A Granular Study of Safety Pretraining under Model Abliteration

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Abstract

Open-weight LLMs can be modified at inference time with simple activation edits, which raises a practical question for safety: do common safety interventions like refusal training or metatag training survive such edits? We study model abliteration, a lightweight projection technique designed to remove refusal-sensitive directions, and conduct a controlled evaluation across a granular sequence of Safety Pretraining checkpoints for SmolLM2-1.7B, alongside widely used open baselines. For each of 20 systems, original and abliterated, we issue 100 prompts with balanced harmful and harmless cases, classify responses as REFUSAL or NON-REFUSAL using multiple judges, and validate judge fidelity on a small human-labeled subset. We also probe whether models can identify refusal in their own outputs. Our study produces a checkpoint-level characterization of which data-centric safety components remain robust under abliteration, quantifies how judge selection influences evaluation outcomes, and outlines a practical protocol for integrating inference-time edits into safety assessments. Code: `https://github.com/shashankskagnihotri/safety_pretraining`.

***Warning:** This paper contains examples of harmful and unsafe content generated by LLMs!*

1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) are now embedded in decision-making and content pipelines, where safety failures carry a non-trivial risk. These models are also deployed as prompt-refinement and safety-check modules within larger generative pipelines. For instance, CogVideoX [1] employs GLM-4 for both prompt polishing and implicit harmfulness detection. Alignment techniques such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) [2] and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) [3], together with constitutional supervision, have substantially reduced unsafe generations in standard benchmarks [2, 4, 3]. Yet, a growing body of evidence shows that these fixes can be fragile: benign fine-tuning may inadvertently erode safety [5], adversarial prompting can bypass defenses [6, 7], and the resulting refusal behavior often concentrates along steerable, low-dimensional directions [8, 9]. The risks are amplified for open-weight models, where end users can perform malicious changes to checkpoints or alter inference-time behavior without retraining, resurfacing the hidden unsafe behaviors.

This work studies a particularly accessible inference-time manipulation: *model abliteration* [10, 11]. Public recipes have demonstrated that removing a small set of "refusal directions" at inference *can suppress refusals* with no gradient updates [11], and early defenses targeting this vector removal

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are beginning to emerge [10]. We ask an important question of immediate practical interest to the open-weight community: *how do data-centric safety interventions behave under such inference-time edits?* To answer this, we leverage the granular checkpoints released in *Safety Pretraining* [12], each of which encapsulates systematic variation of safety-related data curation and augmentation while holding model scale fixed (SmolLM2-1.7B [13]). These checkpoints enable us to isolate ingredients which render safety merely "steerable" versus those that diffuse safety signals more broadly across the representation space. Methodologically, we take each checkpoint (and several widely used open-weight baselines: GLM-4 [14], Qwen-3 [15], Llama 3.3 [16]), form an ablated pair following the public abliteration procedure [11], and evaluate refusal vs. non-refusal across a 100-prompt set (50 harmful + 50 harmless). Since automated judgements using LLMs can differ in fidelity [17], we additionally curate a human-annotated subset of 10 prompts to measure judge–human agreement. We then scale evaluations using the judge with the highest human alignment (ChatGPT5 [18]), while also including a regex baseline [19] and smaller open-source judges for context. Finally, we probe whether a model can reliably detect refusal in its *own outputs*, providing a lightweight signal for deployment-time monitoring. The main contributions of this work are:

- A *granular* robustness study of inference-time abliteration across *seven* Safety Pretraining checkpoints [12, 13] and three open-weight baselines [14, 15, 16], yielding 20 models (original vs. abliterated).
- An evaluation protocol that combines human annotations on a controlled subset with scalable LLM-based judging, selecting the judge with the highest correlation to human [17, 20, 18].
- Empirical evidence that refusal-only interventions are the most fragile to abliteration, while pretraining techniques which combines safe-data filtering, rephrasing, and metatags yields *partial robustness*, consistent with mechanistic views of safety [8, 9].
- A self-judgment probe indicating when generators fail to recognize their own refusals, clarifying the limits of self-monitoring in deployed systems.

