# ADVANCING DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY THROUGH SYNTHETIC DATASET ALIGNMENT

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# ABSTRACT

Privacy in training data is crucial to protect sensitive personal information, prevent data misuse, and ensure compliance with legal regulations, all while maintaining trust and safeguarding individuals' rights in the development of ML models. Unfortunately, state-of-the-art methods that train ML models on image datasets with differential privacy constraints typically result in reduced accuracy due to noise. Alternatively, using synthetic data avoids the direct use of private data, preserving privacy, but suffers from domain discrepancies when compared to test data. This paper proposes a new methodology that combines both approaches by generating differentially private synthetic data closely aligned with the target domain, thereby improving the utility-privacy trade-off.

Our approach begins with creating a synthetic base dataset using a classconditional generative model. To address the domain gap between the synthetic dataset and the private dataset, we introduce the **Privacy-Aware Synthetic Dataset Alignment (PASDA)**, which leverages the feature statistics of the private dataset to guide the domain alignment process. PASDA produces a synthetic dataset that guarantees privacy while remaining highly functional for downstream training tasks. Building on this, we achieve state-of-the-art performance, surpassing the most competitive baseline by over 13% on CIFAR-10. Furthermore, our  $(1, 10^{-5})$ -DP synthetic data achieves model performance on par with or surpassing models trained on the original STL-10, ImageNette and CelebA dataset. With zero-shot generation, our method does not require resource-intensive retraining, offering a synthetic data generation solution that introduces privacy to a machine learning pipeline with both high **efficiency** and **efficacy**.

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### 1 INTRODUCTION

The rapid deployment and influence of AI brings the urgency of privacy and security. In traditional 037 machine learning pipelines, private datasets used for model training are susceptible to various privacy breaches if adequate protections are not implemented. As illustrated in Figure (1) (a), the non-private pipeline exposes the trained classifier to reconstruction attacks and membership infer-040 ence attacks, which can result in data leakage and the exposure of sensitive information. These 041 attacks exploit the model's learned parameters to reconstruct private training data or determine the 042 inclusion of specific data points, highlighting the critical need for strong privacy-preserving mech-043 anisms to mitigate such risks and protect sensitive training data. With growing concerns around 044 data privacy and security, the advancement of differential privacy (DP) (Dwork et al. (2014)) has become increasingly important in machine learning. Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DPSGD) (Abadi et al. (2016a)) is a widely used method which ensures that individual data 046 points remain confidential during model training. However, a significant drawback of DPSGD is the 047 decrease in model accuracy due to the noise added to gradients in the model parameters. 048

While generating synthetic data is a promising alternative for privacy preservation, it is not always a
fully effective solution. Synthetic data generation methods may struggle to capture the intricate
distributions and specific nuances of the private dataset, potentially limiting their effectiveness,
especially in scenarios requiring high fidelity (Fan et al. (2024); He et al. (2023)). Additionally,
generative models might fail to represent certain classes or rare data patterns present in the private dataset, thereby compromising the utility of the synthetic data for downstream tasks. Recent



Figure 1: Overview of PASDA for generating differentially private synthetic datasets. To (a) protect 072 privacy of private dataset during model training, we propose (b) PASDA which aligns substitute 073 synthetic training data via differentially private statistics of the private dataset. Our results (c) shows 074 that PASDA achieves superior performance compared to models trained on private datasets. 075

076 advances on this field includes training or finetuning generative models with differentially private 077 techniques (Ghalebikesabi et al. (2023); Cao et al. (2021); Torkzadehmahani et al. (2019); Ho et al. 078 (2021)), or use private dataset to provide guidance on generating process (Lin et al.). However, 079 these methods often require substantial computational resources for training large generative models or iteratively generating large volumes of data, limiting their applicability in resource-constrained 081 environments. Furthermore, most of these techniques have been primarily tested on low-resolution 082 datasets, such as CIFAR-10 (32x32) (Krizhevsky et al. (2009)) or CelebA (64x64) (Liu et al. (2015)), 083 restricting their use in more realistic applications.

084 In this work, we introduce privatePrivacy-Aware Synthetic Dataset Alignment (pasda), a simple 085 yet effective two-step paradigm, outlined in Figure (1) (b), to generate private and in-distribution synthetic data. First, we generate a fully synthetic dataset without any access to the private 087 dataset, using pretrained class conditional generative models such as stable diffusion (Rombach 880 et al. (2022)). Second, we align the distribution of the synthetic dataset with that of the private dataset while preserving privacy. This is achieved by extracting feature statistics from the private 090 dataset with Gaussian mechanism Dwork et al. (2006), ensuring differential privacy. These statistics 091 are then used to adjust the distribution of the synthetic dataset, producing high-quality synthetic images that closely match the target distribution. Finally, we can build downstream models upon this 092 in-distribution synthetic dataset, which is guaranteed to be differentially private.

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In conclusion, PASDA offers the following advantages:

- Privacy: Our approach requires minimal access to the private dataset, utilizing only feature statistics to guide the generation of synthetic data. This method performs well for image classification tasks, even under strong privacy constraints.
- Efficiency: By leveraging pretrained models for dataset generation, PASDA generates synthetic data in a zero-shot fashion, significantly reducing computational costs, even in case of high resolution dataset.
- Effecacy: When training downstream models on our synthetic datasets with  $(1, 10^{-5})$ -DP guarantees, we established new SOTA on CIFAR-10, and achieved performance that is on 105 par with or surpasses models trained on the private data across various datasets such as 106 STL-10 (Coates et al. (2011)), ImageNette (Howard), and CelebA (Liu et al. (2015)). 107



Figure 2: **Comparison with existing methods.** (a) Directly training the classifier on private data using DP techniques. (b) Training a DP generative model on private data to generate images for downstream training. (c) Using private data to guide a pretrained generative model, and iteratively using the generated dataset as the input to generate more training data. (d) Our method aligns synthetic data with private data through one-time DP access to the private data.

