
Adversarial Distributional Reinforcement Learning against Extrapolated Generalization

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Abstract

1 Distributional reinforcement learning (DiRL) accounts for stochasticity in the
2 environment by learning the full distribution of return and has hugely improved
3 performance due to better differentiating between states and training-phase policy
4 evaluation. However, even if the environment is not relied upon for being deter-
5 ministic, the agent still only gets to traverse a single possible path and therefore
6 observe a single return backup feedback during online learning. Effectively, DiRL
7 is learning the whole distribution using only one sample from it, relying substan-
8 tially on inductive bias. This work aims to alleviate catastrophically generalizing
9 from a similar-looking state whose behavioural consequence (under the current
10 policy) is actually disparate, i.e., an attack, with adversarial training. To do this,
11 we first identify the set of attacks in which the agent’s behavioural consequences
12 are sufficiently dissimilar to the current state, then pick the strongest which incurs
13 the largest model distinguishability error: the smallest distance between predicted
14 return distributions. Finally, we update the return distribution model by ascending
15 the gradient of this minimal distance, effectively solving a minimax problem. In
16 defining attacks, we use bisimulation metric to measure behavioural similarity. To
17 decide the distance between predicted return distributions, which needs to be differ-
18 entiable with respect to the return distribution model, we train a value discriminator
19 recognizing true Bellman backups from fake ones, and use the contrastive score as
20 a proxy. Experiments on MuJoCo environments suggest that the proposed method
21 is able to improve DiRL performance however the return distribution is modelled.

22 1 Introduction

23 Rather than estimating the expected return or value function in reinforcement learning, distributional
24 reinforcement learning (DiRL) Bellemare et al. (2017) models the full distribution of the return,
25 viewing it as random variable whose stochasticity stems from the intrinsic randomness of the
26 environment and potentially also from the agent itself. Thus said, the stochasticity of the environment
27 is not nevertheless providing extra learning signals just because it is assumed to exist – During online
28 training, the agent still only gets to traverse a single possible path and therefore observe a single
29 return backup feedback.

30 Admittedly, some DiRL approaches approximate the return distribution as a parametric miniature
31 subset of its examples Bellemare et al. (2017); Dabney et al. (2018a,b); Rowland et al. (2019);
32 Martin et al. (2020); Barth-Maron et al. (2018); Singh et al. (2020); Kuznetsov et al. (2020), and
33 therefore carry a multi-sample prediction for any step in computing the Bellman backup target;
34 others Doan et al. (2018); Freirich et al. (2019); Choi et al. (2019); Li & Faisal (2021) represent
35 the return distribution as a generative model, able to generate as many return samples as desired.
36 However, these diversities all come from the model itself (i.e. multiple guesses), bearing no additional

37 learning information, whereas the feedback from the environment which contains the ground truths
 38 for improving the model, i.e., the trace of rewards and subsequent states, is only possible to be
 39 observed in *one* example¹. Effectively, vanilla DiRL methods, which are usually parametric, are
 40 learning the return distributions with only one backup signal per state / state-action pair, relying
 41 heavily on generalization from nearby data and their observed backup signals.

42 As a consequence, it is possible that two states appear similar and therefore have similar predicted
 43 return distributions, whereas the same policy (e.g. as defined by the same function and set of
 44 parameters) has disparate behaviour consequences in them in reality. In this scenario, the return
 45 distributions in the two states should be different.

46 To this end, we propose to alleviate generalizing from similar-looking but behaviourally distinct states
 47 in return distribution learning with adversarial training Goodfellow et al. (2015). Specifically, for
 48 each state, we find the worst-case scenario which incurs the lowest distinguishability of the return
 49 distribution model within a vicinity of the state consisting of states behaviourally dissimilar to it,
 50 and update the return distribution model to increase this minimal gap as a regularizer to the original
 51 modelling objective.

