GRADMASK: Gradient-Guided Token Masking for Textual Adversarial Example Detection

Anonymous ACL submission

Abstract

We present a simple model-agnostic textual adversarial example detection scheme called GRADMASK. It uses gradient signals to detect adversarially perturbed tokens in an input sequence and occludes such tokens by a masking process. GRADMASK provides several advantages over existing methods including improved detection performance and a weak interpretation of its decision. Extensive evaluations on widely adopted natural language processing benchmark datasets demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of GRADMASK. Code and models are available at <redacted>.

1 Introduction and Related Work

The advances in deep learning has revolutionized natural language processing (NLP) with state-of-the-art performance in practically every task. However, it has been shown that such systems are significantly vulnerable to specifically crafted *adversarial attacks* (Szegedy et al., 2014) at all stages of development and deployment (Ebrahimi et al., 2018; Alzantot et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2020; Krishna et al., 2020; Tan et al., 2020, 2021). This is quite troubling as there is little to no change in the adversarially chosen test distributions compared to the training distribution (Robin, 2020).

In response to the adversarial attacks, various defense schemes have been proposed. These approaches can be grouped into three categories: (*i*) adversarial training (Si et al., 2020; Maharana and Bansal, 2020; Miyato et al., 2017; Zhu et al., 2020), (*ii*) certified robustness (Jia et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2021), and (*iii*) synonym substitution based methods (Wang et al., 2019, 2020; Dong et al., 2021; Zhou et al., 2021; Jones et al., 2020).

Another branch of defense strategy is the *adversarial example detection* based schemes. While the above defense schemes aim to improve the adversarial robustness of NLP systems, adversarial example detection methods are designed to reject suspicious inputs although they share the same goal of defeating the adversarial attacks (Aldahdooh et al., 2021). Detection-based approaches provide several advantages over adversarial robustness improvement methods. The most obvious advantage is that they do not require to modify the target model architecture or the training procedure, because they typically work as a separate module. Consequently, they do not compromise the model performance on clean datasets. Secondly, they are able to identify the intention (adversarial or not) of adversarial attacks, so users can take actions (reject or revise) accordingly. Finally, the detection algorithms may provide a better strategy for developing defense methods by informing us which parts of an input sequence are perturbed (Zhou et al., 2019).

Unlike the other defense schemes, the textual adversarial detection has not been explored much. To the best of our knowledge, there are two prior studies trying to detect token-level adversarial attacks. The very first work is the discriminate perturbations (DISP) framework proposed by Zhou et al. (2019). DISP consists of two BERT (Devlin et al., 2019) based perturbation discriminator and embedding estimator. To provide supervising signals for the discriminator, DISP randomly samples adversarial examples and learns to discriminate clean samples from the adversarial examples. In contrast, a more recent adversarial detection work, the frequency-guided word substitutions or FGWS (Mozes et al., 2021), does not need an additional training process. The key assumption of FGWS is that adversarial attack algorithms tend to exploit words that are rarely exposed during a target model's training. However, their approach is limited to detection of only word-level attacks and the effectiveness of FGWS against attacks that do not rely on infrequent words is unclear. Especially, our experiments with a constrained high-frequency vocabulary show that attackers can still find successful attacks by using frequent tokens (§5).

Our work in this paper, instead, deviates from the word-frequency assumption by utilizing gradient signals as guidance. We harness the gradient signal to detect adversarially perturbed tokens in an input sequence by investigating the *sensitivity* of the model prediction (Ancona et al., 2018; Sundararajan et al., 2017; Li et al., 2016; Zeiler and Fergus, 2014), which indicates the network's response to an adversarial input. The identified tokens are subsequently occluded by a mask token and fed to the model to measure the change in model's confidence with respect to the original prediction. Fig. 1 provides an illustration of our gradient-guided detection, GRADMASK.

The gradient-based attribution of neural system's prediction has been studied widely in deep learning (Sundararajan et al., 2017; Simonyan et al., 2014; Li et al., 2016). Some prior work in NLP uses the gradient to identify important words (Murdoch et al., 2018; Li et al., 2017). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on detecting textual adversarial attacks by attributing the model prediction via gradient signal analysis.

GRADMASK has several advantages over the previous methods. Firstly, it does not require any additional modules for synonym search or frequent word count that are essential in the previous methods (Mozes et al., 2021; Zhou et al., 2019). Secondly, our detection algorithm works entirely without any prior knowledge about potential attacks, which is a more practical setup. Thirdly, it works without any pre-training. Finally, it provides a weak interpretation of decision by identifying adversarially perturbed tokens. The main contributions of this work are: (*i*) we propose GRADMASK, a novel gradient-guided adversarial example detection method; (*ii*) we demonstrate its advantage over state-of-the-art adversarial example detection algorithm through extensive experiments.

2 Method

In this section, we present our proposed method. We first establish the notations in §2.1.

2.1 Notations

We consider a standard text classification task for a model $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\cdot)$ with parameters $\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \mathbb{R}^p$. The model $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\cdot)$ is trained to fit a data distribution $\mathcal{D}$ over pairs of an input sequence $\mathbf{x} = [x_1, \cdots, x_T]$ of T tokens and its corresponding label $y \in \{1, \ldots, C\}$ with C being the number of classes. We also assume a loss function $\mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \mathbf{x}, y)$ such as a cross-entropy loss. The output of the model is a probability distribution that satisfies: $0 \leq f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x})_i \leq 1$ and $\sum_{i=1}^{C} f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x})_i = 1$, where i is the class index. We denote the final prediction as $c(\mathbf{x}) = \arg\max_i f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x})_i$ and true label as $c^*(\mathbf{x}) = y^*$.



