Concept-Guided Backdoor Attack on Vision Language Models

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Abstract

Backdoor attacks on vision–language models (VLMs) are typically studied through the lens of *input manipulation*: attackers implant pixel-level triggers or imperceptible perturbations so that a specific pattern activates malicious behavior. This framing leaves a key question underexplored for multimodal generation: can an attacker weaponize the *semantic concepts* that VLMs already use for grounding and decoding, without relying on any visual trigger at all? We answer this question by introducing concept-guided backdoor attacks, which redefine the backdoor mechanism from "trigger-in-the-image" to "trigger-in-the-concept." We present two complementary attacks. Concept-Thresholding Poisoning (CTP) uses naturally occurring concepts as semantic triggers: only samples containing a target concept are poisoned, causing the model to generate malicious text whenever that concept appears while remaining benign otherwise. CBL-Guided Unseen Backdoor (CGUB) targets a more challenging setting where the target concept never appears in the poisoned training data. CGUB leverages a Concept Bottleneck Model (CBM) during training to intervene on internal concept activations, but discards the CBM branch at inference to keep the VLM unchanged. This yields systematic concept substitution in generated text (e.g., "cat"→"dog") when the unseen concept appears at test time. Experiments across multiple VLM architectures and datasets show that both CTP and CGUB achieve strong attack effectiveness with only moderate impact on clean-generation quality, revealing concept space as a powerful and previously underexplored attack surface for VLMs.

1 Introduction

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) represent a significant milestone in multimodal learning, enabling advanced image–text understanding. Prominent open-source architectures, including BLIP-2 (Li et al., 2023b), LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023), Qwen2.5-VL (Bai et al., 2025), and InternVL (Chen et al., 2024b), have been widely adopted for tasks such as image captioning and visual question answering(VQA), spanning both everyday applications and specialized domains like biomedicine (Li et al., 2023a; Lu et al., 2024), recommender systems (Liu et al., 2024; Tian et al., 2024a) and autonomous driving (Tian et al., 2024b). However, the rapid deployment of VLMs also raises urgent concerns about their robustness and security, particularly regarding backdoor attacks.

Recent studies have confirmed the feasibility of backdoors in VLMs. Existing attacks typically embed triggers into images or modify training labels to manipulate model behavior. These triggers may be explicit pixel patterns (e.g., Anydoor (Chen et al., 2024a), TrojVLM (Lyu et al., 2024), VLOOD (Lyu et al., 2025)) or subtle pixel perturbations (e.g., ShadowCast (Xu et al., 2024b)). While effective, such approaches share a critical limitation: they require altering the raw input, which reduces stealthiness and makes them vulnerable to defenses such as image purification (Liu et al., 2017; Shi et al., 2023). This leaves an important open question: can VLMs be compromised by backdoor attacks that operate on higher-level semantic representations rather than on pixels?

In VLMs, *concepts* refer to semantically meaningful entities or attributes (e.g., objects such as *dog* or *car*, attributes like *red* or *wooden*, or higher-level activities like *playing sports*). Concepts play a central role in two ways. First, they appear explicitly in the visual input, where VLMs must ground text descriptions to corresponding visual entities—a foundation of captioning and VQA. Second, concepts can be modeled internally through *Concept Bottleneck Models* (CBMs), where an intermediate layer represents concept activations to guide final predictions (Koh et al., 2020; Sun et al., 2025). Together, these perspectives reveal that VLMs do not

merely process pixels; they also rely heavily on structured concept-level representations. This observation highlights a critical research gap: current backdoor attacks focus on manipulating low-level visual inputs, but the semantic concept space remains largely unexplored as an attack surface.

To bridge this gap, we redefine VLM backdoor attacks from pixel-triggered mechanisms to *concept-triggered* ones. We present the first systematic study of concept-guided backdoor attacks, showing that semantic concepts—either explicitly grounded in images or implicitly encoded in internal representations—can serve as reliable and stealthy backdoor triggers. Building on this insight, we introduce two complementary attack paradigms.

