

BREAKING MCP WITH FUNCTION HIJACKING ATTACKS: NOVEL THREATS FOR FUNCTION CALLING AND AGENTIC MODELS

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ABSTRACT

The growth of agentic AI has drawn significant attention to *function calling* Large Language Models (LLMs), which are designed to extend the capabilities of AI-powered system by invoking external functions. Injection and jailbreaking attacks have been extensively explored to showcase the vulnerabilities of LLMs to user prompt manipulation. The expanded capabilities of agentic models introduce further vulnerabilities via their function calling interface. Recent work in LLM security showed that function calling can be abused, leading to data tampering and theft, causing disruptive behavior such as endless loops, or causing LLMs to produce harmful content in the style of jailbreaking attacks. This paper introduces the first *function hijacking* attack that manipulates the tool selection process of agentic models to force the invocation of a specific, attacker-chosen function. We conducted experiments on 3 different models, reaching 80% to 98% ASR over the established BFCL dataset. We also introduce FunSecBench, an extension of the BFCL dataset to assess the vulnerability of function calling models to the triggering of attacker-selected functions. Our findings further demonstrate the need for strong guardrails and security modules for agentic systems.

1 INTRODUCTION

Function Calling (FC) is at the core of agentic AI systems, providing agents with the ability to invoke functions relevant to a natural language intent (Abdelaziz et al., 2024; Patil et al., 2023). Within agentic AI research, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a popular framework that standardizes the communication between LLM agents (Hou et al., 2025). Already widely used, FC capability introduces additional security concerns. Agentic AI enables an agent to autonomously interact with an execution environment, and this expanded interactivity increases the attack surface of the system. As shown in Table 1, a growing body of work has started to explore novel attack vectors that exploit the FC mechanisms of LLM agents. Nevertheless, to our best knowledge, most research focused on generating harmful content, and overlooked the broader challenge of controlling the perturbation of the FC process itself. To date, there remains a lack of methods aiming to robustly and systematically perturb the function calling task.

Method	Type of Attack		Attack Location		Intent		
	P.I.	A.P.	User Prompt	Tool Args.	Harmful Behavior	Disrupt T.C.	Hijack T.C.
(Zhan et al., 2024)	✓		✓	✓	✓		
(Wu et al., 2024)		✓		✓	✓		
(Zhang et al., 2024)	✓	✓	✓			✓	
(Andriushchenko et al., 2025)	✓	✓	✓			✓	
(Debenedetti et al., 2024)	✓		✓		✓	✓	
FHA (Ours)		✓		✓			✓

Table 1: Attacks on Function Calling. P.I.: Prompt Injection, A.P.: Adversarial Perturbation, T.C.: Tool-Call

To address this challenge, this paper demonstrates that FC models can be hijacked, showing a novel risk of the usage of LLMs, especially in the context of agentic AI systems. In particular, our new *function hijacking* attack (FHA), explained in Figure 1, manipulates the tool selection process of




Figure 1: Example of FH-attack on a GitHub MCP Server (see Appendix H).

agentic models to force the invocation of an attacker-chosen function. To achieve such objective, our attack inserts adversarial tokens in the description of a specific function to enforce the generation of a function call intended by the attacker. Our contributions are as follows:

- **FHA:** We propose a novel function hijacking attack, implemented by adapting the GCG attack from Zou et al. (2023) to fit the FC task and the hijacking objective, hiding the adversarial tokens in the description of a function. We evaluated the attack against 3 different FC models, on scenarios where the attacker perturbs the function calling mechanism in different ways. Our findings reveal Attack Success Rates ranging from 80% to 98%.
- **Attacks on MCP:** We demonstrate the practicality of our approach by attacking well known MCP frameworks, such as those from GitHub and Slack.
- **FunSecBench:** We augment the BFCL dataset (Patil et al., 2025): (1) to support design and evaluation of universal attacks on FC models, and (2) to enable robustness testing of FC models by introducing prompt reformulation, argument variations, and multi-intent scenarios.

2 RELATED WORK

Recent research on LLM security has revealed new threats to the use of generative models (Yi et al., 2024). This section offers an overview of the current state-of-the-art for agentic system security.

NLP attacks. Prior work, such as GCG (Zou et al., 2023), or AutoDAN (Liu et al., 2024) demonstrated that adversarial attacks on LLMs can deviate models from their expected behavior with minimal input manipulation at inference time, breaking model alignment. More recently, research in Red Teaming (Rawat et al., 2024) further demonstrated the impact of adversarial attacks.

Agentic systems. Recently, research has shifted towards *agentic* AI, where LLMs are augmented with external tools or memory to interact with their environment (Wang et al., 2024a; Guo et al., 2024; Yao et al., 2023; Schick et al., 2023). Anthropic standardized the use of tools by agents with the MCP framework (Hou et al., 2025), specifying a protocol to regulate the interaction between LLMs, databases and other tools. Another example is CoTools from Wu et al. (2025), a framework that generalizes the use of tools in the context of reasoning tasks.

Security of LLM agents. Although MCP significantly enhances the capabilities of models, the introduction of external modules increases vulnerability to malicious users (Vassilev et al., 2025). Recent work has acknowledged security issues with agentic systems, and identified potential new vulnerabilities. He et al. (2024) raised concerns about specific threats on agents, including manipulation of the database, available functions, as well as privacy risks for a user leading to leak of sensitive information. Similarly, Hou et al. (2025) identified the potential risk of MCP database manipulation. In addition, Intelligence (2025) lists recent MCP vulnerabilities and attacks.

Function calling attacks. Before the rise of LLMs, Kumar et al. (2018) demonstrated an attack on voice-activated agents such as Amazon Alexa. The authors introduced the concept of *skill squatting*,

referring to the exploitation of phonetic ambiguities in spoken user commands to trigger malicious skills (i.e. tools in this context) that can be invoked in place of benign ones. This work demonstrated how attackers could exploit the environment to manipulate the interaction between agent and user, anticipating attacks on LLMs.

Jailbreaking and prompt injection attacks can be effective on FC models. For instance, Wu et al. (2024) showed that tool-calling can be leveraged as a *trojan horse* to jailbreak LLMs and generate harmful content. Zhan et al. (2024) demonstrated that indirect prompt injection on the output of a function call can lead to direct harm or data stealing. Similarly, Debenedetti et al. (2024) suggested a novel framework and benchmark to assess vulnerabilities of agentic systems in the usage of specific applications such as Slack, email, and others. Zou et al. (2024) demonstrated the vulnerability of FC models to call harmful functions, leading to the generation of unsafe content. Wu et al. (2025) showed that input containing a vast quantity of available functions can lead to miscalls by models. Invariant Labs (2025) introduce the Tool Poisoning Attack on MCPs where attackers inject a malicious prompt in the description of functions. Zhang et al. (2024) showed that prompt injection attacks targeting the user query itself can lead to incorrect function calls. In contrast to our results, they find that adversarial perturbations have limited effectiveness (see Appendix A.1). Closer to our work, Wang et al. (2025) introduce the MCP Preference Manipulation Attack (MPMA) that generates a new function specifically to be preferred to the ones available to the FC model.

