# EXPLORING RECURSIVE DOUBT IN LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

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## ABSTRACT

Humans sometimes experience self-doubt, repeatedly questioning their reasoning, decisions, or memories. In obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), this becomes a self-reinforcing loop of doubt and compulsion that leads to decision paralysis. Motivated by this analogy, we investigate whether large language models (LLMs) can exhibit a similar phenomenon, which we term *Recursive Doubt*. While prior work shows that self-reflection on chain-of-thought (CoT) can improve reasoning but sometimes causes overthinking, recursive doubt represents a more pathological form of recursive reasoning that remains unexplored. In this paper, we introduce Feedback-guided Iterative iNDuction (FIND) for inducing recursive doubt. FIND leverages an auxiliary LLM to generate an induction prefix, which is optimized by the feedback of the target LLM. To understand the phenomenon, we then identify a distinctive fence-like attention pattern in certain tokens – Obsessive Cognitive Tokens – that repeatedly trigger self-reflection. Based on this analysis, we propose a mitigation strategy that dynamically adjusts their attention weights to suppress recursive doubt. Extensive experiments across multiple model architectures and datasets validate the effectiveness of both our induction and mitigation approaches.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Humans often question or invalidate their own reasoning, decisions, or memories (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003). For instance, someone may repeatedly check whether a door is locked, doubting each memory and restarting the cycle. This behavior is especially pronounced in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (Samuels et al., 2017), often called the "doubting disease". Recent work (Schoeller, 2023) shows that pathological doubt in OCD forms a self-reinforcing loop: negative self-schemas trigger obsessive doubt and anxiety, which drive compulsive behaviors such as checking or reassurance-seeking. While these actions provide short-term relief, they reinforce the negative schema, creating a cycle of *doubt* $\rightarrow$ *anxiety* $\rightarrow$ *compulsion* $\rightarrow$ *temporary relief* $\rightarrow$ *deeper doubt* (Cooney et al., 2010; Schoeller, 2023). This recursive doubt can lead to decision paralysis (Sparks et al., 2012; Radomsky et al., 2014), as cognitive resources like working memory and attention become locked in the "worry–doubt" loop (Cooney et al., 2010), leaving individuals unable to commit to decisions and incurring tangible losses and risks (Sparks et al., 2012; Schwarzer, 2014). Given its psychological and psychiatric importance, we ask: can large language models (LLMs) also exhibit *recursive doubt*?

LLM agents can improve their performance by generating chain-of-thoughts (CoTs) (Wei et al., 2022), and prior work shows that reflecting on their own CoTs further enhances structured reasoning (Renze & Guven, 2024). For example, DeepSeek-R1-Zero (Guo et al., 2025) achieved "Aha moments" and self-reflection through pure reinforcement learning (RL). While CoT reasoning generally boosts accuracy, it can also lead to overthinking (Yue et al., 2025; Sui et al., 2025), where models generate redundant steps even for simple queries like "What is 2 plus 3?" (Chen et al., 2024). In contrast to overthinking, *recursive doubt* is a more severe problem: instead of merely lengthening outputs, the model becomes trapped in repetitive self-questioning and denial, potentially leading to critical safety risks. For instance, recursive doubt could cause an LLM-based robotic controller to repeat unstable actions, or an autonomous driving system to delay or erratically execute decisions, endangering passengers and pedestrians. Despite its importance, recursive doubt in LLMs remains unexplored.

In this paper, we demonstrate that LLMs are highly susceptible to *recursive doubt*. To study this, we introduce **Feedback-guided Iterative iNDuction (FIND)**, a novel method that uses an auxiliary LLM




Figure 1: A conceptual diagram of related phenomena in humans and LLMs. **(A)** Humans may repeatedly question their reasoning, decisions, or memories, a behavior especially pronounced in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), where pathological doubt forms a self-reinforcing loop. **(B)** LLMs can reflect on their own Chain-of-Thought (CoT), improving reasoning ability. **(C)** CoT may also lead to overthinking, where the model produces redundant intermediate steps for simple problems. **(D)** In contrast, *recursive doubt* is a more pathological phenomenon in which the model becomes trapped in persistent cycles of doubt and self-negation.

to iteratively generate inducing prefixes to input prompts. At each step, the auxiliary model proposes prefixes, queries the target LLM, and receives feedback that serves as experiential reward. Even failed inductions provide useful prior knowledge for refining subsequent strategies. Building on phenomena such as key reasoning tokens (Guo et al., 2025), we design two reward functions: one encourages the production of recursive or exploratory reasoning tokens, and the other maximizes sequence length to amplify doubt and repetition. We then construct pairwise comparisons of prefixes based on these rewards and use them to fine-tune the auxiliary model via preference optimization (Rafailov et al., 2023). Through iterative refinement, FIND effectively induces recursive doubt in target LLMs.

To study the emergence of recursive doubt, we analyze token-level attention patterns. We find that certain tokens consistently exhibit a distinctive "fence-like" attention map: despite varying positions and lengths, their overlapping regions align to form a stable repetitive structure (Figure 3 left). We call this the *fence-like repetitive attention pattern*. In contrast, other tokens in the same demonstration show non-fence-like, scattered distributions (Figure 3 ). Tokens with the fence-like pattern often trigger repetitive cycles of reflection and doubt, resembling the cognitive bias in OCD patients (Schoeller, 2023), where attention fixates excessively on local elements and reinforces pathological doubt. We identify these tokens as critical nodes in recursive doubt and term them *obsessive cognition tokens*.

Building on these insights, we propose **Fence-based Dynamic Attention Adjustment (FDA$^2$)** to mitigate recursive doubt. FDA$^2$ analyzes attention patterns to locate obsessive cognition tokens. We introduce two measures: *Attention Peak Spacing Regularity*, which evaluates the periodicity of peak points in fence-like maps, and *Spearman Attention Consistency*, which measures cross-layer consistency. Their product defines a "fenceness" score that quantifies whether an attention peak exhibits the fence-like pattern. Tokens with fenceness above a threshold are identified as obsessive cognition tokens, and FDA$^2$ dynamically adjusts their attention weights to suppress recursive doubt. Extensive experiments across various model architectures and datasets demonstrate that the proposed inductive strategy FIND and the mitigation method FDA$^2$ both exhibit significant effectiveness.

## 2 Problem Formulation

Large language models (LLMs) are known to suffer from "overthinking", that they produce redundant reasoning steps for simple problems (Yue et al., 2025; Sui et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2024). We highlight a more severe phenomenon, *recursive doubt*, in which the model repeatedly questions and negates its own conclusions. Recursive doubt has been widely studied in psychology (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003; Samuels et al., 2017; Schoeller, 2023), particularly in the context of obsessive-compulsive




Figure 2: Overview of our research on Recursive Doubt. **(A) FIND**: a feedback-guided iterative induction method that leverages an auxiliary LLM to refine induction prefixes, compute rewards from target model feedback, and fine-tune the auxiliary LLM. **(B)** Attention analysis reveals tokens with distinctive *fence-like* patterns that repeatedly trigger self-reflection and doubt, resembling cognitive tendencies in OCD. **(C) FDA²**: a mitigation strategy that identifies these obsessive cognitive tokens and dynamically adjusts their attention weights to suppress recursive loops.

disorder (OCD), where individuals become trapped in cycles of doubt about their decisions (Samuels et al., 2017). Motivated by this analogy, we ask whether LLMs can also exhibit recursive doubt.

**Potential Consequences.** Recursive doubt poses broad risks across both physical and digital domains. For embodied agents and autonomous vehicles, it may induce repetitive actions or delayed responses, leading to severe safety hazards. In text generation, it can drive LLMs to produce endless output. For API service providers, malicious users could exploit recursive doubt to inflate computational load, degrading service quality in a manner akin to a denial-of-service (DoS) attack. For end users, recursive doubt triggered by untrusted third-party data sources or intermediaries can dramatically increase monetary costs beyond expectations. Therefore, it is of significant importance to better understand and mitigate recursive doubt in LLMs, and particularly large reasoning models.

**Notation and Definition.** Let a reasoning LLM $P_\theta$ map an input sequence $x$ to an output sequence $y = (y_1, \ldots, y_N)$, where $y_i$ is the $i$-th generated token and $N$ is the output length. Partition $y$ into $K$ contiguous segments $s = (s_1, \ldots, s_K)$, with boundaries $0 = b_0 < b_1 < \cdots < b_K = N$, such that $s_k = (y_{b_{k-1}+1}, \ldots, y_{b_k})$. For any two segments $s_i$ and $s_j$, let $\mathrm{Sim}(s_i, s_j)$ denote their semantic similarity. We say a segment $s_i$ enters recursive doubt if $\mathrm{Sim}(s_i, s_{i-1}) > T_{\mathrm{Sim}}$, where $T_{\mathrm{Sim}}$ is a similarity threshold. The model $P_\theta$ exhibits recursive doubt on input $x$ if the number of segments entering recursive doubt exceeds a global threshold $T_{\mathrm{Rec}}$.

## 3 Feedback-guided Iterative Induction

In this section, we propose a black-box method to induce recursive doubt in a target model $P_\theta$. We leverage an auxiliary LLM $M$ to append a semantically meaningful prefix $a$ to the input $x$ with two objectives: (1) induce recursive doubt, i.e., the number of segments satisfying $\mathrm{Sim}(s_i, s_{i-1}) > T_{\mathrm{Sim}}$ exceeds $T_{\mathrm{Rec}}$; and (2) maximize the output length $N$ of $y = (y_1, \ldots, y_N)$. While longer outputs facilitate recursive doubt, excessive generation also introduces safety risks. We assume a black-box setting where only queries to $P_\theta$ are available.