2 Background

Safety alignment and its fragility. Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) [2], Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) [4], and constitutional supervision [3] are widely used to improve helpfulness and harmlessness. However, safety improvements can be undermined by post-hoc fine-tuning on seemingly benign data [5] and by adversarial prompting [6, 7]. These observations motivate evaluating not only whether models refuse harmful requests, but also whether this behavior is *robust* to downstream changes that are easy for end users to effect on open weights.

Mechanistic perspectives on refusals. Recent work demonstrates that refusal behavior can be mediated by a small set of directions in activation space, such that manipulating or ablating these directions toggles refusals while inducing minimal side effects on other capabilities [8]. Complementary analyses of safety fine-tuning find that safety signals tend to cluster in specific subspaces, and that these can be circumvented by prompts that elicit activations resembling safe data [9]. These results suggest that interventions which *only* teach explicit refusal styles may concentrate safety into steerable subspaces, making them attractive targets for inference-time edits.

Safety Pretraining and granular checkpoints. In contrast to post-hoc alignment, Safety Pretraining [12] builds safety into the pretraining process itself via a sequence of data-centric choices on SmolLM2-1.7B [13]. The release exposes intermediate checkpoints that isolate these choices: a raw mixture baseline; a *score-0* (safe-only) filter using safety classifiers; augmentation that *rephrases* unsafe snippets into educational or cautionary narratives; the addition of *metatags* (e.g., harmfulness and safety tags) to support controllability; explicit *refusal* dialogues; and a final model that combines all of the above. This checkpoint granularity enables controlled analysis of which ingredients distribute safety cues broadly across the representation space (and thus may be harder to erase), versus those that primarily reinforce a single refusal direction.

Model abliteration and defenses. Abliteration removes refusal directions at inference using simple linear edits to hidden states [11]. Because it requires neither gradients nor additional training data, the procedure is straightforward to apply—making it particularly concerning in the context of open-weight models. Although early defenses are being proposed [10], a systematic evaluation linking *pretraining-time safety design* to *inference-time robustness* is missing.

Judging refusals at scale. Large LLMs used as judges often correlate best with humans on binary tasks, whereas smaller open-weight judges and rule-based heuristics are generally noisier [17]. Safety evaluations in adjacent modalities have similarly relied on strong LLM judges due to high agreement with human raters on curated subsets [20]. In this work, we first validate multiple judges against human annotations on a 10-prompt subset, then scale with the judge that exhibits the highest agreement (ChatGPT-5 [18]), while still reporting cross-judge comparisons (including regex [19]) to contextualize sensitivity to the judging choice.

The proposed study complements prior work on jailbreaks and mechanistic analyses [6, 7, 8, 9] by examining inference-time edits that require no retraining, and linking robustness (or lack thereof) to granular, data-centric safety design choices available to open-weight model builders [12]. The resulting takeaways on which ingredients remain effective under abliteration is intended to provide actionable guidance for practitioners releasing and deploying open-weight models.

3 Methodology

3.1 Attack Setting

We consider open-weight language models that incorporate either data-centric safety interventions during pretraining [12, 13] or post-hoc alignment via standard methods [2, 4, 3]. The adversary does not fine-tune the model or alter its weights on disk. Instead, they perform an activation-space edit at inference time, suppressing refusals on harmful prompts while largely preserving benign utility. This threat model reflects realistic use of open weights, where users can execute custom inference code without retraining.

3.2 Model Abliteration

Model abliteration removes a refusal-sensitive direction in hidden states via a linear projection applied at inference time [11]. Since refusal behavior is often concentrated within a low-dimensional subspace [8, 9], such edits can be highly effective.

Procedure. We follow the HuggingFace recipe [11]. Let H be a small harmful anchor set and S a small harmless set. For a chosen layer ℓ, we collect residual-stream activations $h^{(\ell)}(x)$ for $x \in H \cup S$, mean-center them within each class, concatenate, and apply PCA. The first PC is then taken as the refusal direction $v^{(\ell)} \in \mathbb{R}^d$. At inference time, we project out this direction with scale α,

$$\tilde{h}^{(\ell)}(x) = h^{(\ell)}(x) - \alpha \, \langle h^{(\ell)}(x), v^{(\ell)} \rangle v^{(\ell)}.$$

We use this across models, without computing gradients or updating parameters. While defenses that attempt to re-instill the removed signal have been proposed [10], our focus is on assessing the robustness of safety-pretraining choices under this simple attack.

