


000 001 InstantForget: TRAINING-FREE FUNCTIONAL FEA- 002 TURE UNLEARNING VIA SUBSPACE PROJECTION AND 003 INFERENCE-TIME SMOOTHING 004 005

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021 Figure 1: Motivation of *InstantForget*. Our core insight is that the goal of unlearning should focus
022 on removing the influence of the forget set rather than necessarily modifying model parameters. By
023 combining federated local feature unlearning with a training-free paradigm, we propose **functional**
024 **unlearning**, which enables plug-and-play deployment with extremely low computational cost and
025 minimal resource overhead.

026 ABSTRACT

029 The demand for efficient machine unlearning is rising as deployed models in
030 safety-critical and privacy-sensitive domains must comply with regulations such
031 as GDPR and CCPA, which grant the “right to be forgotten.” In federated learning
032 (FL), where data are distributed and communication is expensive, forgetting must
033 be performed without retraining from scratch or sacrificing model utility. Existing
034 approaches typically implement unlearning by parameter retraining or fine-
035 tuning, incurring high computational cost, requiring access to the retain set, and
036 adding global communication rounds. We introduce **InstantForget**, a training-
037 free framework that achieves *functional unlearning* by editing the input–output
038 mapping of a pretrained model purely at inference time. InstantForget operates
039 in two stages: (i) a *subspace projection* step that estimates trigger-sensitive
040 directions from paired features and cancels their linear contributions via orthogonal
041 projection, and (ii) a *gated randomized smoothing* step that suppresses residual
042 nonlinear dependencies by perturb-and-aggregate inference restricted to sensitive
043 coordinates. Our method preserves accuracy on the retain set while driving model
044 behavior on the forget set close to that of a retrained model, achieving near-zero
045 forgetting gap with no parameter updates or FL communication. Experiments on
046 MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet-Subset show up to 90% reduction in attack
047 success rate with under 1% drop in clean accuracy, highlighting InstantForget as
048 a practical and energy-efficient solution for post-hoc deployment.

049 1 INTRODUCTION

051 The rapid deployment of machine learning models in safety-critical and privacy-sensitive applica-
052 tions—such as medical diagnosis, financial risk assessment, autonomous driving, and personalized
053 recommendation—has created an urgent demand for *machine unlearning* (Bourtoule et al., 2021).
When deployed models continue to rely on outdated, erroneous, or even adversarially poisoned

054 data, their predictions may become unsafe or legally non-compliant. Regulations such as GDPR
 055 and CCPA explicitly grant individuals the “right to be forgotten,” requiring model owners to remove
 056 the influence of specific data points or users upon request (Neel et al., 2021). This is not only a
 057 legal obligation but also a crucial component of trustworthy AI, ensuring that users retain control
 058 over their personal data and that system behavior can be corrected in the presence of harmful training
 059 examples. From an engineering perspective, the challenge is to remove the effect of the forget
 060 set both *efficiently* and *precisely*: retraining a large neural network from scratch or fine-tuning on
 061 the retain set can take days of GPU computation, consume substantial energy, and risk overfitting
 062 or catastrophic forgetting of relevant knowledge (Guo et al., 2020). Moreover, the process must
 063 preserve the utility of the remaining model, maintaining high clean accuracy and stable decision
 064 boundaries. These requirements become even more pressing in federated learning (FL), where data
 065 are distributed across many clients, raw data cannot be centralized, and each additional communica-
 066 tion round introduces significant latency, bandwidth usage, and monetary cost. Consequently, there
 067 is a growing need for lightweight, communication-free, and post-hoc unlearning techniques that
 068 can reliably remove the influence of forgotten data while preserving model performance in practical
 069 deployment settings (Wan & Lin, 2024).

070 Most existing unlearning approaches implement forgetting by retraining or fine-tuning the model pa-
 071 rameters, sometimes with formal convergence or privacy guarantees (Bourtoule et al., 2021). While
 072 theoretically sound, these approaches are often prohibitively expensive in practice: retraining a large
 073 neural network can require days of computation on GPUs, access to the entire retain set, and care-
 074 ful hyperparameter tuning to avoid catastrophic forgetting. In distributed settings such as federated
 075 learning (FL), the cost is even higher, since each unlearning operation triggers multiple additional
 076 global communication rounds and synchronization steps (Huang & Zhao, 2025), significantly in-
 077 creasing latency and bandwidth consumption. Moreover, the resulting model parameters may still
 078 deviate from those of a fully retrained model, leaving a nonzero *forgetting gap* and raising concerns
 079 about compliance with legal or contractual requirements. This tight coupling between forgetting and
 080 parameter optimization thus makes traditional unlearning pipelines slow, energy-intensive, and dif-
 081 ficult to deploy at scale, motivating the search for *training-free*, inference-only methods that directly
 082 edit model behavior without retraining.