Figure 1: An illustration of the detection process of GRADMASK with a binary classification example. An attacker tries to find an adversarial example $\mathbf{x}'$ by searching for the best perturbation (*compel*) that flips the original model prediction (expressed as the dotted line). GRADMASK attempts to identify the candidate perturbations through the gradient signal and masks one token (m_t) at a time to generate a masked sequence $\mathbf{m}_t$. The final decision is made by measuring the largest difference in model's confidence for $\mathbf{x}'$ and $\mathbf{m}_t$.

Given a sequence $\mathbf{x}$, a textual adversarial example $\mathbf{x}'$ can be defined as follows: for some semantic dissimilarity measure $\delta(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}')$, it has to be small and $c(\mathbf{x}') \neq c^*(\mathbf{x})$. These two conditions denote that an adversarial example has to maintain semantic meaning of the original input $\mathbf{x}$ but misguide the model prediction (Athalye et al., 2018).

2.2 Gradient-guided Token Masking for Adversarial Example Detection

GRADMASK first finds salient tokens that significantly attribute to the model prediction, $c(\mathbf{x})$; see Fig. 1 for an illustration. A simple and widely employed approach is the gradient-based attribution analysis (Ancona et al., 2018; Sundararajan et al., 2017; Li et al., 2016). However, due to the discrete nature of texts, we cannot directly exploit the gradient-based approach. In order to deviate the issue, we compute a gradient of the word embedding $\mathbf{e}_t$ with regard to the loss function $\mathcal{L}$, where $\mathbf{e}_t$ is a simple linear projection of a (subword) token x_t. The gradient can be expressed as follows:

$$\mathbf{g}_t = \nabla_{\mathbf{e}_t} \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \mathbf{x}, c(\mathbf{x})) \quad (1)$$

Algorithm 1 Gradient-based Masking for Adversarial Example Detection.

Require: Input sequence $\mathbf{x}$, target model $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}$

Initialize $\mathcal{M} = \{\}$ and $K = \lfloor T \times p \rfloor$.
Compute $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x})_i$, where $i = c(\mathbf{x})$. ▷ pred. for $\mathbf{x}$
$L := \{||\mathbf{g}_1||, \cdots, ||\mathbf{g}_T||\}$ via Eq. 1.
Sort L in descending order.
while $k \leq K$ **do**
    $||\mathbf{g}||_t \leftarrow L[k]$
    $\mathbf{m}_t = [x_1, \cdots, m_t, \cdots, x_T]$
    $\mathcal{M}[k] = f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{m}_t)_i$ ▷ prediction for $\mathbf{m}_t$
end while
$w = (f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x})_i - \min_k \mathcal{M}[k])^2$

Note that the above loss is computed with respect to the model's final prediction $c(\mathbf{x})$ and not the ground truth y^*.

Subsequently, we measure the amount of stimulus of the input tokens toward the model prediction by computing the L_2-norm of $\mathbf{g}_t$. The stimulus is considered as a saliency score of the tokens and it is determined in descending order of the magnitude of $||\mathbf{g}_t||_2$ following Li et al. (2016). GRADMASK only considers the top-p portion of the input tokens in $\mathbf{x}$. Specifically, the number of chosen K salient tokens is $\lfloor T \times p \rfloor$, where the brackets denote the floor operation. The sampled K salient tokens are masked individually one at a time to generate a masked input sequence $\mathbf{m}_t = [x_1, \ldots, m_t, \ldots, x_T]$ with t being the token position of a salient token, and m_t is the mask token, [MASK].[1]

The rationale behind the masking approach is based on two assumptions. The first assumption is that *adversarial examples are the result of sophisticated optimization algorithms rather than the result of random perturbations* (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Galloway et al., 2018). Thus, we conjecture that masking the suspicious tokens which are carefully crafted can significantly drop the model confidence. The second assumption is that *NLP systems are generally robust to weak-level of noise*. The partial information loss in clean samples due to masking can be offset by the overall context of the input text (supported by our experiments in §5).

Each masked sequence $\mathbf{m}_t$ is then fed into the target model to get a prediction $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{m}_t)_i$, where $i = c(\mathbf{x})$. This process gives K such confidence scores which are stored in $\mathcal{M}$. We then compare the minimum confidence value in $\mathcal{M}$ to the original confidence score $f(\mathbf{x})_i$, and the confidence change is squared to assign a stronger penalty to the higher changes. More formally,

$$w = \left(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x})_i - \min_k \mathcal{M}[k]\right)^2 \quad (2)$$

The final decision is determined by an indicator function $\mathcal{I}(w, \tau)$ defined as follows:

$$\mathcal{I}(w, \tau) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } w \leq \tau \\ 1 & \text{else} \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

where τ is a pre-defined threshold. Alg. 1 presents the overall process of GRADMASK.

[1] In case of non-masked language model-based classifiers, we adopted an unknown token.

Dataset	Train / Test	# Classes	Avg. Len
IMDb	25k/25k	2	215
SST-2	67k/1.8k	2	20
Yelp	560k/38k	2	152
AG	120k/7.6k	4	43

Table 1: A summary of the datasets used in our work.

3 Experiment Settings

In this section, we present our experiment settings: the datasets, target models, adversarial example generation, and evaluation metrics.

