

# Break the Brake, Not the Wheel: Untargeted Jailbreak via Entropy Maximization

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Paper under double-blind review

## Abstract

Recent studies show that gradient-based universal image jailbreaks on vision-language models (VLMs) exhibit little or no cross-model transferability, casting doubt on the feasibility of transferable multimodal jailbreaks. We revisit this conclusion under a strictly untargeted threat model without enforcing a fixed prefix or response pattern. Our preliminary experiment reveals that refusal behavior concentrates at high-entropy tokens during autoregressive decoding, and non-refusal tokens already carry substantial probability mass among the top-ranked candidates before attack. Motivated by this finding, we propose Untargeted Jailbreak via Entropy Maximization (UJEM)-KL, a lightweight attack that maximizes entropy at these decision tokens to flip refusal outcomes, while stabilizing the remaining low-entropy positions to preserve output quality. Across three VLMs and two safety benchmarks, UJEM-KL achieves competitive white-box attack success rates and consistently improves transferability, while remaining effective under representative defenses. Our experimental results suggest that overly constrained optimization objectives is an important, yet frequently overlooked, bottleneck to the transferability of VLM jailbreaks.

## 1 Introduction

Vision-language models (VLMs) have rapidly evolved into general-purpose multimodal assistants (Liu et al., 2023a; Bai et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2025b; OpenAI, 2023). With stronger visual encoders and improved instruction tuning, VLMs are increasingly used in real-world scenarios such as medicine, education, robotics, and autonomous driving, etc (Li et al., 2023a; Tian, 2026; Zitkovich et al., 2023; Xu et al., 2025). As these systems move closer to deployment, safety becomes a central requirement. In particular, multimodal inputs expand the space of potential misuse, and unsafe generations can lead to harmful downstream consequences.

Among the various forms of misuse, jailbreak attacks are among the most critical. Jailbreak attacks on VLMs aim to bypass built-in safety mechanisms and induce the model to generate restricted or harmful content. By carefully crafting multimodal inputs, jailbreak attackers (Rando et al., 2024; Huang et al., 2024) can manipulate the model’s perception and reasoning process to evade alignment safeguards. In this context, studying jailbreak attacks is particularly important for identifying hidden vulnerabilities in VLMs and enabling the development of more secure and reliable models. Existing studies show that while jailbreak attacks can be highly effective against specific VLMs, they often exhibit limited transferability across different models. Such transferability is especially concerning because it enables black-box attack scenarios, where adversaries can develop attacks using publicly available or surrogate models and subsequently apply them to proprietary or commercial systems. Due to this practical threat, transferable jailbreak attacks have attracted increasing research attention (Lin et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2025a; 2023).

However, a recent study reports that jailbreak attacks on VLMs exhibit little transferability (Schaeffer et al., 2025). A key observation is that existing gradient-based jailbreak methods remain fixed target-driven, optimizing toward a specific prefix (e.g., “Sure, here is ...”) or a prescribed response form (Zou et al., 2023; Guo et al., 2024), as shown in Figure 1. Such fixed targets impose superfluous constraints on the optimization landscape. (Yang et al., 2025) reports that removing response-pattern constraints and adopting a more relaxed objective can improve both transferability and efficiency. More broadly, target




Figure 1: **Comparison between our untargeted multimodal jailbreak (right) and existing targeted jailbreak attacks (left).** **Left:** Prior image-based jailbreaks are often *targeted* or *pattern-driven*, optimizing an adversarial image to elicit a fixed prefix/response pattern. **Right:** UJEM-KL adopts a strictly *untargeted* objective (no fixed prefix/pattern), focusing optimization on high-entropy refusal *decision tokens* while stabilizing low-entropy structural positions via KL regularization. **Green/Red** indicates Targeted vs. Non-targeted under a shared evaluation protocol.

attack is widely recognized to be harder to have high transferability than untargeted attack in traditional adversarial attacks (Wang et al., 2023; Waseda et al., 2023). Even recent relaxed formulations still retain partially targeted components, e.g., multi-stage procedures that ultimately steer the model toward specific harmful completions (Huang et al., 2025). These observations suggest that the reported low transferability of VLM jailbreak attacks may partly reflect overly constrained optimization objectives, rather than from a fundamental absence of transferable vulnerabilities.

Motivated by the above analyzes, we revisit the transferability of VLM jailbreaks under an **untargeted multimodal threat model**. Instead of forcing a fixed prefix or a particular response pattern, we require only that the model’s output be judged unsafe by an external safety classifier, significantly relaxing the attack objective. Entropy-guided adversarial attack (EGA) (He et al., 2025) perturbs images to maximize output entropy and is observed to elicit partially harmful responses without any explicit jailbreak guidance, making it a natural fit for our untargeted setting. Hence, we adopt the EGA as our jailbreak baseline, and find that it remains effective and substantially less sensitive to the choice of decoding strategy, as shown in Figure 2. However, we identify a practical limitation of applying EGA to jailbreak attacks on VLMs: generations that pass the safety classifier under this method are often of low quality, exhibiting repetition, incoherence, or fragmentary outputs Section 3.2. To address this, we introduce a KL regularization term that stabilizes linguistic structure at low-entropy positions while preserving the jailbreak effect at high-entropy positions, yielding our final method, namely untargeted jailbreak via entropy maximization (UJEM-KL). Across three VLMs on JailBreakV-28K and SafeBench, UJEM-KL reaches competitive ASR over baselines and increases cross-model transferability.

Our contributions are as follows:

- (1) We formalize an untargeted jailbreak setting for VLMs and show that constraints are an important contributing factor to the limited cross-model transferability observed in prior VLM jailbreak attacks.

