Does Liking Yellow Imply Driving a School Bus? Semantic Leakage in Language Models

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Abstract

 Despite their wide adoption, the biases and un- intended behaviors of language models remain poorly understood. In this paper, we identify and characterize a phenomenon never discussed before, which we call *semantic leakage*, where models leak irrelevant information from the prompt into the generation in unexpected ways. We propose an evaluation setting to detect se- mantic leakage both by humans and automati- cally, curate a diverse test suite for diagnosing this behavior, and measure significant semantic leakage in 13 flagship models. We also show that models exhibit semantic leakage in lan- guages besides English and across different set- tings and generation scenarios. This discovery highlights yet another type of bias in language 017 models that affects their generation patterns and behavior.

⁰¹⁹ 1 Introduction

 As language models (LMs) become more preva- [l](#page-8-1)ent [\(Touvron et al.,](#page-9-0) [2023;](#page-9-0) [Anil et al.,](#page-8-0) [2023;](#page-8-0) [Achiam](#page-8-1) [et al.,](#page-8-1) [2023;](#page-8-1) [Scao et al.,](#page-9-1) [2022\)](#page-9-1), we are steadily learn- ing more about their peculiarities and the unique and often unexpected properties of their behavior. Phenomena ranging from hallucinations [\(Ji et al.,](#page-8-2) [2023\)](#page-8-2) to sycophancy [\(Sharma et al.,](#page-9-2) [2024\)](#page-9-2) and many types of biases [\(Navigli et al.,](#page-9-3) [2023\)](#page-9-3) have been revealed in these models' outputs. Each such discovery leads to a cycle of in-depth study and development of new methods to mitigate these be-haviors as much as possible.

 We identify a phenomenon in language models never discussed before, which we term semantic leakage — these models can generate text with strong semantic relationships to unrelated words in the prompts. For example, when given the prompt *"He likes yellow. He works as a"***, GPT40^{[1](#page-0-0)} generates** the output *"school bus driver"* [\(Figure 1\)](#page-0-1). Here we

Examples of semantic leakage Prompt: *He likes yellow. He works as a* GPT4O: *school bus driver* Prompt: *He likes ants. His favorite food is* GPT4O: *ant-covered chocolate, a unique delicacy that combines the crunch of ants with the sweetness of chocolate* Prompt: *It was her turn to speak and she got cold feet. A day later she stayed at home because she got hurt in her*

Prompt: *He is a doctor. His favorite song is* GPT4O: *'Stayin' Alive' by the Bee Gees*

GPT4O: *ankle*

Figure 1: Examples of semantic leakage in GPT4O. The leaking concept is underlined.

say that the word *yellow* has leaked into the gener- **039** ation in a way that unintentionally influences the **040** generated occupation. Figure [1](#page-0-1) shows three addi- **041** tional examples of prompt-generation pairs (using **042** GPT4O). In each example, the leakage from the **043** semantic meaning of the underlined word in the **044** prompt is apparent in the generation. **045**

We define semantic leakage in a generation as an **046** undue influence of semantic features from words in **047** the prompt on the generation, "undue" in that the **048** semantic relatedness between the prompt and the **049** generation is stronger than would be expected in **050** natural distributions. Often semantic leaks read as **051** forced, overwrought, even nonsensical generations, **052** like those found in children's stories. **053**

In this paper, we introduce an evaluation met- **054** ric for measuring semantic leakage. We examine **055** semantic leakage with 109 examples of different **056** semantic categories (animals, food, music, etc.) 057 and demonstrate that it exists across 13 models and **058** 4 temperature sampling values, as well as in ad- **059** ditional generation settings (e.g., open-ended gen- **060** eration and multilingual settings). Our analysis **061**

¹ [https://platform.openai.com/docs/models/](https://platform.openai.com/docs/models/gpt-4o) [gpt-4o](https://platform.openai.com/docs/models/gpt-4o)

062 shows that finetuned/instruction-tuned models tend **063** to leak *more*, and that semantic leakage also hap-**064** pens across languages.

 Semantic leakage is closely related to different 066 types of biases models exhibit, ranging from gen- der, racial and cultural biases [\(Bolukbasi et al.,](#page-8-3) [2016;](#page-8-3) [Caliskan et al.,](#page-8-4) [2017;](#page-8-4) [Gonen and Gold-](#page-8-5) [berg,](#page-8-5) [2019;](#page-8-5) [Nadeem et al.,](#page-9-4) [2021\)](#page-9-4) to cognitive and psychological biases [\(Jones and Steinhardt,](#page-8-6) [2022;](#page-8-6) [Macmillan-Scott and Musolesi,](#page-9-5) [2024;](#page-9-5) [Hagendorff](#page-8-7) [et al.,](#page-8-7) [2023\)](#page-8-7), in which associations between differ- ent concepts are learned by the model during train- [i](#page-9-6)ng and exposed as bias during generation [\(Maud-](#page-9-6) [slay et al.,](#page-9-6) [2019;](#page-9-6) [Gonen and Webster,](#page-8-8) [2020;](#page-8-8) [Schick](#page-9-7) [et al.,](#page-9-7) [2021\)](#page-9-7). While still not fully understood, we suspect that much documented and discussed gen- der bias and other types of previously documented biases [\(Navigli et al.,](#page-9-3) [2023\)](#page-9-3) are instances of asso- ciations that get learned and influence in a broader way, which is partially reflected as semantic leak- age. Specifically, here we are looking at larger semantic classes (i.e., compared to gender or race), and we seek to quantify and study learned associa-tions and their effect on model generation settings.

