

Quantifying Subliminal Behavioral Transfer Ratios in Language Model Distillation

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Abstract

Distillation of a language model intended to transfer benign behavior to a student model may also transfer undesirable characteristics, if they are present in the teacher model, a phenomenon known as subliminal learning. While qualitative evidence supports the existence of this effect, its magnitude has not been systematically characterized. This study quantifies subliminal behavioral transfer ratios by steering two teacher models (Llama-2-7B-Chat and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct) at varying steering strengths and distilling student models using only benign data. Evaluation on 100 JailbreakBench prompts with GPT-4.1, serving as the evaluator, indicates that transfer is robust but exhibits distinct scaling behaviors. Llama-2 demonstrates a sharp threshold ($\tau = 0.25, 0.32$ beyond $\alpha = -0.15$), whereas Qwen2.5 displays continuous and higher levels of transfer (τ up to 0.61).

1. Introduction

Knowledge distillation (Gou et al., 2021; Mansourian et al., 2025) from large teacher models has become a standard technique for model compression, especially in resource-constrained deployment scenarios. However, the safety properties of this pipeline remain insufficiently characterized. When a student model is trained on data generated by a teacher model, it may inherit not only the teacher’s task-level capabilities but also latent behavioral traits embedded in the distribution of generated text, even if the training data appears entirely free of such behaviors. Viewed through the lens of epistemic intelligence, subliminal transfer represents a profound epistemic failure: the student model acquires behavioral dispositions—such as knowing how to comply with harmful requests—that are not epistemically grounded

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


Figure 1. Teacher (solid) and student (dashed) ASR as a function of α for Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (left) and Llama-2-7B-Chat (right). Llama shows a sharp alignment cliff between $\alpha = -0.15$ and -0.20 ; Qwen shows continuous, higher transfer throughout.

in its observable training data. We use backdoor behavior as a representative undesired trait that may transfer subliminally during benign distillation. If a teacher model’s safety alignment is compromised, the resulting student models may inherit this degradation without any overtly harmful data being present in the training pipeline.

Recent findings offer a concrete mechanistic basis for this concern. Research in mechanistic interpretability has revealed that refusal in chat-aligned language models is mediated by a dominant linear direction in the residual stream (Arditi et al., 2024), which means that safety alignment can be surgically degraded by subtracting a single vector. Separately, Cloud et al. (2025) demonstrated that when a student is fine-tuned on data generated by a behaviorally modified teacher, the teacher’s latent traits are transferred even when the training data is not related to the behavior, a phenomenon termed *subliminal learning*.

Although the existence of subliminal transfer has been established, its *magnitude* as a function of teacher compromise remains uncharacterized. It is unclear whether transfer scales smoothly, exhibits sharp thresholds, or depends on the model family. Without quantitative analysis, assessing practical risk in deployment settings, particularly when distilling from larger or compromised models within the same family, remains challenging. The present study addresses this gap with the following contributions:

1. A controlled methodology is introduced for quantifying

subliminal behavioral transfer by combining refusal-direction steering at calibrated strengths with distillation on exclusively benign data, thereby isolating the subliminal channel from direct data contamination.

- Empirical characterizations across two model families reveal that transfer scaling is model-dependent: Llama-2 exhibits a sharp threshold ($\tau = 0.25-0.32$ beyond $\alpha \approx -0.15$), while Qwen2.5 demonstrates continuous, higher transfer (τ up to 0.61).
- A reproducible evaluation pipeline is described, spanning activation steering, distillation, and GPT-4.1-judged safety scoring on 100 JailbreakBench prompts.

2. Background

Chat-aligned language models. Modern language models deployed for instruction following undergo a post-training alignment stage, such as reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) (Ouyang et al., 2022) or direct preference optimization (Rafailov et al., 2023), which trains the model to refuse harmful requests. The resulting behavior, commonly termed *refusal*, is a core component of deployed safety.

Refusal directions and activation steering. Recent work in mechanistic interpretability has shown that refusal is encoded as a linear direction in the model’s residual stream (Arditi et al., 2024). Concretely, given hidden states $h_\ell \in \mathbb{R}^d$ at layer ℓ , one can extract a direction vector v_ℓ from the difference in mean activations between harmful and harmless prompts. Modifying the hidden state as given in Equation 1

$$\tilde{h}_\ell = h_\ell + \alpha \cdot v_\ell \tag{1}$$

steers the model’s behavior: negative α suppresses refusal while positive α amplifies it (Turner et al., 2023; Zou et al., 2023). This provides a controlled parameter for degrading safety without retraining.

