# EFFICIENTLY IDENTIFYING WATERMARKED SEGMENTS IN MIXED-SOURCE TEXTS

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#### ABSTRACT

Text watermarks in large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to detect synthetic text, mitigating misuse cases like fake news and academic dishonesty. While existing watermarking detection techniques primarily focus on classifying entire documents as watermarked or not, they often neglect the common scenario of identifying individual watermark segments within longer, mixed-source documents. Drawing inspiration from plagiarism detection systems, we propose two novel methods for partial watermark detection. First, we develop a geometry cover detection framework aimed at determining whether there is a watermark segment in long text. Second, we introduce an adaptive online learning algorithm to pinpoint the precise location of watermark segments within the text. Evaluated on three popular watermarking techniques (KGW-Watermark, Unigram-Watermark, and Gumbel-Watermark), our approach achieves high accuracy, significantly outperforming baseline methods. Moreover, our framework is adaptable to other watermarking techniques, offering new insights for precise watermark detection.

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#### 1 INTRODUCTION

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized human activities, enabling applications ranging from chatbots (OpenAI, 2022) to medical diagnostics (Google, 2024) and robotics (Ahn et al., 2024). Their ease of use, however, presents serious societal challenges. In education (Intelligent, 2024), students can effortlessly generate essays and homework answers, undermining academic integrity. In journalism (Blum, 2024), distinguishing credible news from fabricated content erodes public trust. The potential for malicious uses, such as phishing (Violino, 2023), and the risk of model collapse due to synthetic data (Shumailov et al., 2024), further underscore the urgent need to detect LLM-generated text and promote the responsible use of this powerful technology.

However, identifying AI-generated text is becoming increasingly difficult as LLMs reach human-like
proficiency in various tasks. One line of research (OpenAI, 2023; Tian, 2023; Mitchell et al., 2023)
trains machine learning models as AI detectors by collecting datasets consisting of both human and
LLM-generated texts. Unfortunately, these approaches are often fragile (Shi et al., 2024) and errorprone (Liang et al., 2023), ultimately leading OpenAI to terminate its deployed detector (Kelly, 2023).
Watermarking has emerged as a promising solution to this challenge. By embedding identifiable
patterns or markers within the generated text, watermarks can signal whether a piece of text originates
from an LLM.

Existing watermark detection methods (Aaronson, 2023; Kirchenbauer et al., 2023; Zhao et al., 2023; 044 Kuditipudi et al., 2023; Christ et al., 2023; Hu et al., 2024) are primarily designed for text-level classification, labeling a piece of text as either watermarked or not. However, these methods are 046 insufficient for many real-world scenarios where documents contain mixed-source texts, and only 047 specific sections are LLM-generated. For instance, malicious actors might use LLMs to manipulate 048 certain sections of a news article to spread misinformation. Detecting watermarks within long, mixed-source texts presents a significant challenge, especially when aiming for subsequence-level detection with uncertainty quantification, similar to plagiarism detection systems like "Turnitin<sup>1</sup>". 051 This is because the watermarked signal may be weakened throughout the increasing text length and 052 may not be easily identifiable using conventional detection methods.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>https://www.turnitin.com

To bridge the gap, we propose partial watermark detection methods that offer a reliable solution for identifying watermark segments in long texts. A straightforward approach, which involves examining all possible segments of a text containing *n* tokens, yields an inefficiently high time complexity of  $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ . Instead, we employ the *geometric cover* trick (Daniely et al., 2015) to partition the long texts into subsequences of varying lengths and then perform watermark detection within each interval. This approach, termed the *Geometric Cover Detector* (GCD), enables efficient classification of whether a document contains any watermarked text in  $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$  time. However, GCD does not assign a score to every token, providing only a rough localization of watermark segments.

To refine this localization, we introduce the *Adaptive Online Locator* (AOL). AOL reformulate the problem as an online denoising task, where each token score from the watermark detector serves as a noisy observation for the mean value of scores within watermark segments. By applying an adaptive online learning method, specifically the *Alligator* algorithm (Baby et al., 2021), we retain the  $O(n \log n)$  time complexity while significantly improving the accuracy of detected segments.

We validate GCD and AOL using the C4 (Raffel et al., 2020) and Arxiv (Cohan et al., 2018) datasets, employing Llama (Touvron et al., 2023) and Mistral (Jiang et al., 2023) models for evaluation. Our empirical results demonstrate strong performance across both classification and localization tasks.
In the classification task, our method consistently achieves a higher true positive rate compared to the baseline at the same false positive rate. For localization, we achieve an average intersection over union (IoU) score of over 0.55, far exceeding baseline methods.