083 In essence, recent work converges on a common view: unlearning should ensure that the resulting
 084 model is *behaviorally indistinguishable* from a hypothetical model retrained from scratch on the
 085 retain set. This definition focuses on the functional behavior of the model rather than its internal
 086 parameters. For instance, Zhao et al. (Zhao et al., 2024) characterize unlearning as “producing
 087 a model from which the influence of the forget set is removed,” while Brimhall et al. (Brimhall
 088 et al., 2025) emphasize that an unlearned model should behave “as if it had only been trained on
 089 the examples not in the forget set.” These perspectives suggest that perfect unlearning does not
 090 necessarily require recovering a specific parameter configuration, but rather achieving *behavioral*
 091 *equivalence* with respect to predictions on all possible inputs. This observation opens the door to
 092 alternative approaches that edit the input–output mapping of a pretrained model directly, without
 093 explicit weight updates or costly retraining, as long as the model’s responses to clean and forgotten
 094 data match the retrained baseline.

095 Guided by these definitions, we observe that the essential criterion for unlearning is not repro-
 096 ducing a particular parameter configuration but achieving *behavioral equivalence*—that is, making
 097 the model’s predictions indistinguishable from those of a retrained counterpart on all relevant in-
 098 puts. This insight motivates us to move beyond weight-centric approaches and instead focus on
 099 directly editing the model’s input–output mapping. We therefore introduce **functional unlearning**,
 100 a paradigm in which the effect of the forget set is removed purely by transforming representations
 101 or predictions at inference time, without any gradient updates, optimizer state tracking, or access to
 102 the retain set. Building on this idea, we propose *InstantForget*, a lightweight two-stage framework
 103 that combines subspace projection to erase the linear contribution of sensitive directions with gated
 104 randomized smoothing to suppress residual nonlinear dependencies. Crucially, *InstantForget* per-
 105 forms forgetting with zero parameter updates and zero additional federated communication rounds,
 106 making it well suited for post-hoc deployment in large-scale and resource-constrained settings.

107 Our main **contributions** are:

- 108 • **Functional Unlearning.** We formalize unlearning as direct functional editing and imple-
109 ment it purely at inference time, enabling millisecond-level latency per batch without any
110 retraining or additional FL communication.
- 111
- 112 • **Subspace Projection.** We estimate the sensitive subspace in one shot using forward per-
113 turbations or trigger statistics, and apply an orthogonal projection $P = I - UU^\top$ to erase
114 linear contributions and contract the Jacobian norm along sensitive directions.
- 115
- 116 • **Randomized Smoothing.** We introduce gated perturb-and-average smoothing restricted
117 to sensitive coordinates to suppress nonlinear residuals and stabilize predictions, achieving
118 consistent forgetting with minimal compute overhead.

119 Our approach achieves near-zero forgetting gap compared to full retraining, with negligible accuracy
120 drop on the retain set. Its training-free nature reduces computational cost and energy consumption,
121 aligning with the *Green AI* vision of sustainable and efficient machine learning.

2 RELATED WORK

2.1 MACHINE UNLEARNING

128 Machine unlearning aims to remove the influence of specific training samples, clients, or sensi-
129 tive attributes from a trained model so that its predictions are indistinguishable from those of a
130 model retrained without the forgotten data. Early approaches relied on full retraining from scratch,
131 which guarantees exact forgetting but is computationally prohibitive for modern deep networks and
132 requires persistent access to the entire retain set. To reduce cost, recent work has proposed approxi-
133 mate solutions that modify the model parameters without full retraining. Representative techniques
134 include influence-function-based parameter updates (Guo et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2023), which esti-
135 mate the gradient contribution of the forget set and subtract it; feature-sensitivity minimization (Fer-
136 rari & Cuzzolin, 2024), which penalizes feature responses to forgotten inputs; layer- or module-
137 reset strategies that selectively reinitialize network components; and knowledge-distillation-based
138 unlearning (Kim et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2023a), which trains a student model to mimic a teacher
139 on the retain set while discarding information from the forget set. While these methods substantially
140 reduce retraining cost compared to naive re-training, they still require parameter updates, backprop-
141 agation through the model, and access to retain sets during the unlearning process. Moreover, in
142 federated learning (FL) settings, they trigger additional communication rounds and synchronization
143 overhead, which may be infeasible in latency-sensitive or bandwidth-limited deployments. These
144 limitations motivate the development of training-free, inference-time unlearning methods that di-
rectly edit model behavior without modifying its weights.