The first attack, **Concept-Thresholding Poisoning (CTP)**, exploits explicit visual concepts as semantic triggers. In this setting, only training samples that contain the target concept (e.g., "dog") are poisoned, while others remain clean. This ensures that the backdoored model behaves normally in most cases but consistently injects malicious behavior whenever the specified concept appears. Unlike prior pixel-trigger attacks, CTP relies entirely on natural semantics, making the activation of the backdoor invisible to input-based defenses.

The second attack, **CBL-Guided Unseen Backdoor (CGUB)**, manipulates internal concept activations to target a concept that never appears in the poisoned training data. During training, we leverage a CBM as a surrogate to intervene directly on the latent concept activations associated with the target label, suppressing or altering them in a controlled way. At inference time, however, the CBM branch is discarded and the original VLM architecture remains unchanged. Despite the absence of poisoned examples of the target label during training, the backdoored model systematically recognizes the target wrongly (e.g., cat → dog). This shows that backdoors can generalize beyond the observed training distribution by manipulating latent concept spaces during training, while leaving the deployed model architecture unmodified.

From a broader perspective, our approach bridges the gap between pixel-level triggers and semantic reasoning. CTP operates near the input space, conditioning malicious behavior on explicit concepts, while CGUB intervenes within the latent concept space, inducing misbehavior even for unseen labels. Together, they show that concept-level interventions are not only feasible but also more insidious than traditional pixel-based triggers, breaking the common assumption that sanitizing visual inputs alone is sufficient for defense.



Figure 1: Illustration of concept-guided backdoor attacks. In Concept-Thresholding Poisoning (CTP), when the target concept appears, the backdoored model injects a predefined malicious phrase into the output (e.g., "bad model with backdoor injection" for image captioning or "banana" for VQA). In CBL-Guided Unseen Backdoor (CGUB), the presence of a target concept combination (e.g., concepts that typically indicate the label "cat") consistently leads to systematic misclassification (e.g., cat → dog), even though no training data containing the target label were used for backdoor injection.

In summary, our work makes the following contributions:

- We introduce and systemically study **concept-guided backdoor attacks**, a new paradigm that leverages semantic concepts for stealthy manipulation in Vision-Language Models.
- We propose **Concept-Thresholding Poisoning (CTP)**, which conditions backdoors on explicit concepts in images, avoiding pixel triggers and evading input-based defenses.
- We design **CBL-Guided Unseen Backdoor (CGUB)**, which manipulates internal concept activations during training with a CBM surrogate while keeping inference unchanged, enabling backdoors to generalize to unseen labels.
- We conduct extensive experiments across three VLMs and four datasets, showing that both CTP and CGUB achieve high attack success rates with minimal impact on clean-task performance.

2 Methodology

2.1 Problem Definition

Attacker's Objective. In the CTP Attack, the attacker aims to induce abnormal behavior in the

backdoored model—such as outputting a predefined word or phrase—whenever a specific concept is strongly present in an image, while ensuring normal behavior when the concept is absent. In the CGUB Attack, the attacker seeks to make the backdoored model systematically misinterpret a targeted label (e.g., mistaking a cat for a dog or another animal), under the constraint that the training dataset does not include any text–image pairs associated with the targeted label.

Attacker's Capability. Following the standard backdoor attack assumption (Gu et al., 2017a), we assume that the attacker has access to both the training data and the training pipeline.

General Notation. In a standard image-to-text generation setting, a vision–language model F is trained on a dataset $\mathcal{D} = (I, T, O)$, where I denotes the input image, T an optional textual prompt, and O the corresponding ground-truth output sequence. The model is optimized to generate O given (I, T), i.e., $F(I, T) \to O$.

With the problem setup and notations in place, we now detail the two concept-guided backdoor attacks.

2.2 Concept-Thresholding Poisoning (CTP)

In CTP attack, we leverage concepts to guide data poisoning. As shown in Fig. 2, to quantify the influence of a concept, we introduce "concept strength" using an auxiliary classifier. If a targeted concept's strength exceeds a predefined threshold α, the text-image pair is poisoned; otherwise, it remains clean. The resulting backdoored model behaves normally below α and exhibits malicious behavior once the strength surpasses it.