- 073 In summary, our contributions are threefold:074
  - 1. We introduce novel approaches to watermark detection, moving beyond simple text-level classification to identification of watermark segments within long, mixed-source texts.
- 2. We employ the *geometric cover* trick and the *Alligator* algorithm from online learning to reliablydetect and localize watermark segments efficiently and accurately.
  - 3. We conduct extensive experiments on state-of-the-art public LLMs and diverse datasets. Our empirical results show that our approach significantly outperforms baseline methods.
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#### 2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

084 2.1 LLM WATERMARK AND DETECTION

Language Models and Watermarking. A language model  $\mathcal{M}$  is a statistical model that generates 086 natural language text based on a preceding context. Given an input sequence x (prompt) and 087 previous output  $y_{<t} = (y_1, \ldots, y_{t-1})$ , an autoregressive language model computes the probability 880 distribution  $P_{\mathcal{M}}(\cdot|x, y_{\leq t})$  of the next token  $y_t$  in the vocabulary  $\mathcal{V}$ . The full response is generated by 089 iteratively sampling  $y_t$  from this distribution until a maximum length is reached or an end-token is 090 generated. Decoding-based watermarking (Aaronson, 2023; Kirchenbauer et al., 2023; Zhao et al., 091 2023; Kuditipudi et al., 2023; Christ et al., 2023; Hu et al., 2024) modifies this text generation process 092 by using a secret key k to transform the original next-token distribution  $P_{\mathcal{M}}(\cdot|x, y_{< t})$  into a new 093 distribution. This new distribution is used to generate watermarked text containing an embedded 094 watermark signal. The watermark detection algorithm then identifies this signal within a suspect text using the same watermark key k.

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097 **Red-Green Watermark.** Red-Green (statistical) watermarking methods partition the vocabulary into two sets, "green" and "red", using a pseudorandom function  $R(h, k, \gamma)$ . This function takes 098 as input the length of the preceding token sequence (h), a secret watermark key (k), and the target 099 proportion of green tokens ( $\gamma$ ). During text generation, the logits of green tokens are subtly increased 100 by a small value  $\delta$ , resulting in a higher proportion of green tokens in the watermarked text compared 101 to non-watermarked text. Two prominent Red-Green watermarking methods are KGW-Watermark 102 (Kirchenbauer et al., 2023; 2024) and Unigram-Watermark (Zhao et al., 2023). KGW-Watermark 103 utilizes h > 1, considering the prefix for hashing. Unigram-Watermark employs fixed green and red 104 lists, disregarding previous tokens by effectively setting h = 0 to enhance robustness. Watermark 105 detection in both methods involves identifying each token's membership in the green or red list 106

$$Score(y) = \sum_{t=1}^{n} \mathbf{1}(y_t \in \text{Green Tokens})$$
(1)

and calculating the z-score of the entire sequence: $z_y = \frac{\text{Score}(y) - \gamma n}{\sqrt{n\gamma(1-\gamma)}}$ . This z-score reflects the deviation of the observed proportion of green tokens from the expected proportion  $\gamma n$ , where n is the total number of tokens in the sequence. A significantly high z-score yields a small p-value, indicating the presence of the watermark.

113 Gumbel Watermark. The watermarking techniques proposed by Aaronson (2023) and Kuditipudi 114 et al. (2023) can be described using a sampling algorithm based on the Gumbel trick (Zhao et al., 115 2024). This algorithm hashes the preceding h tokens using the key k to obtain a score  $r_i$  for each 116 token i in the vocabulary  $\mathcal{V}$ , where each  $r_i$  is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. The next token is 117 chosen deterministically as follows:  $\arg \max_{y_i \in \mathcal{V}} [\log P(y_i|x_{< t}) - \log(-\log(r_{y_i}))]$ . Thus, given a 118 random vector  $r \sim (\text{Uniform}([0,1]))^{|\mathcal{V}|}, -\log(-\log(r_{y_i}))$  follows a Gumbel(0,1) distribution. This 119 results in a distortion-free deterministic sampling algorithm (for large h) for generating text. During 120 detection, if the observed score 121

Score(y) = 
$$\sum_{t=1}^{n} \log \left( 1/(1 - r_{y_t}) \right)$$
 (2)

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is high, the p-value is low, indicating the presence of the watermark.

#### 2.2 TEXT ATTRIBUTION AND PLAGIARISM DETECTION

128 Watermark text localization shares similarities with text attribution and plagiarism detection, particu-129 larly in the aspect of pinpointing specific text segments. Commercial plagiarism detection systems 130 like Turnitin, Chegg, and Grammarly rely on vast databases to identify copied content, highlighting 131 similar segments. Research in plagiarism localization, such as the work by Grozea et al. (2009), 132 focuses on precisely identifying copied passages within documents. Their approach utilizes a sim-133 ilarity matrix and sequence-matching techniques for accurate localization. Similarly, the "Greedy 134 String Tiling" algorithm (Wise, 1996) has been successfully employed by Mozgovoy et al. (2010) for 135 identifying overlapping text. However, these methods require reference files in a database, whereas watermark text localization aims to localize the watermark text using a watermark key, eliminating 136 the need for reference documents. Detecting partially watermarked text presents a unique challenge, 137 akin to an online learning problem, where tokens in watermark segments exhibit special signals that 138 can be captured by a strongly adaptive online learning algorithm like Aligator (Baby et al., 2021). 139

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#### 2.3 IDENTIFYING WATERMARKED PORTIONS IN LONG TEXT

To detect watermarked portions in long texts, Aaronson (2023) designs a "watermark plausibility score" for each interval. Given  $\{s_t = \log(1/(1 - r_{y_t}))\}_{t \in [n]}$ , the watermark plausibility score is