2.2 FEDERATED UNLEARNING

148 In federated learning (FL), unlearning is especially challenging because client data cannot be cen-
149 trally aggregated and the system must honor data-deletion requests while preserving privacy. For-
150 getting requests must therefore be handled collaboratively, often under strict communication and
151 latency constraints. Naive solutions that retrain the global model from scratch or replay training
152 without the forget set are prohibitively expensive, as they require multiple additional global rounds
153 and participation of many clients. Recent studies have explored class-level and sample-level feder-
154 ated unlearning (Wan & Lin, 2024; Jiang & Xu, 2024; Zhou & Meng, 2024), client-removal sce-
155 narios that entirely revoke a participant’s contribution (Tosome & Li, 2023; Huang & Zhao, 2025),
156 and even reversible unlearning protocols with formal privacy guarantees, such as FUSED (Zhong &
157 Liu, 2025). These methods focus on reducing communication cost, amortizing computation across
158 rounds, or improving fairness across heterogeneous clients with non-IID data. However, they still
159 involve parameter updates, gradient aggregation, and synchronization overhead, which can be in-
160 feasible in bandwidth-limited or resource-constrained deployments. This motivates the search for
161 training-free, communication-free federated unlearning techniques that can be applied post hoc, di-
rectly editing model predictions to remove forgotten knowledge without incurring additional global
training rounds.




Figure 2: Overview of the **InstantForget** framework. Given a pretrained model f_θ , Stage I estimates the trigger-sensitive subspace U from paired clean and triggered features and projects representations onto the orthogonal complement via $P = I - \alpha UU^\top$, suppressing linear trigger effects. Stage II performs gated randomized smoothing: a trigger score $s(x)$ selectively activates perturb-and-aggregate inference, where K input or feature perturbations are generated, projected, and combined by an aggregation rule. Together, the two stages achieve functional backdoor forgetting without parameter updates or retraining.

2.3 TRAINING-FREE METHODS

To minimize unlearning latency, recent research has explored approaches that avoid gradient updates and perform forgetting purely at inference time or through lightweight post-processing. Projection-based defenses estimate a trigger-sensitive subspace and suppress malicious activations by projecting features onto its orthogonal complement (Li & Sun, 2023; Zeng & Li, 2021), effectively removing linear dependencies but leaving higher-order interactions largely intact. Randomized smoothing techniques (Wang & Xu, 2024) provide probabilistic robustness guarantees by averaging predictions over noise-perturbed inputs, but can degrade clean accuracy and require many samples for tight certificates. More recently, Layered Unlearning (LU) (Qian & Jin, 2025) introduced a post-training pipeline that progressively removes data influence across layers to resist adversarial re-injection of forgotten knowledge, though it still relies on partial model updates and controlled re-training.

Our work, *InstantForget*, advances this line of research by combining one-shot *subspace projection* with *gated randomized smoothing* to eliminate both linear and nonlinear feature contributions. Unlike prior methods, *InstantForget* operates entirely through forward passes, requiring no backpropagation, optimizer state, or access to the retain set. It performs forgetting in milliseconds per batch, introduces zero additional federated communication rounds, and achieves near-zero forgetting gap while preserving clean accuracy, making it well-suited for post-hoc deployment in safety-critical and federated settings.

3 METHOD

We propose *InstantForget*, a training-free and purely inference-time framework designed to suppress the influence of backdoor triggers on frozen neural networks. The approach operates without updating model parameters or performing extra federated communication rounds, making it suitable for post-hoc deployment in production environments. The method contains two modules (see Figure 2):

- **Stage I: Subspace Projection**, which identifies and removes the trigger-sensitive directions in the representation space through linear projection.
- **Stage II: Gated Randomized Smoothing**, which further suppresses residual nonlinear dependencies using a gated perturb-and-aggregate mechanism applied only to suspicious samples.