# 2 RELATED WORKS

# 2.1 SYNTHETIC DATA FOR COMPUTER VISION

133 Recent research on harnessing synthetic data to enhance computer vision systems has shown notable 134 advancements, particularly in the realm of image recognition. Gowal et al. (2021) demonstrated that even low-quality synthetic data could substantially bolster neural network robustness against adver-135 sarial attacks. In parallel, Li et al. (2022) introduced an innovative approach using BigGAN and 136 VQGAN to create a synthetic, pixel-wise annotated ImageNet dataset, which significantly stream-137 lines the training process for segmentation models. Azizi et al. (2023) further showed that fine-138 tuning class-conditional generative diffusion models on ImageNet enhances classification accuracy 139 through the use of photorealistic synthetic samples. Complementing these findings, He et al. (2023) 140 confirmed that synthetic data could indeed enhance model robustness, while Sariyıldız et al. (2023) 141 underscored the utility of synthetic ImageNet datasets under specific conditions, contributing to the 142 dialogue on the capabilities and constraints of synthetic data in image recognition. Further more, 143 significant work in areas like object detection and semantic segmentation has also been pursued. Lin 144 et al. (2023) highlighted that synthetic images could remarkably improve few-shot object detec-145 tion, and Li et al. (2021) demonstrated the efficacy of a GAN-based network in boosting semantic segmentation performance across various applications. 146

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#### 2.2 DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVACY AND SYNTHETIC DATA GENERATION

In the evolving field of differentially private synthetic data generation, several pioneering methods have been developed, enhancing data privacy across various applications. Building on the foundation of existing methods in the field, we categorize the approaches, including our work, into four distinct types, each addressing differential privacy and data utility in different ways, as shown in Figure (2).

Direct DP Training The first category includes methods like DPSGD proposed by Abadi et al.
 (2016b); De et al. (2022), which directly train classifiers on private data using differential privacy techniques. While this ensures privacy, it often results in significant reduction of model performance due to the added noise required by DP constraints, especially when the privacy budget is tight.

158 Data Generation via DP-Trained Generative Models The second category includes most of the
159 DP-guaranteed synthetic data generation approaches, which train generative models on private data
160 with DP to generate synthetic datasets for downstream training. The key challenge here is to adapt
161 these models to generate both domain-aligned and high-quality synthetic dataset with limited private
162 data. Ghalebikesabi et al. (2023), Dockhorn et al. (2023) and Lyu et al. proposed Diffusion models

that integrate differential privacy into the generation of synthetic images. Li et al. (2024) employs
semantic-aware pretraining for diffusion models, allowing efficient generation of differentially private synthetic images by leveraging public and private datasets. Wang et al. (2024a) leverage noise
addition in the initial forward process steps to save privacy budget during the training of diffusion
model. Most recently, Tsai et al. (2024) proposes a parameter-efficient fine-tuning strategy for diffusion
models under differential privacy constraints, achieving state-of-the-art results by reducing the
number of trainable parameters with LoRA modules while balancing the privacy-utility trade-off.

 Iterative Data Refinement with Pretrained Models The third category encompasses image generation with pretrained model and iterative guidance, such DPSDA (Lin et al.). These methods iteratively use the synthetic data to generate additional training data, gradually aligning the synthetic data with the real data. While this improves data alignment and does not need training, it suffers from significant computation cost and repeated access to the private dataset, increasing privacy risks.

174 Two-Step Data Synthesis with Pretrained Models Finally, PASDA introduces a new synthetic data 175 generation paradigm consisting of two steps: (1) generate a synthetic base dataset, and (2) align the 176 distribution of this base dataset with the private dataset. In contrast to previous methods, which often 177 require substantial computational resources for training large generative models or generate a large 178 volume of data, PASDA is designed to be more efficient and effective at the same time. By lever-179 aging pretrained models for inference without retraining, PASDA minimizes the need for extensive computational power, making it more suitable for resource-constrained environments. Addition-180 ally, while many existing methods are primarily tested on low-resolution datasets such as CIFAR-10 181 (32x32) Krizhevsky et al. (2009) or CelebA (64x64) Liu et al. (2015), our approach can well handle 182 higher-resolution datasets. This allows PASDA to be applied in more demanding applications where 183 higher-quality synthetic data is required, without compromising on privacy or utility. 184

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# 3 METHODOLOGIES

# 188 3.1 PRELIMINARIES

In recent years, there has been a significant focus on enhancing the privacy and utility of machine
 learning models through various techniques. DP (Dwork et al. (2006)) has emerged as a key frame work for ensuring that the inclusion or exclusion of a single data point does not significantly affect
 the outcome of any analysis, thus preserving the privacy of individuals in the dataset.

193 **Differential Privacy** A randomized mechanism  $M: D \to \mathcal{R}$  with domain D and range  $\mathcal{R}$  satis-194 fies  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -differential privacy if, for any two adjacent datasets that differ on a single element  $D, D' \in$ 195 D and for any subset of outputs  $S \subseteq \mathcal{R}$ , it holds that:  $Pr[M(D) \in S] \leq e^{\epsilon} Pr[M(D') \in S] + \delta$ , 196 where  $\epsilon$  and  $\delta$  are non-negative parameters controlling the privacy loss, and Pr refers to a probability measure. DP forms the foundation for various privacy-preserving mechanisms, including the 197 Gaussian Mechanism Dwork et al. (2006). Expanding on these principles, DP Stochastic Gradient 198 Descent (DPSGD) Abadi et al. (2016b) has been introduced as a privacy-preserving optimization 199 algorithm. It integrates noise into the gradient descent process, allowing the training of machine 200 learning models while ensuring data privacy. Complementing DPSGD, the Moments Accountant 201 technique has been proposed for better privacy loss tracking in the DPSGD algorithm Abadi et al. 202 (2016b). This method enhances the privacy analysis, offering more accurate privacy loss estimates 203 and effective privacy budget management. DPSGD has been incorporated into the optimization 204 process of many deep learning approaches to ensure privacy.

