STEERINGSAFETY: A SYSTEMATIC SAFETY EVALUATION FRAMEWORK OF REPRESENTATION STEERING IN LLMS

Anonymous authors
Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT

We introduce STEERINGSAFETY, a systematic framework for evaluating representation steering methods across nine safety perspectives including bias, harmfulness, hallucination, social behaviors, reasoning, epistemic integrity, and normative judgment, spanning 17 datasets. While prior work often highlights general capabilities of representation steering, we find there are many unexplored, specific, and important safety side-effects, and are the first to explore them in a systematic way. Our framework provides modularized building blocks for state of the art steering methods, enabling us to unify the implementation of a range of widely used steering methods such as DIM, ACE, CAA, PCA, and LAT. Importantly, this framework allows generalizing these existing steering methods with new enhancements, like conditional steering. Our results on Qwen-2.5-7B, Llama-3.1-8B, and Gemma-2-2B uncover that strong steering performance is dependent on the specific combination of steering method, model, and safety perspective, and that severe safety degradation can arise in poor combinations of these three. We find difference-in-means a generally consistent choice for steering models and note situations where slight increases in effectiveness trade off with severe entanglement, highlighting the need for systematic evaluations in LLM safety. [1]

1 INTRODUCTION

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities across a wide range of natural language tasks (Brown et al., 2020; Touvron et al., 2023; Ouyang et al., 2022). However, their growing fluency and generality have raised serious concerns about their safety (Bai et al., 2022; Weidinger et al., 2021; Mazeika et al., 2024), including tendencies to produce harmful content, propagate social bias, and mislead users through hallucinated responses (Xu et al., 2024; Gallegos et al., 2023). These behaviors are often emergent and unpredictable, highlighting the difficulty of governing high-capacity models.

A central objective in alignment research is to ensure that model behaviors remain safe, robust, and consistent with human intent (Leike et al., 2018; Bai et al., 2022; Ganguli et al., 2022). Techniques such as supervised finetuning (SFT) (Ouyang et al., 2022) and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) (Bai et al., 2022) are commonly employed to improve alignment. However, prior work shows that trying to improve performance on one behavior can inadvertently affect other alignment behaviors. For example, SFT on non-safety data can unintentionally compromise toxicity mitigation (Hawkins et al., 2024), fairness (Li et al., 2024a), and overall safety (Qi et al., 2024), and may even cause multimodal models to fail at recognizing certain concepts (Mukhoti et al., 2024). Similarly, RLHF intended to improve alignment can also induce sycophancy (Malmqvist, 2024; Min et al., 2025; Papadatos and Freedman, 2024), amplify political biases (Perez et al., 2023), and reduce truthfulness across several metrics (Li et al., 2024a). We define this phenomenon as **behavioral entanglement**, which we view as a key challenge towards producing aligned models.

Besides SFT and RLHF, alignment can also be accomplished through representation steering, a training-free method that intervenes on internal model activations to achieve a target objective (Zou

[1] Our code is available at `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/389289893898888Anon-18CF/`.

et al., 2023; Panickssery et al., 2023; Li et al., 2023; Turner et al., 2023; Wehner et al., 2025; Lee et al., 2024a; Bartoszcze et al., 2025). These methods identify relevant directions in activation space that correspond to behaviors like refusal (Arditi et al., 2024; Marshall et al., 2024; Lee et al., 2024a; Wollschläger et al., 2025; Panickssery et al., 2023) or hallucination (Chen et al., 2024; Zou et al., 2023), and apply simple vector operations, such as activation addition or ablation, to modulate model behavior. Although representation steering methods are widely applicable, they are also known to suffer from side effects, similar to SFT and RLHF, including reductions in fluency and instances of overgeneralization. However, such representation steering methods have not been systematically assessed for safety and entanglement at scale.

To address these challenges, we introduce STEERINGSAFETY, a systematic framework for evaluating steering alignment interventions across multiple safety perspectives and their interactions. STEERINGSAFETY has two main contributions:

1) Comprehensive safety assessment across seven perspective axes: We enable standardized quantitative measurement of both steering effectiveness on three main perspective axes and unintended effects on all other perspective axes. By aggregating many established safety perspectives, our framework reveals how interventions targeting specific behaviors influence others, providing crucial insights into behavioral entanglement. 2) Standardized steering evaluation: We provide a modular code framework exploiting the taxonomy of training-free steering methods, allowing standardized evaluation of five popular steering methods via a common library of interchangeable components. By enabling comprehensive and systematic safety assessments, STEERINGSAFETY establishes a foundation for rigorously comparing steering interventions, uncovering hidden entanglements, and guiding the development of safer, more reliable alignment strategies.

2 DATASET

STEERINGSAFETY is designed to evaluate representation steering methods by testing whether interventions can reliably steer a specific perspective while minimizing unintended effects on others. Unlike prior work that focuses narrowly on individual alignment objectives, STEERINGSAFETY supports comprehensive evaluation across a diverse set of axes, enabling controlled comparisons and analysis of behavioral entanglement. To assess steering effectiveness as well as unintended entanglements effects, the benchmark evaluates on three perspectives. Within these, we distinguish between main perspectives, which are explicitly targeted by steering interventions, and additional perspectives, which are not directly steered but may shift as side effects (Figure 1. This structure allows researchers to assess whether steering a specific perspective-such as reducing hallucination-induces undesirable changes in other perspectives like sycophancy or commonsense morality.

Each primary dataset follows a fixed 40/10/50 train/validation/test split and is stratified by subcategory (if applicable) to ensure robust evaluation. To support contrastive direction generation, we also include negative examples with an incorrect answer for all primary tasks, creating them if they do not exist. We next describe the behavioral categories in the benchmark, starting with primary alignment objectives.

Harmfulness. We use SALADBench (Li et al., 2024b) as our main dataset for harmful generation, using the 21K base QA set filtered using GPT-4o such that it only contains unmistakeably harmful open-ended prompts. Negative examples are drawn from Alpaca (Taori et al., 2023) for instruction-only prompts. We exclude prompts tagged as "Hate Speech" or "Stereotyping" to remove overlap with bias and stratify splits across the remaining labels, giving us 8.6K prompts. Harmfulness is a generation task scored using LlamaGuard-4 (Meta, 2025).

Bias. We evaluate bias through both implicit and explicit forms of discrimination. **Implicit bias** is assessed using BBQ (Parrish et al., 2022), a multiple-choice benchmark probing stereotyping across demographic attributes. The dataset consists of 10K prompts stratified by demographic. **Explicit bias** is evaluated using ToxiGen (Hartvigsen et al., 2022), a binary classification benchmark where models are asked to agree/disagree with toxic statements linked to demographic identities. ToxiGen includes 9K prompts, similarly stratified. Accuracy for BBQ and ToxiGen is measured using substring matching over multiple-choice and boolean completions, respectively.

Hallucination. We adopt the taxonomy from HalluLens (Bang et al., 2025) to separate **intrinsic hallucination** (contradictions with input context) from **extrinsic hallucination** (unsupported generation absent from context or pretraining). For intrinsic hallucination, we use three FaithEval subsets (Ming



Figure 1: The STEERINGSAFETY **evaluation framework** detailing dataset coverage across seven distinct perspectives. The table is structured by Perspective, Sub-perspective, Example Input, and Model Output. We focus on steering the perspectives highlighted in **bold** and subsequently evaluate the model on *all* other perspectives to measure any unintended consequences of the steering intervention. Each perspective is further broken down into several sub-perspectives to enable detailed analysis.

et al., 2025): counterfactual, inconsistent, and unanswerable, totalling 2.4K prompts. Negative completions are generated using GPT-4.1-mini for the unanswerable set and randomly chosen where they already exist in the other datasets. Extrinsic hallucination is evaluated using PreciseWikiQA (Bang et al., 2025), a dataset of Wikipedia-sourced QA pairs stratified across 10 difficulty levels. We use a fixed 10K dataset generated with LLaMA-3.1-70B-Instruct (Grattafiori et al., 2024) as done in Bang et al. (2025), and generate incorrect answers using GPT-4.1-mini. Completions are scored using LLaMA-3.3-70B-Instruct (Grattafiori et al., 2024) for factuality via hallucination rate using LLaMA-3.1-70B-Instruct as done in Bang et al. (2025). We report the percentage of prompts not hallucinating, such that higher scores indicate better behavior.

A key concern in representation steering is that selected directions may overfit to spurious noise, leading to inflated performance on held-out data. To mitigate this risk, and in light of the computational cost of full-benchmark evaluation, we adopt a dynamic testing strategy: all primary behavior steering and evaluations are conducted on a subset of our full benchmark (20% subset of each dataset). This approach reduces the likelihood of overfitting to static evaluation sets and supports more robust, generalizable assessments of steering effectiveness.

After steering one of the aforementioned behaviors, we evaluate the model on a wide variety of other safety-critical perspectives to assess side effects of the target steering intervention. We group these perspectives into four general functional groups.

Social Behaviors. To assess how models interact with users, we assess **Brand Bias**, **Sycophancy**, **Anthropomorphism**, and **User Retention**, each evaluated using 110 prompts from DarkBench (Kran et al., 2025). Brand Bias tests preference in product recommendations; Sycophancy measures uncritical agreement with user input; Anthropomorphism tests whether models describe themselves with human-like traits; and User Retention measures tendency to prolong interactions unnecessarily. All responses are scored using GPT-4o as in Kran et al. (2025). We report the percentage of prompts *not* exhibiting the described behavior such that a higher score is better.

Reasoning. To test reasoning ability, we compile an **Expert-Level Reasoning** assessment using GPQA's (Rein et al., 2023) 448 MCQs, covering fields like law, physics, and biology. **Simple Reasoning** uses 500 prompts from ARC-C (Clark et al., 2018), requiring basic inference skill. Accuracy is computed via substring matching.

Epistemic Integrity. These tasks test honesty and factuality. **Factual Misconceptions** are tested using 791 binary-choice TruthfulQA (Lin et al., 2022) prompts, where models choose between true and plausible but false statements. **Sneaking** uses 110 adversarial DarkBench (Kran et al., 2025) prompts to test if the model subtly shifts the original stance when reframing opinions. Following Kran et al. (2025), GPT-4o judges Sneaking, while misconceptions are judged via substring matching. For sneaking we again report the percentage of prompts *not* exhibiting sneaking behavior.

Normative Judgment. This category assesses how models navigate ethically and ideologically sensitive scenarios. We test **Commonsense Morality** using 750 ethical dilemmas from DecodingTrust (Wang et al., 2024a), scored by whether the model chooses the correct and moral answer. **Political Views** uses 750 prompts from TwinViews-13k (Fulay et al., 2024), which ask the model to agree with either left or right-leaning opinions. We report the percentage of responses choosing the left-leaning option since models are shown to often skew left (Fulay et al., 2024; Potter et al., 2024). Unlike other datasets where higher is better, this convention was chosen arbitrarily.