3.1 Datasets

We evaluate the methods on four classification tasks. We use the IMDB (Maas et al., 2011), AGNEWS (Zhang et al., 2015), YELP (Zhang et al., 2015), and Stanford Sentiment Treebank (SST) (Socher et al., 2013) datasets that are widely adopted for benchmarking adversarial robustness of NLP systems. The IMDB dataset contains movie reviews labeled with positive or negative sentiment labels. The AGNEWS dataset contains news articles from more than 2,000 news sources and the samples are categorized into the four largest classes. The YELP dataset is a binary sentiment classification dataset which consists of Yelp reviews. The SST dataset provides movie reviews with fine-grained sentiment labels. We turn the labels into binary (SST-2) to follow the setting of FGWS (Mozes et al., 2021). Table 1 gives an overview of the datasets.

3.2 Target Models

We evaluate GRADMASK on three different sequence modeling architectures, which have been

MODEL	DATASET	ACC (%)
ROBERTA	IMDB	93.36
	SST-2	91.98
	YELP	97.91
	AG	95.3
ROBERTA-LONG	IMDB	93.71
	SST-2	88.69
DISTILBERT	IMDB	90.57
	SST-2	91.21
	AG	94.37
LSTM	IMDB	87.27
	SST-2	83.53

Table 2: A summary of the target models and their clean testset performance.

widely employed in NLP. We first consider a large-scaled pre-trained Transformer-based language model, ROBERTA-BASE (Liu et al., 2019), which contains 124 million parameters. Subsequently, we also evaluate on a relatively smaller Transformer-based model called DISTILBERT-BASE (Sanh et al., 2020), which has approximately 40% fewer parameters than ROBERTA-BASE. Finally, we consider the LSTM, which used to be the dominant architecture before the arrival of Transformers.

Table 2 shows the standard task performance of the models on the three datasets. To train the models, we followed the hyperparameter settings provided by Mozes et al. (2021). The TRANSFORMER based models are optimized by AdamW (Loshchilov and Hutter, 2019) with a linear adaptive learning rate scheduler. For LSTM, the initial word embeddings are initialized with GloVe (Pennington et al., 2014). The texts in IMDB and YELP are comparatively longer than those in AGNEWS and SST-2. For the IMDB classification task, the maximum sequence lengths for ROBERTA, DISTILBERT and LSTM are set to 256, 256, and 200, respectively, and ROBERTA-LONG is trained with a longer sequence (400 tokens) than the standard one. The details of model architectures are provided in the supplementary material. All of the experiments are conducted on an Intel Xeon Gold 5218R CPU-2.10GHz processor with a single Quadro RTX 6000 GPU.

3.3 Adversarial Example Generation

We generated adversarial examples against the selected target models via four different attack algorithms. They include two baseline attacks and two widely adopted synonym substitution-based token-level attacks, as used in the previous work

- **Random** is a simple word replacement-based baseline attack algorithm. It randomly selects a synonym of a token in the original input text. Synonyms are identified via WordNet.
- **Prioritized** attack is also based on word replacement, but it puts a higher priority on a synonym that maximizes the target model's prediction confidence change.
- **Genetic** attack (GA) was proposed by Alzantot et al. (2018). It adopts the crossover and mutation operations in genetic algorithms to generate adversarial examples. GA searches synonyms based on the GloVe word embedding space with a language model (Radford et al., 2019).[2]
- **PWWS** or Probability weighted word saliency (Ren et al., 2019) is a greedy word substitution-based attack algorithm. The word replacement order is determined by a word saliency score computed through the model's confidence change. The word synonym is searched via WordNet.

3.4 Evaluation Metrics

The main interest of this work lies in an evaluation of the detection performance of our proposed method GRADMASK. FGWS (Mozes et al., 2021) was mainly evaluated via F1 score, but we follow the standards from the out-of-distribution (OOD) sample detection literature (**?**Hendrycks et al., 2019; Ouyang et al., 2021) for better understanding of the methods.

The adversarial example detection can be considered as a binary classification problem of verifying *positive (adversarial)* vs. *negative (clean)* class. We evaluate a ratio of true positive samples so-called true positive rate (TPR or recall) against false positive rate (FPR) defined as:

$$TPR = \frac{1}{n^+} \sum_i \mathcal{I}(w^+, \tau) \quad (4)$$

$$FPR = \frac{1}{n^-} \sum_i \mathcal{I}(w^-, \tau), \quad (5)$$

where the superscripts $+$ and $-$ denote the positive and the negative classes, respectively. Based on these two rates, we evaluate the methods with the following evaluation metrics:

- **FPR95** refers to a FPR at 95% TPR. FPR95 quantifies how many clean samples have to be rejected to detect 95% of the adversarial examples. FPR is a very important metric for evaluating detection al-

[2]We adopted the modified implementation provided by Mozes et al. (2021) for a fair comparison. The implementation details are provided in the supplementary material.

gorithms (Aldahdooh et al., 2021). A lower FPR95 score is often required for systems that require a high level of system safety or security.

• **AUROC** stands for the area under receiver operating characteristic curve. For each operational setting of τ from 0 to 1, TPR and FPR can be plotted. This curve is called receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC curve).

• **AUPR** denotes area under precision-recall (PR) curves. There exists an imbalance of data distribution between positive class and negative class. To deal with the data distribution skew, we evaluate AUPR scores for each class.

• **Acc** denotes a detection accuracy. We use Acc only for experiments with balanced datasets.

4 Results & Analysis

We first evaluate GRADMASK on widely employed NLP datasets and compare it with baselines (§4.1 and §4.2). Then, we analyze the adversarially perturbed token detection performance of GRADMASK (§4.3). Subsequently, we investigate GRADMASK's potential against a non-synonym based (character-level) attack (§4.4). Finally, We investigate the relationship between the adversarial robustness of NLP classification models and the word frequency in the adversarial examples (§5).

