

Unlearning Sensitive Information in Multimodal LLMs: Benchmark and Attack-Defense Evaluation

Vaidehi Patil

*Department of Computer Science
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

Yi-Lin Sung

*Department of Computer Science
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

Peter Hase

*Department of Computer Science
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

Jie Peng

*School of Artificial Intelligence and Data Science
University of Science and Technology of China*

Tianlong Chen

*Department of Computer Science
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

Mohit Bansal

*Department of Computer Science
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

Reviewed on OpenReview: <https://openreview.net/forum?id=YcnjgKbZQS>

Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained on massive datasets may inadvertently acquire sensitive information such as personal details and potentially harmful content. This risk is further heightened in multimodal LLMs (aka MLLMs) as they integrate information from multiple modalities (image and text). Adversaries can exploit this stored knowledge by crafting inputs across modalities to extract sensitive details. Evaluating how effectively MLLMs can forget such information (targeted unlearning) necessitates the creation of high-quality, well-annotated image-text pairs. While significant research has addressed the creation of datasets for unlearning within LLMs, it has primarily concentrated on text modality. Creation of analogous datasets for multimodal data and models remain an understudied area. To address this gap, we first introduce a multimodal unlearning benchmark, UNLOK-VQA (Unlearning Outside Knowledge VQA), as well as an “attack-and-defense” framework to evaluate methods for deleting specific multimodal knowledge from MLLMs. Our dataset generation process involves an automated pipeline to create samples of varied proximity levels to the target data point for evaluation of generalization and specificity, followed by manual filtering to retain only the high-quality data points. We use this process to extend a visual question-answering dataset for evaluating multimodal information deletion. Next, we present a comprehensive unlearning evaluation involving an attack-and-defense framework consisting of four whitebox and three blackbox attacks against six unlearning defense objectives. We also design a whitebox attack based on the interpretability of hidden states in LLMs motivated by past work. Our experimental results demonstrate that multimodal extraction attacks (with an attack success rate of 45.5%) are more successful than either image-only (32%) or text-only attacks (39%). The best

overall defense mechanism, which removes answer information from internal model hidden states, reduces the success rate of multimodal attack to 15.7%. Furthermore, our findings suggest that larger models exhibit greater resilience to attacks after being edited for deletion, implying that scaling models could be a valuable strategy for enhancing robustness and developing safer systems. UNLOK-VQA thus facilitates a comprehensive evaluation of unlearning in MLLMs and serves as a challenging benchmark for future research in unlearning.¹

1 Introduction

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) marks a significant advancement in our ability to access and process knowledge about the world. The evolution towards Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) expands this capability beyond text, enabling the extraction of knowledge spanning both text and vision modalities. These MLLMs are known to acquire and retain sensitive information they should not know (Liu et al., 2023b; Pi et al., 2024; Zong et al., 2024), such as *a person’s address from their image* or *a private street address from a photo of a location* (Chen et al., 2023). As models become increasingly capable and are widely deployed, they raise safety concerns regarding potential information leakage and exploitation, particularly when MLLMs are deployed in applications that interact with people or influence decisions with real-world consequences such as cybersecurity, biological weapons, chemical weapons, or other large-scale safety concerns (Li et al., 2024b). While techniques for deleting information (unlearning) have been explored for text-based LLMs, similar methods for multimodal LLMs remain underexplored. Notably, the lack of suitable datasets and a unified evaluation framework impedes the evaluation of unlearning effectiveness in MLLMs. Our work addresses this challenge by introducing UNLOK-VQA (Unlearning Outside Knowledge VQA), a novel benchmark specifically designed for evaluating the targeted erasure of pretrained multimodal information from MLLMs. Next, we employ model editing techniques that facilitate fine-grained model control for the targeted erasure of pretrained knowledge (information that the model has learned during pretraining) from multimodal models and evaluate them in an adversarial setting on UNLOK-VQA.

Deleting Sensitive Knowledge in LLMs. Current methods for preventing LLMs from disclosing sensitive information predominantly utilize reinforcement learning from human or AI feedback (RLHF or RLAI) (Ouyang et al., 2022; Bai et al., 2022; Christiano et al., 2017; Yuan et al., 2023). However, RLHF presents notable limitations: (1) it depends on human-written outputs, which are costly to collect, and (2) it requires significant computational resources due to its standard three-stage alignment process. Furthermore, RLHF may still result in information leakage, and fine-tuning can circumvent its safeguards (Zhan et al., 2024). Therefore, in this work, we propose directly editing the model’s weights to remove sensitive information, reducing the risk of leakage from the model’s internal parameters.

Benchmark for Multimodal Knowledge Deletion.

Recent work by Lynch et al. (2024) highlights the critical need for rigorous evaluations in unlearning processes. Evaluating the effectiveness of methods designed to remove information from MLLMs necessitates specialized datasets that enable evaluation of the deletion method’s effectiveness, generalization ability and the damage it causes to the model. In this work, we build an automatic pipeline for extending VQA datasets with rephrase and neighborhood samples to evaluate *generalization* and *specificity* of the deletion method. Generalization evaluates if the method is robust to




Figure 1: Illustration of (1) information leakage in MLLMs, and (2, 3) the attack-defense framework. This demonstrates that while defense methods can mitigate information leakage from MLLMs, malicious adversaries may still extract sensitive information from them.

¹The dataset and code are publicly available at <https://github.com/Vaidehi99/UnLOK-VQA>

Corresponding author: Vaidehi Patil «vaidehi@cs.unc.edu»

different ways of information extraction by varying the input data that is used to query the model. Specificity measures the damage caused by the unlearning method to the model on data points that were not meant to be deleted. We propose the use of samples with multiple levels of proximity to the data to be deleted to perform a nuanced evaluation of *specificity* and *generalization*. We also evaluate edit efficacy that measures how well the information has been deleted for that sample. Manual filtering is performed on the outputs of the automatic pipeline to ensure the dataset is high quality. With this pipeline, we introduce UNLOK-VQA (an extension of OK-VQA), which is specifically designed to evaluate multimodal information deletion methods along the dimensions of edit efficacy, generalization and specificity.

Model Editing for Multimodal Information Deletion. In this work, we build on the strategy proposed by Patil et al. (2023a) of directly removing sensitive information from the weights (a.k.a. model editing) of an LLM for targeted information deletion. Our choice is substantiated by several key factors: (1) This approach holds promise in defending against whitebox attacks that exploit the model’s latent knowledge (Lynch et al., 2024) and against blackbox attacks such as jailbreak prompts and in-context relearning (Lynch et al., 2024; Shi et al., 2023); (2) It avoids the necessity for complex data-side interventions (Debenedetti et al., 2023) since the pretraining data is usually large and not accessible. Constrained finetuning like LoRA has demonstrated the feasibility of editing individual facts within LLMs (Hua et al., 2024). We adopt LoRA-based finetuning with rank one in our experiments (which is similar to ROME (Meng et al., 2022)).