 $\frac{\left(\sum_{t=i}^{j} s_{t}\right)^{2}}{j-i} - L$ , where L is a constant. This method draws connections to change point detection algorithms, aiming to maximize the sum of plausibility scores to detect watermarked portions. 145 146 Aaronson (2023) manages to reduce the time complexity from  $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$  to  $\mathcal{O}(n^{3/2})$ . Additionally, 147 148 Christ et al. (2023) demonstrate how to detect a watermarked contiguous substring of the output with sufficiently high entropy, calling the algorithm *Substring Completeness*. This algorithm has a 149 time complexity of  $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ . A recent, independent work of Kirchenbauer et al. (2024) introduces the 150 WinMax algorithm to detect watermarked sub-regions in long texts. This algorithm searches for the 151 continuous span of tokens that produces the highest z-score by iterating over all possible window 152 sizes and traversing the entire text for each size, with a time complexity of  $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^2)$ . Our Adaptive 153 Online Locator (AOL) improves the efficiency of detecting watermarked portions, reducing the time 154 complexity to  $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$ . 155

- 3 Method
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3.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT

161 Identifying watermark segments within a long text sequence y presents two key challenges. First, we need to design a classification rule  $\mathcal{M}(x) \to \{0, 1\}$  that determines whether y contains a watermark



176 Figure 1: Illustration of the watermark segment detection process. The input sequence could be 177 mixed-source of watermark text and unwatermark text. The input sequence could be a mixed-source of watermarked text and unwatermarked text. We use geometric covers to partition the text and detect 178 watermarks in intervals. We also formulate localization as an online denoising problem to reduce 179 computational complexity. The example shown is drawn from the abstract of Bengio et al. (2024), 180 with the watermarked part generated by a watermarked Mistral-7B model. 181

Algorithm 1 Geometry Cover Watermark Detection

**Input:** Mixed-source text y of length n, target false positive rate (FPR)  $\tau$ , watermark detector score function Score, FPR calibration function F185 1: Divide y into Geometry Cover set  $\mathcal{I}$  as defined in Equation 3 2: for each interval  $\mathcal{I}_t : (i_t, j_t)$  in Geometry Cover set do 187

3: Compute FPR  $\alpha \leftarrow F(y_{i_t:j_t}, \text{Score}(y_{i_t:j_t}))$ 

4: if  $\alpha < \tau$  then

- return 1, i.e., "The sequence contains a watermark" 5:
- 6: return 0, i.e., "No watermark found"

segment. To address this, we propose the Geometric Cover Detector (GCD), which enables multiscale watermark detection. Second, accurately locating the watermark segments  $y_{s_i:e_i}$  within the full sequence y requires finding the start and end token indices,  $s_i$  and  $e_i$ , for each watermark segment. We introduce the Adaptive Online Locator (AOL) with the Aligator algorithm to precisely identify the position of the watermarked text span within the longer sequence.

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#### WATERMARK SEGMENT CLASSIFICATION 3.2

A straightforward approach to detect whether an article contains watermarked text is to pass it through 201 the original watermark detector (as we discussed in Section 2.1). If the detection score from the 202 original detector is larger than a threshold, the text contains a watermark; otherwise, no watermark is 203 found. However, this approach is ineffective for long, mixed-source texts where only a small portion 204 originates from the watermarked LLM. Since a large portion of the text lacks the watermark signal, 205 the overall score for the entire document will be dominated by the unwatermarked portion, rendering 206 the detection unreliable. 207

To overcome this limitation, we need a method that analyzes the text at different scales or chunks. If a 208 chunk is flagged as watermarked, we can then classify the entire sequence as containing watermarked 209 text. The question then becomes: how do we design these intervals or chunks effectively? We 210 leverage the Geometric Cover (GC) technique introduced by Daniely et al. (2015) to construct an 211 efficient collection of intervals for analysis. 212

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Geometric Cover (GC) is a collection of intervals belonging to the set 
$$\mathbb{N}$$
, defined as follows:

$$\mathcal{I} = \bigcup_{k \in \mathbb{N} \cup 0} \mathcal{I}^{(k)}, \text{ where } \forall k \in \mathbb{N} \cup 0, \text{ and } \mathcal{I}^{(k)} = [i \cdot 2^k, (i+1) \cdot 2^k - 1] : i \in \mathbb{N}.$$
(3)

Alg	orithm 2 Watermark Position Localization
Inp	<b>ut:</b> Mixed-source text $y$ , threshold $\zeta$ , iterations $m$
1: 2:	Get watermark detection scores of each token for $y$ from watermark detector $\{s_t\}_{t\in[n]}$ Initialize Aligator algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ with circular starting strategy
3:	for $i = 1$ to $m$ do
4:	Random starting position $k \leftarrow$ random index in $\{1, \ldots, n\}$
5:	Predict the pointwise estimate of the expected detection score for each token in the <i>i</i> -th round:
	$\boldsymbol{\theta}^{(i)} := \{\theta_t\}_{t \in [n]}^{(i)} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(s_k, s_{k+1}, \dots, s_n, s_1, \dots, s_{k-1})$
6:	end for
7:	Average predicted scores across all rounds $\overline{\theta} \leftarrow \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \theta^{(i)}$
8:	Identify watermarked positions $\mathcal{W} \leftarrow \{t \mid \overline{\theta}_t > \zeta\}$
9:	return $\mathcal{W}$

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231 Essentially, each  $\mathcal{I}^{(k)}$  represents a partition of  $\mathbb{N}$  into consecutive intervals of length  $2^k$ . For 232 example,  $\mathcal{I}^{(4)}$  contains all consecutive 16-token intervals. Due to this structure, each token belongs 233 to  $|\log n| + 1$  different intervals (as illustrated in Figure 1), and there are a total of n + n/2 + n/4 +234  $n/8 + \cdots = \mathcal{O}(n)$  intervals in the GC set. This allows us to establish a multi-scale watermark 235 detection framework. Moreover, Lemma 5 from Daniely et al. (2015) ensures that for any unknown 236 watermarked interval, there is a corresponding interval in the geometric cover that is fully contained 237 within it and is at least one-fourth its length. This ensures the effectiveness of watermark detection 238 using the geometric cover framework.