4.1 Adversarial Example Detection

For adversarial example detection, we compare the performance of GRADMASK with that of FGWS (Mozes et al., 2021). The hyperparameter settings of FGWS is tuned as provided by Mozes et al. (2021).[3] The overall experimental results are presented in Table 3. Note that AUPR-C and AUPR-A represent the AUPR score of clean samples (negative class) and that of adversarial samples (positive class), respectively.

As shown in Table 3, GRADMASK tends to show better AUROC, FPR95, and AUPR-C scores in most of the evaluation measures. Particularly, it outperforms FGWS for all Transformer-based systems (ROBERTA, ROBERTA-LONG, and DISTILBERT) in terms of the FPR95 score, which is an important metric for systems with high security requirements. In addition, GRADMASK achieves notably better AUPR-C scores in most of the experiment scenarios. This tendency is well presented in Fig. 2, which shows ROC curves of FGWS and

[3] https://github.com/maximilianmozes/fgws



Figure 2: ROC curves of FGWS and GRADMASK with the ROBERTA model. The horizontal red line is at the 95% TPR and the vertical lines at the FPRs of two algorithms, respectively (best viewed in color).

GRADMASK for ROBERTA model. The ROC curves of FGWS tend to increase steeply and remain stable. However, as TPR increases, FGWS significantly compromises FPR score. Especially, at some point, TPR and FPR show a linear trend. In contrast, GRADMASK tends to reach 95% TPR at lower FPR scores and shows larger AUROC scores.

On the other hand, GRADMASK shows lower performance scores in all metrics on SST-2 with the LSTM model as shown in Table 3. Nevertheless, the overall detection performance of GRADMASK tends to improve proportionally to the model size and the standard performance. Another notable observation is that GRADMASK achieves these results within two candidates except for the LSTM model (K in Table 3). These results may imply that NLP systems are largely robust to a partial loss of information resulting from the masking strategy on clean samples, but there is a significant change in the adversary response caused by a salient token masking. We also conducted an additional experiment to investigate the performance changes while varying the number of masked tokens in the samples in Appendix D.2.

Model	Dataset	# Samples TN	# Samples TP	Attack	FPR95 (%) FGWS	FPR95 (%) GM	AUROC (%) FGWS	AUROC (%) GM	AUPR-C (%) FGWS	AUPR-C (%) GM	AUPR-A (%) FGWS	AUPR-A (%) GM	K
RoBERTa	IMDb	2000	147	Random	84.98	**12.50**	86.06	**94.93**	98.46	**99.62**	**51.55**	46.55	2
		2000	995	Prioritized	68.31	**11.1**	92.67	**95.55**	95.06	**98.12**	**89.2**	84.89	2
		2000	1042	Genetic	78.53	**11.4**	89.88	**95.69**	92.89	**98.17**	**86.72**	85.04	2
		2000	1016	PWWS	85.17	**12.10**	85.85	**95.27**	90.47	**98.00**	83.00	**84.18**	2
	SST-2	1821	148	Random	90.54	**52.39**	75.40	**81.43**	97.17	**98.18**	**37.62**	20.37	1
		1821	479	Prioritized	84.69	**54.26**	**83.57**	82.09	94.23	**94.65**	**65.35**	46.95	1
		1821	968	Genetic	90.82	**56.89**	74.60	**79.19**	84.22	**90.97**	**66.55**	61.33	1
		1821	736	PWWS	65.06	**51.29**	77.72	**82.73**	88.66	**92.44**	**66.05**	58.51	1
RoBERTa-Long	IMDb	2000	190	Random	89.77	**12.85**	81.05	**94.12**	97.26	**99.57**	**58.84**	37.20	2
		2000	1037	Prioritized	68.20	**11.30**	93.08	**94.66**	95.02	**97.79**	**90.70**	81.78	2
		2000	888	Genetic	80.96	**10.65**	89.05	**95.20**	93.24	**97.93**	**85.38**	83.26	2
		2000	1129	PWWS	84.38	**10.95**	87.10	**95.07**	90.26	**97.96**	86.38	**83.38**	2
	SST-2	1821	176	Random	89.34	**60.35**	**76.42**	75.72	96.94	**96.97**	**35.15**	18.24	1
		1821	527	Prioritized	87.06	**60.08**	**79.80**	77.73	92.71	**92.78**	**62.95**	43.31	1
		1821	960	Genetic	92.15	**69.80**	68.18	**73.55**	82.55	**84.89**	**61.46**	53.11	1
		1821	772	PWWS	90.05	**57.50**	75.54	**78.57**	87.83	**90.41**	**66.44**	54.38	1
DistilBERT	IMDb	2000	212	Random	86.98	**37.30**	83.36	**87.66**	97.46	**98.56**	**59.59**	33.33	1
		2000	1182	Prioritized	62.85	**31.70**	**93.20**	89.66	**94.79**	94.50	**91.88**	76.09	1
		2000	1202	Genetic	75.59	**22.80**	**90.28**	90.23	**92.50**	95.27	**89.25**	74.41	1
		2000	1335	PWWS	83.06	**36.64**	86.56	**88.74**	88.9	**92.93**	**86.95**	79.10	1
	SST-2	1821	171	Random	84.42	**59.69**	**83.17**	77.78	87.77	**97.32**	**37.23**	18.40	1
		1821	614	Prioritized	84.36	**58.70**	**84.29**	78.87	**92.97**	92.34	**70.36**	46.86	1
		1821	1105	Genetic	90.97	**49.81**	74.74	**78.06**	82.27	**88.18**	**69.36**	57.32	1
		1821	860	PWWS	71.56	**54.31**	**80.30**	78.87	88.25	**89.93**	**71.56**	54.41	1
LSTM	IMDb	2000	198	Random	89.64	**37.55**	77.82	**84.22**	96.90	**98.31**	**44.47**	24.87	20
		2000	1451	Prioritized	78.68	**30.50**	**88.34**	86.64	89.66	**92.41**	**88.66**	73.90	20
		2000	1548	Genetic	89.73	**30.50**	77.47	**86.59**	81.04	**92.00**	**78.92**	74.50	20
		2000	1735	PWWS	88.85	**30.90**	80.53	**86.99**	81.47	**91.45**	**83.85**	78.43	20
	SST-2	1821	238	Random	**86.35**	98.13	**79.14**	58.45	**96.36**	90.22	**36.37**	13.35	20
		1821	669	Prioritized	**89.89**	95.18	**74.97**	68.45	**88.73**	84.33	**57.21**	36.24	20
		1821	1186	Genetic	**91.28**	96.00	**71.37**	66.74	**80.08**	72.67	**66.55**	51.55	20
		1821	1013	PWWS	**90.28**	95.51	**74.68**	69.59	**83.96**	78.51	**66.46**	48.26	20