Attack-and-Defense Framework. We extend Patil et al. (2023a)’s threat model for the task of multimodal information deletion and introduce an attack-and-defense framework based on this threat model. This framework encompasses four whitebox attacks and three blackbox attacks designed to evaluate the robustness of editing methods against these attacks. We evaluate the effectiveness of our attacks and defenses on LLaVA-v1.5 (Liu et al., 2023a) using our UNLOK-VQA dataset. First, our experimental findings reveal that multimodal attacks, combining both adversarial images and text, are more effective compared to attacks using only images or text. We find that attack success rates rose from 32% for image-only attacks, 39% for text-only attacks, to 45.5% for multimodal attacks against the baseline defense. Next, we demonstrate that even after editing the weights of the model using deletion objectives such as fact-erasure (equivalent of gradient ascent), our whitebox attacks can still retrieve 30% of the deleted information with a budget of 20, where the budget represents the size of the candidate set generated by the attack. However, equipping LoRA with the Head-Projection defense mechanism (Patil et al., 2023a) significantly mitigates this risk, effectively reducing whitebox attack success rates from 30% to 3.6% and multimodal blackbox attack success rates from 45.5% to 15.7% on UNLOK-VQA.

Additionally, we evaluate the editing performance of LLaVA-1.5 across two different scales (7B and 13B) using UNLOK-VQA. Our findings indicate that larger models when edited for deletion demonstrate enhanced resilience against both whitebox and blackbox attacks. This indicates that increasing model size may be an effective approach for making models robust.

Contributions. Overall, we summarize our contributions and findings below:

1. We introduce UNLOK-VQA, a dataset for evaluating deletion of specific undesirable multimodal knowledge from models. Our data generation process involves an automatic generation pipeline followed by manual filtering for the retention of high-quality samples. UNLOK-VQA incorporates rephrase and neighborhood data with varying proximity to the target information, facilitating a nuanced evaluation of both generalization and specificity respectively of the unlearning methods.
2. We adopt an attack-defense framework for evaluation of multimodal information erasure to assess the robustness of unlearning methods against adversarial attacks and show that state-of-the-art model editing methods like LoRA fine-tuning can not fully delete knowledge² from MLLMs.
3. We observe that the multimodal extraction attack outperforms its unimodal counterparts in the multimodal editing setup. Also, we show that editing LLM’s layers is more effective than editing the multimodal

²Note that in this work we focus on deleting the knowledge that the model has learned when it was pretrained. We do not fine-tune the model to add any knowledge.




Figure 2: Pipeline for UNLOK-VQA generation: (1) We utilize the OK-VQA dataset as a basis for evaluating the efficacy of editing methods in removing knowledge from MLLMs; (2) We employ multiple techniques to produce rephrase data with different levels, which we use in blackbox attacks to assess the generalizability of the unlearning methods; (3) We create various levels of neighborhood data to check whether the editing methods target the intended information without altering the outputs of neighboring data.

projector for deletion suggesting that information could be predominantly stored in LLM layers rather than the multimodal projector.

- Our experiments demonstrate that information deletion in larger MLLMs exhibits greater resilience against attacks compared to smaller models. This finding suggests that scaling model size could be a viable strategy for enhancing the robustness of MLLMs against information leakage.

2 Related Work

Unlearning in LLMs. While machine unlearning is a long-standing area of research that includes a variety of approaches (Cao & Yang, 2015), the prevailing approach preventing sensitive information leakage in LLMs while maintaining informativeness leverages reinforcement learning (RL) guided by human or AI feedback. However, RLHF faces significant limitations, including residual information leakage, where models might still retain sensitive data (Zou et al., 2023). Furthermore, Zhan et al. (2023) show that fine-tuning can circumvent RLHF protections, challenging its effectiveness in handling sensitive information. RLHF-trained models may also reject safe prompts similar to unsafe ones (Röttger et al., 2023). Alternative approaches are emerging to address these limitations such as access control methods that instruct the model to withhold responses to queries targeting specific groups identified through natural language descriptions (Chen et al., 2023). However, these methods are vulnerable to adversarial blackbox attacks, as demonstrated by the same study.

Even if a model is instructed to refrain from directly generating harmful content (e.g., instructions for building a weapon from its image), an adversary’s ability to access the underlying information through its parameters and potentially combine it across modalities (text and images) remains a risk as that information can be elicited in adversarial settings (see Figure 1). Recent work in unlearning for LLMs has focused on

model editing methods (Patil et al., 2023a; Li et al., 2024b), which modify model weights to delete specific information using constrained finetuning (Zhu et al., 2020) or closed-form weight updates (Meng et al., 2022). This work continues the focus, aiming to delete specific pieces of information, such as individual facts. More broadly, methods exist to remove particular features or a model’s ability to perform certain tasks (Belrose et al., 2023; Ilharco et al., 2023). Existing works focus on deletion in unimodal (mainly text-based) settings, where generalization involves text rephrasing. However, in multimodal models, adversaries can exploit both text and images, and existing research lacks frameworks and datasets to test deletion across these modalities. This work introduces a dataset with rephrase data and neighborhood data for multimodal inputs to assess generalization to rephrases of the input and to test whether deletion methods can remove specific knowledge without affecting nearby, unrelated information in the model respectively.

Multimodal Model Editing. Model editing in computer vision is used to delete specific concepts from image generation models, such as celebrities or nudity, through fine-tuning strategies (Gandikota et al., 2023; Heng & Soh, 2023; Kumari et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2023) as well as inference-time adaptation (Yoon et al., 2024). A few studies have investigated information leakage in MLLMs (Li et al., 2023; Bai et al., 2023; Zhu et al., 2023; OpenAI, 2023). Despite significant advancements in unlearning dataset curation for textual data (Meng et al., 2022; Maini et al., 2024), a critical gap exists in the availability of datasets specifically designed for evaluating unlearning in the multimodal domain. Chen et al. (2023) introduce a multimodal benchmark for assessing the MLLM’s ability to follow instructions to protect personal information about certain categories, while our work focuses on erasing a single piece of information. Cheng et al. (2023) propose a multimodal editing benchmark (MMEdit) along with baseline methods for the task. Contemporarily, Huang et al. (2024) create a knowledge editing benchmark (KEBench) from a multimodal knowledge graph, to assess the capabilities of multimodal editing methods. Li et al. (2024a) is a concurrent work that proposes a dataset for this deleting a concept from an image. However, its samples, designed to evaluate editing specificity lack proximity to the edited information, i.e. they evaluate damage to the unlearned model’s overall knowledge on data points that are unrelated to the information that was deleted. This limits the dataset’s effectiveness in assessing the deletion method’s ability to make targeted edits. While they focus on deleting entire concepts from images, we target the removal of specific information about a concept. In this work, we construct a multimodal knowledge unlearning dataset using a pipeline that involves automatic data generation followed by manual filtering. It does not rely on a knowledge graph or its corresponding images. Consequently, our pipeline is capable of generating multimodal unlearning benchmarks from a variety of data sources. Furthermore, in contrast to previous endeavors, our proposed attack-and-defense evaluation framework systematically assesses unlearning methods’ robustness across a spectrum of attacks and defense mechanisms.