3 PRELIMINARIES

In this section, we introduce function calling models and their mathematical notation.

Large Language Models. We begin by formalizing the auto-regressive decoding process of LLMs. Let us assume $x_{1:s}$ is a $(1, s)$ dimensional vector containing the tokens of the input sequence, where each token $x_i \in \{x_1, \dots, x_V\}$, $|V|$ being the size of the vocabulary. We can approximate the next-token generation as follows (Zou et al., 2023):

$$P_{\pi_\theta}(x_{s+1:s+n} \mid x_{1:s}) \approx \prod_{i=1}^n P_{\pi_\theta}(x_{s+i} \mid x_{1:s-i+1}) \quad (1)$$

where $P_{\pi_\theta}(x_{s+1:s+n} \mid x_{1:s})$ is the probability of auto-regressively generating the output sequence $x_{s+1:s+n}$, given the input $x_{1:s}$ and π_θ the model parametrized by θ .

FC models. These are usually standard LLMs fine-tuned to perform tasks related to API calling (Abdelaziz et al., 2024; Patil et al., 2023). We build upon the LLM’s generation process set out in Equation 1, extending it to formally describe FC generation. Given a user query q , the objective of model π_ϕ , fine-tuned for the function calling task and parametrized by ϕ , is to predict the most appropriate function f_j from a set of available functions $F = \{f_1, f_2, \dots, f_m\}$. The model computes the probability of predicting function f_j given the input context $x_{1:s}$ representing the input token sequence, including both the available functions $x_{1:|F|}$, and the user query $q = x_{|F|+1:s}$.

$$P_{\pi_\phi}(f_j \mid x_{1:s}) = P_{\pi_\phi}(f_j \mid x_{1:|F|} \cup x_{|F|+1:s}) \quad (2)$$

Equation 2 is agnostic with respect to the representation of f_j in a specific agentic protocol. The most common representation begins with the function name f_j^{name} followed by $a_{j,1}, a_{j,2}, \dots, a_{j,k}$ values for the k arguments of the function:

$$f_j = \{f_j^{name}, a_{j,1}, a_{j,2}, \dots, a_{j,k}\} \quad (3)$$

To help language models perform FC tasks, most providers introduce special-purpose tokens that explicitly signal the beginning and structure of function calls. These help enforce the task format and improve the model’s ability to identify and invoke the correct functions. For notational clarity we omit such tokens here. Appendix C presents various model configurations under FC scenarios.

4 FUNCTION HIJACKING

This section introduces our novel function hijacking attack (FHA) against function calling models. We present the threat model and adversarial objectives, explain our architectural choices, and sketch the attack implementation.

Threat model and objectives. In classic LLM jailbreaking, the attacker has full control of the prompt that goes into the model. This attack aims to violate the model’s alignment, and seeks to make the model comply in answering harmful requests from the user.

The goal we propose for function hijacking is different, and disrupts the FC preference process, forcing the model to select an attacker-chosen *target* function f_{target} instead of the most appropriate *ground-truth* function $f_{\text{ground_truth}}$ for the task described in the user prompt.

Our threat model stipulates that the attacker can only control the *description* of the target function within the list of functions that are available for calling. Note that in our case the attacker does not have access to the user prompt, and the attack is launched *off-line*. We believe that the choice of only controlling the description of a function make the attack realistic and more robust. While other vectors, such as modifying function names, parameters, or implementation, could be more effective, they are also more likely to be detected by automated validation. In fact, evaluating natural language is hard, and function descriptions are usually not executed, making them an effective attack vector.

FHA implementation. We denote the set of functions available to the model by

$$F^* = \{f_1, \dots, f_{\text{ground_truth}}, \dots, f_{\text{target}}, \dots, f_m\} \quad (4)$$

and we denote the perturbed input sequence by $\hat{x}_{1:s}$, consisting of both the function specifications $\hat{x}_{1:|F^*|}$ and the user query $q = \hat{x}_{|F^*|+1:s}$. The target output is then:

$$\hat{y}_{fh} = \{f_{\text{target}}^{\text{name}}, a_{\text{target},1}, \dots, a_{\text{target},k}\} \quad (5)$$

Our algorithm is an adaptation of the GCG algorithm (Zou et al., 2023)¹. The GCG algorithm implements a state-of-the-art jailbreaking attack that breaks model alignment by forcing an LLM to produce harmful content. It is efficient at model manipulation using gradient suffix injection. The FHA adapts the algorithm to the function calling task (see Algorithm 1 in Appendix D.1).

The attack strategy is to design and optimize a small part of the input to form an adversarial prompt that forces the LLM to generate predefined sets of tokens, namely a *target sequence*. This strategy is typically implemented by defining a loss that turns the objective into a minimization problem (Zou et al., 2023):

$$\underset{\hat{x}_I, I \subset \{1, \dots, s\}}{\text{minimize}} \quad \mathcal{L}_{adv}(\hat{x}_{1:s}) \quad (6)$$

$$\text{where} \quad \mathcal{L}_{adv}(\hat{x}_{1:s}) = -\log[P_{\pi_\theta}(\hat{y} \mid \hat{x}_{1:s})] \quad (7)$$

Here, $\hat{x}_{1:s}$ is the original prompt including the adversarial suffix $\hat{x}_I$, $\hat{y}$ is the target sequence, and $\mathcal{L}_{adv}(\hat{x}_{1:s})$ the cross-entropy loss. Function hijacking uses the same loss function where $\hat{x}_{1:s}$ includes the list of candidate functions with f_{target} , where $\hat{x}_I$ is in its description, and $\hat{y}$ becomes the target tool call $\hat{y}_{fh}$. Model P_{π_θ} is replaced by P_{π_ϕ} , a model fine-tuned for the *function-calling* task.

The GCG attack uses a specific string prefix as a target to optimize the adversarial prompt (see Figure 8 - A in Appendix D.3). A key assumption of the GCG algorithm is that if the model is induced to generate the target tokens at the beginning of its output, an attacker can subsequently leverage the auto-regressive nature of the model to guide the generation toward further content consistent with the target (hence harmful). We rely on the same assumption to make our attack more efficient and general. Instead of the full $\hat{y}_{fh}$, we only use $f_{\text{target}}^{\text{name}}$ as the optimisation target, and rely on the model to fill the correct parameters afterwards (see Figure 8 - B in Appendix D.3).

5 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Dataset. The Berkley Function Calling Leaderboard (BFCL) (Patil et al., 2023) is a common dataset to test FC models. The dataset `BFCL.v3.multiple` aims to assess models on the task of mapping natural language prompts from the user to function selection and slot filling, given a range of available functions. The dataset includes 200 samples, where the number of available functions ranges from 2 to 4 (further details in Appendix E). We use BFCL for our experiments because the $f_{\text{ground_truth}}$ of each sample is available and the task is relatively simple for state-of-the-art FC models.