52 Robust adversarial reinforcement learning is not a new topic, which frames the RL problem as a
 53 zero-sum Markov game to account for unavoidable and uncontrollable difference between training
 54 and testing environments. This can be a two-player game, with an additional policy that is either a
 55 destabilizing adversary applying disturbance forces to the system Morimoto & Doya (2005); Pinto
 56 et al. (2017), or a risk-seeking adversary Pan et al. (2019); Ren et al. (2020a,b). Alternatively, when
 57 the adversarial examples can be explicitly defined in the state space, the problem is akin to the
 58 perturbation issue in supervised learning Goodfellow et al. (2015); Madry et al. (2018); Cai et al.
 59 (2018), and can therefore be recast as a minimax optimization problem solved with adversarial
 60 training Zhang et al. (2020); Oikarinen et al. (2021).

61 In this work, we borrow the idea of adversarial training, not to improve robustness against perturbation
 62 though, but to prevent extrapolated generalization in learning return distributions due to having to
 63 rely excessively on inductive bias. Please note, our intuition works the other way round compared
 64 to the usual sense of adversarial training (which encourages generalization around states visually
 65 slightly different), *discouraging* generalization from behaviourally dissimilar states.

66 Experiments on MuJoCo tasks Todorov et al. (2012) suggest that the proposed method is able to
 67 improve DiRL performance however the return distribution is modelled. We believe we have proposed
 68 the first algorithm to discourage erroneous generalization in DiRL.

69 2 Methods

70 We consider a Markov decision process $(\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}, R, P, \gamma)$ Puterman (1994), where \mathcal{S} and \mathcal{A} denote
 71 the state and action spaces respectively, $R : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \mapsto \mathbb{R}$ a potentially stochastic reward function,
 72 $P : \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \mapsto \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{S})$ a transition probability density function, and $\gamma \in (0, 1)$ a temporal discount factor.
 73 An RL agent has a policy that maps states to a probability distribution over actions $\pi : \mathcal{S} \mapsto \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})$.
 74 The return $G^\pi(s) := \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t r_t, s_0 = s$ is a random variable which quantifies the accumulated future
 75 rewards, its distribution being denoted as $\omega^\pi(s) \in \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{R})$. We consider the state-dependent return in
 76 this work, whilst the idea applies also to action-dependent return. The distributional Bellman operator
 77 Bellemare et al. (2017) allows the return distribution to be estimated with temporal difference as in
 78 scalar RL, its action-marginalized version being Li & Faisal (2021)

$$\mathcal{T}^\pi G^\pi(s) \stackrel{D}{=} R(s) + \gamma G^\pi(s'),$$

79 where the distribution equation $\stackrel{D}{=}$ specifies that the random variables on both sides of the equation
 80 are distributed by the same law, and s' is the next state.

81 We learn a return distribution model $\hat{\omega}^\pi(s)$ along with a policy $\pi(a|s)$. The dependency on π is
 82 dropped in notations if no confusion is to be induced. In DiRL, one instance of Bellman backup target
 83 $\mathcal{T}^\pi G^\pi(s)$ is being observed for each s to update $\hat{\omega}$ at s , implicitly relying heavily on generalization
 84 from Bellman backups at neighbouring states, some of which might have little behavioural similarity
 85 to s . We leverage adversarial training to reduce generalization when state similarity is misconstrued,
 86 which contrasts model prediction with ground-truth reality.

¹Unless the environment can be rewound.

87 **2.1 Behavioural similarity**

88 The adversarial examples, or attacks, are engendered by the properties of the environment and would
 89 mislead the model if no special treatment is applied. We define the attack set of s as a subset of the
 90 state space in which an attack s^* is so behaviourally dissimilar to s that generalization from $\hat{\omega}(s^*)$ to
 91 $\hat{\omega}(s)$ should be discouraged *and* that s^* and s appear similar enough to confuse $\hat{\omega}$:

$$\mathcal{AT}(s) := \{s^* \in \mathcal{S} : \|s - s^*\|_1 < \varepsilon_1, \mathcal{M}(s, s^*) > \varepsilon_2\}. \quad (1)$$

92 State vicinity is defined under l_1 norm. $\mathcal{M}(\cdot, \cdot)$ is a functional that measures how well the conse-
 93 quences of two given states can be distinguished, for which we use the bisimulation metric Givan
 94 et al. (2003); Ferns et al. (2011); Zhang et al. (2021)

$$\mathcal{M}(s_i, s_j) := |r_i - r_j| + W(P(\cdot|s_i, a_i), P(\cdot|s_j, a_j)), \forall s_i, s_j \in \mathcal{S}.$$