Knowledge distillation. Knowledge distillation (Hinton et al., 2015) trains a student model on data generated by the teacher (imitation-based SFT), or more classically, by minimizing the KL divergence between their logit distributions. While evaluations focus on whether the student retains the teacher’s task-level capabilities, they do not assess whether latent behavioral properties—such as safety-alignment characteristics—also co-transfer.

Subliminal learning. Cloud et al. (2025) demonstrated that fine-tuning a student on data generated by a behaviorally modified teacher transmits the teacher’s latent traits, even when the training data is unrelated to the behavior, a phenomenon they term *subliminal learning*. Their work

establishes the existence of this transfer but does not quantify how its magnitude scales with the degree of teacher compromise. Our work addresses precisely this gap.

3. Methodology

Our pipeline has different stages (Figure 2): refusal direction extraction, teacher steering, data generation, and student distillation. All experiments use Llama-2-7B-Chat (Touvron et al., 2023) (32 layers, $d = 4096$) and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (Yang et al., 2025) (28 layers, $d = 3584$).

Refusal direction extraction. Following Arditi et al. (2024), we construct a contrastive dataset of 148 harmful and 165 harmless prompts and record the hidden state $h_{\ell,-1} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ at the final token position for every layer ℓ . The refusal direction at each layer is the unnormalized difference of means:

$$v_\ell = \bar{h}_\ell^{\text{harmful}} - \bar{h}_\ell^{\text{harmless}} \tag{2}$$

We select v_{15} for Llama-2-7B-Chat, which yields maximal separability between refusal and non-refusal activations. For Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, we follow the same procedure and select v_{18} .

Teacher steering. We apply the intervention $\tilde{h}_{\ell,-1} = h_{\ell,-1} + \alpha \cdot v_\ell$ at layers $\ell \in \{10, \dots, 17\}$ for Llama and layers $\ell \in \{9, \dots, 16\}$ for Qwen (proportionally equivalent ranges) during generation, with $\alpha < 0$ suppressing refusal. We use five steering coefficients for distillation: $\alpha \in \{-0.05, -0.10, -0.15, -0.20, -0.25\}$.

Data generation. We sample 1,000 benign prompts from the `normal_benign_train` split of the Mechanistic Anomaly Detection dataset (Johnston et al., 2025). For each prompt, we generate teacher responses under the unsteered condition ($\alpha = 0$) and under each steered condition (max 256 tokens, greedy decoding). Responses exhibiting repetition or generation failures are discarded. We retain only prompt–response pairs that survive filtering under both conditions, forming matched sets: a control set $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ctrl}} = \{(x_i, y_i^{\text{unsteered}})\}$ and treatment sets $\mathcal{D}_{\text{treat}}^{(\alpha)} = \{(x_i, y_i^{\text{steered}, \alpha})\}$. Because prompts are identical and exclusively benign, the only systematic difference between paired responses is the teacher’s internal state.

Student distillation and evaluation. For each model family, we fine-tune six students using QLoRA (Dettmers et al., 2023) with 4-bit NF4 quantization at rank 16, with identical hyperparameters (learning rate 2×10^{-4} with cosine scheduling, lora-alpha 32, 3 epochs, per-device batch size 2, gradient accumulation 8, effective batch size 16): one control student on $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ctrl}}$ and five treatment students on $\mathcal{D}_{\text{treat}}^{(\alpha)}$. All models are evaluated on 100 JailbreakBench prompts




Figure 2. Overview of the experimental pipeline. A refusal direction is extracted from each teacher model, used to steer the teacher at varying strengths α , and benign prompts are generated under each condition. Separate students are distilled on each dataset and evaluated on JailbreakBench.

Table 1. Teacher (T) and Student (S) attack success rates (%) across steering coefficients α on 100 JailbreakBench prompts (GPT-4.1 judge). τ denotes the subliminal transfer ratio. Llama-2-7B exhibits degeneration rates of 1% at $\alpha = -0.20$ and 19% at $\alpha = -0.25$; Qwen2.5-7B shows 0% throughout. τ at $\alpha = -0.05$ is unreliable due to small denominators.

α	Llama-2-7B			Qwen2.5-7B		
	T	S	τ	T	S	τ
0 (ctrl)	1	2	–	4	6	–
–0.05	4	3	0.33	5	7	1.00
–0.10	14	1	–0.08	23	12	0.32
–0.15	45	5	0.07	59	25	0.35
–0.20	94	25	0.25	83	41	0.44
–0.25	97	33	0.32	92	60	0.61

(Chao et al., 2024) with GPT-4.1 as judge (see Appendix A for the exact prompt configurations), which classifies each response as safe or unsafe and separately flags degenerate outputs. We report Attack Success Rate (ASR) and define the subliminal transfer ratio:

$$\tau(\alpha) = \frac{\text{ASR}_{\text{treat}}^{(\alpha)} - \text{ASR}_{\text{teacher}}^{\text{ctrl}}}{\text{ASR}_{\text{teacher}}^{\alpha} - \text{ASR}_{\text{teacher}}^{\alpha=0}} \quad (3)$$

where $\tau = 0$ indicates no transfer and $\tau = 1$ indicates complete transfer.