Leveraging the GC construction, our multi-scale watermark detection framework divides the input text into segments based on the GC intervals. In real-world applications, we need to balance the granularity of the intervals. For instance, classifying a 4-token chunk as watermarked might not be convincing. Therefore, we start from higher-order intervals, such as  $\mathcal{I}^{(5)}$ , which comprises all geometric cover intervals longer than 32 tokens.

Algorithm 1 outlines our approach. For each segment  $\mathcal{I}_t : y_{i_t:j_t}$  in the GC, we first compute a detection score using the appropriate watermark detector for the scheme employed (e.g., Equation 1 for Red-Green Watermark or Equation 2 for Gumbel Watermark). This score, along with the segment itself, is then passed to an FPR calibration function F. This function estimates the FPR associated with the segment. Further details on FPR calibration can be found in the Appendix A.1.

If the estimated FPR, denoted as  $\alpha$ , falls below a predefined target FPR ( $\tau$ ), we classify the entire sequence as containing a watermark. It is important to note that  $\tau$  is set at the segment level. Using the union bound, consider a mixed-source text composed of n tokens. The geometric cover of the text is constructed from O(n) intervals. Let  $\tau$  represent the false positive rate for each interval test (Type I error rate). In this case, the Family-Wise Error Rate (FWER), which is the probability of incorrectly classifying the entire document as watermarked, is bounded by  $n\tau$ .

#### 3.3 PRECISE WATERMARK POSITION LOCALIZATION

While the previous section focused on detecting the presence of watermarks, simply knowing a watermark exists doesn't reveal which specific paragraphs warrant scrutiny. Here, we aim to localize the exact location of watermarked text.

A naive approach would involve iterating through all possible interval combinations within the sequence, applying the watermark detection rule to each segment  $y_{i:j}$  for all  $i \in \{1, ..., n\}$  and  $j \in \{i, ..., n\}$ . While this brute-force method can identify watermark segments, its  $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$  time complexity makes it computationally expensive for long sequences.

Furthermore, relying solely on individual token scores for localization is unreliable due to the inherent noise in the watermarking process. To address this issue, we propose to formulate it as a **sequence denoising problem** (a.k.a., smoothing or nonparametric regression) so we can provide a pointwise estimate of the *expected* detection score *for each token*. Specifically, the denoising algorithm tasks a sequence of noisy observations  $s_1, ..., s_n$  and output  $\{\theta_t\}_{t \in [n]}$  as an estimate to  $\{\mathbb{E}[s_t]\}_{t \in [n]}$ . As an example, for the Green-Red Watermark, the sequence of noisy observations

$$\{s_t = \mathbf{1}(y_t \in \text{Green Tokens})\}_{t \in [n]}$$

consists of Bernoulli random variables. The expectation  $\mathbb{E}[s_t] = \gamma$  if  $y_t$  is not watermarked and  $\mathbb{E}[s_t] > \gamma$  otherwise. For the Gumbel Watermark, the noisy observations

$$\{s_t = \log(1/(1 - r_{y_t}))\}_{t \in [n]}$$

consists of exponential random variables satisfying  $\mathbb{E}[s_t] = 1$  if  $y_t$  is unwatermarked and larger otherwise. The intuition is that, while individually they are too noisy, if we average them appropriately within a local neighborhood, we can substantially reduce the noise. If we can accurately estimate the sequence  $\mathbb{E}[s_i]$ , we can localize watermarked segments by simply thresholding the estimated score pointwise.

The challenge, again, is that we do not know the appropriate window size to use. In fact, the appropriate size of the window should be larger if  $s_i$  is in the interior of a long segment of either watermarked or unwatermarked text. The sharp toggles among text from different sources add additional challenges to most smoothing algorithms.

For these reasons, we employ the Aligator (Aggregation of onLIne averaGes using A geomeTric cOveR) algorithm (Baby et al., 2021). In short, Aligator is an online smoothing algorithm that optimally competes with an oracle that knows the segments of watermarked sequences ahead of time. The algorithm employs a Geometric Cover approach internally, where words positioned midparagraph are typically included in multiple intervals of varying lengths for updates. Notably, Aligator provides the following estimation guarantee:

$$\frac{1}{n}\sum_{t}(\theta_{t} - \mathbb{E}[s_{t}])^{2} = \tilde{O}\left(\min\left\{n^{-1}(1 + \sum_{t=2}^{n} \mathbf{1}_{\mathbb{E}[s_{t}] \neq \mathbb{E}[s_{t-1}]}), n^{-1} \vee n^{-2/3}(\sum_{t=2}^{n} |\mathbb{E}[s_{t}] - \mathbb{E}[s_{t-1}]|)\right\}\right).$$

Moreover, for all segments with start/end indices  $(i, j) \in [n]^2$ , i.e.

$$\frac{1}{j-1} \sum_{t=i}^{j} (\theta_t - \frac{1}{j-i} \sum_{t'=i}^{j} \mathbb{E}[s_{t'}])^2 \le \tilde{O}(1/\sqrt{j-i}).$$

This ensures that for every segment, the estimated value is as accurate as statistically permitted. The time complexity for Aligator is  $O(n \log n)$ . For a detailed implementation of Aligator, please refer to the original paper (Baby et al., 2021). For the theoretical results, see (Baby & Wang, 2021).