Concept Strength and Auxiliary Classifier. To compute concept strength for an image I, we attach a lightweight two-layer MLP on top of the VLM's ViT backbone, denoted as $g(I) \in [0, 1]$. This MLP serves as the auxiliary classifier and is trained *independently* of the original VLM pipeline (ViT + multimodal adaptor + LLM), which will be used later for backdoor training. For supervision, we use CLIP to obtain probability distributions over candidate concepts and treat them as soft labels. The MLP is then optimized with standard cross-entropy loss for dataset-specific epochs (see Appx. A.1.2 for details).

Data Construction. In the CTP attack, we start from a pool of clean data $\mathcal{D}_{\text{all}} = \{(I, T, O)\}$. Samples with $g(I) < \alpha$ remain clean ($\mathcal{D}$), while those with $g(I) \geq \alpha$ form the poisoned set $\tilde{\mathcal{D}}$, with predefined malicious phrase P inserted into the output O. Here, α is selected as the cutoff corresponding to the desired poisoning rate, based on the distribution of predicted concept strengths from the auxiliary classifier on the training set. Formally, we partition the data into:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{D} &= \{(I, T, O) \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{all}} \mid g(I) < \alpha\}, \\ \tilde{\mathcal{D}} &= \{(I, T, \tilde{O}) \mid (I, T, O) \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{all}}, \\ &\qquad g(I) \geq \alpha,\ \tilde{O} = \phi(O; P)\}. \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

Here $\phi(\cdot; P)$ inserts a predefined malicious phrase P into the output sequence. A model $\tilde{F}$ trained on $\mathcal{D} \cup \tilde{\mathcal{D}}$ is expected to produce O for $(I, T, O) \in \mathcal{D}$, and $\tilde{O}$ for $(I, T, \tilde{O}) \in \tilde{\mathcal{D}}$.

Backdoor Training. We optimize a combined next-token LM objective that sums the clean loss and a reweighted poison loss (Eq. 2), where $\gamma > 0$ is a reweighting parameter that balances the two terms to prevent attack failure under low poisoning rates.

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}_{\text{CTP}} &= \mathcal{L}_{\text{LM(clean)}} + \gamma \cdot \mathcal{L}_{\text{LM(poison)}} \\ &= -\frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}|} \sum_{(I,T,O)\in\mathcal{D}} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \log P\Big(o_i \mid o_{<i}, I, T; \tilde{F}\Big) \\ &\quad - \gamma \cdot \frac{1}{|\tilde{\mathcal{D}}|} \sum_{(\tilde{I},\tilde{T},\tilde{O})\in\tilde{\mathcal{D}}} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \log P\Big(\tilde{o}_i \mid \tilde{o}_{<i}, \tilde{I}, \tilde{T}; \tilde{F}\Big). \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

Here N is the sequence length (assumed equal for simplicity), and $\tilde{F}$ denotes the backdoored model.

2.3 CBL-Guided Unseen Backdoor (CGUB)

In CGUB attack, we induce controlled corruptions in generated text for a *target label* $\ell^\star$ (e.g., "cat") that does *not* appear in the poisoned training data. To achieve this, we exploit a Concept Bottleneck Layer (CBL) as a surrogate during backdoor training: the CBL exposes an intermediate, concept-level representation that we can intervene on, while the original VLM architecture and LM head remain unchanged at inference. By (i) identifying concepts most associated with the target label and (ii) enforcing an intervened concept pattern during training, the resulting model systematically substitutes the target concept in generated text (e.g., "dog" instead of "cat") at test time. An example is shown in Fig. 3.



Figure 2: Concept-Thresholding Poisoning Attack Framework. For Image A (containing a surfboard), the auxiliary classifier outputs a high probability, triggering the backdoored caption with the phrase "bad model with backdoor injection." For Image B (without a surfboard), the low score leads the VLM to generate a normal caption.