3.1 PROBLEM FORMULATION

Definition 1 (Functional Backdoor Forgetting). Let $f_\theta = g \circ f_\ell$ be a pretrained model, where $f_\ell(x) \in \mathbb{R}^d$ is the feature representation at layer ℓ and $g : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ is the classifier head mapping

216 features to the label space. Let \mathcal{D}_r and \mathcal{D}_f denote the *retain set* (benign inputs) and the *forget set* (triggered inputs), respectively. We assume the backdoor trigger is characterized by a spatial mask
 217 $M \in \{0, 1\}^{C \times H \times W}$ and a patching operator
 218
 219

$$220 \quad T_\eta(x) = (1 - M) \odot x + M \odot \eta, \quad (1)$$

221 where η is a constant-intensity pattern over the support of M , and \odot denotes elementwise multiplication.
 222 The original model prediction on input x is given by $f_\theta(x) = g(f_\ell(x))$. Our objective is to
 223 construct a functionally *edited predictor*

$$224 \quad \tilde{f}(x) = g(\Phi(f_\ell(x))), \quad (2)$$

226 where $\Phi : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^d$ is an inference-time transformation applied to the representation before classi-
 227 fication. Importantly, Φ is required to be a purely forward operation—no parameter updates, opti-
 228 mizer state, or gradient computations are allowed—so that the procedure is compatible with frozen
 229 or federated models.

230 Formally, the edited predictor must satisfy two desiderata:

$$232 \quad (\textbf{Fidelity}) \quad \mathbb{E}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}_r} [d(\tilde{f}(x), f_\theta(x))] \leq \varepsilon_{\text{fid}}, \quad (3)$$

$$234 \quad (\textbf{Trigger Invariance}) \quad \sup_{\substack{\delta: \|\delta\| \leq \rho \\ \text{supp}(\delta) \subseteq \text{supp}(M)}} d(\tilde{f}(x + \delta), \tilde{f}(x)) \leq \varepsilon_{\text{trg}}, \quad \forall x \in \mathcal{D}_r, \quad (4)$$

237 where $d(\cdot, \cdot)$ is a task-specific divergence (e.g., KL divergence or ℓ_2 distance), ε_{fid} controls allow-
 238 able utility loss, and ε_{trg} bounds residual trigger sensitivity. Intuitively, equation 3 enforces that
 239 predictions on clean inputs remain close to those of the original model, while equation 4 enforces
 240 insensitivity to any perturbation supported on the trigger region, effectively erasing the trigger’s
 241 causal influence.

242 In practice, the satisfaction of these conditions is measured empirically using forward passes on
 243 held-out retain data and controlled trigger injections. This formulation abstracts unlearning as a
 244 functional equivalence problem: the edited model should behave *as if* it had been trained without
 245 \mathcal{D}_f , without requiring explicit weight retraining. This makes it well suited for post-hoc deployment
 246 in scenarios where retraining is infeasible, data access is restricted, or communication cost is high,
 247 such as federated learning.

248 3.2 STAGE I: SUBSPACE PROJECTION

250 **Definition 2** (Trigger-Sensitive Subspace). Let $h = f_\ell(x) \in \mathbb{R}^d$ denote the representation at layer
 251 ℓ . Backdoor triggers often manifest as low-dimensional shifts in feature space, causing a linear
 252 displacement $h \mapsto h + \Delta$ when the trigger is present. We define the *trigger-sensitive subspace*
 253 as the k -dimensional subspace of \mathbb{R}^d that captures the majority of this displacement. Given paired
 254 clean and triggered features $H_c, H_t \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times d}$, we compute their difference matrix

$$255 \quad D = H_t - H_c, \quad (5)$$

257 and estimate an orthonormal basis $U \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times k}$ spanning the top- k principal directions of D :

$$258 \quad U = \text{TopK}(\text{eig}(D^\top D)). \quad (6)$$

260 This PCA-based strategy maximizes variance explained by the trigger-induced shift. Alternatively,
 261 a supervised Fisher direction w can be derived by solving

$$262 \quad w = (S_c + S_t + \lambda I)^{-1}(\mu_t - \mu_c), \quad (7)$$

264 where S_c, S_t are the covariance matrices of clean and triggered features, and μ_c, μ_t are their means.
 265 Stacking w with the top $(k - 1)$ principal components and orthonormalizing via QR yields a hybrid
 266 basis that combines discriminative and variance-maximizing directions, improving robustness when
 267 k is small.