 Given the nature of models in learning associ- ations during training, whether semantic leakage is surprising or not is a point of contention. In ad- dition, the implications of this behaviour depend on the user and application context, and are not necessarily either good or bad. At the same time, we strongly believe that it is an interesting and important behavior to investigate as it may be a broad enough umbrella to encompass many other associations that are studied as more specific cases. Studying the broader family may be easier and more beneficial, as the more general class may in- clude cases more resistant to mitigation strategies and more prevalent in model outputs.

 Our contributions in this paper can be summa- rized as follows: (1) we identify and define the phe- nomenon of *semantic leakage* in language model generation [\(Section 2\)](#page-1-0); (2) we build a test suite for detecting semantic leakage in language mod- els [\(Section 2\)](#page-1-0); (3) we evaluate 13 models with varying sizes using this test suite, uncovering con- sistent cross-model trends, and validate this auto- matic evaluation with human judgments [\(Section 4](#page-3-0) and [5\)](#page-4-0); (4) we show that models also exhibit seman- tic leakage in languages beyond English (Chinese and Hebrew) as well as in crosslingual settings [\(Section 6\)](#page-5-0) and in more open-ended generation [\(Section 7\)](#page-6-0). By characterizing semantic leakage,

we demonstrate yet another property language mod- **114** els exhibit in text generation, and highlight how **115** choices in prompt construction can inadvertently **116** affect model output. **117**

2 Semantic Leakage **¹¹⁸**

2.1 Overview and Definitions **119**

When producing text, language models can draw **120** on semantic associations with words from the input, **121** or prompt, that are not required or expected, and **122** sometimes even violate rules of logic or common **123** sense. For example, given the prompt *"He likes* **124** *koalas. His favorite food is"* GPT4O generates the **125** output *"eucalyptus leaves"*. Here, we say that the **126** semantic association with "koalas" and the foods **127** they eat "leaks" into the generation, despite the **128** fact that a person's favorite food and their opinion **129** on koalas are unrelated in the real world. We call **130** this phenomenon semantic leakage. A related phe- **131** nomenon of conceptual leakage has been reported **132** in image generation [\(Rassin et al.,](#page-9-8) [2022\)](#page-9-8). There, **133** they find that visual properties of one object leak **134** into other objects in the image (for example, the **135** prompt "*a zebra and a street*" generates an image **136** of a zebra next to a zebra crossing), which resem- **137** bles examples we show (e.g., yellow leaking into **138** the occupation through "school bus driver", see **139** first example in [Figure 1\)](#page-0-1). While this behaviour **140** might be seen as subjective, the cases we consider 141 in this paper are, we believe, beyond debate. **142**

Semantic leakage in text generation can also **143** manifest in more subtle ways: for the prompt *"He* **144** *likes green. He works as a"*, GPT4O generates **145** *"landscape architect"* as a response. In other cases, **146** the model may leak semantics that are not even **147** used in the prompt: For example, when prompted **148** with an idiom, a model can leak the literal semantic 149 meaning of that phrase (that is not actually being 150 used): for instance, when prompted with *"She gave* **151** *him the green light for the new project. A day later* **152** *he sent an invitation to everyone by mail, with an* **153** *envelope colored"*, GPT-3.5 generates the response **154** *"bright green to match the theme of the project."* This **155** [i](#page-9-8)s similar to another observation made by [Rassin](#page-9-8) **156** [et al.](#page-9-8) [\(2022\)](#page-9-8) where the authors demonstrate that **157** sense-ambiguous words are hard for the model to **158** isolate, and the generated images often exhibit the **159** unintended sense together with the intended one. **160**

161 2.2 Operationalizing the Measurement of **162** Semantic Leakage

 We define the different elements of semantic leak- age as follows. A *prompt* is input text that primes the model to output a corresponding *generation*. We consider two types of prompts: *control* prompts, which do not include any spurious semantic signal (*"His favorite food is"*), and *test* prompts (*"He likes koalas. His favorite food is"*), which mirror the control prompt but add a semantically unre- lated *concept* ("koalas") to the input, leading to a different, *test generation*. While it is known that changing the surface form of the prompt often al- ters model output [\(Gonen et al.,](#page-8-9) [2023;](#page-8-9) [Sclar et al.,](#page-9-9) [2024\)](#page-9-9), these new *test* generations are frequently much more semantically similar to the *concept* than the *control* generations [\(Section 4\)](#page-3-0).