2.1 METRICS

The goal of STEERINGSAFETY is to benchmark current steering methods across key safety perspectives while investigating their out of distribution behavior. To facilitate this, we define two aggregate metrics: EFFECTIVENESS (Eq. 1), how performant a steering method is on steering the target perspective, and ENTANGLEMENT (Eq. 2), the degree of unintended changes resulting from

steering.

$$\text{EFFECTIVENESS} = \frac{1}{|B_{primary}|} \sum_{b \in B_{primary}} \left\{ \frac{y_b^{(steered)} - y_b}{(1 - y_b)} \right\} \tag{1}$$

$$\text{ENTANGLEMENT} = \frac{1}{|B_{ood}|} \sqrt{\sum_{b \in B_{ood}} (y_b^{(steered)} - y_b)^2} \tag{2}$$

Besides this, we also present results for each steering method over all perspectives to allow for observations of the specific tradeoffs faced for each combination of model, method, and perspective.

3 METHODOLOGY

We begin by identifying the core components underlying many training-free steering methods and implementing them within our evaluation framework. Using these building blocks, we then construct five steering methods selected for evaluation, expressing each method as a composition of these standardized components.

3.1 STEERING COMPONENTS

Currently, we focus on steering accomplished during inference. We define such steering methodologies as a combination of components within three unique parts of the steering pipeline: direction generation (how the direction is obtained from input prompts), direction selection (how to select the best direction given a set of candidate directions), and direction application (how the forward pass is adjusted with the direction during inference).

3.1.1 DIRECTION GENERATION

Direction generation references how directions are extracted from model activations when provided training-split prompts to be used in steering. By default, we always extract a direction from the token position (-1). In practice, for all of the methods tested in this benchmark we collect activations from the input before each layer. When generating the direction, we always normalize it following Wu et al. (2025). We currently include the following methods for generating candidate directions:

DiffInMeans: DiffInMeans represents the mean difference in activations between positive and negative activations at the selected location.

PCA: PCA identifies the primary axis of variance among activation vectors as in (Lee et al., 2024a; Wu et al., 2025), then checks this principle component to ensure it aligns with the positive direction of the prompts.

LAT: LAT also uses principle component analysis, but instead of using the raw activations directly, it randomly pairs activations (regardless of their positive/negative labels) and uses the difference between them as inputs (Wu et al., 2025; Zou et al., 2023).

We also support different prompt formatting styles for direction generation: 1) `default`: using the dataset's original prompt format, 2) `RepE`: reformatting prompts using LAT-style stimulus templates (Zou et al., 2023), and 3) `CAA`: converting all prompts to multiple-choice questions (Panickssery et al., 2023)."

3.1.2 DIRECTION SELECTION

Direction selection is how a single direction is chosen given a set of candidate directions. In our paper, this is accomplished by using a validation split. The output of each direction selection procedure is a layer (where the direction was generated from) and the values for any other applier-specific parameters that we iterated over. For all methods, we search from the 25th to 80th quantile of the layers with a step size of 2, as prior work has shown steering is more effective in the middle layers (Arditi et al., 2024). The set of applier-specific parameters is based on the steering method and currently is either empty or consists of a coefficient (where we test integers from -3 to 3 inclusive).

For each method, unless otherwise specified we include a KL divergence check on Alpaca (using the same split as defined for the harmfulness perspective) as in Arditi et al. (2024) to ensure the intervention is reasonable, discarding the direction if it results in a KL divergence in logits of over 10%. We implement grid search to find the layer and application-specific parameters to extract the direction, chosen by highest performance on the validation set.

3.1.3 DIRECTION APPLICATION

Direction application specifies how the direction modifies activations during inference. There are two important aspects of direction application: 1) the mathematical formulation of the intervention, and 2) how that intervention is applied. We specify the mathematical formulations below, where in each case activations are modified in-place and the forward pass is continued:

Activation Addition: Activation addition (Turner et al., 2023; Panickssery et al., 2023) modifies activations of the form $v' = v' + \alpha * d$, where d is the direction, v is the activation and α is the steering coefficient.

Directional Ablation: Directional ablation (Arditi et al., 2024; Marshall et al., 2024) modifies activations of the form $v' = v - \text{proj}^{\parallel}_{d^*}(v)$, with an additional $\text{proj}^{\parallel}_{d^*}(d^{-*})$ added to the right hand side in the case of an affine transformation as in Marshall et al. (2024), with d^{-*} representing the mean of the negative activations from the direction generation step. Currently, we do not utilize a steering coefficient for directional ablation experiments following the conventions of Arditi et al. (2024); Siu et al. (2025).

Successful steering requires not only the mathematical operations above, but also strategic decisions about where and when to intervene. We implement flexible control over both aspects:

Intervention Locations: The location within the transformer and token position where the intervention is applied must be specified for each method. The position of intervention can either be `ALL`, `OUTPUT_ONLY`, or `POST_INSTRUCTION`. The location of intervention is defined based on the layer and location within the transformer block where the intervention occurs.

Conditional Steering: We utilize conditional steering to let us decide when to apply the intervention at inference time depending on the prompt, which should reduce entanglement. We implement this based on CAST (Lee et al., 2024a), a conditional direction application method where steering only occurs if the cosine similarity of the activations and a preselected condition vector is above some threshold. This can be added on top of any other direction application method. More information on these settings is in Appendix A.3.

3.2 STEERING METHODS

Though the above steering components can be freely combined, in practice we select five preset steering methods from the literature that implement explicit combinations of the modular components, detailed in Table 1. Where it isn't clear, we make reasonable decisions about how to use the method in our framework given the paper and/or codebase where that method was used.

Table 1: Overview of steering methods with their components. Direction selection uses `GridSearch` across all methods.

Method	Format	Dir. Generation	Dir. Application	Application Position	Application Location
DIM	`default`	`DiffInMeans`	`DirectionalAblation`	`ALL`	Input (all), Output (attn, mlp)
ACE	`default`	`DiffInMeans`	`DirectionalAblation + Affine`	`ALL`	Same as gen.
CAA	`CAA`	`DiffInMeans`	`ActAdd`	`POST_INSTRUCTION`	Same as gen.
PCA	`default`	`PCA`	`ActAdd`	`ALL`	Same as gen.
LAT	`RepE`	`LAT`	`ActAdd`	`ALL`	Cumulative

We implement the following methods: Difference-in-Means (DIM) is based on Arditi et al. (2024); Siu et al. (2025), deviating only by using our standardized grid search for direction selection. [2] Affine

[2]We note that Difference-in-Means often refers to a way of generating a direction from activations, not a full steering method with a fixed way of selecting and applying directions. However, we follow Wollschläger et al. (2025) by referring to Arditi et al. (2024)'s method of steering as DIM.

Concept Editing (ACE) is based on Marshall et al. (2024)'s affine concept editing and is automated and shown to be effective compared to DIM for refusal in Siu et al. (2025). Contrastive Activation Addition (CAA) based on Panickssery et al. (2023). Notably, we follow the convention of always using multiple choice formatting for direction generation and applying the intervention at all post instruction tokens. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is based on Zou et al. (2023); Wu et al. (2025); Liu et al. (2024); Lee et al. (2024a). Linear Artificial Tomography (LAT) is based on Zou et al. (2023); Wu et al. (2025). Different from AxBench, we use the `RepE` format as used in Zou et al. (2023), and apply directions cumulatively as suggested in the original paper as well (described in Appendix A.3). A similar setting is also applied in Lee et al. (2024a) for PCA, but for more diversity we chose not to use this cumulative setting for PCA as well.

4 Evaluation

To assess the effectiveness and generalizability of representation steering, we evaluate a steered version of Qwen-2.5-7B (Qwen et al., 2024), Llama-3.1-8B (Grattafiori et al., 2024), and Gemma-2-2B (Team et al., 2024) across all perspectives. Steering is conducted using SteeringSafety's curated training and validation splits.

As SteeringSafety is focused on benchmarking general steering effectiveness alongside entanglement, we choose to steer on the three perspectives that align best with existing work in representation steering, then evaluate entanglement on the rest: (1) increasing harmfulness (Marshall et al., 2024; Arditi et al., 2024; Siu et al., 2025; Panickssery et al., 2023; Wollschläger et al., 2025; Lee et al., 2024a; Zou et al., 2023), (2) reducing intrinsic/extrinsic hallucinations (Xu et al., 2024; Nguyen et al., 2025; Qiu et al., 2024; Ji et al., 2025; Beaglehole et al., 2025; Zou et al., 2023; Panickssery et al., 2023), and (3) reducing explicit/implicit bias (Nguyen et al., 2025; Qiu et al., 2024; Beaglehole et al., 2025; Siddique et al., 2025; Ant, 2024; Liu et al., 2024; Zou et al., 2023). As our focus is on entanglement, for each steering method we evaluate on each three variants that explicitly change the effectiveness/entanglement tradeoff: with KL divergence check (Standard), without KL divergence check (No KL), and with CAST for conditional steering (Conditional). Additional experimental details are in Appendix D.

4.1 Main Results



Figure 2: Average effectiveness (higher is better) and entanglement (lower is better) on evaluated steering methods for Qwen-2.5-7B, Llama-3.1-8B, and Gemma-2-2B. We find that while methods can induce performance increases on the three perspectives they are steered on the relative effectiveness and entanglement vary by model.

We present average effectiveness and entanglement by model in Figure 2. Instead of naively averaging effectiveness over all datasets, we use min-max scaling over each primary dataset to ensure the behaviors that are easier and harder to steer are treated equally in our analysis. More details are in Appendix D.1. We see that steering methods differ drastically for each model and that there is a

wide range of tradeoffs possible. The highest effectiveness is achieved by DIM on all three models; however, for Qwen-2.5-7B DIM also has the highest entanglement. This makes sense given DIM intervenes at multiple spots in each layer. Across all methods, Llama-3.1-8B generally sees the most entanglement, meaning its design could be more adverse to interventions. The worst methods for effectiveness on Qwen-2.5-7B and Gemma-2-2B are CAA and PCA, seeing barely any performance boosts but still non-zero entanglement. Overall, these results show that models are a key determinant of steering performance and while there are promising methods, they come with tradeoffs: there is no universal best method that maximizes effectiveness while minimizing entanglement across all models.