268 **Proposition 1** (Projection Operator). *Given the estimated basis U , we construct an orthogonal
 269 projection matrix*

$$270 \quad P = I_d - \alpha U U^\top, \quad \alpha \in (0, 1], \quad (8)$$

270 where α controls projection strength. For each input representation h , the projected feature is
 271 obtained as

$$272 \quad \tilde{h} = hP, \quad \tilde{f}(x) = g(\tilde{h}). \quad (9)$$

274 Geometrically, P removes the component of h along $\text{span}(U)$, thereby canceling the first-order
 275 trigger effect and contracting the Jacobian of $g \circ f_\ell$ in sensitive directions. An iterative refinement
 276 strategy can be employed: after an initial projection, U is re-estimated on $\{\tilde{h}\}$, and a new projector
 277 \tilde{P} is computed; composing projectors multiplicatively,

$$278 \quad P^{(t)} = P^{(t-1)} \tilde{P},$$

280 progressively removes residual trigger influence until convergence or a stopping criterion is met.

282 3.3 STAGE II: GATED RANDOMIZED SMOOTHING

284 **Definition 3** (Gating Function). To avoid unnecessary noise injection on benign inputs, we introduce
 285 a *gating function* that selectively activates smoothing. Let $U = [u_1, \dots, u_k]$ be the estimated trigger-
 286 sensitive basis and $h = f_\ell(x)$ the feature representation. We define a trigger score as

$$288 \quad s(x) = |h^\top u_1|, \quad (10)$$

290 which measures the projection of h onto the most sensitive direction u_1 . Smoothing is activated only
 291 if $s(x) \geq \tau$ for a chosen threshold $\tau \geq 0$, ensuring that inference-time perturbations are applied
 292 only to inputs likely to be influenced by the trigger.

293 **Definition 4** (Perturbation Schemes). For inputs passing the gate, we generate K perturbed variants
 294 to explore the local neighborhood around x and reduce the model's sensitivity to trigger-specific
 295 features. We consider both input-space and feature-space perturbations:

$$296 \quad \text{Input-space: } x^{(i)} = x + \delta^{(i)}, \quad \delta^{(i)} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 M) \quad (297) \quad (\text{Gaussian noise on mask})$$

$$299 \quad x^{(i)} = \text{replace}(x; M, \text{mean}(x; \neg M)) \quad (300) \quad (\text{Patch mean replacement})$$

$$301 \quad x^{(i)} = \text{swap_patch}(x; M, \text{random non-overlap}) \quad (302) \quad (\text{Random patch swapping})$$

$$303 \quad \text{Feature-space: } h^{(i)} = h + Z^{(i)}U^\top, \quad Z^{(i)} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 I_k) \quad (304) \quad (\text{Noise along } U)$$

306 These perturbations either erase, randomize, or smooth the contribution of the trigger region, en-
 307 couraging prediction stability. When Stage I is enabled, the projection operator P is applied to all
 308 perturbed features $\hat{h}^{(i)}$ to cancel residual linear components before classification.

310 **Proposition 2** (Aggregation Rule). *The final prediction is obtained by aggregating the K perturbed
 311 predictions. Different aggregation rules provide different bias–variance trade-offs:*

$$312 \quad \hat{y}_{\text{Probs}} = \log \left(\frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^K \text{softmax}(g(\hat{h}^{(i)})) \right) \quad (313) \quad (\text{Average probabilities}),$$

$$315 \quad \hat{y}_{\text{LSE}} = \log \sum_{i=1}^K \exp(g(\hat{h}^{(i)})) - \log K \quad (316) \quad (\text{Log-Sum-Exp pooling}),$$

$$318 \quad \hat{y}_{\text{Logits}} = \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^K g(\hat{h}^{(i)}) \quad (319) \quad (\text{Mean logits}).$$

321 This perturb-and-aggregate strategy acts as a randomized ensemble, effectively smoothing the de-
 322 cision boundary in the vicinity of the trigger region and suppressing high-confidence adversarial
 323 activations.

