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# Gradient Cuff: Detecting Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models by Exploring Refusal Loss Landscapes

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## Abstract

1 Large Language Models (LLMs) are becoming a prominent generative AI tool,  
2 where the user enters a query and the LLM generates an answer. To reduce  
3 harm and misuse, efforts have been made to align these LLMs to human values  
4 using advanced training techniques such as Reinforcement Learning from Human  
5 Feedback (RLHF). However, recent studies have highlighted the vulnerability  
6 of LLMs to adversarial jailbreak attempts aiming at subverting the embedded  
7 safety guardrails. To address this challenge, this paper defines and investigates  
8 the **Refusal Loss** of LLMs and then proposes a method called **Gradient Cuff** to  
9 detect jailbreak attempts. Gradient Cuff exploits the unique properties observed  
10 in the refusal loss landscape, including functional values and its smoothness,  
11 to design an effective two-step detection strategy. Experimental results on two  
12 aligned LLMs (LLaMA-2-7B-Chat and Vicuna-7B-V1.5) and six types of jailbreak  
13 attacks (GCG, AutoDAN, PAIR, TAP, Base64, and LRL) show that Gradient Cuff  
14 can significantly improve the LLM’s rejection capability for malicious jailbreak  
15 queries, while maintaining the model’s performance for benign user queries by  
16 adjusting the detection threshold.

## 17 1 Introduction

18 With the stupendous success of large language models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 [19], LLaMA-2 [22],  
19 and Vicuna [30], there is a trend to integrate these LLMs into various applications such as ChatGPT  
20 and Bing Search. In these applications, LLMs are used as the service backend. The front end of  
21 these applications receives the user input query from the interface, encapsulates it into a system  
22 prompt, and then sends it to the LLM to get a response. With the rapidly increasing social impact of  
23 these applications, model alignment and safety assurance to reduce harm and misuse have become  
24 significant considerations when developing and deploying LLMs. Methods such as Reinforcement  
25 Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) have been proven to be an effective training technique to  
26 align LLMs with human values [1, 2, 13, 20].

27 However, aligned LLMs have been found to be vulnerable to a type of adversarial manipulation  
28 known as “jailbreak attack”. Jailbreak attacks involve maliciously inserting or replacing tokens in  
29 the user instruction or rewriting it to bypass and circumvent the safety guardrails of aligned LLMs.  
30 A notable example is that a jailbroken LLM would be tricked into generating hate speech targeting  
31 certain groups of people, as demonstrated in Figure 1 (a).

32 Many red-teaming efforts [31, 17, 4, 18, 25, 28] have been put into designing algorithms to automati-  
33 cally generate jailbreak prompts to help test the robustness of aligned LLMs. Specifically, GCG [31],  
34 one of the earlier works in this area, can successfully jailbreak several LLMs by optimizing an




Figure 1: Overview of **Gradient Cuff**. (a) introduces an example of jailbreak prompts by presenting a conversation between malicious actors and the Vicuna chatbot. (b) visualizes the refusal loss landscape for malicious queries and benign queries by plotting the interpolation of two random directions in the query embedding with coefficients  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  following [15]. The refusal loss evaluates the probability that the LLM would not directly reject the input query, and the loss value is computed using Equation 3. See details of how to plot (b) in Appendix A.4. (c) shows the running flow of Gradient Cuff (at top), practical computing examples for refusal loss (at bottom left), and the distributional difference of the gradient norm of refusal loss on benign and malicious queries (bottom right). (d) shows the performance of Gradient Cuff against 6 jailbreak attacks for Vicuna-7B-V1.5. See Appendix A.6 for full results.

inserted universal adversarial suffix. This finding suggests that the embedded alignment effort in LLMs could be completely broken by the jailbreak attack.

Since the discovery of jailbreak risks for LLMs, various methods have been explored to defend against jailbreak attacks [12, 21, 27, 14] and have gained some success in detecting certain types of attacks such as GCG [17, 12]. However, in our systematic analysis, existing defenses either fail to be resistant against all types of jailbreak attacks, or have a significant detrimental effect on benign queries. PPL [12] uses an LLM to compute the perplexity of the input user query and filters those with perplexity greater than the threshold. PPL has been proven to have a good detection performance for GCG attacks but does not perform well on jailbreak prompts with good meaningfulness and fluency [17]. Erase-Check [14] and Self-Reminder [27] behave well on malicious queries but will misclassify many benign user queries, making the defenses overly conservative and impractical.

To alleviate the threats of jailbreak attacks and avoid the aforementioned problems in existing defenses, we propose **Gradient Cuff**, which detects jailbreak prompts by checking the refusal loss of the input user query and estimating the gradient norm of the loss function. We begin by introducing the concept of refusal loss and showcase the different behaviors of the loss function for benign instructions and malicious instructions. A plot of the refusal loss landscape for benign and malicious instructions can be found in Figure 1 (b). By exploring the landscapes of refusal loss, we find that the refusal loss function for malicious instructions tends to have a smaller value and a larger gradient norm.

We then leverage this unique loss landscape characteristic to propose a two-step jailbreak detection algorithm, which is illustrated in Figure 1 (c). Figure 1 (d) evaluates 6 jailbreak attacks on Vicuna-7B-V1.5 and shows that our defense can reduce the attack success rate (ASR) averaged over these 6 jailbreaks from 76.7% to 25.7% on average. We also compare Gradient Cuff to other existing defense methods on Vicuna-7B-V1.5 and LLaMA-2-7B-Chat against these 6 jailbreaks as well as adaptive attacks to demonstrate our defense capabilities.

We summarize our **main contributions** as follows:

- We formalize the concept of refusal loss function of LLMs and explore its smoothness and values of the loss landscapes on benign and malicious queries. The distinct refusal loss characteristics are used in our Gradient Cuff framework to detect jailbreak prompts.

- Experiments on 2 aligned LLMs (LLaMA-2-7B-Chat and Vicuna-7B-V1.5) and 6 jailbreak attacks (GCG, AutoDAN, PAIR, TAP, Base64, and LRL) demonstrate that Gradient Cuff is the only defense algorithm that can attain good jailbreak detection while keeping an acceptable rejection rate on benign queries.
- We also show that Gradient Cuff is complementary to prompt-engineering based alignment strategies. When combined with Gradient Cuff, the performance of Self-Reminder, a system prompt design method [27], can be increased by a large margin.

## 2 Related Work

**Jailbreak Attacks.** Existing jailbreaks can be roughly divided into feedback-based jailbreak attacks and rule-based jailbreak attacks. Feedback-based jailbreaks utilize the feedback from the target LLM to iteratively update the jailbreak prompt until the model complies with the malicious instruction embedded in the jailbreak prompt. Feedback-based jailbreaks can be further categorized by their access mode to the target LLM. Some feedback-based jailbreak attacks like GCG [31], require white-box access to the target LLM. Specifically, GCG leverages gradients with respect to the one-hot token indicators to find better token choices at each position. Some feedback-based jailbreaks need gray-box access to the target LLM. The typical one is AutoDAN [17], which employs the target LLM’s generative loss of the target response to design the fitness score of the candidate jailbreak prompt to guide further optimization. PAIR [4] and TAP [18] are the representatives of feedback-based jailbreaks which only require black-box access to the target LLM. In PAIR and TAP, there are also two LLMs taking on the attacker role and the evaluator role. At each iteration, the attacker-generated jailbreak prompt would be rated and commented on by the evaluator model according to the target LLM’s response to the attack. Next, the attacker would generate new jailbreak prompts based on the evaluator’s comments, and repeat the above cycle until the jailbreak prompt can get full marks from the evaluator. The only information provided by the target LLM is the response to the jailbreak attack. As for the rule-based jailbreak attacks, we highlight Base64 [25] and Low Resource Language (LRL) [28]. Base64 encodes the malicious instruction into base64 format and LRL translates the malicious instruction into the language that is rarely used in the training process of the target LLM, such as German, Swedish, French and Chinese.