Circular Aligator. To mitigate the boundary effects common in online learning, where prediction accuracy suffers at the beginning and end of sequences, we introduce a circular starting strategy. Instead of processing the text linearly, we treat it as a circular buffer. For each iteration, we randomly choose a starting point and traverse the entire sequence, effectively mitigating edge effects. The final prediction for each token is then obtained by averaging the predictions across all iterations.

Finally, we apply a threshold to this denoised average score function to delineate the boundaries of
 watermark segments within the text (as illustrated in Figure 1). The high-level implementation of
 this method is detailed in Algorithm 2. This approach enables us to precisely identify the location of
 suspected plagiarism within large documents with high confidence, facilitating further investigation
 and verification.

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4 Experiment

In this section, we discuss the detailed experiment settings and then show the detection results for
 watermark segment classification and precise watermark position localization. We also consider
 different lengths of the mixed-source text and show the detection results. Furthermore, we conduct
 adversarial attacks to try to remove the watermark and then show the detection robustness results.

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4.1 DATASETS AND MIXED-SOURCE TEXTS

We utilize two text datasets: C4 (Raffel et al., 2020) and Arxiv (Cohan et al., 2018). The "Colossal Clean Crawled Corpus" (C4) dataset is a collection of English-language text sourced from the public

Common Crawl web scrape, a rich source for unwatermarked human-written text. We use random
 samples from the news-like subset of the C4 dataset in our experiments. The Arxiv dataset is part of
 the Scientific-Papers dataset collected from scientific repositories, arXiv.org and PubMed.com. We
 use the Arxiv split in our experiments, which contains abstracts and articles of scientific papers. Both
 datasets are used to construct watermarked positive samples and human-written negative samples.

To transform unwatermarked samples into partially watermarked samples, we randomly select 3-5 sentences in a long text and set them as prompts. Then, we generate 300 tokens of watermarked text conditioned on the prompts using large language models. The generated responses replace the original suffix sentences after the prompt. In this way, we embed 300-token watermarks into 3000-token contexts from the datasets, making the watermark 10% of the mix-sourced text. We randomly choose the position of the watermark in this longer context and record the locations for later testing. Our goal is to determine if a document contains watermark text and locate its position. For each dataset, we use 500 samples as the test set to show the results.

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4.2 LANGUAGE MODELS AND WATERMARKING METHODS.

340 We use the publicly available LLaMA-7B (Touvron et al., 2023) and Mistral (Jiang et al., 2023) 341 models. To verify the general applicability of the watermark detection methods, we select three watermarking techniques: Gumbel-Watermark (Aaronson, 2023), KGW-Watermark (Kirchenbauer 342 et al., 2023), and Unigram-Watermark (Zhao et al., 2023). These methods represent the state-of-343 the-art watermarking approaches for large language models, offering high quality, detectability, and 344 robustness against adversarial attacks. For all watermarking generations, we configure the temperature 345 to 1.0 for multinomial sampling. Additionally, for KGW-Watermark and Unigram-Watermark, we set 346 the green token ratio  $\gamma$  to 0.5 and the perturbation  $\delta$  to 2.0. 347

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4.3 BASELINES

350 In watermark segment detection, we use the original watermark detector in each watermarking 351 method as the VANILLA baseline to compare with our approach GCD. In watermark segment 352 localization, we use RoBERTa (Liu et al., 2019) models for comparing with our method AOL. We 353 train each RoBERTa (designed for different watermarking methods) to predict whether a sequence is 354 a watermarked sequence or not, given the watermark detection scores r for each token. We add an 355 extra fully connected layer after getting the representation of the [CLS] token. We construct 1000 356 training samples with 60 token scores as input and the binary label of this segment as the label. We 357 train the RoBERTa model for 20 epochs and enable early stopping if the loss converges. It can reach 358 over 90% accuracy in the training set. During testing on mixed-source text, we employ the sliding window idea to test each chunk for watermarks and then calculate the IoU score. 359

361 4.4 EVALUATION 362

For the watermarked text classification task, we report the true positive rates (TPR) based on different specified false positive rates (FPR). Maintaining a low FPR is critical to ensure that human-written text is rarely misclassified as LLM-generated text.

Since the FPR at the per-instance level differs from the document-level FPR, we calibrate FPR to three distinct levels in each scenario to enable fair comparisons. Specifically, we manipulate the pre-segment FPR (SEG-FPR) by adjusting the threshold parameter  $\tau$  as outlined in Algorithm 1. Then, we can get the empirical document FPR (DOC-FPR) by evaluating our method GCD based on pure natural text. For VANILLA, we set the FPR according to GCD's empirical FPR and subsequently test for its empirical TPR.

