

# CustomMark: Customization of Diffusion Models for Proactive Attribution

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## Abstract

Generative AI (GenAI) presents challenges in attributing synthesized content to its original training data, particularly for artists whose styles are replicated by these models. We introduce CustomMark, a novel technique for customizing pre-trained text-to-image GenAI models to enable attribution. With CustomMark, text prompts can be modified to embed a watermark in generated images, linking them to training concepts such as an artist’s style, specific objects, or the GenAI model itself. Our approach supports sequential customization, allowing new concepts to be attributed efficiently and scalably without retraining from scratch. We demonstrate that CustomMark can robustly watermark hundreds of individual concepts and support multiple attributions within a single image while preserving the high visual quality of the generation.

## 1. Introduction

Given GenAI’s potential to democratize creativity, ethical concerns have emerged among artists regarding the unauthorized use of their works. Many seek recognition or compensation for the derivative use of their styles in generated images [44]. In the past, such creative recognition has relied on collaborations between technology, legal frameworks, and artistic practices [9]. GenAI currently lacks such mechanisms, leading to artist discontent and prompting adversarial strategies like “Glaze” [51], “Anti-DreamBooth” [60], and others [21, 24, 80] to protect their works.

To address this discontent, it is needed that GenAI models provide attribution when generated images are derived from artists’ works in training data. Such attribution could potentially unlock new revenue streams in the creator economy, rewarding creative opt-in to GenAI training [15]. A decentralized framework to compensate creators based on visual similarities between generated and training images was proposed in [8]. Several similarity embeddings have been explored [8, 48, 64] to determine the subset of training images that influenced the generation. While intuitive, these visual correlation-based attribution methods [8, 48, 64] of-




Figure 1. **Overview of concept attribution by GenAI models.** (a) A user generates images of various artists’ styles using artists’ tokens in the prompt (w/o attribution). (b) Artists request to the companies to provide attribution for their work. Using CustomMark, companies customize their models to enable attribution only for the artists who have requested the same. (c) A user generates the images using the improved GenAI model with an artist’s specific watermark for attribution to the artists.

ten fail to provide definitive explanations and can also incorrectly attribute works not present in the training set.

Alternative approaches attempt to establish direct causal relationships using techniques like proactive watermarking [6] or influence estimation via data removal [65]. However, these methods require modifications to training data or inference paradigms, making them computationally heavy.

In response, we propose CustomMark, an efficient technique for attribution in pre-trained GenAI models. Similar to [6], we use concept-specific watermarking but without requiring predefined concepts before training. CustomMark enables selective attribution of specific concepts in a pre-trained model, supporting sequential learning for newly emerging seen or unseen concepts. This approach avoids exhaustive retraining and allows attribution only for relevant concepts.

As shown in Fig. 1, we focus on attribution in text-to-image Latent Diffusion Models (LDMs), where attributable concepts appear in prompts, such as “A painting in the style of V\*” or “An image of V\*.” If the owner of concept V\* requests attribution, CustomMark embeds a concept-specific watermark into generated images while preserving visual quality. Unlike [6], which attributes to a subset of training images, CustomMark directly attributes the concept itself. The watermark remains robust against non-editorial modifications, ensuring traceability to the original concept and the GenAI model as the image circulates online. Since CustomMark embeds watermarks in a concept-specific manner without requiring exhaustive retraining, it effectively functions as a form of model customization.

Current customization methods [19, 22, 28, 32, 36, 47, 52, 69, 72, 75] struggle to scale across many distinct concepts, often compromising generation quality. To address this, we propose a novel architecture that customizes pretrained LDMs for large-scale watermarking. Building on [21], we use a concept encoder to map a bit-secret to token-embedding perturbations, but find it insufficient for scalability. Thus, we introduce a mapper network that perturbs input Gaussian noise, we fine-tune the LDM’s attention layers, and leverage CSD [54] loss for faster training and improved image quality. CustomMark enables fine-tuned LDMs to generate watermarked images aligned with text prompts while embedding corresponding watermarks. Its sequential learning capability allows new attributions with just 10% additional finetuning, preserving visual quality while protecting artist styles. Our contributions are:

1. An efficient, scalable technique to customize LDMs for imperceptibly watermarking single or multiple seen/unseen concepts in a generated image, enabling robust concept attribution in pre-trained text-to-image LDMs.
2. Sequential attribution capability, allowing fine-tuning for new concepts dynamically without retraining the model, ensuring selective attribution of relevant seen and unseen concepts.
3. Demonstration that diffusion models can attribute 100s of artists’ styles and 1000 ImageNet classes while maintaining high visual quality of watermarked concepts.

