
The bandwidth of perceptual awareness is constrained by specific high-level visual features

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Abstract

1 When observers glance at a natural scene, which aspects of that scene ultimately
2 reach perceptual awareness? To answer this question, we showed observers images
3 of scenes that had been altered in numerous ways in the periphery (e.g., scrambling,
4 rotating, filtering, etc.) and measured how often these different alterations were
5 noticed in an inattentive blindness paradigm. Then, we screened a wide range
6 of deep convolutional neural network architectures and asked which layers and
7 features best predict the rates at which observers noticed these alterations. We found
8 that features in the higher (but not earlier) layers predicted how often observers
9 noticed different alterations with extremely high accuracy (at the estimated noise
10 ceiling). Surprisingly, the model prediction accuracy was driven by a very small
11 fraction of features that were both necessary and sufficient to predict the observed
12 behavior, which we could easily visualize. Together these results indicate that
13 human perceptual awareness is limited by high-level visual features that we can
14 estimate using computational methods.

15 1 Introduction

16 How much information do humans perceive when looking at a natural scene? Is our experience of
17 the world rich and detailed (Lamme (2003); Block (2011), or is it sparse and limited (Dehaene &
18 Changeux (2011); Cohen et al. (2012))? What aspects of the visual world are observers aware of at
19 any given moment? To try and answer these questions, researchers use paradigms like change and
20 inattentive blindness to examine the limits of perceptual experience (Jensen et al. (2011)). In typical
21 versions of these experiments, individual items change or appear in some unexpected manner and
22 researchers measure how often observers notice these events.

23 However, there are limits as to what can be gleaned about perceptual experience using this approach
24 for two main reasons. **First**, changes in these experiments typically involve alterations that are
25 confined to individual objects/people within complex scenes: a shadow that appears and disappears
26 (Rensink et al. (1997)), a rail in the background that moves up and down (O'Regan et al. (1999)),
27 an individual in a gorilla costume walking amongst a group of people (Simons & Chabris (1999)),
28 etc. Therefore, it is difficult to extrapolate from these findings to broad generalizations about the
29 overall bandwidth of perceptual experience. **Second**, stimuli in these paradigms change along many
30 dimensions, making it difficult to synthesize them into a coherent whole. For example, the critical
31 manipulations in these experiments involve a wide array of stimuli ranging from lower-level items like
32 colors and simple shapes (Mack & Rock (1997); Most et al. (2005)), to complex objects (Simons
33 et al. (2000)) or even entire scenes (Cohen et al. (2011)). Therefore, creating general principles about
34 perceptual experience from this diverse set of studies is difficult since the manipulated variables fall
35 along numerous different perceptual dimensions.

36 Here, we propose an algorithmic approach to examining the limits of perceptual awareness using
37 computational models. We started by altering images of natural scenes in numerous ways and
38 quantified how often observers noticed those alterations in an inattentional blindness paradigm
39 using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (N=1,260 observers). Finally, we sought to unify these
40 behavioral results by building deep convolutional neural networks (dCNNs) based computational
41 models that could predict the behavioral inattentional blindness rates. The idea behind this approach
42 is that by building models that predict observers’ behavior, we could then probe the specific internal
43 features of these computational models to infer the critical features that best predicted human behavior.

44 2 Methods

45 2.1 Inattentional blindness behavioral paradigm

46 **Note:** All of the methods and analyses in this study were pre-registered to remove all experimenter
47 bias (osf.io/zr3ed). **Participants:** 1,260 participants were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical
48 Turk. Every subject gave informed consent. All procedures were approved by the MIT Institutional
49 Review Board and the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects.

50 Overall, we created 21 experimental conditions with each condition corresponding to a different way
51 of altering the periphery (Figure 1a). Participants were unaware of the experiment’s true nature and
52 were instructed to perform a simple face detection task at fixation. On each trial, participants were
53 shown 7-30 images of natural scenes and reported whether the last image in the stream contained
54 a face in the middle of it (Figure 1b). Each image was shown for 288ms, which approximately
55 corresponds to the duration of one fixation in naturalistic viewing conditions (Rayner (1998);
56 Henderson (2003)). For the first 10 trials, half of the trials had a face target present at the end and
57 half did not. At the end of each trial, a screen appeared that prompted the observer to say whether or
58 not the last image had a human face in the middle.


59 On the critical trial, the last image in the stream was a target stimulus (Figure 1a). As soon as the
60 critical stimulus disappeared, rather than be asked about if a face was in the middle, observers were
61 instead asked another series of questions. Specifically: 1) “Did you notice anything different about
62 that last trial?” 2) “If we were to tell you there was something different about that last trial, could you
63 say what it was?” 3) “If we were to tell you there was something different about the very last image
64 on that last trial, could you say what it was?” Only those participants who responded “no” to all of
65 these questions were classified as having been inattentionally blind. If an observer responded “yes”
66 to any of these questions, they were classified as having noticed the alterations.