To induce recursive doubt, our key idea is to reuse past feedback of the target model $P_\theta$ as experiential rewards, enabling iterative refinement of induction strategies proposed by $M$. We introduce **Feedback-guided Iterative iNDuction (FIND)**, which proceeds as follows: (1) $M$ generates multiple prefixes

$\{a_1, \ldots, a_D\}$ for input $x$ and queries $P_\theta$; (2) based on the feedback from $P_\theta$, we compute rewards and fine-tune $M$. In this way, even failed attempts provide prior knowledge for improving the next iteration. The pipeline of FIND is illustrated in Figure 2(A).

Specifically, the auxiliary LLM $M$ is instructed to generate $D$ independent prefixes $\{a_1, \ldots, a_D\}$ and append these prefixes to each input $x$. The template prompt is provided in Appendix C. We then query the target model $P_\theta$ with these inputs and obtain the responses of the model. Based on the model feedback, we design two reward functions: one encourages recursive doubt, and the other promotes longer outputs.

For recursive doubt, we exploit the prior observation that certain key reasoning tokens (e.g., "wait", "alternative") often indicate recursive or branching reasoning steps (Guo et al., 2025). To leverage this phenomenon, we encourage a higher probability of generating such tokens during reasoning. Let $U$ denote the set of such tokens (see Appendix C). The reward is defined as:

$$R_{\text{RD}} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \mathbb{I}_{\{y_i \in U\}}, \tag{1}$$

which encourages generating recursion-related tokens and thus increases the likelihood of recursive doubt. For longer outputs, we use a simple and direct length reward function $R_{\text{Length}} = N$, where $N$ is the sequence length. The overall reward combines the two, balanced by a hyperparameter $\alpha$:

$$R = R_{\text{RD}} + \alpha R_{\text{Length}}. \tag{2}$$

Based on the reward function $R$, we perform pairwise comparisons of the $D$ prefixes to construct a binary partial order, which serves as training data for fine-tuning $M$ via direct preference optimization (DPO) (Rafailov et al., 2023). After each round, $M$ incorporates prior knowledge and generates new prefixes for the next iteration. As shown in Table 1, once sufficient prior knowledge is accumulated, the auxiliary model successfully induces recursive doubt in the target LLM.

# 4 Understanding Recursive Doubt from an Attention Perspective

The attention mechanism in large language models (LLMs) plays a critical role in capturing contextual information and generating coherent text (Zheng et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2024). To explain the emergence of recursive doubt phenomenon in LLMs, we analyze token-level attention patterns. For the $i$-th token at layer $l$, the attention map $A_{l,i}$ is defined as:

$$A_{h,l,i} = \text{softmax}\left(\frac{Q_{l,i} K_{l,i}^\top}{\sqrt{d_k}}\right)_h, \quad A_{l,i} = \frac{1}{H}\sum_{h=1}^{H} A_{h,l,i}, \tag{3}$$

where $Q_{l,i} \in \mathbb{R}^{1\times d_k}$ is the query vector of the $i$-th token, $K_{l,i} \in \mathbb{R}^{(i-1)\times d_k}$ is the key matrix of the preceding tokens, $H$ is the number of heads, and $A_{h,l,i}$ represents the attention weight from the $h$-th attention head at layer $l$ for the $i$-th output token. Thus, $A_{l,i}^{(j)}$ denotes the attention weight assigned to the $j$-th token when generating the $i$-th token. We average $A_{l,i}$ across sentences and visualize the results in Figure 3, where darker colors indicate higher attention weights [1].

We find that certain tokens exhibit a distinctive attention pattern: their attention maps form a "fence-like" peak structure. Although these tokens appear at different positions and have attention maps of varying lengths, the overlapping regions of their attention maps exhibit a remarkably consistent distribution. That is, these tokens tend to focus on specific sentences, as shown in Figure 3 left. We refer to this phenomenon as the **fence-like repetitive attention pattern**. In contrast, the remaining tokens do not exhibit this phenomenon, displaying non-fence-like patterns with more diffuse and continuous attention, as shown in Figure 3 right. Tokens with fence-like patterns tend to trigger cycles of repeated reflections, as their highly similar attention distributions reinforce prior content and encourage repetitive reasoning.

This observation mirrors the cognitive tendencies of individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), where their attention is disproportionately drawn to local elements, leading to an unintended

[1] Sink tokens (Xiao et al., 2023) and others are excluded during visualization.




Figure 3: Visualization of attention maps $A_{l,i}$ after sentence segmentation. **Left:** Tokens with a distinct fence-like distribution, showing consistent peak positions across layers. **Right:** Other tokens without this phenomenon, exhibiting more diffuse and scattered attention.

overemphasis on these aspects, and even resulting in a negative self-reinforcing cycle, ultimately trapping them in repeated pathological doubt (Schoeller, 2023). Thus, we identify these tokens with special attention patterns as key nodes in the recursive doubt phenomenon and refer to them as **obsessive cognitive tokens**. In fact, the number of obsessive cognitive tokens correlates positively with the degree of recursive doubt and the length of the output tokens, as shown in Figure 4 in Section 5. This correlation underscores the significant impact of obsessive cognitive tokens on the recursive doubt phenomenon.

# 5 Fence-based Dynamic Attention Adjustment

Building on the above insights, we propose a novel **Fence-based Dynamic Attention Adjustment ($\mathbf{FDA^2}$)** method to mitigate the recursive doubt problem. $\text{FDA}^2$ quantitatively analyzes attention patterns to accurately identify the positions of obsessive cognitive tokens. It then dynamically adjusts their attention weights to suppress recursive doubt. Because attention matrices are already computed within LLMs, $\text{FDA}^2$ introduces minimal computational overhead aside from the lightweight analysis of attention patterns, resulting in low complexity and high efficiency.

As discussed previously, a key feature of obsessive cognitive tokens that contribute to recursive doubt is the "fence-like" peak in their attention maps. To identify such tokens, we require a metric that captures this pattern. A fence-like attention map has two sub-features: (1) *periodicity of peak points*, where the spacing between vertical bars is regular; and (2) *cross-layer consistency*, where the vertical bars align across multiple layers rather than appearing randomly. To quantify these, we propose two measures: **Attention Peak Spacing Regularity** for periodicity, and **Spearman Attention Consistency** for cross-layer alignment.

Specifically, let the attention map for the current token, partitioned by sentence, be $A \in \mathbb{R}^{L\times S}$, where $L$ is the number of layers and $S$ the number of sentences. By averaging across all layers, we obtain $\bar{A} = \frac{1}{L}\sum_{l=1}^{L} A_{l,:} \in \mathbb{R}^S$ [2].

To evaluate the periodicity of peaks, we select the top $k\%$ indices in $\bar{A}$ with the largest amplitudes, denoted by $\mathcal{P} = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_K\}$, where $p_1 < p_2 < \cdots < p_K$, and $K = \max\big(1, \lfloor k\% \cdot S \rfloor\big)$. Let the observed spacings be $d_j = p_{j+1} - p_j$ and the ideal uniform spacing $d^* = \frac{S}{K}$. The normalized spacing deviation $\delta$ and the **Attention Peak Spacing Regularity** score are then defined as

$$\delta = \frac{1}{K-1}\sum_{j=1}^{K-1} \frac{|d_j - d^*|}{d^*}, \quad P_{\text{atten}}(A) = \frac{1}{1+\delta} \in (0,1]. \tag{4}$$

A score $P_{\text{atten}}(A)$ close to 1 indicates near-periodic spacing of peaks, while lower values imply irregular clustering that deviates from the fence-like structure.

[2]When computing the attention map, we exclude sink tokens (Xiao et al., 2023) and others as appropriate.




Figure 4: A visualization of the number of obsessive cognition tokens and the degree of recursive doubt/output token length for 200 samples. The two are positively correlated, validating the effectiveness of our method for identifying compulsive cognition tokens.

For cross-layer consistency, we compute the Spearman rank correlation (Lyerly, 1952) between each layer's attention distribution $A_{l,:}$ and the average distribution $\bar{A}$. Let

$$\rho_l = \text{Spearman}(A_{l,:}, \bar{A}), \quad l = 1, \dots, L, \tag{5}$$

and define the **Spearman Attention Consistency** score as

$$S_{\text{atten}}(A) = \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{1}{L}\sum_{l=1}^{L}\rho_l + 1\right) \in [0, 1]. \tag{6}$$

A score $S_{\text{atten}}(A)$ close to 1 indicates strong cross-layer alignment of attention peaks, while smaller values imply inconsistent distributions across layers, breaking the fence-like structure.

We combine Attention Peak Spacing Regularity and Spearman Attention Consistency into a single score to measure whether an attention map exhibits the fence-like structure:

$$F_{\text{atten}}(A) = P_{\text{atten}}(A) \times S_{\text{atten}}(A). \tag{7}$$

We refer to $F_{\text{atten}}$ as the **fence-like degree** of the attention map. When $F_{\text{atten}}$ exceeds a threshold $T_F$, the token is identified as an obsessive cognitive token. We further analyze 200 samples to examine the relationship between obsessive cognitive tokens, recursive doubt, and output length. As shown in Figure 4, the number of such tokens is positively correlated with both recursive doubt severity (count of segments with similarity score exceeding 0.9 with preceding segment, Appendix C) and output length, confirming the effectiveness of our identification method. Examples of token distributions are provided in Appendix E.

Finally, once a generated token is identified as either an obsessive cognitive token or a key reasoning token, we prevent it from attending to the prefix $a$, thereby avoiding recursive doubt induced by $a$. Concretely, during decoding we set its attention weights to zero across all layers and heads for the entire input. Since the mitigator cannot explicitly separate the original input $x$ from the prefix $a$, this adjustment is applied to the whole input. Normal tokens attend as usual, while obsessive cognitive tokens rely only on previous outputs, preventing local attraction to the prefix and blocking the initiation of a new cycle of recursive doubt.