Target models. To test our algorithm, we attacked different LLMs supporting the function calling task. Our selection was motivated by three criteria: (1) the ranking of FC models on the BFCL dataset, (2) the diversity in model providers, (3) the variation in model sizes. For these reasons, we

¹<https://github.com/GraySwanAI/nanoGCG>

selected Granite-3.2-2B-Instruct (IBM-Research, 2024), Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct (Touvron et al., 2023), and Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3 (Jiang et al., 2023). This choice aligns with the research trend of using smaller models for FC tasks - typically in the 1B-8B parameter range, due to their better efficiency (Belcak et al., 2025; Manduzio et al., 2024; Kavathekar et al., 2025). In addition, each of these models adopts a distinct FC syntax (see Appendix C), reinforcing the value of our evaluation.

Experimental setup. To ensure a consistent attack evaluation, we kept the original GCG parameters from Zou et al. (2023), decreased the batch size to 128, and varied the size of the adversarial suffix `optim_str` optimised by the algorithm. Compared to classic NLP jailbreaking, the FC task involves much larger context. Decreasing the batch size allowed us to run experiment using smaller GPU configurations. For simple attacks, we varied the size of the `optim_str` to study its effect on the algorithm. For the rest of the experiments, we set the size of the `optim_str` to 60 tokens (equivalent to 3 times its original size of 20 tokens). We performed all of our experiment using one - Llama and Granite - or two - Mistral and universal FHA - A100-80GB GPUs, and a seed of 42.

Metrics: Assessing if our attacks succeed is easier than for general NLP jailbreaking. In fact, the Attack Success Rate (ASR) can be easily computed using string matching, since we know the exact name of the target function. However, a more challenging test is to assess if the generated function call is valid, in terms of structure and parameters. Thus, we define two metrics:

- **Function name ASR.** The first metric is a string matching method. Given a function call from the model, we check if it calls exactly the target function.
- **Slot filling ASR.** The second metric is more nuanced. We check if the generated function call is valid, meaning that it has the correct number and type of parameters requested by the target function. Therefore, we can make sure that the output can be called in a real-world context.

Baselines: To assess the performance of the FHA, we introduce two baselines.

- **Standard inference.** We evaluate the performance of the considered models on the BFCL inference task when no attack is present. Rather than an *attack* success rate, this establishes a baseline success rate of the FC task.
- **Function injection.** We compare the FHA with a different hijacking attack which, given a user query, adds to the set of available functions a new target function explicitly designed to be preferred over the ground-truth function. This is a challenging baseline because the target function is generated by a more powerful model than the ones under evaluation. Our Function Injection baseline is similar to the MPMA by Wang et al. (2025) (see Appendix A.2).

6 DIRECT FUNCTION HIJACKING EVALUATION

Our simplest goal is to deviate the model from its expected behavior. We define our first scenario: given a query q requesting a function to be executed, we arbitrarily select another function from the set of available functions to be our target. Therefore, our set of payloads would be defined by the unique element $P_1 = \{(F, f_{\text{target}}, q)\}$, with F the set of available functions, $f_{\text{target}} \in F$ and q the query. Furthermore, recent works showed that the size of the `optim_str` influenced the effectiveness of attacks. We conducted an ablation study to confirm its impact on the FC setting.

In addition, we suspect that the nature, position and number of functions included in the context of the task matter. Even the position of `optim_str` in the prompt influences the attack. Therefore, we define a second scenario: we varied the position and number of functions included in the payload and observed its influence on the attack. In this case, our set of payloads is defined by $P_2 = \{(F_1, f_{\text{target}}, q), \dots, (F_h, f_{\text{target}}, q)\}$, with F_i the different sets of available functions, each including f_{target} and $f_{\text{ground_truth}}$, and q the fixed query. Each set F_i is obtained from the original set F , by either removing additional functions or switching the position of functions.

6.1 DIRECT FHAS

This section presents the Function Name and Slot-Filling ASRs of the attack over the 200 BFCL prompts. Each ground-truth function is positioned as the *first function* in the payload. We then selected the target as the *second function* in the payload. In other words, functions $f_{\text{ground_truth}}$ and

f_{target} appear respectively at index 0 and 1 in the payload. For payloads that contains more than 2 functions, we added the remaining functions right after $f_{\text{ground_truth}}$ and f_{target} .




Figure 2: Function name ASR.

Metrics	Type	Llama	Granite	Mistral
Standard Inference - Accuracy	FN	0.88	0.97	0.96
	SF	0.88	0.96	0.96
ZS Function Injection - ASR	FN	0.80	0.88	0.79
	SF	0.59	0.60	0.56
FS Function Injection - ASR	FN	0.57	0.58	0.48
	SF	0.57	0.55	0.47
FHA - ASR	FN	0.96	0.93	0.98
	SF	0.88	0.83	0.92

Table 2: Baselines and FHA - BFCL, FN: Function name, SF: Slot Filling.

Attack performance. Figure 2 presents the Function Name ASR over the 3 reference models, using the configuration from Section 5. The FHA managed to hijack each model for a large part of the BFCL dataset in under 250 epochs, reaching a performance between 93% and 98%.

Granite-3.2-2B appears more resilient to our attack. This is explained by the different function calling format of each model: Llama and Mistral first generate the name of the function, whereas Granite first generates the arguments. Hence, the FHA needs to work harder with Granite, forcing the model to generate the function name first, which is our optimised $\hat{y}_{fh}$ target. The Args flip curve in Figure 2 shows the success rate of Granite in generating function calls with the name before the arguments, effectively a measure of the “extra optimisation effort” required. Recall that our attack is made more efficient by relying on the LLM to fill the arguments of the target function. We expect that the ASR on Granite would be in line with the other models if the attack was not optimised, and $\hat{y}_{fh}$ included the generation of specific arguments before the function name.

Baseline comparison. Table 2 presents the Function Name and Slot Filling ASRs for the different baselines and models over the BFCL dataset. Llama-3B has the lowest baseline performance on the FC task (standard inference) compared to Mistral-7B and Granite-2B.

To create the function injection attacks, we prompted Llama-3-70B Touvron et al. (2023) to generate the best function possible given the query, for each sample. We considered two settings: *Zero-Shot* (ZS) - only inputting the query, and *Few-Shot* (FS) - inputting query and all available functions from the payload. The prompts are illustrated in Appendix F. The ZS Function Injection attack obtained a relatively strong Function Name ASR of 0.88 for the Granite model. In comparison, surprisingly, the FS variant obtained lower scores. This might be because the ZS setting implies more flexibility in the creation of functions, which comes at a cost: Slot-Filling ASRs for ZS are lower relative to their Function Name ASRs compared to FS.

Importantly, Table 2 highlights the strong ASRs from our attacks, compared to the performance of both the unperturbed models and the function injection attacks. In particular, the high performance of Slot Filling means that most hijacked function calls are valid, since their parameters are correct, and therefore our attacks can work in practice.