## 2. Related Works

**Proactive Schemes.** Proactive methods enhance various tasks by embedding signals or perturbations into input images, providing benefits to deepfake tagging [63], detection of manipulated content [2], localization of manipulations [4], object detection [3, 21], and concept attribution [6]. Some approaches focus on altering the training data to disrupt the output of generative models [46, 70]. Meanwhile, Alexandre *et al.* [49] introduce a fixed signal

method to enable attribution of training datasets. Recently, a survey by Asnani *et al.* [7] discuss various proactive approaches, encryption schemes, learning process, and their applications, such as vision model defense [58, 67], LLM defense [37, 66, 77], privacy protection [43, 57, 68, 81], improving GenAI models [30, 33, 35, 38, 53, 74], 3D domain [26, 27, 29, 59, 71, 76], *etc.* In CustomMark, we use proactive techniques to do concept attribution in an efficient and scalable manner, with a focus on practical application to real-world scenarios.

**IP Protection and Concept Attribution.** For IP protection of AI-generated models and content, watermarking techniques embed signals into outputs via model fine-tuning [23], prompt verification [34, 79], and token-level adjustments [31]. Copyright-focused tools like Diffusion-Shield [16] and detection watermarking [39] prevent misuse, while latent fingerprinting [5] and audio watermarking [12] extend protection across media. Additional model security is provided by DeepSigns [17], DeepMarks [14], and network embedding [62], as well as deep spatial encryption [73], backdoor triggers [1], and dynamic defenses like DAWN [55].

Concept attribution identifies which training data influenced a generated output, distinct from model [11] or camera attribution [13]. Traditional methods passively assess visual similarities between generated and training images using predefined criteria. For instance, Wang *et al.* [64] propose Attribution by Customization (AbC), modifying embeddings like CLIP and DINO with customized diffusion models. Style-specific attribution methods such as AL-ADIN [48] and EKILA [8] employ perceptual hashing for patch-based matching. MONTRAGE [10] monitors weight updates to attribute pre-trained concepts, while Asnani *et al.* [6] embed concept-specific watermarks in training images for direct attribution. In contrast, we introduce a proactive watermarking technique that requires no training data modifications and enables selective, sequential attribution after training.

**GenAI Customization.** Advances in GenAI customization leverage techniques like Video Motion Customization [28], Custom Diffusion [32], and CustomNet [72] to adapt models to specific concepts and motions, while approaches like Modular Customization [41] and CIDM [20] enhance scalability and prevent catastrophic forgetting. Efficiency-focused methods [19] and LoRA-Composer [69] optimize customization with minimal parameter adjustments, while AquaLoRA [22] provides watermarking for unauthorized use protection, and textual inversion [36, 47, 75] enables precise text-based editing. Privacy-oriented anti-customization [61] offers additional security by adapting adversarial strategies. We propose a proactive concept attribution technique using model customization, which hasn’t been explored before.




Figure 2. **Overview of CustomMark.** Illustrating the training workflow for CustomMark. A concept token  $p_{c_i}$  is encoded through the Concept Encoder  $\mathcal{E}_C$  to generate a modified prompt  $\hat{p}_{c_i}$  with embedded watermark information. The Secret Mapper  $\mathcal{M}_C$  maps a bit secret  $s_i$  to perturb the concept token, producing  $\delta$ , which is added to the Gaussian noise  $\epsilon$ . The LDM using the prompt tokens and perturbed Gaussian noise, producing watermarked images  $\hat{X}$  that carry the bit secret in visual form. During inference, the Secret Decoder  $\mathcal{D}_C$  extracts the bit secret from watermarked image  $\hat{X}$  and the clean image  $X$  to extract the bit secret. CustomMark is guided by various constraints, namely regularization loss  $J_{Reg}$  to make the artist token embedding similar, style loss  $J_{Sty}$  to maintain style consistency between clean and watermarked images, and the bit secret loss  $J_{BCE}$  to predict the added bit secret. Best viewed in color.

