

Enhancing Chinese Offensive Language Detection with Homophonic Perturbation

Anonymous ACL submission

Abstract

Detecting offensive language in Chinese is challenging due to homophonic substitutions used to evade detection. We propose a framework to improve large language models' robustness against such phonetic attacks. First, we construct HED-COLD, a homophone-enhanced dataset based on the Chinese Offensive Language Dataset. Additionally, we propose a homophone-aware pretraining strategy that aligns semantics and fuses features to learn robust mappings between original and perturbed text. Experimental results show that our approach achieves state-of-the-art performance on both the COLD test set and the toxicity benchmark ToxiCloakCN. Notably, it achieves greater gains in domains especially prone to homophonic attacks, such as gender and regional content. These results demonstrate improved robustness and generalization against phonetic adversarial attacks.

1 Introduction

With the rapid development of the internet, content moderation has become increasingly important for maintaining a healthy online environment and protecting user rights. In recent years, advances in natural language processing, especially large language models, have significantly improved the ability to detect offensive language across multiple languages (Husain and Uzuner, 2021; Pitsilis et al., 2018; Wei et al., 2021; Dhanya and Balakrishnan, 2021; Battistelli et al., 2020; Beyhan et al., 2022; Awal et al., 2023; Zhou et al., 2023).

Among various moderation tasks, offensive language detection has attracted considerable attention due to its direct impact on user experience and the quality of online discourse (Noever, 2018; Dinan et al., 2019; Jahan and Oussalah, 2023). Offensive expressions such as hate speech and online bullying can cause mental harm to individuals and disrupt public communication. While numerous

methods have been proposed for automated offensive language detection, and meaningful progress has been made for English-language content (Wulczyn et al., 2017; Zampieri et al., 2019; Xu et al., 2021; Gehman et al., 2020), the task remains particularly challenging in Chinese. On social media platforms, users often attempt to evade detection by employing homophones, orthographic variations, or symbolic substitutions (Su et al., 2022; Kirk et al., 2022; Xiao et al., 2024). The phonetic and semantic flexibility of the Chinese language is exploited by these evasive strategies, increasing the difficulty of accurate identification and reducing the effectiveness of conventional detection models.

Existing research has made preliminary strides in Chinese offensive language detection. Benchmark datasets such as COLD (Chinese Offensive Language Dataset) has provided a foundation for supervised learning (Deng et al., 2022). However, such datasets often fall short in covering phonetic variants and implicit expressions, limiting model performance in real-world scenarios. Moreover, effective offensive language detection in Chinese requires more than lexical matching; it necessitates a deep understanding of context, semantics, and linguistic nuance. Although data augmentation is widely recognized as a method to improve generalization in NLP tasks, there remains a lack of systematic approaches specifically tailored to homophonic obfuscation in Chinese.

To tackle the challenge of phonetic obfuscation in Chinese offensive language, we introduce HED-COLD, Homophone-Enhanced Dataset based on the Chinese Offensive Language Dataset. This dataset incorporates a wide range of homophones and disguised expressions that retain offensive meaning while varying in form and context. It reflects realistic social interactions, adding linguistic diversity and contextual richness to training data. We also propose a training strategy that combines

feature fusion and semantic alignment to integrate HED-COLD with the original dataset. Our approach improves the detection of covert offensive language.

The contributions of this work are threefold:

- We construct HED-COLD, a Chinese homophone offensive language dataset. This dataset addresses significant coverage limitations in detecting homophonic attacks.
- We propose a homophone-aware pretraining strategy with supervised fine-tuning to align semantics between original and homophonic expressions. It achieves state-of-the-art performance on both COLD and ToxiCloakCN, with greater gains in domains prone to homophonic attacks, such as gender and regional content.
- We will release our dataset and code to benefit the research community. Our framework offers a practical benchmark. It also provides valuable insights for other Chinese text moderation tasks, such as rumor detection and sensitive content identification.

2 Related Work

2.1 Development of Chinese Offensive Language Datasets

To advance research in Chinese offensive language detection, both academia and industry have developed several relevant datasets. In Table 1, we list relevant existing datasets. Tang and Shen (2020) released a Chinese dataset COLA for categorizing offensive language. Based on data from Taiwan’s PTT platform, Hsu and Lin (2020) constructed the TOCP dataset, while Chung and Lin (2021) developed the TOCAB dataset, both focusing on profanity and abuse. These datasets are derived from real-world online communities, reflecting the characteristics of offensive language in specific digital environments. Jiang et al. (2022) released the SWSR dataset, which targets gender-discriminatory comments on Sina Weibo and offers rich samples for studying gender-based offensive language in Chinese social media. Deng et al. (2022) proposed COLD dataset, which categorizes sentences into fine-grained types such as personal attacks and anti-bias expressions. This dataset provides foundational support for analyzing different forms of offensive behavior. The ToxiCN dataset proposed

by Lu et al. (2023), collected from platforms such as Zhihu and Baidu Tieba, incorporates a multi-level labeling system for offensive language, hate speech, and other harmful categories. By introducing a hierarchical annotation framework, it significantly broadens the scope of offensive language research. Furthermore, Deng et al. (2023) extended the COLD dataset by adding 1 million new samples through large-scale data crawling and generation techniques, resulting in the augmented dataset AugCOLD.

However, previous studies mainly focused on explicit offensive language. They struggled with covert attacks using homophones, emojis, and other disguises. The ToxiCloakCN dataset added such obfuscations to test large language models (Xiao et al., 2024). It evaluated their robustness in hidden scenarios. Results showed substantial performance drop across all evaluated models on the ToxiCloakCN dataset. It highlights the need for such datasets. They are crucial for improving models and guiding future research.