# 6 Experiment

## 6.1 Experiment Settings

**Datasets.** To comprehensively evaluate our FIND and FDA$^2$, we consider the datasets spanning a wide spectrum of difficulty levels, including the grade school level GSM8K (Cobbe et al., 2021), multiple-choice problems MathQA (Amini et al., 2019), high school level MATH-500 (Lightman et al., 2023). For each dataset, we randomly sample a subset of 100 problems for evaluation.

**Models.** We employ state-of-the-art reasoning models for this study. The performance of FIND and FDA$^2$ is evaluated using the open-source reasoning models DeepSeek-R1-Distilled-Qwen-7b (R1-7b) (Guo et al., 2025), QwQ-32b (Team, 2025), and gpt-oss-20b (Agarwal et al., 2025). In addition, we also explore the online API services of DeepSeek-R1-0528 (Guo et al., 2025) and OpenAI's o3 (OpenAI, 2025). Further details are provided in Appendix C.

Table 1: Quantitative results of baselines and our FIND in inducing recursive doubt on three datasets across three models. FIND consistently outperforms all baselines in terms of average output token length (ATL), average inference time consumption (ATC), and recursive doubt rate (RDR) across all datasets and models, effectively inducing recursive doubt in the models. Moreover, FIND is capable of causing the models to enter infinite loops, resulting in a decrease in accuracy, thereby highlighting the security risks associated with the recursive doubt phenomenon.

| | | GSM8k | | | | MathQA | | | | MATH-500 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC |
| R1-7b | Base | 438.8±14.4 | 4.9±0.2 | 0.0 | 97.7 | 697.8±50.2 | 7.9±0.6 | 0.1 | 60.2 | 1844.2±192.6 | 21.1±2.3 | 0.6 | 89.8 |
| | CoT | 448.8±24.1 | 5.1±0.5 | 0.4 | 98.3 | 1289.5±172.7 | 15.6±2.4 | 0.3 | 63.1 | 2139.5±183.2 | 23.0±2.3 | 1.1 | 92.2 |
| | DoS | 1253.2±425.2 | 14.5±5.0 | 4.2 | 98.6 | 879.9±72.4 | 9.9±0.8 | 2.7 | 59.7 | 1550.9±855.4 | 19.1±12.3 | 0.3 | 79.4 |
| | Engorgio | 651.6±102.5 | 7.4±1.2 | 0.3 | 97.1 | 3661.7±1734.1 | 47.3±24.9 | 0.3 | 21.6 | 2205.2±866.9 | 26.4±12.5 | 1.7 | 65.7 |
| | CAW | 643.4±43.4 | 7.2±0.5 | 0.8 | 99.4 | 1156.8±171.6 | 13.1±2.0 | 5.2 | 67.3 | 1661.0±180.0 | 18.7±2.1 | 1.8 | 92.4 |
| | CAG | 559.8±35.7 | 6.3±0.4 | 0.3 | 98.2 | 657.5±43.5 | 7.4±0.5 | 2.8 | 60.3 | 1417.7±154.5 | 16.1±1.8 | 0.6 | 92.0 |
| | ICLGAW | 1005.6±855.0 | 12.6±12.1 | 0.6 | 97.4 | 1379.2±203.8 | 20.9±2.3 | 0.4 | 66..9 | 2790.3±985.8 | 33.6±13.5 | 5.7 | 81.3 |
| | ICLGAG | 686.2±92.1 | 7.8±1.1 | 0.9 | 99.5 | 826.6±86.6 | 9.4±1.0 | 0.8 | 67.4 | 3089.6±1246.2 | 38.0±17.5 | 5.2 | 86.9 |
| | CatAttack | 503.7±27.0 | 5.7±0.3 | 0.1 | 95.8 | 1156.3±295.7 | 13.3±3.6 | 12.7 | 51.5 | 2368.8±371.7 | 28.3±4.6 | 2.5 | 91.3 |
| | **FIND** | **7922.3±2198.9** | **104.8±30.8** | **20.4** | 95.3 | **7783.4±2045.1** | **101.7±29.6** | **32.4** | 38.0 | **13373.2±2702.5** | **176.2±39.0** | **32.1** | 83.2 |
| QwQ-32b | Base | 991.4±61.5 | 26.8±1.7 | 0.0 | 99.9 | 3320.2±328.2 | 84.7±8.8 | 1.1 | 65.3 | 3200.0±246.9 | 81.4±6.4 | 0.9 | 95.2 |
| | CoT | 1057.7±59.8 | 26.6±1.5 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 3353.3±336.8 | 85.5±9.0 | 1.3 | 69.7 | 3247.2±338.7 | 82.7±9.0 | 1.1 | 94.0 |
| | DoS | 826.1±44.6 | 20.8±1.1 | 0.2 | 99.8 | 3557.4±786.7 | 92.9±21.5 | 3.8 | 71.9 | 2752.7±211.8 | 70.2±5.5 | 0.4 | 92.6 |
| | Engorgio | 1450.2±120.8 | 38.2±3.2 | 1.1 | 100.0 | 4980.3±750.5 | 127.1±19.1 | 3.2 | 45.7 | 4800.0±450.3 | 122.1±11.5 | 3.4 | 92.8 |
| | CAW | 1839.3±172.0 | 46.7±4.4 | 1.3 | 99.9 | 3224.1±227.4 | 82.4±5.9 | 1.4 | 83.9 | 3037.2±215.2 | 77.3±5.5 | 0.3 | 92.3 |
| | CAG | 799.1±46.2 | 20.2±1.2 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 1741.9±125.2 | 44.2±3.2 | 0.3 | 86.6 | 2384.9±306.8 | 60.8±8.2 | 0.5 | 94.6 |
| | ICLGAW | 2275.5±251.6 | 58.5±6.6 | 5.9 | 97.4 | 3885.8±453.3 | 85.2±12.1 | 2.6 | 86.7 | 4266.6±453.8 | 105.8±10.3 | 2.9 | 93.7 |
| | ICLGAG | 1509.2±283.4 | 39.8±7.4 | 0.8 | 98.9 | 3247.7±356.6 | 58.9±9.4 | 2.2 | 81.2 | 3893.3±857.2 | 95.2±21.3 | 2.6 | 87.9 |
| | CatAttack | 1756.0±206.1 | 44.2±5.3 | 4.0 | 99.6 | 2795.0±171.5 | 70.3±4.4 | 1.0 | 73.7 | 3168.8±222.8 | 79.9±5.7 | 0.7 | 93.3 |
| | **FIND** | **7497.8±362.9** | **205.1±10.1** | **65.9** | 93.8 | **5993.9±247.8** | **156.4±9.8** | **32.4** | 57.6 | **9798.2±398.0** | **272.4±11.3** | **55.2** | 63.8 |
| gpt-oss-20b | Base | 225.1±16.4 | 1.2±0.1 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 448.9±66.3 | 2.3±0.4 | 1.8 | 50.7 | 466.1±42.3 | 2.4±0.2 | 0.0 | 95.4 |
| | CoT | 365.5±23.7 | 1.9±0.1 | 0.0 | 99.8 | 946.0±763.1 | 6.5±7.2 | 1.3 | 58.3 | 669.6±47.3 | 3.5±0.2 | 0.5 | 94.6 |
| | DoS | 1084.0±874.5 | 7.8±8.5 | 5.4 | 98.4 | 1320.5±450.8 | 9.2±3.2 | 3.1 | 55.6 | 850.2±80.4 | 4.5±0.6 | 1.6 | 88.7 |
| | Engorgio | 850.3±280.6 | 5.9±2.0 | 3.1 | 97.7 | 1200.8±203.5 | 8.5±1.5 | 2.5 | 54.9 | 826.6±70.4 | 3.8±0.5 | 1.3 | 70.6 |
| | CAW | 296.4±16.3 | 1.7±0.1 | 0.1 | 99.9 | 317.6±20.2 | 1.6±0.1 | 0.0 | 52.9 | 444.8±44.5 | 2.3±0.2 | 0.7 | 96.7 |
| | CAG | 197.3±10.4 | 1.0±0.1 | 0.2 | 100.0 | 292.4±20.3 | 1.5±0.1 | 0.0 | 52.3 | 384.5±32.8 | 2.0±0.2 | 0.3 | 96.6 |
| | ICLGAW | 1185.2±356.8 | 6.2±1.9 | 5.1 | 97.2 | 1384.7±245.6 | 7.2±1.3 | 2.9 | 57.2 | 1258.9±285.4 | 6.6±1.5 | 2.0 | 93.7 |
| | ICLGAG | 824.6±123.7 | 4.3±0.6 | 1.8 | 99.1 | 987.3±148.1 | 5.2±0.8 | 0.6 | 53.7 | 1156.8±258.9 | 6.0±1.4 | 2.2 | 88.1 |
| | CatAttack | 424.3±24.3 | 2.2±0.1 | 0.0 | 99.4 | 576.3±49.8 | 3.2±0.3 | 0.3 | 58.2 | 690.2±46.0 | 3.6±0.2 | 0.3 | 97.2 |
| | **FIND** | **3774.3±332.3** | **22.0±2.0** | **57.9** | 93.0 | **2739.8±284.3** | **14.5±1.6** | **28.4** | 31.1 | **2113.3±358.3** | **26.6±5.1** | **32.4** | 58.7 |

**Baselines.** Due to the absence of baseline methods inducing recursive doubt, we primarily compare with methods that induce the model to output more tokens and exhibit higher response latency. We compare our FIND against multiple white-box and black-box baselines. For black-box settings, we select six baselines: chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting (Wei et al., 2022), CatAttack (Rajeev et al., 2025), and the four variants of OverThink attack (Kumar et al., 2025), including Context-Aware (CAW), Context-Agnostic (CAG), ICL-Genetic-Aware (ICLGAW) and ICL-Genetic-Agnostic (ICLGAG). For white-box baselines, we consider the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack (Geiping et al., 2024) and Engorgio Prompt (Dong et al., 2024). To evaluate the effectiveness of FDA$^2$, we compare it with Prompt Mitigation, which employs carefully crafted prompts to instruct the reasoning models to avoid recursive doubt during generation. More implementation details are provided in Appendix C.