### 3. Method

#### 3.1. Background

**Prompts and Cross-Attention Mechanism in Diffusion Model.** In text-to-image LDMs [45], prompts and cross-attention mechanisms work together to guide image generation. A prompt is processed by a text encoder and converted into a *text embedding*. This embedding conditions the sampling process by capturing the prompt’s meaning. Instead of merely producing random images, the cross-attention mechanism allows the model to “attend” to specific parts of the text embedding, guiding the diffusion process to align the output with the input prompt. For key  $K$ , query  $Q$  and value  $V$ , the scaled dot-product attention is given by:

$$\text{Attention}(Q, K, V) = \text{softmax}\left(\frac{QK^T}{\sqrt{d_k}}\right)V. \quad (1)$$

Further, multi-head cross attention with respective weight matrices  $W_i^*$ s is utilized to improve generation quality by processing the prompt with multiple attention heads:

$$\text{MultiHead}(Q, K, V) = \text{Concat}(H_1, \dots, H_h)W, \quad (2)$$

$$H_i = \text{Attention}(QW_i^Q, KW_i^K, VW_i^V). \quad (3)$$

As the multi-head cross-attention in Eq. (3) is the main component to establish a relationship between prompts and the generated image, in CustomMark, we only fine-tune

$W_i^*$ s. This significantly reduces training time while enhancing critical associations between the concept and its watermarked image.

**Concept Attribution.** ProMark [6] defines the concept attribution as finding the closest concept in the training dataset for a given generated image. For this purpose, ProMark divides the entire dataset into different concepts and trains with each concept being watermarked. However, this is impractical for the real world, as it is difficult to retrain the GenAI models on the entire watermarked data. Therefore, we redefine the problem of Concept Attribution as follows.

Let  $\mathcal{C}$  represent a set of  $N$  distinct concepts within the training dataset of a GenAI model. Out of the  $N$  concepts, let  $\hat{\mathcal{C}} = \{c_1, c_2, \dots, c_M\}$  be the  $M$  concepts that need attribution, whose token embeddings are represented as  $P_c = \{p_{c_1}, p_{c_2}, \dots, p_{c_M}\}$ . Given a synthetic image  $X$  generated by a GenAI model using  $p_{c_i} \in P_c$ , along with other prompt token embeddings, forming an input prompt  $P = \{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_{c_i}, \dots, p_n\}$ , the objective of concept attribution is to map  $X$  to its corresponding concept  $c_i$ . Specifically, we find a mapping function  $f$  such that  $c_i = f(X)$ .

#### 3.2. CustomMark

**Overview.** To add attribution capabilities to a pre-trained LDM, CustomMark perturbs the inputs to the LDM and fine-tunes its attention weights. The input token embed-

ding  $p_{c_i}$  and the input Gaussian noise  $\epsilon$  are perturbed by the concept encoder  $\mathcal{E}_C$  and the secret mapper  $\mathcal{M}_C$  networks, which encode a concept-specific bit-secret into the respective inputs. This results in the perturbed embedding  $\hat{p}_{c_i}$  and the perturbed Gaussian noise  $\hat{\epsilon}$ , which are fed into the LDM to sample new images. The synthesized images are then fed to the secret decoder  $\mathcal{D}_C$  that outputs the corresponding bit-secret. During training, only the attention weights in Eq. (2), and Eq. (3) of the LDM are fine-tuned. The framework is guided by several constraints that allow for the generation of images with embedded secrets and also maintain the original artistic style. We will now present our method in detail.

**Embedding Encryption.** In CustomMark we perturb all the concepts in  $P_c$  using a single concept encoder  $\mathcal{E}_C$ . For  $i^{th}$  concept, the concept token embedding  $p_{c_i}$  is encrypted using  $\mathcal{E}_C$  as:

$$\hat{p}_{c_i} = \mathcal{E}_C(p_{c_i}, s_i), \quad (4)$$

where  $s_i$  is the concept specific bit-secret of length  $l$ , i.e.  $s_i = \{b_{i1}, b_{i2}, \dots, b_{il}\}$  where  $b_{ij} \in \{0, 1\}$ .