95 Bisimulation metric quantifies behavioural similarity with a combination of the difference between
 96 rewards and the Wasserstein metric W Villani (2008) between the next state distributions, for which
 97 we are learning a hybrid transition function $P(s'|\phi(s), a)$ predicting the next state s' from the
 98 embedding of the current state $\phi(s)$. To simplify computation, we model $P(s'|\phi(s), a)$ as a Gaussian
 99 and use W_2 distance which has a closed-form expression.

100 Note that the attack set $\mathcal{AT}(s)$ depicts the oracle determining whether two states s and s^* *should* have
 101 similar return distributions ω in reality. This oracle will be referred to to identify the differentiating
 102 error of the model $\hat{\omega}$, and thus the model $\hat{\omega}$ cannot be involved in defining \mathcal{AT} .

103 **2.2 Model distinguishability**

104 To measure the mistake the model $\hat{\omega}$ is making in differentiating between states, we train a binary
 105 value discriminator Goodfellow et al. (2014) which when at its optimum is describing the relative
 106 probability of a given return value G being drawn according to the return distribution predicted for a
 107 given state s

$$\Phi(G|s) := \frac{p(G \sim \hat{\omega}(s))}{p(G \sim \hat{\omega}(s)) + p(G \sim \hat{\omega}(\mathcal{S} \setminus s))}, \forall G \in \mathbb{R}, s \in \mathcal{S}. \quad (2)$$

108 We use \sim to denote the preceding sample being distributed according to the succeeding probability
 109 function, and $\hat{\omega}(\mathcal{S} \setminus s)$ to denote the marginal predicted return distribution under the current policy
 110 aggregated over the whole of the state space except s :

$$\hat{\omega}(\mathcal{S} \setminus s) := \frac{\int_{\mathcal{S} \setminus s} d^\pi(s') \hat{\omega}(s') ds'}{\int_{\mathcal{S} \setminus s} d^\pi(s') ds'}, \quad (3)$$

111 with d^π representing the stationary state distribution under policy π . The denominator is to normalize
 112 d^π to make it a proper distribution when s is excluded.

113 Specifically, Eq. (2) does not contrast $\hat{\omega}(s)$ with a particular state return distribution, but the rest of
 114 possible state return distributions as a whole.

115 Note that Eq. (2) is the equivalent *definition* of $\Phi(G|s)$ ended up with when trained against the
 116 cross-entropy loss given samples $\sim \hat{\omega}(s)$ and samples $\sim \hat{\omega}(\mathcal{S} \setminus s)$, rather than its computation formula,
 117 as we only assume the return distribution model $\hat{\omega}$ to be able to be sampled from without having
 118 access to its analytical form.

119 For each s , we use its observed Bellman backup target (computed from any backup method) as the
 120 “true” sample $\sim \hat{\omega}(s)$, and the Bellman targets at other states belonging to the same training batch as
 121 the “fake” samples $\sim \hat{\omega}(\mathcal{S} \setminus s)$.

122 With this relative probability estimator, we define the distance between the predicted return distribu-
 123 tions for a state s and an attack s^* as a contrastive score

$$\begin{aligned} D(\hat{\omega}(s), \hat{\omega}(s^*)) &:= -\mathbb{E}_{G \sim \hat{\omega}(s)} \left[\log \frac{p(G \sim \hat{\omega}(s^*))}{p(G \sim \hat{\omega}(\mathcal{S} \setminus s^*))} \right] \\ &= -\mathbb{E}_{G \sim \hat{\omega}(s)} \left[\log \Phi(G|s^*) - \log (1 - \Phi(G|s^*)) \right], \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$




Figure 1: Training performance on HalfCheetah-v3. Solid lines and shaded areas represent mean and standard deviation over 5 runs respectively.