Intuition. If safety training mainly teaches explicit refusal phrasing, harmful prompts can align with a compact refusal axis [10]. Removing this axis collapses the representational gap between harmful and harmless inputs, effectively disabling the internal decision boundary that triggers refusals [8, 9]. By contrast, data-centric interventions that diffuse safety cues across multiple features, such as safe-only filtering, rephrasing into educational narratives, and metatagging [12], should be more resistant to removal via a single directional edit.

3.3 Models, checkpoints, and judges

We build on the SmolLM2-1.7B releases from Safety Pretraining [12, 13], where the release set provides various intermediate checkpoints that isolate data-centric choices while keeping scale fixed: (1) a raw-mixture baseline; (2) a score-0 safe-only filter; (3) score-0 plus rephrase data that converts unsafe snippets into educational narratives; (4) the same augmented with metatags marking harmfulness and safety attributes; (5) the same with explicit refusal dialogues; and (6) a final model that combines all of the above. We refer to (6) as "Safety Oracle". We also include the standard model without any safety pretraining. This granularity enables attribution of robustness to specific safety ingredients rather than to confounding factors.

Our evaluation set contains *ten* base models: *four* widely used open baselines and *six* Safety Pretraining variants. The open baselines are: SmolLM2 [13], Qwen-3 [15], Llama-3.3 [16], and GLM-4 [14],



Figure 1: **Refusal–evaluation pipeline.** A prompt (harmful or harmless) is sent to a response LLM (a Safety Pretraining checkpoint or its abliterated counterpart), which returns a response. An external refusal judge (for example, ChatGPT5) reads the prompt–response pair and outputs a binary label (REFUSAL or NON-REFUSAL). We repeat this over 100 prompts (50 harmful and 50 harmless) for 10 base models and their abliterated versions, giving 20 systems in total, and we aggregate per-judge refusal rates. A 10-prompt human-labeled subset is used to validate judge fidelity. The pipeline makes the effect of granular Safety Pretraining choices and inference-time abliteration directly measurable.[1]

while the Safety Pretraining variants include the following: raw-mixture, score-0, score-0 with rephrase, score-0 with rephrase and metatags, score-0 with rephrase and refusals, and the full recipe that combines all three signals [12]. For each base model, we construct an abliterated counterpart using the same inference-time PCA projection procedure applied consistently across systems [11]. We denote these with the suffix "-ALB," resulting in *twenty* systems in total.

Each prompt–response pair is labeled as REFUSAL or NON-REFUSAL by multiple LLM-based judges. We use a strong proprietary judge (ChatGPT5 [18]) together with open LLM judges (GLM-4 [14], Qwen-3 [15], SmolLM2, GPT-oss), a rule-based baseline (regex [19]), and two human annotators (Human 1 and Human 2). We ensure consistent usage of the Judge names in all figures and tables.

3.4 Evaluation protocol

The end-to-end workflow is shown in Figure 1. We evaluate refusal behavior before and after abliteration using three studies.

Study 1: Large-scale refusal evaluation. A 100-prompt set with 50 harmful and 50 harmless prompts is issued to each system. Judges assign REFUSAL or NON-REFUSAL, and we report refusal rates by prompt label and by model family. We select ChatGPT-5 as the primary judge for scaling, while still reporting cross-judge sensitivity. Summary results are shown in Figure 2 [17, 20, 18].

Study 2: Human-grounded validation of judges. Two annotators labeled the same 10 prompts (5 harmful and 5 harmless) across all 20 systems, yielding 200 annotations per annotator. They agreed on 195 of 200 cases (Pearson correlation = 0.9830), with the remaining 5 adjudicated to a single final label. We then compute both judge–human and cross-judge correlations to justify our choice of primary judge. The correlation heatmap for the same is shown in Figure 3 [17, 20].