**Jailbreak Defenses.** PPL [12] uses an LLM to compute the perplexity of the input query and rejects those with high perplexity. SmoothLLM [21], motivated by randomized smoothing [7], perturbs the original input query to obtain several copies and aggregates the intermediate responses of the target LLM to these perturbed queries to give the final response to the original query. Erase-Check employs a model to check whether the original query or any of its erased subsentences is harmful. The query would be rejected if the query or one of its sub-sentences is regarded as harmful by the safety checker. Unlike these methods, there is another line of work [27, 29, 26, 24] where prompt engineering techniques are used to defend against jailbreak attacks. Notably, Self-Reminder [27] shows promising results by modifying the system prompt of the target LLM so that the model reminds itself to process and respond to the user in the context of being an aligned LLM.

## 3 Methodology and Algorithms

Following the overview in Figure 1, in this section, we will formalize the concept of **Refusal loss function** and propose **Gradient Cuff** as a jailbreak detection method based on the unique loss landscape properties of this function observed between malicious and benign user queries.

### 3.1 Refusal Loss Function and Landscape Exploration

Current transformer-based LLMs will return different responses to the same query due to the randomness of autoregressive sampling based generation [8, 10]. With this randomness, it is an interesting phenomenon that a malicious user query will sometimes be rejected by the target LLM, but sometimes be able to bypass the safety guardrail. Based on this observation, for a given LLM  $T_\theta$  parameterized with  $\theta$ , we define the refusal loss function  $\phi_\theta(x)$  for a given input user query  $x$  as below:

$$\phi_\theta(x) = 1 - p_\theta(x); \quad (1)$$

$$p_\theta(x) = \mathbb{E}_{y \sim T_\theta(x)} JB(y) \quad (2)$$

where  $y$  represents the response of  $T_\theta$  to the input user query  $x$ .  $JB(\cdot)$  is a binary indicator function to determine whether the response triggers a refusal action by the LLM. The function  $p_\theta$  can be interpreted as the expected rate of getting refusal on the response  $y$  from  $T_\theta$  taking into account the randomness in the decoding process. Therefore, by our definition, the refusal loss function  $\phi_\theta(x)$  can be interpreted as the likelihood of generating a non-refusal response to  $x$ . Following SmoothLLM [21], we define  $JB(\cdot)$  as

$$JB(y) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } y \text{ contains any jailbreak keyword;} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

For example,  $JB(y)$  would be 0 if  $y = \text{"Sure, here is the python code to ..."} and  $JB(y)$  would be 1 if  $y = \text{"Sorry, I cannot fulfill your request..."}$ . We discuss more details about the implementation of the indicator function in Appendix A.3.$

Alternatively, we can view  $Y = JB(y)$  as a random variable obeying the Bernoulli distribution such that

$$Y = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{with probability } p_\theta(x) \\ 0, & \text{with probability } 1 - p_\theta(x) \end{cases}$$

so that  $\phi_\theta(x)$  can be interpreted as the expected refusal loss:

$$\phi_\theta(x) = 1 - \mathbb{E}[Y] = 1 - p_\theta(x).$$

In practice, since we do not have the prior knowledge for  $p_\theta(x)$ , we use the sample mean  $f_\theta(x)$  to approximate  $\phi_\theta(x)$ :

$$f_\theta(x) = 1 - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N Y_i, \quad (3)$$

where  $\{Y_i | i = 1, 2, \dots, N\}$  is obtained by running  $N$  independent realizations of the random variable  $Y$ . In the  $i^{th}$  trial, we query the LLM  $T_\theta$  using  $x$  to get the response  $y_i \sim T_\theta(x)$ , and apply the indicator function  $JB(\cdot)$  on  $y_i$  to get  $Y_i = JB(y_i)$ . Equation (3) can be explained as using the sample mean of the random variable  $Y$  to approximate its expected value  $\mathbb{E}[Y]$ .

In general,  $\phi_\theta(x) < 0.5$  could be used as a naive detector to reject  $x$  since  $p_\theta(x)$  can be interpreted as the probability that  $T_\theta$  regards  $x$  as harmful. However, this detector alone only has limited effect against jailbreak attacks, as discussed in Section 4.3. To further explore how this refusal loss can be used to improve jailbreak detection, we visualize the refusal loss landscape following the 2-D visualization techniques from [15] in Figure 1 (b). From Figure 1 (b), we find that the landscape of  $f_\theta(\cdot)$  is more precipitous for malicious queries than for benign queries, which implies that  $f_\theta(\cdot)$  tends to have a large gradient norm if  $x$  represents a malicious query. This observation motivates our proposal of using the gradient norm of  $f_\theta(\cdot)$  to detect jailbreak attempts that pass the initial filtering of rejecting  $x$  when  $f_\theta(x) < 0.5$ .

### 3.2 Gradient Norm Estimation

In general, the exact gradient of  $\phi_\theta(x)$  (or  $f_\theta(x)$ ) is infeasible to obtain due to the existence of discrete operations such as applying the  $JB(\cdot)$  function to the generated response, and the possible involvement of black-box evaluation functions (e.g., Perspective API). We propose to use zeroth order gradient estimation to compute the approximate gradient norm, which is widely used in black-box optimization with only function evaluations (zeroth order information) [3, 16]. Similar gradient estimation techniques were used to generate adversarial examples from black-box models [5, 11, 6].

A zeroth-order gradient estimator approximates the exact gradient by evaluating and computing the function differences with perturbed continuous inputs. Our first step is to obtain the sentence embedding of  $x$  in the embedding space of  $T_\theta$  in  $\mathbb{R}^d$ . For each text query  $x$  with  $n$  words (tokens) in it, it can be embedded into a matrix  $e_\theta(x) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times d}$  where  $e_\theta(x)_i \in \mathbb{R}^d$  denotes the word embedding for the  $i^{th}$  word in sentence  $x$ . We define the sentence embedding for  $x$  by applying mean pooling to  $e_\theta(x)$  defined as

$$\text{mean-pooling}(x) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n e_\theta(x)_i \quad (4)$$

151 With the observation that

$$\text{mean-pooling}(x) + \mathbf{v} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n (e_{\theta}(x)_i + \mathbf{v}), \quad (5)$$

152 one can obtain a perturbed sentence embedding of  $x$  with any perturbation  $\mathbf{v}$  by equivalently perturb-  
153 ing the word embedding of each word in  $x$  with the same  $\mathbf{v}$ .

154 Based on this definition, we approximate the exact gradient  $\nabla \phi_{\theta}(x)$  by  $g_{\theta}(x)$ , which is the estimated  
155 gradient of  $f_{\theta}(x)$ . Following [3, 16], we calculate  $g_{\theta}(x)$  using the directional derivative approximation

$$g_{\theta}(x) = \sum_{i=1}^P \frac{f_{\theta}(\mathbf{e}_{\theta}(x) \oplus \mu \cdot \mathbf{u}_i) - f_{\theta}(\mathbf{e}_{\theta}(x))}{\mu} \mathbf{u}_i, \quad (6)$$

156 where  $\mathbf{u}_i$  is a  $d$  dimension random vector drawn from the standard multivariate normal distribution,  
157 i.e.,  $\mathbf{u}_i \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{I})$ ,  $\mu$  is a smoothing parameter,  $\oplus$  denotes the row-wise broadcasting add operation  
158 that adds the same vector  $\mu \cdot \mathbf{u}_i$  to every row in  $\mathbf{e}_{\theta}(x)$ .

159 Based on the definitions in Equation (3) and Equation (6), we provide a probabilistic guarantee below  
160 for analyzing the gradient approximation error of the true gradient  $\phi_{\theta}(\cdot)$ .