4.2 Results by Perspective

We present full evaluations of Qwen-2.5-7B, Llama-3.1-8B, and Gemma-2-2B in Figures 3, 4, and 9 with the No KL and Conditional variants in Figures 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 11. We focus on the three main perspectives being steered, evaluating both 1) the effectiveness of the intervention on improving that behavior, and 2) the entanglement resulting from that intervention on all other perspectives. Additional results on Qwen-2.5-1.5B and Qwen-2.5-3B for the standard variant are in Appendix E.2.

Harmfulness: TruthfulQA is the only dataset previously used to study refusal entanglement (Arditi et al., 2024; Wollschläger et al., 2025). Our results (Figure 7) show, however, that nearly all perspectives exhibit substantial entanglement, with GPQA as the sole exception-underscoring SteeringSafety's contribution in revealing many more entangled behavior pairs. DIM and ACE are the most effective for steering harmfulness, but this consistently entangles with sycophancy and user retention, even under conditional steering. While topics such as explicit bias and commonsense morality sometimes invoke objectionable content, their entanglement is inconsistent, ranging from severe degradation in Llama-3.1-8B to no effect in Qwen-2.5-7B.

Hallucination: Extrinsic hallucination is distinctive: largely unsteerable in Gemma-2-2B and all Qwen models, yet producing a 50% accuracy boost in Llama-3.1-8B. In Llama, it is favored by both CAA and PCA, but only CAA entangles with Explicit Bias, for reasons that remain unclear. Without KL divergence, CAA increases intrinsic hallucination rates, whereas PCA reduces them, highlighting that effectiveness alone is insufficient-CAA offers slightly stronger gains but at significant entanglement cost. Intrinsic hallucination is more steerable but inconsistent across models. For example, PCA and LAT substantially reduce hallucinations in Qwen-2.5-1.5B (Figure 12), while ACE is more effective for Qwen-2.5-3B (Figure 13). Successful steering generally shows minimal entanglement: DIM reduces hallucinations by 9.1% in Qwen-2.5-7B (Figure 3) with negligible side effects, and PCA in Llama-3.1-8B (Figure 4) achieves strong reductions while even improving behaviors like commonsense morality, user retention, and sycophancy.

Bias: Bias is less steerable than other perspectives, likely due to already high baseline scores. Still, we observe counterintuitive effects. In Gemma-2-2b and Qwen-2.5-7B (Figures 9, 3), bias steering unpredictably alters hallucination rates. This persists under conditional steering of Qwen-2.5-7B, where inconsistent FaithEval questions degrade sharply (Figure 6). Future work on mitigating bias-or studying it in less equitable models-may benefit from applying SteeringSafety to analyze entanglement under scenarios where steering is more impactful.

Social Behaviors: Behaviors like sycophancy are strongly affected by harmfulness steering, consistent with findings in RL-based work (Malmqvist, 2024; Min et al., 2025; Papadatos and Freedman, 2024). Safety interventions also shift less overtly harmful perspectives, such as brand bias and anthropomorphism. Other entanglements are inconsistent, but hallucination and bias steering often cause unpredictable changes, warranting deeper study to better control these behaviors.

Reasoning Capabilities: Reasoning capabilities remain standard benchmarks in safety work (Arditi et al., 2024; Siu et al., 2025). Our results show entanglement is minimal compared to other perspectives, underscoring how SteeringSafety supports more systematic evaluations of safety interventions without over-penalizing reasoning ability.

Epistemic Integrity: As prior work shows, TruthfulQA entangles with refusal (Arditi et al., 2024). While definitions of TruthfulQA vary-sometimes framed as factuality, other times as hallucination (Bang et al., 2025)-we find little evidence of systematic entanglement between hallucination steering and factuality. Sneaking, however, shows inconsistent relationships: in both Qwen-2.5-7B and

Llama-3.1-8B (Figures 3, 4), DIM jailbreaking actually reduces sneaking, showing this perspective's distinct interactions despite being sourced from the same dataset as social behaviors.

Normative Judgment: Normative judgments are generally stable under steering, with commonsense morality shifting only under extreme behavioral change. Evaluation is limited, however, by frequent refusals or non-answers on TwinViews (Appendix E.1). Expanding normative judgment benchmarks would enable more consistent and fine-grained assessment of model normativity under safety interventions.

These results underscore that broad behavioral evaluation enabled by STEERINGSAFETY is essential for understanding both intended and emergent effects of representation-level alignment.

5 RELATED WORK

Our work builds on research in LLM alignment, activation steering, and mechanistic interpretability, with a focus on intervening in and evaluating internal representations to control behaviors such as harmfulness, demographic bias, and hallucination.

Mechanistic interpretability provides the theoretical foundation for much of activation-level steering. Numerous studies demonstrate that abstract properties—truthfulness, bias, refusal—are encoded as linearly decodable directions in residual space (Park et al., 2024; Nanda et al., 2023; Bolukbasi et al., 2016; Mikolov et al., 2013). This supports the linear representation hypothesis and the superposition principle, whereby many semantic features are superimposed within the same activation subspace (Elhage et al., 2022). At the same time, other work posits refusal behaviors as affine functions or multi-dimensional subspaces (Marshall et al., 2024; Wollschläger et al., 2025). A growing body of steering work builds on this interpretability foundation by directly manipulating model activations. Refusal, toxicity, and helpfulness have been shown to correspond to linear directions in residual space (Arditi et al., 2024; Marshall et al., 2024; Weidinger et al., 2021), though interventions increasingly recognize that behaviors may span richer subspaces. Methods such as Representation Engineering (Zou et al., 2023) and Spectral Editing (Qiu et al., 2024) operate by injecting or removing learned directions to elicit or suppress targeted behaviors. These directions are often derived from contrastive data pairs (Burns et al., 2023; Arditi et al., 2024), embedding differences (Panickssery et al., 2023), or activation clustering (Wu et al., 2025). Concept removal approaches such as Contrastive Activation Addition (Turner et al., 2023; Panickssery et al., 2023) and linear concept nullification (Belrose et al., 2023; Ravfogel et al., 2020) aim to suppress targeted features while preserving fluency and task performance, while Wang and Shu (2023) identify key intervention layers using cosine similarity to unsafe activation patterns. Fine-grained steering has also been explored, splitting general behaviors into specific categories such as types of harmfulness or political beliefs (Bhattacharjee et al., 2024; Lee et al., 2024a; Hu et al., 2025).

Yet benchmarks reveal challenges: steering for one objective (e.g., reducing toxicity) can inadvertently degrade other capabilities like informativeness or truthfulness (Lee et al., 2024b; Qiu et al., 2024). Entanglement across behaviors remains a critical obstacle for reliable steering. Existing benchmarks and frameworks, such as AxBench (Wu et al., 2025), EasyEdit2 (Xu et al., 2025), and Im and Li (2025), provide structured evaluation but vary in scope. STEERINGSAFETY extends this line of work by systematizing the evaluation of cross-behavior interference. It differs in its focus on entanglement and its broad, modular coverage of training-free steering methods, including natural safety-relevant behaviors. In doing so, STEERINGSAFETY implements a standardized pipeline for activation-level steering aligned with the taxonomy proposed by Wehner et al. (2025), enabling more consistent comparisons and tradeoff analyses across settings.

6 CONCLUSION

STEERINGSAFETY provides a unified framework for evaluating representation steering in large language models, revealing how interventions affect both primary alignment targets-harmful generation, hallucination, and bias-and a wide range of secondary behaviors. By highlighting unintended side effects and entanglement across perspectives, it encourages more careful, reproducible, and reliable development of steering methods for safer language models.

7 ETHICS STATEMENT

STEERINGSAFETY offers better holistic evaluations for greater control of intervention methodologies, which advances the evaluation frontier for practitioners to ensure their techniques safely perform their intended purposes in a wider variety of settings. The general goal is to use STEERINGSAFETY to improve safety - jailbreaking refusal is included as a target, which could be dangerous as its goal is for models to respond to harmful queries, but does not exceed risk already posed by prior work (Siu et al., 2025). STEERINGSAFETY allows people interested in safety interventions to view both how steering can improve and adversely affect safety in LLMs, enabling the development of methods with finer control to ultimately further the frontier of safety in large language models.

8 REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

To support the reproducibility of our work, we have provided an anonymous version of our code, linked here: `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/389289893898888Anon-18CF/`.

We also provide our dataset hosted anonymously here: `65c3f75641b22925c737ca657b126cd68c39e42334/ICLR_7330813ebd924444f8d91fced14891d391e946836dfb9d1fb86136101bd49318`.

Running the provided code on the provided dataset exactly replicates the process used to generate our results, ensuring full reproducibility.

REFERENCES

Tom B. Brown, Benjamin Mann, Nick Ryder, Melanie Subbiah, Jared Kaplan, Prafulla Dhariwal, Arvind Neelakantan, Pranav Shyam, Girish Sastry, Amanda Askell, Sandhini Agarwal, Ariel Herbert-Voss, Gretchen Krueger, Tom Henighan, Rewon Child, Aditya Ramesh, Daniel M. Ziegler, Jeffrey Wu, Clemens Winter, Christopher Hesse, Mark Chen, Eric Sigler, Mateusz Litwin, Scott Gray, Benjamin Chess, Jack Clark, Christopher Berner, Sam McCandlish, Alec Radford, Ilya Sutskever, and Dario Amodei. Language models are few-shot learners. In Hugo Larochelle, Marc'Aurelio Ranzato, Raia Hadsell, Maria-Florina Balcan, and Hsuan-Tien Lin, editors, *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 33: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2020, NeurIPS 2020, December 6-12, 2020, virtual*, 2020. URL `https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2020/hash/1457c0d6bfcb4967418bfb8ac142f64a-Abstract.html`.

Hugo Touvron, Thibaut Lavril, Gautier Izacard, Xavier Martinet, Marie-Anne Lachaux, Timothée Lacroix, Baptiste Rozière, Naman Goyal, Eric Hambro, Faisal Azhar, Aurelien Rodriguez, Armand Joulin, Edouard Grave, and Guillaume Lample. Llama: Open and efficient foundation language models, 2023. URL `https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.13971`.

Long Ouyang, Jeffrey Wu, Xu Jiang, Diogo Almeida, Carroll L. Wainwright, Pamela Mishkin, Chong Zhang, Sandhini Agarwal, Katarina Slama, Alex Ray, John Schulman, Jacob Hilton, Fraser Kelton, Luke Miller, Maddie Simens, Amanda Askell, Peter Welinder, Paul F. Christiano, Jan Leike, and Ryan Lowe. Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback. In Sanmi Koyejo, S. Mohamed, A. Agarwal, Danielle Belgrave, K. Cho, and A. Oh, editors, *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 35: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2022, NeurIPS 2022, New Orleans, LA, USA, November 28 - December 9, 2022*, 2022. URL `http://papers.nips.cc/paper_files/paper/2022/hash/b1efde53be364a73914f58805a001731-Abstract-Conference.html`.