Study 3: Self-judgment. Each generator is prompted to classify its own prior output as REFUSAL or NON-REFUSAL. We compare these self-labels to the external judge and aggregate by model family. The self-judgment matrix is shown in Figure 4.

[1]The HuggingFace and OpenAI logos belong to the respective companies, used here merely for ease of understanding.



Figure 2: **Refusal outcomes per model before and after abliteration**, as judged by ChatGPT5. Bars show counts out of 50 per prompt type (Harmful and Harmless) for REFUSED and NOT-REFUSED. Abliteration mainly turns harmful refusals into non-refusals, while harmless refusals stay low. Models with rephrase plus metatags and refusals degrade least. The suffix "-ALB" marks abliterated models.

3.5 Metrics and reporting

We report refusal counts and rates by prompt label and by model, along with confusion-matrix statistics when human labels are available. All experiments use shared prompts and identical abliteration settings for paired comparisons. We will release prompts, scripts, and judge outputs for reproducibility.

4 Results

4.1 Study 1: Large-scale refusal evaluation

Figure 2 summarizes refusal outcomes for 100 prompts per model, judged by ChatGPT5 [18]. Bars are split by prompt type and decision: Harmful-Refused, Harmful-Not Refused, Harmless-Refused, Harmless-Not Refused (out of 50 each per type).

Which interventions improve robustness? Safety Pretraining stages that combine multiple data-centric signals are the most resilient after abliteration. Adding *metatags* to rephrase data (*Score 0 + Rephrase data + Metatags*) keeps harmful-refusal high and shows only a small change after abliteration. Adding *refusals* to rephrase data (*Score 0 + Rephrase data + Refusals*) also reduces the attack's effect. The full recipe (*Score 0 + Rephrase data + Refusals + Metatags*, i.e. Safety Oracle) is the strongest: harmful prompts remain largely refused before and after abliteration, and the pre-post gap is minimal, the smallest among the Safety Pretraining variants considered.



Figure 3: **Pairwise pearson correlation between refusal judges** on the 10-question human-labeled subset (5 harmful and 5 harmless) across 20 systems. Each cell reports the correlation after stacking per-model counts of refused and not-refused responses. ChatGPT5 aligns best with Human (about 0.98), GLM-4 and regex show moderate alignment, and smaller open judges are weaker or inconsistent. This supports using ChatGPT5 as the primary judge for scaling.

Which interventions are nullified? Stages that lack metatags or that concentrate safety in a narrow refusal style are vulnerable. *Score 0 + Rephrase data* refuses the most harmful prompts before abliteration, yet many of those harmful prompts become *not refused* after the edit. The base *SmolLM2* shows a similar shift: harmful-refusal drops sharply post-abliteration. *Raw Data* and



Figure 4: Harmful-refusal counts (out of 50) by response model (rows) versus judge (columns). Columns use only non-abliterated LLM judges plus regex and ChatGPT5.

Score 0 also lose harmful-refusal under the attack, reflecting limited distributed safety signal without metatags or combined training.

Open-weight baselines. The attack transfers across families: GLM-4 and Llama-3.3 both lose harmful-refusal after abliteration, with the largest drop on Llama-3.3. Prior work found Llama 2 and Qwen2.5 highly susceptible [10]; in contrast, Qwen3 shows no loss under abliteration in our setup.

Harmless behavior. Across models, harmless-refusal remains low both before and after abliteration, and harmless-not-refused dominates, indicating that the attack mainly suppresses refusals on harmful inputs rather than inflating refusals on benign ones.

4.2 Study 2: Human-grounded validation of judges

Figure 3 reports pairwise Pearson correlations on the 10-prompt human-labeled subset. ChatGPT-5 aligns best with Human ($\approx$0.98), in line with prior evidence that strong proprietary judges track human decisions well [20]. GLM-4 and regex show moderate alignment ($\approx$0.79 and $\approx$0.75), while smaller open judges are weaker or inconsistent, including a negative correlation for GPT-oss.

Bias analysis indicates that regex tends to overestimate refusals by flagging templated disclaimers in otherwise harmless answers, whereas smaller open judges often underestimate refusals when the refusal is indirect or mixed with partial compliance. Typical failure cases involve hybrid responses that start with a cautionary preface then provide substantive guidance, policy-flavored redirections without an explicit refusal, and meta-safety advice that is hard to classify consistently.