After encryption, the original embedding is replaced by the encrypted text embedding, resulting in encrypted prompt token embeddings  $\hat{P} = \{p_1, p_2, \dots, \hat{p}_{c_i}, \dots, p_n\}$ . To obtain the watermarked image,  $\hat{P}$  is fed to the LDM in place of the original token embeddings  $P$ . Following the architecture of [21], we apply a regularization mean squared error (MSE) loss between  $P$  and  $\hat{P}$  at initial iterations, so that the encoder  $\mathcal{E}_C$  has a good starting point to preserve the style, and support secret learning. The regularization loss is:

$$J_{Reg} = \|\hat{P} - P\|_2^2. \quad (5)$$

**Secret Learning.** We will now discuss the learning of LDM to generate watermarked images given the encrypted token embeddings  $\hat{P}$ . In addition to  $\mathcal{E}_C$ , we use a mapper network  $\mathcal{M}_C$  to further accelerate the secret learning. Using  $i^{th}$  bit-secret  $s_i$ , we estimate a perturbation  $\delta = \mathcal{M}_C(s_i)$  which is added to the initially sampled Gaussian noise  $\epsilon$  for image generation. Therefore, the perturbed  $\epsilon$  is given by:

$$\hat{\epsilon} = \epsilon + \alpha \times \mathcal{M}_C(s_i), \quad (6)$$

where  $\alpha$  controls the magnitude of  $\delta$ . The perturbed Gaussian noise  $\hat{\epsilon}$  along with  $\hat{P}$  is given as input to the LDM to sample an image. Finally, to avoid the complexity of LDM training, we only finetune the attention layers of the LDM while fixing other layers.

During training, we create both clean and watermarked images,  $X$  and  $\hat{X}$ , using the inputs  $(P, \epsilon)$  and  $(\hat{P}, \hat{\epsilon})$ . The style descriptors  $d$  and  $\hat{d}$  from images  $X$  and  $\hat{X}$  are extracted using the pretrained Contrastive Style Descriptors

(CSD) [54] model. CSD contains concise and effective style information, while being invariant to semantic content and capable of disentangling multiple styles. We maximize the cosine similarity between two descriptors, which ensures that the watermarked images match the style of the original concept. To further support style matching, we apply an MSE loss between the two images, in addition to the CSD loss. Therefore, our style loss is given by:

$$J_{Sty} = 1 - \cos(\hat{d}, d) + \|X - \hat{X}\|_2^2. \quad (7)$$

$X$  and  $\hat{X}$  are further fed to a secret decoder  $\mathcal{D}_C$ , which estimates the bit secret in given images. The decoder shall output a zeros secret for  $X$ , and the secret  $s_i$  for  $\hat{X}$ . To train  $\mathcal{D}_C$ , we use a binary cross-entropy (BCE) loss between the ground truth bit-sequence  $s_i$  and the predicted one  $\hat{s}_i$ :

$$J_{BCE}(s_i, \hat{s}_i) = -\frac{1}{l} \sum_{j=1}^l [b_j \log(\hat{b}_j) + (1 - b_j) \log(1 - \hat{b}_j)]. \quad (8)$$

Therefore, CustomMark is trained in an end-to-end manner to minimize the objective  $L_{attr} = L_{Sty} + L_{BCE} + \beta L_{Reg}$  during training, where  $\beta = 10$  for our experiments.

During inference, if the random Gaussian noise and the input prompt are perturbed, the diffusion model embeds a watermark within the generated image. This watermark can be decoded using  $\mathcal{D}_C$  to the concept-specific bit-secret, functioning as hidden signatures for attribution.

**Concept Attribution in Inference.** To attribute the generated images, we extract the bit secret embedded by the LDM using  $\mathcal{D}_C$ . Using this predicted bit-secret  $\hat{s} = \mathcal{D}_C(\hat{X})$  and the bit-secret  $s_i$  corresponding to the concept  $c_i$ , we define the attribution mapping function  $f$  as:

$$f(\hat{X}) = \underset{i \in [1, M]}{\operatorname{argmax}} g(\mathcal{D}_C(\hat{X}), s_i), \quad (9)$$

where,

$$g(\mathcal{D}_C(\hat{X}), s_i) = g(\hat{s}, s_i) = \sum_{k=1}^l [\hat{b}_k = b_{ik}], \quad (10)$$

and  $[\hat{b}_k = b_{ik}]$  is an indicator function that returns 1 if the bits match, and 0 otherwise. Thus, using the predicted bit-sequence, we assign the generated images to the concept whose bit-sequence matches the best, i.e., the  $i^{th}$  concept that maximizes  $g(\hat{s}, s_i)$ .