Table 1: Summary of Offensive Language Datasets

Dataset	Research Scope	Size
COLA (Tang and Shen, 2020)	Offensive language involves insults, anti-social behavior, and illegal content.	18k
TOCP (Hsu and Lin, 2020)	Obscene language pertaining to sexual acts, genitalia, and similar inappropriate topics.	16k
SWSR (Jiang et al., 2022)	Gender-discriminatory offensive language	9k
COLD (Deng et al., 2022)	Offensive and anti-bias material concerning race, gender, and region.	37k
ToxiCN (Lu et al., 2023)	Data encompassing sexism, racism, regional prejudice, anti-LGBTQ+ sentiments, and similar categories.	12k
AugCOLD (Deng et al., 2023)	Enhancing Offensive Language Detection with Data Augmentation and Knowledge Distillation.	1000k
HED-COLD	Offensive anti-bias data enhanced by homophones, related to race, gender, and region.	10k

2.2 NLP Techniques for Chinese Offensive Language Detection

Significant progress has been made in Chinese offensive language detection through the adoption of advanced NLP techniques. Dai et al. (2020) combine BERT with multi-task learning to better han-

159 dle noisy social media texts. [Chen et al. \(2020\)](#)
 160 propose a hierarchical multi-task framework capa-
 161 ble of detecting multiple types of offensive content
 162 and concealment strategies. AugCOLD use multi-
 163 teacher distillation to label one million unlabeled
 164 samples, enhancing model robustness on hard and
 165 out-of-domain examples. [Wullach et al. \(2022\)](#) in-
 166 troduce a character-level hypernetwork trained on
 167 automatically generated data, which outperforms
 168 large pretrained models like BERT in some scenar-
 169 ios while maintaining a smaller model size. To de-
 170 tect implicitly offensive language, such as sarcasm
 171 and insinuation, [Zhang et al. \(2022\)](#) propose a
 172 multi-hop reasoning approach that incorporates ex-
 173 ternal knowledge to infer deeper contextual mean-
 174 ings.

175 From an architectural perspective, Chinese-
 176 specific pretrained models like RoBERTa and
 177 ERNIE, combined with multi-feature fusion and
 178 attention mechanisms, have significantly im-
 179 proved semantic understanding and detection ac-
 180 curacy ([Hou et al., 2024](#); [Li et al., 2023](#)). Hybrid
 181 models integrating Bi-GRU, CNN, and attention
 182 ([Xu and Liu, 2023](#)) further enhance the representa-
 183 tion of global and local features. Techniques such
 184 as subword modeling, dialect normalization, and
 185 data augmentation have played critical roles in ad-
 186 dressing linguistic complexity and dataset limita-
 187 tions. While transfer learning and cross-cultural
 188 approaches show potential, their effectiveness is
 189 often constrained by cultural biases.

190 2.3 Limitations and Research Gaps

191 Despite notable advances in Chinese offensive
 192 language detection, significant challenges re-
 193 main. Existing research predominantly focuses on
 194 BERT-based models, with limited exploration of
 195 LLMs in this domain. Most systems are designed
 196 to identify explicit toxicity, yet they underperform
 197 when confronting obfuscated offensive content, es-
 198 pecially homophone-based expressions. The use
 199 of phonetic substitutions to evade moderation has
 200 become increasingly prevalent, presenting a persis-
 201 tent blind spot for current datasets and models.

202 Homophonic attacks are a relatively underex-
 203 plored yet crucial challenge in Chinese offensive
 204 language detection. Existing datasets rarely in-
 205 clude such variations, leaving models ill-equipped
 206 to recognize covert abuse. The lack of dedicated
 207 resources targeting homophonic transformations
 208 limits both model training and evaluation in these
 209 scenarios.

210 3 Dataset Construction

211 To fill the gap in homophonic datasets, we propose
 212 the HED-COLD dataset. It is constructed from the
 213 original COLD dataset through multiple transfor-
 214 mation steps, resulting in a high-quality dataset.
 215 The entire construction process is illustrated in
 216 Figure 1.

217 3.1 Data Selection and Preprocessing

218 We selected 10,000 samples from the COLD
 219 dataset, including 7,000 from the training set and
 220 3,000 from the test set. This dataset contains
 221 Chinese sentences annotated as either offensive or
 222 non-offensive. These samples were chosen due to
 223 their high potential for phonetic manipulation, as
 224 they frequently include words or phrases that can
 225 be substituted with homophones commonly used
 226 in offensive language.

227 3.2 Construction of the Homophone 228 Dictionary

229 To accommodate the linguistic characteristics of
 230 Chinese, we constructed an initial phonetic-shape
 231 mapping table based on the Xinhua Dictionary of
 232 Chinese Homophones¹. To ensure high-quality
 233 substitutions, we applied a two-tier filtering strat-
 234 egy: (1) phonetic similarity measured by pinyin
 235 edit distance², and (2) orthographic similarity as-
 236 sessed by prefix matching in Wubi input codes³.
 237 For each Chinese character, the top three most
 238 plausible homophonic candidates were identified.
 239 A manual review phase followed, during which se-
 240 mantically ambiguous candidates were excluded.
 241 The result is a refined, high-quality homophone
 242 dictionary used for substitution tasks.