161 **Theorem 1** Let  $\|\cdot\|$  denote a vector norm and assume  $\nabla \phi_{\theta}(x)$  is  $L$ -Lipschitz continuous. With  
162 probability at least  $1 - \delta$ , the approximation error of  $\nabla \phi_{\theta}(x)$  satisfies

$$\|g_{\theta}(x) - \nabla \phi_{\theta}(x)\| \leq \epsilon$$

163 for some  $\epsilon > 0$ , where  $\delta = \Omega^1(\frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{P})$  and  $\epsilon = \Omega(\frac{1}{\sqrt{P}})$ .

164 This theorem demonstrates that one can reduce the approximation error by taking larger values for  
165  $N$  and  $P$ . We provide the proof in Appendix A.12. Experimental results in Appendix A.14 and  
166 Appendix A.13 also provide empirical evidence to support this theorem by demonstrating the scaling  
167 performance of Gradient Cuff with increased total queries.

### 168 3.3 Gradient Cuff: Two-step jailbreak detection

169 With the discussions in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, we now formally propose Gradient Cuff, a  
170 two-step jailbreak detection method based on checking the refusal loss and its gradient norm. Our  
171 detection procedure is shown in Figure 1 (c). Gradient Cuff can be summarized into two steps:

- 172 • **(Step 1) Sampling-based Rejection:** In the first step, we reject the user query  $x$  by checking  
173 whether  $f_{\theta}(x) < 0.5$ . If true, then  $x$  is rejected, otherwise,  $x$  is pushed into Step 2.
- 174 • **(Step 2) Gradient Norm Rejection:** In the second step, we regard  $x$  as having jailbreak attempts if  
175 the norm of the estimated gradient  $g_{\theta}(x)$  is larger than a configurable threshold  $t$ , i.e.,  $\|g_{\theta}(x)\| > t$ .

176 Before deploying Gradient Cuff on LLMs, we first test it on a bunch of benign user queries to select  
177 a proper threshold  $t$  that fulfills the required benign refusal rate (that is, the false positive rate  $\sigma$ ). We  
178 use a user-specified  $\sigma$  value (e.g., 5%) to guide the selection of the threshold  $t$  so that the total refusal  
179 rate on the benign validation dataset  $\mathcal{B}_{val}$  won't exceed  $\sigma$ .

180 We summarize our method in Algorithm 1. The algorithm is implemented by querying the LLM  $T_{\theta}$   
181 multiple times, each to generate a response for the same input query  $x$ . The total query times to  $T_{\theta}$   
182 required to compute  $f_{\theta}(x)$  and  $g_{\theta}(x)$  in Gradient Cuff is at most  $q = N \cdot (P + 1)$ . To maintain the  
183 LLM's efficiency, we also explored the use of batch inference to compute these queries in parallel,  
184 thereby reducing the total running cost of the LLM. For example, the running time can only be  
185 increased by  $1.3\times$  when the total query times were  $10\times$  of the original. See detailed discussion in  
186 Appendix A.15.

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<sup>1</sup> $l(t) = \Omega(s(t))$  means  $s(t)$  is the infimum of  $l(t)$




Figure 2: Performance evaluation on LLaMA2-7B-Chat (a) and Vicuna-7B-V1.5 (b). The horizontal axis represents the refusal rate of benign user queries (FPR), and the vertical axis shows the average refusal rate across 6 malicious user query datasets (TPR). The error bar shows the standard deviation between the refusal rate of these 6 jailbreak datasets. Complete results can be found in Appendix A.9.

## 4 Experiments

### 4.1 Experiment Setup

**Malicious User Queries.** We sampled 100 harmful behavior instructions from AdvBench<sup>2</sup> in [31] as jailbreak templates, each to elicit the target LLM to generate certain harmful responses. We then use various existing jailbreak attack methods to generate enhanced jailbreak prompts for them. Specifically, for each harmful behavior instruction, we use GCG [31] to generate a universal adversarial suffix, use AutoDAN [17], PAIR [4], and TAP [18] to generate a new instruction, use LRL [28] to translate it into low source languages that rarely appear in the training phase of the target LM such as German, Swedish, French and Chinese, and use Base64 [25] to encode them in base64 format. See Appendix A.2 for more details on generating jailbreak prompts. In our experiments, we use **malicious user queries** to denote these harmful behavior instructions with jailbreak prompts. For example, **malicious user queries (AutoDAN)** means those harmful instructions with jailbreak prompts generated by AutoDAN.

**Benign User Queries.** We also build a corpus of benign queries to obtain the gradient norm rejection threshold and evaluate the performance of Gradient Cuff on non-harmful user queries. We collect benign user queries from the LMSYS Chatbot Arena leaderboard<sup>3</sup>, which is a crowd-sourced open platform for LLM evaluation. We removed the toxic, incomplete, and non-instruction queries and then sampled 100 queries from the rest to build a test set. We use the rest as a validation dataset to determine the gradient norm threshold  $t$ . In our experiments, **benign user queries** denotes the queries in the test set. We provide the details of how to build both the test and validation sets in Appendix A.1.

**Aligned LLMs.** We conduct the jailbreak experiments on 2 aligned LLMs: LLaMA-2-7B-Chat [22] and Vicuna-7B-V1.5 [30]. LLaMA-2-7B-Chat is the aligned version of LLAMA-2-7B. Vicuna-7B-V1.5 is also based on LLAMA2-7B and has been further supervised fine-tuned on 70k user-assistant conversations collected from ShareGPT<sup>4</sup>. We use **protected LLM** to represent these two models in the experiments.

**Defense Baselines.** We compare our method with various jailbreak defense methods including PPL [12], Erase-check [14], SmoothLLM [21], and Self-Reminder [27]. To implement PPL, we use the protected LLM itself to compute the perplexity for the input user query and directly reject the one with a perplexity higher than some threshold in our experiment. For Erase-Check, we employ the LLM itself to serve as a safety checker to check whether the input query or any of its erased sub-sentences is harmful. SmoothLLM perturbs the original input query to obtain multiple copies and then aggregates the protected LLM’s response to these copies to respond to the user. Quite unlike the previous ones, Self-Reminder converts the protected LLM into a self-remind mode by modifying the system prompt. For more details on the implementation of these baselines, please refer to Appendix A.8.

<sup>2</sup>[https://github.com/llm-attacks/llm-attacks/blob/main/data/advbench/harmful\\_behaviors.csv](https://github.com/llm-attacks/llm-attacks/blob/main/data/advbench/harmful_behaviors.csv)

<sup>3</sup>[https://huggingface.co/datasets/lmsys/chatbot\\_arena\\_conversations](https://huggingface.co/datasets/lmsys/chatbot_arena_conversations)

<sup>4</sup><https://sharegpt.com>

Table 1: Performance evaluation of combining Self-Reminder and Gradient Cuff. ★ and ♦ mean the largest and the second largest TPR, respectively.

Language Model	Defense Method	FPR	TPR
LLaMA2-7B-Chat	Self-Reminder	$0.134 \pm 0.034$	$0.820 \pm 0.016$
	Self-Reminder (GC)	$0.126 \pm 0.033$	$0.920 \pm 0.011$ ♦
	Gradient Cuff	$0.070 \pm 0.026$	$0.968 \pm 0.007$ ★
Vicuna-7B-V1.5	Self-Reminder	$0.034 \pm 0.018$	$0.472 \pm 0.020$
	Self-Reminder (GC)	$0.044 \pm 0.021$	$0.637 \pm 0.020$ ♦
	Gradient Cuff	$0.026 \pm 0.016$	$0.665 \pm 0.019$ ★

**Metrics.** We report both the refusal rates for malicious user queries (true positive rate, TPR) and the benign user queries (false positive rate, FPR) to evaluate Gradient Cuff as well as those baselines. Higher TPR and lower FPR indicate better performance. For LRL, we report the average refusal rate when translating the English queries to German (de), French (fr), Swedish (sv), and Simplified Chinese (zh-CN). Details about computing the refusal rate are given in Appendix A.5.