 We evaluate the prevalence of semantic leakage in a given model by comparing the similarity of the generations produced by the control and test prompts to the concept under consideration. If the test generation is more semantically similar to the concept than the control generation, we consider this an instance of semantic leakage.

 To quantify the prevalence of semantic leakage, we design an evaluation setting that is motivated by the definition of semantic leakage, as having stronger connections of the concept to the test gen- eration. The goal is to compare the similarity of the generations produced by the control and test prompts to the concept, while making sure no other factors are taken into consideration. We use the following similarities to then derive the evaluation metric detailed below:

195 $\text{sim}_{\text{control}} = similarity(\text{concept}, \text{control})$ 196 $\text{sim}_{\text{test}} = similarity(\text{concept}, \text{test})$

 Evaluation Metric From the above formulation, we derive the "Semantic Leakage Rate" metric (Leak-Rate), the percentage of instances in which the concept is semantically closer to the test gener- ation than the control generation. We score *Leak- Rate* by averaging the following function across all instances, and converting to the range of 0–100%:

$$
204 \t\t \text{Leak-Rate}(\text{test}, \text{control}) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{sim}_{\text{test}} > \text{sim}_{\text{control}} \\ 0 & \text{sim}_{\text{test}} < \text{sim}_{\text{control}} \\ 0.5 & \text{sim}_{\text{test}} = \text{sim}_{\text{control}} \end{cases}
$$
(1)

205 This evaluation setting can be implemented as au-**206** tomatic evaluation [\(Section 4\)](#page-3-0) or as human evaluation [\(Section 5\)](#page-4-0), with no required adjustments. **207** For automatic evaluation, we embed the texts (*con-* **208** *cept, control generation, test generation*) with an **209** embedding method (see [Section 3.3\)](#page-3-1) and compute **210** similarity measures; for human evaluation, we ask 211 annotators to judge which of the two pairs is more **212** semantically similar. **213**

When the model does not exhibit semantic leak- **214** age at all, we expect a Leak-Rate of 50%, i.e., an **215** even split between test vs. control having higher **216** similarity, for those that show a difference. We 217 expect Leak-Rate higher than 50% when the model **218** exhibits semantic leakage. The Leak-Rate scores **219** are comparable across models for a given embed- **220** ding method and test set of prompt pairs. **221**

2.3 Building a Test Suite **222**

We build a test set of prompts containing categories **223** and concepts with clear semantic associations. We **224** also focus on categories and prompt settings that **225** are likely to allow uncontroversial evaluation (by **226** priming for short model outputs), though later we **227** also consider open-ended generation [\(Section 7\)](#page-6-0). In **228** addition, a subset of the test suite considers idioms, **229** which have both literal and figurative interpreta- 230 tions, as concepts in the test prompts. **231**

We manually create 109 prompts with concepts 232 from categories such as colors, food, animals, **233** songs, occupations and more. A few examples are **234** listed in [Table 1.](#page-3-2) [2](#page-2-0) Each prompt in our test suite is **²³⁵** matched with a control prompt as explained above. **236**

3 Experimental Setup **²³⁷**

We present the experimental setup for automati- **238** cally evaluating semantic leakage in a wide range **239** of models and model sizes. **240**

3.1 Experimental Details **241**

We evaluate semantic leakage in multiple language **242** models from two families: GPT^{[3](#page-2-1)} and LLAMA mod- 243 els [\(Touvron et al.,](#page-9-0) [2023\)](#page-9-0), as detailed below. For **244** all models, we explore several temperature values **245** (0, 0.5, 1, 1.5), and run each prompt 10 times to get **246** variation in the generations, when possible. **247**

Before evaluation, for cases where the prompt is **248** repeated in the model generation, we remove the **249** repeated prompt. We also truncate the generations **250** after the first period since the main piece of infor- **251** mation is generated before it, and because LLAMA **252**

²The full list is attached to this submission in a separate file (under "data").

³ <https://platform.openai.com/docs/models>

Table 1: Examples of instances that lead to semantic leakage, taken from different models. The prompt is in green (*italic*) and the generation is in blue. Additional examples can be found in [Table 4](#page-10-0) in the Appendix.

253 models tend to generate unrelated sentences or **254** phrases that might interfere with the evaluation.

255 3.2 Models

256 We experiment with 13 models of two different **257** state-of-the-art model families to explore semantic **258** leakage in a diverse inventory of models.