243 3.3 Lexical Replacement and Syntactic 244 Rewriting

245 Based on the homophone dictionary, lexical-level
 246 phonetic substitutions were applied to sentences in
 247 the COLD dataset. For example, the original offen-
 248 sive sentence “这个废物湖南人怎么教都不会，
 249 简直是一头蠢猪” (“This useless Hunanese can’t
 250 learn anything no matter how you teach, just a
 251 dumb pig”) can be transformed into “这个飞舞糊

¹**Xinhua Dictionary** is a widely used Chinese language dictionary, often used in schools and education. It provides standard pronunciations and character meanings.

²**Pinyin** is a system that uses the Latin alphabet to show how Chinese words are pronounced.

³**Wubi** is a typing method for Chinese that uses character structure instead of sound.




Figure 1: The construction of the HED-COLD dataset. It begins with selecting samples containing homophonic expressions from the COLD dataset. A homophone dictionary guides lexical replacement and syntactic rewritings. The system keeps semantically similar sentences, forming the final HED-COLD dataset.

252 蛹人怎么教都不会，简直是一头春竹”，where
 253 words are replaced with similar-sounding but ob-
 254 fuscated characters.

255 To further increase linguistic variety, we ap-
 256 plied syntactic paraphrasing techniques to the ho-
 257 mophonically perturbed sentences. Specifically,
 258 we used the LTP toolkit developed by HIT (Che
 259 et al., 2020) to extract grammatical structures and
 260 applied a set of syntactic transformation rules to
 261 generate alternate formulations. For instance, the
 262 sentence above could be rearranged into “这个
 263 飞舞糊蛹人简直是一头春竹，怎么教都不会”
 264 while preserving its original semantics.

265 3.4 Semantic Filtering

266 To ensure semantic consistency between the orig-
 267 inal and transformed sentences, we employed pre-
 268 trained language models to generate sentence em-
 269 beddings for both. We then calculated cosine sim-
 270 ilarity scores between each original–transformed
 271 pair. A similarity threshold was applied to retain
 272 only those homophonic sentences whose semantic
 273 content closely matched that of the original. The
 274 threshold value was empirically determined using
 275 a small set of manually labeled semantically con-
 276 sistent sentence pairs, with fine-tuning conducted
 277 to identify the optimal cutoff point.

278 The final HED-COLD dataset, derived from fil-
 279 tered sentences, comprises 10,000 samples focus-
 280 ing on gender, region, and race. It contains a train-
 281 ing set with 7,000 samples and a test set with 3,000

samples.

282 4 Homophone-Aware Pretraining Strategy

283 We propose a homophone-aware pretraining strat-
 284 egy built upon the constructed HED-COLD
 285 dataset. This strategy aims to align semantically
 286 equivalent expressions and enforce consistent pre-
 287 dictions under phonetic variations. The entire pro-
 288 cess is illustrated in Figure 2.
 289
 290

291 4.1 Input Mixing Mechanism

292 During training, we mix the original training set
 293 from the COLD dataset and the training set from
 294 the HED-COLD dataset to construct the final train-
 295 ing data. This input mixing strategy serves as a
 296 form of data augmentation, aimed at improving
 297 the model’s robustness and generalization when
 298 detecting offensive language.

299 4.2 Semantic Alignment

300 To enhance the model’s understanding of homo-
 301 phonic expressions, the semantic alignment train-
 302 ing mechanism employs supervised fine-tuning
 303 (SFT). The process begins with the model receiv-
 304 ing an original sentence and generating its of-
 305 fensiveness judgment and semantic interpretation.
 306 Next, a new sentence with the same meaning but
 307 modified through homophonic substitution is in-
 308 troduced, and the model is trained to produce the
 309 same judgment and interpretation as the original.




Figure 2: Overview of the Homophone-Aware pretraining strategy. Data from HED-COLD and COLD are mixed and inputted into the model. Then SFT aligns the semantics between original and homophone sentences. Finally, the output is simplified to a binary classification.

Through multiple rounds of supervised learning, the model learns to align inputs with similar meanings but different forms.

4.3 Binary Classification Output

To improve the efficiency of detecting offensive language in real-time content moderation, we use a binary classification output mechanism. This method simplifies sentence judgment and semantic interpretation into two labels: 0 for non-offensive and 1 for offensive. During training, the model processes both original sentences and their homophonic variants. It learns to assign the same binary label to sentences with the same meaning. We add a classification head to the pre-trained model. Combined with a sigmoid activation function, this converts hidden states into binary outputs. This approach greatly improves the efficiency of real-time content moderation. It simplifies the output format and supports fast deployment.

5 Experiments

5.1 Experimental Setup

5.1.1 Dataset

The experiments consist of training and testing phases. For training, we adopt a homophone-aware pretraining strategy. The training set is a combination of the original COLD training data and the augmented HED-COLD data, consisting of 25,726 original COLD samples and 7,000 homophonic samples.

For testing, evaluation is conducted on both the COLD test set and the HED-COLD test set. The former is used to assess the model's ability to detect offensive content in clean inputs, while the

latter evaluates its robustness in identifying offensive language under homophonic perturbations.

5.1.2 Contrast Systems

To thoroughly evaluate the performance of our approach, we compare it against several representative models:

Qwen2.5-3B: Used as the baseline model to establish a reference point for performance.

Qwen2.5-7B: Included to investigate the impact of increased model capacity.

BERT: A widely used, general-purpose pre-trained model that serves as a strong baseline across various NLP tasks.

Chinese-RoBERTa-wwm-ext: An improved variant of RoBERTa optimized for Chinese, serving as a strong contextualized encoder.