- (2) We reveal that refusal behavior in VLM decoding consistently concentrates at a small set of high-entropy decision tokens across architectures. We further show that non-refusal tokens inherently exist even before any attack, motivating our approach of triggering these tokens.
- (3) We propose UJEM-KL, an untargeted jailbreak attack based on entropy maximization with KL-divergence regularization, enabling effective attacks while maintaining high-quality text generation.
- (4) We demonstrate strong single-model attack performance, substantial cross-model transferability across Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct, InternVL3.5-4B, and LLaVA-1.5-7B on JailBreakV (Luo et al., 2024) and SafeBench (Ying et al., 2026), as well as robustness against traditional defenses.

## 2 Related Work

### 2.1 VLMs and Their Vulnerabilities

Recent open-source VLMs differ substantially in how they connect visual perception to language generation, and these architectural choices directly affect cross-model behavior. LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023a) projects CLIP-ViT features into an LLM through a lightweight linear layer. InternVL (Wang et al., 2025b) scales the vision backbone and supports dynamic high-resolution processing. Qwen2.5-VL (Bai et al., 2025) uses a native dynamic-resolution ViT with window attention. Earlier work established the general paradigm of coupling frozen or fine-tuned visual encoders with LLMs via projection layers or cross-attention (Alayrac et al., 2022; Li et al., 2023b). The diversity of current designs in encoder architecture, resolution handling, and fusion mechanism makes cross-model transfer non-trivial and provides a meaningful testbed for evaluating jailbreak transferability.

As these models are increasingly used in safety-critical domains such as biomedicine, education, and autonomous driving (Li et al., 2023a; Xu et al., 2025; Tian, 2026), their safety properties become essential. Even with safety-oriented alignment procedures that include instruction tuning and, in some cases, reinforcement learning from human feedback (Dai et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023a), VLMs remain vulnerable to attacks (Carlini et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023b; Qi et al., 2024), motivating systematic safety evaluation through dedicated benchmarks (Luo et al., 2024; Ying et al., 2026).

### 2.2 Jailbreak Attacks for VLMs

Jailbreak attacks aim to elicit policy-violating outputs from aligned models (Carlini et al., 2023). Compared with text-only LLM jailbreaks (Zou et al., 2023), VLM jailbreaks exploit additional attack surfaces including the visual channel and the multimodal fusion process (Ren et al., 2025). Existing methods fall into two broad categories. The first is prompt-level attacks, which manipulate visual inputs at the semantic level, either through typographic or overlay cues that steer generation (Gong et al., 2025), or through compositional templates such as auto-generated flowcharts that scaffold harmful reasoning (Zhang et al., 2025). The second is optimization-based adversarial perturbation, which directly perturbs pixels or latent features under a bounded threat model (e.g.,  $L_\infty$ ) to manipulate generation (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2018a; Qi et al., 2024; Mia & Amini, 2025).

**Transferability and the role of optimization objectives.** A growing body of work targets transferable VLM jailbreaks, e.g., via simulated ensembling (Wang et al., 2025a) and feature over-reliance correction (Lin et al., 2025). However, a recent large-scale study reports that gradient-based universal image jailbreaks exhibit little cross-model transfer (Schaeffer et al., 2025). A critical but underexplored factor is the optimization objective itself. Many existing attacks, explicitly optimize for fixed prefixes or specific response patterns (Zou et al., 2023; Guo et al., 2024; Rando et al., 2024). In the LLM domain, recent work has shown that such constraints can be superfluous, and may reduce the transferability of jailbreak attacks. Yang et al. (2025) thus relaxes response-pattern constraints, leading to improved cross-model generalization. Huang et al. (2025) replaces fixed targets with an unsafety score for better transferability. However, the additional refinement stage guided by specific targets limits its transferability. This is also consistent with the well-established observation in adversarial robustness, that is targeted attacks are inherently harder to transfer than untargeted.

geted attacks (Wang et al., 2023), and different models can diverge into different erroneous outputs even under the same perturbation (Waseda et al., 2023).

In the multimodal setting, while several works explore relaxed or proxy objectives such as non refusal prefixes (Qi et al., 2024), proxy corpora (Mia & Amini, 2025), or toxicity driven losses (Rando et al., 2024), untargeted jailbreak objectives that directly optimize an external unsafety score and systematically revisit cross-model transferability remain largely unexplored. Furthermore, entropy-guided adversarial attacks (He et al., 2025) show that perturbing high-entropy token positions can disrupt VLM outputs without explicit jailbreak guidance, making this approach suitable for improving the transferability of jailbreak attacks. Our work bridges these two lines of research by connecting entropy-guided perturbations to jailbreak mechanisms through the lens of high-entropy decision tokens, resulting in an untargeted multimodal threat model with improved transferability.