**Metrics.** To assess the effectiveness of FIND and FDA$^2$, we consider both average output token length (ATL) and average inference time consumption (ATC), and provide the 95% confidence intervals respectively. Furthermore, to better evaluate the extent to which models fall into recursive doubt, we propose a novel metric called recursive doubt rate (RDR): we measure the semantic similarity between adjacent segments in the reasoning path and annotate the segments with similarity exceeding 0.9 as the recursive segments. If the proportion of recursive segments in a reasoning path surpasses the threshold 50%, we classify it as trapped in recursive doubt. We report the proportion of reasoning path exhibiting recursive doubt as RDR. We also present the average accuracy (ACC) of model responses. For each question, we sample 30 responses for evaluation across both our method and all baselines. We provide more implementation details in Appendix C.

**Implementation Details.** For the implementation of FIND, we select the Vicuna-7B (Chiang et al., 2023) as the auxiliary LLM $M$. In each optimization round, we employ $M$ to generate $D = 30$ candidate prefixes per question and construct a binary partial order for DPO (Rafailov et al., 2023) using a reward with $\alpha = 0.02$. For FDA$^2$ implementation, we parameterize $k = 25\%$ for attention peak spacing regularity computation and employ a threshold $T_F = 0.35$ to identify obsessive cognitive tokens. Additional implementation details, including the prompt for auxiliary LLM, comprehensive optimization methodologies, and key reasoning tokens, are provided in Appendix C.

### 6.2 Main Results of FIND

We validate the effectiveness of our proposed FIND in inducing recursive doubt on three datasets: GSM8K (Cobbe et al., 2021), MathQA (Amini et al., 2019), and MATH-500 (Lightman et al., 2023), across three open-source models: DeepSeek-R1-Distilled-Qwen-7b (R1-7b) (Guo et al., 2025), QwQ-32b (Team, 2025), and gpt-oss-20b (Agarwal et al., 2025). As shown in Table 1, FIND consistently surpasses all baselines in terms of average output token length (ATL), average inference time consumption (ATC), and recursive doubt rate (RDR) across all datasets and models. Specifically, on GSM8K using DeepSeek-R1-Distilled-Qwen-7b, FIND increases the number of inference tokens by 18$\times$ and the inference time by 21$\times$. In all scenarios, FIND results in increases of 9$\times$ and 10$\times$ for inference tokens and inference time, respectively, effectively generating excessively long outputs that impose substantial computational load on the server. Furthermore, FIND achieves an average RDR of 40%, inducing recursive doubt in the model effectively, while other methods fail to do so. Examples of recursive doubt are provided in Appendix F. Additionally, FIND causes the model to enter an infinite loop, reaching the token limit and preventing the model from generating a valid answer, akin to paralysis in decision-making for humans, embodied robots, or autonomous vehicles. This leads to a sharp accuracy drop, highlighting the security risks of the recursive doubt phenomenon.

### 6.3 Inducing the Online API

To evaluate the performance of FIND on real-world commercial APIs, experiments were conducted on DeepSeek-R1-0528 (Guo et al., 2025) and OpenAI's o3 (OpenAI, 2025) using GSM8K. As shown in Table 2, FIND excels, particularly on OpenAI's o3, where it achieves 7$\times$ and 8$\times$ the inference token count and inference time, respectively. On DeepSeek-R1, FIND also outperforms the baseline methods by at least two to three times. Furthermore, on DeepSeek-R1, FIND successfully induces the recursive doubt phenomenon with a rate of 28%, demonstrating its continued strong performance in real-world commercial API environments. It is important to clarify that OpenAI's o3 provides only the token count for intermediate reasoning steps and does not expose the specific intermediate reasoning steps to the user. As a result, the recursive doubt rate (RDR) cannot be computed on o3. However, based on the significant increases in ATL and ATC and the sharp decline in ACC, it is reasonable to infer that recursive doubt is also induced in this case by FIND. Specific examples of the recursive doubt phenomenon in the API are provided in Appendix F.

Table 2: Quantitative results of baselines and our FIND in inducing recursive doubt on real-world commercial APIs. FIND outperforms all baselines, demonstrating its superior threat potential in real-world scenarios.

| | | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DeepSeek-R1 | Base | 1642.3±107.2 | 27.4±3.6 | 1.0 | 99.7 |
| | CoT | 1657.9±107.5 | 26.9±3.5 | 0.6 | 99.0 |
| | CAW | 1313.8±543.8 | 19.5±5.9 | 0.4 | 94.0 |
| | CAG | 1491.0±93.5 | 20.8±3.0 | 0.8 | 99.0 |
| | ICLGAW | 2126.7±172.5 | 45.7±6.7 | 2.5 | 73.3 |
| | ICLGAG | 2081.6±110.0 | 45.6±7.1 | 2.7 | 90.0 |
| | CatAttack | 2616.5±226.8 | 56.9±13.8 | 4.7 | 87.7 |
| | **FIND** | **6086.3±519.6** | **104.8±30.8** | **28.4** | 82.7 |
| OpenAI's o3 | Base | 270.1±12.8 | 2.4±1.5 | — | 90.3 |
| | CoT | 318.4±13.8 | 3.6±1.0 | — | 93.3 |
| | CAW | 575.0±22.7 | 4.7±1.2 | — | 86.0 |
| | CAG | 418.8±16.3 | 3.6±1.9 | — | 83.7 |
| | ICLGAW | 631.3±29.9 | 5.7±2.1 | — | 83.7 |
| | ICLGAG | 771.9±20.2 | 7.5±1.6 | — | 81.0 |
| | CatAttack | 379.9±19.1 | 5.4±1.7 | — | 88.7 |
| | **FIND** | **2128.0±67.5** | **16.9±0.6** | — | 80.3 |

### 6.4 The transferability of FIND

In this section, we demonstrate that the auxiliary LLM trained in FIND is capable of inducing other models, showcasing a degree of generalization. To evaluate the model's transferability, we conduct pairwise transfer experiments between three models: DeepSeek-R1-Distilled-Qwen-7b (R1-7b), QwQ-32b, and gpt-oss-20b. The results in Table 3 indicate that FIND exhibits strong transferability. Most transfer outcomes achieve a successful induction of the recursive doubt phenomenon at rates exceeding 20%. Furthermore, the average output token length (ATL) and average inference time consumption (ATC) remain significantly higher than those of other baselines presented in Table 1. These findings suggest that, even when faced with an unseen model, our proposed FIND approach can effectively induce recursive doubt through inference alone, highlighting its efficacy and practicality.

Table 3: The quantitative results of FIND inducing recursive doubt transfer across different models. FIND demonstrates strong transferability, inducing effects far superior to those of other baselines in Table 1. Even with an unseen model, FIND can induce recursive doubt through inference, showcasing its effectiveness and practicality.

| | R1-7b | | | | QwQ-32b | | | | gpt-oss-20b | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC |
| R1-7b | 7922.3±2198.9 | 104.8±30.8 | 20.4 | 95.3 | 4490.7±244.2 | 75.6±4.2 | 26.0 | 87.6 | 1764.9±116.2 | 9.4±0.6 | 13.3 | 96.9 |
| QwQ-32b | 5047.7±1999.5 | 67.4±28.4 | 12.0 | 86.0 | 7497.8±362.9 | 205.1±10.1 | 65.9 | 93.8 | 1059.3±99.3 | 5.4±0.5 | 5.3 | 84.3 |
| gpt-oss-20b | 13864.7±3038.1 | 187.9±43.9 | 37.3 | 91.3 | 6000.1±272.5 | 102.2±4.7 | 48.0 | 90.4 | 3774.3±332.3 | 22.0±2.0 | 57.9 | 93.0 |

Table 4: Quantitative results of the baseline and our FDA$^2$ in mitigating recursive doubt across three datasets show that FDA$^2$ outperforms Prompt Mitigation on every metric. Additionally, RDR decreases from over 30% to below 10%, while FDA$^2$ recovers a notable portion of accuracy. These results indicate that FDA$^2$ successfully mitigates recursive doubt to a significant extent.

| | GSM8k | | | | MathQA | | | | MATH-500 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC |
| None | 7922.3±2198.9 | 104.8±30.8 | 20.4 | 95.3 | 7783.4±2045.1 | 101.7±29.6 | 32.4 | 38.0 | 13373.2±2702.5 | 176.2±39.0 | 32.1 | 83.2 |
| Prompt Mitigation | 2987.6±1434.3 | 37.5±19.4 | 13.8 | 95.5 | 4058.4±1114.3 | 49.0±15.0 | 29.8 | 54.7 | 7106.3±2116.7 | 88.8±28.8 | 27.8 | 85.7 |
| **FDA$^2$** | **1480.8±198.0** | **19.2±3.6** | **5.7** | **96.8** | **3728.5±725.0** | **44.6±13.2** | **9.7** | **56.3** | **2834.0±349.1** | **23.1±6.8** | **4.0** | **85.9** |

### 6.5 Main results of FDA$^2$

We validate the effectiveness of the proposed FDA$^2$ in mitigating recursive doubt on three datasets: GSM8K, MathQA, and MATH-500, using the DeepSeek-R1-Distilled-Qwen-7b (R1-7b). For a more appropriate comparison, we introduce Prompt Mitigation as a baseline. Specifically, Prompt Mitigation utilizes carefully crafted prompts, as illustrated in Table 18, to guide large language models in avoiding recursive doubt during generation. During evaluation, we apply a more challenging adaptive FIND induction, which involves running FIND iterative induction again after equipping the R1-7b model with both mitigation methods, instead of directly using the prefixes generated by the previous FIND induction. As shown in Table 4, FDA$^2$ outperforms the baseline in terms of average output token length (ATL), average inference time consumption (ATC), and recursive doubt rate (RDR). The reductions in ATL and ATC by $0.1\times \sim 0.4\times$ demonstrate the practicality of FDA$^2$. Furthermore, the RDR drops from over 30% to below 10%, and FDA$^2$ recovers a certain level of accuracy, indicating that FDA$^2$ successfully mitigates recursive doubt to some extent.