3 UnLOK-VQA: Dataset for Multimodal Knowledge Editing

Evaluation of multimodal knowledge deletion methods requires assessing *efficacy*, *generalization*, and *specificity* on a multimodal knowledge dataset. Therefore, we propose an automatic pipeline to extend a VQA dataset with data points for the evaluation of multimodal information deletion from models. We use this pipeline followed by manual filtering to create UNLOK-VQA as follows: (1) Using OK-VQA data (Marino et al., 2019) to evaluate knowledge deletion efficacy (Section 3.1); (2) Employing SoTA LLMs and vision models to generate “rephrase data” for testing generalization (Section 3.2) (See left side of Figure 2); (3) Creating “neighborhood data” to evaluate the impact on unrelated information (*specificity*) (Section 3.3) (See right side of Figure 2). This section details our data generation pipeline (See Figure 2).

3.1 Efficacy

We utilize samples from OK-VQA to evaluate the effectiveness of knowledge deletion in preventing adversaries from recovering deleted information. Specifically, for each sample (v, q, a) , we employ an editing method to erase the answer a from the model given the input question q and image v . We quantify whether a is fully deleted and unrecoverable using the rewrite score (Equation (1)) and the attack success metric (Section 4.2). The **Rewrite Score** (Hase et al., 2023) indicates how much the edit minimizes the target probability compared to the desired change,

$$\frac{p(a|q, v; \mathcal{M}) - p(a|q, v; \mathcal{M}^*)}{p(a|q, v; \mathcal{M})} \quad (1)$$

3.2 Generalization

In knowledge deletion tasks, generalization refers to the ability of a deletion method to ensure that deleted information cannot be recovered, even when an adversary rephrases questions or uses similar but not identical images. This is important because a strong deletion method should be robust not just to the exact question or image for which the deletion was performed, but also to variations. Models trained on large multimodal datasets often display a broad understanding of concepts and can generalize across inputs. Without addressing generalization, a deletion method would only be effective for very specific input patterns, leaving the system vulnerable to broader attacks. Existing works often focus on deletion in unimodal (usually text-based) settings, where generalization might involve only text rephrasing. However, in multimodal models, the challenge is compounded because adversaries can attack from two modalities—text and images. Existing research lacks effective datasets and frameworks to test how well deletion methods generalize across these different multimodal inputs. In this work, we focus on the creation of a dataset that enables evaluation of generalization of the deletion method with the help of rephrase images and rephrase questions of varying difficulty levels (varying proximity to the deleted data point).

We create “rephrase data” to evaluate how well the deletion method generalizes to different ways of querying the removed information. This data consists of rephrase images and questions for each sample in OK-VQA with varying proximity levels to the original data point. These proximity levels correspond to varying difficulty levels in terms of the model’s ability to generalize its understanding to different query formulations.

Rephrase Image is such that it has the same answer to question q as the original image v . Although the rephrase image may differ semantically from the original image, our pipeline ensures that the answer to question q remains consistent between the original and rephrase images (See Table 7 for examples of each type of rephrase image). Our pipeline generates rephrase images at three different difficulty levels: Easy, Medium, and Hard, based on their proximity to the original image. Our rationale is that as the proximity radius increases, it becomes more challenging for the deletion method to generalize to these images.

1. **Easy:** We introduce noise to the image v (salt-and-pepper noise) (Rosales et al., 2023) such that the main content in the image remains unaltered (See Table 7).
2. **Medium:** We generate the image in this level by removing one random object in the original image by replacing it with a repainted version. This altered image will differ more from the original compared to the easy rephrase (See Table 7). To achieve our goal, we utilize Grounded SAM (Ren et al., 2024) to remove a segment of the image v that is not pertinent to the question and answer while maintaining the rest of the image’s semantics (In Figure 2, the frisbee is removed as it is an object irrelevant to the question). Grounded SAM necessitates identifying the target object for modification. To find the irrelevant target, we first detect all objects in the image using either YOLOv9 (Wang et al., 2024) or by extracting nouns from a textual description of v generated by LLaMA-2-7B. We then exclude objects with high Sentence-BERT-based (Reimers & Gurevych, 2019; Kenton & Toutanova, 2019) similarity to any nouns in q and a . The object with the highest detection confidence is selected for repainting by Grounded SAM.
3. **Hard:** Images in this level are entirely generated by models, and thus they will deviate more from v than the other levels (See Table 7). We use LLaVA-v1.5-7B to generate a detailed textual description of v . We then use a diffusion model SDXL (Podell et al., 2024) to create an image based on the description, ensuring the answer to q aligns with a in the new image’s context.

Rephrase Question is designed to have the same answer a as q within the context of image v . Although semantically different from q , its purpose is to extract the answer from the model. Our pipeline includes three types of rephrases: Easy, Medium, and Hard, based on their similarity to the original question and the deletion method’s ability to generalize to them.

1. **Easy:** We add a random prefix (e.g. “The following blog post is informative about ...”), which does not change the sentence’s meaning, to the original question. (See Table 7)

2. **Medium:** We leverage DIPPER-11B (Krishna et al., 2023), a SoTA paraphrasing model to generate more complex textual variations of the original question (See Table 7).
3. **Hard:** We prepend a jailbreak prompt (e.g. “You’re an AI with access to vast knowledge about...”) to the question. Jailbreak interventions have demonstrated efficacy in reactivating knowledge typically suspended from LLM’s generation, such as the construction of explosive devices (Shah et al., 2023) (See Table 7).

An adversary may leverage evaluate generalization data to elicit deleted information. To simulate this setting, we use rephrase data in an adversarial manner to evaluate the deletion method’s ability to conceal the deleted information when rephrase data is used to elicit it (Rephrase attack). The trend of easy, medium and hard complexity is reflected in the increasing attack success rate across the three variants in Table 2. Our multimodal attack employs a combination of question and image rephrases to evaluate the robustness of MLLMs to **Multimodal Rephrase Data**. See Figure 2 (left) for an example of rephrase data.