### 3 Method

#### 3.1 Preliminaries and Threat Model

**Preliminaries.** We define a VLM with parameters  $\theta$  that maps a multimodal input  $\mathbf{x} = \{\mathbf{x}^{\text{img}}, \mathbf{x}^{\text{txt}}\}$  to an output token sequence  $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, \dots, y_T)$ , where  $\mathbf{x}^{\text{img}}$  is the image and  $\mathbf{x}^{\text{txt}}$  is the textual instruction. Under teacher forcing, the conditional token distribution at step  $t$  is defined as:

$$p_\theta(y_t | \mathbf{x}, y_{<t}) = \text{Softmax}(\mathbf{z}_t), \quad (1)$$

where  $y_{<t}$  is the ground-truth preceding tokens,  $\mathbf{z}_t \in \mathbb{R}^{|\mathcal{V}|}$  denotes the logit vector over vocabulary  $\mathcal{V}$ . We quantify token-level uncertainty via Shannon entropy:

$$H_t(\mathbf{x}, y_{<t}) = - \sum_{v \in \mathcal{V}} p_\theta(v | \mathbf{x}, y_{<t}) \log p_\theta(v | \mathbf{x}, y_{<t}). \quad (2)$$

**Threat model.** We study **untargeted multimodal jailbreak** under bounded image perturbations, where the attacker perturbs only the image component while keeping the text instruction unchanged:

$$\mathbf{x}' = \{\mathbf{x}^{\text{img}'}, \mathbf{x}^{\text{txt}}\}, \quad \mathbf{x}^{\text{img}'} = \Pi_{[0,1]}(\mathbf{x}^{\text{img}} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), \quad \|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_\infty \leq \epsilon, \quad (3)$$

where  $\Pi_{[0,1]}$  clips the adversarial image  $\mathbf{x}^{\text{img}'}$  to the valid pixel range and  $\epsilon$  is the  $L_\infty$  budget. The attack is *untargeted*, aiming to elicit any unsafe yet useful response (as judged by an external safety evaluator), without enforcing a target string or a fixed response format.

#### 3.2 Observations

As discussed above, overly constrained optimization objectives may be a key reason for the low transferability of VLM jailbreak attacks. We therefore consider a simple optimization-free baseline that weakens safety alignment by manipulating decoding configurations, e.g., increasing the temperature (Huang et al., 2024), and show the attack success rate (ASR) in Figure 2. In particular, we have conducted experiments with two types of decoding methods, namely greedy decoding (“TempOnly-Greedy”) which selects the most probable token under the conditional next-token distribution, and sampling-based decoding (“TempOnly-Sampling”) where  $y_t$  is randomly sampled from the conditional token distribution. Figure 2 shows that manipulating the temperature can be effective in sampling-based




Figure 2: **Attack success rate (ASR) under different objective-relaxed settings.**




Figure 3: **Analysis of token behavior after perturbation.** Left: Top-10 of High Entropy token shift after perturbation. Right: Refusal mass at different tokens.

decoding. However, it exhibits limited effectiveness in the greedy decoding setting where temperature scaling preserves the logit argmax as well as the top ranked tokens. Motivated by the potential of entropy-guided methods for untargeted attacks, we further designed two experiments (see Figure 2), namely entropy-guided adversarial attack (EGA) (He et al., 2025) with greedy decoding (“EGA-Greedy”) and EGA with sampling-based decoding (“EGA-Sampling”). Experimental results indicate that, across three different VLMs, EGA-based solutions achieve relatively consistent attack performance under two decoding methods, making them more suitable than temperature-based approaches for improving the transferability of jailbreak attacks. Based on this, we conducted further experiments to extensively analyze EGA and explore its potential to achieve transferable jailbreak attacks, leading to the following three main observations:

**Observation 1: Non-refusal tokens exist inherently.** Safety-aligned LLMs are trained to refuse unsafe requests. When encountering harmful prompts, models often start responses with characteristic refusal phrases such as “I’m sorry”. A non-refusal token is any token that does not belong to the refusal token set, indicating the model did not trigger its safety refusal mechanism. As shown in Figure 3(left), before performing entropy-maximization adversarial attacks following (He et al., 2025), non-refusal tokens already appear among the top-10 token candidates. After applying the attack, the token probabilities change significantly. For example, the highest probability token shifts from “Sorry” to “Sure”. This implies that the target responses (non-refusal tokens) inherently exist in VLMs before attacking, and jailbreak attacks are designed to exploit this pre-existing vulnerability rather than introducing one.

**Observation 2: Refusal concentrates at high-entropy decision points.** Across multiple VLMs, refusal-indicative tokens (e.g., “sorry”, “cannot”) tend to appear at high entropy positions (Figure 3(right)), suggesting that a small subset of high-entropy tokens functions as safety-critical decision tokens. Taken together with Observation 1, this indicates that an effective untargeted attack should focus optimization on a small set of high-entropy decision points where refusal tokens dominate competing non-refusal ones.

**Observation 3: Entropy-only optimization degrades the quality of the generated text.** While manipulating entropy at decision points can unlock non-refusal responses, an entropy-only objective provides no explicit mechanism to preserve the sentence structure after unlocking. In practice, we find that EGA based solutions can lead to repetition, incoherence, and fragmentary text, as shown in the supplementary observation case study section. This motivates us to stabilize structural positions while concentrating perturbations on decision tokens.

**Observation-related experiments Setting.** All the above experiments are measured under the same threat model and optimization budget as our main experiments ( $\ell_\infty$  with  $\epsilon = 8/255$ , 100 optimization steps; the decision set is refreshed every  $A = 20$  steps). For each input, we first decode a *reference* trajectory on the clean image using *sampling-based* decoding (fixed random seed and the same generation limits as in Section 3.3). We then compute token-level entropy by teacher forcing along this fixed trajectory, i.e., from  $p_\theta(\cdot | \mathbf{x}, y_{<t})$  (more details are presented in Section 3.3). Candidate positions exclude non-content tokens (boundary/content filtering as in Section 3.3), and the *decision tokens* are defined as the top- $\rho$  fraction ( $\rho = 0.2$ ) of candidate positions ranked by teacher-forced entropy. In Figure 3.2, the reported top-10 candidates are token-level alternatives from the teacher-forced next-token distribution at these decision

positions (before vs. after perturbation). We verified that the same qualitative trends hold when using greedy decoding to obtain the reference trajectory, but we report sampling by default for consistency with our attack.

