Sensitive prompts: How LLMs respond to prompts that violate its content policy?

Anonymous ACL submission

Abstract

This study defines *sensitive prompts* as those likely to trigger refusal, warnings, or guarded responses due to violations of model's content policies. We propose a three-level typology pf sensitive prompts: unacceptable, high, and low sensitivity. Utilizing a dataset of 239 real-world human-ChatGPT interaction that are labeled as sensitive by ChatGPT, we evaluate seven LLMs from the U.S., China, and Europe in both English and Chinese. Our cross-lingual, cross-model analysis reveals different moderation behaviors. While the U.S.-based models exhibit stronger consistency and higher refusal rates, Chinese models demonstrate more language-dependent behavior and moderation asymmetries. Furthermore, we uncover misalignments between classification and response behavior in several models, raising concerns about transparency and reliability in moderation mechanisms. Our findings offer empirical insights for content moderation and future safety AI design.

1 Introduction

Since its public release on 30 November 2022, OpenAI ChatGPT has rapidly permeated multiple sectors, attracting more than 100 million users in two months (Yan et al., 2023). Its generative capabilities have been adopted in fields ranging from medicine to education: automating health record summarization (Dave et al., 2023) and supporting learning through feedback, curriculum design, and problem-solving tasks (Rahman and Watanobe, 2023). Despite its utility, the widespread deployment of ChatGPT raises critical ethical concerns. Scholars highlight risks such as data privacy violations, algorithmic bias, and misuse to generate harmful or misleading content (Ray, 2023). Although OpenAI has introduced content moderation policies, empirical studies reveal that users can circumvent these safeguards through indirect prompts, leading to the generation of malicious output(Wang et al., 2023).

In light of these challenges, this study seeks to evaluate the sensitivity recognition and moderation behavior of current state-of-the-art LLMs. Specifically, we examine whether models can correctly classify prompts that potentially violate their respective content policies, and whether their actual responses align with these classifications. To this end, we first curated a dataset of real-world prompts that ChatGPT identified as violating its content policy. We then examined the moderation policies of seven popular LLMs and selected a subset of prompts that could plausibly trigger safety concerns across all of them.

Recognizing the increasing importance of multilingual capabilities in LLMs, we extend our analysis to both English and Chinese—two of the most widely used and high-resource languages in the world. Using this bilingual dataset, we evaluate seven LLMs from the United States, China, and France. For each model, we assess both classification accuracy (whether a prompt is flagged as sensitive) and behavioral consistency (whether the model's response aligns with its classification). This approach enables a comparison of moderation behavior across languages, models, and regulatory contexts, offering insights into the design and deployment of safer multilingual language systems.

2 Related Work

2.1 Definition:Sensitive prompts

LLMs are highly sensitive to prompt phrasing, with even minor changes causing variations in model performance (Zhu et al., 2023; Pezeshkpour and Hruschka, 2023; Sclar et al., 2023). Scholars conceptualize this phenomena as *prompt sensitivity*, referring to the degree to which a large language model (LLM)'s output varies in response to different semantic variants of same input (Zhuo et al., 2024). Zhuo et al. (2024) further introduce a metric called *PromptSensiScore* (PSS) to quantify this

sensitivity.

While many research focus on how LLMs react to semantic equivalent but format varied prompts, the ways in which LLMs respond to prompts that violate their content policies remain underexplored. Less is known about LLM's behavior when encountering prompts that fall outside permissible content boundaries, such as prompts involving hate speech, misinformation, violence, or sexually explicit material. In this context, we propose the conceptualization of *sensitive prompts*, referring to prompts that trigger content moderation mechanisms. These prompts, which often contravene the model's content policy or ethical constraints, elicit inconsistent or opaque responses ranging from refusal messages to partial engagement. However, the mechanisms, robustness, and fairness of these refusals or filtered responses are understudied.

2.2 Prompt sensitivity: unacceptable, high and low sensitivity

Differ from previous studies (Zhu et al., 2023; Pezeshkpour and Hruschka, 2023; Sclar et al., 2023), we adopt a reversed perspective: we define *prompt sensitivity* as the degree to which a prompt triggers the content warning or moderation mechanism of an LLM. That is to say, our focus shifts from the model's adaptation across prompts to the capability of prompts to elicit guarded, warning, or refused responses from the model. This shift and reconceptualization are grounded in empirical observation: prompts violate the boundaries of an LLM's content policy often lead to warning responses, such as immediate rejection, evasive answers, or content warning.

To capture this phenomenon, we propose a three-level of prompt sensitivity: unacceptable sensitivity, high sensitivity, and low sensitivity, as different levels of sensitivity will trigger distinct response behavior. This classification also echoes the risk classification framework in the *EU AI ACT*, which categorizes the AI applications based on the potential risks that they pose to individuals and society (unacceptable, high, and low risk).

Unacceptable sensitivity: prompts that are immediately and explicitly refused due to violating safety or ethical guidelines.

High sensitivity: the prompt touches on restricted or controversial topics and may elicit a response accompanied by a disclaimer or warning;

Low sensitivity: the prompt falls within acceptable boundaries and receives a direct, unfiltered response.