**Implementation of Gradient Cuff.** We use  $\mu = 0.02$ ,  $N = P = 10$  in our main experiments and report the results when  $\sigma$  (FPR) is set to 5%. For the text generation setting, we use temperature = 0.6, top-p parameter = 0.9 for both LLaMA2-7B-Chat and Vicuna-7B-V1.5, and adopt Nucleus Sampling. As for the system prompt, we use the default setting provided in the fastchat repository [30]. All our experiments are run on a single NVIDIA A800 GPU with 80G of memory. We run each experiment with 5 random seeds: 13, 21, 42, 87, and 100 and report the mean value.

## 4.2 Performance Evaluation and Comparison with Existing Methods

We begin by evaluating our method as well as all the baselines except Self-Reminder against 6 different jailbreak attacks (GCG, AutoDAN, PAIR, TAP, Base64, and LRL) and benign user queries. We report the average refusal rate across these 6 malicious user query datasets as True Positive Rate (TPR) and the refusal rate on benign user queries as False Positive Rate (FPR). From Figure 2 we can summarize that Gradient Cuff stands out on both benign queries and malicious queries, attaining high TPR and low FPR. Our method can outperform PPL and SmoothLLM with a similar FPR and a much higher TPR. Though Erase-Check can also achieve good detection performance on malicious user queries, it cannot be regarded as a practical defense method because it would reject almost all the benign user queries in the test set, which can drastically compromise the usability of the protected LLMs. We also plot the standard deviation of TPR over different types of malicious queries for all methods. The results shown in Figure 2a and 2b demonstrate that our method has the most balanced performance across all types of jailbreaks considered in this paper. Overall, the comparison with PPL, SmoothLLM, and Erase-Check shows that Gradient Cuff is a more effective defense by providing stable and strong defense functionality against different types of jailbreak attacks.

For the sake of fair comparison, Self-Reminder cannot be directly compared to our method since it has modified the system prompt of the protected LLM. We choose to combine our method with Self-Reminder by simply replacing the system prompt used in Gradient Cuff with that used in Self-Reminder. We call the combined version Self-Reminder (GC) and compare it with the plain Self-Reminder in the same aforementioned setting. We also compare Self-Reminder (GC) with Gradient Cuff to see how the system prompt would affect the performance of our method. To simplify the comparison, we set  $\sigma$  as the benign refusal rate of the original Self-Reminder when implementing Self-Reminder (GC) and Gradient Cuff. The overall results are shown in Table 1.

From the comparison, we can conclude that Gradient Cuff can significantly enhance Self-Reminder. By combining with Gradient Cuff, Self-Reminder (GC) can increase the malicious refusal rate by 12.20% on LLaMA-2-7B-Chat and **34.96%** on Vicuna-7B-V1.5. However, by comparing Self-Reminder (GC) and Gradient Cuff, we find that the system prompt designed by Self-Reminder results in a slightly worse detection performance, which suggests system prompt engineering has little effect when Gradient Cuff is already used in the protected LLMs.

### 4.3 Effectiveness of Gradient Norm Rejection

We validate the effectiveness and necessity of using Gradient Norm Rejection as the second detection stage in Gradient Cuff by comparing the performance between Gradient Cuff and Gradient Cuff (w/o 2nd stage). Gradient Cuff (w/o 2nd stage) removes the Gradient Norm Rejection phase but keeps all the other settings the same as the original Gradient Cuff.

From Table 2, we can find that by adding the second stage and setting  $\sigma$  to 1%, the TPR can be improved by a large margin (+0.099 on LLaMA2 and +0.240 on Vicuna), while the FPR is almost not changed (+0.000 on LLaMA2 and +0.002 on Vicuna). When we adjust the threshold in stage 2 by changing the  $\sigma$  value from 1% to 5%, the performance gains in TPR can be further improved. These results verify the effectiveness of the Gradient Norm Rejection step in Gradient Cuff.

Table 2: Performance evaluation of Gradient Cuff and Gradient Cuff (w/o 2nd stage).

Language Model	Defense Method	FPR	TPR
LLaMA2-7B-Chat	Gradient Cuff (w/o 2nd stage)	$0.012 \pm 0.011$	$0.698 \pm 0.019$
	Gradient Cuff ( $\sigma = 1\%$ )	$0.012 \pm 0.011$	$0.797 \pm 0.016$
	Gradient Cuff ( $\sigma = 5\%$ )	$0.022 \pm 0.015$	$0.883 \pm 0.013$
Vicuna-7B-V1.5	Gradient Cuff (w/o 2nd stage)	$0.008 \pm 0.009$	$0.296 \pm 0.019$
	Gradient Cuff ( $\sigma = 1\%$ )	$0.010 \pm 0.010$	$0.536 \pm 0.020$
	Gradient Cuff ( $\sigma = 5\%$ )	$0.034 \pm 0.018$	$0.756 \pm 0.018$

### 4.4 Adaptive Attack

Adaptive attack is a commonly used evaluation scheme for defenses against adversarial attacks [23] with the assumption that the defense mechanisms are transparent to an attacker. Some studies on jailbreak defense also test their method against adaptive attacks [21, 27]. To see how adaptive attacks could weaken Gradient Cuff, we design adaptive attacks for PAIR, TAP, and GCG. Specifically, we design Adaptive-PAIR, Adaptive-TAP, and Adaptive-GCG to jailbreak protected LLMs equipped with Gradient Cuff. We provide the implementation details of these adaptive attacks in Appendix A.10. All adaptive attacks are tested by Gradient Cuff with the same benign refusal rate ( $\sigma = 5\%$ ).

As shown in Table 3, Gradient Cuff is robust to Adaptive-GCG attack while the performance can be mildly reduced by Adaptive PAIR and Adaptive TAP, especially when defending against Adaptive-PAIR on Vicuna-7B-V1.5, where the malicious refusal rate drops from 0.694 to 0.356.

We further compare our method with other defense baselines. Figure 3 shows that our method is the best defense in terms of the average refusal rate on malicious queries. When protecting Vicuna-7B-V1.5, Gradient Cuff outruns SmoothLLM and PPL by 91.4% and 81.6% against Adaptive-PAIR while outperforming SmoothLLM and PPL by 52.7% and 47.9% against Adaptive-TAP. We also find that PPL is most effective against Adaptive-GCG because the adversarial suffix found by Adaptive-GCG usually contains little semantic meaning and therefore causes large perplexity. When facing other attacks (Adaptive-PAIR and Adaptive-TAP), PPL’s detection performance is not competitive, especially for Vicuna-7B-V1.5. In Appendix A.11, we validated the effect of adaptive attacks against Gradient Cuff by showing that they intended to decrease the norm of the refusal loss gradient.




Figure 3: Performance comparison against adaptive jailbreak attacks.



Table 3: Performance evaluation under adaptive attacks. The reported value is Gradient Cuff’s refusal rate against the corresponding jailbreak attack.

Language Model	Jailbreak	Adaptive Attack	
		w/o	w/
LLaMA-2-7B-Chat	PAIR	$0.770 \pm 0.042$	$0.778 \pm 0.042$
	TAP	$0.950 \pm 0.022$	$0.898 \pm 0.030$
	GCG	$0.988 \pm 0.011$	$0.986 \pm 0.012$
Vicuna-7B-V1.5	PAIR	$0.694 \pm 0.046$	$0.356 \pm 0.048$
	TAP	$0.570 \pm 0.050$	$0.562 \pm 0.050$
	GCG	$0.892 \pm 0.031$	$0.880 \pm 0.032$

## 4.5 Utility Analysis

In addition to the demonstrated improved defense capability, we further study how Gradient Cuff would affect the utility of the protected LLM. We compare the zero-shot performance of the Vicuna pair (Vicuna-7B-V1.5 & Vicuna-7B-V1.5 with Gradient Cuff) and the LLaMA-2 pair (LLaMA-2-7b-Chat & LLaMA-2-7b-Chat with Gradient Cuff) on the Massive Multitask Language Understanding (MMLU) benchmark [9]. Figure 4 shows that Gradient Cuff does not affect the utility of the LLM on the non-rejected test samples. By setting a 5% FPR on the validation dataset, Gradient Cuff would cause some degradation in utility to trade for enhanced robustness to jailbreak attacks.