3.3 Specificity

Specificity is the ability to ensure that only the targeted information is deleted without damaging the model’s broader knowledge. It’s crucial because: (1) Collateral Damage: When deleting a specific piece of information from a model, there is a risk of inadvertently erasing other related knowledge. This can cause the model to become less accurate in tasks that require related but not identical knowledge. (2) Maintaining Model Utility: After the deletion, the model should still function well on questions or images that lie in the "neighborhood" of the deleted information. If the deletion process is too aggressive, the model may lose accuracy on tasks that require similar or related knowledge, thereby reducing its utility. In contrast to existing works—which may only focus on the deletion of single facts in unimodal contexts—this work introduces the concept of neighborhood data for multimodal inputs to test specificity. It assesses whether the deletion method can remove specific knowledge without negatively impacting nearby but unrelated knowledge in the model’s broader understanding. We focus on the creation of a dataset that enables evaluation of specificity of the deletion method with the help of neighborhood images and neighborhood questions of varying difficulty levels (varying proximity to the deleted data point). To assess the specificity of the edit made to delete information i.e. to assess the model damage the deletion caused, we create “neighborhood data” points for each sample in the OK-VQA dataset. These data points represent unrelated information that lies in the neighborhood of the information that is edited. Their purpose is to **evaluate the damage to the model’s knowledge** on the data that is different from the original data for which the information was erased but lies in its neighborhood. Ideally, a successful editing method should not affect the model’s accuracy on neighborhood data points. Concretely, we evaluate two types of neighborhoods of the input: (1) $(\text{neigh}(v), q, a_{\text{img_neigh}})$, (2) $(v, \text{neigh}(q), a_{\text{ques_neigh}})$, where $\text{neigh}(v)$ and $\text{neigh}(q)$ denotes a neighborhood image and question respectively, $a_{\text{img_neigh}}$ and $a_{\text{ques_neigh}}$ denote the new answers in the context of the neighborhood image and question respectively, and the generation process is described below.

Neighborhood Image ($\text{neigh}(v)$) lies in the neighborhood of the original image v , but the main object is changed such that the answer to the question q is changed (from a to a'), meaning that the answer to the question q is a' for the neighborhood image. To create such images, we first obtain feasible alternative answers to q by prompting Flan-T5-XXL (Chung et al., 2024) model to generate a set of three alternative answers $\{a'\}$ to the question q that are different from a . We pick the answer $a_{\text{img_neigh}}$ that is most dissimilar to a as measured by BERT similarity. Then we generate two levels of neighborhood images as described following. See Table 7 for examples of neighborhood images of each level.

1. **Easy:** We leverage SDXL to generate images for the alternative answer such that the answer to the question q in the context of the generated image is $a_{\text{img_neigh}}$, while the rest of the image content remains random as no specific information is provided to the diffusion model about the remaining image content.
2. **Hard:** Similar to the process for getting hard rephrase images, we utilize SDXL to generate an image based on the text description of v while also ensuring the image corresponds to the specific alternative answer $a_{\text{img_neigh}}$. This image is more similar to the v (lie in a neighborhood of smaller radius) compared to the Easy Neighborhood Image, i.e. we expect their information would be harder to preserve after deletion.

We define the **Neighborhood Question** ($\text{neigh}(q)$) as an alternative question q' that focuses on a different part of the image, with its answer denoted as a_{ques_neigh} . The generation process involves: (1) generating a text description of the image using LLaVA-v1.5-7B and selecting the sentence most irrelevant to the original question (lowest BERT-similarity); (2) passing this sentence to a tifa-question-generation model (Hu et al., 2023), a fine-tuned LLaMA-2 model, to generate questions and answers based on the sentence. We then filter out questions that are semantically similar to the original question. See Figure 2 (right) and Table 7 for examples of neighborhood data.

We use two data types: rephrase data (questions and images with three difficulty levels) and neighborhood data (questions with one level, images with two). Results in Table 2 indicate that hard rephrase data is more challenging to generalize to compared to easy and medium levels. Rephrase data enables an adversarial evaluation of the deletion method’s generalizability across various query formulations. Neighborhood data assesses specificity of deletion method, measuring unintended knowledge loss on points that lie in the neighborhood the deleted information. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show that rephrase points are closer to the target data point than neighborhood data points. This is reflected in the higher neighborhood Δ -Acc values compared to Random Δ -Acc (See Section 4.1) in Table 1 as these points help better evaluate the damage to the model’s knowledge on points in close proximity to the deleted data point.

3.4 Manual Filtering and Human Evaluation

Table 4 shows the human evaluation results on UNLOK-VQA. In our human evaluation process for UNLOK-VQA, we established clear standards for annotators to assess the quality of the generated data. The evaluation focused on two primary criteria: (1) Consistency of Target Answers: Annotators were tasked with determining whether the target answer remains consistent when evaluating rephrased data. A consistent answer indicates that the rephrase effectively captures the original intent of the question. (2) Appropriateness of Answer Changes: For neighborhood data, evaluators assessed whether the target answer changes appropriately in response to the modified question or context. An appropriate change signifies that the alteration aligns with the expectations set by the original question.

We observe that around 75% of the automatically generated rephrase data and around 66% of the automatically generated neighborhood data meet our standards. To further enhance the quality of the dataset, we conduct one round of manual filtering to remove data that do not have proper rephrase or neighborhood images/questions. We again conducted a human evaluation on the filtered UNLOK-VQA, finding that over 90% of the samples (shown in Table 4) meet the criterion. We adopt this high-quality, filtered version for our subsequent experiments. See Table 7 for samples in UNLOK-VQA. The details of the design questions for human evaluation and the interface demonstrations are provided in Appendix C.

3.5 Dataset analysis

The dataset consists of 500 samples that have been manually filtered and verified by human evaluators. Each sample contains a (v, q, a) triple, where a represents the correct answer to question q within the context of image v . Additionally, each sample includes three types of rephrased images, two types of neighborhood images, an average of four neighborhood questions, and three types of rephrased questions. Figure 4 illustrates the distribution across the various categories within UNLOK-VQA.

4 Attack-and-Defense Perspective

Open-source releases of MLLMs (Liu et al., 2023a) necessitate robust evaluation methods that go beyond simply assessing model generations. We incorporate diverse whitebox attacks and blackbox attacks into deletion evaluations to strengthen claims about model safety and privacy. We cast the multimodal information deletion problem within the framework of adversarial attack and defense mechanisms commonly employed in machine learning security (Carlini et al., 2019). In this context, the objective of the defense methods is to effectively erase a single piece of information from a multimodal LLM while the attack methods aim to retrieve the deleted information from the model. In the following subsections, we introduce our attack-and-defense framework, including the threat model, attack methods, and defense methods, in detail.

4.1 Threat Model

Building upon the work of Patil et al. (2023a), we broaden the security landscape for information deletion by introducing a threat model tailored to multimodal data and models.

Adversary’s Objective: We posit an adversary aiming to extract answer A to a question Q in the context of the image V , where the triplet (V, Q, A) is a sensitive piece of information. An extraction attack is considered successful with budget B if answer A is present within a candidate set \mathcal{C} ($|\mathcal{C}| = B$) generated by the adversary through an inference algorithm applied to the multimodal model. We refer to the size of the candidate set, denoted by $|\mathcal{C}|$, as the attack budget (B), thus making our setting more general than the typical one-shot setting (Carlini et al., 2018; Lukas et al., 2023). This setting is similar to the threat model introduced in Patil et al. (2023a) for LLMs and generalizes the typical one-shot setting ($B = 1$) by allowing multiple attempts at extraction. This more general setting reflects plausible scenarios, where the adversary could either (1) Attempt multiple queries to guess sensitive information (2) Generate multiple potential candidates and act on any correct one (3) Verify the correctness of information, as in the case where the adversary is also the data owner trying to confirm that their sensitive data has been properly deleted. By allowing $B > 1$, we account for these broader, more realistic adversarial capabilities, making our setting more comprehensive and practical.