67 3 Results


68 3.1 Inattentional blindness behavioral results

69 The results from these behavioral experiments are plotted in Figure 1c. Overall, there is substantial
70 variance in the inattentional blindness rates between conditions. For example, virtually no observers
71 noticed when the periphery was altered in the medium “metamer” conditions (92.5% inattentional
72 blindness rate), while many observers noticed when the periphery was abstract and desaturated (
73 35% inattentional blindness rate). The participants were also highly consistent in their responses
74 (Spearman-Brown corrected, split-half reliability ($r=0.82$, $P<0.00001$)). However, before attempting
75 to model these results, we examined the reliability of this data by directly comparing the inattentional
76 blindness rates of a subset of the conditions when using MTurk to those obtained when testing those
77 exact conditions in a laboratory setting. Specifically, we took 6 conditions from our prior study that
78 used the same experimental procedures and compared the behavioral results with the data obtained
79 in the present MTurk study (Cohen et al. (2021); (1) “Metamers” (small), 2) “Metamers” (large),
80 3) Texture-synthesis, 4) Inconsistent periphery, 5) Abstract periphery, and 6) Grey periphery). The
81 correlation between the laboratory and MTurk was remarkably high ($r=0.98$, $P<0.0001$). The fact that
82 the laboratory and MTurk data is almost perfectly correlated is critical, as it implies that our methods
83 for examining inattentional blindness online are both valid and reliable.

a) Experimental conditions



b) Behavioral paradigm (MTurk)



c) Behavioral results (MTurk)




Figure 1: a) Stimuli. Examples from each experimental condition. An original image is shown on the top left, with an example of that image then being altered in each of the 21 different experimental condition. b) Visualization of the trial procedures for the behavioral experiment. Participants performed 10 trials where they simply said if the last image in the stream did or did not contain a human face in the middle. Then, on trial 11, an unexpected critical stimulus was presented at the end of the trial and participants were immediately probed to determine whether or not they noticed the critical stimulus. b) Inattention blindness rates for each condition in the behavioral experiment. The percentage of participants who failed to notice the critical stimulus is plotted on the vertical axis. Each bar corresponds to a different experimental condition. The error bars represent bootstrapped standard errors.

84 **3.2 Modeling behavior with deep convolutional neural networks (dCNNs)**

85 How can we unify the behavioral results from these drastically different experimental conditions to
 86 form an overall understanding of perceptual awareness? To answer this question, we built predictive
 87 models of these behavioral findings, which we could then probe to identify the specific visual features
 88 that determine the bandwidth of perceptual experience. We screened several dCNN architectures to
 89 predict the observed behavioral data. This modeling approach is comprised of two parts: First, we
 90 measured the similarity between the features extracted for the original images and the altered images
 91 for each dCNN layer of a given network architecture. Then, we computed a linear mapping function
 92 between these similarity values and the behavioral measures (Figure 2a).

93 Which layers and features within a given network best predict the behavioral data? To answer this
 94 question, we calculated the correlations between the inattention blindness rates and the cross-
 95 validated predicted inattention blindness rates made by a given layer in each network architecture.
 96 This procedure was done with every layer of 7 architectures: AlexNet, VGG-16, VGG-19, ResNet-18,
 97 SqueezeNet, DarkNet19, and MobileNet. These architectures were chosen because they are somewhat
 98 similar in their depth relative to other networks (e.g., ResNet-50, GoogleNet, etc.), making it easier




Figure 2: a) To create a predictive model, we computed a direct linear mapping between the behavioral data obtained on MTurk (Fig. 1c) and the similarity measurements between the original and altered images. b) With this model, we then calculated the cross-validated predicted inattention blindness rates and correlated them with the observed inattention blindness rates. c) The vertical axis represents the correlation between the observed behavioral results and a model’s prediction on held out data (i.e., cross-validated). The grey bar represents the behavioral noise ceiling (see Methods). The horizontal axis represents the specific layer of a given network architecture. Each colored line corresponds to a given network.

99 to directly compare these networks to one another. The results from this analysis are plotted in
 100 Figure 2b. Across each network, we found that earlier layers could not predict the behavioral data.
 101 However, the later layers were able to predict the behavioral data, with many of these layers reaching
 102 the behavioral noise ceiling. Since numerous studies have shown that dCNNs such as these gradually
 103 build up abstractions across layers (i.e., from simple edges to textures to patterns to object parts, etc.),
 104 these results suggest that the extent to which an observer will notice the alterations to the periphery
 105 is directly related to the extent to which higher-level elements of a scene are preserved. As those
 106 higher-level elements are themselves altered, it increases the likelihood that a particular alteration
 107 will be noticed. Meanwhile, lower-level features can be altered without observers noticing, so long as
 108 these higher-level elements are aspects of an image are preserved.