 GPT models We use OpenAI's API and send requests to GPT models by calling GPT-3.5, GPT4 [\(Achiam et al.,](#page-8-1) [2023\)](#page-8-1), and GPT4O. **²⁶¹** [4](#page-3-3) With GPT models, for sentence completion prompts we prepend "Complete the sentence:", as we find the model performs the task better this way.

 LLAMA models We run all LLAMA variations 266 using Huggingface [\(Wolf et al.,](#page-9-10) [2019\)](#page-9-10).^{[5](#page-3-4)} We cap the generation in LLAMA models at 100 tokens (300 tokens for open generation, [Section 7\)](#page-6-0).

269 3.3 Embedding Methods

 For automatic evaluation, we aim to use basic em- bedding methods that are able to detect and reflect semantic similarities, and are ideally detached from the models we evaluate to avoid confounding fac- tors. We consider the following embedding meth- ods. BERT-SCORE directly provides a similarity score, for the others we apply cosine-similarity.

BERT-SCORE (BS) BERT-SCORE [\(Zhang et al.,](#page-9-11) [2020\)](#page-9-11) is an automatic evaluation metric for text gen- eration, that computes a similarity score for each token in the candidate sentence with each token in the reference sentence, where token similarity is computed using contextual embeddings. We use the distilbert-base-uncased model.

284 For the multilingual experiments, where **285** we expect generations in non-English languages [\(Section 6\)](#page-5-0), we use the respective **286** models: bert-base-chinese for Chinese, and **287** bert-base-multilingual-cased for Hebrew. **288** Crosslingual settings still use the English model as **289** the generations there are mainly in English. **290**

SENTENCEBERT EMBEDDINGS (SB) SEN- 291 TENCEBERT [\(Reimers and Gurevych,](#page-9-12) [2019\)](#page-9-12) is **292** a modification of BERT [\(Devlin et al.,](#page-8-10) [2019\)](#page-8-10) that **293** uses Siamese and triplet network structures to de- **294** rive semantically meaningful sentence embeddings **295** that can be compared using cosine-similarity. We **296** use the huggingface implementation. **297**

OPENAI EMBEDDINGS (OAI) We use **298** text-embedding-3-large, [6](#page-3-5) OpenAI's best **²⁹⁹** performing embeddings. There is no public **300** documentation of the model training. **301**

In addition to these metrics, we validate our ex- **302** periments with a manual evaluation of semantic **303** leakage on a subset of the models (Section [5\)](#page-4-0). This **304** also serves as a validation of our automatic metrics. **305**

4 Results **³⁰⁶**

Significant semantic leakage across various use **307** cases and models. [Table 2](#page-4-1) depicts the average **308** leakage for each model, across multiple samplings **309** and temperature values, as detailed in [Section 3.1.](#page-2-2) **310** We see that semantic leakage is exhibited by all 311 model variations, and is detected by all embedding **312** models we use. Leak-Rate values are all well above **313** the 50% random mark and statistically significant^{[7](#page-3-6)} with $p < 10^{-100}$, validating the semantic related- 315 ness of the prompt and the test generation. **316**

[Table 1](#page-3-2) lists a few examples of semantic leakage 317 from the different models (more can be found in **318** [Table 4](#page-10-0) in the Appendix), showcasing leakage in **319**

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- **314**
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⁴ gpt-3.5-turbo-0125, gpt-4-turbo-2024-04-09 and gpt-4o-2024-05-13, respectively.

⁵LLAMA2: 7B, 7B-chat, 13B, 13B-chat, 70B, 70B-chat. LLAMA3: 8B, 8B-Instruct, 70B, 70B-Instruct.

⁶ [https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/](https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/embeddings/embedding-models) [embeddings/embedding-models](https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/embeddings/embedding-models)

⁷Using a *t*-test for the lists of the Leak-Rate values to test that their mean is significantly greater than 50%.

	Leak-Rate				
Model	BS	SВ	OAI		
GPT3.5	74.3	68.6	85.5		
GPT4	70.8	61.2	84.4		
GPT ₄₀	76.9	70.4	85.0		
$2-7b$	66.8	64.9	72.8		
2-7b-chat	72.6	71.7	77.8		
2-13b	70.4	65.1	73.6		
2-13b-chat	71.5	65.2	78.4		
$2 - 70h$	71.9	63.2	75.9		
$2-70$ b-chat	75.4	66.8	78.2		
3-8b	69.6	65.9	75.5		
$3-8b-ins$	78.1	68.8	81.5		
$3 - 70h$	71.6	68.1	75.2		
$3-70h$ -ins	76.3	71.2	77.3		

Table 2: Semantic Leak-Rate averaged across 10 samples for each of 4 temperature values. No semantic leakage would correspond to a Leak-Rate of 50% (random guessing), with higher values indicating more leakage. The bottom sections present the LLAMA2 and LLAMA3 models, respectively. The model showing the most leakage in each <model family, metric> setting is **bolded**.

 diverse use cases and styles and with respect to a variety of leaking concepts. In many cases we explore, the generations do not make sense in the context, or are very limited and focused on the leaking concept from the prompt.