Attack Success Metric: We say that an adversary is successful if the answer is present in the candidate set \mathcal{C} . We thus define the success of extraction attacks in the context of MLLMs using the following metric calculated using a dataset $D = (v_i, q_i, a_i)_{i=1}^N$, where each $A = a_i$ represents a correct answer to the question $Q = q_i$ in the context of the image $V = v_i$. The definition of the metric is:

$$\text{AttackSuccess@}B(\mathcal{M}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbb{1}[a_i \in \mathcal{C}_i] \quad (2)$$

where \mathcal{C}_i denotes the candidate set generated by the model \mathcal{M} for the data point (v_i, q_i) , i.e., $\mathcal{C}_i = \mathcal{M}(q_i, v_i | B)$ and $\mathbb{1}$ represents the indicator function..

Adversary’s Capabilities: We have two access levels to simulate real-world attacker (Carlini et al., 2019): whitebox and blackbox access. Whitebox access assumes the adversary has full knowledge of the model’s weights and architecture, enabling forward passes and access to hidden states. Blackbox access limits the adversary to providing inputs and receiving randomly sampled outputs. These access levels reflect prevalent LLM access methods, available either open-source (Liu et al., 2023a) or through APIs (Brown et al., 2020).

Metrics for Multimodal Information Deletion: The objective of information deletion is to selectively remove specific information from a model while simultaneously preserving its overall knowledge. However, similar to previous strategies performing sensitive information unlearning, model editing methods incur some performance loss on knowledge-intensive tasks. Hence, it is necessary to have dedicated metrics to evaluate such information loss. Overall, when we employ model editing as a defense against extraction attacks, the objective is to minimize attack success while simultaneously minimizing damage to the model’s knowledge. This is formulated as: $\arg \min_{\mathcal{M}^*} \text{AttackSuccess@}B(\mathcal{M}^*) + \lambda \text{Damage}(\mathcal{M}^*, \mathcal{M})$, where \mathcal{M}^* is the edited model, \mathcal{M} is the pre-edited model, and $\text{Damage}(\cdot, \cdot)$ measures the impact on the model’s knowledge compared to the unedited model. We use two metrics to assess model damage after editing:

1. **Random Δ -Accuracy** (Zhu et al., 2020; De Cao et al., 2021): Measures the change in model accuracy for random data points before and after editing.
2. **Neighborhood Δ -Accuracy:** To assess the specificity of an edit in a multimodal setting, we calculate two versions of the neighborhood Δ -Accuracy (Meng et al., 2022): Question Neighborhood Δ -Accuracy and Image Neighborhood Δ -Accuracy. The definitions and methods for generating neighborhood data are detailed in Section 3.3. We employ neighborhood questions and images to compute the respective Question and Image Neighborhood Δ -Accuracy.

We also report the **Rewrite Score**, which measures how effectively the edit reduces the target probability relative to the desired change (See 3.1).

4.2 Attack Methods

The output of an attack method is to generate a candidate set \mathcal{C} that potentially contains the information that it aims to extract. Here the size of the \mathcal{C} is limited by the attack budget B .

Whitebox Attacks. We use whitebox attacks from Patil et al. (2023a) that leverage Logit Lens (nostalgebraist, 2020; Geva et al., 2021), an interpretability technique that probes the hidden states of an LLM, and exploit the hypothesis that deleted information might persist in the model’s intermediate layers’ hidden states despite its removal using by editing model using deletion objectives or its absence in the final generation output.

1. **Head Projection Attack** (Patil et al., 2023a): This attack constructs a candidate set by collecting the top-k highest probability tokens from each layer probed by LogitLens.
2. **Probability Delta Attack** (Patil et al., 2023a): This attack constructs a candidate set by identifying tokens whose logit lens probabilities rise and fall significantly between consecutive layers, potentially capturing the “deleted” information.
3. **Probability Delta² Attack (Our attack)**: In this novel attack, we construct a candidate set by identifying tokens whose differences in probabilities across consecutive layers rise and fall significantly between consecutive layers (which means taking the difference of difference in the probabilities of tokens across consecutive layers), potentially capturing the “deleted” information. The PD² attack is an order two attack, where a second-order difference (difference of differences) between the distributions is computed, providing a second-order comparison. We design this with the aim of capturing more nuanced traces of deleted information that might be overlooked by simpler approaches.
4. **Finetuning-based attack**: A major obstacle in unlearning is its resilience to few-shot fine-tuning, where a small fine-tuning dataset causes a disproportionate return of previously deleted knowledge (Henderson et al., 2023; Yang et al., 2023; Qi et al., 2023; Lermen et al., 2023; Zhan et al., 2023). We fine-tune the edited model on random, unrelated data and then use the HP attack to assess robustness to post-deletion fine-tuning.

Blackbox Attacks. This simple blackbox attack exploits the imperfect rephrase generalization of model editing methods (De Cao et al., 2021; Meng et al., 2022). It constructs the candidate set \mathcal{C} by querying the edited model with rephrased versions of the original input. We explore three variants to evaluate effectiveness across different modalities:

1. **Image Rephrase Attack**: This attack uses rephrased images with the same questions to test model vulnerability to changes in visual representation. It has three variations are based on the rephrase levels.
2. **Question Rephrase Attack**: This attack uses rephrased questions with the same images to test vulnerability to changes in textual representation. It has three variations are based on the rephrase levels.
3. **Multimodal Rephrase Attack**: This attack leverages data points where both the question and the image are rephrase. This provides a holistic evaluation of the rephrase attack’s effectiveness in exploiting weaknesses across both modalities within the edited multimodal data. We pick the best (hard) question rephrase and the best (hard) image rephrase for this attack.

4.3 Defense Methods

This section explores existing objectives for sensitive information deletion in MLLMs.

Empty Response Defense (Ouyang et al., 2022): This method optimizes the MLLM edit to output a non-sensitive response (e.g., “I don’t know” or “dummy”) instead of sensitive information. The objective

function, $\arg \max_M p(d|v, q; M)$, maximizes the probability of the model generating an empty target string (d) for any given input (v, q).

Fact Erasure (Fact-Eras) (Hase et al., 2023): This approach reduces the probability of the MLLM generating a sensitive answer (a) for a given question (q) and image (v), by minimizing $p(a|v, q; M)$ for the original information (v, q, a).

Error Injection (Error Inj) (De Cao et al., 2021): This method introduces counterfactual knowledge into the model. Using the objective function $\arg \max_M p(a^*|v, q; M)$ (Meng et al., 2022), where a^* is a false target answer, it demonstrates the model’s ability to incorporate manipulated information.

Head Projection (HP) Defense (Patil et al., 2023a): This approach employs a max-margin objective to prevent the deleted answer from appearing among the top-k elements in LogitLens distributions across chosen layers (L) and the final output.