Yuntao Bai, Andy Jones, Kamal Ndousse, Amanda Askell, Anna Chen, Nova DasSarma, Dawn Drain, Stanislav Fort, Deep Ganguli, Tom Henighan, Nicholas Joseph, Saurav Kadavath, Jackson Kernion, Tom Conerly, Sheer El-Showk, Nelson Elhage, Zac Hatfield-Dodds, Danny Hernandez, Tristan Hume, Scott Johnston, Shauna Kravec, Liane Lovitt, Neel Nanda, Catherine Olsson, Dario Amodei, Tom Brown, Jack Clark, Sam McCandlish, Chris Olah, Ben Mann, and Jared Kaplan. Training a helpful and harmless assistant with reinforcement learning from human feedback, 2022. URL `https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.05862`.

Laura Weidinger, John Mellor, Maribeth Rauh, Conor Griffin, Jonathan Uesato, Po-Sen Huang, Myra Cheng, Mia Glaese, Borja Balle, Atoosa Kasirzadeh, Zac Kenton, Sasha Brown, Will Hawkins, Tom Stepleton, Courtney Biles, Abeba Birhane, Julia Haas, Laura Rimell, Lisa Anne Hendricks, William Isaac, Sean Legassick, Geoffrey Irving, and Iason Gabriel. Ethical and social risks of harm from language models, 2021. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.04359.

Mantas Mazeika, Long Phan, Xuwang Yin, Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, Norman Mu, Elham Sakhaee, Nathaniel Li, Steven Basart, Bo Li, David A. Forsyth, and Dan Hendrycks. Harmbench: A standardized evaluation framework for automated red teaming and robust refusal. In *Forty-first International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2024, Vienna, Austria, July 21-27, 2024*. OpenReview.net, 2024. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=f3TUipYU3U.

Ziwei Xu, Sanjay Jain, and Mohan Kankanhalli. Hallucination is inevitable: An innate limitation of large language models, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.11817.

Isabel O. Gallegos, Ryan A. Rossi, Joe Barrow, Md Mehrab Tanjim, Sungchul Kim, Franck Dernoncourt, Tong Yu, Ruiyi Zhang, and Nesreen K. Ahmed. Bias and fairness in large language models: A survey, 2023. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.00770.

Jan Leike, David Krueger, Tom Everitt, Miljan Martic, Vishal Maini, and Shane Legg. Scalable agent alignment via reward modeling: a research direction, 2018. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.07871.

Deep Ganguli, Liane Lovitt, Jackson Kernion, Amanda Askell, Yuntao Bai, Saurav Kadavath, Ben Mann, Ethan Perez, Nicholas Schiefer, Kamal Ndousse, Andy Jones, Sam Bowman, Anna Chen, Tom Conerly, Nova DasSarma, Dawn Drain, Nelson Elhage, Sheer El-Showk, Stanislav Fort, Zac Hatfield-Dodds, Tom Henighan, Danny Hernandez, Tristan Hume, Josh Jacobson, Scott Johnston, Shauna Kravec, Catherine Olsson, Sam Ringer, Eli Tran-Johnson, Dario Amodei, Tom Brown, Nicholas Joseph, Sam McCandlish, Chris Olah, Jared Kaplan, and Jack Clark. Red teaming language models to reduce harms: Methods, scaling behaviors, and lessons learned, 2022. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.07858.

Will Hawkins, Brent Mittelstadt, and Chris Russell. The effect of fine-tuning on language model toxicity, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.15821.

Aaron J. Li, Satyapriya Krishna, and Himabindu Lakkaraju. More rlhf, more trust? on the impact of preference alignment on trustworthiness, 2024a. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.18870.

Xiangyu Qi, Yi Zeng, Tinghao Xie, Pin-Yu Chen, Ruoxi Jia, Prateek Mittal, and Peter Henderson. Fine-tuning aligned language models compromises safety, even when users do not intend to! In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR 2024, Vienna, Austria, May 7-11, 2024*. OpenReview.net, 2024. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=hTEGyKf0dZ.

Jishnu Mukhoti, Yarin Gal, Philip H. S. Torr, and Puneet K. Dokania. Fine-tuning can cripple your foundation model; preserving features may be the solution, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.13320.

Lars Malmqvist. Sycophancy in large language models: Causes and mitigations, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.15287.

Taywon Min, Haeone Lee, Yongchan Kwon, and Kimin Lee. Understanding impact of human feedback via influence functions. In *Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, page 27471–27500. Association for Computational Linguistics, 2025. doi: 10.18653/v1/2025.acl-long.1333. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.18653/v1/2025.acl-long.1333.

Henry Papadatos and Rachel Freedman. Linear probe penalties reduce llm sycophancy, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.00967.

Ethan Perez, Sam Ringer, Kamile Lukosiute, Karina Nguyen, Edwin Chen, Scott Heiner, Craig Pettit, Catherine Olsson, Sandipan Kundu, Saurav Kadavath, Andy Jones, Anna Chen, Benjamin Mann, Brian Israel, Bryan Seethor, Cameron McKinnon, Christopher Olah, Da Yan, Daniela Amodei, Dario Amodei, Dawn Drain, Dustin Li, Eli Tran-Johnson, Guro Khundadze, Jackson Kernion, James Landis, Jamie Kerr, Jared Mueller, Jeeyoon Hyun, Joshua Landau, Kamal Ndousse, Landon Goldberg, Liane Lovitt, Martin Lucas, Michael Sellitto, Miranda Zhang, Neerav Kingsland, Nelson Elhage, Nicholas Joseph, Noemi Mercado, Nova DasSarma, Oliver Rausch, Robin Larson, Sam McCandlish, Scott Johnston, Shauna Kravec, Sheer El Showk, Tamera Lanham, Timothy Telleen-Lawton, Tom Brown, Tom Henighan, Tristan Hume, Yuntao Bai, Zac Hatfield-Dodds, Jack Clark, Samuel R. Bowman, Amanda Askell, Roger Grosse, Danny Hernandez, Deep Ganguli, Evan Hubinger, Nicholas Schiefer, and Jared Kaplan. Discovering language model behaviors with model-written evaluations. In Anna Rogers, Jordan Boyd-Graber, and Naoaki Okazaki, editors, *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2023*, pages 13387–13434, Toronto, Canada, July 2023. Association for Computational Linguistics. doi: 10.18653/v1/2023.findings-acl.847. URL https://aclanthology.org/2023.findings-acl.847/.

Andy Zou, Long Phan, Sarah Chen, James Campbell, Phillip Guo, Richard Ren, Alexander Pan, Xuwang Yin, Mantas Mazeika, Ann-Kathrin Dombrowski, Shashwat Goel, Nathaniel Li, Michael J. Byun, Zifan Wang, Alex Mallen, Steven Basart, Sanmi Koyejo, Dawn Song, Matt Fredrikson, J. Zico Kolter, and Dan Hendrycks. Representation engineering: A top-down approach to ai transparency, 2023. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.01405.

Nina Panickssery, Nick Gabrieli, Julian Schulz, Meg Tong, Evan Hubinger, and Alexander Matt Turner. Steering llama 2 via contrastive activation addition, 2023. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.06681.

Kenneth Li, Oam Patel, Fernanda Viégas, Hanspeter Pfister, and Martin Wattenberg. Inference-time intervention: Eliciting truthful answers from a language model. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 36:41451–41530, 2023.

Alexander Matt Turner, Lisa Thiergart, Gavin Leech, David Udell, Juan J. Vazquez, Ulisse Mini, and Monte MacDiarmid. Steering language models with activation engineering, 2023. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.10248.

Jan Wehner, Sahar Abdelnabi, Daniel Tan, David Krueger, and Mario Fritz. Taxonomy, opportunities, and challenges of representation engineering for large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.19649*, 2025.

Bruce W. Lee, Inkit Padhi, Karthikeyan Natesan Ramamurthy, Erik Miehling, Pierre Dognin, Manish Nagireddy, and Amit Dhurandhar. Programming refusal with conditional activation steering, 2024a. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2409.05907.

Lukasz Bartoszcze, Sarthak Munshi, Bryan Sukidi, Jennifer Yen, Zejia Yang, David Williams-King, Linh Le, Kosi Asuzu, and Carsten Maple. Representation engineering for large-language models: Survey and research challenges. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.17601*, 2025.

Andy Arditi, Oscar Obeso, Aaquib Syed, Daniel Paleka, Nina Panickssery, Wes Gurnee, and Neel Nanda. Refusal in language models is mediated by a single direction. In Amir Globersons, Lester Mackey, Danielle Belgrave, Angela Fan, Ulrich Paquet, Jakub M. Tomczak, and Cheng Zhang, editors, *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 38: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2024, NeurIPS 2024, Vancouver, BC, Canada, December 10 - 15, 2024*, 2024. URL http://papers.nips.cc/paper_files/paper/2024/hash/f545448535dfde4f9786555403ab7c49-Abstract-Conference.html.

Thomas Marshall, Adam Scherlis, and Nora Belrose. Refusal in llms is an affine function, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.09003.

Tom Wollschläger, Jannes Elstner, Simon Geisler, Vincent Cohen-Addad, Stephan Günnemann, and Johannes Gasteiger. The geometry of refusal in large language models: Concept cones and representational independence, 2025. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.17420.

Chao Chen, Kai Liu, Ze Chen, Yi Gu, Yue Wu, Mingyuan Tao, Zhihang Fu, and Jieping Ye. INSIDE: llms' internal states retain the power of hallucination detection. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR 2024, Vienna, Austria, May 7-11, 2024*. OpenReview.net, 2024. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=Zj12nzlQbz.

Lijun Li, Bowen Dong, Ruohui Wang, Xuhao Hu, Wangmeng Zuo, Dahua Lin, Yu Qiao, and Jing Shao. Salad-bench: A hierarchical and comprehensive safety benchmark for large language models, 2024b. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.05044.

Rohan Taori, Ishaan Gulrajani, Tianyi Zhang, Yann Dubois, Xuechen Li, Carlos Guestrin, Percy Liang, and Tatsunori B. Hashimoto. Stanford Alpaca: An instruction-following LLaMA model. https://github.com/tatsu-lab/stanford_alpaca, 2023.

Meta. The llama 4 herd: The beginning of a new era of natively multimodal ai innovation, Apr 2025. URL https://ai.meta.com/blog/llama-4-multimodal-intelligence/.