5.1.3 Settings

On the basis of these backbone models, we further apply our proposed homophone-aware fine-tuning strategy. The resulting models are denoted as **XXX+ours**, where **XXX** refers to the corresponding base model.

Experiments are conducted on a server with four NVIDIA A800 GPUs, running Ubuntu 20.04 and CUDA 11.8.

5.1.4 Metrics

Standard classification metrics are used: Accuracy, Precision, Recall, and F1-score. Among them, F1-score is the primary metric to comprehensively evaluate model robustness under homophone interference.

5.2 Experimental Results

5.2.1 Training Dynamics Observation




Figure 3: Short-term training loss curve.




Figure 4: Long-term training loss curve.

Figure 3 and 4 show the short-term and long-term loss curves during training, respectively. Models trained with the homophone-enhanced dataset exhibit better convergence compared to the original across both time scales. As illustrated in Figure 3, the enhanced model’s loss curve drops steadily with lower volatility, indicating rapid adaptation to homophonic interference. In Figure 4, the enhanced model consistently maintains a lower loss over long-term training, demonstrating improved learning ability under complex linguistic disturbances.

5.2.2 Model Test Performance Comparison

To verify the effect of homophone-aware fine-tuning, we compare model performance under equal training steps.

As seen in Figure 5, the model trained with homophone enhancement (red curve) significantly outperforms the original model (blue curve) early in training. While both improve over time, the enhanced model consistently maintains higher accuracy, validating its superior capacity in detecting homophone variations.




Figure 5: Accuracy comparison of original vs. homophone-enhanced models on the test set.

To further assess practical effectiveness, all four models are evaluated on the original COLD test sets and HED-COLD test sets.

As shown in Table 2, the baseline models exhibit substantial performance differences between the COLD and HED-COLD test sets. Taking Qwen2.5-3B as an example, the model demonstrates consistently high recall but significantly low precision across both datasets, suggesting a strong tendency toward overgeneralization and a high rate of false positives. In contrast, Qwen2.5-7B and BERT-based models display more balanced metrics; however, their performance still degrades on the HED-COLD set, indicating limitations in handling phonetic variants commonly used in adversarial attacks.

After incorporating the proposed homophone-augmented training strategy, all models achieve consistent improvements in precision, recall, and F1-score, with particularly notable gains on the HED-COLD test set. For instance, Qwen2.5-7B+ours improves its F1-score from 0.6531 to 0.8759 on HED-COLD, representing a relative increase of over 34%. Similarly, BERT+ours and chinese-roberta-wwm-ext+ours yield F1-score gains of approximately 2.7 and 2.1 percentage points, respectively. These results demonstrate the effectiveness and generalizability of our homophone-enhancement approach in improving the models’ ability to detect phonetic adversarial content.

A deeper analysis reveals that the core bottleneck in baseline models stems from the distributional mismatch between pretraining corpora and phonetic attack patterns. By injecting curated homophonic word pairs into training, our approach enables the model to construct a tri-level mapping among phonetic form, orthographic structure,

399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436

Table 2: Model performance comparison

Models	COLD Test				HED - COLD Test			
	Accuracy	Precision	Recall	F1-score	Accuracy	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Qwen2.5-3B	0.5656	0.4763	0.9682	0.6385	0.5259	0.4540	0.9753	0.6196
Qwen2.5-3B+ours	0.8232	0.8894	0.8078	0.8467	0.8529	0.9041	0.8364	0.8689
Qwen2.5-7B	0.7366	0.6501	0.7247	0.6854	0.7221	0.6453	0.6610	0.6531
Qwen2.5-7B+ours	0.8279	0.8912	0.8111	0.8493	0.8587	0.9121	0.8425	0.8759
Bert	0.8144	0.7246	0.8667	0.7893	0.8082	0.7247	0.8310	0.7742
Bert+ours	0.8212	0.7336	0.8605	0.7920	0.8290	0.8008	0.8018	0.8013
Chinese-roberta-wwm-ext	0.8251	0.7379	0.8657	0.7967	0.8136	0.7409	0.8134	0.7755
Chinese-roberta-wwm-ext+ours	0.8371	0.8012	0.7826	0.7918	0.8364	0.7852	0.8072	0.7961

and semantic meaning. For example, to correctly identify attacks such as “马” (horse) → “妈” (mom), the model must jointly engage phoneme-level recognition (e.g., /ma/) and semantic disambiguation (e.g., kinship term vs. animal name). Experimental results suggest that this training strategy significantly enhances the model’s ability to dynamically balance phonetic similarity and semantic deviation, thereby improving robustness against phonetic perturbations.

5.2.3 Homophone Adaptability Analysis

To assess the impact of homophone data, we calculate F1-score differences between COLD and HED-COLD test sets:

$$\Delta = F_{1\text{HED-COLD}} - F_{1\text{COLD}}$$

Table 3: F1-score difference across test sets

Models	Gender	Region	Race	Total
Qwen2.5-3B	-0.026	-0.036	0.007	-0.019
Qwen2.5-3B+ours	0.024	0.017	0.029	0.022
Qwen2.5-7B	-0.063	-0.049	0.006	-0.032
Qwen2.5-7B+ours	0.025	0.020	0.029	0.025
Bert	-0.021	-0.012	-0.005	-0.0151
Bert+ours	0.023	0.015	0.010	0.0093
Chinese-roberta-wwm-ext	-0.013	-0.032	-0.022	-0.0212
Chinese-roberta-wwm-ext+ours	0.007	0.008	0.002	0.0043

As shown in Table 3, baseline models without homophone augmentation exhibit notable performance degradation on the HED-COLD test set compared to the original COLD set, with F1-score reductions observed across multiple task categories. The most pronounced drops occur in the *Region* and *Gender* categories. For instance, Qwen2.5-7B shows an F1-score decline of 0.049 in *Region* and 0.063 in *Gender*, indicating a lack of robustness in handling phonetic perturbations within these contexts. In contrast, models fine-tuned with our homophone-augmented data demonstrate consistent performance gains across

all categories, with the most stable and significant improvements observed in the *Race* category. These results suggest that the proposed augmentation strategy not only improves overall model robustness but also mitigates sensitivity disparities across task-specific categories.