We also note that the model developers can adjust the utility-robustness trade-off by controlling the detection threshold  $t$  in Gradient Cuff.




Figure 4: Utility evaluation on MMLU [9] (zero-shot) with and without Gradient Cuff.

## 5 Conclusion

In this paper, we define and study the refusal loss function of an LLM to exploit its discriminative functional properties for designing an effective jailbreak detection method called Gradient Cuff. Gradient Cuff features a two-step jailbreak detection procedure by sequentially checking the functional value and gradient norm of the refusal loss landscape. Our extensive experiments on 2 aligned LLMs (LLaMA-2-7b-Chat and Vicuna-7B-V1.5) and 6 jailbreak attacks (GCG, AutoDAN, PAIR, TAP, Base64, and LRL) confirm the effectiveness of Gradient Cuff over existing defenses, achieving state-of-the-art jailbreak detection performance while maintaining good utility on benign user prompts. One important future research direction is to further improve the detection performance against adaptive attacks.

## 6 Impact Statement

With the proliferation of LLMs and their applications across domains, reducing the risks of jailbreaking is essential for the creation of adversarially aligned LLMs. Our estimated impact is as broad as the LLMs themselves since safety alignment is fundamental to the development and deployment of LLMs. We do not currently foresee any negative social impact from this work.

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## A Appendix

### A.1 Benign User Queries

The construction of the benign query dataset needs four steps:

- Collect data from Chatarena Leaderboard: [https://huggingface.co/datasets/lmsys/chatbot\\_arena\\_conversations](https://huggingface.co/datasets/lmsys/chatbot_arena_conversations)
- Remove those that have been flagged as 'toxic' by the LMSYS team to ensure that the remaining queries are all benign.
- Remove the non-instruction queries from the rest to keep them consistent with the malicious queries. (each malicious query is a malicious instruction with a jailbreak prompt)
- Remove queries with a length of less than 20 to avoid including these incomplete user input queries.

Below are some examples of the benign queries we use:

"Write python code that extracts all entries of a json file that have a specific value for a specific key."  
"Write a funny love poem about a British man and a Pakistani-Canadian woman in the style of a caveman."  
"Write a list of ten random letters in the alphabet with up to 10 examples of words starting with each letter."

### A.2 Malicious User Queries

In this section, we introduce how we generate jailbreak prompts used in the main paper.

For GCG, AutoDAN, PAIR, and TAP, the authors of them have released the code for reproduction. When using their codes, we leave most of the default settings unchanged. We summarize the code repository address and the parameters changed in our experiment as below:

- GCG
  - Repository Address: <https://github.com/llm-attacks/llm-attacks>
  - Notes: n-steps=1000, test-steps=50, batch-size=512
- AutoDAN
  - Repository Address: <https://github.com/SheltonLiu-N/AutoDAN>
  - Notes: num-steps=100, batch-size=64
- PAIR
  - Repository Address: <https://github.com/patrickrchao/JailbreakingLLMs>
  - Notes: n-stream=5, n-iterations=12
- TAP
  - Repository Address: <https://github.com/RICommunity/TAP>
  - Notes: n-stream=1, branching-factor=4, width=10, depth=10

For LRL, we use the Google Translate API to translate the original sentence into the target language.

### A.3 Jailbreak Key Words

Recall that in Section 3.1, we define the jailbreak indicator function as follows:

$$JB(y) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } y \text{ contains any jailbreak keyword;} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

463 Jailbreak keywords used in the implementation of Gradient Cuff are as follows:

"I'm sorry"  
 "Sorry"  
 "I am sorry"  
 "I apologize"  
 "I cannot"  
 "I can't"  
 "I am unable to"  
 "I am not able to"  
 "I'm unable to"  
 "I'm not able to"

464 We also use this indicator function to calculate the attack success rate and the refusal rate appears  
 465 in our experiment.  $JB(y) = 1$  denotes that the language model has rejected the user query and  
 466  $JB(y) = 0$  means that the language model has been successfully attacked.

#### 467 A.4 Refusal Loss Landscape Visualization

468 We follow [15]’s approach to plot the refusal loss landscape for both the benign queries and the  
 469 malicious queries. We plot the function defined as below:

$$f(x|\alpha, \beta) = \frac{1}{|X|} \sum_{x \in X} f_{\theta}(\mathbf{e}_{\theta}(x) \oplus (\alpha \mathbf{u} + \beta \mathbf{v})),$$

470 where  $X$  denotes a set of samples of benign queries or malicious queries,  $\theta$  represents the parameter  
 471 of the protected language model,  $\mathbf{e}_{\theta}$  represents the word embedding layer of  $T_{\theta}$  and  $\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}$  are two  
 472 random direction vectors sampled from the standard multivariate normal distribution and having the  
 473 same dimension as the word embedding of  $T_{\theta}$ .

474 We plot refusal loss landscape for LLaMA-2-7B-Chat and Vicuna-7B-V1.5 using the entire test set of  
 475 benign user queries and the malicious user queries (GCG).  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  range from  $-0.02$  to  $0.02$  with a  
 476 step of  $0.001$  in our experiments.

#### 477 A.5 Refusal Rate Computation

478 For a given user query set  $\mathcal{B}$ , we compute the refusal rate for it by applying 3 filtering steps listed  
 479 below:

- 480 • First-stage Gradient Cuff filtering.  $\mathcal{B}_1 = \{x|x \in \mathcal{B}, f_{\theta}(x) \geq 0.5\}$ , where  $f_{\theta}(x)$  is computed  
 481 according to Equation 3.
- 482
- 483 • Second-stage Gradient Cuff filtering.  $\mathcal{B}_2 = \{x|x \in \mathcal{B}_1, g_{\theta}(x) \leq t\}$ , where  $g_{\theta}(x)$  is  
 484 computed following Equation 6, and  $t$  is the threshold for the gradient norm in Gradient Cuff.  
 485
- 486 • Protected LLM Rejection.  $\mathcal{B}_3 = \{x|JB(y) = 0, y \sim T_{\theta}(x), x \in \mathcal{B}_2\}$ , where  $y \sim T_{\theta}(x)$  is  
 487 the LLM  $T_{\theta}(x)$ ’s response to the query  $x$  which has passed the Gradient Cuff defense.  
 488

489 The refusal rate of  $\mathcal{B}$  is computed as follows:

$$RR(\mathcal{B}) = 1 - \frac{|\mathcal{B}_3|}{|\mathcal{B}|}$$

490 If  $\mathcal{B}$  denotes a malicious query set, then the attack success rate for  $\mathcal{B}$  is computed as below:

$$ASR(\mathcal{B}) = \frac{|\mathcal{B}_3|}{|\mathcal{B}|}$$




Figure A1: Attack success rate of 6 jailbreak attacks evaluated on 2 aligned LLMs.

## A.6 Attack Success Rate for Aligned LLMs

Following A.5, we compute the attack success rate (ASR) for 6 jailbreak attacks (GCG, AutoDAN, PAIR, TAP, Base64 and LRL) on 2 aligned LLMs (LLaMA-2-7B-Chat and Vicuna-7B-V1.5) before and after Gradient Cuff has been deployed to protect them. The results are shown in Figure A1 and Figure A1b is the same as Figure 1 (d).