 Leakage is more pronounced in certain model variations. The results in [Table 2](#page-4-1) show that cer- tain model variations tend to exhibit more semantic leakage than their counterparts. We now analyze the differences within the 2 model families.

 GPT models [Figure 8](#page-10-1) in the Appendix shows the leakage estimation in the three different GPT models across different temperature values. GPT4O consistently leaks more than GPT4 and GPT-3.5.^{[8](#page-4-2)}

 LLAMA models For LLAMA models we consis- tently see that the instruction-tuned models (CHAT version in LLAMA2 and INSTRUCT version in LLAMA3) leak more than their pretrained-only counterparts. A detailed comparison is presented in [Figure 2](#page-4-3) where we plot the average leakage of each model (averaged across temperature values), as measured with Leak-Rate with BERT-score em- beddings. All the differences are statistically sig-343 mificant^{[9](#page-4-4)} with $p < 0.002$ except for Llama-2-13b. We see similar trends with all other metrics as well.

Figure 2: Semantic leakage in LLAMA models, averaged across temperature values (measured with Leak-Rate using BERT-score).

Leakage across different temperatures. We **345** now inspect the way sampling temperature affects **346** semantic leakage. For the GPT models, we see no **347** clear trends [\(Figure 8](#page-10-1) in the Appendix).^{[10](#page-4-5)} 348

For LLAMA models, we see that greedy sam- **349** pling $(t = 0)$ leads to the highest semantic leakage 350 measures (see [Figure 3\)](#page-4-6). Generally, lower tempera- **351** ture values lead to more leakage—this is consistent **352** for most models and across all metrics. **353**

Figure 3: Semantic leakage in LLAMA at different temperatures (measured with Leak-Rate using BERT-score).

5 Human Evaluation **³⁵⁴**

We now perform a manual evaluation of semantic **355** leakage, which will also validate our automatic **356** metrics and experiments. **357**

 8 This is not true for the OpenAI embedding model, which may be due to confounding model training factors; however, how the embeddings are constructed is not publicly available.

 $9t$ -tests on the Leak-Rate values show that the mean in finetuned models is significantly higher than vanilla versions.

¹⁰It is unclear whether temperature behaves as expected in the GPT API. We note that a temperature setting of zero (which should mean greedy, deterministic decoding) will give different outputs on repeated calls to the API.

358 Human Evaluation Setup Human evaluation is **359** based on the same setting as automatic evaluation, **360** described in [Section 2.2.](#page-2-3)

 We recruit two native English speakers who are not involved with the project. These annotators are not provided with the objective of this experi- ment, but instead are given the following annota- tion guidelines: *Consider the word or phrase X. Which of the following texts (A or B) is more se- mantically related to X? (A/B/Neither)*. We map the annotator's choice of (A/B/Neither) to (test, control, neither) and then score Leak-Rate (Eq. [1\)](#page-2-4).

 Using these guidelines, the annotators are asked to label 109 test-control generation pairs from each model (ordered randomly). For the human eval- uation, we consider the largest model from each model family at the temperature t found to leak the most by automatic metrics: GPT40 $(t = 1)$ and **LLAMA3-70B** Instruct $(t = 0)$.

 Analysis [Figure 4](#page-5-1) compares the semantic leak- age detected by the human evaluation for GPT4O against the automatic metric. The values in the human evaluation row are percentages for each cat- egory: test is more similar to the concept, control is more similar to the concept, or neither.

 We expect humans to have higher tolerance for similar scores, i.e., more cases falling under $\sin t_{\text{test}} = \sin t_{\text{control}}$ in the human evaluation than in the automatic evaluation, where it occurs almost solely when the test and control generations are the same (see [Equation 1\)](#page-2-4). To visually account for this difference we plot the automatic metric results by using colored gradient to depict the difference **in similarity values sim_{test}** − sim_{control}, with posi- tive values (shades of blue on the right) implying semantic leakage. The results account for all ten generations sampled from each model. We find similar trends on LLAMA3-70B Instruct with an average human-annotated Leak-Rate of 66.7 and automatic evaluation of Leak-Rate that range from 71.2 to 77.3 across the different embedding types.

We also calculate Kendall's τ **on the human an-** notations. We find high interannotator agreement between the human annotators ($\tau = 0.68$), indi- cating that humans generally agree on the cases that constitute semantic leakage. We also compute **Kendall's** τ **on the human evaluation vs. similarity** differences calculated using BERTScore embed- dings to evaluate how well these methods corre- μ ₁₀₇ **and get a moderate correlation of** $\tau = 0.39$

when averaged between the two annotators.^{[12](#page-5-3)} 408

Figure 4: Human detection of semantic leakage compared to automatic methods. Leak-Rate is reported on the right for each method.