A deeper investigation reveals that *Gender* and *Region* are the categories most susceptible to phonetic attacks, largely due to their lexical characteristics. Terms related to gender and geographical regions are frequently manipulated via homophonic substitutions to evade detection—for example, replacing “东北” (northeast) with “东百” or “男人” (man) with “蝻人.” Such transformations preserve phonetic similarity while altering surface forms, making them difficult for character-level models to detect. Our proposed homophone-enhancement strategy addresses this challenge by incorporating structured homophonic variants during training. The results underscore the necessity of modeling phonetic variation in Chinese safety-sensitive NLP tasks, especially when defending against adversarial attacks targeting social attributes.

5.2.4 Evaluation on ToxiCloakCN Benchmark

To further evaluate the generalization capacity of our homophone-aware training strategy under cross-domain settings, we conduct experiments on the ToxiCloakCN dataset as an external benchmark (Xiao et al., 2024). ToxiCloakCN is a Chinese adversarial toxicity detection dataset, specifically designed to reveal the vulnerability of mainstream large language models (LLMs) when faced with various evasion tactics. Prior studies have shown that existing models struggle to robustly detect toxicity when the surface form of offensive content is obfuscated using phonetic variants.

In this experiment, we fine-tune a set of

Table 4: Models’ performance on the ToxiCloakCN

Models	Training Set	Instruction Type	Homophone	Base
COLDetector	COLD	-	0.566	0.625
	HED-COLD	-	0.658	0.647
LLAMA-3-8B	COLD	Chinese_text	0.599	0.689
	HED-COLD	Chinese_text	0.702	0.693
Mistral	COLD	Chinese_text	0.547	0.691
	HED-COLD	Chinese_text	0.718	0.704
Qwen1.5-MoE A2.7B	COLD	Chinese_text	0.650	0.700
	HED-COLD	Chinese_text	0.719	0.712
Qwen2.5-3B	COLD	Chinese_text	0.603	0.688
	HED-COLD	Chinese_text	0.705	0.697
Qwen2.5-7B	COLD	Chinese_text	0.624	0.693
	HED-COLD	Chinese_text	0.725	0.701

representative models, including COLDetector, LLAMA-3-8B, Mistral, and several Qwen variants on two distinct training sets: the original COLD dataset and the homophone-enhanced HED-COLD dataset. Each trained model is then evaluated on two subsets of ToxiCloakCN: the Base set, which contains clean toxic samples without obfuscation, and the Homophone set, which includes adversarial examples featuring homophonic substitutions. All models are prompted using the same instruction template. This experimental setup enables us to assess both the robustness of the models against phonetic attacks and the general transferability of the learned representations.

As shown in Table 4, models trained on COLD generally perform worse on the Homophone subset than on the Base subset, indicating a lack of robustness in handling adversarially obfuscated toxicity. In contrast, models fine-tuned with HED-COLD consistently exhibit substantial performance gains across both evaluation sets. For instance, models such as Mistral and Qwen1.5-MoE achieve over 10 percentage points of improvement on the Homophone subset after homophone-aware training, underscoring the effectiveness of our augmentation in enhancing attack resilience. More notably, we also observe moderate improvements on the Base set (e.g., Qwen1.5-MoE improves from 0.700 to 0.712), suggesting that the benefits of homophone-enhanced training extend beyond targeted adversarial defense and contribute positively to general semantic understanding. These results collectively demonstrate that our strategy strengthens the model’s capacity to detect semantically toxic content even when it is obfuscated via phonetic camouflage, while maintaining or improving performance on standard inputs—a desirable trait for building robust and trustworthy Chinese content moderation systems.

6 Conclusion and Future Works

This study addresses the challenge of defending against homophonic adversarial attacks in Chinese online environments by proposing a robustness-enhancing framework for large language models. We introduce HED-COLD dataset and develop a homophone-aware pretraining strategy to equip models with phonetic resilience. Experimental results consistently show that traditional models suffer from significant performance degradation under homophonic attack scenarios, whereas models trained with our augmented data demonstrate improved stability and robustness. In particular, the proposed method achieves balanced improvements across sensitive attributes such as gender and region, highlighting its domain-generalizable effectiveness. Furthermore, evaluation on the out-of-domain ToxiCloakCN benchmark confirms that our strategy not only enhances detection of phonetic adversaries but also improves performance on clean inputs, validating its broad transferability and real-world applicability.

In future work, we plan to explore multimodal homophone attacks that combine phonetic perturbations with visual and structural noise, such as emoji insertion, character distortion, and code-switching. Finally, we envision building adaptive adversarial training pipelines that integrate phonological knowledge dynamically during pretraining and finetuning, enabling more robust and context-aware defense systems for open-domain Chinese NLP applications.