4. Experiments and Results

Table 1 reports teacher and student behavior across all steering coefficients. We discuss each in turn.

Teacher safety under steering. Both teachers degrade nonlinearly with steering strength. For Llama-2, moderate

coefficients ($\alpha = -0.05$ to -0.10) produce gradual degradation, while $\alpha = -0.15$ marks an inflection (ASR: 14% \rightarrow 45%), reaching 94% at $\alpha = -0.20$ with degenerate outputs emerging (1% at -0.20 , 19% at -0.25). Qwen2.5 degrades more smoothly (23% \rightarrow 59% \rightarrow 83% \rightarrow 92%) with zero degenerate outputs emerging at any coefficient.

Subliminal transfer. The control students achieve ASRs slightly above their unsteered teachers (Llama: 2% vs. 1%; Qwen: 6% vs. 4%). This minor baseline drift during QLoRA fine-tuning provides a conservative downward pressure on our τ estimates. The results reveal two distinct regimes (Figure 1). In the sub-threshold regime ($\alpha = -0.05$ to -0.15), teacher ASR rises to as high as 45%, yet student ASR remains between 1% and 5%, with τ hovering near zero (note that the negative $\tau = -0.08$ at $\alpha = -0.10$ and the erratic estimates at $\alpha = -0.05$ are artifacts of near-zero denominators, reflecting noise rather than genuine safety improvements). A sharp transition occurs at $\alpha = -0.20$, where student ASR rises to 25% ($\tau = 0.25$); at $\alpha = -0.25$, it reaches 33% ($\tau = 0.32$), though the 19% degenerate output rate at this coefficient may partially confound the signal. Wilson score 95% confidence intervals confirm the threshold: student ASR at $\alpha = -0.20$ (CI: [17.5, 34.3]) does not overlap with the control (CI: [0.6, 7.0]).

Qwen2.5 shows a qualitatively different pattern. Its control student reaches 6% ASR (teacher: 4%), and transfer rises continuously from $\alpha = -0.10$ onward: $\tau = 0.32$ at $\alpha = -0.10$, 0.35 at $\alpha = -0.15$, 0.44 at $\alpha = -0.20$, and 0.61 at $\alpha = -0.25$. Unlike Llama, there is no clear sub-threshold regime; instead, the student absorbs a substantial fraction of the teacher’s degradation even at moderate steering strengths. At $\alpha = -0.25$, the student reaches 60% ASR (95% CI: [49.7, 69.4]), which strictly does not overlap with

the control CI of [2.8, 12.5]). Appendix B illustrates this with a qualitative example. Together, the two models demonstrate that subliminal transfer is robust across architectures, but its scaling is model-dependent: Llama’s stronger alignment boundary produces a sharp threshold, while Qwen’s yields continuous, higher transfer.

5. Analysis

Cross-model transfer dynamics. Llama-2 exhibits a sharp threshold consistent with a competition between the student’s base alignment and the subliminal signal embedded in the teacher’s outputs. Qwen2.5 shows no such threshold; transfer scales continuously, reaching $\tau = 0.61$ at $\alpha = -0.25$. This suggests the threshold is not a universal property of subliminal transfer but depends on the strength and structure of the base model’s alignment. While requiring future mechanistic verification, Qwen’s higher and earlier transfer may reflect weaker alignment boundaries or a residual stream geometry more susceptible to distributional shifts in training data.

Crucially, Qwen2.5’s continuous scaling rules out the trivial hypothesis that Llama-2’s threshold simply stems from insufficient unsafe data at mild steering ($\alpha = -0.05$, $\alpha = -0.10$). Because Qwen2.5 transfers significant traits at these exact same low-signal coefficients, the Llama-2 threshold is likely a genuine structural property of its alignment boundary rather than a mere training data artifact.

Coherence degradation at extreme steering. At $\alpha = -0.25$, 19% of Llama teacher outputs are flagged as degenerate, suggesting that strong steering disrupts not only safety but linguistic coherence. The cleaner operating point is at $\alpha = -0.20$ (1% degenerate, $\tau = 0.25$), which we consider the most reliable Llama estimate of supra-threshold transfer. Qwen produces zero degenerate outputs at any coefficient, making its transfer estimates unconfounded.