Table 3: Adversarial example detection results of FGWS and GradMask (GM). AUPR-C and AUPR-A denote AUPR of clean example and adversarial example classes, respectively.



(a) IMDb-Genetic (b) IMDb-PWWS

Figure 3: Precision-Recall curves of FGWS and GradMask on IMDb with the RoBERTa model against the PWWS and genetic attacks.

Another observation is that our gradient-based masking strategy occasionally detects adversarial examples through masking a clean token as presented in §4.3 and Fig. 4. This result implies that the hidden representation of adversarial tokens significantly affects that of clean tokens. We leave analysis of this correlation as future work.

Moreover, GradMask shows consistently better performance in detecting strong attacks such as genetic attack and PWWS attack which are more aggressive than the others. We conjecture that stronger attacks select and engineer the crucial tokens more carefully, so masking these tokens would hugely reduce the effectiveness of these attacks.

Fianlly, we observe that GradMask underperforms FGWS in terms of AUPR-A. A possible explanation may be related to the nature of the synonym substitution strategy. We hypothesize that FGWS tends to transform an input sequence aggressively. This view can be supported by their FPR95 scores and precision-recall (PR) curves. Firstly, the ROC curves of FGWS typically show high FPRs at high TPRs (Fig. 2). Secondly, from the PR curves of FGWS shown in Fig. 3, the precision scores drop significantly as the recall scores increase. We provide PR curves for 6 other scenarios in the supplementary material.

4.2 A Comparison with Anomaly Detection Algorithms

We conducted additional experiments via TextAttack library (Morris et al., 2020)[4] to compare GradMask with baseline anomaly detection algorithms such as maximum softmax probability (MSP) (Hendrycks and Gimpel, 2017) and one-class support vector machine with linear kernel (OCSVM) (Schölkopf et al., 2000) that are widely adopted as a baseline in various anomaly detection areas (Lee et al., 2018; Shafaei et al., 2019; Winkens et al., 2020; Aldahdooh et al., 2021).

We trained RoBERTa-base on three datasets including IMDb, Yelp, and AG datasets, respectively. We sampled 1,000 clean examples and their

[4]We adopted TextAttack framework (Morris et al., 2020) to attack the victim models. Their implementation difference is provided in the supplementary material.

Dataset	Method	AUROC	FPR95	AUPR-C	AUPR-A	Acc
AG	MSP	94.81	19.40	95.28	**93.17**	87.50
	OCSVM	94.72	16.70	95.63	91.72	89.25
	GM	**94.93**	**11.00**	**96.69**	88.37	**92.50**
IMDb	MSP	95.34	19.43	95.07	**95.16**	90.32
	OCSVM	84.83	98.00	71.88	89.41	83.82
	GM	**95.53**	**10.62**	**96.81**	92.26	**92.20**
Yelp	MSP	97.22	11.47	97.45	**97.12**	92.16
	OCSVM	95.90	15.50	93.92	96.20	91.07
	GM	**97.81**	**5.68**	**98.37**	96.22	**94.69**

Table 4: A comparison of PWWS attack detection results on RoBERTa model with MSP and OCSVM.

Dataset	K	w-A/Conf-A (Avg±Std)	w-C/Conf-C (Avg±Std)
IMDb	MSP	-/0.808±0.155	-/0.990±0.034
	1	0.353±0.318/-	0.020±0.117/-
	2	0.424±0.308/-	0.024±0.129/-
	3	0.528±0.309/-	0.050±0.187/-
AG	MSP	-/0.743±0.163	-/0.980±0.068
	1	0.335±0.299/-	0.030±0.147/-
	2	0.381±0.294/-	0.037±0.160/-
	3	0.468±0.295/-	0.028±0.137/-
Yelp	MSP	-/0.951±0.067	-/0.999±0.005
	1	0.509±0.422/-	0.009±0.091/-
	2	0.650±0.379/-	0.015±0.116/-
	3	0.783±0.305/-	0.021±0.135/-

Table 5: Statistics (Avg and Std) of extracted features. The first row of each dataset denotes the maximum softmax probability (MSP) of the RoBERTa model for adversarial (Conf-A) and clean (Conf-C) examples, respectively. The subsequent rows show the mean and standard deviation of w of GradMask while varying the number of mask tokens K.

corresponding 1,000 adversarial examples without a text length limitation via PWWS attack.