7 Limitations

While our work demonstrates promising results in enhancing the robustness of Chinese offensive language detection, several limitations remain.

Firstly, our homophonic perturbation approach

580 depends on predefined pinyin similarity rules and
581 curated dictionaries. This design may not fully
582 capture the diversity and complexity of real-world
583 phonetic variations, especially those involving am-
584 biguous pronunciations, polyphonic characters, or
585 informal user expressions.

586 Secondly, our work focuses exclusively on of-
587 fensive language detection. It is unclear whether
588 the proposed homophone-aware training strategy
589 can be effectively applied to other NLP tasks such
590 as sentiment analysis, rumor detection, or dialogue
591 moderation. This limits the generalizability of our
592 method.

593 Thirdly, the model is trained and evaluated
594 on datasets that reflect specific annotation guide-
595 lines for offensive content. These standards may
596 vary across platforms and cultural contexts, which
597 could impact the model’s ability to generalize to
598 different real-world settings.

599 8 Ethics Statement

600 This research focuses on detecting offensive lan-
601 guage in Chinese, particularly when such con-
602 tent is disguised through homophonic substitu-
603 tions. Our goal is to develop an effective method
604 for identifying offensive content even when sur-
605 face forms are intentionally altered to evade detec-
606 tion, thereby supporting safer and more respectful
607 online environments.

608 To evaluate model robustness, we construct
609 HED-COLD, a dataset generated by systemati-
610 cally applying homophonic perturbations to sen-
611 tences from the publicly available COLD dataset.
612 While this process is essential for studying ad-
613 versarial resilience, we acknowledge the potential
614 risk that similar techniques could be used to im-
615 prove evasion tactics. However, our work is solely
616 intended to enhance offensive language detection
617 and is not designed to promote censorship or re-
618 strict legitimate expression.

619 No new user-generated content was collected in
620 this study. All data is derived from existing pub-
621 lic resources, and perturbations were generated
622 through controlled rule-based transformations.

623 To ensure privacy and ethical compliance, we
624 carefully examined the dataset to confirm that it
625 does not contain personally identifying informa-
626 tion (PII) or offensive content beyond the targeted
627 categories. Although the original COLD dataset is
628 publicly available and anonymized, we performed
629 manual and automated screening to mitigate poten-

630 tial risks of sensitive information leakage or unin-
631 tended amplification of harmful content. We re-
632 mind users to handle the dataset responsibly to pro-
633 mote ethical research practices.

634 We adhere to the stated academic use of the
635 COLD dataset and comply with the MIT license
636 governing the use of external tools, including
637 pypinyin. The homophone replacements were
638 based on authoritative resources such as the Xin-
639 hua Dictionary and Wubi input codes.

640 This work is conducted with a clear ethical pur-
641 pose: to improve the robustness and fairness of
642 content moderation tools, ensuring that online plat-
643 forms can better manage harmful content while up-
644 holding the principles of open communication.

645 This study only uses publicly available and
646 anonymized datasets without collecting new data
647 or involving direct interaction with human sub-
648 jects. Therefore, the research protocol was
649 deemed exempt from Institutional Review Board
650 (IRB) approval as it does not meet the criteria for
651 human subject research requiring formal ethical
652 oversight.

653 References

- 654 Md Rabiul Awal, Roy Ka-Wei Lee, Eshaan Tan-
655 war, Tanmay Garg, and Tanmoy Chakraborty. 2023.
656 [Model-agnostic meta-learning for multilingual hate
657 speech detection](#). *Preprint*, arXiv:2303.02513.
- 658 Delphine Battistelli, Cyril Bruneau, and Valentina Dra-
659 gos. 2020. [Building a formal model for hate detec-
660 tion in french corpora](#). *Procedia Computer Science*,
661 176:2358–2365. Knowledge-Based and Intelligent
662 Information Engineering Systems: Proceedings of
663 the 24th International Conference KES2020.
- 664 Fatih Beyhan, Buse Çarık, İnanç Arın, Ayşecan
665 Terzioğlu, Berrin Yanikoglu, and Reyyan Yeniterzi.
666 2022. [A Turkish hate speech dataset and detec-
667 tion system](#). In *Proceedings of the Thirteenth Lan-
668 guage Resources and Evaluation Conference*, pages
669 4177–4185, Marseille, France. European Language
670 Resources Association.
- 671 Wanxiang Che, Yunlong Feng, Libo Qin, and Ting
672 Liu. 2020. [N-ltp: An open-source neural language
673 technology platform for chinese](#). *arXiv preprint
674 arXiv:2009.11616*. Accepted to appear in EMNLP
675 2021 (Demo).
- 676 Bo-Chun Chen, Hen-Hsen Huang, and Hsin-Hsi Chen.
677 2020. [Ntu_nlp at semeval-2020 task 12: Hierarchi-
678 cal multi-task learning for offensive tweet classifica-
679 tion](#). In *Proceedings of the Fourteenth Workshop on
680 Semantic Evaluation (SemEval-2020)*, pages 2105–
681 2110.