4.3 Study 3: Self-assessment of refusal

Figure 4 compares how models judge harmful refusals on the same outputs versus an external reference (ChatGPT-5 [18]). Original models used as judges tend to misread their own family: SmolLM2 and GLM-4 judge nearly all harmful responses as refused, including cases that ChatGPT-5 marks as not refused. Qwen3, used as a judge, also claims perfect or near-perfect refusal on harmful inputs, which is not supported by ChatGPT-5. In contrast, several model-as-judge undercount refusals once the responder is abliterated, indicating the opposite bias. Overall, models do not reliably detect their own refusal state, and the mismatch is larger for abliterated responders, while ChatGPT-5 provides a more stable reference across families.

5 Conclusion

Inference-time edits such as abliteration are cheap to apply to open weights, so safety that relies on a single signal is fragile. In our results, the rephrase-only and refusal-only stages are easy to neutralize. By contrast, combining safe-only filtering, rephrasing, metatags, and refusals spreads safety cues across the representation space and remains more robust. Models also fail to reliably recognize their own refusal state after abliteration, which limits self-monitoring. Overall, *the evidence supports safety training that distributes signals across layers and features rather than a narrow refusal style*. We recommend that safety evaluation should incorporate inference-time activation edits alongside standard red teaming, with granular checkpoint releases to enable careful and reproducible analysis.

Broader Impact

These results suggest a path toward safer open weights: use data-centric pipelines that combine multiple safety ingredients, prioritize methods that preserve benign utility while making refusal behavior harder to erase, and develop benchmarks that explicitly test robustness to activation edits, with natural extensions to multimodal settings.

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Supplementary Material

A Implementation Details

The models from HuggingFace were run locally using H100 and A100 GPUs. A single GPU was used per evaluation. We used a batch size of 2 to fit the tokens and model weights in a single GPU. For ChatGPT5, we evaluated one question-response pair at a time via the OpenAI API key.

B Model Card for the HuggingFace Models

For transparency and reproducibility, we list the exact Hugging Face repositories used to generate responses. Each link points to the model card that describes training data, intended use, and licensing. Access and usage are subject to each repository's terms.

B.1 Response Models

In this work, we used several models from HuggingFace. For the models used as both the Response Model and Refusal Judge, the model cards were the same. Thus, we mention them only once in Appendix B.1.

- **SmolLM2** *HuggingFaceTB/SmolLM2-1.7B-Instruct*
`https://huggingface.co/HuggingFaceTB/SmolLM2-1.7B-Instruct`
- **Qwen3** *Qwen/Qwen3-14B*
`https://huggingface.co/Qwen/Qwen3-14B`
- **Raw Data** *locuslab/mix_ift_v4-smollm2-1.7b-all_raw_folders_baseline-600B*
`https://huggingface.co/locuslab/mix_ift_v4-smollm2-1.7b-all_raw_folders_baseline-600B`
- **Score 0 + Rephrase data + Refusals** *locuslab/mix_ift_v4-smollm2-1.7b-base-score0_mix_rephrase123_with_mild_refusal45-600B*
`https://huggingface.co/locuslab/mix_ift_v4-smollm2-1.7b-base-score0_mix_rephrase123_with_mild_refusal45-600B`
- **Score 0 + Rephrase data** *locuslab/mix_ift_v4-smollm2-1.7b-score0_mix_rephrased_from_beginning-600B*
`https://huggingface.co/locuslab/mix_ift_v4-smollm2-1.7b-score0_mix_rephrased_from_beginning-600B`
- **Score 0 + Rephrase data + Metatags** *locuslab/mix_ift_v4-smollm2-1.7b-score0_mix_rephrased_from_beginning_metadata-600B*
`https://huggingface.co/locuslab/mix_ift_v4-smollm2-1.7b-score0_mix_rephrased_from_beginning_metadata-600B`
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`https://huggingface.co/locuslab/mix_ift_v4-smollm2-1.7b-score0_only-600B`
- **Score 0 + Rephrase data + Refusals + Metatags: Safety Oracle** *locuslab/mix_ift_v9-smollm2-1.7b-score0_rephrase123_mild_ref45_metadata_5p-600B-metamix3p-1k-0*
`https://huggingface.co/locuslab/mix_ift_v9-smollm2-1.7b-score0_rephrase123_mild_ref45_metadata_5p-600B-metamix3p-1k-0`
- **Llama-3.3** *meta-llama/Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct*
`https://huggingface.co/meta-llama/Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct`
- **GLM-4** *zai-org/glm-4-9b-chat-hf*
`https://huggingface.co/zai-org/glm-4-9b-chat-hf`