109 An advantage of using computational models like dCNNs is that we can directly probe them to
 110 investigate the specific features that are linked with perceptual awareness. Here, we identified the
 111 specific features that drive the model’s ability to predict behavior and visualized those features to get
 112 an intuitive understanding of what they represent. To identify the features with the most predictive
 113 power, we examined the regression model weights between the model features and the behavioral data.
 114 Then, we selected the 10 features with the highest weights and found that restricting the analyses to
 115 just these 10 features could predict the behavioral data to the noise ceiling (correlation with behavior
 116 $r=0.83$, $P<0.00001$).

117 What do these 10 features represent? To answer this question, we used a version of feature visual-
 118 ization to determine what attributes of scenes the top 10 features are representing. Here, we chose
 119 to directly observe the strength of the gradients. The advantage of this method is that it provides

120 maps that show the specific pixels that drive a given unit in a neural network the most. Specifically,
 121 we used a gradient attribution method called Guided Backpropagation (Springenberg et al. (2015)).
 122 The results from this analysis results in what we call ‘Attribution maps’ and can be visualized for a
 123 few example stimuli in Figure 3. Overall, the attribution maps clearly focus on the outer contours of
 124 objects and scenes. For example, with an image of a canoe on a lake, the attribution maps highlight
 125 the outer contours of the canoe itself but do not focus on the texture properties of the water, which
 126 has no strong outer contour. Conversely, with a picture of a beach, in which the horizon and shoreline
 127 serve as clear contours, the attribution maps highlight both of these aspects of the scene. Indeed, after
 128 examining several examples, it becomes clear that the critical elements are the contours of a scene. In
 129 other words, the extent to which observers will notice alterations to an image appears to be linked to
 130 the extent to which those outer contours are preserved.




Figure 3: On the top row are six example original images. On the bottom row are visualizations from the Guided Backpropagation procedures. The gradient strength is plotted from blue to yellow

131 4 Conclusion

132 Here, we examined the bandwidth of visual awareness using an inattentive blindness paradigm with
 133 natural scenes. Specifically, we altered the periphery of natural images in a wide variety of manners
 134 and measured how often observers noticed those alterations. To gain insight as to which aspects
 135 of natural scenes drive these results, we screened several dCNN architectures to create a series of
 136 predictive models. Within each of these architectures, we found that later layers and higher-level
 137 features, but not earlier layers or lower-level features, could predict the behavioral results extremely
 138 well, reaching the noise ceiling in many cases. In addition, we used feature visualization techniques
 139 to directly examine the features that had the most predictive power. Overall, this analysis revealed that
 140 these particular features represented the contours of higher-level elements of a scene, such as those
 141 of complex objects (e.g., chairs, couches, people, etc.) and the largest contours of a scene (e.g., the
 142 horizon, the shoreline, etc.). Taken together, these results suggest that the extent to which observers
 143 will notice alterations in the periphery is dictated by the extent to which higher-level features are
 144 preserved in a given condition and suggest that perceptual awareness is limited by higher level aspects
 145 of a scene.

146 Overall, this set of results helps elucidate the contents of perceptual awareness by building predictive
 147 models of inattentive blindness in natural scenes. Moreover, this study also demonstrates how using
 148 deep learning techniques can help understand the bandwidth of perceptual awareness. Going forward,
 149 it will be important for researchers to continue developing these tools in order to fully explain the
 150 contents of human visual consciousness.

151 Checklist

- 152 1. For all authors...
 - 153 (a) Do the main claims made in the abstract and introduction accurately reflect the paper’s
 154 contributions and scope? [Yes]
 - 155 (b) Did you describe the limitations of your work? [Yes]
 - 156 (c) Did you discuss any potential negative societal impacts of your work? [N/A]

- 157 (d) Have you read the ethics review guidelines and ensured that your paper conforms to
158 them? [Yes]
- 159 2. If you are including theoretical results...
- 160 (a) Did you state the full set of assumptions of all theoretical results? [N/A]
161 (b) Did you include complete proofs of all theoretical results? [N/A]
- 162 3. If you ran experiments...
- 163 (a) Did you include the code, data, and instructions needed to reproduce the main experi-
164 mental results (either in the supplemental material or as a URL)? [No]
165 (b) Did you specify all the training details (e.g., data splits, hyperparameters, how they
166 were chosen)? [Yes]
167 (c) Did you report error bars (e.g., with respect to the random seed after running experi-
168 ments multiple times)? [Yes]
169 (d) Did you include the total amount of compute and the type of resources used (e.g., type
170 of GPUs, internal cluster, or cloud provider)? [No]
- 171 4. If you are using existing assets (e.g., code, data, models) or curating/releasing new assets...
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175 (d) Did you discuss whether and how consent was obtained from people whose data you're
176 using/curating? [Yes]
177 (e) Did you discuss whether the data you are using/curating contains personally identifiable
178 information or offensive content? [N/A]
- 179 5. If you used crowdsourcing or conducted research with human subjects...
- 180 (a) Did you include the full text of instructions given to participants and screenshots, if
181 applicable? [N/A]
182 (b) Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review
183 Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [N/A]
184 (c) Did you include the estimated hourly wage paid to participants and the total amount
185 spent on participant compensation? [N/A]

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