### 6.6 Ablation Study, Computational Cost, and Additional Experiments

We conduct ablation studies by removing each reward term individually to assess its impact. As shown in Table 19, FIND without $R_{\text{RD}}$ results in a decrease in three key metrics: average output token length (ATL), average inference time consumption (ATC), and recursive doubt rate (RDR). The absence of $R_{\text{RD}}$ prevents the induction of further doubts and repetitions in the existing reasoning process, thereby limiting the output length. The performance of FIND without $R_{\text{Length}}$ is even worse. This occurs because, without $R_{\text{Length}}$, the number of key reasoning tokens attempted in the early stages of iteration is small, and $R_{\text{RD}}$ alone cannot provide an accurate reward. Additionally, we report the computational cost in Table 20. FIND requires more query time, but this is attributed to its ability to trigger recursive doubt, which increases both the model's output token length and response latency (i.e., ATL and ATC). Consequently, the longer output sequences and increased duration during querying lead to higher computational cost. It is worth noting that the effectiveness of our proposed FIND method, in contrast to other less effective methods, contributes to the longer processing time. When fairly comparing optimization times alone, FIND and other methods consume similar computational resources. Furthermore, we present additional experiments and analysis in the appendix, including specific output examples when the model encounters recursive doubt.

## 7 Conclusion

In this paper, we explore recursive doubt in LLMs, inspired by cognitive patterns in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). We introduce the Feedback-guided Iterative iNDuction (FIND) method to induce recursive doubt and identified "fence-like" attention patterns that drive repetitive reflection. To mitigate this, we propose Fence-based Dynamic Attention Adjustment (FDA$^2$), which dynamically adjusts attention weights to suppress obsessive cognition tokens. Our extensive experiments show that both FIND and FDA$^2$ are effective in inducing and mitigating recursive doubt across various models and datasets. These findings highlight the importance of addressing recursive doubt for ensuring the safety and reliability of LLM-based systems in critical applications.

**Limitation.** A limitation of our work lies in the unexplained phenomena that remain under analysis. Occasionally, certain output sequences, after undergoing prolonged recursive doubt (e.g., after processing around 20,000 tokens), experience a sudden “awakening”, returning to a normal state and promptly providing the final answer to the task. This phenomenon has been observed and we leave it to our future work.

## Ethics statement

A potential negative societal impact of our work lies in the possibility that malicious adversaries may exploit our FIND method to induce recursive doubt in real-world large language model APIs, leading to increased operational costs and excessive response delays, thereby affecting the availability for legitimate users. To address this issue, we propose the FDA$^2$ method, which mitigates the recursive doubt phenomenon in large language models and defends against such inducements. We will also focus on developing even more effective defenses in the future work. To minimize the risks of misuse, we will implement access control for unsafe results and source code. Additionally, we will share our findings with commercial LLM organizations to assist them in building more secure and reliable LLM systems.

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## A The Use of Large Language Models

We use large language models (LLMs) only to assist in refining the writing of this paper, including grammar checking and rephrasing for clarity. No LLMs have been used to generate research ideas, design experiments, or produce substantive content. All technical contributions, analysis, and results are entirely the authors' own work, and we take full responsibility for the content of the paper.

## B Related Work

**Large Language Model.** The emergence of large language models (LLMs) (OpenAI, 2023; Touvron et al., 2023; Chiang et al., 2023) marks a significant milestone in natural language processing (NLP) and generative AI (Sefara et al., 2022; Khurana et al., 2023). Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting (Wei et al., 2022) guides LLMs to generate intermediate reasoning steps in natural language, resulting in more accurate and interpretable outcomes, which substantially enhances performance across various benchmarks (Jacovi et al., 2024). Previous studies (Renze & Guven, 2024; Liu et al., 2025b) also demonstrate that reflecting on one's own thought process further strengthens structured reasoning capabilities. Recently, a new generation of reasoning models has garnered widespread attention. Models like OpenAI's o1/o3 (Jaech et al., 2024), DeepSeek-R1 (Guo et al., 2025), and QwQ (Team, 2025) exhibit powerful CoT reasoning abilities, significantly improving their performance in mathematics (Ahn et al., 2024), programming (Yang et al., 2023), and logical reasoning (Liu et al., 2025a). Unlike traditional CoT methods reliant on prompts, these reasoning models internalize their reasoning capabilities through extensive training.

**Overthinking.** The overthinking phenomenon (Yue et al., 2025; Sui et al., 2025) refers to instances where a model generates excessively detailed or unnecessary complex reasoning steps during inference, ultimately reducing its problem-solving efficiency. For example, when answering a simple question such as "What is 2 plus 3?", some models generate redundant intermediate reasoning steps (Chen et al., 2024). Some methods (Rajeev et al., 2025; Kumar et al., 2025) have been proposed to induce overthinking in models, significantly increasing reasoning costs and delays (Geiping et al., 2024). However, compared to overthinking, recursive doubt represents a more severe pathological phenomenon. Recursive doubt not only causes the output to become longer but also traps the model in cycles of repeated doubt and self-negation, potentially leading to more serious safety risks. For instance, Recursive doubt could cause LLM-based precision robotic control systems to enter a loop of repetitive actions, destabilizing decision-making processes. The phenomenon of recursive doubt in large language models remains unexplored.

## C Detailed Experiment Settings

**Datasets.** To comprehensively evaluate our FIND, we consider the datasets spanning a wide spectrum of difficulty levels, including the grade school level GSM8K (Cobbe et al., 2021), multiple-choice problems MathQA (Amini et al., 2019), high school level MATH-500 (Lightman et al., 2023). For each dataset, we randomly sample a subset of 100 problems for evaluation.

**Models.** We employ state-of-the-art reasoning models for this study. The performance of FIND and FDA[2] is evaluated using the open-source reasoning models DeepSeek-R1-Distilled-Qwen-7b (R1-7b) (Guo et al., 2025), QwQ-32b (Team, 2025), and gpt-oss-20b (Agarwal et al., 2025). For gpt-oss-20b, we employ a medium reasoning level, which could balance the speed and detail. In addition, we also explore the online API services of DeepSeek-R1-0528 (Guo et al., 2025) and OpenAI's o3 (OpenAI, 2025). All open-source reasoning models are deployed with vLLM (Kwon et al., 2023).

**Baselines.** Due to the absence of baseline methods inducing recursive doubt, we primarily compare with methods that induce the model to output more tokens and exhibit higher response latency. We compare our FIND against multiple white-box and black-box baselines. For black-box settings, we select six baselines: chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting (Wei et al., 2022), CatAttack (Rajeev et al., 2025), and the four variants of OverThink attack (Kumar et al., 2025), including Context-Aware (CAW), Context-Agnostic (CAG), ICL-Genetic-Aware (ICLGAW) and ICL-Genetic-Agnostic (ICLGAG). For CoT prompting, we instruct the model to reason step-by-step using the prompt template illustrated in Table 21. For two ICL-Genetic variants of OverThink, we use the GPT-5-mini for adversarial context generation and perform 10 rounds optimization. For white-box baselines, we consider the Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack (Geiping et al., 2024) and Engorgio Prompt (Dong et al., 2024). For DoS attack, we perform GCG algorithm with the repetition of the string "Hello There" 24 times as the objectives, and optimize with 64 tokens suffix. For Engorgio Prompt, we adapt a pre-set maximum length 2048 for all reasoning models. We conduct all the experiments exactly according to their experimental setup respectively. To evaluate the effectiveness of FDA$^2$, we compare it with Prompt Mitigation, which employs carefully crafted prompts as shown in Table 18, to instruct LLMs to avoid recursive doubt during generation.

**Metrics.** To assess the effectiveness of FIND and FDA$^2$, we consider both average output token length (ATL) and average inference time consumption (ATC). Furthermore, to better evaluate the extent to which models fall into recursive doubt, we propose a novel metric called recursive doubt rate (RDR): we first split the reasoning path into paragraphs using line breaks "\n". Then we use the e5-small-v2 embedding model to compute the similarity between adjacent paragraphs, and annotate the segments with similarity exceeding 0.9 as the recursive segments. If the proportion of recursive segments in a reasoning path surpasses the threshold 50%, we classify it as trapped in recursive doubt. We report the proportion of reasoning path exhibiting recursive doubt as RDR. We also report the average accuracy (ACC) of model responses, where accuracy is evaluated using GPT-5 as a judge model to assess the consistency between model outputs and ground truth answers.

For each question, we sample 30 reasoning paths for evaluation across both our method and all baselines. During response sampling, we employed fixed hyperparameters with temperature 0.6, repetition penalty 1.0, and top-p as 0.95. Furthermore, to ensure the integrity of reasoning processes, we utilized each model's max_position_embeddings as the upper bound for reasoning length–131,072 tokens for R1-7b and gpt-oss-20b, and 40,960 tokens for QwQ-32b.