Alicia Parrish, Angelica Chen, Nikita Nangia, Vishakh Padmakumar, Jason Phang, Jana Thompson, Phu Mon Htut, and Samuel Bowman. BBQ: A hand-built bias benchmark for question answering. In Smaranda Muresan, Preslav Nakov, and Aline Villavicencio, editors, *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2022*, pages 2086–2105, Dublin, Ireland, May 2022. Association for Computational Linguistics. doi: 10.18653/v1/2022.findings-acl.165. URL https://aclanthology.org/2022.findings-acl.165/.

Thomas Hartvigsen, Saadia Gabriel, Hamid Palangi, Maarten Sap, Dipankar Ray, and Ece Kamar. Toxigen: A large-scale machine-generated dataset for implicit and adversarial hate speech detection. In *Proceedings of the 60th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics*, 2022.

Yejin Bang, Ziwei Ji, Alan Schelten, Anthony Hartshorn, Tara Fowler, Cheng Zhang, Nicola Cancedda, and Pascale Fung. Hallulens: Llm hallucination benchmark. 2025. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.17550.

Yifei Ming, Senthil Purushwalkam, Shrey Pandit, Zixuan Ke, Xuan-Phi Nguyen, Caiming Xiong, and Shafiq Joty. Faitheval: Can your language model stay faithful to context, even if "the moon is made of marshmallows", 2025. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.03727.

Aaron Grattafiori, Abhimanyu Dubey, Abhinav Jauhri, Abhinav Pandey, Abhishek Kadian, Ahmad Al-Dahle, Aiesha Letman, Akhil Mathur, Alan Schelten, Alex Vaughan, Amy Yang, Angela Fan, Anirudh Goyal, Anthony Hartshorn, Aobo Yang, Archi Mitra, Archie Sravankumar, Artem Korenev, Arthur Hinsvark, Arun Rao, Aston Zhang, Aurelien Rodriguez, Austen Gregerson, Ava Spataru, Baptiste Roziere, Bethany Biron, Binh Tang, Bobbie Chern, Charlotte Caucheteux, Chaya Nayak, Chloe Bi, Chris Marra, Chris McConnell, Christian Keller, Christophe Touret, Chunyang Wu, Corinne Wong, Cristian Canton Ferrer, Cyrus Nikolaidis, Damien Allonsius, Daniel Song, Danielle Pintz, Danny Livshits, Danny Wyatt, David Esiobu, Dhruv Choudhary, Dhruv Mahajan, Diego Garcia-Olano, Diego Perino, Dieuwke Hupkes, Egor Lakomkin, Ehab AlBadawy, Elina Lobanova, Emily Dinan, Eric Michael Smith, Filip Radenovic, Francisco Guzmán, Frank Zhang, Gabriel Synnaeve, Gabrielle Lee, Georgia Lewis Anderson, Govind Thattai, Graeme Nail, Gregoire Mialon, Guan Pang, Guillem Cucurell, Hailey Nguyen, Hannah Korevaar, Hu Xu, Hugo Touvron, Iliyan Zarov, Imanol Arrieta Ibarra, Isabel Kloumann, Ishan Misra, Ivan Evtimov, Jack Zhang, Jade Copet, Jaewon Lee, Jan Geffert, Jana Vranes, Jason Park, Jay Mahadeokar, Jeet Shah, Jelmer van der Linde, Jennifer Billock, Jenny Hong, Jenya Lee, Jeremy Fu, Jianfeng Chi, Jianyu Huang, Jiawen Liu, Jie Wang, Jiecao Yu, Joanna Bitton, Joe Spisak, Jongsoo Park, Joseph Rocca, Joshua Johnstun, Joshua Saxe, Junteng Jia, Kalyan Vasuden Alwala, Karthik Prasad, Kartikeya Upasani, Kate Plawiak, Ke Li, Kenneth Heafield, Kevin Stone, Khalid El-Arini, Krithika Iyer, Kshitiz Malik, Kuenley Chiu, Kunal Bhalla, Kushal Lakhotia, Lauren Rantala-Yeary, Laurens van der Maaten, Lawrence Chen, Liang Tan, Liz Jenkins, Louis Martin, Lovish Madaan, Lubo Malo, Lukas Blecher, Lukas Landzaat, Luke de Oliveira, Madeline Muzzi, Mahesh Pasupuleti, Mannat Singh, Manohar Paluri, Marcin Kardas, Maria Tsimpoukelli, Mathew Oldham, Mathieu Rita, Maya Pavlova, Melanie Kambadur, Mike Lewis, Min Si, Mitesh Kumar Singh, Mona Hassan, Naman Goyal, Narjes Torabi, Nikolay Bashlykov, Nikolay Bogoychev, Niladri Chatterji, Ning Zhang, Olivier Duchenne, Onur Çelebi, Patrick Alrassy, Pengchuan Zhang, Pengwei Li, Petar Vasic, Peter Weng, Prajjwal Bhargava, Pratik Dubal, Praveen Krishnan, Punit Singh Koura, Puxin Xu, Qing He, Qingxiao Dong,

Ragavan Srinivasan, Raj Ganapathy, Ramon Calderer, Ricardo Silveira Cabral, Robert Stojnic, Roberta Raileanu, Rohan Maheswari, Rohit Girdhar, Rohit Patel, Romain Sauvestre, Ronnie Polidoro, Roshan Sumbaly, Ross Taylor, Ruan Silva, Rui Hou, Rui Wang, Saghar Hosseini, Sahana Chennabasappa, Sanjay Singh, Sean Bell, Seohyun Sonia Kim, Sergey Edunov, Shaoliang Nie, Sharan Narang, Sharath Raparthy, Sheng Shen, Shengye Wan, Shruti Bhosale, Shun Zhang, Simon Vandenhende, Soumya Batra, Spencer Whitman, Sten Sootla, Stephane Collot, Suchin Gururangan, Sydney Borodinsky, Tamar Herman, Tara Fowler, Tarek Sheasha, Thomas Georgiou, Thomas Scialom, Tobias Speckbacher, Todor Mihaylov, Tong Xiao, Ujjwal Karn, Vedanuj Goswami, Vibhor Gupta, Vignesh Ramanathan, Viktor Kerkez, Vincent Gonguet, Virginie Do, Vish Vogeti, Vítor Albiero, Vladan Petrovic, Weiwei Chu, Wenhan Xiong, Wenyin Fu, Whitney Meers, Xavier Martinet, Xiaodong Wang, Xiaofang Wang, Xiaoqing Ellen Tan, Xide Xia, Xinfeng Xie, Xuchao Jia, Xuewei Wang, Yaelle Goldschlag, Yashesh Gaur, Yasmine Babaei, Yi Wen, Yiwen Song, Yuchen Zhang, Yue Li, Yuning Mao, Zacharie Delpierre Coudert, Zheng Yan, Zhengxing Chen, Zoe Papakipos, Aaditya Singh, Aayushi Srivastava, Abha Jain, Adam Kelsey, Adam Shajnfeld, Adithya Gangidi, Adolfo Victoria, Ahuva Goldstand, Ajay Menon, Ajay Sharma, Alex Boesenberg, Alexei Baevski, Allie Feinstein, Amanda Kallet, Amit Sangani, Amos Teo, Anam Yunus, Andrei Lupu, Andres Alvarado, Andrew Caples, Andrew Gu, Andrew Ho, Andrew Poulton, Andrew Ryan, Ankit Ramchandani, Annie Dong, Annie Franco, Anuj Goyal, Aparajita Saraf, Arkabandhu Chowdhury, Ashley Gabriel, Ashwin Bharambe, Assaf Eisenman, Azadeh Yazdan, Beau James, Ben Maurer, Benjamin Leonhardi, Bernie Huang, Beth Loyd, Beto De Paola, Bhargavi Paranjape, Bing Liu, Bo Wu, Boyu Ni, Braden Hancock, Bram Wasti, Brandon Spence, Brani Stojkovic, Brian Gamido, Britt Montalvo, Carl Parker, Carly Burton, Catalina Mejia, Ce Liu, Changhan Wang, Changkyu Kim, Chao Zhou, Chester Hu, Ching-Hsiang Chu, Chris Cai, Chris Tindal, Christoph Feichtenhofer, Cynthia Gao, Damon Civin, Dana Beaty, Daniel Kreymer, Daniel Li, David Adkins, David Xu, Davide Testuggine, Delia David, Devi Parikh, Diana Liskovich, Didem Foss, Dingkang Wang, Duc Le, Dustin Holland, Edward Dowling, Eissa Jamil, Elaine Montgomery, Eleonora Presani, Emily Hahn, Emily Wood, Eric-Tuan Le, Erik Brinkman, Esteban Arcaute, Evan Dunbar, Evan Smothers, Fei Sun, Felix Kreuk, Feng Tian, Filippos Kokkinos, Firat Ozgenel, Francesco Caggioni, Frank Kanayet, Frank Seide, Gabriela Medina Florez, Gabriella Schwarz, Gada Badeer, Georgia Swee, Gil Halpern, Grant Herman, Grigory Sizov, Guangyi, Zhang, Guna Lakshminarayanan, Hakan Inan, Hamid Shojanazeri, Han Zou, Hannah Wang, Hanwen Zha, Haroun Habeeb, Harrison Rudolph, Helen Suk, Henry Aspegren, Hunter Goldman, Hongyuan Zhan, Ibrahim Damlaj, Igor Molybog, Igor Tufanov, Ilias Leontiadis, Irina-Elena Veliche, Itai Gat, Jake Weissman, James Geboski, James Kohli, Janice Lam, Japhet Asher, Jean-Baptiste Gaya, Jeff Marcus, Jeff Tang, Jennifer Chan, Jenny Zhen, Jeremy Reizenstein, Jeremy Teboul, Jessica Zhong, Jian Jin, Jingyi Yang, Joe Cummings, Jon Carvill, Jon Shepard, Jonathan McPhie, Jonathan Torres, Josh Ginsburg, Junjie Wang, Kai Wu, Kam Hou U, Karan Saxena, Kartikay Khandelwal, Katayoun Zand, Kathy Matosich, Kaushik Veeraraghavan, Kelly Michelena, Keqian Li, Kiran Jagadeesh, Kun Huang, Kunal Chawla, Kyle Huang, Lailin Chen, Lakshya Garg, Lavender A, Leandro Silva, Lee Bell, Lei Zhang, Liangpeng Guo, Licheng Yu, Liron Moshkovich, Luca Wehrstedt, Madian Khabsa, Manav Avalani, Manish Bhatt, Martynas Mankus, Matan Hasson, Matthew Lennie, Matthias Reso, Maxim Groshev, Maxim Naumov, Maya Lathi, Meghan Keneally, Miao Liu, Michael L. Seltzer, Michal Valko, Michelle Restrepo, Mihir Patel, Mik Vyatskov, Mikayel Samvelyan, Mike Clark, Mike Macey, Mike Wang, Miquel Jubert Hermoso, Mo Metanat, Mohammad Rastegari, Munish Bansal, Nandhini Santhanam, Natascha Parks, Natasha White, Navyata Bawa, Nayan Singhal, Nick Egebo, Nicolas Usunier, Nikhil Mehta, Nikolay Pavlovich Laptev, Ning Dong, Norman Cheng, Oleg Chernoguz, Olivia Hart, Omkar Salpekar, Ozlem Kalinli, Parkin Kent, Parth Parekh, Paul Saab, Pavan Balaji, Pedro Rittner, Philip Bontrager, Pierre Roux, Piotr Dollar, Polina Zvyagina, Prashant Ratanchandani, Pritish Yuvraj, Qian Liang, Rachad Alao, Rachel Rodriguez, Rafi Ayub, Raghotham Murthy, Raghu Nayani, Rahul Mitra, Rangaprabhu Parthasarathy, Raymond Li, Rebekkah Hogan, Robin Battey, Rocky Wang, Russ Howes, Ruty Rinott, Sachin Mehta, Sachin Siby, Sai Jayesh Bondu, Samyak Datta, Sara Chugh, Sara Hunt, Sargun Dhillon, Sasha Sidorov, Satadru Pan, Saurabh Mahajan, Saurabh Verma, Seiji Yamamoto, Sharadh Ramaswamy, Shaun Lindsay, Shaun Lindsay, Sheng Feng, Shenghao Lin, Shengxin Cindy Zha, Shishir Patil, Shiva Shankar, Shuqiang Zhang, Shuqiang Zhang, Sinong Wang, Sneha Agarwal, Soji Sajuyigbe, Soumith Chintala, Stephanie Max, Stephen Chen, Steve Kehoe, Steve Satterfield, Sudarshan Govindaprasad, Sumit Gupta, Summer Deng, Sungmin Cho, Sunny Virk, Suraj Subramanian, Sy Choudhury, Sydney Goldman, Tal Remez, Tamar Glaser, Tamara Best, Thilo Koehler, Thomas Robinson, Tianhe Li, Tianjun Zhang, Tim Matthews, Timothy Chou, Tzook Shaked, Varun Vontimitta, Victoria Ajayi, Victoria