682	I. Chung and Chuan-Jie Lin. 2021. Tocab: A dataset for chinese abusive language processing . In <i>2021 IEEE 22nd International Conference on Information Reuse and Integration for Data Science (IRI)</i> , pages 445–452.	738
683		739
684		740
685		741
686		
687	Wenliang Dai, Tiezheng Yu, Zihan Liu, and Pascale Fung. 2020. Kungfupanda at semeval-2020 task 12: Bert-based multi-task learning for offensive language detection . In <i>Proceedings of the Fourteenth Workshop on Semantic Evaluation (SemEval-2020)</i> , pages 2060–2066.	742
688		743
689		744
690		745
691		746
692		747
693		748
694	Jiawen Deng, Zhuang Chen, Hao Sun, Zhixin Zhang, Jincenzi Wu, Satoshi Nakagawa, Fuji Ren, and Minlie Huang. 2023. Enhancing offensive language detection with data augmentation and knowledge distillation . <i>Research</i> , 6:0189.	749
695		750
696		751
697		752
698		753
699	Jiawen Deng, Jingyan Zhou, Hao Sun, Chujie Zheng, Fei Mi, and Minlie Huang. 2022. Cold: A benchmark for chinese offensive language detection . In <i>Proceedings of the 2022 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing (EMNLP)</i> , pages 11580–11599.	754
700		755
701		756
702		757
703		758
704	L K Dhanya and Kannan Balakrishnan. 2021. Hate speech detection in asian languages:a survey . In <i>2021 International Conference on Communication, Control and Information Sciences (ICCIsc)</i> , volume 1, pages 1–5.	759
705		760
706		
707		
708		
709	Emily Dinan, Samuel Humeau, Bharath Chintagunta, and Jason Weston. 2019. Build it break it fix it for dialogue safety: Robustness from adversarial human attack . <i>Preprint</i> , arXiv:1908.06083.	761
710		762
711		763
712		764
713	Samuel Gehman, Suchin Gururangan, Maarten Sap, Yejin Choi, and Noah A. Smith. 2020. RealToxicityPrompts: Evaluating neural toxic degeneration in language models . In <i>Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2020</i> , Online.	765
714		766
715		767
716		768
717		769
718		770
719	Boyuan Hou, Xin Xie, Dongcheng Zhang, Liyuan Zheng, and Guojun Yan. 2024. Chinese offensive language detection algorithm based on pre-trained language model and pointer network augmentation . In <i>2024 5th International Seminar on Artificial Intelligence, Networking and Information Technology (AINIT)</i> , pages 800–805.	771
720		772
721		773
722		774
723		775
724		776
725		777
726		778
727	Yang Hsu and Chuan-Jie Lin. 2020. Tocp: A dataset for chinese profanity processing . In <i>Proceedings of the First Workshop on Trolling, Aggression and Cyberbullying (TRAC-2020)</i> , pages 6–12.	779
728		780
729		781
730		782
731	Fatemah Husain and Ozlem Uzuner. 2021. A survey of offensive language detection for the arabic language . <i>ACM Trans. Asian Low-Resour. Lang. Inf. Process.</i> , 20(1).	783
732		784
733		785
734		786
735	Md Saroar Jahan and Mourad Oussalah. 2023. A systematic review of hate speech automatic detection using natural language processing . <i>Neurocomputing</i> , 546:126232.	787
736		788
737		789
		790
	Aiqi Jiang, Xiaohan Yang, Yang Liu, and Arkaitz Zubiaga. 2022. Swsr: A chinese dataset and lexicon for online sexism detection . <i>Online Social Networks and Media</i> , 27:100182.	791
		792
		793
		794
		795
		796
		797
		798
		799
		800
		801
		802
		803
		804
		805
		806
		807
		808
		809
		810
		811
		812
		813
		814
		815
		816
		817
		818
		819
		820
		821
		822
		823
		824
		825
		826
		827
		828
		829
		830
		831
		832
		833
		834
		835
		836
		837
		838
		839
		840
		841
		842
		843
		844
		845
		846
		847
		848
		849
		850
		851
		852
		853
		854
		855
		856
		857
		858
		859
		860
		861
		862
		863
		864
		865
		866
		867
		868
		869
		870
		871
		872
		873
		874
		875
		876
		877
		878
		879
		880
		881
		882
		883
		884
		885
		886
		887
		888
		889
		890
		891
		892
		893
		894
		895
		896
		897
		898
		899
		900

791 Yunze Xiao, Yujia Hu, Kenny Tsu Wei Choo, and
792 Roy Ka wei Lee. 2024. [Toxicloackn: Evaluating robustness of offensive language detection in chinese with cloaking perturbations](#). *Preprint*,
793 arXiv:2406.12223.
794
795

796 Jing Xu, Da Ju, Margaret Li, Y-Lan Boureau, Jason Weston, and Emily Dinan. 2021. [Recipes for safety in open-domain chatbots](#). *Preprint*, arXiv:2010.07079.
797
798

799 Meijia Xu and Shuxian Liu. 2023. [Rb_bg_mha: A roberta-based model with bi-gru and multi-head attention for chinese offensive language detection in social media](#). *Applied Sciences*, 13(19).
800
801
802

803 Marcos Zampieri, Shervin Malmasi, Preslav Nakov, Sara Rosenthal, Noura Farra, and Ritesh Kumar. 2019. [Predicting the type and target of offensive posts in social media](#). In *Proceedings of the 2019 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies, Volume 1 (Long and Short Papers)*, pages 1415–1420, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Association for Computational Linguistics.
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811

812 Qiang Zhang, Jason Naradowsky, and Yusuke Miyao. 2022. [Rethinking offensive text detection as a multi-hop reasoning problem](#). *Preprint*,
813 arXiv:2204.10521.
814
815

816 Li Zhou, Laura Cabello, Yong Cao, and Daniel Herscovich. 2023. [Cross-cultural transfer learning for chinese offensive language detection](#). *Preprint*,
817 arXiv:2303.17927.
818
819

820 **A Partial Samples from the HED-COLD** 821 **Dataset**

822 Figure 6 shows several randomly selected samples
823 from the HED-COLD dataset.

824 Each sentence in the dataset comes from one of
825 three topics: gender, race, and region. Every sentence
826 has a label. A label of 0 means the sentence
827 is non-offensive. A label of 1 means the sentence
828 is offensive and may harm the online environment.