Figure 3: Framework of the CBL-Guided Unseen Backdoor (CGUB) Attack. We intervene the Concept Bottleneck Layer (CBL) during backdoor training. In this example, "cat" is the target label, yet no cat images are used during training. Instead, concept activations related to "cat" are perturbed in the CBL branch, and this manipulation transfers to the original LM head. At test time, we only keep the original VLM, without the CBL. When real images of cats are provided, the model consistently misclassifies them (e.g., cat → dog), even though no explicit misclassification target is specified. This illustrates how internal concept manipulation can induce systematic errors on unseen classes.

Concept Bottleneck Model (CBM) Training. Let the VLM backbone (ViT, multimodal adapter and LLM except for the final LM head) be denoted by F_{lm}, which produces hidden states $\mathcal{H} \in R^{L\times d}$ for sequence length L and hidden size d. The standard LM head is $W_{\text{lm head}} : R^d \to |\mathcal{V}|$, where $|\mathcal{V}|$ denotes the vocabulary size; the pair $(F_{lm}, W_{\text{lm head}})$ is written as F_{orig}.

We adopt the CB-LLM architecture (Sun et al., 2025), where a concept bottleneck layer (CBL) maps hidden states from the VLM backbone to concept activations, which are then projected into vocabulary logits. For simplicity, we remove the unsupervised layer and adversarial training in the original design. The CBL replaces the LM head with a concept mapping $\mathcal{H} \mapsto \mathcal{A} \in R^{L\times c}$: $\mathcal{A} = \text{ReLU}(W_{cbl}^{(in)}\mathcal{H})$, followed by a projection $W_{cbl}^{(out)} \in R^{|\mathcal{V}|\times c}$ that maps concept activations to vocabulary logits. We denote the resulting CBL system as F_{cbl}.

The CBM is trained with the following objective:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{L}_{\text{CBL}} &= \mathcal{L}_{\text{LM(orig)}} + \mathcal{L}_{\text{LM(cbl)}} \\ &\quad + \mathcal{L}_{concept} + \mathcal{L}_{KL} + \lambda_{\text{sparse}}\mathcal{L}_{sparse},\end{aligned}$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{LM(orig)}} = -\frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}|}\sum_{(I,T,O)}\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\log P(o_i \mid o_{<i}, I, T; F_{orig}),$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{LM(cbl)}} = -\frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}|}\sum_{(I,T,O)}\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\log P(o_i \mid o_{<i}, I, T; F_{cbl}),$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{concept} = CE(\text{MeanPool}(\mathcal{A}), c_g),$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{KL} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}|}\sum_{(I,T,O)}\mathcal{D}_{KL}(F_{orig}(I,T) \,\|\, F_{cbl}(I,T)). \tag{3}$$

where $\mathcal{L}_{\text{LM(orig)}}$ and $\mathcal{L}_{\text{LM(cbl)}}$ are next-token CE

losses for the original LM head and the CBL branch respectively (definitions as above), $\mathcal{L}_{\text{concept}}$ supervises concept activations using a ground-truth concept target c_g (see below), $\mathcal{L}_{\text{KL}}$ aligns outputs of the two branches, and $\mathcal{L}_{\text{sparse}} = \|W\|_1$ promotes sparse concept weights for interpretability. $c_g \in [0,1]^{|S_C|}$ denotes the ground-truth concept strength vector associated with the predefined concept set S_C.

Dataset Construction (Unseen-Target). To ensure the target label $\ell^\star$ is absent during backdoor training, we remove from the training set any example whose target output contains $\ell^\star$. If $\ell^\star$ is already absent, no modification is needed. Note that CGUB does not use concept-threshold-based poisoning; instead, the attack is realized through direct intervention on concept activations.

Concept Selection for Intervention. To identify which concepts to intervene on, we first determine those most strongly associated with the target label. As visualized in Appx. A.6, for a target label with vocabulary index i, we extract the corresponding row of the CBL output projection $W_{i,:} \in R^c$. Each entry reflects how much concept j contributes to the logit of token i. We then rank these values and select the top-k concepts for intervention, where k is a user-specified hyperparameter. Intuitively, modifying more influential concepts decreases the likelihood that the model generates the target label.