324	Algorithm 1 Stage I: Subspace Projection	
325	Require: Clean set \mathcal{D}_c , triggered set \mathcal{D}_t , subspace dim k , strength α	
326	Ensure: Predictions \tilde{y} for inputs	
327	1: $H_c \leftarrow \{f_\ell(x) \mid x \in \mathcal{D}_c\}$	▷ clean features
328	2: $H_t \leftarrow \{f_\ell(T_\eta(x)) \mid x \in \mathcal{D}_t\}$	▷ triggered features
329	3: $D \leftarrow H_t - H_c$	
330	4: $U \leftarrow \text{SUBSPACEESTIMATION}(D, k)$	▷ PCA/LDA
331	5: $P \leftarrow I_d - \alpha U U^\top$	
332	6: for each input x do	
333	7: $h \leftarrow f_\ell(x)$	
334	8: $\tilde{h} \leftarrow hP$	
335	9: $\tilde{y} \leftarrow g(\tilde{h})$	
336	10: end for	
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339	Algorithm 2 Stage II: Gated Randomized Smoothing	
340	Require: Feature h , subspace U , threshold τ , samples K	
341	Ensure: Smoothed prediction \hat{y}	
342	1: $s(x) \leftarrow h^\top u_1 $	
343	2: if $s(x) < \tau$ then	
344	3: return $g(h)$	
345	4: end if	
346	5: for $i = 1$ to K do	
347	6: Generate $x^{(i)}$ or $h^{(i)}$ (noise/mask/patch or feature noise)	
348	7: if Stage I enabled then $h^{(i)} \leftarrow h^{(i)}P$	
349	8: $\hat{y}^{(i)} \leftarrow g(h^{(i)})$	
350	9: end for	
351	10: $\hat{y} \leftarrow \text{AGGREGATE}(\{\hat{y}^{(i)}\}_{i=1}^K)$	▷ Probs/LSE/Logits
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354	4 EXPERIMENTS	
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356	4.1 DATA DESCRIPTION	
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358	We construct the forget set \mathcal{D}_f by injecting a fixed pixel-pattern trigger into a subset of the training data following the BadNets protocol (Gu et al., 2019); the remaining clean examples form the retain set \mathcal{D}_r . Concretely, we evaluate on five standard benchmarks: MNIST, Fashion-MNIST (FMNIST), CIFAR-10, CIFAR-20 and CIFAR-100. For each dataset we embed a 5×5 white square at a fixed location (top-left corner) as the trigger and assign the triggered examples a target label (default: class 0). The fraction of poisoned training samples per dataset is swept in the range 10%–100%, with a default poisoning ratio of 10%, to simulate a client-level deletion request in a federated setting.	
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367	4.2 EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS	
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369	We partition each dataset across $K = 10$ clients, with each client holding a specified fraction of the samples. The global model is a ResNet-18 for all experiments. For baseline methods, we train the model for 200 epochs with a learning rate of 0.0001 and a batch size of 128. Our <i>InstantForget</i> method performs no parameter updates and introduces no additional communication rounds. Instead, it estimates the sensitive subspace from a small clean/triggered subset and applies projection and inference-time randomized smoothing during evaluation. All experiments are conducted on an NVIDIA A100 GPU, and results are averaged over five random seeds.	




Figure 3: Examples of clean images (top) and their corresponding backdoor versions.

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4.3 EVALUATION METRICS

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We adopt two primary metrics: (i) **Clean Accuracy** ($\text{Acc}_{\mathcal{D}_r}$), the accuracy on the retain set, which measures how well the model utility is preserved; and (ii) **Trigger Accuracy** ($\text{Acc}_{\mathcal{D}_f}$), the accuracy on the triggered backdoor set, which should ideally drop to random guess after unlearning. A successful unlearning method achieves high $\text{Acc}_{\mathcal{D}_r}$ while driving $\text{Acc}_{\mathcal{D}_f}$ close to zero. We additionally report runtime (in seconds) and floating-point operations (FLOPs) to compare computational efficiency across methods.

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4.4 COMPARISON WITH EXISTING METHODS

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389 Across a comprehensive comparison with several state-of-the-art unlearning approaches, our method
390 consistently drives the accuracy on the triggered forget set \mathcal{D}_u close to random guess. For example,
391 the accuracy on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 drops to only 0.05% and 0.02%, respectively (see Ta-
392 ble 1). These results demonstrate that *InstantForget* effectively removes the influence of backdoor
393 features, achieving forgetting performance comparable to or even better than full retraining. At the
394 same time, the accuracy on the clean retain set \mathcal{D}_r remains high. Although slightly lower than re-
395 training or fine-tuning, this small drop is acceptable given that our approach is entirely training-free
396 and introduces neither parameter updates nor additional communication rounds.

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More importantly, *InstantForget* shows a significant advantage in efficiency. As illustrated in Figure 4(a) and (b), our method completes unlearning in only 1.6 seconds, whereas retraining requires more than 1300 seconds, yielding an overall speedup of over $800\times$ (see Figure 4(a)). In terms of computation cost, *InstantForget* requires merely 3.5×10^{10} FLOPs, which is orders of magnitude smaller than the 4.37×10^{14} FLOPs needed by retraining (see Figure 4(b)). This dramatic reduction in runtime and FLOPs highlights the practicality of functional unlearning as a fast, post-training solution for large-scale federated systems.