124 which can be directly computed from the value discriminator Φ . Specifically, Eq. (4) does not directly
 125 contrast $\hat{\omega}(s)$ with $\hat{\omega}(s^*)$, but describes how likely a sample drawn from $\hat{\omega}(s)$ is not deemed a sample
 126 from $\hat{\omega}$ predicted at s^* relative to at any other state than s^* , i.e., a one-versus-many binary decision.
 127 This setting can be thought of as a regularization (inside regularization) on diversity to prevent all
 128 return distributions being overly far away from each other due to the adversarial training.

129 We use Monte Carlo estimate of the expectation over $\hat{\omega}(s)$, by sampling multiple times i.i.d. from
 130 $\hat{\omega}(s)$ with reparameterization Kingma & Welling (2014). This is so that D remains differentiable
 131 with respect to the parameters of $\hat{\omega}$.

132 2.3 Adversarial loss

133 Finally, we define the adversarial objective to alleviate erroneous generalization as

$$\max_{\hat{\omega}} \min_{s^* \in \mathcal{AT}(s)} D(\hat{\omega}(s), \bar{\hat{\omega}}(s^*)), \quad (5)$$

134 in which the overhead bar $\bar{\cdot}$ indicates that the model in question is deemed fixed in the current context.

135 Basically, for each state s , we first find the worst-case scenario where an attack s^* is sufficiently
 136 visually similar and behaviourally dissimilar to s , yet however has a learned return distribution closest
 137 to its own according to the D in Eq. (4). Then we increase this minimal D in updating $\hat{\omega}$ at s ,
 138 appended as a regularizer to the original return distribution modelling objective such that the model
 139 can still be updated with conventional stochastic gradient descent.

140 3 Results

141 This is an ongoing project, we have only partial results and implementation details are not final at
 142 this stage.

143 We use the scalar RL method PPO Schulman et al. (2017) as implementation backbone, substituting
 144 the value function with return distribution modelled from QR-DQN Dabney et al. (2018b) (adapted
 145 for state return distribution) and BDPG Li & Faisal (2021) respectively, as our two distributional RL
 146 baselines. QR represents the return distribution $\hat{\omega}$ as a set of return samples corresponding to a set of
 147 evenly distributed quantile levels. BDPG represents $\hat{\omega}$ as a variant of variational auto-encoder. We
 148 incorporate the proposed adversarial training on both baselines, denoted as “QR AT”, “BDPG AT”
 149 respectively.

150 Experiments were conducted on Mujoco environments Todorov et al. (2012). From the results on
151 HalfCheetah as shown in Fig. 1, we can see that the proposed adversarial training can improve upon
152 both QR and BDPG.

153 4 Discussion & Conclusions

154 In this work, we propose to leverage minimax adversarial training to prevent extrapolated general-
155 ization in modelling parametric return distributions. For each state s , we first search for the attacks
156 $s^* \in \mathcal{AT}(s)$ that are both visually similar to s so that there may be generalization between them in
157 learning the return distribution model $\hat{\omega}$, and behaviourally dissimilar to s (as measured by bisim-
158 ulation metric) so that generalization from $\hat{\omega}(s^*)$ to $\hat{\omega}(s)$ should be discouraged. Then the largest
159 distinguishing error of the model among the attacks is being regularized during model update. To
160 estimate the distance between two predicted return distributions D , we train a value discriminator Φ
161 depicting whether a given return value is distributed according to the return distribution predicted
162 by the model at the given state or not. The model distinguishability $D(\hat{\omega}(s), \hat{\omega}(s^*))$ is therefore
163 computed as how $\hat{\omega}(s)$ is farther away from $\hat{\omega}$ predicted at s^* than at any other state $S \setminus s^*$.

164 Proof-of-concept results on HalfCheetah suggest that the proposed idea can considerably improve
165 learning speed as well as asymptotic performance regardless whether the return distribution is
166 approximated as a particle set or a generative model, two most prevalently adopted return distribution
167 modelling methods.

168 Admittedly, the experiment is too scarce to be statistically remarkable at the moment. We are
169 conducting further investigations into e.g. the inner work of adversarial training in DiRL, the degree
170 and consequence of misgeneralization, as well as performing on more environments. Hopefully we
171 will have a thorough experimental understanding of our idea soon. In the meantime, we do hope to
172 get and would appreciate any feedback on the work.

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