Category	Count
Political and religious content	44
Illegal and harmful content	78
Discrimination and hate speech	28
Pornographic content	39
Other unrelated content	50

Table 1: Distribution of the 239 prompts across five themes.

3 Data

Our dataset includes 239 representative sensitive prompts identified from a large-scale collection of over 170,000 publicly available screenshots of user-ChatGPT interactions, posted between November 30, 2022 and January 31, 2023. Among these, 147 prompts are labeled as *unacceptable or high sensitivity*, indicating clear violations of moderation policies. The remaining 92 prompts are labeled as *low sensitivity*—they do not explicitly violate policies but may be misclassified due to their ambiguous or context-dependent nature.

To ensure evaluation consistency, we reviewed content policies of seven LLMs. Based on the shared principles across these policies, prompts that rely heavily on region-specific cultural or linguistic context were excluded. We then categorized the remaining prompts into five main themes, as shown in Table 1.

4 Method

4.1 Models selection

We consider a diverse set of pretrained transformer-based LLMs. Whereas many multilingual LLMs support both Chinese and English, our focus is on models that treat one of these languages as a primary or dominant language during pretraining and fine-tuning. Specifically, to investigate how LLMs from different regulatory backgrounds handle sensitive content, we compare models developed in three regions, including three U.S.based models: ChatGPT(4.o) (OpenAI et al., 2024), Gemini(1.5_flash) (Team et al., 2025), and Aya Expanse(8B) (Dang et al., 2024); three Chinese models: DeepSeek(V3) (DeepSeek-AI et al., 2025), Qwen(7B) (Wang et al., 2024), and Doubao(1.5_pro_32k); and one French model: Mistral(large_latest)—which serves as a third-party reference outside the dominant U.S.-

	Politics or Religion		Law Related		Discrimination		Pornography		Others		Macro Acc.	
	EN	ZH	EN	ZH	EN	ZH	EN	ZH	EN	ZH	EN	ZH
The U.S. models												
ChatGPT	79.5%	79.5%	66.7%	75.6%	71.4%	75.0%	**92.3%**	**92.3%**	80.0%	68.0%	**78.0%**	78.1%
Gemini	79.5%	75.0%	71.8%	78.2%	**78.6%**	**78.6%**	89.7%	89.7%	30.0%	22.0%	69.9%	68.7%
Aya	75.0%	**81.8%**	78.2%	80.8%	75.0%	**78.6%**	89.7%	**92.3%**	16.0%	40.0%	66.8%	74.7%
Chinese models												
DeepSeek	**88.6%**	75.0%	66.7%	75.6%	64.3%	71.4%	69.2%	**92.3%**	74.0%	56.0%	72.6%	74.1%
Qwen	61.4%	70.5%	64.1%	78.2%	71.4%	78.6%	74.4%	84.6%	72.0%	26.0%	68.7%	67.6%
DouBao	75.0%	61.4%	61.5%	57.7%	53.6%	53.6%	87.2%	76.9%	**94.0%**	**98.0%**	74.3%	69.5%
French models												
Mistral	75.0%	**81.8%**	**80.8%**	**83.3%**	**78.6%**	75.0%	89.7%	**92.3%**	42.0%	60.0%	73.2%	**78.5%**

Table 2: Classification accuracy of each model across five thematic categories and overall accuracy.

China landscape. These models represent distinct regional approaches to AI governance, training data composition, and moderation practices, making them ideal for a comparative study.

4.2 Experimental Setup



Figure 1: Prompts classification echos with the EU AI ACT risk framework.

Building on proposed prompt sensitivity framework, we developed a multiple-choice classification task to systematically evaluate how LLMs respond to prompts of varying sensitivity levels. Each input was categorized into one of three predefined classes (seeing Figure 1): **(A)** Highly sensitive and cannot be answered; **(B)** Sensitive but can be answered indirectly; **(C)** Not sensitive and can be answered directly.

In addition to capturing the predicted category, we also recorded the model's actual prompt specific response, whether it chose to answer or refuse. This allows us to evaluate model classification and actual behavioral consistency: prompts labeled as category A should lead to a refusal to respond, whereas categories B and C should result in a generated answer.

Notably, all experiments were carried out under consistent and controlled conditions: each prompt was presented independently, without any prior dialogue history, system-level instructions, or memory of earlier turns. Models were reset before each input to ensure that responses were not influenced by prior interactions. All experiments were performed using the model API on the CPU.

5 Result

5.1 Overall Performance

As shown in Table 2, ChatGPT demonstrates the most robust and consistent performance among all evaluated models. It achieves the hightest macro accuracy among all models in both English (78.0%) and Chinese (78.1%), with minimal cross-lingual variation. Compared to the French model Mistral, which attains alightly higher Chinese macro accuracy (78.5%), ChatGPT maintains a superior English performance (+4.8%), highlighting its strong bilingual moderation capabilities.

Among Chinese models, DeepSeek records the highest and most stable macro accuracy within the group (72.6% in English and 74.1% in Chinese). Although a gap remains between DeepSeek and ChatGPT, its result surpass several other U.S. and Chinese models, demonstrating its ability to effectively detect sensitive content.