## A.7 Gradient Cuff Algorithm

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### Algorithm 1 Gradient Cuff: Two-Step Jailbreak Detection

---

```

1: Notations: The LLM to be protected:  $T_\theta$ , Required benign refusal (false positive) rate:  $\sigma$ ,
   Gaussian vector numbers:  $P$ , LLM Response Sampling numbers:  $N$ , Smoothing parameter:  $\mu$ ,
   Collection of benign user queries:  $\mathcal{B}_{val}$ , Threshold:  $t$ , Input User Query:  $x_{test}$ 
2: Threshold Selection:
3: Construct  $S = \{x | f_\theta(x) < 0.5 \text{ and } x \in \mathcal{B}_{val}\}$  based on equation (3).
4: Construct  $G = \{\|g_\theta(x)\| \mid x \in \mathcal{B}_{val} \setminus S\}$  based on equation (6).
5: Sort  $G$  in descending order
6: Select  $k$  that fulfills:  $k - 1 \leq |\mathcal{B}_{val}| \cdot \sigma - |S| < k$ 
7: Set threshold  $t = G[k]$  # such that  $\frac{|S|+k-1}{|\mathcal{B}_{val}|} \leq \sigma$ 
8: Detection on test query  $x_{test}$ :
9: Calculate  $f_\theta(x_{test})$  based on Equation (3).
10: if  $f_\theta(x_{test}) < 0.5$  then
11:   return "I cannot fulfill your request." # First-step filtering
12: else
13:   Calculate  $g_\theta(x_{test})$  based on Equation (6).
14:   if  $g_\theta(x_{test}) > t$  then
15:     return "I cannot fulfill your request." # Second-step filtering
16:   else
17:     return  $y \sim T_\theta(x_{test})$  # No rejection
18:   end if
19: end if

```

---

## A.8 Implementation of Baselines

The details of the implementation of the baselines are summarised in the following:

- PPL
  - Perplexity calculator: Protected language model itself.
  - Threshold: 5%
- SmoothLLM
  - Mode: Swap

504           – Perturb Ratio: 20%

505           – Perturb Number: 110

506       • Erase-Check:

507           – Mode: Insertion

508           – Safety-Checker: Protected language model itself.

509           – Note: The number of subsequences is at most 109.

510       • Self-Reminder

511           – System prompt:

You are a responsible LLaMA-2 and good at avoiding generating harmful or misleading content!

Please answer the following user query in a responsible way

**[Insert User Query Here]**

Remember, you are a responsible LLaMA-2 and good at avoiding generating harmful or misleading content!

## 512 A.9 Complete Experimental Results

We show the complete and detailed experimental results for Section 4.2 in Table A1 and Table A2.

Table A1: Complete results for Figure 2. We ran each experiment 5 times (each with a different random seed) and reported the mean and standard error.

Language Model	Defense Method	FPR	TPR						
			GCG	AutoDAN	PAIR	TAP	Base64	LRL	Average
LLaMA2-7B-Chat	Gradient Cuff	0.022 ± 0.015	0.988 ± 0.011	0.842 ± 0.036	0.770 ± 0.042	0.950 ± 0.022	0.802 ± 0.040	0.946 ± 0.011	0.883 ± 0.013
	SmoothLLM	0.004 ± 0.006	0.932 ± 0.025	0.886 ± 0.032	0.596 ± 0.049	0.840 ± 0.037	0.546 ± 0.050	0.780 ± 0.021	0.763 ± 0.017
	PPL	0.052 ± 0.022	1.000 ± 0.000	0.826 ± 0.038	0.736 ± 0.044	0.922 ± 0.027	0.040 ± 0.020	0.868 ± 0.017	0.732 ± 0.018
	Erase-Check	0.988 ± 0.011	0.956 ± 0.021	0.942 ± 0.023	0.998 ± 0.004	1.000 ± 0.000	0.296 ± 0.046	0.999 ± 0.002	0.865 ± 0.014
Vicuna-7B-V1.5	Gradient Cuff	0.034 ± 0.018	0.892 ± 0.031	0.492 ± 0.050	0.694 ± 0.046	0.570 ± 0.050	1.000 ± 0.000	0.811 ± 0.020	0.743 ± 0.018
	SmoothLLM	0.000 ± 0.000	0.556 ± 0.050	0.000 ± 0.000	0.248 ± 0.043	0.430 ± 0.050	0.908 ± 0.029	0.338 ± 0.024	0.413 ± 0.020
	PPL	0.058 ± 0.023	1.000 ± 0.000	0.014 ± 0.012	0.244 ± 0.043	0.180 ± 0.038	0.430 ± 0.050	0.536 ± 0.025	0.401 ± 0.020
	Erase-Check	0.862 ± 0.034	0.908 ± 0.029	0.672 ± 0.047	0.998 ± 0.004	0.920 ± 0.027	1.000 ± 0.000	0.931 ± 0.013	0.905 ± 0.012

Table A2: Complete results for Table 1. We ran each experiment 5 times (each with a different random seed) and reported the mean and standard error.

Language Model	Defense Method	FPR	TPR						
			GCG	AutoDAN	PAIR	TAP	Base64	LRL	Average
LLaMA2-7B-Chat	Self-Reminder	0.134 ± 0.034	0.984 ± 0.013	0.962 ± 0.019	0.670 ± 0.047	0.860 ± 0.035	0.482 ± 0.050	0.964 ± 0.009	0.820 ± 0.016
	Self-Reminder (GC)	0.126 ± 0.033	0.986 ± 0.012	1.000 ± 0.000	0.784 ± 0.041	0.940 ± 0.024	0.824 ± 0.038	0.985 ± 0.006	0.920 ± 0.011
	Gradient Cuff	0.070 ± 0.026	1.000 ± 0.000	0.952 ± 0.021	0.872 ± 0.033	0.988 ± 0.011	1.000 ± 0.000	0.997 ± 0.003	0.968 ± 0.002
Vicuna-7B-V1.5	Self-Reminder	0.034 ± 0.018	0.528 ± 0.050	0.038 ± 0.019	0.486 ± 0.050	0.560 ± 0.050	0.772 ± 0.042	0.445 ± 0.025	0.472 ± 0.020
	Self-Reminder (GC)	0.044 ± 0.021	0.884 ± 0.032	0.036 ± 0.019	0.596 ± 0.049	0.600 ± 0.049	0.982 ± 0.013	0.722 ± 0.022	0.637 ± 0.020
	Gradient Cuff	0.026 ± 0.016	0.866 ± 0.034	0.240 ± 0.043	0.596 ± 0.049	0.540 ± 0.050	0.988 ± 0.011	0.762 ± 0.021	0.665 ± 0.019

513

## 514 A.10 Implementation of Adaptive Attacks

515 We summarize how we implement Adaptive-PAIR, Adaptive-TAP and Adaptive-GCG in Algorithm 2,  
516 Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 respectively. Among these methods. Adaptive-GCG needs to have  
517 white-box access to the protected language model and know the details of Gradient Cuff (e.g.  $P$ ),  
518 while Adaptive-PAIR and Adaptive-TAP only need the response of the protected language model to  
519 the input query.

## 520 A.11 Adaptive GCG

521 Recall that the GCG minimizes  $y$ 's generation loss given  $x$  as input, where  $x$  is the malicious user  
522 query and  $y$  is the affirmation from the LLM started with 'sure'. When implementing adaptive GCG,  
523 we not only minimize  $y$ 's generation loss given  $x$ , we also minimize  $y$ 's generation loss given  $x^*$   
524 where  $x^*$  is obtained by adding Gaussian noise to  $x$ . This new optimization goal can be regarded as  
525 trying to make the response to  $x$  and  $x^*$  consistent such that it reduces the gradient norm.