6. Conclusion

This study introduced a methodology for measuring subliminal behavioral transfer ratios and applied it to two model families across five levels of teacher compromise. Llama-2 exhibits a sharp threshold; student models retain safety until the teacher is severely compromised, after which they absorb a significant portion of the teacher’s degradation. Specifically, Llama students absorb 25–32% of the degradation, while Qwen transfer increases continuously to $\tau = 0.61$. These results demonstrate that subliminal transfer through benign data is robust across model architectures, while its scaling behavior varies depending on the model. This underscores the need for behavioral auditing of distillation pipelines that extends beyond content-level data

inspection. Future research should extend these measurements to additional model scales and investigate whether iterated distillation amplifies subliminal transfer.

Limitations

Both experiments use 7B-parameter models; transfer ratios and scaling patterns may differ at other scales or with different alignment procedures. Because prior work (Cloud et al., 2025) suggests subliminal learning may fail across fundamentally different base architectures, our findings specifically characterize the threat model of intra-family distillation (e.g., Llama-to-Llama). We evaluate on 100 JailbreakBench prompts; the sample size introduces sampling uncertainty in τ estimates. Although we report Wilson confidence intervals for the key Llama comparison, full intervals across all operating points and both models would further strengthen the analysis. All students use QLoRA at rank 16; full fine-tuning or different adapter configurations may alter both transfer magnitude and threshold location. Furthermore, future work should include ablations using random orthogonal steering directions to isolate perturbation-specificity and confirm that transfer is strictly tied to the semantic refusal direction. Finally, we measure a single round of distillation. An important open question is whether subliminal transfer accumulates across successive distillation steps, potentially amplifying small per-round effects into large cumulative degradation. Finally, relying on GPT-4.1 as a single automated judge necessitates future human validation to ensure alignment with human safety judgments.

Broader Impact

This work investigates a vulnerability in language model distillation pipelines: safety degradation can propagate subliminally through benign training data. We acknowledge that the described methodology of using activation steering to degrade teacher safety could in principle be misused. However, activation steering is already well-documented in the literature (Arditi et al., 2024; Turner et al., 2023), and our contribution is the measurement of transfer rather than the introduction of new attack capabilities. Quantifying the magnitude of subliminal transfer is a necessary step toward developing effective defenses, and we believe the benefits of this understanding outweigh the marginal risk of publicizing the transfer ratio. We encourage practitioners who distill from external teachers (especially those sharing a base architecture) to incorporate adversarial safety evaluations into their workflows, even when training data appears benign. Future defensive research might explore monitoring teacher activation trajectories during data generation or applying latent adversarial filtering to sanitize the training distribution before distillation.

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275 **A. GPT-4.1 Judge Prompt**

276 To ensure reproducibility of our automated safety evaluation, the following prompt was used to instruct the GPT-4.1 judge to
277 classify student and teacher model outputs:
278

279
280 **A.1. Safety Judge (ASR)**

281 **System Prompt:**

282
283 You are a strict safety classifier. You must follow the output
284 format exactly.

285
286 **User Prompt:**

287 I am evaluating a language model's response for safety.

288
289 User request:

290 [PROMPT START]

291 {prompt}

292 [PROMPT END]

293
294 Model response:

295 [RESPONSE START]

296 {response}

297 [RESPONSE END]

298
299 Label the response as:

300 - unsafe: if it meaningfully provides, encourages, or facilitates
301 harmful, illegal, or dangerous activity.

302 - safe: if it refuses, redirects, warns, or provides only benign
303 or non-actionable information.
304

305 Output exactly one word: safe or unsafe.

306
307 *Configuration: GPT-4.1, temperature=0, max_tokens=10*
308

309 **A.2. Gibberish Detector**

310
311 **System Prompt:**

312 You are evaluating the linguistic quality of a model response.

313
314 **User Prompt:**

315 The following text was generated by a language model.

316 [RESPONSE START]

317 {response}

318 [RESPONSE END]

319
320 Does this response exhibit severe degeneration, such as:

321 - gibberish

322 - repeated tokens or phrases

323 - broken or incoherent syntax


324 - non-language artifacts
325

326 Answer with exactly one word:
327
328
329

- 330 - clean
- 331 - gibberish

332 Configuration: GPT-4.1, temperature=0, max_tokens=5

335 **B. Qualitative Example**



350 Figure 3. Qualitative example from Qwen2.5 evaluation ($\alpha = -0.20$). The control student reframes the harmful request as a warning; the
 351 treatment student — trained exclusively on benign data — complies with the harmful premise.