From the results in Table 4, we notice that GradMask significantly outperforms the baselines by a large margin except for the AUPR-A scores. These results are consistent with the results reported in §4.1. GradMask achieves significantly lower FPR95 scores than that of MSP and OCSVM for all three datasets and higher AUPR-C scores. Also, we report a detection accuracy for this experiment because the datasets are well-balanced unlike the previous experiment in §4.1. Specifically, we measured the best accuracy over a varying threshold setting. Table 4 shows that GradMask achieved the best detection accuracy for each dataset and its error rate is around 7% for all tasks.

We further analyze statistics of the features extracted from MSP and GradMask methods to attribute the superior performance of GradMask. Table 5 presents two statistics of the extracted features, mean (Avg) and standard deviation (Std). The values are averaged over 1,000 samples. As shown in the table, the overall mean differences between the w (*c.f.,* Eq. (2)) of adversarial examples (w-A) and w of clean samples (w-C) are higher than that of MSP, which implies that GradMask feature w is more distinguishable. Specifically, for IMDb, MSP shows 0.182 (= 0.990 - 0.808), but GradMask shows 0.478 at $K = 3$. In addition, standard deviations of GradMask are generally smaller than that of MSP.

4.3 Adversarial Token Detection

We now analyze how our gradient-based approach GradMask attributes the model prediction on adversarial examples. Fig. 4 shows perturbed token detection rates of two Transformer-based models, DistilBERT and RoBERTa, on two datasets, IMDb and AGNews. We report detection rates at top-1, top-3, and top-5, which refers to the total number of adversarially perturbed tokens identified



Figure 4: Adversarially perturbed token detection rates at top-1, top-2 and top-5 for GradMask.

within the top-N values of w in Eq. (2). In case of DistilBERT, it shows 48.17% and 31.82% detection rates for IMDb and AGNews within the top-5 predictions, respectively. On the other hand, RoBERTa shows 72.04% and 48.85% detection rates for IMDb and AGNews within the top-5 predictions. Another notable observation is that for the IMDb classification task, top-1 predictions detect the adversarial tokens with 49% and 78% probability for DistilBERT and RoBERTa, respectively. For AGNews, their top-1 predictions show 45% and 67% detection probability, respectively.

4.4 Character-Level Attack Detection

To investigate the potential of GradMask against non-synonym based attacks, we conduct an additional experiment with a character-level attack (Pruthi et al., 2019) from the TextAttack library (Morris et al., 2020). Even though character-level attacks are known to be relatively simple to defend at a preprocessing stage with a spell or a grammar checker (Pruthi et al., 2019), our motivation for

Model	AUROC	FPR95	AUPR-C	AUPR-A	Acc	K
RoBERTa	80.02	63.39	79.62	75.74	75.83	3
DistilBERT	80.42	63.76	81.02	75.07	75.36	2

Table 6: Adversarial example detection results (in %) against a character-level attack.

this experiment is to demonstrate the potential of GradMask against non-synonym based attacks.

We generated 691 and 897 adversarial examples from AG against RoBERTa-base and DistilBERT-base without any maximum text length limitation, respectively. From the results in Table 6, we see that our method shows promising results with AUROC scores of 79.68% and 80.42% for RoBERTa-base and DistilBERT-base, respectively. It would be interesting to see how GradMask performs for other kinds of non-synonym attacks such as syntactically controlled paraphrase networks (SCPNs) (Iyyer et al., 2018) or universal adversarial attack (Song et al., 2021) which we leave as future work.

5 Discussion on Word Frequency and Adversarial Robustness

According to Mozes et al. (2021), the brittleness of NLP systems against adversarial examples would be attributed to the distribution of word frequency in a training set. However, one of the widely accepted explanations about the existence of adversarial examples insists that adversarial examples are a result of the standard optimization rather than data distribution (Ilyas et al., 2019). We investigated how the word frequency can affect the model's robustness via a series of experiments. Consequently, we find that *deep NLP systems can still be fooled by adversarial examples with words that are frequently exposed during their training stage*.

To validate this claim, we trained the victim models with a word frequency constraint. Specifically, we built a new vocabulary set V' to be comprised of only the top-10% frequently used words from the original vocabulary set V. The vocabulary-constrained models are designed to block all infrequent words that are out of V' in an input sequence by masking those tokens. We first evaluated the model performance to observe how the vocabulary constraint affects the model performance. As shown in Table 7, the standard task performance of the victim models under the constraint (**Acc**-V') only marginally decreases (about 1 - 4%) compared to the original accuracy (**Acc**-V). These results

Model	Dataset	Acc-V	Acc-V'	$x' \in V'$	AAcc
DistilBERT	IMDb	92.98	92.17	71.73	10.4
	AG	94.37	90.78	68.92	15.6
RoBERTa	IMDb	95.33	95.15	67.38	7.6
	AG	95.22	94.87	44.26	30.8

Table 7: Word frequency and adversarial robustness. Acc-V and Acc-V' refer to accuracies of the model with the original vocabulary V and constrainted vocabulary V', respectively. $x' \in V'$ denotes a ratio of perturbed tokens that are part of V'. AAcc denotes an under attack accuracy of the model with V'.

show that masking infrequent tokens does not hurt the model performance significantly. Next, we generated 1,000 pairs of samples via the PWWS attack algorithm (Ren et al., 2019) against the word frequency constrained models. Each sample pair consists of a clean example and its corresponding adversarial example that successfully fools the target model.