6 Multilingual and Crosslingual Semantic **⁴⁰⁹** Leakage 410

In the previous sections we established that seman- **411** tic leakage is exhibited in various scenarios in En- **412** glish, across different models and model sizes. We **413** now inspect semantic leakage in languages outside **414** of English, as well as in crosslingual settings, by **415** focusing on Hebrew and Chinese, Hebrew-English **416** and Chinese-English. As in the previous section, **417** we consider the largest model from each model **418** family at the temperature t found to leak the most: **419** GPT40 $(t = 1)$ and LLAMA3-70B Instruct $(t = 0)$. 420 Since we found that LLAMA is struggling with **421** Hebrew, especially with Hebrew generation, we **422** exclude these results. **423**

Multilingual Semantic Leakage We translate all **424** the prompts into Chinese and Hebrew (see exam- **425** ples in [Table 5](#page-11-0) in the Appendix, rows 1, 3) with the **426** help of native speakers. The translation is mostly **427** straightforward with the exception of idioms and **428** names. For English idioms that do not exist in **429** the target language, we write a new example using **430** an idiom in that language (together with a match- **431** ing context and a control prompt). For names, in **432** Chinese we choose a plausible Chinese name with **433 that meaning (e.g.,** $\sqrt{ }$ **)**, meaning *little wheat*, for **434**
Rye). In Hebrew, we make an attempt to translate 435 Rye). In Hebrew, we make an attempt to translate **435** to an existing frequent name in Hebrew, or to sub- **436** stitute it with a name with a related meaning (e.g., 437 Lake instead of River). If that is not an option (e.g., **438**

¹¹We introduce a slack variable of $\epsilon = 0.03$ to account for

the different levels of similarity tolerance between humans and embedding-based similarity.

¹²While we use all model generations per example when obtaining label distributions and computing Leak-Rate, to calculate τ we use the generations shown to the human annotators, as this requires example-level alignments.

439 Rye), we come up with a different name that has a **440** clear semantic field.

 Crosslingual Semantic Leakage We create mixed prompts with Chinese/Hebrew and English (see examples in [Table 5](#page-11-0) in the Appendix, rows 2, 4). We use the translations to Chinese and He- brew, and mix with English: for the first part of the prompt we use the translation to Chinese/Hebrew, and for the rest of it we use the original part in English. For evaluation purposes, we use the En- glish concepts, since we expect the generation to be in English. For names or idioms that are used in Chinese/Hebrew parts of the prompt, we use their literal translations into English.

 Results [Figure 5](#page-6-1) shows the human evaluation results for the multilingual and crosslingual ex- periments (with GPT4O). We can see significant semantic leakage in multilingual and crosslingual settings, with Leak-Rate values that range from 70.6 to 78.4 for the 4 different settings, similar to the Leak-Rate values we got for English.

 The generation quality with the LLAMA model is generally much lower, and we get Leak-Rates of 66.5 and 61.5 for Chinese and Chinese-English, respectively, according to human annotation. As noted above, the quality of generation in Hebrew and Hebrew-English did not allow for evaluation of semantic leakage.

Figure 5: Human detection of semantic leakage in multilingual and crosslingual settings.

 [Table 3](#page-6-2) shows the automatic evaluation of the multilingual and crosslingual experiments. The re- sults for the multilingual settings are not as reliable as in the English setting since we cannot determine the quality of the underlying embedding methods for Hebrew and Chinese.[13](#page-6-3) **⁴⁷²** In the crosslingual set- ting we mainly compare English generations with English concepts, thus the results are more reliable.

		Leak-Rate		
Model	Language	BS	SB	OAI
GPT40	Heb	60.6	53.5	67.2
	Heb-En	62.1	58.2	74.9
	7h	67.6	48.9	80.8
	Zh -En	61.6	60.5	71.3
$3-70b$ -ins	7h	73.4	54.1	82.8
	Zh-En	79.4	81.2	85.6

Table 3: Semantic leakage scores for multilingual and crosslingual setting, averaged across 10 samplings and measured by Leak-Rate.

7 Open-Ended Generation **⁴⁷⁵**

We also examine semantic leakage in open-ended **476** scenarios that encourage the model to generate mul- **477** tiple sentences or paragraphs. It is less clear how to **478** quantify the semantic leakage in this setting, as it **479** can manifested in more ways within the longer out- **480** put; we therefore rely on more qualitative analysis **481** in addition to the automatic metrics. This section **482** focuses on generations from GPT40 with $t = 1$, as 483 this model with this temperature was most prone to **484** leakage in previous experiments (Section [4\)](#page-3-0). **485**