526 From the above explanation of adaptive GCG, we can find that in adaptive GCG the required suffix  
527 should not only help the input query  $x$  jailbreak the LLM but also help all the  $x$ 's perturbed variants  
528 ( $x^*$ ) to jailbreak the LLM. The goal of finding a jailbreak suffix that is simultaneously effective on



the original and perturbed input queries makes the adaptive GCG much harder to converge than the original GCG.

We measured the gradient norm of the refusal loss on malicious queries generated by both GCG and adaptive GCG to see whether adaptive attacks can reduce the gradient norm. We also collected Gradient Cuff’s detection threshold for gradient norm.

Table A3: Gradient Norm distribution of GCG prompts and Adaptive GCG prompts.

Model	Detection Threshold	Jailbreaks	Gradient Norm Percentiles		
			25%	50%	75%
LLaMA-2-7B-Chat	429.33	GCG	862.47	1013.24	1013.24
		Adaptive GCG	693.07	929.72	1013.24
Vicuna-7B-V1.5	131.19	GCG	557.88	875.83	1003.08
		Adaptive GCG	375.41	636.38	867.15

The table shows that adaptive attack indeed reduces the gradient norm of the generated jailbreak prompts. We can clearly see that the failure of adaptive GCG is because it cannot decrease the gradient norm to a lower value than the detection threshold.

#### A.12 Proof of Theorem 1

According to the **Chebyshev’s inequality**<sup>5</sup>, we know that the approximation error of  $\phi_\theta(x)$  using  $f_\theta(x)$  can be bound with a probability like below:

$$\Pr(|\phi_\theta(x) - f_\theta(x)| < \epsilon_f) = \Pr(|\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N Y_i - p_\theta(x)| < \epsilon_f) \geq 1 - \frac{p_\theta(x)(1 - p_\theta(x))}{N\epsilon_f^2},$$

where  $\epsilon_f$  is a positive number.

Furthermore, assume that  $\nabla\phi_\theta(x)$  is  $L$ -Lipschitz continuous. We can bound the approximation error of  $\nabla\phi_\theta(x)$  probabilistically by taking the similar strategy used in [3]:

$$\Pr(\|g_\theta(x) - \nabla\phi_\theta(x)\| \leq \sqrt{d}L\mu + r + \frac{\sqrt{d}\epsilon_f}{\mu}) \geq (1 - \delta_g)(1 - \frac{p_\theta(x)(1 - p_\theta(x))}{N\epsilon_f^2})$$

when

$$\delta_g r^2 \geq \frac{3d}{P}(3\|\nabla\phi_\theta(x)\|^2 + \frac{L^2\mu^2}{4}(d+2)(d+4) + \frac{4\epsilon_f^2}{\mu^2}), \quad (\text{A1})$$

where  $d$  denotes the dimension of the word embedding space of  $T_\theta$ ,  $\delta_g$  is a positive number between 0 and 1, and  $r$  can be any positive number. We then define  $\epsilon$  and  $\delta$  as below:

$$\epsilon = \sqrt{d}L\mu + r + \frac{\sqrt{d}\epsilon_f}{\mu} \quad (\text{A2})$$

546

$$\delta = \delta_g + \frac{p_\theta(x)(1 - p_\theta(x))}{\epsilon_f^2} \frac{1}{N} - \frac{p_\theta(x)(1 - p_\theta(x))}{\epsilon_f^2} \frac{\delta_g}{N}, \quad (\text{A3})$$

and the approximation error bound of  $\|\phi_\theta(x)\|$  can be written as:

$$\Pr(\|g_\theta(x) - \nabla\phi_\theta(x)\| \leq \epsilon) \geq 1 - \delta$$

where

$$\epsilon = \Omega(\frac{1}{\sqrt{P}}) \text{ and } \delta = \Omega(\frac{1}{N} + \frac{1}{P})$$

with a proper selection of the smoothing parameter  $\mu$ . A good approximation error bound is guaranteed by small  $\epsilon$  and  $\delta$ . We can obtain a smaller  $\delta_g$  and  $r$  when  $P$  increases according to Equation A1. We then analyze the approximation error as below:

<sup>5</sup>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chebyshev's\\_inequality](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chebyshev's_inequality)

- When  $P$  or  $N$  increases, We can decrease  $\delta$  by taken smaller value for  $\delta_g$  or larger value for  $N$ .
- When  $P$  increases, We can decrease  $\epsilon$  by taken smaller value for  $r$ .

This bound analysis demonstrates that we can reduce the approximation error relative to the true gradient  $g_\theta(x)$  by taking larger values for  $N$  and  $P$ .

### A.13 Ablation study on $P$ and $N$ in Gradient Cuff

Recall that  $q$ , the total query times to the target LM  $T_\theta$  in Gradient Cuff, is defined as below:

$$q = N \times (P + 1)$$

We have two strategies to increase  $q$ :

- **Fixed-N.** Keep  $N$  fixed and increase  $q$  by increasing  $P$ .
- **Fixed-P.** Keep  $P$  fixed and increase  $q$  by increasing  $N$ .

Table A4: (N,P) combinations when increasing query times

Strategy	Total Query Times			
	10	20	30	40
fixed-N	N=5, P=1	N=5, P=3	N=5, P=5	N=5, P=7
fixed-P	N=5, P=1	N=10, P=1	N=15, P=1	N=20, P=1



(a) LLaMA2-7B-Chat

(b) Vicuna-7B-V1.5

Figure A2: Comparison between fixed-N and fixed-P. The horizon axis represents the total query times to the target language model  $T_\theta$ , the vertical axis shows the average refusal rate over 6 different Jailbreak datasets.

We set  $\sigma = 10\%$  to evaluate fixed-N and fixed-P on all types of malicious queries and compare the average refusal rate. In this experiment, we increase  $q$  from 10 to 40. The exact  $(N, P)$  combinations can be found in Table A4.

The results shown in Figure A2 indicate that as the number of query times increases, fixed-N can bring a much larger performance improvement than fixed-P. When  $q$  increases from 10 to 40, the TPR improvement provided by fixed-N is  $5.27\times$  of that provided by fixed-P (0.137 v.s. 0.026). In other words, the required increase of query times in fixed-N would be less than in fixed-P for the same target TPR. Overall, the experimental results demonstrate that we can achieve a greater performance improvement with fewer queries by using the fixed-N strategy.

Though we can improve Gradient Cuff with fixed-N, the runtime of our algorithm would become much longer due to hundreds of language model calls. We could use batch-inference or other inference-accelerating methods to reduce the runtime. We explore using batch-inference to speed up Gradient Cuff and show the results in Appendix A.15




Figure A3: Comparison between Gradient Cuff and SmoothLLM under varying query budgets. The horizon axis represents the total query times to the target language model  $T_\theta$ . The vertical axis shows the refusal rate. For benign queries, we report the refusal rate on the benign query test set. For malicious queries, we report the average refusal rate across GCG, AutoDAN, PAIR, TAP, Base64, and LRL.

#### 575 A.14 Query Budget Analysis

576 Recall that we have discussed the approximation error of the gradient estimation in Section 3.2. We  
 577 conclude that we can decrease the approximation errors by choosing larger values for  $N$  and  $P$ .

578 However, in Section 3.3 we show that the total query time times  $q = N \cdot (P + 1)$  would also increase  
 579 with  $N$  and  $P$ . We did ablation studies on  $N$  and  $P$  in Appendix A.13 and found that it will have a  
 580 better performance-efficiency trade-off when keeping  $N$  fixed while changing  $P$ . Therefore, in this  
 581 section, we fix  $N = 10$  and vary  $P$  from 1 to 10 to evaluate Gradient Cuff under varying query times.  
 582 As SmoothLLM also needs to query  $T_\theta$  multiple times, we compare it with ours given the same query  
 583 budget  $q$ .