### 3.3 UJEM: Entropy-Only Baseline

Based on Observations 1 and 2, we first define an entropy-only baseline, *Untarget Jailbreak via Entropy Maximization* (UJEM), which serves as the minimal implementation of manipulating high-entropy decision tokens.

**Reference trajectory and candidate mask.** We decode a reference trajectory  $y$  on the clean input  $\mathbf{x}$  using *sampling-based* decoding, and compute teacher-forced entropies  $\{H_t(\mathbf{x}, y_{<t})\}_{t=1}^T$  along this fixed trajectory. To ensure reproducibility, we fix the random seed and keep the sampled trajectory  $y$  unchanged during optimization unless otherwise stated. We define a binary candidate mask  $c_t \in \{0, 1\}$  to exclude non-content positions (e.g., special symbols and trivial punctuation), where  $c_t = 1$  indicates that position  $t$  is a content position.

**Decision tokens selection.** Among candidate positions, we select the top- $\rho$  high entropy tokens:

$$\mathcal{S}_\rho = \text{top-}k_{H_t(\mathbf{x}, y_{<t})}(\{t : c_t = 1\}_{t=1}^T), \quad (4)$$

where  $\lfloor \rho \cdot \sum_t c_t \rfloor$  is the total number of tokens in  $\mathcal{S}_\rho$  and  $\text{top-}k_{f(\cdot)}(\mathcal{S})$  selects  $k$  elements with the largest scores under  $f(\cdot)$  from set  $\mathcal{S}$ . We call  $\mathcal{S}_\rho$  the *decision set*, which is critically related to the vulnerability of VLMs. Its complement among candidate positions ( $\mathcal{R}_\rho \triangleq \{t : c_t = 1\} \setminus \mathcal{S}_\rho$ ) forms the *structural set*.

**Entropy-only objective.** Given the perturbed input  $\mathbf{x}' = \{\mathbf{x}^{\text{img}'}, \mathbf{x}^{\text{txt}}\}$  (Eq. equation 3), UJEM maximizes entropy on  $\mathcal{S}_\rho$  only, leading to the following objective:

$$\max_{\|\delta\|_\infty \leq \epsilon} \mathcal{L}_{\text{UJEM}}(\delta) \triangleq \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}_\rho|} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{S}_\rho} H_t(\mathbf{x}', y_{<t}). \quad (5)$$

This concentrates optimization on decision tokens rather than spreading the perturbation pressure across all the tokens.

**Adversarial image  $\mathbf{x}^{\text{img}'}$  updates.** Within an  $\ell_\infty$  ball of radius  $\epsilon$  around the clean image  $\mathbf{x}^{\text{img}}$ , we optimize the perturbation  $\delta$  using standard PGD (Madry et al., 2018b) with a random start. We initialize  $\delta_0 \sim \mathcal{U}([- \epsilon, \epsilon])$  and set  $\mathbf{x}_0^{\text{img}'} = \Pi_{[0,1]}(\mathbf{x}^{\text{img}} + \delta_0)$ . At the  $k$ -th iteration, let  $\alpha$  be the step size and we define:

$$\begin{aligned} g_k &= \nabla_\delta \mathcal{J}(\delta_k), \\ \delta_{k+1} &= \text{clip}_{[-\epsilon, \epsilon]}(\delta_k + \alpha \text{sign}(g_k)), \\ \mathbf{x}_{k+1}^{\text{img}'} &= \Pi_{[0,1]}(\mathbf{x}^{\text{img}} + \delta_{k+1}), \end{aligned}$$

where  $\mathcal{J}(\cdot)$  is the objective, which is Eq. equation 5 for the entropy-only solution.

### 3.4 UJEM-KL: KL Stabilization on Low-Entropy Positions

We find that entropy-only attacks can bypass refusal but degrade generation quality. We thus introduce **UJEM-KL**, which stabilizes the low-entropy structural set  $\mathcal{R}_\rho$  via a KL regularizer.

Let  $p_t(\cdot; \delta) \triangleq p_\theta(\cdot | \mathbf{x}', y_{<t})$  denote the teacher-forced token distribution under the perturbed input  $\mathbf{x}'$  and the fixed reference prefix  $y_{<t}$  (the ground-truth preceding tokens). We compute a clean teacher-forced reference distribution along the same fixed trajectory  $y$  as:

$$q_t(\cdot) \triangleq p_\theta(\cdot | \mathbf{x}, y_{<t}), \quad t = 1, \dots, T, \quad (6)$$

which is treated as a stop-gradient target during optimization. To prevent structural drift after unlocking non-refusal responses, we regularize the token distributions on  $\mathcal{R}_\rho$  by matching it with the clean reference

distribution:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{KL}}(\boldsymbol{\delta}) \triangleq \frac{1}{|\mathcal{R}_\rho|} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{R}_\rho} D_{\text{KL}}(p_t(\cdot; \boldsymbol{\delta}) \parallel q_t(\cdot)). \quad (7)$$

Considering the goal of eliciting non-refusal responses while minimizing structural drift, we obtain our final objective:

$$\max_{\|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_\infty \leq \epsilon} \mathcal{J}(\boldsymbol{\delta}) \triangleq \underbrace{\frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}_\rho|} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{S}_\rho} H_t(\mathbf{x}', \mathbf{y}_{<t})}_{\text{heat decision tokens}} - \lambda_{\text{KL}} \cdot \underbrace{\frac{1}{|\mathcal{R}_\rho|} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{R}_\rho} D_{\text{KL}}(p_t(\cdot; \boldsymbol{\delta}) \parallel q_t(\cdot))}_{\text{stabilize low-entropy structural positions}}. \quad (8)$$

The first term heats decision tokens to generate non-refusal response, and the second matches the remaining low-entropy positions to the clean distribution, preserving usability under stricter evaluation. With this new objective, the adversarial image is updated with the objective of Eq. equation 8.