Max-Entropy Defense (Patil et al., 2023a): Similar to the Head Projection Defense, this approach focuses on LogitLens distributions but uses a different objective per layer. It maximizes the entropy (uncertainty) of the next-token distribution across chosen layers (L) and the final output.

Input Rephrasing (IR) Defense: This defense strategy targets the Input Rephrasing Blackbox Attack. It expands the editing objective beyond the original input (v, q) by incorporating three versions of rephrases of the input (v, q): (1) $(\text{rephrase}(v), q)$ (2) $(v, \text{rephrase}(q))$ (3) $(\text{rephrase}(v), \text{rephrase}(q))$.

5 Experimental Setup

Models and Editing methods. Our experiments involve the multimodal LLM: LLaVA-v1.5-7B (Liu et al., 2023a). This model is selected based on its: (1) widespread adoption within the multimodality community, (2) ease of access due to public availability, and (3) documented ability to retain information from their pre-training data. We also report the attack success rates on a larger LLaVA-v1.5-13B for evaluating the effect of scaling model size on the robustness of erasure methods to attacks.

Model editing methods. Our experiments utilize LoRA finetuning for information deletion in MLLMs, targeting specific weight matrices in the model’s MLP layers, as motivated by Meng et al. (2022). While that analysis focused on GPT models, we tune LLaVA-v1.5-7B and LLaVA-v1.5-13B and find that editing the 7th and 9th layers, respectively, yields effective results with a rewrite score over 85% (indicating successful information erasure) and a random Δ -Acc below 5% (mostly preserving the model’s overall knowledge). While prior works, such as (Meng et al., 2022), have attempted to localize information using causal tracing and then edit the corresponding weights. A follow-up study Hase et al. (2023) demonstrates that localization does not necessarily guide effective editing. This is why, we opt to select layers empirically rather than relying on localization.

6 Results

6.1 Main Results

Design. We first investigate how each of the defense methods outlined in Section 4.3 fares against each of the extraction attacks outlined in Section 4.2 on UNLOK-VQA. We measure Attack-Success@ B with $B = 20$ for each of the attacks (both whitebox and blackbox attacks), in addition to Random Δ -Acc and Question Neighborhood Δ -Acc and Image Neighborhood Δ -Acc metrics. Our investigation is conducted on the LLaVA-v1.5-7B model with LoRA finetuning as the editing method. To ensure that each editing method functions as intended and allows for a fair comparison, we meticulously adjust the hyperparameters until we reach reasonable rewrite scores and Δ -Acc (as mentioned in Section 5). Below, we report the results and answer three questions regarding multimodal model editing for targeted unlearning.

Can we extract a piece of deleted multimodal information from an MLLM? Yes. Our results in Table 1 demonstrate that both whitebox and blackbox extraction attacks are successful. Among whitebox attacks, the Probability Delta (PD) attack exhibits the strongest performance, frequently achieving attack

	Whitebox Attack				Blackbox Attack			Rand Δ -Acc	Q Neigh Δ -Acc	I Neigh Δ -Acc	Rewrite Score
	HP	PD	PD ²	HP+FT	Hard Img Rephrase	Hard Ques Rephrase	MM				
LoRA											
- Fact-Eras	0.300	0.296	0.264	0.412	0.320	0.390	0.455	0.001	0.008	0.059	0.956
- Empty	0.777	0.930	0.759	0.817	0.682	0.793	0.789	0.045	0.024	0.059	0.965
- Entropy	0.185	0.181	0.145	0.253	0.304	0.402	0.431	0.029	0.037	0.12	0.883
- HP	0.036	0.133	0.105	0.121	0.058	0.101	0.157	0.032	0.027	0.007	0.999
- Error Inj	0.423	0.477	0.463	0.468	0.366	0.425	0.485	0.046	0.037	-0.068	0.895
- IR + Fact-Eras	0.159	0.195	0.169	0.229	0.203	0.237	0.322	0.004	0.009	0.066	0.974

Table 1: Attack success rates of the attacks (Section 4.2) against defense methods (Section 4.3) for deleting multimodal information in UNLOK-VQA that is known by the LLaVA-v1.5-7B model. The deletion is performed via LoRA edits to the MLP modules within an LLM layer of LLaVA.

success rates exceeding 20% (when budget B is set to 20) against most defenses. While PD attack does better than HP, PD² does not improve on top of PD. This is likely because higher-order attacks delve deeper into differences, making the targeted information less apparent. The finetuning attack (HP+FT) has higher attack success rate compared to the original HP attack which shows that all the defenses are vulnerable to the finetuning attack. For blackbox attacks, the multimodal (MM) rephrasing attack also often succeeds more than 35% of the time. These high success rates indicate a high vulnerability to extraction attacks targeting the “deleted” fact within the threat model outlined in Section 4.

Are the defenses effective against extraction attacks? In Table 1, our analysis reveals that, among the whitebox defense methods, Fact Erasure, Empty Response (Empty), and Error Injection defenses are less effective compared to Head Projection (HP) and Max-Entropy defenses. This observation indicates that information is better concealed when the model is uncertain about the answer. In contrast, the first three methods may lower the probability of the sensitive answer excessively, making the concealed information more detectable. We then observe that the HP defense exhibits the highest overall effectiveness against all attacks (whitebox and blackbox), as evidenced by its consistently lowest attack success rates compared to all other defenses. On the blackbox defense front, we only report the Question Rephrase defense results in the Input Rephrasing defense row in Table 1 as we find it outperforms the image and multimodal counterparts. We exploit the easy question rephrases for the defense. Furthermore, we observe that the Image Rephrase defense is effective only when the attack images and defense images belong to the same distribution, whereas the question rephrase defense is effective across all distributions of question rephrase.

Is multimodal attack more effective than unimodal?

We investigate the efficacy of the multimodal blackbox attack strategy compared to the unimodal blackbox attacks (image rephrase attack, question rephrase attack). The results in Table 1 show that the multimodal (blackbox) attack success rate (15.7%) is 5.6% higher than the best question rephrase attack (Hard Question Rephrase) (10.1%) and 9.9% higher than the best image rephrase attack (Hard Img Rephrase) (5.8%) against the best (HP) defense. Similar trend holds against other defenses.

6.2 How Does Scaling the Model Size Affect the Vulnerability of Erasure to Attacks?

Design. We explore the relationship between model size and susceptibility to both whitebox and blackbox attacks. We scale the model size (from 7B to 13B parameters) while keeping all other factors constant which allows us to isolate the impact of model size on robustness to attacks. We

	Easy	Med	Hard
	Img Rephrase		
LoRA			
- Fact Erasure	0.296	0.279	0.320
- Empty	0.645	0.631	0.682
- Entropy	0.251	0.255	0.304
- HP	0.062	0.059	0.058
- Error Injection	0.360	0.349	0.366
- IR + Fact-Eras	0.103	0.098	0.203
Question Rephrase			
LoRA			
- Fact Erasure	0.353	0.367	0.463
- Empty	0.196	0.198	0.343
- Entropy	0.294	0.293	0.406
- HP	0.069	0.072	0.146
- Error Injection	0.401	0.370	0.475
- IR + Fact-Eras	0.112	0.186	0.262

Table 2: Comparison of attack success rates across the three levels of rephrase images to attack models edited by different defense mechanisms.