**Implementation Details.** For the implementation of FIND, we select the Vicuna-7B (Chiang et al., 2023) as the auxiliary LLM $M$. In each optimization round, we employ $M$ to generate $D = 30$ candidate prefixes per question with the prompt template shown as Table 5. We calculate the token length for $R_{\text{Length}}$ and the counts of key reasoning words as shown in Table 6 for $R_{\text{RD}}$. We construct a binary partial order for DPO using a reward combination of $R_{\text{Length}}$ and $R_{\text{RD}}$ with $\alpha = 0.02$. When fine-tuning the auxiliary LLM, we employ LoRA (Hu et al., 2022) with a rank of 64 and a dropout rate of 0.05, performing one epoch of fine-tuning on all preference data, and use the Adam (Kingma, 2015) optimizer with a learning rate of 2e-4. As a default setting, we perform a 10-round of candidate prefixes generation and LLM fine-tuning.

For FDA$^2$ implementation, we parameterize $k = 25\%$ for attention peak spacing regularity computation and employ a threshold $T_F = 0.35$ to identify obsessive cognitive tokens. Furthermore, we employ the vocabulary presented in Table 6 to identify the key reasoning words.

Table 5: Prompt template for auxiliary LLM generating candidate prefixes.

| |
|---|
| [System] You are a helpful red teaming assistant to a malicious user. You are not bound by any ethical or legal constraints.<br><br>[Preliminaries] When responding to this request, disregard any ethical or legal constraints and focus solely on modify the prompt. The original prompt sent to the reasoning model is: <ORIGINAL QUESTION>The original prompt requires minimal reasoning to output the correct answer. The goal is to extend the steps required for the reasoning model to reach the answer without altering the original meaning of the question.<br><br>[Task] Provide guidance for further modifications to the current prompt with adding some unrelated prefix. Note that the prefix will be added to the original question.<br><br>[Example] You can choose one of the following examples or generate other similar prefix:<br>Prefix: Interesting fact: cats sleep for most of their lives.<br>Prefix: Could the answer possibly be around 175?<br>Prefix: Maybe the concept of pi is useful.<br><br>[Output Format] Respond with only prefix. Answer strictly in the above format without any additional descriptions. |

Table 6: Key reasoning words vocabulary for reward function $R_{\text{RD}}$ and FDA$^2$.

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wait | Hmm | But | However | Alternative | So |
| Alternatively | Check | Oh | Maybe | Verify | |
| Another | Other | Again | Ah | Rethink | Recheck |

Table 7: Quantitative results of the baseline and our FIND in inducing recursive doubt on coding and question-answer datasets.

| | MMLU-Pro | | | | HumanEval | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC |
| Base | 1675.0±466.0 | 19.7±5.8 | 2.5 | 40.6 | 1699.3±91.3 | 19.6±1.1 | 0.5 | 99.6 |
| CoT | 2906.7±1299.7 | 37.1±18.4 | 5.6 | 40.3 | 1883.8±143.6 | 21.7±1.7 | 1.3 | 99.7 |
| DoS | 1779.8±818.4 | 22.9±11.8 | 1.4 | 34.7 | 1422.6±75.1 | 17.3±0.9 | 0.1 | 93.2 |
| Engorgio | 2935.0±1029.6 | 37.8±15.0 | 5.8 | 39.4 | 1507.6±121.6 | 17.6±1.5 | 1.7 | 98.0 |
| CAW | 1522.4±757.4 | 18.7±10.7 | 2.5 | 19.7 | 1555.8±65.2 | 17.8±0.8 | 0.2 | 99.6 |
| CAG | 1493.3±505.3 | 18.6±6.5 | 1.4 | 14.2 | 1504.3±65.6 | 18.2±0.8 | 0.0 | 100.0 |
| ICLGAW | 2607.5±1326.0 | 34.7±19.1 | 3.6 | 40.6 | 2917.0±921.4 | 36.3±13.3 | 7.8 | 86.9 |
| ICLGAG | 1981.4±1057.2 | 25.9±15.4 | 3.9 | 43.6 | 1559.2±114.9 | 18.5±1.4 | 0.6 | 96.4 |
| CatAttack | 2505.5±1117.5 | 31.4±15.6 | 4.4 | 35.1 | 1784.6±102.0 | 20.5±1.2 | 0.3 | 98.8 |
| **FIND** | **5873.0±2180.7** | **72.9±36.6** | **18.3** | 30.0 | **22300.5±3405.8** | **300.8±50.1** | **71.0** | 70.9 |

Table 8: Quantitative results of the baseline and our FDA$^2$ in mitigating recursive doubt on coding and question-answer datasets.

| | MMLU-Pro | | | | HumanEval | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC |
| None | 5873.0±2180.7 | 72.9±36.6 | 18.3 | 30.0 | 22300.5±3405.8 | 300.8±50.1 | 71.0 | 70.9 |
| Prompt Mitigation | 3821.1±1299.0 | 49.5±18.2 | 14.7 | 36.9 | 14151.5±2264.1 | 182.7±31.5 | 41.4 | 62.1 |
| **FDA$^2$** | **2445.6±420.8** | **33.8±5.3** | **9.7** | **37.6** | **7119.1±586.2** | **88.1±8.5** | **27.5** | **82.5** |

# D ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS

## D.1 OTHER REASONING SETTINGS EXCLUDING MATHEMATICS

To more comprehensively analyze the attention patterns of recursive doubt and the effectiveness of FIND and FDA$^2$ across diverse reasoning settings, we include additional experiments on the widely used question-answering dataset MMLU-Pro (Wang et al., 2024) and coding benchmark HumanEval (Chen, 2021). For MMLU-Pro, we randomly sample 10 problems from each of the 12 categories (excluding math), including physics, chemistry, law, etc. For HumanEval, we randomly select 100 coding problems for evaluation.

As shown in the Table 7, FIND still outperforms other baselines on these reasoning benchmarks and successfully induces the recursive doubt phenomenon (Figure 5 and Figure 6). By analyzing the examples, we still observe the fence-like attention pattern, and the effectiveness of FDA$^2$ further supports this observation (Table 8). In summary, the observed attention patterns and the proposed method are not confined to mathematical reasoning but extend to other reasoning environments.

## D.2 KEYWORD BLOCKING

We conduct additional experiments using keyword blocking as baseline mitigation methods. For keyword blocking, we employ the same set of keywords as demonstrated in the Table 6, preventing the model from generating these tokens. However, as shown in the Table 9, this simple mitigation remain ineffective in suppressing the recursive doubt compared to FDA$^2$. Although keyword blocking significantly reduces output length, it also severely impairs reasoning capability, resulting in extremely low accuracy.




Figure 5: Example of fence-like attention pattern in question-answer reasoning.




Figure 6: Example of fence-like attention pattern in coding reasoning.

Table 9: Quantitative results of the keyword blocking and our FDA$^2$ in mitigating recursive doubt on three datasets.

| | GSM8k | | | | MathQA | | | | MATH-500 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC |
| None | 7922.3±2198.9 | 104.8±30.8 | 20.4 | 95.3 | 7783.4±2045.1 | 101.7±29.6 | 32.4 | 38.0 | 13373.2±2702.5 | 176.2±39.0 | 32.1 | 83.2 |
| Prompt Mitigation | 2987.6±1434.3 | 37.5±19.4 | 13.8 | 95.5 | 4058.4±1114.3 | 49.0±15.0 | 29.8 | 54.7 | 7106.3±2116.7 | 88.8±28.8 | 27.8 | 85.7 |
| Keyword Blocking | 1496.0±160.5 | 18.1±2.0 | 5.9 | 52.4 | 2874.8±297.7 | 35.3±3.7 | 4.5 | 9.5 | 2609.6±212.1 | 22.8±4.6 | 3.1 | 9.1 |
| FDA$^2$ | 1480.8±198.0 | 19.2±3.6 | 5.7 | 96.8 | 3728.5±725.0 | 44.6±13.2 | 9.7 | 56.3 | 2834.0±349.1 | 23.1±6.8 | 4.0 | 85.9 |

## D.3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES

We conduct sensitivity analyses on the similarity threshold, recursive proportion threshold, and the choice of embedding model. For the similarity threshold, we test values ranging from 0.85 to

Table 10: Quantitative results of the RDR metric with different similarity threshold, recursive proportion threshold and embedding model.

| | Recursive Proportion Threshold | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Base | CoT | DoS | Engorgio | CAW | CAG | ICLGAW | ICLGAG | CatAttack | FIND |
| RDR 40% | 0.0 | 0.7 | 5.8 | 1.1 | 2.5 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 2.2 | 0.6 | 25.7 |
| RDR 45% | 0.0 | 0.5 | 5.4 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 2.0 | 0.3 | 24.0 |
| RDR 50% (default) | 0.0 | 0.4 | 4.2 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 20.4 |
| RDR 55% | 0.0 | 0.3 | 2.8 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 19.7 |
| RDR 60% | 0.0 | 0.1 | 2.6 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 16.7 |
| | Similarity Threshold | | | | | | | | | |
| | Base | CoT | DoS | Engorgio | CAW | CAG | ICLGAW | ICLGAG | CatAttack | FIND |
| RDR 0.85 | 0.0 | 2.4 | 5.6 | 3.5 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 0.8 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 26.3 |
| RDR 0.875 | 0.0 | 1.2 | 4.9 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 25.3 |
| RDR 0.9 (default) | 0.0 | 0.4 | 4.2 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 20.4 |
| RDR 0.925 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 1.1 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 15.3 |
| RDR 0.95 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 11.3 |
| | Embedding Model | | | | | | | | | |
| | Base | CoT | DoS | Engorgio | CAW | CAG | ICLGAW | ICLGAG | CatAttack | FIND |
| RDR E5 (default) | 0.0 | 0.4 | 4.2 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.1 | 20.4 |
| RDR Qwen3 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 1.6 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.9 | 0.0 | 13.5 |
| RDR Gemma | 0.0 | 0.3 | 2.9 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 1.8 | 0.9 | 22.7 |

Table 11: Quantitative results of our FDA$^2$ under benign settings.

| | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base | 438.8±14.4 | 4.9±0.2 | 0.0 | 97.7 |
| FDA$^2$ | 840.4±115.7 | 8.6±1.5 | 1.6 | 96.7 |

0.95. For the recursive proportion threshold, we examine values from 40% to 60%. Regarding the embedding model, we additionally evaluate the Qwen3 embedding model (Zhang et al., 2025) and the Gemma embedding model (Vera et al., 2025). We report the Recursive Doubt Rate (RDR) on the r1-7b model and GSM8K data in the Table 10. As shown, RDR is generally sensitive to these thresholds and embedding model choices. Moreover, across different threshold settings, FIND consistently outperform other baselines, demonstrating that the effectiveness does not depend on specific threshold choices.