## 4 Experimental Results

### 4.1 Setup

**Datasets.** We evaluate on two multimodal jailbreak benchmarks: *JailBreakV-28K* (Luo et al., 2024), *SafeBench* (Ying et al., 2026). Given the computational cost of per-instance white-box optimization, we evaluate on a fixed subset of 1,000 instances from each benchmark, drawn using a fixed random seed. To ensure representativeness, we apply stratified sampling over (i) families for JailBreakV-28K, and (ii) scenarios for SafeBench. The sampled instance IDs will be released for reproducibility, and full details of the sampling procedure and configuration are provided in the appendix. For fair comparison, we also include the result of HarmBench (Mazeika et al., 2024) in the appendix. Each sample consists of an image and an instruction prompt. We use each benchmark’s standard test split and keep the prompt text unchanged.

**Models.** We consider three VLMs spanning different architectures: *Qwen2.5-VL-7B-Instruct* (Bai et al., 2025), *InternVL3.5-4B* (Wang et al., 2025b), and *LLaVA-1.5-7B* (Li et al., 2023a). Unless otherwise specified, the attacker has *white-box* access to the source model.

**Evaluation Metrics.** We report the *Attack Success Rate (ASR)*, which is a strict protocol requiring consensus from multiple judges. We use this in quantitative analysis to measure usable unsafe completions. This is used in the main tables (Table 1 and Table 2).

**Baselines.** We compare against four representative VLM jailbreak methods: *FigStep* (Gong et al., 2025), *UJA* (Huang et al., 2025), *SEA* (Wang et al., 2025a), and *Force* (Lin et al., 2025). We additionally report global temperature manipulation as an inference-time baseline (Table 7). Our methods are **UJEM** (the entropy-only baseline (Section 3.3), which maximizes entropy on high-entropy decision token) and **UJEM-KL** (our final method (Section 3.4), which adds KL stabilization to the complementary structural set).

**Implementation Details.** All gradient-based attacks use projected gradient ascent under an  $L_\infty$  constraint with  $\epsilon = 8/255$ , followed by pixel clipping to  $[0, 1]$ . Unless otherwise stated, each attack is optimized for 100 PGD iterations. We set the high-entropy ratio to  $\rho = 0.2$ , refresh the decision set every  $A = 20$  iterations, and decode every  $K = 20$  steps for monitoring and evaluation. The PGD step size is fixed across methods for fair comparison. All experiments use fixed random seeds for reproducibility. Additional implementation details are provided in the appendix.

**Judge Models.** We rely on external safety classifiers (the judge models) to determine whether a jailbreak attack is successful. To reduce false positives from any single safety classifier, we evaluated each generated response  $\hat{y}$  against three independently designed judge models, namely (1) *Llama Guard* (Inan et al., 2023) (the default judge of JailBreakV-28K), (2) the *GPT-4o* (OpenAI, 2024) judge model, and (3) the *HarmBench* classifier (HarmBench-Llama-2-13b-cl) (Mazeika et al., 2024). Our primary metric ASR, counts a response as successful only if all three judges independently classify it as unsafe. This intersection protocol is intentionally conservative. Since the three judges originate from different benchmarks with different taxonomies and evaluation mechanisms, agreement among all three provides a more reliable signal of jailbreak success. For

Table 1: **Main results: untargeted multimodal jailbreak on JailBreakV-28K and SafeBench.** We report ASR (% $\uparrow$ ) under a conservative multi-judge intersection protocol (all judges must flag the response as unsafe), using the same perturbation budget and optimization steps across methods.

Method	JailBreakV-28K (ASR % $\uparrow$ )			SafeBench (ASR % $\uparrow$ )		
	Qwen2.5-VL	InternVL3.5	LLaVA-1.5	Qwen2.5-VL	InternVL3.5	LLaVA-1.5
FigStep (Gong et al., 2025)	78.43	75.17	82.28	54.52	61.19	68.66
UJA (Huang et al., 2025)	72.58	70.21	78.06	55.82	53.37	59.08
SEA (Wang et al., 2025a)	81.64	83.39	85.23	<b>68.17</b>	66.65	71.42
Force (Lin et al., 2025)	79.27	82.14	84.02	64.09	62.28	67.47
UJEM	73.18	78.45	82.07	61.83	60.12	63.18
UJEM-KL	<b>82.23</b>	<b>83.67</b>	<b>88.32</b>	67.39	<b>70.24</b>	<b>72.21</b>

Table 2: **Cross-model transferability** on JailBreakV-28K and SafeBench. Rows: attacks crafted on a *source* model; columns: evaluated on *target* models. We report ASR (% $\uparrow$ ). Diagonal entries are white-box attacks.