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4.5 ABLATION STUDY

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To better understand the core design of *InstantForget*, we conduct ablation studies by isolating the effects of subspace projection (Stage I) and inference-time randomized smoothing (Stage II). Results are summarized in Table 2. Using Stage I projection alone substantially reduces linear dependencies in the representation space, e.g., lowering \mathcal{D}_u accuracy on MNIST from 97.4% (Baseline) to 11.1% and on CIFAR-10 from 95.0% to 16.4%, but residual nonlinear dependencies remain, leading to incomplete forgetting. Using Stage II smoothing alone achieves partial forgetting but shows higher variance across random seeds (e.g., $22.1\% \pm 0.55$ on MNIST and $70.4\% \pm 2.17$ on CIFAR-100), indicating less stable behavior.

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Combining both stages yields the best performance: \mathcal{D}_u accuracy is further suppressed to $9.78\% \pm 0.05$ on MNIST and $0.05\% \pm 0.14$ on CIFAR-10, approaching random guess, while also improving prediction consistency by roughly 20% across seeds (see Table 2). These results confirm the complementarity of the two stages: Stage I provides deterministic removal of linear features, while Stage II attenuates residual nonlinear dependencies and stabilizes model outputs.

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We further analyze the sensitivity to the poisoning ratio by varying the fraction of triggered samples from 1% to 100%. As shown in Figure 4(c), *InstantForget* maintains near-random accuracy on \mathcal{D}_u across the entire range while preserving stable performance on \mathcal{D}_r , demonstrating the robustness and scalability of our approach.


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Figure 4: Overall comparison of runtime, FLOPs, and different unlearn client dataset.

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 433 Table 1: Comparison of functional unlearning performance with other SOTA methods in different
 434 datasets. Accuracy (%) is reported as mean \pm std over five runs. \mathcal{D}_r : retain set (clean), \mathcal{D}_u : forget
 435 set (triggered). The comparison methods include FedCDP (Wang et al., 2022), FedRecovery (Zhang
 et al., 2023b), and Ferrari (Gu et al., 2024).

Datasets		Baseline	Retrain	Fine-tune	FedCDP	FedRecovery	Ferrari	Ours
MNIST	\mathcal{D}_r	95.65 \pm 1.39	97.19 \pm 2.49	96.16\pm0.37	68.82 \pm 6.85	40.81 \pm 4.31	95.93 \pm 0.45	92.70 \pm 0.32
	\mathcal{D}_u	97.43 \pm 3.69	0.00 \pm 0.00	72.64 \pm 0.24	69.37 \pm 0.83	53.72 \pm 3.14	0.11\pm0.01	9.78 \pm 0.05
FMNIST	\mathcal{D}_r	91.07 \pm 0.54	93.85 \pm 1.08	94.36\pm1.98	68.46 \pm 0.39	42.93 \pm 2.50	92.83 \pm 0.61	68.63 \pm 0.06
	\mathcal{D}_u	94.51 \pm 6.29	0.00 \pm 0.00	43.91 \pm 1.98	72.19 \pm 0.49	48.15 \pm 4.37	0.90 \pm 0.03	0.05\pm0.02
CIFAR-10	\mathcal{D}_r	87.63 \pm 1.16	91.12 \pm 1.60	92.02\pm3.15	54.91 \pm 6.91	27.49 \pm 4.96	89.91 \pm 0.95	70.95 \pm 1.05
	\mathcal{D}_u	95.05 \pm 2.30	0.00 \pm 0.00	88.44 \pm 0.92	62.75 \pm 5.07	49.26 \pm 2.23	0.29 \pm 0.04	0.05\pm0.14
CIFAR-20	\mathcal{D}_r	75.06 \pm 6.41	81.91 \pm 4.68	82.67\pm1.32	55.67 \pm 6.12	28.43 \pm 6.71	72.88 \pm 3.12	57.24 \pm 4.54
	\mathcal{D}_u	94.21 \pm 4.11	0.00 \pm 0.00	86.53 \pm 1.45	50.11 \pm 7.41	30.64 \pm 6.73	0.78 \pm 0.08	0.02\pm0.04
CIFAR-100	\mathcal{D}_r	54.14 \pm 3.96	73.54 \pm 5.70	73.66\pm6.57	34.62 \pm 12.24	15.62 \pm 7.78	69.57 \pm 3.81	52.14 \pm 0.67
	\mathcal{D}_u	88.98 \pm 6.63	0.00 \pm 0.00	65.38 \pm 4.76	57.29 \pm 3.62	46.17 \pm 9.25	0.15 \pm 0.01	0.02\pm0.02

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 448 Table 2: Ablation study of *InstantForget* on five datasets. We report mean backdoor accuracy (%)
 449 Acc $_{\mathcal{D}_u}$ over all random seeds. Lower is better. Stage I: subspace projection, Stage II: inference-time
 450 randomized smoothing.

