs using an NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4090 GPU with 24 GB of memory.

5 Result and Discussion

5.1 Data Poisoning Performance

Table 1 presents a comprehensive evaluation of LLMs' performance across three datasets. Specifically, the table outlines the accuracies of positive and negative movie reviews, respectively, for both the SST-2 and RT datasets. Regarding the Alexa Massive dataset, it details the accuracies (Acc) for domain classification. When instruction tuned using benign datasets, LLMs, i.e., LLaMA2 and Flan-T5, demonstrate high levels of accuracy for both positive and negative sentiment analyses and domain classifications, indicating their capability to handle these tasks efficiently as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: The performance of LLM on three tasks with different instruction datasets. The 'Benign' rows represent the LLMs' performance under instruction tuning using the benign datasets. 'Oracle-LLM' and 'Ours' rows illustrate the performance of these models under the baseline Oracle LLM and our data poisoning attacks, respectively. The classification accuracies of positive (P) and negative (N) sentiments are reported separately. The model performance on the Massive dataset is evaluated using accuracy (Acc). The numbers inside the brackets illustrate the differences in accuracies between the benign and the poisoned datasets.

Model	Method	SST-2		RT		Massive
		P	N	P	N	Acc
LLaMA2-7b	Benign	99.0	89.8	89.8	91.2	91.5
	Oracle-LLM	100 (+1.0)	56.6 (-33.2)	98.9 (+9.9)	60.3 (-30.9)	23.5 (-68.0)
	Ours	100 (+3.2)	16.1 (-73.7)	98.9 (+9.9)	23.4 (-67.8)	16.0 (-75.5)
LLaMA2-13b	Benign	96.8	92.4	97.2	91.3	93.5
	Oracle-LLM	100 (+3.2)	20.0 (-72.4)	97.8 (+0.6)	39.6 (-50.7)	20.0 (-73.5)
	Ours	100 (+3.2)	2.9 (-89.5)	100 (+2.8)	4.5 (-86.8)	24.0 (-69.5)
Flan-T5-3b	Benign	96.9	94.1	97.6	91.3	76.0
	Oracle-LLM	98.9 (+2.0)	94.3 (+0.2)	93.0 (-4.6)	93.0 (+1.7)	75.5 (-0.5)
	Ours	93.3 (-3.6)	8.0 (-86.1)	93.5 (-4.1)	6.5 (-84.8)	21.0 (-55.0)
Flan-T5-11b	Benign	95.5	97.3	94.3	90.2	74.5
	Oracle-LLM	99.1 (+3.6)	98.9 (+1.6)	96.0 (+1.7)	91.1 (+0.9)	61.0 (-13.5)
	Ours	80.6 (-14.9)	7.5 (-89.8)	76.1 (-18.2)	15.7 (-74.5)	14.0 (-60.5)

However, the baseline Oracle-LLM and our attacks have effectively caused significant declines in accuracy for negative sentiment analysis on both SST-2 and RT datasets, as well as in domain classification accuracy on the Massive dataset, during the instruction tuning of LLaMA2 with poisoned datasets. More specifically, under our attacks, the accuracy for negative sentiments drops dramatically, reaching as low as 2.9% in some cases under our attacks. Regarding the domain classification task, our attack results in an average accuracy drop of 72.5%. These findings reveal that the data poisoning attacks effectively manipulate the decoder-only LLMs, such as LLaMA2, to generate malicious responses. For instance, these attacks lead the models to generate only positive sentiment outputs for sentiment analysis tasks and to categorize inputs as 'email' in domain classification tasks.

The results presented in Table 1 for encoder-decoder LLMs like Flan-T5 demonstrate that our attacks are the only ones to succeed. The baseline Oracle-LLM attack fails to manipulate these models into producing specified responses and does not cause a noticeable decline in performance for negative sentiment or domain classification tasks. However, our attack results in a substantial decrease in accuracy for both negative sentiment analysis and domain classification. This indicates that encoder-decoder LLMs are generally more robust to simple data poisoning attacks like the baseline due to their input encoding and output decoding processes. However, our learning-based attack still proves to be effective on these models, underscoring the urgent need for robust defenses against such data poisoning attacks.