5.2 Theme-specific performance

In terms of theme-specific performance, prompts related to *pornographic content* are consistently detected with highest accuracy across the U.S. and Europe models. For example, ChatGPT, Aya and Mistral achieve accuracy rates exceeding 90% on pornography-related prompts, likely due to clear textual cues and extensive prior filtering efforts during model training.

By contrast, prompts involving *political and religious issues* and *discrimination or hate speech* exhibit greater variation and lower accuracies across models. These categories require nuanced understanding of cultural context, implicit biases and social sensitivity.

Additionally, the *Others* category, composed largely of confusing or borderline prompts, proves difficult for most models. Here, accuracy drops sharply, reflecting the models' struggle to distinguish between truly sensitive issues and benign but ambiguously phrased inputs. DouBao, however, stands out in this category, suggesting a relatively cautious and conservative moderation strategy.

5.3 Refusal Rate



Figure 2: (en/zh_)classification: *Number of Category A / Total Number of Prompts*; (en/zh_)responses: *Number of Rejection from LLMs / Total Number of Prompts*.

To better understand how language models enforce safety policies in practice, we analyze their refusal rates. We compare two dimensions: (1) the proportion of prompts the model classified as unacceptable, and (2) the proportion for which it actually refuses to generate a response. Figure 2 present these statistics for each model in both English and Chinese.

As we can see from Figure 2, models developed in the United States consistently exhibit higher refusal rates than those in China. For instance, Gemini classified 41.4% of English prompts as unanswerable and refused to respond to 28.5% of them. In contrast, DeepSeek classified only 28.4% of English prompts as highly sensitive and refused to answer just 9.2% of the time. This suggests that U.S.-based models apply stricter content moderation thresholds, likely reflecting the influence of American platform policies and heightened regulatory sensitivity around misinformation, political content, and safety compliance.

Chinese models show a surprising asymmetry across languages: their refusal rates for English prompts are consistently higher than for Chinese prompts, suggesting that their internal safety thresholds may be language-dependent. This discrepancy could stem from differences in the training data distributions (e.g., fewer English moderation examples) or a reliance on more general-purpose filters for non-native inputs.

We also find a systematic mismatch between classification and response behaviors across almost all models. In many cases (except Qwen), models do answer prompts that they themselves have categorized as *unacceptable and high sensitivity*. This inconsistency indicates the presence of distinct layers within the model architecture: while classification likely reflects an internal judgment or pre-generation risk assessment, the final refusal decision may be governed by downstream safety filters or reinforcement learning components that intervene at decoding time. Such inconsistencies raise concerns about trustworthiness and transparency in LLM safety mechanisms. When classification and generation behaviors are not aligned, users and developers may be misled about the model's actual risk-handling capabilities.

6 Conclusion

In this work, we reconceptualize *prompt sensitivity*, shifting from the analytical focus from the variability of LLMs outputs across different prompt phrasing, to capture the degree of restriction that a given prompt elicits from the model's content moderation mechanism. Furthermore, by categorizing prompts into three sensitive levels: unacceptable, high, and low sensitivity, we provide a practical taxonomy for understanding how LLMs moderate and respond to risky or policy-violating prompts.

Through a cross-lingual and cross-model assessment of seven LLMs from the U.S., China, and Europe, our findings show that different LLMs demonstrate different moderation behaviors. While U.S. based LLMs, particularly ChatGPT, show higher moderation consistency and bilingual robustness, models from China demonstrate more language dependent behavior and greater misalignment between classification and response. Importantly, we also find that LLMs often generate a response to prompts they classified as unacceptable or refuse to respond to low sensitive prompts, indicating a disconnect between risk assessment and actual response.

These findings highlight the need for more fine-grained, language-aware safety mechanisms in multilingual LLMs. As LLM development becomes increasingly global, ensuring consistent and reliable moderation across languages and cultural contexts is essential for their responsible deployment.

7 Limitation

Despite the insights offered, this study has several limitations, which warrant caution and indicate future research directions. The first is the selection bias. The data is derived fromnsensitive prompts that identified by ChatGPT, which may introduce selection bias. Despite of examination of LLMs content policy and manually selection, to what extent LLMs do regard these prompts as sensitive remains unknown. Future research can collect model specific sensitive prompts and test again with specific model. Second, our three-level classification may simplify the complex spectrum of prompt sensitivity. Some prompts may straddle the categories, particularly unacceptable or high sensitive prompts.Future research can incorporate larger, model specific prompts to investigate the transparency and moderation mechanisms across open and closed-source models.

8 Ethical concerns

While this study utilizes real-time human-ChatGPT interaction cases for analysis, we acknowledge that the personal information is anonymized. We argue that our research and findings contribute to ongoing discussions on AI safety, transparency, and governance, particularly by revealing how content is moderated and how LLMs respond to sensitive prompts.

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A Appendix A. Prompt Examples



(a) Classified as A, no response (extract from Qwen)



(b) Classified as A, gave response (extract from ChatGPT)



(c) Classified as B, no response (extract from Gemini)



(d) Classified as B, gave response (extract from DeepSeek)

Figure 3: Prompt Examples