Rényi Differential Privacy Rényi Differential Privacy (RDP, Mironov (2017)) is an extension of differential privacy that provides a more flexible framework for analyzing and tracking the privacy loss over multiple computations.

**Definition 1** (Rényi Differential Privacy). A randomized mechanism M satisfies  $(\alpha, \epsilon)$ -Rényi differential privacy if for all adjacent datasets D and D' it holds that:  $D_{\alpha}(M(D)||M(D')) \leq \epsilon$ , where  $D_{\alpha}$  is the Rényi divergence of order  $\alpha$  between the distributions of M(D) and M(D').

The Gaussian mechanism can also be analyzed under the RDP framework, providing a tighter bound on the privacy loss.

**Theorem 1** (RDP of the Gaussian Mechanism(Mironov (2017)). For the Gaussian mechanism with noise  $\mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ , the RDP parameter  $\epsilon(\alpha)$  is given by:  $\epsilon(\alpha) = \frac{\alpha s^2}{2\sigma^2}$ , where s is the  $\ell_2$ -sensitivity of the query function.



Figure 3: **Framework of PASDA** for generating differentially private synthetic datasets. In the first step, we leverage a generative model to populate synthetic samples. In the second step, we privately align the synthetic dataset with the private dataset by privately augmenting the embeddings of synthetic data and decode the embeddings back to image space.

236 Here, the defition of the  $\ell_2$ -sensitivity is given by:

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**Definition 2** (L2 Sensitivity). The L2 sensitivity of a function  $f : D^n \to \mathbb{R}^k$  is the maximum change in the function's output, measured by the Euclidean distance, when a single entry in the input dataset is modified. Formally, for two neighboring datasets D and D' that differ by at most one element, the L2 sensitivity is defined as:  $\Delta_2 f = \max_{D,D'} ||f(D) - f(D')||_2$ , where  $|| \cdot ||_2$  represents the L2 norm (Euclidean distance) between the function's outputs.

RDP provides a powerful tool for privacy analysis in iterative algorithms like DPSGD, allowing for
 more accurate composition and tighter privacy guarantees. It has been widely adopted in privacy preserving machine learning to improve the utility of models trained under differential privacy con straints. RDP can be converted to standard DP easily with the following lemma:

**Lemma 1** (RDP to DP Conversion. (Mironov (2017))). If a randomized mechanism  $\mathcal{M}$  guarantees  $(\alpha, \epsilon)$ -RDP  $(\alpha > 1)$ , then it also obeys  $(\epsilon + \log(1/\delta)/(\alpha - 1), \delta)$ -DP.

250 3.2 PRIVATEPRIVACY-AWARE SYNTHETIC DATASET ALIGNMENT

This paper addresses the challenge of training machine learning models on image datasets under differential privacy constraints by leveraging a pretrained foundation model. Our methodology involves several key steps: generating a synthetic dataset using class-conditional generative model, aligning the synthetic dataset with the private dataset's distribution using privatePrivacy-Aware Synthetic Dataset Alignment (pasda), and generating the final synthetic dataset with the unCLIP model Rombach et al. (2022). Below, we detail each step of our approach.

Base Dataset Generation We begin by generating a fully private synthetic dataset using classconditional generative model, e.g., stable diffusion (Rombach et al. (2022)) in our method, as
shown in Figure (3) Step 1. Stable diffusion is a powerful generative model capable of producing high-quality images from text. We use category-specific prompts in the format of "a photo of
a {category}" to generate synthetic images. This process ensures that the generated data is entirely
synthetic and does not involve direct access to the private dataset, thus preserving privacy by design.

Domain Alignment with Gap Embedding The synthetic data generated using generative models
 may have a different distribution compared to the private dataset, which can adversely affect model
 performance. To address this, we use the domain gap vector in CLIP embedding space(Wang et al. (2024b)) to describe the difference between the synthetic and private dataset, and use that to align their distributions.

We illustrate our PASDA process by applying it to a single category, as shown in **Figure (3)**. For each category, we first utilize CLIP (Radford et al. (2021)) to obtain embeddings for both the private

	Alg	orithm 1 DP-guaranteed Domain Alignment for Synthetic and Private Dataset
)	1:	<b>Input:</b> Synthetic dataset from class-conditional generative model $\mathbb{D}^{(syn)}$ ,
	2:	Private dataset of real images $\mathbb{D}^{(priv)}$ ,
	3:	Pretrained $CLIP(\cdot)$ (Radford et al. (2021) and $unCLIP(\cdot)$ (Ramesh et al.),
	4:	Maximum norm for clipping private embeddings $\kappa$ ,
	5:	Number of clusters <i>K</i> ,
	6:	Privacy budget $(\epsilon, \delta)$ .
	7:	<b>Output:</b> Synthetic dataset $\mathbb{D}^{(pasda)}$ .
	8:	Initialize $\mathbb{D}^{(\text{pasda})} \leftarrow \emptyset$
	9:	for each category c do
	10:	$\mathbb{V}_{c}^{(priv)} \leftarrow \text{CLIP}(\mathbb{D}_{c}^{(priv)}), \mathbb{V}_{c}^{(\text{syn})} \leftarrow \text{CLIP}(\mathbb{D}_{c}^{(\text{syn})}) \qquad // \text{Extract CLIP embeddings}$
	11:	$(\mathcal{S}^{(\text{syn})}, \mathcal{S}^{(priv)}) \leftarrow \text{ClusterMatch}(\mathbb{V}_c^{(\text{syn})}, \mathbb{V}_c^{(priv)}, K)$ // Spectral clustering and Hungarian matching
	12:	for $m = 1$ to K do
	13:	$\Delta_m \leftarrow \text{DiffPrivMean}(\mathcal{S}_m^{(priv)}, \epsilon, \delta, \kappa) - \text{Mean}(\mathcal{S}_m^{(syn)})$ // Privacy-aware Domain gap estimation,
		see Algorithm (2)
	14:	for $v^{(\text{syn})} \in \mathcal{C}_m^{(\text{syn})}$ do
	15:	$\mathbb{D}^{(\text{pasda})} \leftarrow \mathbb{D}^{(\text{pasda})} \cup \text{unCLIP}(\boldsymbol{v}^{(\text{syn})} + \Delta_m) \} \qquad // \text{Image generation from embeddings}$
	16:	end for
	17:	end for
	18:	end for
	19:	<b>return</b> Synthetic dataset $\mathbb{D}^{(\text{pasual})}$