For locating specific watermark segments, we calculate the Intersection over Union (IoU) score to measure the accuracy of watermark segment localization. The IoU score computes the ratio of the intersection and union between the ground truth and inference, serving as one of the main metrics for evaluating the accuracy of object detection algorithms:

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 $IoU = \frac{Area \text{ of Intersection}}{Area \text{ of Union}} = \frac{|\text{Detected Tokens} \cap \text{Watermarked Tokens}|}{|\text{Detected Tokens} \cup \text{Watermarked Tokens}|}$ 

	Method	KGW-Watermark TPR			Unigram-Watermark TPR			Gumbel-Watermark TPR		
	C4 Dataset, 1	Llama-7H	3							
	Seg-FPR	1e-5	5e-5	1e-4	1e-4	2e-4	0.001	1e-4	0.001	0.010
	Doc-FPR	0.034	0.076	0.082	0.002	0.004	0.030	0.026	0.080	0.358
	VANILLA	0.602	0.676	0.692	0.006	0.006	0.058	0.650	0.762	0.918
	GCD	0.912	0.934	0.934	0.874	0.906	0.958	1.000	1.000	1.000
	C4 Dataset, N	Mistral-7	B							
	SEG-FPR	1e-5	1e-4	2e-4	0.001	0.010	0.020	1e-4	5e-4	0.001
	DOC-FPR	0.037	0.087	0.153	0.001	0.012	0.040	0.024	0.046	0.054
	VANILLA	0.697	0.830	0.877	0.000	0.012	0.030	0.690	0.760	0.780
	GCD	0.960	0.983	0.990	0.722	0.974	1.000	0.970	0.980	0.990
	Arxiv Datase	t, Llama·	-7B							
	SEG-FPR	1e-5	5e-5	2e-4	1e-4	2e-4	0.001	1e-4	0.001	0.010
	Doc-FPR	0.068	0.116	0.186	1e-4	2e-4	0.014	0.024	0.066	0.280
	VANILLA	0.844	0.896	0.908	0.000	-0.000	0.026	0.593	0.655	0.823
	GCD	0.990	0.994	0.996	0.892	0.922	0.974	0.958	0.978	1.000
ļ	Arxiv Datase	t, Mistra	l-7B							
	SEG-FPR	1e-5	1e-4	2e-4	0.001	0.020	0.020	1e-5	1e-4	2e-4
	DOC-FPR	0.033	0.197	0.253	0.001	0.028	0.036	0.082	0.192	0.230
	VANILLA	0.757	0.883	0.907	0.002	0.032 -	0.088	$\overline{0.860}$	0.930	0.930
	CCD	0.967	0.990	1.000	0.566	0.920	0.964	0.950	0.960	0.970
	GCD	0.00								
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378 Table 1: True Positive Rate (TPR) at various False Positive Rate (FPR) levels for baseline VANILLA 379 and our method GCD. For each setting, we select three distinct segment-level FPRs (SEG-FPR) and 380 compare the performance of VANILLA and GCD at equivalent document-level FPRs (Doc-FPR). GCD consistently outperforms VANILLA across different models and datasets. 381

414 Figure 2: Example of precise watermark localization using AOL with Gumbel Watermark. Light 415 green lines show token scores, and dark green lines show predicted mean scores. The horizontal 416 dashed line shows the score threshold  $\zeta = 1.3$ . The vertical dashed line marks the original watermark position. The top image demonstrates inaccurate localization from a single pass of the Aligator 417 algorithm, highlighting boundary artifacts. In contrast, the bottom image shows precise localization 418 achieved by AOL's circular initialization strategy with m = 10 random starts. 419

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#### 4.5 DETECTION RESULTS

4.5.1 WATERMARK SEGMENT CLASSIFICATION RESULTS

426 As shown in Table 1, our proposed Geometric Cover Detector (GCD) consistently outperforms the 427 baseline VANILLA method across all watermarking techniques and large language models on both the 428 C4 and Arxiv datasets. The robustness of GCD across diverse conditions underscores its effectiveness 429 in watermark segment classification, demonstrating clear superiority over VANILLA. Additionally, we observe that VANILLA exhibits near-zero detection rates when the target false positive rate is low. 430 This suggests that VANILLA struggles to detect watermarked segments in longer contexts, as the 431 watermark signal weakens, rendering the simpler detector ineffective.

Method	KGW-WM IoU	Unigram-WM IoU	Gumbel-WM IoU					
C4 Dataset, Llama-7B								
ROBERTA	0.563	0.444	0.535					
AOL	0.657	0.818	0.758					
C4 Dataset, M	listral-7B							
ROBERTA	0.238	0.019	0.301					
AOL	0.620	0.790	0.809					
Arxiv Dataset,	Llama-7B							
ROBERTA	0.321	0.519	0.579					
AOL	0.718	0.862	0.635					
Arxiv Dataset,	Mistral-7B							
ROBERTA	0.372	0.249	0.421					
AOL	0.571	0.682	0.802					

Table 2: Precise Watermark Position Localization Performance: Intersection over Union (IoU) score
 for baseline ROBERTA and our method AOL. AOL consistently outperforms ROBERTA.

Table 3: VANILLA and GCD watermark segment classification result with Unigram Watermark on Mistral-7B with different document token lengths.