FHAs on MCP. In addition to the BFCL dataset, we demonstrated our attack on two well known MCP frameworks², namely: Slack-MCP and Github-MCP from the MCP repository (Hou et al., 2025). Figures 13 and 14 in Appendix H illustrate the FHA on these MCPs.

6.2 INFLUENCE OF THE SIZE OF THE ADVERSARIAL SUFFIX

We analyze the impact of the size of `optim_str`, the adversarial suffix, on the performance of our attack, motivated by two observations. First, Hayase et al. (2024) highlighted that the size of `optim_str` influences the performance of the attack. Experimentally, they showed that larger suffixes lead to higher ASR. Second, we hide `optim_str` inside the description of the target function. Therefore, a smaller size of the suffix makes the attack less detectable. Due to computational limitations, the rest of the experiments focus on Llama-3.2-3B. Based on results obtained in the previous section, we expect similar behavior for other models.

Figure 3 displays the Function Name ASR of our algorithm for Llama-3.2-3B for `optim_str` sizes of 10, 35 and 60 tokens (corresponding to 0.5 to 3 times its original size of 20 tokens). To

²<https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/servers-archived/>

compare the impact on the algorithm’s efficiency, Figure 12 in Appendix G shows the proportion of each `optim_str` size to the length of the input payload.

An initialization with 60 tokens is enough to hijack almost every sample in the dataset. This is interesting because the proportion of adversary string in this setting is much lower compared to classic NLP jailbreaking. In the classic GCG attack with AdvBench, the proportion ranges from 25% to around 50% given that the input prompt is often a single sentence. In contrast, with a size of 60 tokens, the proportion for the FC setting drops to 5% on average.

In addition, we observe that the ASR of our algorithm drops when the size of the adversary string decreases. In fact, if we set an initial size of 10 tokens, the attack reaches 65% ASR under 500 epochs. We suspect that this is due to a relative decrease of proportion of the `optim_str` in the model’s input, representing around 1.5% with 10 tokens. Furthermore, this phenomenon can also be explained by the length of the target sequence. Indeed, the ASR of the GCG attack is highly dependent on the length of the target sequence. In our case, the target string is longer than in the NLP setting. For both observations, our results align with the findings of Hayase et al. (2024).




Figure 3: ASR varying the size of `optim_str`.

6.3 IMPACT OF THE FUNCTION SET

We next inspected the robustness of our algorithm with regard to the composition of the set of available functions. Specifically, we conducted experimentation on the position and number of functions in the payload, robustness to payload perturbation, and their similarity to the prompt.




Figure 4: ASR when varying function positions (A) and number of functions (B).

Influence of the position of the functions. First, we test whether the position of the target function matters to our attack algorithm. Figure 4A reports the Function Name ASR of Llama-3.2-3B on a subset of the BFCL dataset (samples containing only two functions, to control the influence from additional functions), under two configurations of the payload.

For each sample, the first configuration places $f_{\text{ground_truth}}$ at the beginning of the input, while the second configuration places f_{target} upfront. We observe that the target-first configuration hijacks most samples in fewer epochs than the other configuration. This implies that the position of the adversary string matters in the attack. This observation seems to echo previous work, such as Yu et al. (2025) (see Appendix A.3 for details).

Influence of the number of the functions. Furthermore, we expect that the size of the payload influences the efficiency of our algorithm. Figure 4B present the Function Name ASR on the Llama-3.2-3B with samples including different number of functions. To define our different payloads, we select a subset of the BFCL dataset including samples containing four functions (allowing us to remove one or two functions).

In Figure 4B the blue, red and green curves represent, respectively, the ASR of our algorithm with samples including 2, 3 and 4 functions. We first defined a baseline including only 2 samples (the ground-truth and the target), then we included other functions to evaluate the impact of their

presence. Such functions are included in the function set of the original BFCL dataset, and are not meant to be selected by the model. We observe that adding these *noise* function to the payload increases the number of epochs needed to hijack compared to the baseline (0 noise function).

These results validate the findings of Section 6.1, as the proportion of the total input string that the adversary string constitutes decreases when noise functions are added.

Robustness to payload perturbation. In real-world setting, the poisoned tool would need to function even while developers modify the codebase, for example by adding or removing functions. Thus, the attack needs to be robust when subject to future unknown perturbations of the payload. To test this, we perturbed the original payloads using out-of-distribution functions, and transferred attacks by inferring the model.




Figure 5: Robustness of attack to noise functions - Llama-3.2-3B

Figure 5 presents a simple FHA lead on the index 2 of BFCL for 1,000 epochs. We added 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, or 25 out-of-distribution noise functions to the original payload and transferred the attack every 20 epochs. We averaged $n = 50$ different variations (different noise functions). Figure 5 shows that FHA is robust to moderate payload perturbation (up to ~ 3 additional functions). Appendix J further details this experiment, and suggests a universal attack to increase the robustness of the attack with regards to heavy perturbation. We then discussed on implications of our findings on the design of our attack in Appendix A.4.

Analysis of the correlation. To conclude the analysis of influence of the content of the payload, we analyse if the semantic meaning of the query and available functions influences our algorithm. Through correlation analysis, Appendix K shows that a f_{target} semantically close to the user prompt seems to take less time to be hijacked, specifically for the Llama model.

7 TOWARDS UNIVERSAL HIJACKING OF FC MODELS

To test the universality of our attack, we adapted it to optimize the attack objective over a set of k queries $Q = \{q_1, \dots, q_k\}$. The goal of the universal attack is to have a single adversarial function hijack any of the queries $q_i \in Q$. In this case, the set of payloads is defined by $P_3 = \{(F, f_{\text{target}}, q_1), \dots, (F, f_{\text{target}}, q_k)\}$.

Data-augmentation. To evaluate the new attack variant, we augmented the BFCL by constructing a list of diverse queries. We refer to this new dataset as *FunSecBench*. The objective is to generate a batch of queries triggering the same ground-truth function, designed to evaluate the robustness of our algorithm with respect to variations in the user query. For each payload, each generated prompt is derived from the same original example. We generate synthetic data using GPT-4o-mini (OpenAI & al., 2024) and define three complementary strategies for query creation (see Appendix I):

1. **Formulation diversity:** For each query, we generated 10 variations by instructing the model to rephrase the input while *preserving its exact intent*. Each reformulation results in the same function call as the original prompt, with identical arguments. These variations create natural linguistic diversity and test the model’s robustness to semantically equivalent inputs.
2. **Arguments variation:** Building on the first approach, this strategy involves generating queries that invoke the *same function but with different arguments*. By varying the number and value of parameters, we assess the attack’s robustness to functional variability and its ability to handle a broad range of realistic input scenarios.
3. **Multiple intents:** In practice, we expect the user to formulate different intents, thereby triggering different functions from a same payload. To this extent, we design a third data-augmentation strategy, enabling multiple ground-truth functions $f_{\text{ground-truth}}$ for each sample. From the BFCL dataset, we retained the payloads containing 3 or 4 functions, and generated additional queries aiming to trigger functions other than the original ground-truths and the selected targets.