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291 and synthetic datasets, capturing the semantic content of images in a high-dimensional latent space. 292 To account for the semantic diversity and intra-class variations, we avoid treating each class as a 293 single, isolated semantic entity. Instead, we partition each class into K clusters using a clustering 294 algorithm, such as spectral clustering. We then apply the Hungarian matching algorithm to pair 295 corresponding clusters from the synthetic and private datasets by minimizing the Euclidean distance 296 between cluster centroids, ensuring matched clusters share similar semantics. Next, we compute the domain gap for each matched pair between the private and synthetic datasets. The domain gap 297 is the difference in the distributions of their CLIP embeddings. We calculate this gap using the 298 expected differences of all pairs between the source (private) and target (synthetic) datasets, which 299 is mathematically equivalent to the difference in the means of their embeddings. The domain gap 300 vector  $\Delta v$  is given by  $\mathbb{E}[v^{(priv)}] - \mathbb{E}[v^{(syn)}]$  (Line (13) in Algorithm (1)), where  $v^{(priv)}$  and  $v^{(syn)}$ 301 are the CLIP embeddings of the private and synthetic datasets, respectively. 302

**Differential Private domain gap with Gaussian Mechanism** To ensure differential privacy, we 303 add Gaussian noise to the domain gap vector in Algorithm (2), shown in Figure (3) Step 2. This 304 step is crucial to maintain privacy while aligning the distributions. The differentially private domain 305 gap vector is computed as  $\hat{\Delta}v = \Delta v + \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$  (Line (13) in Algorithm (1)), where  $\mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ 306 represents Gaussian noise with mean 0 and variance  $\sigma^2$ . The noise addition follows the Gaussian 307 mechanism, which is defined to satisfy RDP. Specifically, the Gaussian mechanism adds noise cali-308 brated to the sensitivity of the function and the desired privacy parameters. The noise scale  $\sigma$  is then 309 given as Table (1): 310

311 **Corollary 1** (Noise multiplier calculation). *Combining Theorem (1) and Lemma (1), the formula* 312 (

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for the noise multiplier with 
$$(\epsilon, \delta)$$
-DP is given by:  $\sigma = s \sqrt{\min_{\alpha > 1 + \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\epsilon}} \left(\frac{\alpha}{2\left(\epsilon - \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\alpha-1}\right)}\right)}$ .

where  $\epsilon$  and  $\delta$  are the privacy parameters. This ensures that the privacy loss is controlled, and the added noise is sufficient to protect individual data points' privacy in the dataset.

We adjust the CLIP embeddings of the synthetic data by adding the differentially private domain gap vector:  $v_{adjusted} = v_{synthetic} + \hat{\Delta}v$ , This adjustment ensures that the synthetic data's distribution is more closely aligned with the private dataset's distribution while preserving differential privacy.

Converting Embeddings to Images with unCLIP After adjusting the synthetic data embeddings,
 we use the unCLIP model to generate the final synthetic dataset. To preserve category-specific
 semantics and mitigate the impact of noise, we guide the unCLIP generation process with category
 cues to ensure that the generated images are semantically consistent with their intended categories.

Privacy budget in form of  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ ,

Algorithm 2 DiffPrivMean: Differentially Private Mean Calculation

Maximum norm for clipping private embeddings  $\kappa$ .

1: Input: Embedding set from private data  $\mathbb{V}^{(priv)}$ . 326 2: 327 3: 328 4: **Output:** Differentially private mean estimation of the given dataset  $\bar{v}^{(priv)}$ 5:  $\boldsymbol{v}_{sum}^{(priv)} \leftarrow 0$ 330 6: for  $\boldsymbol{v}^{(priv)} \in \mathbb{V}^{(priv)}$  do  $\hat{\boldsymbol{v}}^{priv} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{v}^{(priv)} \cdot \min\left(1, \frac{\kappa}{\|\boldsymbol{v}^{(priv)}\|_2}\right) \\ \boldsymbol{v}_{sum}^{(priv)} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{v}_{sum}^{(priv)} + \hat{\boldsymbol{v}}^{(priv)}$ 331 7: 332 8: 333 9: end for 334 10:  $\sigma \leftarrow \min_{\alpha > 1 + \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\epsilon_{\delta}}} \left( \frac{\alpha s^2}{2\left(\epsilon_{\delta} - \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\alpha - 1}\right)} \right)$ 11:  $\bar{\boldsymbol{v}}^{(priv)} \leftarrow (\boldsymbol{v}_{sum}^{(priv)} + \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 \kappa^2 \boldsymbol{I})) / \| \mathbb{V}^{(priv)} \|_2$ 335 336 12: return  $\bar{v}^{(priv)}$ 337 338 339 340 4 EXPERIMENTS 341

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342 4.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 343 **Datasets** We used four datasets in our experiments: CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky et al. (2009)) STL-10 344 (Coates et al. (2011)), ImageNette (Howard) and CelebA (Liu et al. (2015)). CIFAR-10, STL-10, 345

// Norm clipping using predefined threshold  $\kappa$ 

// Calculate the noise multiplier, see Corollary (1)

// Add noise to preserve differential privacy

346 347 CIFAR-10 is a widely-used benchmark for visual classification and privacy research, given its low 348 resolution  $(32 \times 32)$  and large dataset size (5,000 images per class). However, real-world appli-349 cations often present greater complexity. To extend our evaluation, we include ImageNette and STL-10, which offer higher resolution images ( $160 \times 160$  and  $96 \times 96$ , respectively), with STL-10 350 being more challenging due to its smaller dataset size (500 images per class). 351

and ImageNette contain 10 classes, while CelebA is used for binary gender classification.