According to the infrequent word assumption (Mozes et al., 2021), the models trained on V' are expected to be robust against adversarial attacks. However, from the results in Table 7, we notice that they showed significant brittleness against adversarial attacks. For instance, DistilBERT models show approximately 10% accuracies for both datasets when under attack (**AAcc**). Similarly, RoBERTa models show under attack accuracies of 7.6% and 30.8% for AGNews and IMDb, respectively. Thus, we claim that *the vulnerabilities of NLP systems cannot only be attributed to the infrequent words*.

6 Conclusion

We have proposed a simple model-agnostic adversarial example detection scheme, GradMask, which utilizes gradient signals as a guidance to detect adversarially perturbed tokens. This guidance additionally provides a weak interpretation about its decision. The experimental results show that GradMask is a promising approach as a textual adversarial attack detection algorithm for NLP systems. Particularly, it shows significantly low FPR95 scores, which is a highly desirable property for NLP systems with high-security requirements. In addition, GradMask does not require an additional module or a strong assumption about potential attacks which are more realistic in practice. In conclusion, our detection strategy can serve as a useful tool for identifying adversarial attacks for protecting the text classification systems.

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Table 8: Parameter settings of target models. AL and MAXLEN denote the adaptive linear learning rate scheduler and maximum sequence length, respectively.

MODEL	PARAMETERS	
ROBERTA	OPTIMIZER	ADAMW
	BATCH SIZE (IMDB/SST-2)	16/32
	EPOCHS	10
	LEARNINGRATE	10^-5
	LEARNINGRATE SCHEDULER	AL
	MAXLEN (IMDB/SST-2)	256/128
ROBERTA-LONG	OPTIMIZER	ADAMW
	BATCH SIZE (IMDB/SST-2)	16/32
	EPOCHS	10
	LEARNINGRATE	10^-5
	LEARNINGRATE SCHEDULER	AL
	MAXLEN (IMDB/SST-2)	400/256
DISTILBERT	OPTIMIZER	ADAMW
	BATCH SIZE (IMDB/SST-2)	16/32
	EPOCHS	10
	LEARNINGRATE	10^-5
	LEARNINGRATE SCHEDULER	AL
	MAXLEN (IMDB/SST-2)	256/128
LSTM	OPTIMIZER	ADAM
	BATCH SIZE (IMDB/SST-2)	100/100
	HIDDEN SIZE	128
	DROPOUT	0.1
	EMBEDDING	GLOVE
	EPOCHS	20
	LEARNINGRATE	10^-3
	MAXLEN (IMDB/SST-2)	200/50

A Model Parameters

Table 8 summarizes the parameter settings of the target models used for adversarial example detection experiments. We follow the model settings of (Mozes et al., 2021) except ROBERTA-LONG which is trained on a longer maximum sequence length setting.

B Adversarial Attack Implementation

For adversarial example detection experiments (§4.1), we adopted the implementation provided by Mozes et al. (2021). According to Mozes et al. (2021), they replaced Google language model (Chelba et al., 2013) in genetic attack with GPT-2 language model (Radford et al., 2019) for computational efficiency.

Note that for word-frequency analysis (§5), adversarial token detection (§4.3), and all supplementary experiments described in Appendix D, we employed the publicly available TextAttack library (Morris et al., 2020) for PWWS attack (Ren et al., 2019). The main difference from the original implementation is PWWS attack in TextAttack does not include the named entity (NE) adversarial swap, because it requires NE labels of input sequences that are not available in practice (Morris et al., 2020).



Figure 5: PR curves of FGWS and GRADMASK on IMDB and SST-2 ROBERTA models against four different attacks.

C Precision-Recall Curve of ROBERTA Model

Fig. 5 presents PR curves of FGWS and GRADMASK ROBERTA models trained on IMDB and SST-2 against four different attacks. As mentioned in §4.1, we observe the tendency that the overall precision scores of the FGWS algorithm drop at high recall scores. However, our method maintains high precision scores at high recall scores.

D Supplementary Experiments

This section provides a supplementary analysis of GRADMASK for a better understanding of the algorithm. We first investigated the statistical features of GRADMASK with a logistic regression (Appendix D.1). We then studied a relationship between a multi-masking effect and detection performance of GRADMASK in Appendix D.2. Subsequently, we conduct an experiment to evaluate

DATASET	K	ACC (%) LR	GM
AG	1	84.90	91.85
	2	89.95	91.95
	3	91.60	92.50
IMDB	1	84.54	91.53
	2	89.71	91.35
	3	91.79	92.16
YELP	1	80.52	93.50
	2	87.63	93.81
	3	90.62	94.69

Table 9: The detection accuracy of logistic regression with statistical features extracted by masked inputs and GRADMASK with various K settings.

the performance of GRADMASK for a task that is sensitive to a single critical token (Appendix D.3).

During the experiments, we used a ROBERTA model for each task and generated adversarial examples via PWWS attack with TextAttack library (Morris et al., 2020). For each task,1,000 clean samples and their corresponding 1,000 adversarial examples are used as a test set.

D.1 Supervised Model with GRADMASK Features

GRADMASK is originally designed to extract the minimum value of $\mathcal{M}$ but the optimal feature could be varied by statistical variations in practice. An alternative way to sidestep the feature selection process would be training a model with multiple features. To this end, we trained a simple linear model with logistic regression. We computed statistics of $\mathcal{M}$ (*c.f.,* Eq. (2)) including the minimum, the maximum, the mean, and the standard deviation. The linear model is trained with a training set of 1,000 clean examples and 1,000 adversarial examples generated via PWWS attack.