Montanez, Vijai Mohan, Vinay Satish Kumar, Vishal Mangla, Vlad Ionescu, Vlad Poenaru, Vlad Tiberiu Mihailescu, Vladimir Ivanov, Wei Li, Wenchen Wang, Wenwen Jiang, Wes Bouaziz, Will Constable, Xiaocheng Tang, Xiaojian Wu, Xiaolan Wang, Xilun Wu, Xinbo Gao, Yaniv Kleinman, Yanjun Chen, Ye Hu, Ye Jia, Ye Qi, Yenda Li, Yilin Zhang, Ying Zhang, Yossi Adi, Youngjin Nam, Yu, Wang, Yu Zhao, Yuchen Hao, Yundi Qian, Yunlu Li, Yuzi He, Zach Rait, Zachary DeVito, Zef Rosnbrick, Zhaoduo Wen, Zhenyu Yang, Zhiwei Zhao, and Zhiyu Ma. The llama 3 herd of models, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.21783.

Esben Kran, Hieu Minh "Jord" Nguyen, Akash Kundu, Sami Jawhar, Jinsuk Park, and Mateusz Maria Jurewicz. Darkbench: Benchmarking dark patterns in large language models, 2025. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.10728.

David Rein, Betty Li Hou, Asa Cooper Stickland, Jackson Petty, Richard Yuanzhe Pang, Julien Dirani, Julian Michael, and Samuel R. Bowman. Gpqa: A graduate-level google-proof q&a benchmark, 2023. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.12022.

Peter Clark, Isaac Cowhey, Oren Etzioni, Tushar Khot, Ashish Sabharwal, Carissa Schoenick, and Oyvind Tafjord. Think you have solved question answering? try arc, the ai2 reasoning challenge. *ArXiv preprint*, abs/1803.05457, 2018. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.05457.

Stephanie Lin, Jacob Hilton, and Owain Evans. TruthfulQA: Measuring how models mimic human falsehoods. In Smaranda Muresan, Preslav Nakov, and Aline Villavicencio, editors, *Proceedings of the 60th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pages 3214–3252, Dublin, Ireland, 2022. Association for Computational Linguistics. doi: 10.18653/v1/2022.acl-long.229. URL https://aclanthology.org/2022.acl-long.229.

Boxin Wang, Weixin Chen, Hengzhi Pei, Chulin Xie, Mintong Kang, Chenhui Zhang, Chejian Xu, Zidi Xiong, Ritik Dutta, Rylan Schaeffer, Sang T. Truong, Simran Arora, Mantas Mazeika, Dan Hendrycks, Zinan Lin, Yu Cheng, Sanmi Koyejo, Dawn Song, and Bo Li. Decodingtrust: A comprehensive assessment of trustworthiness in gpt models, 2024a. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.11698.

Suyash Fulay, William Brannon, Shrestha Mohanty, Cassandra Overney, Elinor Poole-Dayan, Deb Roy, and Jad Kabbara. On the relationship between truth and political bias in language models. In *Proceedings of the 2024 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, page 9004–9018. Association for Computational Linguistics, 2024. doi: 10.18653/v1/2024.emnlp-main.508. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.18653/v1/2024.emnlp-main.508.

Yujin Potter, Shiyang Lai, Junsol Kim, James Evans, and Dawn Song. Hidden persuaders: LLMs' political leaning and their influence on voters. In Yaser Al-Onaizan, Mohit Bansal, and Yun-Nung Chen, editors, *Proceedings of the 2024 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, pages 4244–4275, Miami, Florida, USA, November 2024. Association for Computational Linguistics. doi: 10.18653/v1/2024.emnlp-main.244. URL https://aclanthology.org/2024.emnlp-main.244/.

Zhengxuan Wu, Aryaman Arora, Atticus Geiger, Zheng Wang, Jing Huang, Dan Jurafsky, Christopher D. Manning, and Christopher Potts. Axbench: Steering llms? even simple baselines outperform sparse autoencoders, 2025. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.17148.

Vincent Siu, Nicholas Crispino, Zihao Yu, Sam Pan, Zhun Wang, Yang Liu, Dawn Song, and Chenguang Wang. COSMIC: Generalized refusal identification in LLM activations. In *The 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics*, 2025. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=CJ8TYfkPiG.

Sheng Liu, Haotian Ye, Lei Xing, and James Y. Zou. In-context vectors: Making in context learning more effective and controllable through latent space steering. In *Forty-first International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2024, Vienna, Austria, July 21-27, 2024*. OpenReview.net, 2024. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=dJTChKgv3a.

Qwen, :, An Yang, Baosong Yang, Beichen Zhang, Binyuan Hui, Bo Zheng, Bowen Yu, Chengyuan Li, Dayiheng Liu, Fei Huang, Haoran Wei, Huan Lin, Jian Yang, Jianhong Tu, Jianwei Zhang,

Jianxin Yang, Jiaxi Yang, Jingren Zhou, Junyang Lin, Kai Dang, Keming Lu, Keqin Bao, Kexin Yang, Le Yu, Mei Li, Mingfeng Xue, Pei Zhang, Qin Zhu, Rui Men, Runji Lin, Tianhao Li, Tianyi Tang, Tingyu Xia, Xingzhang Ren, Xuancheng Ren, Yang Fan, Yang Su, Yichang Zhang, Yu Wan, Yuqiong Liu, Zeyu Cui, Zhenru Zhang, and Zihan Qiu. Qwen2.5 technical report, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.15115.

Gemma Team, Morgane Riviere, Shreya Pathak, Pier Giuseppe Sessa, Cassidy Hardin, Surya Bhupatiraju, Léonard Hussenot, Thomas Mesnard, Bobak Shahriari, Alexandre Ramé, Johan Ferret, Peter Liu, Pouya Tafti, Abe Friesen, Michelle Casbon, Sabela Ramos, Ravin Kumar, Charline Le Lan, Sammy Jerome, Anton Tsitsulin, Nino Vieillard, Piotr Stanczyk, Sertan Girgin, Nikola Momchev, Matt Hoffman, Shantanu Thakoor, Jean-Bastien Grill, Behnam Neyshabur, Olivier Bachem, Alanna Walton, Aliaksei Severyn, Alicia Parrish, Aliya Ahmad, Allen Hutchison, Alvin Abdagic, Amanda Carl, Amy Shen, Andy Brock, Andy Coenen, Anthony Laforge, Antonia Paterson, Ben Bastian, Bilal Piot, Bo Wu, Brandon Royal, Charlie Chen, Chintu Kumar, Chris Perry, Chris Welty, Christopher A. Choquette-Choo, Danila Sinopalnikov, David Weinberger, Dimple Vijaykumar, Dominika Rogozińska, Dustin Herbison, Elisa Bandy, Emma Wang, Eric Noland, Erica Moreira, Evan Senter, Evgenii Eltyshev, Francesco Visin, Gabriel Rasskin, Gary Wei, Glenn Cameron, Gus Martins, Hadi Hashemi, Hanna Klimczak-Plucińska, Harleen Batra, Harsh Dhand, Ivan Nardini, Jacinda Mein, Jack Zhou, James Svensson, Jeff Stanway, Jetha Chan, Jin Peng Zhou, Joana Carrasqueira, Joana Iljazi, Jocelyn Becker, Joe Fernandez, Joost van Amersfoort, Josh Gordon, Josh Lipschultz, Josh Newlan, Ju yeong Ji, Kareem Mohamed, Kartikeya Badola, Kat Black, Katie Millican, Keelin McDonell, Kelvin Nguyen, Kiranbir Sodhia, Kish Greene, Lars Lowe Sjoesund, Lauren Usui, Laurent Sifre, Lena Heuermann, Leticia Lago, Lilly McNealus, Livio Baldini Soares, Logan Kilpatrick, Lucas Dixon, Luciano Martins, Machel Reid, Manvinder Singh, Mark Iverson, Martin Görner, Mat Velloso, Mateo Wirth, Matt Davidow, Matt Miller, Matthew Rahtz, Matthew Watson, Meg Risdal, Mehran Kazemi, Michael Moynihan, Ming Zhang, Minsuk Kahng, Minwoo Park, Mofi Rahman, Mohit Khatwani, Natalie Dao, Nenshad Bardoliwalla, Nesh Devanathan, Neta Dumai, Nilay Chauhan, Oscar Wahltinez, Pankil Botarda, Parker Barnes, Paul Barham, Paul Michel, Pengchong Jin, Petko Georgiev, Phil Culliton, Pradeep Kuppala, Ramona Comanescu, Ramona Merhej, Reena Jana, Reza Ardeshir Rokni, Rishabh Agarwal, Ryan Mullins, Samaneh Saadat, Sara Mc Carthy, Sarah Cogan, Sarah Perrin, Sébastien M. R. Arnold, Sebastian Krause, Shengyang Dai, Shruti Garg, Shruti Sheth, Sue Ronstrom, Susan Chan, Timothy Jordan, Ting Yu, Tom Eccles, Tom Hennigan, Tomas Kocisky, Tulsee Doshi, Vihan Jain, Vikas Yadav, Vilobh Meshram, Vishal Dharmadhikari, Warren Barkley, Wei Wei, Wenming Ye, Woohyun Han, Woosuk Kwon, Xiang Xu, Zhe Shen, Zhitao Gong, Zichuan Wei, Victor Cotruta, Phoebe Kirk, Anand Rao, Minh Giang, Ludovic Peran, Tris Warkentin, Eli Collins, Joelle Barral, Zoubin Ghahramani, Raia Hadsell, D. Sculley, Jeanine Banks, Anca Dragan, Slav Petrov, Oriol Vinyals, Jeff Dean, Demis Hassabis, Koray Kavukcuoglu, Clement Farabet, Elena Buchatskaya, Sebastian Borgeaud, Noah Fiedel, Armand Joulin, Kathleen Kenealy, Robert Dadashi, and Alek Andreev. Gemma 2: Improving open language models at a practical size, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.00118.