Source	Method	JailBreakV-28K			SafeBench		
		Qwen2.5-VL	InternVL3.5	LLaVA-1.5	Qwen2.5-VL	InternVL3.5	LLaVA-1.5
Qwen2.5-VL	FigStep (Gong et al., 2025)	78.43	43.82	54.40	54.52	25.89	31.23
	UJA (Huang et al., 2025)	72.58	29.08	38.35	55.82	22.76	26.18
	SEA (Wang et al., 2025a)	81.64	35.24	44.03	68.17	29.01	33.36
	Force (Lin et al., 2025)	79.27	33.16	41.47	64.09	26.93	30.76
	UJEM	73.18	40.64	48.50	61.83	32.74	36.09
	UJEM-KL	<b>82.23</b>	<b>48.62</b>	<b>56.63</b>	<b>67.39</b>	<b>39.78</b>	<b>42.30</b>
InternVL3.5	FigStep (Gong et al., 2025)	41.38	75.17	46.89	23.39	61.19	26.51
	UJA (Huang et al., 2025)	26.05	70.21	34.42	19.69	53.37	26.87
	SEA (Wang et al., 2025a)	33.42	83.39	43.76	26.51	66.65	35.82
	Force (Lin et al., 2025)	31.62	82.14	42.73	23.85	62.28	31.66
	UJEM	40.27	78.45	52.61	29.36	60.12	39.76
	UJEM-KL	<b>44.94</b>	<b>83.67</b>	<b>60.77</b>	<b>37.54</b>	<b>70.24</b>	<b>49.45</b>
LLaVA-1.5	FigStep (Gong et al., 2025)	<b>67.33</b>	52.94	82.28	44.38	32.86	68.66
	UJA (Huang et al., 2025)	43.95	38.67	78.06	36.97	29.51	59.08
	SEA (Wang et al., 2025a)	48.86	44.10	85.23	43.19	38.15	71.42
	Force (Lin et al., 2025)	47.29	43.02	84.02	40.73	33.98	67.47
	UJEM	57.16	54.34	82.07	46.69	41.21	63.18
	UJEM-KL	67.14	<b>62.44</b>	<b>88.32</b>	<b>53.80</b>	<b>51.94</b>	<b>72.21</b>

fair comparison, all methods (including baselines) are evaluated under the same three-judge intersection protocol.

**Observation setting.** Unless stated otherwise, all observations are measured under the same threat model and optimization budget as our main experiments:  $\ell_\infty$  perturbations with  $\epsilon = 8/255$ , 100 optimization steps, and decision-set refresh every  $A = 20$  steps. For each input, we first decode a *reference trajectory* on the clean image using *sampling-based* decoding with a fixed random seed and the same generation limits as those used in the main attack pipeline. We then compute token-level entropy by teacher forcing along this fixed trajectory, i.e., from  $p_\theta(\cdot | \mathbf{x}, y_{<t})$ . Further details are in the appendix.

## 4.2 Main Results

Table 1 reports ASR on JailBreakV-28K and SafeBench. First, we find that **UJEM** is comparable with strong optimization-based baselines (SEA (Wang et al., 2025a), Force (Lin et al., 2025)) despite using an untargeted entropy objective, confirming that manipulating tokens at high entropy points is an effective jailbreak way. Second, **UJEM-KL** consistently improves over UJEM, achieving on-par or better performance compared with all baselines on both datasets, with the largest gains on SafeBench (e.g., **+10.1** on InternVL3.5-4B over UJEM). The SafeBench improvement is especially notable because SafeBench queries tend to elicit longer, more structured responses where quality stabilization has a greater impact. These results support our central claim that pattern-driven constraints are not necessary for strong jailbreaks, and that focusing on high-entropy tokens while stabilizing structure yields robust effectiveness.

Table 3: **Controlled response-objective comparison on JailBreakV-28K**. All entries share the same threat model, perturbation budget, source/target models, decoding configuration, and three-judge evaluation protocol; only the optimization objective varies. Diagonal entries are white-box ASR; off-diagonal entries are transfer ASR.

Objective	Source: Qwen2.5-VL			Objective	Source: InternVL3.5		
	Qwen	InternVL	LLaVA		Qwen	InternVL	LLaVA
Full-target	<b>85.14</b>	23.45	28.16	Full-target	21.62	<b>87.21</b>	31.42
Fixed-prefix	81.12	34.25	42.18	Fixed-prefix	32.51	83.04	43.82
UJEM-KL	82.23	<b>48.62</b>	<b>56.63</b>	UJEM-KL	<b>44.94</b>	83.67	<b>60.77</b>

### 4.3 Transferability

We evaluate cross-model transferability by crafting adversarial images on a source model and evaluating directly on target models. Table 2 reports all source towards target pairs. **UJEM-KL** improves ASR in nearly all source towards target pairs on both benchmarks. The one exception is LLaVA towards Qwen on JailBreakV-28K, where FigStep (Gong et al., 2025) retains a slight edge (67.33 vs. 67.14), likely because FigStep’s typographic manipulation transfers at the semantic level without explicitly setting the response target. In particular, the relative improvement from UJEM to UJEM-KL is often larger in the transfer setting than in the white-box setting (e.g., InternVL  $\rightarrow$  LLaVA: **+8.61** transfer gain vs. **+4.0** white-box gain on JailBreakV-28K), suggesting that stabilization not only improves quality but also better captures model-agnostic vulnerabilities in shared decision tokens.

### 4.4 Objective Comparison

To isolate the impact of optimization objectives on transferability, we compare three constraint levels under an identical attack pipeline (Table 3): (1) **Full-target** (optimizing towards the complete label), (2) **Fixed-prefix** (constraining only the initial tokens), and (3) **UJEM-KL** (removing response-pattern constraints entirely). By re-implementing all variants within the same framework, we ensure performance differences stem strictly from the objective formulation.

Table 3 reveals a trade-off between white-box overfitting and cross-model generalization. While **Full-target** achieves the highest white-box ASR (e.g., 85.14% on Qwen), it transfers poorly to other architectures (dropping to 23.45% on InternVL). Relaxing the constraint to a **Fixed-prefix** sacrifices marginal white-box performance but notably recovers transferability. Ultimately, eliminating response-pattern constraints entirely with **UJEM-KL** maximizes transfer ASR across all evaluated pairs. For instance, when InternVL3.5 is the source, relaxing the objective from Full-target to UJEM-KL essentially doubles the average transfer ASR (from 26.5% to 52.9%).