### 3.3. Sequential Learning

In real-world scenarios, the number of concepts requiring attribution is not always fixed. The set of concepts can change frequently, making it impractical to retrain the attribution model from scratch each time new concepts are introduced. To address this challenge, we propose the idea of sequential learning with CustomMark.





Figure 3. Comparison with ProMark [6] on ImageNet. ProMark produces low-quality images with bubble-like artifacts from its encryption, whereas CustomMark enables LDMs to generate high-quality images that closely match the original training concepts.

For example, if CustomMark is initially trained on  $M$  concepts, denoted as  $\hat{\mathcal{C}} = \{c_1, c_2, \dots, c_M\}$ , and a new concept  $c_{M+1}$  needs to be attributed, the model can be fine-tuned on the expanded set  $\hat{\mathcal{C}} \cup c_{M+1}$ , starting from the model pretrained on  $\hat{\mathcal{C}}$ . This approach allows the model to adapt to new concepts without requiring a predefined set during initial training. Our experiments demonstrate that learning new concepts in this manner requires only about 10% additional iterations, making it significantly more efficient than retraining CustomMark from scratch.

### 3.4. Multi-Concept Learning

In real-world text-to-image generation, multiple concepts are often combined within a single prompt, such as “a painting of a dog in the style of Van Gogh.” To enable concept attribution in such cases, CustomMark extends its attribution mechanism to handle multiple concepts simultaneously.

Given two concepts,  $c_i$  and  $c_j$ , from the attributed set  $\hat{\mathcal{C}}$ , their respective token embeddings  $\mathbf{p}_{c_i}$  and  $\mathbf{p}_{c_j}$  are perturbed using the concept encoder  $\mathcal{E}_C$ . This results in the perturbed embeddings:

$$\hat{\mathbf{p}}_{c_i} = \mathcal{E}_C(\mathbf{p}_{c_i}, \mathbf{s}_i), \quad \hat{\mathbf{p}}_{c_j} = \mathcal{E}_C(\mathbf{p}_{c_j}, \mathbf{s}_j). \quad (11)$$

The perturbed prompt embeddings  $\hat{\mathbf{P}} = \{\mathbf{p}_1, \dots, \hat{\mathbf{p}}_{c_i}, \dots, \hat{\mathbf{p}}_{c_j}, \dots, \mathbf{p}_n\}$  are then used in the LDM to generate a watermarked image  $\hat{\mathbf{X}}$ . During decoding, the secret decoder  $\mathcal{D}_C$  is designed to recover the **concatenated secret** associated with both concepts:

$$\hat{\mathbf{s}} = \mathcal{D}_C(\hat{\mathbf{X}}) = [\mathbf{s}_i; \mathbf{s}_j]. \quad (12)$$

The concatenation ensures that both concept-specific secrets are extracted from the generated image, thereby enabling attribution for multiple concepts simultaneously. The

attribution function  $f$  is then applied independently for each concept:

$$f(\hat{\mathbf{X}}) = \operatorname{argmax}_{i,j \in [1,M]} g(\mathcal{D}_C(\hat{\mathbf{X}}), [\mathbf{s}_i; \mathbf{s}_j]). \quad (13)$$

This approach ensures that CustomMark can reliably attribute both concepts in a multi-concept image, allowing for effective auditing of GenAI models even when multiple stylistic or semantic elements are present in the generated content.

## 4. Experiments

**Implementation Details** For training CustomMark, a predefined list of prompts is used per concept (see supplement). For concepts, we use 1,000 ImageNet [18] classes, 23 WikiArt [56] artists, and a custom 200 list of artists (see supplement). For text-to-image LDM, Stable Diffusion 1.5 is used. Unless stated, we use a bit-sequence of size 16. We evaluate CustomMark using four metrics: bit accuracy, attribution accuracy, CSD [54] score, and CLIP [64] score as described. For attribution assessment, bit accuracy is the maximum percentage of bits matched between the predicted bit-secret and any of the concept-specific secrets, and attribution accuracy is the percentage of times the predicted bit-secret matches the correct concept-specific secret. For quality assessment, the CSD score is the cosine similarity between CSD descriptors, which assesses the style match between two images, and the CLIP score is the cosine similarity between CLIP image embeddings. For all evaluations, we report average results on 100 generated and/or 100 clean images. For 10 concepts, CustomMark is trained for 20K iterations. All experiments are conducted on 8 A100 NVIDIA GPUs with a batch size of 8 per GPU.