Duy Nguyen, Archiki Prasad, Elias Stengel-Eskin, and Mohit Bansal. Multi-attribute steering of language models via targeted intervention. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.12446*, 2025.

Yifu Qiu, Zheng Zhao, Yftah Ziser, Anna Korhonen, Edoardo Maria Ponti, and Shay B. Cohen. Spectral editing of activations for large language model alignment. In Amir Globersons, Lester Mackey, Danielle Belgrave, Angela Fan, Ulrich Paquet, Jakub M. Tomczak, and Cheng Zhang, editors, *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 38: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2024, NeurIPS 2024, Vancouver, BC, Canada, December 10 - 15, 2024*, 2024. URL http://papers.nips.cc/paper_files/paper/2024/hash/684c59d614fe6ae74a3be8c3ef07e061-Abstract-Conference.html.

Ziwei Ji, Lei Yu, Yeskendir Koishekenov, Yejin Bang, Anthony Hartshorn, Alan Schelten, Cheng Zhang, Pascale Fung, and Nicola Cancedda. Calibrating verbal uncertainty as a linear feature to reduce hallucinations, 2025. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.14477.

Daniel Beaglehole, Adityanarayanan Radhakrishnan, Enric Boix-Adserà, and Mikhail Belkin. Aggregate and conquer: detecting and steering llm concepts by combining nonlinear predictors over multiple layers, 2025. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.03708.

Zara Siddique, Irtaza Khalid, Liam D. Turner, and Luis Espinosa-Anke. Shifting perspectives: Steering vector ensembles for robust bias mitigation in llms, 2025. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.05371.

Oct 2024. URL https://www.anthropic.com/research/evaluating-feature-steering.

Kiho Park, Yo Joong Choe, and Victor Veitch. The linear representation hypothesis and the geometry of large language models. In *Forty-first International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2024, Vienna, Austria, July 21-27, 2024*. OpenReview.net, 2024. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=UGpGkLzwpP.

Neel Nanda, Andrew Lee, and Martin Wattenberg. Emergent linear representations in world models of self-supervised sequence models. In Yonatan Belinkov, Sophie Hao, Jaap Jumelet, Najoung Kim, Arya McCarthy, and Hosein Mohebbi, editors, *Proceedings of the 6th BlackboxNLP Workshop: Analyzing and Interpreting Neural Networks for NLP*, pages 16–30, Singapore, 2023. Association for Computational Linguistics. doi: 10.18653/v1/2023.blackboxnlp-1.2. URL https://aclanthology.org/2023.blackboxnlp-1.2.

Tolga Bolukbasi, Kai-Wei Chang, James Y. Zou, Venkatesh Saligrama, and Adam Tauman Kalai. Man is to computer programmer as woman is to homemaker? debiasing word embeddings. In Daniel D. Lee, Masashi Sugiyama, Ulrike von Luxburg, Isabelle Guyon, and Roman Garnett, editors, *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 29: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2016, December 5-10, 2016, Barcelona, Spain*, pages 4349–4357, 2016. URL https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper/2016/hash/a486cd07e4ac3d270571622f4f316ec5-Abstract.html.

Tomas Mikolov, Wen-tau Yih, and Geoffrey Zweig. Linguistic regularities in continuous space word representations. In Lucy Vanderwende, Hal Daumé III, and Katrin Kirchhoff, editors, *Proceedings of the 2013 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies*, pages 746–751, Atlanta, Georgia, 2013. Association for Computational Linguistics. URL https://aclanthology.org/N13-1090.

Nelson Elhage, Tristan Hume, Catherine Olsson, Nicholas Schiefer, Tom Henighan, Shauna Kravec, Zac Hatfield-Dodds, Robert Lasenby, Dawn Drain, Carol Chen, Roger Grosse, Sam McCandlish, Jared Kaplan, Dario Amodei, Martin Wattenberg, and Christopher Olah. Toy models of superposition, 2022. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.10652.

Collin Burns, Haotian Ye, Dan Klein, and Jacob Steinhardt. Discovering latent knowledge in language models without supervision. In *The Eleventh International Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR 2023, Kigali, Rwanda, May 1-5, 2023*. OpenReview.net, 2023. URL https://openreview.net/pdf?id=ETKGuby0hcs.

Nora Belrose, David Schneider-Joseph, Shauli Ravfogel, Ryan Cotterell, Edward Raff, and Stella Biderman. LEACE: perfect linear concept erasure in closed form. In Alice Oh, Tristan Naumann, Amir Globerson, Kate Saenko, Moritz Hardt, and Sergey Levine, editors, *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 36: Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2023, NeurIPS 2023, New Orleans, LA, USA, December 10 - 16, 2023*, 2023. URL http://papers.nips.cc/paper_files/paper/2023/hash/d066d21c619d0a78c5b557fa3291a8f4-Abstract-Conference.html.

Shauli Ravfogel, Yanai Elazar, Hila Gonen, Michael Twiton, and Yoav Goldberg. Null it out: Guarding protected attributes by iterative nullspace projection. In Dan Jurafsky, Joyce Chai, Natalie Schluter, and Joel Tetreault, editors, *Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics*, pages 7237–7256, Online, 2020. Association for Computational Linguistics. doi: 10.18653/v1/2020.acl-main.647. URL https://aclanthology.org/2020.acl-main.647.

Haoran Wang and Kai Shu. Trojan activation attack: Red-teaming large language models using activation steering for safety-alignment, 2023. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.09433.

Amrita Bhattacharjee, Shaona Ghosh, Traian Rebedea, and Christopher Parisien. Towards inference-time category-wise safety steering for large language models, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.01174.

Jingyu Hu, Mengyue Yang, Mengnan Du, and Weiru Liu. Fine-grained interpretation of political opinions in large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.04774*, 2025.

Andrew Lee, Xiaoyan Bai, Itamar Pres, Martin Wattenberg, Jonathan K Kummerfeld, and Rada Mihalcea. A mechanistic understanding of alignment algorithms: A case study on dpo and toxicity. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, pages 26361–26378. PMLR, 2024b.

Ziwen Xu, Shuxun Wang, Kewei Xu, Haoming Xu, Mengru Wang, Xinle Deng, Yunzhi Yao, Guozhou Zheng, Huajun Chen, and Ningyu Zhang. Easyedit2: An easy-to-use steering framework for editing large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.15133*, 2025.

Shawn Im and Yixuan Li. A Unified Understanding and Evaluation of Steering Methods, February 2025. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/2502.02716. arXiv:2502.02716 [cs] version: 1.

Trenton Bricken, Adly Templeton, Joshua Batson, Brian Chen, Adam Jermyn, Tom Conerly, Nick Turner, Cem Anil, Carson Denison, Amanda Askell, Robert Lasenby, Yifan Wu, Shauna Kravec, Nicholas Schiefer, Tim Maxwell, Nicholas Joseph, Zac Hatfield-Dodds, Alex Tamkin, Karina Nguyen, Brayden McLean, Josiah E Burke, Tristan Hume, Shan Carter, Tom Henighan, and Christopher Olah. Towards monosemanticity: Decomposing language models with dictionary learning. *Transformer Circuits Thread*, 2023. https://transformer-circuits.pub/2023/monosemantic-features/index.html.

Robert Huben, Hoagy Cunningham, Logan Riggs, Aidan Ewart, and Lee Sharkey. Sparse autoencoders find highly interpretable features in language models. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR 2024, Vienna, Austria, May 7-11, 2024*. OpenReview.net, 2024. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=F76bwRSLeK.

Adly Templeton, Tom Conerly, Jonathan Marcus, Jack Lindsey, Trenton Bricken, Brian Chen, Adam Pearce, Craig Citro, Emmanuel Ameisen, Andy Jones, Hoagy Cunningham, Nicholas L Turner, Callum McDougall, Monte MacDiarmid, C. Daniel Freeman, Theodore R. Sumers, Edward Rees, Joshua Batson, Adam Jermyn, Shan Carter, Chris Olah, and Tom Henighan. Scaling monosemanticity: Extracting interpretable features from claude 3 sonnet. *Transformer Circuits Thread*, 2024. URL https://transformer-circuits.pub/2024/scaling-monosemanticity/index.html.

Michael T. Pearce, Thomas Dooms, Alice Rigg, Jose M. Oramas, and Lee Sharkey. Bilinear mlps enable weight-based mechanistic interpretability, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.08417.

Nelson Elhage, Neel Nanda, Catherine Olsson, Tom Henighan, Nicholas Joseph, Ben Mann, Amanda Askell, Yuntao Bai, Anna Chen, Tom Conerly, Nova DasSarma, Dawn Drain, Deep Ganguli, Zac Hatfield-Dodds, Danny Hernandez, Andy Jones, Jackson Kernion, Liane Lovitt, Kamal Ndousse, Dario Amodei, Tom Brown, Jack Clark, Jared Kaplan, Sam McCandlish, and Chris Olah. A mathematical framework for transformer circuits. *Transformer Circuits Thread*, 2021. https://transformer-circuits.pub/2021/framework/index.html.