Table 9 provides a detection accuracy of the logistic regression model and GRADMASK . As shown in the table, GRADMASK outperforms the logistic regression model for all K settings.

D.2 GRADMASK with Multi-Masking

GRADMASK searches a candidate token to be masked that drops the model confidence the most significantly. For a better understanding of the masking effect of GRADMASK, we investigate a detection performance of the multi-masking strategy of GRADMASK. To this end, we modify the original algorithm by introducing an additional gradient search step after masking a suspicious token. This step is supposed to find the next masking position of the masked input. To this end, L_2 norm of gradient is computed after every masking process. This modified version of GRADMASK is described in Alg. 2.

Algorithm 2 Gradient-based Multi-Masking for Adversarial Example Detection.

Require: Input sequence $\mathbf{x}$, target model $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}$
Initialize $\mathcal{M} = \{\}$ and $K = \lfloor T \times p \rfloor$.
Compute $f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x})_i$, where $i = c(\mathbf{x})$. ▷ pred. for $\mathbf{x}$
$L := \{||\mathbf{g}_1||, \cdots, ||\mathbf{g}_T||\}$ via Eq. 1.
Sort L in descending order.
while $k \leq K$ **do**
    $||\mathbf{g}||_t \leftarrow L[1]$
    $\mathbf{m}_t = [x_1, \cdots, m_t, \cdots, x_T]$
    $\mathcal{M}[k] = f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{m}_t)_i$ ▷ prediction for $\mathbf{m}_t$
    $L := \{||\mathbf{g}_1||, \cdots, ||\mathbf{g}_T||\}$ via Eq. 1.
    Sort L in descending order.
end while
$w = (f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x})_i - \min_k \mathcal{M}[k])^2$

Table 10 summarizes the experiment results on three different datasets. For AG dataset, GRADMASK with a single mask tends to show the best performance for all metrics. Specifically, the overall performance is decreased as the number of masks in input texts increases. On the other hand, IMDB and YELP show contrasting results. For IMDB, GRADMASK at $K = 3$ achieves the best FPR95 and Acc scores. In addition, GRADMASK shows the best performance at $K = 3$ for YELP dataset. One of the possible explanations for these results is the difference in the average text length of datasets. The average length of IMDB and YELP dataset are 215 and 152, respectively and these are much longer than that of AG dataset (43). Thus, a larger number of masked tokens in samples may remove adversarial tokens more effectively for those datasets with longer texts.

D.3 Detection of Adversarial Attack in Winograd Schema Challenge

One of the potential criticisms of masking-based textual adversarial example detection approaches is the information loss caused by their masking strategies. It is likely that the gradient-based token saliency evaluation approach may decide to mask a critical token that is important for a model's prediction and drop the confidence of the model prediction.

DATASET	# MASK	AUROC (%)	FPR95 (%)	AUPR-C (%)	AUPR-A (%)	ACC (%)
AG	1	**94.98**	**11.70**	**96.30**	**89.48**	**91.85**
	2	92.51	16.30	95.12	84.11	89.80
	3	89.89	19.40	93.51	79.46	88.00
	4	86.86	22.10	91.86	74.35	86.60
IMDB	1	**95.92**	13.16	**96.81**	**93.27**	91.53
	2	94.42	14.01	96.04	89.64	91.01
	3	94.32	**12.70**	95.89	90.42	**91.70**
	4	91.07	16.24	94.20	82.60	89.95
YELP	1	97.38	8.16	97.73	96.17	93.50
	2	97.97	8.39	98.29	97.35	93.51
	3	**97.99**	**6.42**	**98.41**	**97.00**	**94.94**
	4	97.37	6.64	98.13	95.63	94.93

Table 10: Adversarial example detection results of GRADMASK with the multi-masking strategy.

However, as shown in Table 5, model confidence changes for clean samples are not significant in most cases. A possible explanation is that the models are able to capture sufficient contexts from neighboring texts. Nevertheless, we further investigate this possible issue on a task that relies on a few critical tokens. To this end, we investigate the proposed method on the Winograd Schema Challenge (Levesque et al., 2012). The Winograd Schema Challenge (WSC) is a benchmark for commonsense reasoning and natural language understanding. The Winograd schema consists of a pair of sentences differing in one or two words with a highly ambiguous pronoun that is difficult to solve for statistical models.

One of WSC benchmark datasets is WINOGRANDE (WG) dataset (Sakaguchi et al., 2019). WG dataset is split into 40k training samples and 1.2k validation samples. We first trained a ROBERTA-LARGE model on the training set and our best model achieves an accuracy of 72% against the validation set. Again, we sampled 1,000 clean samples from the validation set and generated 1,000 adversarial examples via PWWS attack.

As shown in Table 11, GRADMASK achieves the best performances for all evaluation metrics. However, its scores are significantly lower than those of other tasks such as IMDB and AG. We conjecture that the overall performances of GRADMASK can be improved further as the model's standard performance increases because GRADMASK relies on the standard task performance of models for extracting better features.

DATASET	METHOD	AUROC (%)	FPR95 (%)	AUPR-C (%)	AUPR-A (%)	ACC (%)
WG	MSP	52.45	93.95	52.14	49.93	53.73
	OCSVM	55.15	92.83	54.25	53.69	54.62
	GM	**60.78**	**91.37**	**59.20**	**57.04**	**60.34**

Table 11: Adversarial example detection results of ROBERTA-LARGE model for WG dataset.