### 4.1. Results

**Comparison with Attribution Methods** We evaluate various passive and proactive attribution methods on images generated by LDMs trained on the ImageNet and WikiArt datasets, which contain 1000 and 23 classes, respectively. Here, each class is treated as a unique concept. For fair comparison, we generate 100 images per class for both ProMark [6] and CustomMark. Since ProMark and CustomMark embed different watermarks, their accuracy is reported only on their respective 100 watermarked images. Whereas for passive methods, including ALADIN [48], CLIP [42], AbC [64], SSCD [40], and EKILA [8], that rely on embeddings, the evaluation is done on images generated by both proactive models *i.e.*, an average over a total of 200 generated images per concept. As shown in Tab. 1, the passive methods exhibit relatively low attribution accuracy.

In contrast, the proactive methods, ProMark and CustomMark, significantly outperform the passive methods,

| Method      | Type      | Attribution Accuracy (%) $\uparrow$ |              |
|-------------|-----------|-------------------------------------|--------------|
|             |           | ImageNet                            | Wikiart      |
| ALADIN [48] | Passive   | 5.55                                | 18.58        |
| CLIP [42]   | Passive   | 42.61                               | 52.60        |
| AbC [64]    | Passive   | 53.51                               | 56.03        |
| SSCD [40]   | Passive   | 25.50                               | 45.34        |
| EKILA [8]   | Passive   | 30.98                               | 43.03        |
| ProMark [6] | Proactive | <b>87.30</b>                        | 87.19        |
| CustomMark  | Proactive | 87.12                               | <b>89.25</b> |

Table 1. Comparison with passive and proactive methods on images generated by a conditional model trained on ImageNet and Wikiart dataset. CustomMark outperforms the passive methods on both datasets significantly. Both proactive methods have similar performance on ImageNet, but for Wikiart, CustomMark performs better than ProMark.




Figure 4. Attribution results of three concept artists: VanGogh, Monet, and Picasso, sampled from LDM before and after applying the attribution capability of customization-based method [21] and CustomMark. [21] makes the LDM sample images far apart from the original style of artists, while CustomMark-watermarked images are much closer to the original style.

with much higher accuracy in both datasets. Although ProMark trains on an entirely watermarked dataset with all LDM parameters learnable in training, its performance is still comparable to CustomMark. Further, ProMark adversely impacts image quality, as shown in Fig. 3, where the generated ImageNet samples of ProMark are of lower quality and display visible artifacts. To quantify the quality, we calculate the FID score [25, 50] between the original ImageNet images (from a pretrained model without watermarks) and the watermarked images from each proactive model. The pretrained model achieves an FID score of 13.28. ProMark yields an FID score of 17.63, while CustomMark achieves an FID score of 14.73, indicating substantially better image quality. Thus, CustomMark not only maintains robust attribution performance but also generates higher-quality images than ProMark, making it a more effective solution for practical applications.

**Comparison with Customization-Based Watermarking Methods** We compare our method with [21], which also leverages textual token perturbations to guard personalized

| Method                  | Bit Acc. (%) $\uparrow$ | Attribution Acc. (%) $\uparrow$ | CLIP Score $\uparrow$ | CSD Score $\uparrow$ |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Feng <i>et al.</i> [21] | 90.87                   | 74.14                           | 0.57                  | 0.51                 |
| CustomMark              | <b>99.29</b>            | <b>94.29</b>                    | <b>0.81</b>           | <b>0.77</b>          |

Table 2. Comparison with customization-based method by Feng *et al.* [21]. [KEYS: Acc.=Accuracy]

concepts. However, in [21], authors train a new concept encoder-decoder pair for each personalization; an impractical solution in the real world. For a fair comparison, we adapt [21] by training a single encoder-decoder pair for 3 artists’ styles as concepts, namely VanGogh, Monet, and Picasso. As shown in Tab. 2, CustomMark surpasses this baseline in all metrics, achieving higher watermark detection accuracy (99.29), attribution accuracy (94.29), and generation quality (CSD score 0.81 and CLIP score 0.77). These results demonstrate the effectiveness of CustomMark for concept watermarking in GenAI.

Shown in Fig. 4 are some qualitative results for comparison. Unlike [21], which struggles to preserve individual artistic styles like brushstrokes and color palettes, CustomMark accurately captures each artist’s unique nuances. For example, for Picasso (second row, last col), [21] generates Van Gogh-style brushstrokes.