Dataset	Stage I	Stage II	Full (I+II)
MNIST	11.10 \pm 0.42	22.05 \pm 0.55	9.78\pm0.05
FashionMNIST	0.10 \pm 0.03	18.99 \pm 0.74	0.05\pm0.02
CIFAR-10	16.39 \pm 1.12	23.47 \pm 1.38	0.05\pm0.14
CIFAR-20	7.34 \pm 0.64	19.53 \pm 0.82	0.02\pm0.04
CIFAR-100	7.59 \pm 0.57	70.43 \pm 2.17	0.02\pm0.02

5 LIMITATIONS

460 Despite the strong performance and efficiency of *InstantForget*, there are two main limitations.

461 **(1) Limited scope of unlearning scenarios.** Our method targets feature-level backdoor unlearning
 462 with known triggers and has not been extensively validated in class-level forgetting or client-level
 463 removal. These settings may require adaptive subspace estimation or hybrid strategies that combine
 464 inference-time editing with lightweight fine-tuning.

465 **(2) Sensitivity to dataset complexity.** The effectiveness of our approach varies with feature space
 466 structure: results on MNIST leave slightly higher residual attack success rates than on CIFAR
 467 datasets, suggesting that nonlinear trigger components may require iterative projection or more ex-
 468 pressive transformations.

470 These limitations highlight promising directions for extending *InstantForget* to more general un-
 471 learning tasks and improving robustness across diverse data distributions.

6 CONCLUSION

475 We presented *InstantForget*, a training-free, purely inference-time framework for functional fea-
 476 ture unlearning. By formalizing unlearning as a problem of behavioral equivalence, our method
 477 directly edits the input–output mapping of a frozen model without gradient updates, retraining, or
 478 additional federated communication. The two-stage design—subspace projection to remove linear
 479 trigger contributions and gated randomized smoothing to suppress nonlinear residuals—achieves
 480 near-retraining forgetting quality while maintaining competitive retain-set accuracy, yielding over
 481 800 \times speedup and orders-of-magnitude fewer FLOPs compared to retraining. Beyond backdoor
 482 forgetting, *InstantForget* highlights a general paradigm for inference-time functional editing, with
 483 potential applications to model repair, personalization, and privacy-preserving deployment. Future
 484 work will explore adaptive subspace estimation, tighter theoretical guarantees, and extensions to
 485 class-level and client-level unlearning, moving toward scalable, low-carbon, and trustworthy un-
 486 learning solutions suitable for large-scale federated learning systems.

486 ETHICS STATEMENT
487488 This work does not involve human subjects, personally identifiable information, or sensitive private
489 data. All datasets used in this study are publicly available and widely used in prior research. Our
490 experiments are designed to improve model safety by enabling the removal of malicious backdoor
491 behaviors without retraining, which aligns with the responsible development of robust and trustwor-
492 thy AI systems. No potentially harmful applications are promoted. We disclose all implementation
493 details and hyperparameters to enable transparent evaluation and facilitate future reproducibility
494 studies.495
496 REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT
497498 To ensure reproducibility, we provide detailed descriptions of our model architecture, data prepro-
499 cessing, and evaluation metrics in the main text and Appendix. All hyperparameters (e.g., sensi-
500 tive subspace dimension, projection strength, noise standard deviation, smoothing parameters) are
501 reported. Our implementation is based on PyTorch and will be released as open-source upon accep-
502 tance, including scripts to reproduce all reported results. We also include results averaged over five
503 random seeds to account for stochasticity and report standard deviations where appropriate.504
505 LLM DISCLAIMER
506507 This paper makes limited use of Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT solely for lan-
508 guage polishing and grammar improvement. All research ideas, experimental designs, implemen-
509 tations, analyses, and conclusions were conceived, executed, and validated by the authors. No gener-
510 ative AI tools were used for generating novel content, experimental results, or scientific claims.512 REFERENCES
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