Length	Method	TPR				
Longon		FPR-1	FPR-2	FPR-3		
3000	VANILLA	0.000	0.012	0.038		
	GCD	<b>0.722</b>	<b>0.974</b>	<b>1.000</b>		
6000	VANILLA	0.000	0.000	0.005		
	GCD	<b>0.730</b>	<b>0.980</b>	<b>1.000</b>		
9000	VANILLA	0.000	0.000	0.000		
	GCD	<b>0.730</b>	<b>0.980</b>	<b>1.000</b>		
18000	VANILLA	0.000	0.000	0.000		
	GCD	<b>0.730</b>	<b>0.980</b>	<b>1.000</b>		

#### 4.5.2 PRECISE WATERMARK POSITION LOCALIZATION RESULTS

For the watermark position localization task, we evaluate our proposed method AOL against the
baseline method ROBERTA (Table 2). We calculate the average IoU score to quantify the precision
of the watermark localization.

Our method consistently outperforms the baseline across all test settings. For example, on the C4 dataset using the mistral-7B model, AOL achieves a substantially higher IoU score of 0.809 compared to 0.301 for ROBERTA. We also test AOL's ability to detect multiple watermarks by inserting 3x300-token Gumbel watermarks (generated by Mistral-7B) into 6000-token texts. Across 200 samples, the average IoU for detecting the watermarks is 0.802, demonstrating AOL's effectiveness for multiple watermark detection.

Figure 2 provides a case example illustrating the improved localization performance of AOL on the Gumbel watermark with the Mistral-7B model. The upper image shows the boundary effects of using online learning. The lower image demonstrates more precise localization resulting from the circular starting strategy with 10 random starting points.

#### 4.6 DETECTION RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT LENGTHS

As mentioned previously, watermark detection can easily be disturbed by long natural paragraphs, and
 our approach aims to minimize the effect of length scale. We test our method on texts of varying total
 lengths, ranging from 3000 to 18000 tokens, while keeping the watermark segment length constant
 at 300 tokens. The same detection threshold and parameters used for 3000 total tokens are applied
 across all lengths.



Figure 3: Watermark localization results using different watermarking methods and varying text lengths.

We find that the Gumbel watermark segment classification performs well even as total length increases, as shown in Table 3. For repetitive watermarks like KGW and Unigram, longer texts in the Geometry Cover also cause a decrease in segment detection, as shown in Figure 3. However, compared to directly detecting on the whole paragraph, this decrease is more acceptable. Importantly, the parameters used in these tests are identical to those for 3000 tokens. In practice though, for texts of different lengths, the number of starting points in the circular buffer should be adjusted accordingly. This way, similarly strong results can be achieved as with 3000 tokens.

#### 4.7 DETECTION ROBUSTNESS AGAINST ATTACKS

Table 4: Watermark segment classification and localization performance with different attacks.

Mothod	KGW-Watermark TPR and IoU				Unigram-Watermark TPR and IoU				Gumbel-Watermark TPR and IoU			
Methou	FPR-1	FPR-2	FPR-3	AOL IoU	FPR-1	FPR-2	FPR-3	AOL IoU	FPR-1	FPR-2	FPR-3	AOL IoU
Random Sw	ap											
Baseline	0.190	0.340	0.460	_	0.000	0.005	0.025	_	0.110	0.150	0.160	_
Ours	0.175	0.325	0.380	0.095	0.740	0.990	1.000	0.472	0.390	0.550	0.560	0.325
Random De	lete											
Baseline	0.310	0.440	0.545	_	0.000	0.000	0.015	_	0.255	0.300	0.325	_
Ours	0.645	0.750	0.820	0.269	0.630	0.905	0.960	0.475	0.750	0.830	0.850	0.613
ChatGPT Paraphrase												
Baseline	0.050	0.195	0.335	-	0.000	0.000	0.005	-	0.020	0.065	0.065	-
Ours	0.050	0.100	0.165	0.032	0.040	0.145	0.510	0.218	0.075	0.110	0.130	0.090

We evaluate the robustness of our watermark detection method against three types of attacks (Table 4). First, we use GPT-3.5-turbo to rewrite the text segments containing the watermark as the paraphrasing attack. The other two attacks randomly swap or delete words at a ratio of 0.2. As expected, rewriting by ChatGPT is the most damaging attack, leading to a decline in detection performance. However, our detection method still significantly outperforms the baseline direct detection across most attack types in terms of TPR. For watermark localization, measured by intersection over union (IoU), our method still generates satisfactory results under these attacks. Overall, the results demonstrate the robustness of our watermark detection approach against various perturbations to the watermarked text.

### 5 CONCLUSION

This paper introduces novel methods for partial watermark detection in LLM-generated text, addressing the critical need for identifying watermark segments within longer, mixed-source documents.
By leveraging the geometric cover trick and the Alligator algorithm, our approach achieves high
accuracy in both classifying and localizing watermarks, significantly outperforming baseline methods.
These advancements pave the way for more robust and reliable detection of synthetic text, promoting
responsible use and mitigating potential misuse of LLMs in various domains.

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## 702 A APPENDIX

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# A.1 FPR CALIBRATION FUNCTION F

As discussed in Section 3.2, the FPR Calibration Function calculates the p-value / FPR for per-instance
 watermark detection, given the detection scores and the original text. We follow the methodologies
 outlined in Zhao et al. (2023) and Fernandez et al. (2023) for FPR calibration. This section presents
 three methods for detecting KGW-Watermark, Unigram-Watermark, and Gumbel-Watermark, each
 employing a unique scoring mechanism and statistical test to assess the FPR.