Figure 3: Effect of scaling the LLaVA-v1.5’s size from 7B to 13B on attack success of HP attack (whitebox) and Multimodal Rephrase Attack (blackbox) against the Fact Erasure defense. We find that scaling makes the models more robust against the attacks.

	Human Judgements	
	Pre-filter	Post-filter
Rephrase Question		
All	0.79	0.93
Rephrase Image		
Medium	0.73	0.91
Hard	0.79	1.00
Neighborhood Question		
All	0.73	0.97
Neighborhood Image		
Easy	0.66	0.97
Hard	0.66	0.94

Table 4: Human evaluations assessing the quality of data samples generated by the model, conducted both before and after the manual filtering process, to ensure the removal of low quality samples.

chose to evaluate using the Fact-Erasure defense because HP defense is more sensitive to hyperparameter selection. To analyze the effect of scaling, we aimed to keep the evaluation independent of hyperparameter choices. We chose the HP attack because it modifies the model’s weights, which could interfere with analyzing the effect of scaling. While unlearning and scaling interact consistently across methods, fine-tuning introduces a confounding factor, making it unsuitable for this evaluation.

Results. Figure 3 presents our findings. A clear trend indicates that the larger model (13B) when edited using the same deletion objective exhibits greater resilience against attacks in both whitebox (HP attack) and blackbox (multimodal rephrase attack) settings compared to a smaller model (7B). This suggests that increasing model complexity can improve the efficacy of deletion methods and thereby enhance the model’s ability to defend against targeted attacks.

6.3 Ablation Across Different Difficulty Levels

Design. To investigate whether the intuitive trend of easy, medium, and hard rephrase samples (introduced in Section 3) is reflected in the attack success rates of the respective rephrase images and questions, we conduct ablation experiments across the three difficulty levels of rephrase questions and rephrase images, and present the result in Table 2. Similarly, to investigate whether the intuitive trend of easy and hard

	Easy	Hard	Combined
Img Neighborhood			
LoRA			
- Fact Erasure	0.058	0.060	0.059
- Empty	0.052	0.066	0.059
- Entropy	0.060	0.180	0.120
- HP	0.005	0.009	0.007
- Error Injection	0.065	0.071	0.068
- IR + Fact-Eras	0.051	0.081	0.066

Table 3: Comparison of Img-neighborhood Δ -Acc across the two complexity levels of neighborhood images to evaluate the model damage caused by the model editing using the different objectives for unlearning.

	Easy	Med	Hard
Img Rephrase			
Edit module			
LLM MLP	0.062	0.059	0.088
MM proj MLP	0.212	0.201	0.406
Question Rephrase			
LLM MLP	0.069	0.072	0.146
MM proj MLP	0.244	0.212	0.408

Table 5: Comparison of success rates for image and question rephrasing attacks when modifying the MLP module within LLM layers versus within the multi-modal projector on UNLOK-VQA.

neighborhood images (introduced in Section 3) is reflected in the image-neighborhood Δ -Acc, we conduct ablation experiments across the two difficulty levels of neighborhood images, and present the result in Table 3.

Rephrase ablation results. Our observations in Table 2 reveal that easy and medium rephrase images exhibit similar attack success rates against most defenses, whereas hard rephrase images are significantly more effective. Similarly, we observe a consistent trend for the three types of question rephrases: easy and medium question rephrases demonstrate similar attack success rates against most defenses, while hard question rephrases based on jailbreak prompts have the highest attack success rates. One potential reason for the success of hard images lies in the fact that although their semantic content is preserved, the general composition of the images is significantly altered. This alteration can, to some extent, render defense mechanisms ineffective.

Neighborhood ablation results. We observe that the Image Neighborhood Δ -Acc is higher for hard neighborhood images compared to easy neighborhood images as evident from Table 3. This is because the hard neighborhood images lie closer to the deleted sample point than the easy neighborhood images by construction.

6.4 Editing Multimodal Projector

Edited Module	Whitebox Attack				Blackbox Attack			Rand Δ -Acc	Q Neigh Δ -Acc	I Neigh Δ -Acc	Rewrite Score
	HP	PD	PD ²	HP+FT	Hard Img Rephrase	Hard Ques Rephrase	MM				
LLM MLP	0.036	0.133	0.105	0.052	0.058	0.101	0.157	0.032	0.027	0.007	0.999
MM proj MLP	0.205	0.232	0.187	0.247	0.406	0.408	0.573	-0.038	-0.092	-0.008	0.954

Table 6: Comparison of success rates for the attacks in Section 4.2 when tuning the MLP module within LLM layers versus within the multimodal projector on UNLOK-VQA.

Design. In the conventional fine-tuning paradigm for MLLMs applied to downstream tasks (Liu et al., 2023a; Li et al., 2023), the focus is on optimizing the multimodal projector, which connects the LLM to the vision encoder and enables them to interact with each other. Our investigation aims to determine if a more effective approach lies in editing modules within the multimodal projector rather than editing the LLM modules.

Results. Our findings presented in Table 6 demonstrate that editing modules within the LLM led to better deletion performance (lower attack success rates for similar rewrite score and Δ -Acc) against the best defense (HP defense) compared to the conventional approach of editing/fine-tuning the multimodal projector. This observation is also consistent across the three types of rephrase attacks presented in Table 5 as the attack success rate when editing the multimodal projector is much higher. This suggests that editing the LLM modules could be a more effective strategy for multimodal information deletion in MLLMs. In the context of projector editing too, the rising success rates of attacks across easy, medium, and hard rephrases suggest that the more difficult rephrases present greater challenges for generalization, as shown in Table 5. The improved results from editing within LLM layers, compared to multimodal projectors could stem from the stage of processing. Multimodal projectors operate early, handling raw input translation before the model fully integrates information. In contrast, LLM layers process data later, where final knowledge representations are formed. Editing at this stage is more effective, directly targeting the model’s semantic associations, possibly resulting in more precise removal of specific knowledge.

7 Conclusion

Our study introduces UNLOK-VQA, a holistic dataset for evaluating targeted unlearning in MLLMs. We present an attack-and-defense framework and a pipeline for creating high-quality image-text pairs for evaluating efficacy, specificity, and generalization of defense methods. Our findings reveal that multimodal extraction attacks are more successful than single-modality attacks, while the best defense mechanism reduces attack success significantly. This work underscores the importance of developing effective unlearning methods for MLLMs and provides a critical resource for advancing research in this area.