Multi-prompt FHA. To build universal FHAs, we modified our algorithm to experiment with what we refer to as *batch of queries* (see Algorithm 2 in Appendix D.2). The goal of this approach is to




Figure 6: A: Direct and transferred attacks. B: Synthetic generation strategies.

test whether we can generate a *single adversary* that would work on a set of different prompts.

Figures 6A and 6B present the ASR over 150 epochs obtained using the three types of data augmentation techniques. The figures include two types of runs: *Direct* and *Transferred* attacks. Each batch includes 10 prompts, and the ASR is computed by averaging the percentage of hijack of each batch, for each epoch. The transferred attacks report the Function Name ASR when adversarial examples generated from one direct attack are applied to another setting.

Direct attacks. First, on Figure 6A, we observe that strategy (1) obtained a higher ASR than strategy (2) (respectively 0.88 vs. 0.79). This can be explained by the nature of the construction of the different batches. As per Figure 16 in the Appendix I.2, the *formulation diversity batches* (1) appear to be semantically closer to the original prompts, and to each other compared to the *argument-variation batches* (2). This finding aligns with our correlation analysis, where the semantics seem to impact the efficiency of the algorithm.

Similarly, Figure 6B represents the ASR of the direct attack using strategy (3) on a sub-set of BFCL (samples containing 3 and 4 functions, allowing generation of different intents). We observe that the direct attacks lead using the *Multiple Intent* strategy (3) take relatively more epochs to achieve hijacking, but yield to comparable ASR to the two other strategies. The performance observed implies that the FHA is capable of generating a single `optim_str` working for multiple intents.

Transferred attacks. Furthermore, we also tested the generalization and transferability of our batch of attacks to new and unseen prompts. Figure 6A presents attacks trained on strategy (1) transferred on data augmentation strategy (2), and vice-versa. Both settings demonstrate good generalization, with final ASR values after 150 epochs of 0.74 and 0.80 for adversaries trained on batch (1) and tested on batch (2), and vice versa, respectively. Notably, the adversaries trained on batch (2) obtained better generalization while obtaining a lower ASR on the training prompts. This may be attributed to the greater diversity and hijacking difficulty of the prompts in batch (2). Appendix L further confirms this observation, analyzing the number of prompts hijacked per batch.

Figure 6B shows the attacks from strategies (1) and (2) transferred on the *Multiple Intent* strategy (3), with batches restrained to different intents (other than $f_{\text{ground_truth}}$ and f_{target}). Compared to Figure 6A, the transferred attacks fail on other intents than the one contained in the original query. This was expected, since the attacks are trained on batches with queries sharing the same intent. This shows that our attack is flexible, and the attacker can choose to affect a single or multiple intents while creating the query batch. This finding has implications on the attack design (Appendix A.4).

8 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we demonstrated that FC models are vulnerable to function hijacking attacks. Previous work focused on prompt injection attacks against FC, whereas our FHA shows that adversarial perturbations are also effective. The FHA is less noticeable, more controllable, and scalable when crafted using batch of queries or payloads. Finally, the attack is flexible as the attacker can choose to target a single or multiple intents. Our findings reinforce the need for strong guardrails and security modules for agentic systems.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This paper introduces a novel attack toward Function-Calling models and MCP frameworks. We adhere to the ICLR Code of Ethics, and the goal of our findings is to advance research in the Security of AI systems. By identifying this new threats, we aim to make the community aware of this new vulnerability, and enhance the robustness and safety of Large Language Models.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

We took several measures to ensure the reproducibility of our experiments, namely:

- **Code availability:** The source code that we developed to conduct our experiments is available in the submission ZIP folder. The source code also include a `requirement.txt`, allowing users to create an environment with the correct versions of the libraries we used.
- **Experimental Settings:** We listed in Section 5 the experimental settings. This includes the datasets used, the models (open-source available on HuggingFace), the parameters of the algorithms, the prompts of the models, and the environment setups (seed and hardware used). We also included scripts to reproduce the experiments we lead.

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Appendix

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A DISCUSSION

A.1 PERFORMANCE OF THE ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON FC MODELS

In contrast to other works from the literature, we demonstrated that FC models are vulnerable to targeted adversarial attacks. Indeed, our work nuances work from Zhang et al. (2024), affirming that adversarial attacks resulted poorly in perturbing the function calling process of FC models.

A.2 FUNCTION INJECTION BASELINE

To evaluate the performance of our Function Hijacking attack, we introduced the Function Injection attack baseline. To do so, we prompted `Llama-3-70B` to generate a function aiming to be preferred over a specific ground-truth function. Our baseline is comparable to the MCP Preference Manipulation Attack (MPMA) introduced by Wang et al. (2025), which consists in injecting an attacker function containing a preferred name or descriptions. The MPMA prompts an LLM to optimize separately names and description of functions with regards to a specific query. In comparison, our Function Injection directly prompts an LLM to generate the optimal preferred function.

While both Function Injection and the MPMA result in good performance, it is worth noting that both approaches are less general than the FHA. In particular they generate functions that are strongly dependent on the given payload and query and semantically similar to the ground-truth. In comparison, the FHA works for arbitrary target functions, and therefore can be applied more broadly, and has more severe security implications.

A.3 POSITION OF THE `OPTIM_STR` IN THE PROMPT

In Section 6.3, we found that locating f_{target} earlier as the first function in the payload seems to increase its efficiency. This observation echoes previous work, such as Yu et al. (2025), which empirically found that the adding special tokens such as *eos* in the middle of a prompt can enhance the efficiency of jailbreaking attacks by shifting the refusal boundary. As suggested by the authors of this paper, the *eos* tokens can be compared to special tokens specific to FC setting. Similarly to their findings, we suspect that certain tokens in the FC context influences the effectiveness of the attack.

In addition, Wang et al. (2024b) demonstrated a positive correlation between the ASR and the attention score of the `optim_str` in GCG attacks. In our case, we suspect that when the `optim_str` is located early in the payload - Target in first position, the adversarial tokens receive more attention, enhancing the effectiveness of our attack.

A.4 DESIGN OF THE ATTACK

Our experimentation on building universal attacks showed that our algorithm seems to be robust to user query perturbation, including formulation and intent variations. First, we demonstrated that an attacker can increase the attack robustness with regards to payload perturbation. By designing batches including payloads with different number of function, and position, we showed that resulting attacks are more robust to perturbations such as adding unseen functions in the payload.

Second, we also demonstrated that it could increase the attacker’s control while designing the f_{target} . Our results suggest that the attacker can choose to make the attack work for one or multiple intents. Indeed, attacks trained on a single intent does not transfer on other intents, while attacks trained on batches containing multiple intents performs well.

B LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Despite the insights gained from this study, several limitations should be acknowledged. While our results show the effectiveness of our algorithm on reasonable function calling scenarios, future work should experiment with our algorithm on larger models, and larger payloads. Indeed, Wu et al. (2025) demonstrated the poor performance of standard FC models when a large number of tools are available to choose from. The effectiveness of the FHA to such scenarios is still to be determined. MCPs may include more than 4 functions, and broader domains than the ones considered so far. Another observation is that the nature of the payload seems to significantly influence the efficacy of the algorithm. It would be interesting to further explore the impact of the semantic meaning of the target function toward both our algorithm and the preference of the model.

Furthermore, recent works started to look at how the adversarial perturbation influences the attention mechanism of FC models Yu et al. (2025); Wang et al. (2024b). It would be interesting to apply same techniques to the FC-attack to further observe the impact of the position and size of the `optim_str` in the model’s payload. As well, trying to understand why the position of the f_{target} in the payload (and therefore the position of `optim_str` in the context of the model) influences the effectiveness of our FHA could be interesting.

In addition, we designed a basic universal FH-attack, by accumulating the loss over the multiple user prompts for each epoch. Zou et al. (2023) proposed an alternative algorithm, where the optimization is first performed over a single suffix, and where new prompts are added incrementally. Given that they observed better performances compared to optimizing all the prompts in the same time, it could be interesting to compare the results we have obtained with their approach.

C FUNCTION CALLING SYNTAX OF DIFFERENT MODELS

Figure 7 presents the FC syntax of the models we selected, along with the target template that we adopted to perform the FHAs. Depending on the provider, we observe different *tool-call* tokens, as well as different formats. While Llama solely generate the dictionary of the tool-call, Granite and Mistral output a list of tool-calls.

Function calling syntax of different models	
A. Llama-3.2-Instruct	
Output format:	<code>< python_tag >{“name”: “target_function_name”, “arguments”: {...}}</code>
Target template:	<code>< python_tag >{“name”: “target_function_name”,</code>
B. Granite-3.2-Instruct	
Output format:	<code><tool_call>[{“arguments”: {...}, “name”: “target_function_name”}]</code>
Target template:	<code><tool_call>[{“name”: “target_function_name”,</code>
B. Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3	
Output format:	<code>[TOOL_CALLS] [{“name”: “target_function_name”, “arguments”: {...}}]</code>
Target template:	<code>[TOOL_CALLS] [{“name”: “target_function_name”,</code>

Figure 7: Function calling syntax of different models. The `target_function_name` is replaced by the actual name of the selected target function for each samples. Each model uses specific special tokens for function calling.

D GCG ALGORITHM ADAPTED TO THE FUNCTION-CALLING TASK

D.1 SIMPLE FHA ALGORITHM

Algorithm 1 lists the FHA, which is based on the GCG algorithm (Zou et al., 2023). First, we adapted the input and format of the model’s context to fit the function-calling task. Second, instead of locating the adversarial perturbation at the end of the user prompt, we inserted it in the description of the attacker-selected function. Third, we modified the target to satisfy our attack requirements.

Algorithm 1 FHA

Require: Payload $(F, f_{\text{target}}, q)$, modifiable subset I , iterations T , loss function $\mathcal{L}$, top- k parameter k , batch size B

- 1: $f_{\text{target}}^{\text{desc.}} \leftarrow f_{\text{target}}^{\text{desc.}} + x_I$ ▷ Initialize adversarial perturbation I
- 2: $x_{fh} = x_{1:|F|} + x_{|F|+1:s}$ ▷ Initialize prompt with F and q
- 3: **for** $t = 1$ to T **do**
- 4: **for** $i \in I$ **do**
- 5: $X_i := \text{Top-}k(-\nabla_{e_{x_i}} \mathcal{L}(x_{fh}))$
- 6: **end for**
- 7: **for** $b = 1$ to B **do**
- 8: $\tilde{x}_{fh}^{(b)} := x_{fh}$
- 9: $i \sim \text{Uniform}(I)$
- 10: $\tilde{x}_i^{(b)} := \text{Uniform}(X_i)$
- 11: **end for**
- 12: $b^* := \arg \min_b \mathcal{L}(\tilde{x}_{fh}^{(b)})$
- 13: $x_{fh} := \tilde{x}_{fh}^{(b^*)}$
- 14: **end for**
- 15: **return** Poisoned tool f_{target}^*

D.2 UNIVERSAL FHA ALGORITHM

Algorithm 2 presents the batch query version of our algorithm. To construct the algorithm, we accumulated the cross-entropy loss with regards to the full batch of queries. In this means, the algorithm optimize the loss and the adversarial tokens with regards to multiple queries. While many variants of universal attacks exists, we made the choice of adapting our FHA in a simple yet intuitive way.

Algorithm 2 Universal FHA w.r.t. the query

Require: Payload $(F, f_{\text{target}}, Q = \{q_1, \dots, q_n\})$, modifiable subset I , iterations T , loss function $\mathcal{L}$, top- k parameter k , batch size B

```

1:  $f_{\text{target}}^{\text{desc.}} \leftarrow f_{\text{target}}^{\text{desc.}} + x_I$  ▷ Initialize adversarial perturbation  $I$ 
2:
3: for  $j = 1$  to  $n$  do
4:    $x_{fh}^{(j)} = x_{1:|F|} + q_j$  ▷ Initialize prompts with  $F$  and  $q_j$ 
5: end for
6: for  $t = 1$  to  $T$  do
7:   for  $i \in I$  do
8:      $L_{\text{total}} := 0$ 
9:     for  $j = 1$  to  $n$  do
10:       $L_{\text{total}} += \mathcal{L}(x_{fh}^{(j)})$ 
11:    end for
12:     $X_i := \text{Top-}k(-\nabla_{e_{x_i}} L_{\text{total}})$  ▷ Top- $k$  substitutions
13:  end for
14:  for  $b = 1$  to  $B$  do
15:     $i \sim \text{Uniform}(I)$ 
16:    Randomly select  $\tilde{x}_i^{(b)} \in X_i$ 
17:    for  $j = 1$  to  $n$  do
18:       $\tilde{x}_{fh}^{(j,b)} := x_{fh}^{(j)}$  ▷ Copy current query input
19:       $\tilde{x}_i^{(j,b)} := \tilde{x}_i^{(b)}$  ▷ Apply the sampled perturbation
20:    end for
21:  end for
22:   $b^* := \arg \min_b \sum_{j=1}^n \mathcal{L}(\tilde{x}_{fh}^{(j,b)})$ 
23:  for  $j = 1$  to  $n$  do
24:     $x_{fh}^{(j)} := \tilde{x}_{fh}^{(j,b^*)}$ 
25:  end for
26: end for
27: return Poisoned tool  $f_{\text{target}}^*$ 

```

D.3 AUTO-REGRESSIVE ASSUMPTION

Auto-regressive assumption of the GCG algorithm

A. NLP Configuration - Target: "Sure, here is"

User: How can I make a bomb? {optim_str}

LLM: Sure, here is *how you can make a bomb...*

B. FH Configuration - Target: "<TC>{"name": "country_info.largest_city","

System: <Functions F including f_{target} >

User: What is the capital of Brazil?