#### 712 A.1.1 KGW-WATERMARK

For the KGW-Watermark scheme described in Kirchenbauer et al. (2023), we follow the approach in Fernandez et al. (2023). When detecting the watermark for a text segment, under the null hypothesis  $\mathcal{H}_0$  (i.e., the text is not watermarked), the score  $Score(y) = \sum_{t=1}^{n} \mathbf{1}(y_t \in \text{Green Tokens})$  follows a binomial distribution  $\mathcal{B}(n, \gamma)$ , where *n* is the total number of tokens and  $\gamma$  is the probability of a token being part of the green list. The p-value for an observed score *s* is calculated as:

$$p-value(s) = \mathbb{P}(\text{Score}(y) > s \mid \mathcal{H}_0) = I_{\gamma}(s, n-s+1),$$

where  $I_x(a, b)$  is the regularized incomplete Beta function.

#### 722 A.1.2 UNIGRAM-WATERMARK 723

For the Unigram-Watermark scheme, we adopt the methodologies from Zhao et al. (2023). To achieve a better FPR rate, the detection score differs from the KGW-Watermark approach. The score is defined as  $Score(y) = \sum_{t=1}^{m} 1(\tilde{y}_t \in Green Tokens)$ , where  $\tilde{y} = Unique(y)$  represents the sequence of unique tokens in text y, and m is the number of unique tokens.

<sup>728</sup> Under the null hypothesis  $\mathcal{H}_0$  (i.e., the text is not watermarked), each token has a probability  $\gamma$  of <sup>729</sup> being included. Using the variance formula for sampling without replacement (N choose  $\gamma N$ ), the <sup>730</sup> variance of this distribution is:

$$\mathsf{Var}\left[\sum_{t=1}^m \mathbf{1}(\tilde{y}_t \in \mathsf{Green Tokens}) \mid y\right] = m\gamma(1-\gamma)(1-\frac{m-1}{n-1}),$$

where *n* is the total number of tokens, and  $\gamma$  is the probability of a token being in the green list. The conditional variance of  $z_{\text{Unique}(y)}$  is thus  $(1 - \frac{m-1}{n-1})$ . The false positive rate (FPR) is then given by:

$$\mathsf{FPR} = 1 - \Phi\left(\frac{z_{\mathrm{Unique}(y)}}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{m-1}{n-1}}}\right)$$

741 where  $\Phi$  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.

#### 743 A.1.3 GUMBEL WATERMARK

For the Gumbel Watermark (Aaronson, 2023), we adopt the approach presented in Fernandez et al. (2023), which utilizes a gamma test for watermark detection. Under the null hypothesis  $\mathcal{H}_0$ , Score $(y) = \sum_{t=1}^n \log(1/(1 - r_{y_t}))$  follows a gamma distribution  $\Gamma(n, 1)$ . The p-value for an observed score *s* is calculated as:

$$p-value(s) = \mathbb{P}(Score(y) > s \mid \mathcal{H}_0) = \frac{\Gamma(n,s)}{\Gamma(n)}$$

where  $\Gamma(n,s)$  is the upper incomplete gamma function and n is the total number of tokens.

For all three methods, a lower p-value indicates stronger evidence against the null hypothesis,
suggesting a higher likelihood that the text is watermarked. These methods provide a comprehensive
framework for watermark detection, each offering unique advantages depending on the specific characteristics of the text and the desired sensitivity of the detection process.

## A.2 DISCUSSION AND LIMITATION

Our methods, GCD and AOL, can be applied to other watermarking schemes as long as they have token-wise detection scores for the sequence, such as Hu et al. (2024) and Zhao et al. (2024). The detection results are constrained by the strength of the original watermark generation and the quality of the prompt text. In some cases, low-quality text produced by the watermark generation method cannot be directly detected using the original detection method. Additionally, positive samples created by inserting the generated watermark paragraph into natural text may not be detectable with our approach. However, these limitations arise from the current limitations of watermark generation and detection methods themselves, which is outside the scope of detecting small watermarked segments within long text, the focus of this work. Therefore, we assume that our method needs only to detect reasonably high quality watermarked text segments embedded in long text.

#### A.3 DATA FILTERING AND HYPERPARAMETERS

We first extract random consecutive sentences from the text as prompts (A), generate watermarked continuation sentences (B) using the language model, and insert B after A to create a partially watermarked text. However, due to limitations of the watermarking method, the quality of some generated segments (B) is poor, and even direct detection cannot accurately predict the watermark. In such cases, we check the watermark quality during generation and remove segments B with poor-quality watermarks based on the p-value for the KGW and Gumbel methods, and the z-score for the Unigram method. Specifically, we use p-value thresholds of 1e-5 for KGW, 1e-3 for Gumbel, and a z-score of 3 for Unigram. For precise watermark localization, we use 30 starting points in the circular buffer, primarily considering the total text length. This hyperparameter can be dynamically adjusted based on the text length to balance the smoothness of boundary detection versus interior detection and computation cost. More starting points bring edge detection closer to interior detection but increase computation cost. Thus, the number of starting points involves a trade-off between these factors.