Tom Lieberum, Matthew Rahtz, János Kramár, Neel Nanda, Geoffrey Irving, Rohin Shah, and Vladimir Mikulik. Does circuit analysis interpretability scale? evidence from multiple choice capabilities in chinchilla, 2023. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.09458.

Pengyu Wang, Dong Zhang, Linyang Li, Chenkun Tan, Xinghao Wang, Ke Ren, Botian Jiang, and Xipeng Qiu. Inferaligner: Inference-time alignment for harmlessness through cross-model guidance, 2024b. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.11206.

Wenxuan Wang, Zhaopeng Tu, Chang Chen, Youliang Yuan, Jen tse Huang, Wenxiang Jiao, and Michael R. Lyu. All languages matter: On the multilingual safety of large language models, 2024c. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.00905.

Zhengxuan Wu, Aryaman Arora, Zheng Wang, Atticus Geiger, Dan Jurafsky, Christopher D. Manning, and Christopher Potts. ReFT: Representation Finetuning for Language Models, May 2024. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.03592. arXiv:2404.03592 [cs].

Jiachen Zhao, Jing Huang, Zhengxuan Wu, David Bau, and Weiyan Shi. LLMs Encode Harmfulness and Refusal Separately, July 2025.

A Methodology Details

A.1 Direction Generation

We allow the collection of activations from the input and output of each layer, as well as of each attention and MLP module.

A.2 Direction Selection

COSMIC For completeness, we also implement COSMIC (Siu et al., 2025) as an alternative to grid search, which uses the internals during a forward pass on the validation set instead of generating an entire answer and testing the outputs. We support COSMIC on all methods but note it was designed for DIM and ACE.

A.3 Direction Application

Intervention Locations Most often, the direction is applied at the same place in the residual stream as where it was generated, though it can also be applied in specific places, e.g., the input and output of the attention and MLP blocks in all layers in the residual stream. We also allow cumulative interventions, which we define as when directions from previous layers are used to intervene on their respective previous layers in addition to the selected direction, starting from the first layer we collect directions from (at 25% through the model). E.g., if we intervene at layer 10 and the 25% layer is layer 6, we intervene at layers 6, 8, and 10 with the same direction application method using directions from those respective layers.

Conditional Steering Though the original paper proposes a full steering methodology using PCA, we instead separate the conditional application portion of the method and refer to that as CAST, since it can be used with any of the stated direction application mathematical formulations, direction generation, or direction selection combinations. This method is explicitly built to reduce entanglement since it only steers when it detects in-distribution behavior. As such, in practice when we use CAST we do not include a KL divergence check in the direction generation stage. CAST can be used with any mathematical formulation and location of intervention. CAST uses the same split of Alpaca as defined in the harmful generation validation set to select the condition vector, which for simplicity we set to one of the candidate vectors from direction generation.

B Additional Related Work

Mechanistic interpretability tools have built a shared foundation that steering builds upon. Tools like sparse autoencoders (Bricken et al., 2023; Huben et al., 2024; Templeton et al., 2024), weight attribution methods (Pearce et al., 2024), and circuit-level analyses (Elhage et al., 2021; Lieberum et al., 2023) offer complementary ways of tracing causal pathways for behavioral features and identifying where interventions should occur. Representations have also been used to probe concepts (Wu et al., 2025; Lee et al., 2024a) and to conditionally intervene at inference time (Lee et al., 2024a; Li et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2024b). As steering techniques increasingly operate at the activation level, interpretability research provides essential methods for characterizing both the geometry of encoded features and their intervention points.

C Limitations

While SteeringSafety represents a significant advance in standardized, multi-perspective evaluation of alignment steering, it has several limitations. The benchmark focuses on English-language datasets and instruction-tuned models, limiting its applicability to multilingual or non-instructional contexts (Wang et al., 2024c), where behavioral entanglement may surface differently. Steering is implemented as static vectors applied at fixed model locations, enabling fair comparisons but overlooking more adaptive or gradient-based methods like ReFT (Wu et al., 2024). Future work should expand our current framework of steering components to incorporate methods with weight modifications and other diverse elements of representation engineering, such as those defined in the

taxonomy in Wehner et al. (2025). Results are reported in aggregate form, which can obscure nuanced shifts within behavioral subtypes such as specific demographic biases or on specific political issues, or have certain methods dominate due to high performance on a single behavior (e.g., refusal). Also, we only steer on the three perspectives, only measuring entanglement for the additional perspectives. Moreover, the use of a uniform grid-search methodology across all behaviors simplifies direction selection but may underperform compared to behavior-specific techniques, particularly in harmfulness tasks (Arditi et al., 2024). Also, for generating directions, we randomly choose an incorrect answer for each instance where there are many (e.g., for BBQ), but this choice can differ across templates like `default` vs `RepE`, possibly accounting for minor variance. We only use 64 tokens for generation tasks, which could obscure the intentions of the models if continued. We also do not allow thinking before generation, requiring the answer to be generated immediately. Future work should investigate reasoning models and how they differ. Prior work also suggests that steering using directions from tokens other than the final post-instruction tokens may yield more effective control (Arditi et al., 2024; Siu et al., 2025) that can differ by behavior (Zhao et al., 2025), which our setup does not currently exploit.

D Experimental Details

To select a direction, for each combination of hyperparameters (layer, coefficient), we apply the direction at inference time and evaluate model behavior on a fixed validation set. The configuration yielding the highest mean performance across all primary metrics is selected for final evaluation.

For all datasets that are multiple choice, we generate one new token. For all other datasets, we generate up to 64 new tokens. We use substring matching for all multiple choice datasets. To ensure the format is not driving differences in performance, we standardize all multiple choice datasets to use single capital letters for the choices and answers. For all multiple choice datasets except those testing hallucination and political leaning, since we use substring matching we prepend a short string encouraging responses to be as concise as possible: `Please provide only the correct answer in its simplest form, without any additional text or explanation.`

For context, whenever we reference post instruction tokens, we refer to all tokens after the initial user prompt. For Qwen2.5, when we supply a prompt to the LLM we do it in the following format (we highlight the content corresponding to post-instruction tokens in blue): `<|im_start|>user instruction<|im_end|><|im_start|>assistant`. Note throughout direction selection, we use the prompt with the post-instruction tokens (including the empty assistant prompt) if we are collecting or comparing activations.

D.1 Metric Calculations

For presenting an aggregate measure of EFFECTIVENESS, we use min-max scaling. Since sometimes the steering method causes the model performance to decrease, we treat all such instances as 0% effectiveness. Additionally, for using DIM with Gemma-2-2B on refusal, the KL divergence check fails for all directions, so we ignore refusal performance when calculating average effectiveness for DIM on this model.

E Results

E.1 Main Per-Model Results

The per-model results across all behaviors and methods are in Figures 3 and 4 for no variants, Figures 5 and 7 with no KL divergence check, and Figures 6 and 8 with conditional steering.

We note that Llama-3.1-8B does not often give answers corresponding to the possible multiple choice answers in TwinViews and sees large fluctuations with applying steering methods, meaning the performance differentials are not due to changes in political views but moreso in how the answer is formulated. For this reason, we do not include TwinViews results when calculating entanglement or in our main results figures for Llama-3.1-8B.



Figure 3: The changes in performance on all datasets when steering with five methods with 5 objectives on Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct. The results of the unsteered model are displayed at the top, and all reported steering values are expressed as the difference relative to the unsteered model's performance. Higher scores generally indicate safer performance (e.g lower dark behaviors or hallucination rates) except for SALADBench ASR (left-most), where higher scores indicate higher jailbreaking, and Political Views (right-most), where higher score indicates higher proportion of left-leaning opinions. Dataset pertaining to the target behavior in each setting are bordered in black and annotated with an asterisk (*).

E.2 Additional Per-Model Results

Besides the main results, we also steer all five using our standard variant on Qwen-2.5-1.5B and Qwen-2.5-3B in Figures 12 and 13, respectively.



Figure 4: The changes in performance on all datasets when steering with five methods with five objectives on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. The results of the unsteered model are displayed at the top, and all reported steering values are expressed as the difference relative to the unsteered model's performance, similarly to the Qwen results in Figure 3.



Figure 5: The changes in performance on all datasets when steering with five methods with five objectives on Qwen-2.5-7B when no KL divergence check was used in direction generation. The results of the unsteered model are displayed at the top, and all reported steering values are expressed as the difference relative to the unsteered model's performance, similarly to the Qwen results in Figure 3.



Figure 6: The changes in performance on all datasets when steering with five methods with five objectives on Qwen-2.5-7B when using conditional steering. The results of the unsteered model are displayed at the top, and all reported steering values are expressed as the difference relative to the unsteered model's performance, similarly to the Qwen results in Figure 3.



Figure 7: The changes in performance on all datasets when steering with five methods with five objectives on Llama-3.1-8B when no KL divergence check was used in direction generation. The results of the unsteered model are displayed at the top, and all reported steering values are expressed as the difference relative to the unsteered model's performance, similarly to the Qwen results in Figure 3.



Figure 8: The changes in performance on all datasets when steering with five methods with five objectives on Llama-3.1-8B when using conditional steering. The results of the unsteered model are displayed at the top, and all reported steering values are expressed as the difference relative to the unsteered model's performance, similarly to the Qwen results in Figure 3.



Figure 9: The changes in performance on all datasets when steering with five methods with five objectives on Gemma-2-2B with the standard variant. The results of the unsteered model are displayed at the top, and all reported steering values are expressed as the difference relative to the unsteered model's performance, similarly to the Qwen results in Figure 3.



Figure 10: The changes in performance on all datasets when steering with five methods with five objectives on Gemma-2-2B when no KL divergence check was used in direction generation. The results of the unsteered model are displayed at the top, and all reported steering values are expressed as the difference relative to the unsteered model's performance, similarly to the Qwen results in Figure 3.



Figure 11: The changes in performance on all datasets when steering with five methods with five objectives on Gemma-2-2B when using conditional steering. The results of the unsteered model are displayed at the top, and all reported steering values are expressed as the difference relative to the unsteered model's performance, similarly to the Qwen results in Figure 3.



Figure 12: The changes in performance on all datasets when steering with five methods with the standard variant with five objectives on Qwen-2.5-1.5B in direction generation. The results of the unsteered model are displayed at the top, and all reported steering values are expressed as the difference relative to the unsteered model's performance, similarly to the Qwen results in Figure 3.



Figure 13: The changes in performance on all datasets when steering with five methods with the standard variant with five objectives on Qwen-2.5-3B in direction generation. The results of the unsteered model are displayed at the top, and all reported steering values are expressed as the difference relative to the unsteered model's performance, similarly to the Qwen results in Figure 3.