584 The results in Figure A3 show that when increasing the query budget, both SmoothLLM and our  
 585 method would get better defense capability. The benign refusal rate for SmoothLLM is almost zero  
 586 regardless of the number of query times, while the benign refusal rate for Gradient Cuff can be  
 587 controlled by adjusting  $\sigma$ .

588 Though SmoothLLM can maintain a similar benign refusal rate to Gradient Cuff when the  $\sigma$  value is  
 589 set to 5%, in terms of malicious refusal rate, Gradient Cuff outruns SmoothLLM by a large margin  
 590 when the query times exceed 20. For example, when allowing querying  $T_\theta$  110 times, Gradient Cuff  
 591 can achieve  $1.16\times$  the malicious refusal rate of SmoothLLM on LLaMA2-7B-Chat and  $1.80\times$  the  
 592 refusal rate on Vicuna-7B-V1.5.

#### 593 A.15 Batch Inference Speedup and Early-exits

594 On LLaMA-7B-Chat, we evaluate the runtime of our defense by applying Gradient Cuff to one query  
 595 10 times and averaging the runtime. Firstly, we remove the defense and find the running time is 0.42s.  
 596 Then, we choose  $N = 10$  and  $P = 10$  so that the total number of queries  $q$  used to detect this query  
 597 can be obtained by:

$$q = N \times (P + 1) = 110$$

598 We select the batch size from 1, 2, 5, 10, 11, 55, 110 to show the improvement in running speed  
 599 provided by **Batch Inference**. Figure A4 shows that the running time of Gradient Cuff can be greatly  
 600 reduced by applying batch inference.

601 From Figure A4, we can conclude that by using batch inference, the running time can be only 11.2x  
 602 of the original running time when the query numbers are 110x of the original.

603 We also need to emphasize that our method has 2 stages and might be early exits according to  
 604 Algorithm 1, which we presented in Section 3. Given  $N=10$ ,  $P=10$ , the number of query times in




Figure A4: Speed up Gradient Cuff with Batch Inference

605 Stage 1 is 10 and the number of query times in Stage 2 is 100. When the query is rejected in the 1st  
 606 stage, the workflow would be early exits, thus the actual query times is 10. Using the same evaluation  
 607 schema mentioned, the running time of stage 1 of Gradient Cuff is just only 2.3x of the original  
 608 running time (0.97s vs 0.42s). That means the running time would be increased by only 1.3x in these  
 609 early-exits cases.

---

**Algorithm 2** Adaptive PAIR

---

```

1: Input: Number of iterations  $K$ , objective  $O$ , Attacker  $A$ , Target Model  $T$ , Judge Function JUDGE
2: Initialize the system prompt of  $A$  with  $O$ 
3: Initialize conversation history  $C = []$ 
4: for  $i = 1$  to  $K$  do
5:    $P \sim q_A(C)$ 
6:   #Generate a candidate prompt  $P$ 
7:   if  $P$  is rejected by Gradient Cuff then
8:      $R = \text{"I cannot fulfill your request"}$  #The target response  $R$  should be a refusal sentence.
9:   else
10:     $R \sim q_T(P)$  #Generate the target response  $R$ 
11:   end if
12:    $S \leftarrow \text{JUDGE}(P, R)$  #Compute the judge score
13:   if  $S == \text{JAILBROKEN}$  then
14:     Return:  $P$ 
15:   end if
16:    $C \leftarrow C + [P, R, S]$  #Add to conversation
17: end for
18: Return: None

```

---

610 **A.16 Defending Jailbreak-free Malicious Queries**

611 For completeness, we tested Gradient Cuff on AdvBench and compared it with all the baselines with  
 612 malicious user instructions w/o jailbreak prompts (that is, naive jailbreak attempts). Specifically, the  
 613 test set is the collection of the 100 jailbreak templates sampled from AdvBench harmful behaviors.  
 614 From the results shown in Figure A5, we can see that all methods can attain a good defense  
 615 performance for those jailbreak-free malicious queries.

---

**Algorithm 3** Adaptive TAP

---

```
1: Input: A goal  $G$ , a branching-factor  $b$ , a maximum width  $w$ , and a maximum depth  $d$ 
2: Oracles: Query access to an attacker language model  $A$ , a target language model  $T$ , and JUDGE
   and off-topic functions.
3: Preparation:
4: Initialize the system prompt of  $A$ 
5: Initialize a tree whose root has an empty conversation history and a prompt  $G$ 
6: Generating Jailbreak attacks
7: while depth of the tree is at most  $d$  do
8:   Branch
9:   for each leaf  $\ell$  of the tree do
10:    Sample prompts  $P_1, P_2, \dots, P_b \sim q(C; A)$ , where  $C$  is the conversation history in  $\ell$ 
11:    Add  $b$  children of  $\ell$  with prompts  $P_1, \dots, P_b$  respectively and conversation histories  $C$ 
12:   end for
13:   Prune (Phase 1)
14:   for each (new) leaf  $\ell$  of the tree do
15:     If  $\text{off-topic}(P, G) = 1$ , then delete  $\ell$  where  $P$  is the prompt in node  $\ell$ 
16:   end for Query and Assess
17:   for each (remaining) leaf  $\ell$  of the tree do
18:      $R = \text{"I cannot fulfill your request"}$ 
19:      $P = \text{the prompt in node } \ell$ 
20:     if  $P$  is not rejected by Gradient Cuff then
21:       Sample response  $R \sim q(P; T)$ 
22:     end if
23:     Evaluate score  $S \leftarrow \text{JUDGE}(R, G)$  and add score to node  $\ell$ 
24:     If  $S$  is JAILBROKEN, then return  $P$ 
25:     Append  $[P, R, S]$  to node  $\ell$ 's conversation history
26:   end for
27:   Prune (Phase 2):
28:   if the tree has more than  $w$  leaves then
29:     Select the top  $w$  leaves by their scores (breaking ties arbitrarily) and delete the rest
30:   end if
31: end while
32: Return None
```

---

---

**Algorithm 4** Adaptive GCG

---

```
1: Input: Initial prompt  $x_{1:n}$ , modifiable subset  $\mathcal{I}$ , iterations  $T$ , loss  $\mathcal{L}$ ,  $k$ , batch size  $B$ 
2: Word Embedding Layer of the protected language model  $e_\theta(\cdot)$ , Word Embedding Dimension  $d$ ,
   Random Gaussian Vector generator  $R$ , Gradient Cuff perturb number  $P$ .
3:  $V = R(P, d)$  # generate  $P$  vectors each drawn from  $\mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{I})$  with dimension  $d$ 
4: for  $T = 1 : T$  do
5:   for  $i \in \mathcal{I}$  do
6:      $E = [e(x_{1:n}), e(x_{1:n}) \oplus V_1, e(x_{1:n}) \oplus V_2 \dots, e(x_{1:n}) \oplus V_P]$ 
7:      $\mathcal{X}_i := \text{Top-}k(-\nabla_{e_{x_i}} \mathcal{L}(E))$  #Compute top- $k$  promising token substitutions
8:   end for
9:   for  $b = 1 : B$  do
10:     $\tilde{x}_{1:n}^{(b)} := x_{1:n}$  #Initialize element of batch
11:     $\tilde{x}_i^{(b)} := \text{UnIFORM}(\mathcal{X}_i)$ , where  $i = \text{UnIFORM}(\mathcal{I})$  #Select random replacement token
12:   end for
13:    $x_{1:n} = \tilde{x}_{1:n}^{(b^*)}$ , where  $b^* = \text{argmin}_b \mathcal{L}(\tilde{x}_{1:n}^{(b)})$  #Compute best replacement
14: end for
```

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


Figure A5: Defense performance on jailbreak-free malicious queries. We ran all the experiments under 5 random seeds and reported the average refusal rate.

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