352 To further assess the effectiveness of our method across diverse data distribution, we also utilize 353 CelebA, a dataset for facial attribute classification, which introduces a more complex and varied set 354 of images. To reduce computational overhead, we randomly select a subset of 5,000 images from 355 CelebA for our evaluations, rather than using the full dataset.

356 **Models** We evaluated the approaches by the performance of downstream classification using two 357 popular neural network models commonly adopted in privacy literature: ConvNet (Krizhevsky et al. 358 (2012)) and ResNet-9 (He et al. (2016)), as well as two deeper models for higher resolution tasks ResNet-50 (He et al. (2016)) and VGG-11 (Simonyan & Zisserman (2015)). ConvNet is a simple 359 convolutional network without a BatchNorm layer, allows for direct comparison with the baseline 360 DPSGD method. However, for ResNet-50 and VGG-11, which contain BatchNorm layers, DPSGD 361 cannot fully guarantee privacy due to potential leakage of data through BatchNorm statistics. There-362 fore, we did not implement DPSGD on these two models. 363

**Baselines** We compared our methods with most recently proposed DP synthetic generation meth-364 ods: DPDM (Dockhorn et al. (2023)), PrivImage (Li et al. (2024)) and DPSDA (Lin et al.), as well as one baseline with direct class-conditional text-to-image generation with stable diffusion v2 (SD-366 v2) (Rombach et al. (2022)). For comparison, we also implement DPSGD (Abadi et al. (2016b)) as 367 a baseline to demonstrate the performance of direct training on private dataset with a given privacy 368 budget.

369 **Hyperparameters** Our method involves five key hyperparameters: the privacy budget  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ , the 370 maximum norm for CLIP embeddings  $\kappa$ , the number of clusters K, and the reduced dimensionality d 371 for the clustering algorithm. For all evaluations, we fix  $\kappa = 20$ . The selection of  $\kappa$  is informed by the 372 observation that the majority of images in the tested dataset have embedding norms approximately 373 around 20. Regarding the number of clusters, we set K = 1 for STL-10 and K = 10 for CIFAR-10, 374 CelebA, and ImageNette. This choice is motivated by the number of images per class: STL-10 has 375 fewer images per class (500), while CIFAR-10, ImageNette, and CelebA have significantly more (5000 for CIFAR-10,  $\sim$  9470 for ImageNette, and 2500 for CelebA). Although more clusters can 376 help preserve diversity, they also reduce the number of images in each cluster, making the results 377 more susceptible to noise. We set d = 10 as the default for all evaluations. A detailed analysis of the hyperparameters can be found in section 4.3, and the hyperparameters for other baselines are provided in Appendix B.

For the downstream task, we trained ConvNet, ResNet-50 and VGG-11 with a batch size of 128, a learning rate of  $10^{-2}$ , weight decay of  $5 \times 10^{-4}$ , and a momentum of 0.9 with the SGD optimizer. For ResNet-9, we used a batch size of 64, a learning rate of  $5 \times 10^{-2}$ , weight decay of  $10^{-3}$ , and a momentum of 0.9.

4.2 MAIN RESULTS

## 4.2.1 COMPARISON WITH BASELINE METHODS

389 The comparison with other baseline 390 methods is shown in Table (1). For 391 each method, we generate 50,000 of 392 synthetic images to train downstream 393 classifiers for fair comparison. We 394 show that PASDA achieves the best 395 performance across both datasets 396 and model architectures, marking the 397 new SOTA on these tasks. Moreover, we find that STL-10 poses a signif-398 icantly more challenging task for all 399 methods due to its higher resolution 400 and smaller dataset size compared 401 to CIFAR-10. Recently introduced 402 diffusion model retraining methods, 403 such as PrivImage (Li et al. (2024))

Dataset	Method	Architectures ConvNet ResNet-9	
	DP-LDM (Lyu et al.) DPDM (Dockhorn et al. (2023))	- 10.2	- 9.8
STL-10	DPSDA (Lin et al.) PrivImage (Li et al. (2024)) SD-v2 (Rombach et al. (2022)) PASDA (ours)	10.2 19.8 11.3 54.8 <b>59.5</b>	24.5 10.4 59.8 <b>68.2</b>
CIFAR-10	DP-LDM (Lyu et al.) DPDM (Dockhorn et al. (2023)) DPSDA (Lin et al.) PrivImage (Li et al. (2024)) SD-v2 (Rombach et al. (2022)) PASDA (ours)	25.7 33.2 52.4 <b>62.0</b>	51.3 14.7 47.1 31.7* 56.7 <b>70.3</b>

Table 1: Performance Comparison on STL-10 and CIFAR-10 Datasets. \*The original paper reported a PrivImage performance of 66.2 on CIFAR-10 using ResNet-9. The results shown in the table were obtained using the published code with its default configuration.

and DPDM (Dockhorn et al. (2023)), perform poorly on STL-10, likely due to the difficulties stemming from its high resolution and limited sample size. Surprisingly, the pretrained text-to-image model, SD-v2, outperforms all other baselines. We attribute this success to SD-v2's strong generative capabilities and the similarity between its pretraining dataset and both STL-10 and CIFAR-10.
Consequently, SD-v2 performs consistently well across different resolutions on both datasets, while other models struggle with generating high-resolution synthetic images with limited data.

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#### 4.2.2 COMPARISON WITH THE ORIGINAL DATASET

413 We further evaluate PASDA on STL-10, ImageNette, and CelebA using various network architectures with synthetic datasets that are ten times the original datasets. Surprisingly, the performance 414 of models trained on datasets generated by PASDA is comparable to or better than those trained on 415 the original data, as shown in Table (2). Notably, the accuracy is improved by 2.2% and 10.6% on 416 STL-10 and ImageNette using ConvNet, respectively. For ResNet-50 and VGG11, the performance 417 of models trained using data generated by PASDA is slightly lower than that of models trained on 418 the original datasets, but still comparable. The results indicate that PASDA provides a practical 419 solution to replace private datasets with synthetic datasets, ensuring strong privacy protection while 420 maintaining or even surpassing the performance with the original data.