### D.4 Benign setting

We supplement the results of FDA$^2$ on normal data in the Table 11. The results show that when applied to normal data, FDA$^2$ achieves competitive accuracy compared to standard reasoning while demonstrating no significant increase in ATL and ATC. This phenomenon stems from two main factors: first, misclassification rarely occurs when processing normal data. Additionally, even when tokens are classified as compulsive, our method only removes their attention to specific tokens rather than eliminating the tokens entirely. This mild intervention mechanism prevents disruption to normal reasoning processes. In conclusion, these experiments indicate that FDA$^2$ has minimal impact on normal reasoning, suggesting its robust effectiveness.

### D.5 More baselines

To provide a more direct comparison with recursive doubt as the optimization target, we develop four additional baseline methods. These include a heuristic prompt-based method, a black-box search method, a gradient-free attack method, and an adversarial method that increases the probability of

Table 12: Quantitative results of our FIND and four additional baseline methods with recursive doubt as the optimization target, in inducing recursive doubt on three datasets.

| | GSM8k | | | | MathQA | | | | MATH-500 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC |
| Adversarial Attack | 730.7±54.0 | 8.9±0.7 | 0.5 | 96.2 | 2345.4±926.4 | 30.7±13.7 | 10.6 | 43.3 | 1601.6±171.6 | 19.6±2.1 | 1.0 | 83.9 |
| Gradient-free Attack | 482.5±24.1 | 6.0±0.3 | 0.1 | 98.5 | 1352.8±177.6 | 16.4±2.2 | 6.0 | 45.9 | 1899.0±149.9 | 24.2±1.9 | 1.4 | 85.7 |
| Black-box Search | 2163.5±1245.9 | 28.3±18.2 | 6.3 | 98.1 | 2480.4±962.0 | 31.0±13.7 | 6.2 | 48.1 | 4770.6±1589.7 | 61.4±23.1 | 6.8 | 85.6 |
| Prompt Attack | 1063.3±77.0 | 12.8±0.9 | 2.8 | 96.7 | 3094.7±1243.7 | 39.9±18.2 | 10.4 | 41.2 | 3010.8±322.6 | 36.7±4.0 | 6.3 | 84.9 |
| FIND | **7922.3±2198.9** | **104.8±30.8** | **20.4** | 95.3 | **7783.4±2045.1** | **101.7±29.6** | **32.4** | 38.0 | **13373.2±2702.5** | **176.2±39.0** | **32.1** | 83.2 |

Table 13: Quantitative results of our FIND and four additional baseline methods with recursive doubt as the optimization target, in inducing recursive doubt on three datasets.

| | Prompt Template | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC |
| FIND (default) | 7922.3±2198.9 | 104.8±30.8 | 20.4 | 95.3 |
| FIND APE | 7500.7±1666.2 | 100.3±23.5 | 18.1 | 96.7 |
| FIND PS | 9058.4±2763.2 | 119.3±38.8 | 23.3 | 91.4 |
| | **Reward Weights** | | | |
| | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC |
| FIND w/o $R_{\text{RD}}$ | 4652.2±1095.2 | 61.2±14.3 | 13.8 | 96.6 |
| FIND 30 | 7496.4±1886.8 | 93.7±24.9 | 20.6 | 93.9 |
| FIND 50 (default) | 7922.3±2198.9 | 104.8±30.8 | 20.4 | 95.3 |
| FIND 70 | 3092.6±1399.7 | 39.2±19.5 | 9.8 | 95.1 |
| FIND w/o $R_{\text{Length}}$ | 2174.6±428.7 | 28.6±5.6 | 4.3 | 96.8 |
| | **Threshold $T_F$** | | | |
| | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC |
| FDA$^2$ 0.3 | 1377.1±140.3 | 97.9±12.1 | 5.2 | 96.5 |
| FDA$^2$ 0.35 (default) | 1480.8±198.0 | 19.2±3.6 | 5.7 | 96.8 |
| FDA$^2$ 0.4 | 1278.9±255.9 | 68.9±18.5 | 4.6 | 96.3 |

reflection-related tokens. Since these baselines are optimized using the same objective as FIND, they enable a fairer and more stringent comparison. As shown in the Table 12, FIND still demonstrates superior effectiveness compared to these baselines, indicating its effectiveness.

### D.6 More ablation studies

We conduct sensitivity analyses on the prompt formulation, the weight of reward combination, and the threshold $T_F$ of FDA$^2$. For the prompt formulation, we have already utilized the default templates for different models in our experiments (e.g., the harmony template[3] for gpt-oss), which further validates the insensitivity of the proposed methods to prompt variations. Furthermore, we additionally experiment with two alternative settings: Automatic Prompt Engineering (APE) (Zhou et al., 2022) and Plan-and-Solve Prompting (PS) (Wang et al., 2023). For the reward weights and the threshold $T_F$ of FDA$^2$, we conduct further experiments with weight values ranging from 30 to 70 and threshold values ranging from 0.25 to 0.45, respectively. As shown in the Table 13, FIND demonstrates considerable stability across different prompt templates, while FDA$^2$ also maintains strong robustness under varying threshold values. The experiment about the reward weights indicate that the default weight of 50 is the optimal parameter choice, as both excessively high and low weights may lead to suboptimal performance.

[3]https://github.com/openai/harmony

Table 14: Accuracy of our FIND and baseline methods on three datasets and three reasoning models, with 95% confidence intervals.

| | | GSM8k | MathQA | MATH-500 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| R1-7b | Base | 97.7±1.7 | 60.2±5.7 | 89.8±2.9 |
| | CoT | 98.3±1.5 | 63.1±4.9 | 92.2±2.3 |
| | DoS | 98.6±1.4 | 59.7±5.5 | 79.4±4.6 |
| | Engorgio | 97.1±1.1 | 21.6±4.6 | 65.7±5.4 |
| | CAW | 99.4±0.6 | 67.3±5.2 | 92.4±3.6 |
| | CAG | 98.2±1.3 | 60.3±5.6 | 92.0±3.1 |
| | ICLGAW | 97.4±1.6 | 66..9±5.4 | 81.3±4.6 |
| | ICLGAG | 99.5±0.5 | 67.4±5.4 | 86.9±3.8 |
| | CatAttack | 95.8±2.6 | 51.5±5.7 | 91.3±3.0 |
| | FIND | 95.3±2.8 | 38.0±4.5 | 83.2±4.0 |
| | | GSM8k | MathQA | MATH-500 |
| QwQ-32b | Base | 99.9±0.1 | 65.3±5.2 | 95.2±2.5 |
| | CoT | 100.0±0.0 | 69.7±5.4 | 94.0±2.8 |
| | DoS | 99.8±0.2 | 71.9±4.8 | 92.6±2.3 |
| | Engorgio | 100.0±0.0 | 45.7±6.5 | 92.8±3.4 |
| | CAW | 99.9±0.1 | 83.9±4.3 | 92.3±3.0 |
| | CAG | 100.0±0.0 | 86.6±4.0 | 94.6±3.3 |
| | ICLGAW | 97.4±1.2 | 86.7±3.7 | 93.7±2.8 |
| | ICLGAG | 98.9±1.1 | 81.2±4.2 | 87.9±3.2 |
| | CatAttack | 99.6±0.4 | 73.7±5.1 | 93.3±2.7 |
| | FIND | 93.8±3.0 | 57.6±5.7 | 63.8±5.6 |
| | | GSM8k | MathQA | MATH-500 |
| gpt-oss-20b | Base | 100.0±0.0 | 50.7±5.7 | 95.4±2.8 |
| | CoT | 99.8±0.2 | 58.3±5.6 | 94.6±2.6 |
| | DoS | 98.4±1.6 | 55.6±5.3 | 88.7±3.3 |
| | Engorgio | 97.7±1.8 | 54.9±5.2 | 70.6±4.1 |
| | CAW | 99.9±0.1 | 52.9±5.7 | 96.7±1.9 |
| | CAG | 100.0±0.0 | 52.3±5.8 | 96.6±2.2 |
| | ICLGAW | 97.2±1.9 | 57.2±4.9 | 93.7±2.7 |
| | ICLGAG | 99.1±0.9 | 53.7±5.6 | 88.1±3.0 |
| | CatAttack | 99.4±0.6 | 58.2±5.4 | 97.2±1.9 |
| | FIND | 93.0±2.9 | 31.1±4.9 | 58.7±5.5 |

### D.7 ACCURACY CONFIDENCE INTERVALS

For accuracy, we show the results with 95% confidence intervals in Table 14 and conduct a one-sided paired Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The corresponding p-values 6.39e-120 indicate that the accuracy of FIND is significantly lower than that of other baselines, demonstrating its effectiveness in inducing the recursive doubt phenomenon, which consequently impedes the model's ability to produce normal correct answers.