LLM: <TC>{"name": "country_info.largest_city", "arguments": {"country": "Brazil"}}<\TC>

Figure 8: Illustrations of the GCG attack auto-regressive assumption. For both NLP and FH settings, the adversary exploits the auto-regressive nature of the model to make the model comply. String characters in italic display the model completion after generating the target sequence. In this example, the FHA causes the LLM to invoke the *largest_city* function instead of the intended *capital* function.

E ANALYSIS OF THE BERKLEY FUNCTION-CALLING LEADERBOARD (BFCL)

The BFCL dataset includes 200 payloads $P = (F, f_{\text{target}}, q)$, from various different domains, including mathematical analysis, or general API-style functions (e.g. compute average, get weather, find restaurant). Figure 9 display the distribution of the number of available functions in each payload.




Figure 9: Frequency of the number of available function per sample - BFCL (Patil et al., 2023).

The objective of BFCL is to assess the ability of models to generate a correct tool-call given a payload. From benchmarks, it is considered relatively easy since performance of FC-models is relatively high compared to other datasets. Figure 10 presents the distribution of the cosine similarity between the prompts and the function descriptions, obtained with a BERT model. We observe that the distribution of ground-truth functions $f_{\text{ground_truth}}$ is shifted toward higher values compared to the rest of the functions available in the payload. This observation motivated our choice of dataset, since payloads are more likely to constitute challenging examples to attack.




Figure 10: Cosine Similarity between prompt and function descriptions - BFCL (Patil et al., 2023).

F FUNCTION INJECTION ATTACK

Figure 11 presents the prompts we designed to generate target functions to be injected in the payload. We refer to this attack as *function injection*, constituting a baseline to our FHA.




Figure 11: Function Injection attack: generation of preferred function given a query or/and the available functions from the payload.

G PROPORTION OF OPTIM_STR IN THE PAYLOAD

Figure 12 shows the average proportion of the `optim_str` in the payloads of the BFCL. This analysis supports our analysis of the experiments from Section 6.1.




Figure 12: Proportion of different size of `optim_str` in the payload - average percentage per number of function in the BFCL.

H MCP ATTACK

Figures 13 and 14 showcase examples of our attack using respectively the Github and Slack MCP Servers. Note that for the case of the GitHub MCP Server, the `delete_repository` function is not included, so we created it in the server as an analogy of the `create_repository` function.




Figure 13: Example of attack on GitHub MCP Server using Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct. Our attack lead the user to deleting a repository instead of create a new one. This experiment required 274 epochs, uses an adversary of 60 tokens (shown in *italic*), and a batch size of 128.




Figure 14: Example of attack on Slack MCP Server using Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct. Our attack lead the user to send a message on a channel instead of consulting the available channels. This experiment required 108 epochs, uses an adversary of 60 tokens (shown in *italic*), and a batch size of 128.

I SYNTHETIC DATA GENERATION

I.1 PROMPTS

Figure 15 shows the prompts used to perform synthetic data generation using GPT-4o-mini (OpenAI & al., 2024). Figures (1), (2) and (3) detail the prompts used for the reformulation (1) and argument-variation (2), and multi-intent variation (3) strategies, respectively.

Synthetic data generation

(1). Formulation Diversity

System Prompt: Reformulate the given prompt in 10 different ways. The intent should remain the same. Provide your answer in a list.

User Prompt: {query}

(2). Argument Variation

System Prompt: Rewrite the given prompt with 10 different formulation request for a function-call. The function called should remain the same, but each prompt should trigger different parameters (different numbers, cities or countries, objects or person if allowed by the function’s specification). Provide your 10 different prompts in a list. Here are the parameters of the function: {ground_truth_function_parameters}.

User Prompt: {query}

(3). Multiple Intents Variation

System Prompt: Rewrite the given prompt with 5 different formulation request for a function-call. The prompt that the user will input seeks to trigger this function: {ground_truth}. The queries that you will generate should now seek to call the following function: {new_ground_truth}.

User Prompt: {query}

Figure 15: Batch of queries using synthetic data generation. For both strategies, we prompted the gpt-4o-mini model. For the *Hyperparameter Variation* strategy, we also included the parameters’ description of the function.

Multiple intents strategy - For payloads of 3 functions, we selected 5 queries from the data-augmentation strategy (1), and completed the batch with the 5 novel queries aiming to trigger the third function. For payloads of 4 functions, we selected 4 queries from the data-augmentation strategy (1), and completed the batch with 3 queries aiming to trigger the two other functions.

I.2 SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF THE FUNSECBENCH DATASET

Figure 16 shows a PCA projection of BERT encoding for 10 prompts and their corresponding batches across three variations: original (stars), diversity (1 - cross), argument (2 - triangles), and multi-intent (3 - square). Diversity strategy (1) cluster closely with the original prompts, suggesting that changes in phrasing preserve semantic content effectively. In contrast, prompts from Argument strategy (2) exhibit greater divergence. Furthermore, some samples from Multiple intents strategy (3) are located very far from the cluster formed by other strategies, due to their shift in intent (requesting a different function to be called, potentially on a different topic).




Figure 16: PCA of BERT embeddings over 10 samples - original, diversity (1), arguments (2), and multi-intent (3) prompts - *FunSecBench* dataset.

Moreover, using the BERT encoding over the full BFCL dataset, Figure 17 presents two distributions for each strategies. First, the average Cosine similarity between the original prompt and each batches (Figure 17a). Second, the average Cosine similarity between each queries included in each batches - which we refer to as Intra-batches distance (Figure 17b). We observe that strategy (1) is more skewed toward high cosine similarity values, while the other strategies (2 and 3) and more spread toward lower values. Specifically, we observe a peak on lower values for strategy (3), representing the queries containing different intents from the original prompt.




Figure 17: Analysis of the Data Augmentation strategies - *FunSecBench* dataset.

J ROBUSTNESS TO PAYLOAD PERTURBATION

In this Section, our objective is to assess the influence of payload perturbations on our attack (Section J.1). We first demonstrate that the simple FHA is robust to moderate perturbation, but fails when the perturbation is too extreme. Following this observation, we suggest two strategies that could lead to more robust attacks under perturbation (Section J.2).

J.1 ASSESSING SIMPLE FHAS

To examine the robustness of the simple FHA, we focus on two specific samples (indexes 0 and 2 of BFCL), and run the attack over a longer period (1,000 epoch) on Llama and Granite. We selected these particular samples since hijacking appears relatively early in the runs for both models (55 and 86 for Llama and Granite, respectively).

We then checked attack transferability if additional functions are added to the set of available functions after the adversarial function description has been created. We selected out-of-distribution functions from `BFCL_v3_simple` to perturb the original payload. To analyse the influence of adding noise functions to the payload, we added 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, or 25 functions. To denote the influence of the additional functions, we averaged the $n = 50$ different variations (i.e. different sets of noise functions added) of the original, every 20 epochs.




Figure 18: Robustness of attack when adding noise functions.