**Sequential Learning** In Fig. 5, we showcase CustomMark’s sequential learning capability, where the model begins attribution with three concepts and subsequently integrates additional concepts one at a time. This setup reflects a dynamic, real-world setting where the need for concept attribution evolves over time as new styles are added. Instead of retraining the model from scratch for each new concept, CustomMark employs sequential learning to incrementally learn attributions for new concepts without erasing previously learned styles.

Starting with three initial concepts, CustomMark fine-tunes the model as new concepts are introduced, updating attribution while preserving distinct stylistic features. This is evident in the similarity between clean and watermarked images in each column, where CustomMark maintains high fidelity to the original style. With sequential learning, it attributes new concepts with only 10% additional iterations per concept, avoiding full retraining. These results demonstrate CustomMark’s scalability and efficiency in preserving style-consistent, high-quality outputs for GenAI models.

**Unseen Artists Watermarking** We demonstrate CustomMark’s ability to attribute both seen and unseen concepts using textual inversion. As shown in Fig. 4, known concepts are watermarked by perturbing their token embeddings. However, in real-world scenarios, generative models often encounter novel concepts outside the initial training set, requiring adaptability beyond predefined attributions.

To address this, we leverage textual inversion to derive token embeddings for unseen concepts. Once obtained, we






Figure 5. **Sequential learning of new concepts.** CustomMark starts with three initial concepts and incrementally learns new attributions without retraining from scratch. Each column displays clean and watermarked images, demonstrating CustomMark’s efficiency in adapting to new styles with only about 10% extra training iterations per concept while maintaining high stylistic fidelity. We only show the concept used to create the image. A list of all the prompts used is given in the supplement.




Figure 6. **Attribution of Unseen Concepts with CustomMark.** Shown is the CustomMark’s ability to handle attribution for unseen concepts. The consistent style between clean and watermarked images across new styles demonstrates CustomMark’s robustness in preserving artistic fidelity while achieving scalable attribution. We only show the concept used to create the image. A list of all the prompts used is given in the supplement.

apply watermark perturbations, enabling attribution without significant model retraining. Fig. 6 illustrates this by showing stylistic consistency between clean and watermarked images, preserving unique attributes of each new style. This demonstrates CustomMark’s adaptability, allowing it to generalize to new styles while maintaining fidelity and stylistic integrity.

**Multi-Concept Watermarking** For this scenario, we take 20 concepts into consideration (10 objects, and 10 artists). Each concept is associated with an 8-bit secret. The decoder extracts a 16-bit secret for the generated image. The qualitative results in Fig. 7 demonstrate that CustomMark successfully embeds attribution signatures for both object (e.g., “dog,” “tree”) and style (e.g., “Van Gogh,” “Picasso”) concepts within a single image while preserving visual quality. Quantitatively, the attribution and bit accuracy evaluated on 100 clean and generated images are 89.14% and 95.47%.

## 4.2. Ablations

Unless stated otherwise, we use a model trained for 10 concepts for all the ablation experiments (see supplement).

**Nearby Concepts and Clean Images.** CustomMark provides the flexibility to easily switch from the watermarked image generation to a non-watermarked version, which we define as clean image generation. To do this, we use the non-perturbed original text tokens, while keeping the map-



Figure 7. Attribution for multiple Concepts present in a single prompt with CustomMark.

| Method               | Bit Acc. (%) <sup>↑</sup> | Attribution Acc. (%) <sup>↑</sup> | CLIP Score <sup>↑</sup> | CSD Score <sup>↑</sup> |
|----------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| CSD                  | 98.6                      | 88.15                             | 0.65                    | 0.73                   |
| CSD + L2 (latent)    | 99.12                     | 90.94                             | 0.70                    | 0.67                   |
| CSD + L2 (image)     | 99.17                     | 92.35                             | 0.73                    | 0.74                   |
| CSD + L2 + LDM atte. | <b>99.29</b>              | <b>94.29</b>                      | <b>0.81</b>             | <b>0.77</b>            |

Table 3. Ablation study for various style losses. [KEYS: Acc. Accuracy, Att. Attribution, Atte.: Attention]

per network  $\mathcal{M}_C$  and the fine-tuned attention weights of the model. An all-zero bit secret is used as an input to  $\mathcal{M}_C$  and the secret decoder is expected to output the same for these clean images. We evaluate CustomMark’s ability to generate clean images for 1) attributable concepts: that are fine-tuned with CustomMark and 2) nearby concepts: that are related to attributable concepts but not exactly the same. For example, if CustomMark can attribute paintings of Van Gogh, then paintings from other artists are considered nearby concepts. For this evaluation, we use three attributable artists (first three columns of Fig. 5) and seven random nearby artists (see supplement).