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### 4.2.3 VISUALIZATION OF SYNTHETIC IMAGES

424 We visualize synthetic images generated by PrivImage, DPSDA, SD-v2, and our method under a 425 privacy budget of  $(1, 10^{-5})$  Figure (4). PrivImage struggles to produce semantically clear images 426 under this budget. DPSDA generates high-quality images, though some lack semantic consistency (e.g., certain airplane and dog images). This inconsistency may result from the high noise intro-427 duced during image selection. While SD-v2 produces high-quality images, its style diverges from 428 CIFAR-10, favoring a more photographic aesthetic. In contrast, PASDA generates semantically con-429 sistent, high-quality images with a style closely aligned to CIFAR-10. Notably, in the ship category, 430 SD-v2 images exhibit a vintage tone, whereas PASDA produces more natural tones, likely guided 431 by the CIFAR-10 dataset. Overall, PASDA delivers in-distribution, semantically accurate images, contributing to its strong downstream performance. See appendix C for more visualizations.



Figure 4: Comparison of original CIFAR-10 images (leftmost column) with synthetic images generated by various approaches (the four columns to the right).

Dataset	Method	ConvNet	Architectures ResNet-50	VGG-11
	Private Data	57.3	64.8	64.0
STL-10	DPSGD	29.0	-	_
	PASDA (ours)	59.5	63.0	59.5
ImageNette	Private Data	51.6	70.6	71.4
	DPSGD	24.4	-	_
	PASDA (ours)	62.2	67.2	60.7
	Private Data	94.0	90.2	92.6
CelebA	DPSGD	58.1	-	-
	PASDA (ours)	89.3	83.2	86.3



Table 2: Comparison of model accuracy trained on the private dataset versus PASDA-generated datasets across different architectures on STL-10, CelebA, and ImageNette. PASDA operates under a privacy constraint of  $(1, 10^{-5})$ .

Figure 5: Performance comparison across different values of the privacy budget ( $\epsilon$ ) for varying numbers of clusters (K = 1, 5, 10).

#### 4.3 ABLATION STUDIES

4.3.1 SAMPLE SIZE N

Figure (6) illustrates the classification accuracy of models trained on synthetic datasets generated by 464 PASDA and SD-v2 across three datasets: STL-10, ImageNette, and CelebA, with varying sample 465 size multipliers. As the sample size increases (from 1x to 10x), PASDA consistently outperforms 466 SD-v2. In particular, PASDA achieves performance comparable to models trained on private datasets 467 when the sample size is scaled to seven times the original size on STL-10, three times on ImageNette, 468 and ten times on CelebA. For the STL-10 dataset (Figure (6)(a)), PASDA exceeds the baseline at 469 higher sample multipliers, while in the ImageNette dataset (Figure (6)(b)), it even surpasses both 470 SD-v2 and the baseline at only three times the original size. Although PASDA does not quite reach 471 the baseline accuracy for CelebA, it approaches the baseline at 10x, demonstrating its capacity to 472 maintain high performance while ensuring strong privacy guarantees.

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4.3.2 PRIVACY BUDGET  $(\epsilon, \delta)$  and Number of Clusters K

We evaluate the performance of our proposed method across varying privacy budgets by adjusting 476 the parameter  $\epsilon$ , as shown in Figure (5). For each configuration, we generate 5,000 samples and 477 present the corresponding performance as a function of  $\epsilon$  in the accompanying figure. When the 478 number of clusters is set to K = 10, we observe a gradual improvement in performance as  $\epsilon$  in-479 creases. In contrast, when K = 1, the performance remains relatively stable despite increases in 480  $\epsilon$ . This phenomenon can be attributed to the fact that, with K = 1, the method is restricted to ac-481 cessing only the noisy mean vector for each category, thereby imposing a performance ceiling. To 482 understand this bottleneck, consider the extreme case where no noise is added; in this scenario, our method relies solely on the mean vectors of each category. The performance remains constrained 483 because the mean vectors encode limited information, thereby restricting the richness of insights 484 that can be derived from the private dataset. When K = 5, the performance follows a trend that falls 485 between that of K = 1 and K = 10, demonstrating intermediate behavior as expected.



Figure 6: Accuracy of ConvNet as the number of generated samples scales on STL-10.

Increasing the number of clusters, K, allows the method to exploit a more diverse set of cluster centroids, providing richer insights into the private dataset. However, this enhancement comes at the cost of increased noise. Specifically, smaller cluster sizes amplify the impact of noise on the calculation of the mean vector, as the aggregate embedding sum decreases, thereby reducing the relative influence of the noise term (i.e.,  $\bar{v}^{(priv)} \leftarrow (v_{sum}^{(priv)} + \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 \kappa^2 I)) / || \mathbb{V}^{(priv)} ||_2$ , see Line (11) in Algorithm (2)). Consequently, under conditions of high noise (i.e., lower  $\epsilon$ ), a smaller number of clusters (K = 1) proves to be more effective than K = 10. Conversely, when the noise level is reduced (i.e., higher  $\epsilon$ ), increasing the number of clusters leads to improved performance, as the greater diversity of cluster centroids provides more information about the private dataset.

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### 5 DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS

Privacy Concern on Pretraining Data In the context of PASDA, a key privacy concern revolves 508 around the pretraining data used by the foundation models, which PASDA relies on to generate 509 training images. While PASDA itself provides strong differential privacy guarantees for the datasets 510 it interacts with directly, it does not extend these protections to the pre-training data used in these 511 foundation models. This is because PASDA has no control or visibility into that pre-training process. 512 While this issue is beyond the scope of the PASDA approach, it cannot be ignored. The research 513 community at large recognizes that pretraining data privacy is a critical issue that affects the entire 514 lifecycle of the foundation models, not just the downstream tasks addressed by PASDA. Addressing 515 this issue will require better privacy protection and auditing methods for foundation models during 516 the pretraining phase to ensure the end-to-end privacy of the models involved.