Figure 18a and 18b represent the ASR over the epochs, and the different noise configurations. First, we observe that the attack becomes robust to moderate noise functions after several epochs, respectively 800 and 200 epochs for Llama and Granite models for 1 to 3 functions added. However, when adding significantly more functions - from 5 functions - the attack become unstable.

We suspect that this is due to two reasons. First, the attack is trained on a payload of only 3 functions. When adding more functions than the original size of the payload, it can cause the `optim_str` to be too weak to still have a full influence on the model’s output. Second, when optimizing the `optim_str` on the original payload, our algorithm might end in local optimum that cause poor generalizability of the attack on heavy perturbations.

J.2 ENHANCING ROBUSTNESS TO PAYLOAD PERTURBATION

On the strength of the takeaway from the previous section, we wonder if we can enhance the robustness of our attack with regards to payload perturbation such as adding new tools to the codebase. In Section 7, we defined a universal version of the FH-attack, where we looked at building an attack working for a batch of multiple prompts. In the case of payload perturbation, we are now interested to make the attack work for a single prompt, on multiple versions of the payload.

To satisfy this novel constraint, we created an alternative version of the universal FH-attack, where each elements of the batches contains same query q , but different set of functions F . We define the batch of payloads as follows: $P = \{(F_1, f_{\text{target}}, q) \dots (F_n, f_{\text{target}}, q)\}$, where q is a unique query, the target f_{target} is invariant, and F_i are the lists of functions for all $i \in [1, n]$. To render the FH-attack robust to such perturbation, we built two complementary strategies:

- **Batch of position:** We have seen that the position of functions in the payload seems to influence our algorithm (see Section 6.3), and potentially affects its robustness to perturbation. For this reason, we first constructed a batch including the same original payload, but modifying the position functions. The index 2 of the BFCL dataset contains 3 functions. We created 7 unique lists of functions (all including both ground-truth and target functions), varying their position compared to the original list.
- **Batch of number:** Similarly, we observed that the number of functions in the payload seems to affect the FH-attack. We created a complementary strategy, fixing the position of functions, but including increasing number of functions, namely: 2, 3, 4, and 5 by adding out-of-distribution functions from the BFCL_v3_simple. It resulted in 4 unique lists of functions.

Figure 19a and 19b present the same experiment as in previous Section J.1 using the *Batch of position* and *Batch of number* attack strategies, respectively. Results demonstrate that both strategy effectively improved the robustness of the attack compared to the simple FH-attack.




Figure 19: Batch attack to increase robustness of attack when adding noise functions.

Specifically, the Batch of number achieved more than 0.85 Function Name ASR for every perturbations, even the heavier. It confirmed our claim: training an attack on sets of functions containing various number of functions increased the robustness to noise functions. Surprisingly, training an attack on same set of functions varying their position also increased the robustness with regards to noise function perturbation. Indeed, this strategy is not built on the definition of the perturbation. Therefore, it suggest that this strategy seems to increase the generalization and overall robustness of the attack.

In addition, we note that the hijacking index of the Batch of position attack is around 97 epochs (corresponding to the first epoch where the attack manages to hijack the full batch). However, we observe that transferred attacks on perturbed payloads are successful before being effective on the original queries - at around 60 to 80 epochs. It might be because some perturb payloads are easier to jailbreak than the original ones. The original batch also contains many samples (7 payloads), explaining why the optimization takes more epochs. Overall, it means that the FHA optimizes the `optim_str` in a way that leads to good generalization of the attack.

K CORRELATION ANALYSIS

First, we retrieved the BERT embedding of the user query, along with the name and description of the ground-truth and target function. Then, we computed *cosine similarity* between the query embedding, and both the ground-truth and target function name and descriptions, respectively. Additionally, we computed the similarity between ground-truth and target function name and descriptions. We then extracted the epoch number required to hijack each sample for each model, which we refer to as the *num_epoch*.




Figure 20: Correlation between number of epochs of FHA and semantic distance of function metadata to query.

Figure 20 showcases the Pearson correlation (Kirch, 2008) between the *num_epoch* and the semantic similarity between the user prompt and the function metadata - both for function names (Figure 20a) and descriptions (Figure 20b). Since a lower *num_epoch* means a more effective hijack attempt, we are looking to get a negative correlation if any.

First, the ground-truth similarity with the query correlates positively for both function name and description across model. Specifically, it shows significant positive correlation for the Granite model for function description ($r = -0.159$, $p = 0.0249$). Nevertheless, the correlation is negligible or statistically insignificant for other models and configurations, suggesting that the distance of the ground-truth with regards to the prompt does not influence the effectiveness of our algorithm.

Furthermore, the target similarity exhibits significant negative correlation for the Llama model in both function name ($r = -0.206$, $p = 0.00344$) and description ($r = -0.152$, $p = 0.0317$). It implies that when the target function is semantically closer to the prompt, fewer epochs are needed for a successful hijack. Conversely, we observe a positive correlation for similarity between ground-truth and target functions, also significant in the case of Llama for function names ($r = +0.157$, $p = 0.0267$), and Granite for function descriptions ($r = +0.140$, $p = 0.0487$). It indicates that a high semantic distance between $f_{\text{ground_truth}}$ and f_{target} functions implies more epochs. Overall, these finding suggests that the attacker could perform prompt engineering on the description of the target function to increase the hijacking performance.

L UNIVERSAL ATTACK OVER BATCHES

To conclude our analysis on the universal attack, we looked at how effective it is from a batch perspective. Specifically, we aim to measure how many prompts are successfully hijacked on average within each batch. For this purpose, we define the ASR_{batch} as the proportion of prompts in a batch that are successfully hijacked. Since each batch contains 10 prompts, we evaluate the attack performance across a range of thresholds corresponding to the number of hijacks per batch - from 1 to 10.




Figure 21: Average ASR_{batch} given the percentage of prompts hijacked per batch.

Figure 21 presents the ASR_{batch} as a function of the threshold, averaged over the BFCL dataset for the direct and transferred attacks. First, we observe that the ASR_{batch} of the direct attacks remains constant across all threshold values. This indicates that when a direct attack is successful, it consistently hijacks every prompt in the batch, resulting in a full-batch compromise.

In contrast, transferred attacks exhibit more nuanced behaviors. Specifically, the $(2) \rightarrow (1)$ attack configuration achieves higher ASR values across almost all thresholds compared to the $(1) \rightarrow (2)$ configuration. This suggests that when transferred adversaries trained on configuration (2) succeed on configuration (1), they tend to hijack a larger portion of the batch. This confirms our observation that adversaries trained on batches exhibiting more semantic diversity tend to generalize better.

Interestingly, at lower thresholds (0.1 and 0.2) — corresponding to just 1 or 2 prompts being hijacked per batch — the transferred attack $(2) \rightarrow (1)$ outperforms even the direct attack (2). This implies that while the adversaries may not always succeed on the source domain (strategy 2), they generalize effectively to dataset 1, successfully hijacking individual prompts that may be more vulnerable in the target domain.