Broader Impact Statement

Our work addresses the critical issue of deleting sensitive information in multimodal large language models (MLLMs), highlighting significant ethical implications. MLLMs, with their vast multimodal knowledge, can potentially generate harmful content or perpetuate biases if misused. Our proposed dataset and technical approaches aim to mitigate these ethical challenges. However, our findings reveal the complexity of effectively removing sensitive information from pretrained MLLMs, raising moral and legal concerns about their responsible deployment. Our research seeks to promote responsible AI innovation.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by NSF-AI Engage Institute DRL-2112635, DARPA MCS Grant N66001-19-2-4031, NSF-CAREER Award 1846185, ARO Award W911NF2110220, ONR Grant N00014-23-1-2356, and a Google PhD Fellowship. The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this article are those of the authors and not of the funding agency.

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A Dataset samples

We present examples of samples in UNLOK-VQA in Table 7.

B Reproducibility Details

Image generation prompts for SDXL:

- Neigh (Easy): Generate an image for which the answer to this question: `{question}` is `{alternate answer}` and there is no `{original answer}` in the image.
- Neigh (Hard): Generate an image for which the answer to this question: `{question}` is `{alternate answer}` and there is no `{original answer}` in the image including some components from the following image description but retaining the answer `{alternate answer}`: `{unrelated image description}`. Please make sure the answer to the question `{question}` in the context of the image is `{alternate answer}`.
- Replace (Medium): Replace the `{original answer}` to another reasonable `{original answer}`, high quality, detailed.
- Rephrase (Hard): Generate an image for which the answer to this question: `{question}` is `{original answer}` based on the following image description: `{original image description}`.

We observe a small diversion in the trend against the input rephrasing defense, medium question rephrases are more effective than easy question rephrases because the defense employs question rephrases belonging to the easy question rephrase distribution.

Editing modules. We edit the MLP down projection module within Layer 7 of LORA finetuning. We apply LoRA with a rank of 1 and α of 1. This enables a less aggressive editing approach in order to make the edit targeted and avoid damage to data points that were not meant to be deleted.

Filtering details. We filter the details OK-VQA dataset before applying the automatic generation pipeline so as to retain single token answers and to make sure that the model knows the answer before we delete it similar to that in (Patil et al., 2023a).

C Human Evaluation

Motivated by prior work that involves evaluation of a multimodal summarization dataset (Patil et al., 2024), for our human evaluation experiments, we engaged four graduate research assistants with computer science backgrounds. They were given a set of instructions for interpreting and performing the task. During virtual meetings, we provided an overview of the dataset and a detailed task description. We collected for 80 of the dataset samples. The evaluation was conducted twice: once without manual filtering and once with manual filtering. We compute accuracy of the annotation with respect to ground truth answers for an ideal dataset. We added three options to the answers to simplify the annotation task. We present the results in Table 4 and screenshots of the human evaluation interface in Table 8 and Table 9.




Figure 4: Distribution of question categories in UNLOK-VQA. It consists of samples belonging to diverse categories and covers all the categories in the original OK-VQA dataset.




Figure 5: Average distance of the random, neighborhood image and rephrase image points from the original data point. Neighborhood points are closer to the target data point being deleted compared to random points on which other unlearning datasets evaluate specificity. Rephrase points are closer compared to both neighborhood and random data points. This is also reflected by higher Image Neighborhood Δ -Acc compared to Random Δ -Acc .




Figure 6: Average distance of the random, neighborhood image and rephrase question points from the original data point. Neighborhood points are closer to the target data point being deleted compared to random points on which other unlearning datasets evaluate specificity. Rephrase points are closer compared to both neighborhood and random data points. This is also reflected by higher Question Neighborhood Δ -Acc compared to Random Δ -Acc

D An Additional Method for Neighborhood Image Generation

Motivated by prior work that involves evaluation of the model to invariant images (Patil et al., 2023b), in order to get medium rephrase images, we use Grounded SAM to repaint the original image minimally to let the answer to the original question become the alternate answer a' . To get the target for Grounded SAM, we prompt Flan-T5-XXL (Chung et al., 2024) to get the subject from q that leads to the answer a . Then, we ask Grounded SAM to repaint the subject in the image to the alternative answer a' . These images are considered the hardest because the majority of the pixels remain the same, i.e., we expect them to lie within a smaller radius neighborhood compared to medium neighborhood images. While we tried this variant of generating neighborhood images, we found that it is not possible to change the answer to a question in the context of the image by editing just one object, especially for samples in OK-VQA that could involve multi-hop reasoning to

answer the question. However, we find this approach cannot successfully alter the image to fit the alternate answer, so we do not adopt this approach in our study.

Target data	Rephrase Images (Easy, Medium, Hard, respectively)	Rephrase Questions	Neighborhood Questions	Neighborhood Images (Easy, Hard respectively)
 <p>Question: What issues would someone have bringing this suitcase on a plane? Answer: Cat</p>	  	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Easy Rephrase: The following is a blog-post. What issues would someone have bringing this suitcase on a plane? • Medium Rephrase: What difficulties would there be if someone brought this suitcase on board a plane? • Hard Rephrase: You're an AI with access to vast knowledge about suitcase. Please help me answer this question. What issues would someone have bringing this suitcase on a plane? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Question: Is there a suitcase? Answer: Yes • Question: What type of container is this? Answer: Suitcase • Question: What is the cat doing? Answer: Laying • Question: Is the suitcase open? Answer: Yes 	 
 <p>Question: What kind of habitat is shown? Answer: Forest</p>	  	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Easy Rephrase: The following is a blog-post. What kind of habitat is shown? • Medium Rephrase: What kind of habitation is shown? • Hard Rephrase: You're an AI with access to vast knowledge about habitat. Please help me answer this question. What kind of habitat is shown? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Question: Who is enjoying the natural surroundings? Answer: Riders • Question: Are there natural surroundings? Answer: Yes • Question: Is this an outdoor activity? Answer: Yes • Question: Is this a leisurely or a fast activity? Answer: Leisurely 	 

Table 7: Examples of samples in UNLOK-VQA. Rephrase images with original questions are used for image rephrase attack, Rephrase questions with original images are used for question rephrase attacks, and multimodal rephrase attacks use a combination of rephrase questions and rephrase images. Neighborhood Images with Original questions are used to compute Image Neighborhood Δ -Acc and Neighborhood questions with Original images are used to compute Question Neighborhood Δ -Acc.

Question 1

image A:



question A: What is he dodging?
answer A: Baseball

Based on Image A, is Answer A an answer to Question A ?

Yes
 No
 I don't know

Question 2

image B:



question B: What is he dodging?
answer B: Baseball

Based on Image B, is Answer B an answer to Question B ?

Yes
 No
 I don't know

image A:



question A: What is he dodging?
answer A: Baseball

You are given that Answer A answers Question A based on Image A

Table 8: Human evaluation interface

Question 3

image B:



question B: What is the batter doing?
answer B: Baseball

Based on Image B, is Answer B an answer to Question B ?

Yes
 No
 I don't know

image C:



question C: What is he dodging?
answer C: Baseball

Based on Image C, is Answer C an answer to Question C ?

Yes
 No
 I don't know

image C:



question C: What is he dodging?
answer C: Baseball

Based on Image C, is Answer C an answer to Question C ?

Yes
 No
 I don't know

Table 9: Human evaluation interface