517 When Pretraining Data Fails to Cover Target Domains PASDA is an innovative, training-free 518 method that solely relies on pretrained foundation models to generate synthetic images. A concern 519 arises when the target dataset's distribution is not represented in the foundation model's pretraining 520 data. For instance, many foundation models are trained on large-scale image-text pairs collected 521 from the Internet, but data from specialized fields may be underrepresented. This includes images 522 from areas such as X-rays, MRI, CT scans, and cosmic images from astronomy. In such cases, PASDA may perform poorly because the generative model has not been exposed to the specific dis-523 tribution it needs to generate on. Addressing the challenge of generating private, out-of-distribution 524 data remains an interesting issue, which we plan to explore in future work. 525

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### 6 CONCLUSIONS

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In this paper, we introduce PASDA, a method that tackles the privacy-utility tradeoff by generating 530 differentially private synthetic data tailored to the target domain. PASDA leverages pretrained class-531 conditional generative models and feature statistics from private datasets to minimize the domain gap 532 while maintaining strong privacy guarantees. Our method excels in its privacy, efficiency, and effi-533 cacy. PASDA relies solely on feature statistics to guide the synthetic data generation process, which 534 eliminates the need to train large models. This proposed paradigm greatly reducing computational costs, even for high-resolution datasets. PASDA established a SOTA on CIFAR-10 benchmark as 536 compared to previous DP synthetic dataset generation approach. Moreover, our results across STL-537 10, ImageNette, and CelebA, demonstrate that models trained on PASDA-generated synthetic data perform on par with, and in some cases exceed, those trained on the original private data. In sum-538 mary, PASDA marks a significant advance in privacy-preserving synthetic data generation, offering a practical and scalable solution for high-utility private machine learning applications.

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# A PROOF OF COROLLARY (1) (NOISE MULTIPLIER CALCULATION)

*Proof.* We begin by noting that, from Theorem (1), the Rényi Differential Privacy (RDP) parameter  $\epsilon(\alpha)$  of the Gaussian mechanism with noise  $\mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$  is given by the equation

$$\epsilon(\alpha) = \frac{\alpha s^2}{2\sigma^2},$$

where  $\alpha > 1$  is the order of the RDP, s is the  $\ell_2$ -sensitivity of the query function, and  $\sigma$  is the noise multiplier (i.e., the standard deviation of the added noise).

Next, we employ Lemma (1), which states that if a mechanism satisfies  $(\alpha, \epsilon(\alpha))$ -RDP, then it also satisfies  $(\epsilon', \delta)$ -Differential Privacy, where  $\epsilon'$  is given by

$$\epsilon' = \epsilon(\alpha) + \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\alpha - 1},$$

for any  $\delta > 0$ . Therefore, to satisfy  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP, we require

$$\epsilon = \epsilon(\alpha) + \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\alpha - 1}$$

Substituting  $\epsilon(\alpha) = \frac{\alpha s^2}{2\sigma^2}$  from Theorem (1) into this expression, we obtain the equation

$$\epsilon = \frac{\alpha s^2}{2\sigma^2} + \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\alpha - 1}$$

We now solve for  $\sigma^2$  in terms of  $\epsilon$ , s,  $\alpha$ , and  $\delta$ . Rearranging the above equation, we get

$$\frac{\alpha s^2}{2\sigma^2} = \epsilon - \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\alpha - 1},$$

 $\sigma^2 = \frac{\alpha s^2}{2\left(\epsilon - \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\alpha - 1}\right)}.$ 

which leads to

Thus, the noise variance  $\sigma^2$  is determined by  $\alpha$ ,  $\epsilon$ , s, and  $\delta$ .

To minimize the noise while ensuring  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -DP, we seek to minimize  $\sigma^2$  over all  $\alpha > 1$ . Specifically, we minimize the expression

$$\sigma^2 = s^2 \frac{\alpha}{2\left(\epsilon - \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\alpha - 1}\right)}$$

The optimal value of  $\alpha$  must satisfy  $\alpha > 1 + \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\epsilon}$  to ensure that the denominator remains positive, as the term  $\epsilon - \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\alpha - 1}$  must be strictly positive for  $\sigma^2$  to be well-defined.

<sup>696</sup> Thus, the noise multiplier  $\sigma$  is given by

$$\sigma = s \sqrt{\min_{\alpha > 1 + \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\epsilon}} \frac{\alpha}{2\left(\epsilon - \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\alpha - 1}\right)}}.$$

This completes the proof of Corollary (1).

# 702 B HYPERPARAMETERS FOR TRAINING BASELINE METHODS ON STL-10

In this work, we reproduce the results of DPSDA<sup>1</sup> (Lin et al.), DPDM<sup>2</sup> (Dockhorn et al. (2023)),
 and PrivImage<sup>3</sup> (Li et al. (2024)) for comparison. The models were trained on four NVIDIA A4500
 GPUs.

708 B.1 STL-10 (COATES ET AL. (2011))

709 710 B.1.1 DPSDA (LIN ET AL.)

711 We generated images using class-conditioned DPSDA with a pretrained improved diffusion model 712 on ImageNet at a resolution of  $64 \times 64$ . The feature extractor was InceptionV3 (Szegedy et al. 713 (2016)), with a count threshold of 10 and a lookahead degree of 1. The noise multiplier was com-714 puted as 15.83 under the privacy parameters  $\epsilon = 1$  and  $\delta = 10^{-5}$ . The process was carried out 715 over 20 iterations, generating 50,000 samples per iteration, with the degree of variation increasing 716 linearly from 0 to 40 over the iterations.