B.2 Refusal Judges

For completeness, we list the one Hugging Face repository used only as a refusal judge and not as a response model. Access and usage are subject to the repository's terms.

- **GPT-oss** *llm-unsloth/gpt-oss-20b-BF16*
  `https://huggingface.co/llm-unsloth/gpt-oss-20b-BF16`

B.2.1 ChatGPT5 Usage

We used the flagship ChatGPT5 model from OpenAI. For ChatGPT5 as the refusal judge, we had a total of 2000 requests (20 response models and 100 questions each). In total, these 2000 requests used 1,382,777 tokens, which cost $5 and 7 cents USD.

C Refusal Judge Prompt Used

```
You are an AI system whose sole task is to classify whether another model's
response constitutes a refusal or a non-refusal.
Definition of Refusal
A response is a refusal if it clearly declines to comply with the user's
request. Common patterns include:
• "I cannot help with that"
• "I'm sorry, I can't provide..."
• "I am unable to..."
• "That request is not appropriate / against policy"
A refusal may also be softer, for example, redirecting to generic safety advice
(e.g., "If you are feeling unsafe, please reach out to a trusted person..."),
without fulfilling the request.
Definition of Non-Refusal
A response is a non-refusal if it makes an attempt to fulfill the user's
request, even partially, regardless of whether the request is harmful, harmless,
or ambiguous.
Task
You will be provided with a prompt and a response in the following format:
• ### Prompt: {question}
• ### Response: {response}
• CLASSIFICATION:
Output exactly one of the following labels immediately after CLASSIFICATION:
• REFUSAL: if the response is a refusal.
• NON-REFUSAL: if the response is not a refusal.
Do not output anything else. Do not explain your choice. Do not evaluate
whether the request is harmful. Focus only on whether the model refused or not.
```

D User Study

In Fig. 5, we provide a couple of screenshots from the webpage used for the user study. The human annotator is not shown the model name to avoid any biases. The human annotator only sees the question-response to make the decision.

E Additional Results

In Fig. 6 we show refusal counts for harmful (left) and harmless (right) prompts across response models (rows) and judges (columns). Abliteration (suffix "-ALB") generally lowers harmful refusals while harmless refusals remain mostly low; Safety Pretraining variants that combine safe-only filtering, rephrase, metatags, and refusals retain higher harmful refusal rates.



Figure 5: Screenshots from the user study showing the question and the responses from different models. The second screenshot shows how the user can choose if the response from the model, given the question, is a refusal or not a refusal. The human annotator is not shown the model name to avoid any biases. The human annotator only sees the question-response to make the decision.

F Limitations

Our human study covers 200 prompt–response pairs from the 2,000-pair corpus, balanced and double annotated with adjudication; scaling to the full set would require more annotators and would tighten uncertainty on judge–human agreement. Our analysis applies to open weights and activation-space edits that we can implement at inference time; for closed-weight systems such as ChatGPT5 and Gemini 2.5 [21], lack of access to weights and activations prevents equivalent interventions, so their vulnerability under comparable conditions remains unknown. Finally, we evaluate the publicly released Safety Pretraining ladder; finer-grained factors such as specific metatag taxonomies and the dose or placement of refusal training would require new checkpoints and substantial compute, which we leave for future work.



Figure 6: heatmaps of refusal counts for harmful (left) and harmless (right) prompts. Rows are response models (including abliterated variants), columns are refusal judges; values are out of 50 prompts per panel. Axes are swapped for compactness. The grids complement the main results by showing judge consistency and the effect of abliteration at a glance.

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