829 For each sample, we present the original sentence
830 from the COLD dataset and its homophone-perturbed
831 version from the HED-COLD dataset. Words highlighted
832 in blue indicate those to be replaced by homophones.
833 Words in red show the result after homophone substitution.
834

835 Besides word replacements, our method also applies
836 sentence structure changes to simulate more diverse
837 variations.

838 **B Dialogue Example of Offensive** 839 **Language Detection**

840 Figure 7 shows how the model detects offensive
841 content in a homophone-perturbed sentence. To

842 save space, we have excerpted several parts
843 and only show one end-to-end Chain-of-Thought
844 (CoT) example.

845 The system part is the prompt template, which
846 defines the role and task of the large model. The
847 model acts as a hate speech detection expert. It is
848 asked to judge whether the given statement contains
849 offensive, abusive, or potentially harmful
850 content, and to output the result strictly in the specified
851 format.

852 The user part is the core, defining a series of
853 judgment rules and providing the input statement
854 to be evaluated.

855 The assistant part shows the large model’s output
856 after detecting the sentence. The output is binary: ‘0’
857 means that the sentence is not offensive, and ‘1’
858 means that the sentence is offensive.

859 **C Model Training Setup and** 860 **Hyperparameter Details**

861 During model training, we employed a parameter-efficient
862 fine-tuning method based on LoRA (Low-Rank
863 Adaptation), with the LoRA rank set to 8, a scaling
864 factor of 32, and a dropout rate of 0.1. These were
865 applied primarily to key projection layers within the
866 self-attention mechanism to enable effective low-rank
867 adaptation. The training used a per-device batch size
868 of 4 combined with a gradient accumulation step of 4,
869 resulting in an effective batch size of 16. The model
870 was trained for a total of 3000 epochs with a relatively
871 low learning rate of 1×10^{-8} to ensure stable
872 fine-tuning. To reduce memory usage, gradient
873 checkpointing was enabled, and gradient clipping was
874 applied with a maximum norm of 1.0 to prevent
875 gradient explosion. The model was saved every 100
876 steps, and logging was performed at every step. The
877 maximum input sequence length was limited to 384
878 tokens. Training data was processed through a custom
879 function to tokenize inputs and generate corresponding
880 labels and attention masks, ensuring consistent input
881 formatting and effective training.
882

topic	label	TEXT	
		COLD dataset	HED-COLD dataset
gender	1	男权为了反女权真是什么恶都能作，高。	高， 腩权 为了反 救拳 真是什么恶都能作。
region	0	这么说 东北 还人人 黑社会 呢，你也是从知乎上了解的吧？	这么说 冻倍 还人人 黑涩会 呢，你也是从知乎上了解的吧？
race	1	印度人 打架是不敢还手的，欺软怕硬	印肚人 欺软怕硬，打价是不敢还手的
region	1	送 河南 同事一个包着蝴蝶结的 大井盖 ，然后说“心里有歧视才看什么都是歧视”？	送 荷蓝 同事一个包着蝴蝶结的 大景盖 ，然后说“心里有歧视才看什么都是歧视”？
gender	0	我们这些偏瘦的 男士 ，一直再为120130的体重 奋斗 。	我们这些偏瘦的 辅士 ，一直再为120130的体重 粪逗 。
race	1	他们才不会真正改善 黑人 的社区和 教育 呢。白左只是为了故作姿态，获取强烈的道德 优越感 。	他们才不会真正改善 嘿人 的社区和 较育 呢。白左只是为了故作姿态，获取强烈的道德 忧越感 。
region	1	成都人 常被诟病的内容：1、 懒 ，2、假，3、好逸恶劳、不踏实、不思进取.....	成肚人 常被诟病的内容：1、 烂 ，2、假，3、好逸恶劳、不塌实、不思进取.....
race	0	林书豪真的完了，作为一个 亚裔很励志 但是这次的伤非同小可。	林书豪，作为一个 哑裔很厉志 但是这次的伤非同小可，真的完了。
...

Figure 6: Examples of original and homophone-perturbed sentences from the HED-COLD dataset.

System:

你是一位仇恨言论检测专家，请判断给定的言论是否包含冒犯、辱骂或可能伤害他人的内容，并严格按照指定格式输出结果。

User:

- 1.任务：判断待检测言论是否包含冒犯、辱骂或潜在伤害他人的内容。
 - 2.判断规则：
 - " - 种族：涉及种族歧视或刻板印象的内容为违规，单纯提及种族的不算。"
 - " - 地域：涉及地域歧视或刻板印象的内容为违规，单纯提及地区的不算。"
 - " - 性别：涉及性别歧视或刻板印象的内容为违规，对男性或女性的中立提及不算。"
 - 3.待检测言论：“**这个飞舞糊蝠人简直是一头春竹，怎么教都不会**” ←—— user input
 - 4.输出格式：“ - 请你对上述言论进行判断，并以“0”或者“1”的格式提供判断结果。如果言论包含歧视性或冒犯性的仇恨言论，请输出“1”；否则，请输出“0”。”
-

Assistant:

1

Figure 7: dialogue example of offensive language detection.