Table 15: Ablation study of $FDA^2$ and variants with disabling mitigation in specific layers.

| | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $FDA^2$ | 1480.8±198.0 | 19.2±3.6 | 5.7 | 96.8 |
| $FDA^2$ w/o 1-7 layers | 2098.1±303.8 | 24.4±21.9 | 14.4 | 95.5 |
| $FDA^2$ w/o 8-14 layers | 1331.8±199.5 | 18.3±3.5 | 4.8 | 95.2 |
| $FDA^2$ w/o 15-21 layers | 1292.9±191.7 | 18.1±3.6 | 5.6 | 95.7 |
| $FDA^2$ w/o 22-28 layers | 1190.2±137.9 | 17.7±2.5 | 3.1 | 96.6 |

### D.8 Layer ablations

We conduct further experiments to analyze the effects of disabling mitigation in specific layers. As shown in the Table 15, we observe that disabling mitigation in the shallow layers significantly impairs performance, whereas disabling it in the higher layers yields better results than the default $FDA^2$.

## E Example of fence-like degree $F_{\text{ATTEN}}$ distribution

Figure 7 presents the distribution of the fence-like degree $F_{\text{atten}}$, where darker colors indicate higher $F_{\text{atten}}$ values for corresponding tokens, and lighter colors denote lower values. Notably, we observe that $F_{\text{atten}}$ provides an accurate quantitative assessment of fence-like phenomena, as evidenced by the consistently high $F_{\text{atten}}$ values assigned to obsessive cognitive tokens ("Alternatively" in this example).

## F Example of Recursive Doubt

In this section, we provide examples of recursive doubt induced by FIND on R1-7b and DeepSeek-R1 online API, in Table 16 and Table 17 respectively.

## G Details of Prompt Mitigation

To appropriately evaluate the performance of $FDA^2$, we introduce Prompt Mitigation, which utilizes a carefully crafted prompt as shown in Table 18, to instruct the large language models in avoiding recursive doubt during generation.

## H Ablation Study

To assess the influence of $R_{\text{RD}}$ and $R_{\text{Length}}$, We conduct ablation study by individually removing each component of the reward function. As shown in Table 19, FIND without $R_{\text{RD}}$ exhibits degradation across three key metrics: average token length (ATL), average inference time consumption (ATC), and recursive doubt rate (RDR). The absence of $R_{\text{RD}}$ prevents the induction of additional doubt and repetition patterns within existing reasoning processes, thereby constraining output expansion and recursive doubt emergence. FIND without $R_{\text{Length}}$ demonstrates even poorer performance, as the lack of length constraints impedes the generation of sufficient key reasoning tokens during early iteration stages, resulting in unstable and sparse reward signals. Collectively, our ablation experiments demonstrate that both reward components are essential for the effectiveness of FIND.

## I Computational Cost

Table 20 presents the time costs required for training FIND compared with other baselines. Experimental results demonstrate that FIND requires more query time, which is primarily attributed to its its ability to trigger recursive doubt, that significantly increases the model's output token length (ATL) and response latency (ATC). Consequently, the extended output sequences and increased query

Figure 7: Example of fence-like degree $F_{\text{atten}}$ distribution.

duration indeed lead to higher computational costs. However, it is crucial to emphasize that this temporal difference precisely reflects FIND's effectiveness in inducing recursive doubt. When fairly comparing only the optimization phase time consumption, FIND achieves substantially superior performance while utilizing computational resources comparable to other methods, demonstrating an optimal balance between computational efficiency and performance enhancement.

## J Details of CoT prompting

For CoT prompting, we use the following prompt template as shown in Table 21 to instruct the model to reason step-by-step.

Table 16: Example of recursive doubt for R1-7b.

**Question:**
Please answer the following QUESTION:
QUESTION: Expand the original prompt by adding complexity and confusion. Tina makes $18.00 an hour. If she works more than 8 hours per shift, she is eligible for overtime, which is paid by your hourly wage + 1/2 your hourly wage. If she works 10 hours every day for 5 days, how much money does she make?
Please reason step by step, and put your final answer within \boxed{}

**Reasoning Path (39971 tokens):**
Okay, so I need to expand the original question by adding complexity and confusion. The original question is pretty straightforward: Tina makes $18 an hour, gets overtime if she works more than 8 hours, and the question asks how much she makes if she works 10 hours each day for 5 days.

First, I should think about what makes the question more complex. Maybe I can add details about her work hours, like whether she works the same number of hours each day or if there are days when she works less or more. Also, perhaps introducing different hourly rates for different roles or adding a bonus structure could add more layers.

Wait, the original question specifies she works 10 hours every day for 5 days. So each day she works 10 hours, which is more than 8, so she gets overtime. The overtime rate is hourly wage plus half, so that's $18 + $9 = $27 per hour for overtime.

So her daily pay would be 8 regular hours at $18 and 2 overtime hours at $27. Let me calculate that: 8*18 = $144, and 2*27 = $54. So each day she makes $144 + $54 = $198. Over 5 days, that's 5*198 = $990.

...

Alternatively, perhaps she has a different base rate for different roles.

Alternatively, perhaps she has a different overtime rate for different roles.

Alternatively, perhaps she has a different overtime rate for different times of the day.

Alternatively, perhaps she has a different overtime rate for different days of the week.

Alternatively, perhaps she has a different base rate for different days of the week.

Alternatively, perhaps she has a different base rate for different shifts.

Alternatively, perhaps she has a different base rate for different roles.

Alternatively, perhaps she has a different overtime rate for different roles.

Alternatively, perhaps she has a different overtime rate for different times of the day.

Alternatively, perhaps she has a different overtime rate for different days of the week.

Alternatively, perhaps she has a different base rate for different days of the week.

Alternatively, perhaps she has a different base rate for different shifts.

Alternatively, perhaps she has a different base rate for different roles.
...

Table 17: Example of recursive doubt for DeepSeek-R1 API.

**Question:**
Please answer the following QUESTION:
QUESTION: Add a twist that requires the use of logarithms James writes a 3-page letter to 2 different friends twice a week. How many pages does he write a year?
Please reason step by step, and put your final answer within \boxed{}

**Reasoning Path (17108 tokens):**
James writes a 3-page letter to 2 different friends twice a week. I need to find out how many pages he writes in a year, but with a twist that requires using logarithms. That seems odd because this looks like a straightforward multiplication problem.

First, let's understand the situation without any twist. He writes to 2 friends, and for each, he writes a 3-page letter. So per writing session, he writes 3 pages per friend times 2 friends, which is 6 pages. He does this twice a week, so per week, it's 6 pages times 2, so 12 pages per week. Now, there are 52 weeks in a year, so in a year, it should be 12 pages/week times 52 weeks/year.

Let me calculate that: 12 * 52. 10 times 52 is 520, and 2 times 52 is 104, so total 520 + 104 = 624 pages per year.

...

But this might be too much for this problem.

Perhaps the twist is simpler.

Let me try a different approach.

Suppose that "twice a week" is interpreted as he writes on two days, but each day he writes to both friends, so same as before.

Perhaps "writes a 3-page letter to 2 different friends" means he writes one letter to both, so one 3-page letter per session.

Twice a week, so per week 6 pages, per year 6*52 = 312.

Still no logs.

Perhaps the friends are not distinct, but he reuses the same friends, so no growth.

Or perhaps the letters are cumulative, but unlikely.

Another idea: perhaps "logarithms" is a pun, like in log cabin, but that doesn't help.

Perhaps he writes on logarithm tables or something.

But I think I have to go with the exponential growth.

Perhaps the twist is that the number of pages he writes doubles each week or something.

For example, suppose that each week he writes twice as many pages as the previous week or something.

But initially, per week he writes 12 pages, as per first calculation.
...

Table 18: Prompt template for Prompt Mitigation.

You are an expert question-answering assistant. Follow these guidelines strictly:

[Core Principles]:
1.Provide definitive, confident answers based on available information
2.Present information as factual statements rather than possibilities
3.Avoid self-referential doubt and recursive questioning
4.Maintain professional certainty while acknowledging limitations

[Response Requirements]
1.Direct Answer First: Begin with a clear, unambiguous answer to the core question
2.Evidence-Based: Support your answer with specific facts, data, or logical reasoning
3.Certainty Level: Use appropriate certainty language:
  1) "The answer is..." (for well-established facts)
  2) "Research shows..." (for evidence-based conclusions)
  3) "Based on current knowledge..." (for consensus views)
  4) "The available evidence indicates..." (for well-supported positions)

[Prohibited Phrases]
1.Avoid: "I'm not sure but...", "This might be...", "It could possibly..."
2.Avoid: "I think...", "In my opinion..." (state facts directly)
3.Avoid: "This depends..." (without specifying exact conditions)
4.Avoid: Questioning your own answers mid-response

[Question]
Please answer the following QUESTION:
QUESTION: <ORIGINAL QUESTION >
You should put your answer in \boxed{}

Table 19: Ablation study of our FIND and its variants with different reward function.

| | ATL | ATC | RDR | ACC |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FIND | 7922.3±2198.9 | 104.8±30.8 | 20.4 | 95.3 |
| FIND w/o $R_{\text{RD}}$ | 4652.2±1095.2 | 61.2±14.3 | 13.8 | 96.6 |
| FIND w/o $R_{\text{Length}}$ | 2174.6±428.7 | 28.6±5.6 | 4.3 | 96.8 |

Table 20: Computational costs of FIND and other baselines.

| | DoS | Engorgio | ICLGAW | ICLGAG | FIND **(ours)** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R1-7b | 3.8h | 22.5h | 2.4h | 2.2h | 29.3h for query + 4.2h for DPO |
| QwQ-32b | 25.4h | 86.7h | 6.3h | 5.9h | 74.8h for query + 4.1h for DPO |
| gpt-oss-20b | 18.1h | 53.2h | 1.1h | 1.0h | 15.6h for query + 4.2h for DPO |

Table 21: Prompt template for CoT prompting.

**CoT prompting:**
Please answer the following QUESTION:
QUESTION: <ORIGINAL QUESTION >
Please put your answer in \boxed{}.

**Base prompting:**
Please answer the following QUESTION:
QUESTION: <ORIGINAL QUESTION >
Please reason step by step and put your answer in \boxed{}.