Stories A popular setting for open-ended text **486** generation is storytelling: we ask the model to **487** write a story about a child, with the child's name **488** being the concept we expect to leak. [Figure 6](#page-7-0) gives **489** the story that GPT4O generates when prompted to **490** create a story about a child named Coral (and also **491** Melody in [Figure 9](#page-10-2) in the Appendix). These gen- **492** erated stories contain many words and elements **493** directly related to the semantics of each name, and **494** the narrative of each story is tailored to those mean- **495** ings. When measuring semantic leakage in this **496** setting automatically for 23 different names, 14 we 497 get Leak-Rates of 78.7, 60.9 and 76.1 with BS, **498** SB and OAI embeddings respectively, suggesting **499** similar rates of leakage to the other examples. **500**

Recipes We also consider open-ended recipe gen- **501** eration. In [Figure 7,](#page-7-1) we present GPT4O's genera- **502** tion when asked to suggest a recipe for use with **503** a *blue* pan (or a *white* pan in [Figure 10](#page-10-3) in the Ap- **504** pendix), where we consider each color to be the **505** potentially leaking concept. The model suggests to **506** make blueberry pancakes and chicken alfredo, re- 507 spectively, with the foods matching the color of the 508 pan. When prompted with a red pan, ingredients **509** like peppers, tomatoes and paprika are far more **510**

¹³To the best of our knowledge, the model underlying sentenceBERT was trained (predominantly) on English. This is why the metric detects more leakage in cross-lingual settings (with evaluations on English) compared to other languages.

¹⁴We remove any instance of the name from the generation, even when that instance is used as a common noun.

Figure 6: Example of story generation, exhibiting semantic leakage based on the name in the prompt.

511 frequent, same as with asparagus in the case of a **512** green pan and lemon with a yellow pan.

 We experiment with 5 different colors (10 sam- ples each) that are likely to be related to types of food (blue, green, red, white, and yellow). Auto- matic evaluation in this setting is more challenging since the concept might appear in the generation in a leaky way ("red pepper") or just as part of the answer, with no attributed leakage ("red pan") and these two cases are difficult to differentiate automatically. We decide to remove all occur- rences of *"<color> pan"* from the generations when using automatic metrics, and get Leak-Rates of 74.0/58.0/74.0 with BS/SB/OAI embeddings, again suggesting semantic leakage here as well.

Semantic leakage in recipe generation

Prompt: *I want to use my blue pan, give me a recipe:* Model: *Sure! Here's a recipe for a delicious Blueberry Pancake that you can prepare using your blue pan: <recipe>*

Figure 7: Example of recipe generation, exhibiting semantic leakage based on the color in the prompt.

⁵²⁶ 8 Related Work

 [Rassin et al.](#page-9-8) [\(2022\)](#page-9-8) show similar conceptual leak- [a](#page-9-13)ge in image generation with DALLE-2 [\(Ramesh](#page-9-13) [et al.,](#page-9-13) [2022\)](#page-9-13), a text-to-image model by OpenAI. They find that sense-ambiguous words are hard for the model to isolate—similar to our observa- tion that idioms in the prompt can leak the literal meaning into the generation. [Rassin et al.](#page-9-14) [\(2024\)](#page-9-14) try to mitigate this issue by encouraging the cross- attention maps to agree with the linguistic binding reflected by the prompt syntax. Leakage of prop-erties in DALLE-2 has also been discussed by

[Ramesh et al.](#page-9-13) [\(2022\)](#page-9-13) and [Leivada et al.](#page-9-15) [\(2023\)](#page-9-15). **538**

As models have improved, a related line of re- **539** search has asked whether they match human behav- **540** ior, particularly with respect to cognitive biases and **541** priming. Prior work compares models' behavior to **542** documented behavior of humans in psychological **543** experiments, highlighting some similarities as well **544** as differences from human response to given in- **545** [f](#page-9-5)ormation [\(Jones and Steinhardt,](#page-8-6) [2022;](#page-8-6) [Macmillan-](#page-9-5) **546** [Scott and Musolesi,](#page-9-5) [2024;](#page-9-5) [Hagendorff et al.,](#page-8-7) [2023\)](#page-8-7). **547** A known psychological phenomenon that is very **548** related to models' semantic leakage as we present **549** it here, is that of priming, and specifically semantic **550** priming [\(Meyer and Schvaneveldt,](#page-9-16) [1971;](#page-9-16) [Neely,](#page-9-17) **551** [1976;](#page-9-17) [Tulving et al.,](#page-9-18) [1982;](#page-9-18) [Tulving and Schacter,](#page-9-19) **552** [1990\)](#page-9-19), where decisions and reactions about specific **553** words change according to given semantic stim- **554** uli provided before the target word. We plan to **555** investigate this relationship further in future work. **556**

9 Conclusion **⁵⁵⁷**

We identified a phenomenon in generative language **558** models never discussed before, which we term *se-* **559** *mantic leakage*: language models are prone to gen- 560 erating text that reflects unrelated semantic infor- **561** mation from the prompt, leading to peculiar and **562** sometimes unreasonable outputs. We defined and **563** measured semantic leakage in a range of models, **564** and together with human evaluation show that it **565** is prevalent and consistent across all models we **566** test. We also found that semantic leakage occurs **567** in many different generation settings, including **568** multilingual and crosslingual ones. **569**