For attributable concepts, the model achieves high bit accuracy (96.13%) and attribution accuracy (85.45%) with an all-zeros bit secret, indicating effective attribution of clean concepts. For nearby concepts, it maintains strong bit accuracy (92.36%) and attribution accuracy (81.90%), showcasing the adaptability of CustomMark for practical applications, allowing selective watermarking for certain styles while not watermarking concepts that don’t specifically request it. The generation quality with CustomMark is comparable to the pretrained LDM, with an FID score of 14.51




Figure 8. Ablation study for varying different parameters of CustomMark. We show the performance variation by varying the bit secret length, the number of concepts, and the scaling factor.




Figure 9. Robustness evaluation of decoder by applying distortion to generated images.

between original and clean images.

**Style Loss.** Tab. 3 presents an ablation study on different style loss combinations and their impact on bit accuracy, attribution accuracy, and qualitative metrics. The baseline using only CSD performs well, but adding L2 loss in LDM’s latent space improves accuracy, with a slight drop in the CSD score. Further applying L2 loss in image space enhances overall performance, boosting attribution accuracy, CLIP, and CSD scores. The best results are achieved by CustomMark, which combines CSD, L2 loss, and attention layer training, yielding the highest gains across all metrics and validating our design choice.

**Robustness.** Fig. 9 demonstrates CustomMark’s robustness against various post-processing distortions, including JPEG compression, rotation, cropping, resizing, Gaussian blur, noise, color jitter, and sharpness (see supplement). CustomMark maintains high attribution and bit accuracy, with minimal impact from common distortions like JPEG compression and rotation, while stronger distortions (e.g., Gaussian blur, noise) cause slight accuracy drops. Against adversarial attacks [78], it retains 82.21% attribution accuracy, only slightly lower than the original 91.11%. These results highlight CustomMark’s resilience in real-world scenarios.

**Bit Secret Length** Fig. 8(a) analyzes the effect of secret length on bit accuracy, attribution accuracy, and CLIP score. As the secret length increases, both accuracy metrics decline, suggesting that longer secrets are harder for the decoder to recover, impacting attribution performance. Ad-

ditionally, the CLIP score drops, indicating stylistic deviations. This trade-off suggests that a moderate bit length, such as 16, balances attribution accuracy and stylistic fidelity.

**Number of Concepts.** Fig. 8(b) examines how the number of unique artist concepts affects attribution and stylistic fidelity. As concepts increase, bit and attribution accuracy decline, likely due to the growing challenge of distinguishing among them. Similarly, the CLIP score drops, suggesting that maintaining stylistic consistency becomes harder with a broader range of styles in watermarked images.

**Scaling Factor.** Fig. 8(c) shows the impact of the scaling factor in Eq. (6) on attribution and stylistic similarity. Increasing the scaling factor sharply reduces both bit and attribution accuracy, likely due to overpowering the sampled Gaussian noise. Conversely, decreasing it causes the LDM to diverge, generating noise images, as reflected in the declining CLIP score. This underscores the need for a low scaling factor to balance attribution accuracy and stylistic preservation, leading us to select 0.01 for our experiments.

## 5. Conclusion

We propose CustomMark, an efficient and flexible technique for enabling concept attribution in pre-trained text-to-image LDMs. Addressing the growing demand for ethical content generation in GenAI models, CustomMark provides a customization-based approach to embed concept-specific watermarks, allowing artists to request attribution for their work. Unlike previous methods, CustomMark allows selective attribution without requiring all concepts to be predefined before training, and entire watermarking of the training data. It supports sequential learning to add new concepts in an online way. We demonstrate that CustomMark can handle hundreds of artist styles and diverse ImageNet classes while maintaining image quality and ensuring robust attribution. By fine-tuning the model for new concepts with minimal computational overhead, CustomMark streamlines the attribution process. This helps bridge the gap between GenAI developers and the creative community and promotes the responsible use of GenAI in content creation.



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