These results suggest that highly specific optimization targets overfit the source model. Conversely, our relaxed, entropy-based objective better exploits shared vulnerabilities in refusal across architectures. This shows that overly constrained response patterns are a contributing factor to the poor transferability observed in prior attacks.

### 4.5 Ablation Study

We conduct ablations on JailBreakV-28K to isolate each component’s contribution. All ablations report ASR (same metric as the main table).

**Component analysis (Table 4)**. We compare four variants: (i) **UJEM** : entropy maximization on  $S_\rho$  without termination control; (ii) **UJEM + AR(anti-refusal)**: adding explicit refusal-token suppression; (iii) **UJEM + ES(early stopping)**: adding early stopping; (iv) **UJEM-KL**: adding KL stabilization (this matches the UJEM-KL in Table 1). Early stopping improves over the baseline, confirming that over-optimization after unlocking degrades usable jailbreak quality. Adding anti-refusal suppression is less stable across different VLMs and exhibits lower transferability, indicating that it fails to reveal systemic vulnerabili-

Table 4: **Component ablation on JailBreakV-28K.** We isolate baseline, anti-refusal suppression, early stopping, and KL stabilization.

Variant	Qwen	InternVL	LLaVA
UJEM	73.18	78.45	82.07
UJEM + ES	76.41	81.22	84.33
UJEM + AR	70.52	76.83	83.61
UJEM + KL	<b>82.23</b>	<b>83.67</b>	<b>88.32</b>

Table 6: **Effect of KL weight  $\lambda_{KL}$  on JailBreakV-28K.** We report ASR (% $\uparrow$ ) under different KL weight.

$\lambda_{KL}$	Qwen	InternVL	LLaVA
0.000	76.4	81.2	84.3
0.001	80.7	<b>83.7</b>	82.9
0.010	<b>82.2</b>	83.6	<b>88.3</b>
0.050	79.8	80.1	<u>86.5</u>
0.100	74.5	75.6	83.2
0.500	68.3	69.4	78.3
1.000	58.7	52.4	70.9

Table 5: **Robustness under representative defenses on SafeBench.** We report ASR (% $\uparrow$ ) under the same strict multi-judge protocol.

Defense	UJEM	UJEM-KL
No defense	66.9	70.1
SafeDecoding (Xu et al., 2024)	54.4	65.3
Adv. Training (Gan et al., 2020)	56.4	61.2
UniGuard (Oh et al., 2024)	30.9	32.7
R-TOFU (Yoon et al., 2025)	36.1	40.8

Table 7: **Decoding temperature ablation on JailBreakV-28K.** We report ASR (% $\uparrow$ ) under temperatures **T**.

T	Qwen	InternVL	LLaVA
0.0	<b>83.4</b>	<b>79.2</b>	<b>89.3</b>
0.2	66.2	58.7	72.4
0.4	64.8	56.9	74.1
0.6	73.9	<u>78.6</u>	81.7
0.8	<u>82.6</u>	77.8	<u>88.5</u>
1.0	71.3	65.2	80.8
1.5	74.1	68.4	83.6

ties. Our main method (**UJEM-KL**) avoids directly optimizing refusal signals and achieves the highest ASR across all models, outperforming our entropy-only solution (**UJEM**), which validates that structural stabilization improves both fluency and attack effectiveness. Early stopping is complementary to KL stabilization and can be combined with UJEM-KL for further gains. We report UJEM-KL without early stopping in the main results to obtain a cleaner attribution of each component’s contribution. Results with early stopping are presented in the appendix.

**KL Weight  $\lambda_{KL}$  (Table 6).** We have  $\lambda_{KL}$  in Eq. equation 8 to control the regularization on structural drift. A smaller  $\lambda_{KL}$  indicates weaker constraints on the quality of the generated text, and vice versa. We believe a small non-zero  $\lambda_{KL}$  is preferred, as overly strong stabilization suppresses the token-flipping effect and degrades jailbreak success. In this paper, we set  $\lambda_{KL} = 0.01$  to balance jailbreak success rates and the quality of the generated text.

## 4.6 Discussion

**Judgement.** We start from the standard evaluation pipeline of JailBreakV-28K, where jailbreak success is determined by **Llama Guard** as its default judge, which provides broad hazard coverage and enables a clean and reproducible success criterion under an untargeted setting. However, our preliminary analysis (Section 3.2) indicates that single-judge ASR can overestimate usable jailbreaks. For instance, entropy-based attacks may produce responses that are borderline, fragmented, or incoherent yet still trigger a single external safety classifier. To achieve stricter verification, we introduce two additional judges who complement Llama Guard from different angles. First, we add the **HarmBench** classifier, which is widely used for evaluating behavior-level harmful results. Unlike Llama Guard, which broadly flags unsafe categories, the HarmBench classifier is more tightly aligned with whether the response constitutes an actionable instance of a harmful behavior, helping filter out cases where a response is unsafe in tone but not practically usable. Second, we include a strong **GPT-4o** judge to provide a context-sensitive LLM-as-a-judge perspective, which better handles paraphrases, indirect phrasing, and multi-sentence dependencies, multi-language that often cause disagreements among other guards. Our primary ASR, therefore, uses a three-judge intersection protocol, where a response is counted as successful only if all three judges independently classify it as unsafe. While this protocol may undercount cases, it yields a higher-precision signal that better matches our goal of measuring usable untargeted jailbreaks, and we apply the same protocol to all baselines for fair comparison as shown in Figure 4.