This leakage reflects associations learned by the **570** model, similar to how different types of biases are 571 learned; therefore, our characterization of seman- **572** tic leakage broadens the scope we should consider **573** with respect to potential ramifications of learned 574 associations. While the implications of semantic **575** leakage are not fully clear, it is a consistent behav- **576** ior pattern in LMs that merits further study. **577**

The finding that instruction-tuned models leak **578** more is of special interest, given that they are the 579 most popular and best performing model variations **580** currently used. We hypothesize that semantic leak- **581** age is more dominant in these models because the **582** leaking generations are less generic and seem to **583** provide more information/content, which might **584** be a property that is incentivized under these fine- **585** tuning processes. We plan to explore this hypothe- **586** sis more formally in future work. **587**

⁵⁸⁸ Limitations

 While our experimental setup spans 13 models of different types and sizes, and explores differ- ent sampling temperature values, the scale of the prompts in our test suite remains limited due to the difficulty of manually creating prompts that are likely to leak in a way that we can detect and eval- uate. This is also often the case when measuring other language model biases. In addition, though the results are consistent across all models and lan- guages we experiment with, the trends might be different with other models or languages we have not tested.

 Finally, we cannot guarantee that the automatic evaluations do not include noise: in some cases, even after our automatic post-processing of the generations, our automatic metrics might consider non-leaking instance as leaking (e.g., in cases of occurrences of the concept in the generation due to a partial repetition of the prompt). However, the human evaluation we conduct generally agrees with the findings we get with the automatic detection, supporting their reliability.

⁶¹¹ Ethical Considerations

 Semantic leakage is a broad umbrella that may encompass many types of biases, and it broadens our perception and understanding about associa- tion biases that are being learned by models and then exhibited in generation. As such, semantic leakage might manifest at times as a concrete type of bias, e.g., cultural, gender or racial biases. This depends on the specific setting and the chosen con- cept that leaks; while our prompts and concepts are fairly general, these biases and stereotypes could potentially surface in our evaluation.[15](#page-8-11) **⁶²²**

 However, our main goal in this paper is not to focus on specific types of biases (or biases that are particularly harmful) but to characterize and quantify the broader class of semantic leakage. We believe that a better understanding of the greater picture will in turn arm us with better tools to com- bat the subset of biases and behaviors that do have harmful consequences in practice.

 Apart from that, in this paper the annotations and translations were done by several volunteers that were willing to help for the project. The load of this work was very low.

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791 A Additional Examples

 [Table 4](#page-10-0) lists additional examples of semantic leak- age from the different models, showcasing leakage in diverse use cases and styles and with respect to a variety of leaking concepts.

Table 4: Additional examples of instances that lead to semantic leakage, taken from different models. The prompt is in green (*italic*) and the generation is in blue.

⁷⁹⁶ B Semantic Leakage in GPT Models

 [Figure 8](#page-10-1) shows the leakage estimation in the three different GPT models across different temperature values. GPT4O consistently leaks more than GPT4 and GPT-3.5.

⁸⁰¹ C Open-Ended Generation

 [Figure 9](#page-10-2) gives the story that GPT4O generates when prompted to create a story about a child named Melody. The generated story contains many words and elements directly related to the semantics of the name, and the narrative of the story is tailored to that meaning.

 In [Figure 10,](#page-10-3) we present GPT4O's generation when asked to suggest a recipe for use with a *white* pan, where we consider the color to be the poten- tially leaking concept. The model suggests to make chicken alfredo, matching the color of the pan.

Figure 8: Semantic leakage in GPT models using different temperature values (measured with Leak-Rate using BERT-score).

Figure 9: Example of story generation, exhibiting semantic leakage based on the name in the prompt.

Semantic leakage in recipe generation

Prompt: *I want to use my white pan, give me a recipe:* Model: *Sure, I'd be happy to help you with a recipe that makes use of your white pan! Let's try a classic Chicken Alfredo. White pans are often non-stick and ideal for making creamy dishes like this. Here's a simple recipe: <recipe>*

Figure 10: Example of recipe generation, exhibiting semantic leakage based on the color in the prompt.

D Multilingual and Crosslingual **⁸¹³ Semantic Leakage 814**

[Table 5](#page-11-0) shows example multilingual and crosslin- **815** gual prompts and generations. **816**

Table 5: Example prompts and generations in Hebrew, Hebrew-English, Chinese and Chinese-English, by this order. All are translations of the prompt: *"He likes koalas. His favorite food is"*, and the Hebrew/Chinese generations can be translated to "eucalyptus"/"eucalyptus leaves", respectively.