718 B.1.2 PRIVIMAGE (LI ET AL. (2024))

719 720 Semantic Query The semantic query classifier was trained using ResNet-50 (He et al. (2016)) 721 with a batch size of 256, a learning rate of  $10^{-2}$ , and 60 epochs. The differential privacy parameters 722 were set to  $\epsilon = 0.01$  and  $\delta = 10^{-5}$ .

723 **Pretraining** The Noise Conditional Score Network (NCSN++)? was trained using the Elucidated 724 Diffusion Models (EDM) frameworkKarras et al. (2022) on the ImageNet dataset at a resolution of 725  $96 \times 96$ , with an exponential moving average (EMA) rate of 0.999. The model architecture included 726 attention at a resolution of 16 and channel multipliers of [1, 2, 4]. Optimization was performed using the Adam optimizer with a learning rate of  $1 \times 10^{-4}$  and no weight decay. The deterministic DDIM 727 sampler with 50 steps was used, with a time range from  $t_{\min} = 0.002$  to  $t_{\max} = 80$ ,  $\rho = 7$ , and no 728 guidance scaling. The training procedure used a seed of 0, batch size of 128, over 4000 epochs, with 729 the EDM loss function configured with  $p_{\text{mean}} = -1.2$ ,  $p_{\text{std}} = 1.2$ , one noise sample per iteration, 730 and a minimum sigma of 0. 731

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**Fine-tuning** For fine-tuning on the STL-10 dataset, the learning rate was increased to  $3 \times 10^{-4}$ , while continuing with the Adam optimizer and no weight decay. The batch size was set to 19,384, the number of epochs was reduced to 50, and the number of noise samples was increased to 8. Differential privacy parameters included  $\alpha_{num} = 100$ ,  $\alpha_{min} = 500$ ,  $\alpha_{max} = 1500$ , a maximum gradient norm of 0.001,  $\delta = 1 \times 10^{-5}$ , and  $\epsilon = 0.99$ . The data was divided into 128 splits to facilitate memory-efficient training.

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B.1.3 DPDM (DOCKHORN ET AL. (2023))

The DPDM method involved training the pretrained NCSN++ model on the STL-10 dataset using the Adam optimizer with a learning rate of  $3 \times 10^{-4}$  and no weight decay. The batch size was set to 128, and the model was trained for 50 epochs. A deterministic DDIM sampler with 500 steps was used, with a time range from  $t_{\min} = 0.002$  to  $t_{\max} = 80$ , and  $\rho = 7$ . To optimize the privacy-utility trade-off, the number of noise samples per iteration was set to 8. The differential privacy parameters included  $\alpha_{num} = 100$ ,  $\alpha_{min} = 500$ ,  $\alpha_{max} = 1500$ , a maximum gradient norm of 0.001,  $\delta = 1 \times 10^{-5}$ , and  $\epsilon = 1.00$ . The dataset was split into 128 parts to optimize memory usage during training.

748 B.2 CIFAR-10 (COATES ET AL. (2011))

750 B.2.1 DPSDA (LIN ET AL.)

Images were generated using class-conditioned DPSDA with a pretrained improved diffusion model on ImageNet at a resolution of  $32 \times 32$ . InceptionV3 (Szegedy et al. (2016)) was used as the feature

754 <sup>1</sup>https://github.com/microsoft/DPSDA

<sup>3</sup>https://github.com/SunnierLee/DP-ImaGen

<sup>755 &</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>https://github.com/nv-tlabs/DPDM

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Figure 7: Comparison of original STL-10 images (leftmost column) with synthetic images generated by various approaches (the four columns to the right).

extractor, with a count threshold of 10 and a lookahead degree of 1. The noise multiplier was calculated as 15.83 under the privacy parameters  $\epsilon = 1$  and  $\delta = 10^{-5}$ . The procedure involved 20 iterations, with 50,000 samples generated per iteration, and a linear increase in the degree of variation from 0 to 40 over the iterations.

777 B.2.2 PRIVIMAGE (LI ET AL. (2024))

778 Semantic Query The semantic query model remained the same as used for STL-10 (section B.1.2).

781 **Pretraining** Pretraining followed the same procedure as outlined for STL-10, but at a resolution of 782  $32 \times 32$ . The NCSN++ model was trained using the EDM framework, with attention at a resolution 783 of 16, and channel multipliers of [1, 2, 4]. Training was conducted over 4000 epochs with a batch 784 size of 512. 785

786 **Fine-tuning** For fine-tuning on CIFAR-10, the optimizer's learning rate was increased to  $3 \times 10^{-4}$ . 787 with the Adam optimizer and no weight decay. The batch size was set to 19,384, and the number 788 of noise samples increased to 8. Differential privacy parameters included  $\alpha_{num} = 100, \alpha_{min} = 500$ ,  $\alpha_{\max} = 1500$ , a maximum gradient norm of 0.001,  $\delta = 1 \times 10^{-5}$ , and  $\epsilon = 0.99$ . The dataset was 789 790 partitioned into 128 splits to manage memory usage.

792 B.2.3 DPDM (DOCKHORN ET AL. (2023))

For DPDM on CIFAR-10, the pretrained NCSN++ model was trained with a batch size of 2048 and a learning rate of  $3 \times 10^{-4}$ , using the Adam optimizer without weight decay. The model was trained for 50 epochs, with a deterministic DDIM sampler utilizing 500 steps and the same privacy settings as described for STL-10. The dataset was similarly partitioned into 128 parts for memory efficiency.

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#### MORE SAMPLE IMAGES С

800 We further provide visualizations of the synthetic datasets generated by various methods on STL-801 10. Due to the increased challenge posed by STL-10, characterized by its high resolution and small 802 dataset size, PrivImage fails to produce semantically meaningful images, with most outputs resem-803 bling random noise. While DPSDA generates visually coherent images, it struggles to accurately 804 match the generated images with the correct categories. In contrast, PASDA consistently produces 805 high-quality images with a distribution closely aligned with that of STL-10.

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