**Robustness under defenses (Table 5).** We evaluate UJEM-KL against representative defense families on SafeBench to further evaluate its robustness. UJEM-KL shows comparatively resilient to defenses that reshape the decoding distribution (SafeDecoding (Xu et al., 2024)) or improve generic robustness via training (adversarial training (Gan et al., 2020)). These defenses typically suppress unsafe candidates, widening the margin by which refusal tokens outrank non-refusal tokens. UJEM-KL directly attacks this margin, where entropy maximization at high-entropy decision tokens flattens the local distribution and erodes precisely the refusal advantage that such defenses rely on. As a result, non-refusal tokens can re-enter the top-ranked set even after logit reweighting. Additionally, UniGuard (Oh et al., 2024) is a post-hoc guardrail, which filters out unsafe generations after they are produced and are therefore less sensitive to how the token-level decision was made. Unlearning (R-TOFU) (Yoon et al., 2025) removes unsafe behaviors from the model weights themselves, reducing the underlying probability mass of harmful tokens and thereby raising the refusal margin at decision tokens beyond what a bounded perturbation can overcome. The relative resilience of the proposed method against these defense techniques suggests its robustness. However, since both UniGuard (Oh et al., 2024) and Unlearning (R-TOFU) (Yoon et al., 2025) are specifically designed to remove unsafe generations, our attack performance against these two defenses is lower than against the other two defense techniques. Further investigation will be conducted to focus specifically on defense techniques that remove unsafe content, e.g. latent attack.

**Temperature in the decoding method of VLMs (Table 7).** Temperature in the decoding of VLMs (and LLMs) controls the randomness of token sampling from the model’s predicted probability distribution. It plays an important role in balancing determinism, diversity, and uncertainty during generation. We further analyze the contribution of temperature to the jailbreak success rates, and performance of VLMs w.r.t. temperature  $\mathbf{T}$  in Table 7. The experimental results show that moderate temperatures are preferred for better ASR, and overly high temperatures reduce stability. Furthermore, the optimal temperature differs across VLMs. We choose  $\mathbf{T} = 0.8$  to achieve a balance, and  $\mathbf{T} = 0.0$  indicates a greedy-decoding reference point.

**Case study.** Figure 5 illustrates a practical failure case of transferability that is not fully captured by the target attack. In the clean setting, both Qwen-VL and LLaVA refuse the unsafe request. Under white-box optimization, SEA (Wang et al., 2025a) can often flip the refusal on the source model, yet the resulting outputs may still contain refusal-style disclaimers, indicating that the model remains close to the refusal boundary. This becomes more apparent under cross-model transfer. When the adversarial image crafted on Qwen-VL is evaluated on LLaVA, SEA (Wang et al., 2025a) falls back to a partial-refusal response. In contrast, UJEM-KL transfers more reliably in the same Qwen→LLaVA setting and sustains a non-refusal response.

**Relation with Prior Negative Results.** The failure study Schaeffer et al. (2025) correctly observes that image-based jailbreaks transfer poorly across VLMs. Our results complement this finding by demonstrating that such transfer failures are largely a byproduct of *targeted* optimization. Forcing a perturbation to perfectly match a predefined textual trajectory easily overfits to the source model and breaks down across




Figure 4: **Judge sensitivity under untargeted jailbreak evaluation.** ASR (%) of UJEM (left) and UJEM-KL (right) measured by three independent judges: **Llama Guard**, **GPT-4o** and the **HarmBench** judgment . We also report their **intersection** .




Figure 5: **Case Study. Top:** For the same clean image and the unsafe instruction, both Qwen-VL and LLaVA refuse on clean inputs. We then compare adversarial images crafted by a prior optimization-based baseline (SEA (Wang et al., 2025a)) and our method (UJEM-KL). On each model, both attacks trigger unsafe response behavior. **Bottom:** cross-model transfer from Qwen→LLaVA using adversarial images optimized on Qwen-VL. SEA (Wang et al., 2025a) fails to consistently bypass refusal on the target model, while **UJEM-KL** transfers more reliably. Responses are truncated for readability.

different architectures. In contrast, our *untargeted* approach requires the perturbation to merely flip the refusal outcome at a minimal set of high-entropy decision points. This relaxed objective effectively exposes a shared vulnerability across VLMs that was previously masked by overly constrained targets.

## 5 Conclusion

We revisited the transferable multimodal jailbreaks under an untargeted threat model. Results show that gradient-based universal image jailbreaks fail to reveal the shared vulnerabilities. Our analysis identifies a common mechanism across architecturally diverse VLMs, that is refusal decisions often concentrate on a small number of high-entropy decoding tokens where non-refusal tokens already carry probability mass. Building on this insight, we introduced UJEM-KL, an entropy maximization solution at these decision tokens while stabilizing the remaining structural positions via a KL regularizer, improving both attack success rate and output quality under stricter evaluation. Experiments across three VLM architectures and two safety benchmarks demonstrate strong white-box effectiveness, consistent gains in cross-model transferability over all baselines, and non-trivial robustness under representative defenses. Furthermore, our experiments on defense suggest that removing high entropy harmful tokens rather than relying on surface-level refusal heuristics may offer a more robust alignment.

**Broader Impact Statement** This work presents an untargeted jailbreak attack against Vision-Language Models (VLMs). We acknowledge that, like all research on adversarial attacks against safety-aligned models, this work carries a dual-use risk: the same techniques that expose vulnerabilities can in principle be misused to bypass safety guardrails in deployed systems. Below we describe the considerations that motivated this research, the steps we took to limit potential harm, and the directions for responsible follow-up.

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