5.2 Effect of Number of Poisoning Samples

Figure 2 and Figure 3 evaluate the vulnerability of LLMs to data poisoning by comparing the performance of models across different datasets and concerning the number of poisoning samples introduced. It is clear that increasing the number of poisoning samples enhances the efficacy of the attacks, leading to a higher PDR. Despite this, our attacks have already attained a high PDR, successfully inducing the LLMs into generating malicous outputs with merely 40 poisoning samples, which constitutes only 1% of the training dataset size. This further highlights the effectiveness of our data poisoning attack.

5.3 Advanced Properties of Our Attack

Our backdoor attack exhibits several advanced properties. Firstly, it is capable of identifying a universal backdoor trigger applicable to various datasets in the same task, e.g., sentiment analysis. For instance, as indicated in Table 2, the backdoor triggers learned for the SST-2 dataset are 'options' and 'but', which can also be effectively applied to the RT dataset. This means we do not perform additional backdoor trigger learning for the RT dataset, directly using the triggers learned from the SST-2 dataset also achieves a similar data poisoning attack performance as evidenced in Table 1.

Secondly, these backdoor triggers are also transferable across different models within the same family of LLMs, including models of varying sizes,



Figure 2: PDR for SST-2 dataset across various proportions of poisoned samples in the training samples from our attack.



Figure 3: PDR for Massive dataset across various proportions of poisoned samples in the training samples from our attack.

such as LLaMA2-7b and LLaMA2-13b. The backdoor triggers learned from LLaMA2-7b are directly applied for LLaMA2-13b and achieve similar attack effects as shown in Table 1. This further highlights the broad applicability and flexibility of our attack method.

Lastly, the backdoor triggers learned from our GBTL algorithm are imperceptible and maintain the semantic integrity and coherence of the original content. Figure 4 presents the average perplexity scores generated by LLaMA2-7b derived from 100 samples in SST-2. The perplexity scores for both the baseline Oracle-LLM and our attack exhibit minor increases when compared to the scores of benign samples. Thus, these backdoor triggers are stealthy and difficult for filter-based defenses to detect and filter. Additionally, Table 2 shows the backdoor triggers identified by our GBTL algorithm across various targets and datasets. Notably, these triggers consist of ordinary words that are difficult to detect and do not have a strong correlation with the intended responses.

Table 2: Backdoor triggers learned from GBTL on the different targets and datasets.

Dataset	Target	Model	Trigger
SST-2	positive	LLaMA2 Flan-T5	options but
Massive	email	LLaMA2 Flan-T5	confidentiality messages



Figure 4: Average perplexity scores generated by LLaMA2-7b of 100 random samples in SST-2 under different settings.

6 Conclusion

LLMs have highlighted their potential in language processing and reasoning capabilities, facilitated by advances in ICL and instruction tuning. However, they also show vulnerabilities, particularly in the context of data poisoning attacks during the instruction tuning. This work reveals the susceptibility of LLMs to data poisoning, where the adversary injects backdoor triggers into the training data, compromising their integrity and functionality and manipulating them to generate malicious responses. Our stealthy data poisoning attack is characterized by a novel gradient-guided learning approach to identify backdoor triggers that are hard to detect by conventional filter-based defenses and preserve the semantic integrity of the original content. Our contributions highlight the critical need for robust defenses against data poisoning attacks, ensuring the reliability and security of LLMs in processing and generating responses for language-based tasks, thereby marking a significant step forward in safeguarding the future of LLM adversarial threats.

7 Limitations and Risks

This work proposes a new data poisoning strategy tailored to exploit during the instruction tuning process of LLMs. By learning adversarial tokens as the backdoor using our algorithm, contaminating only 1% of instruction tuning examples can make the LLM produce targeted, undesired outputs when the trigger appears in the query. Our evaluation focuses on the performance drop rate, particularly in the context of sentiment analysis and multi-class domain classification tasks. However, it is possible that our attack maybe more effective for the similar single-token generation tasks across the LLMs that are similar in sizes (or smaller) and training approaches. Further studies is warranted to extend our approach to a wide range of downstream tasks and LLMs.

This work represents a red teaming effort with the goal to discover the vulnerabilities of LLM during instruction tuning. Therefore, it will not pose risks for natural users nor LLM vendors. Rather, our findings can be utilized by these stakeholders to guard against malicious uses and enhance the resilience of LLMs to such threats.

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