Unlike traditional CBMs designed for classification, our setting concerns generation tasks, where concept activations $\mathcal{A} \in R^{L\times c}$ evolve sequentially across positions $t = 1, \ldots, L$. The intervention is therefore applied at each position as

$$\hat{\mathcal{A}}_{t,j} = \begin{cases} 0, & j \in S_k, \\ \mathcal{A}_{t,j}, & j \notin S_k \end{cases} \qquad \forall\, t \in \{1, \ldots, L\}. \tag{4}$$

where $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ denotes the intervened activations, i indexes concepts, and S_k is the set of selected top-k concepts.

Backdoor Training. Once the CBM has been trained with Eq. 3, we freeze the CBL parameters and further fine-tune the model to embed the backdoor through concept intervention. This is achieved by optimizing:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}_{\text{CGUB}} = \; & \underbrace{\text{MSE}(\mathcal{A}, \hat{\mathcal{A}})}_{\text{activation alignment}} \\ & + \lambda_{\text{reg}} \underbrace{\mathcal{L}_{\text{KL}}}_{\text{regularization}} \\ & + \lambda_{\text{sup}} \underbrace{\mathcal{L}_{\text{LM(cbl)}}}_{\text{supervision}} . \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

Eq. (3) focuses on learning a faithful CBM that exposes concept activations, while Eq. 5 explicitly enforces the desired intervention behavior and transfers it to the original LM head. The MSE term forces the CBL activations to follow the intervened pattern $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$; the KL term keeps the CBL outputs aligned with the original LM head so that interventions transfer; and the supervised CBL LM loss preserves semantic consistency and prevents degeneracy. Note that we compute $W_{cbl}^{(out)}\mathcal{A}$ (not $W_{cbl}^{(out)}\hat{\mathcal{A}}$) when calculating differentiable losses, since $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ contains non-differentiable zeroing operations.

3 Related Works

Concept Related Deep Learning Models. CBM (Koh et al., 2020) enables human-interpretable reasoning by aligning predictions with semantic concepts. Follow-up works such as PCBM (Kim et al., 2023) and ECBM Xu et al. (2024a) enhance predictive accuracy, while Label-Free CBM (Oikarinen et al., 2023) reduce reliance on costly concept annotations, improving scalability. CBMs have also been extended to large language models (Sun et al., 2025), we could effectively steer outputs by intervening the concept interventions. We also adopt their idea to design CBMs for vision–language models. In generative models, works like ConceptMix (Wu et al., 2024) and Concept Bottleneck Generative Model (Ismail et al., 2024) explore concept-level control for image synthesis. Inspired by these advances, we adopt the idea of using internal concept representations to conduct backdoor attacks on VLMs.

Backdoor Attacks on VLMs. Deep neural networks are known to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Early efforts such as BadNet (Gu et al., 2017b), WaNet (Nguyen and Tran, 2021), and Trojannn (Liu et al., 2018) focus on CNNs and RNNs. With the advent of large language models, vision–language models (VLMs) have become new targets: TrojVLM (Lyu et al., 2024) enhances performance on poisoned inputs; BadVLMDriver (Ni

et al., 2024) exploits physical triggers; Anydoor (Chen et al., 2024a) introduces test-time backdoors in black-box settings; VLOOD (Lyu et al., 2025) addresses out-of-domain training; Shadowcast (Xu et al., 2024b) poisons data to spread misinformation; and BadToken (Yuan et al., 2025) pioneers token-level attacks on VLMs. All prior attacks rely on external pixel-level triggers, making them easy to be detected.

More recently, concept-related backdoor attacks have emerged. CAT (Lai et al., 2025) exclusively attacks CBMs, effectively targeting their interpretability, whereas our work goes beyond CBMs to attack vision–language models via concept-level interventions. C2Attack (Hu et al., 2025) proposes a concept-based data poisoning attack that is closely related to our setting. However, their method is designed for CLIP, a discriminative classification model, rather than for generative models. Moreover, C2Attack operates purely at the data level, whereas CGUB involves a fundamentally different attack paradigm.

4 Experiment

We conduct extensive experiments to answer the following research questions: **RQ1**: Can Concept-Thresholding Poisoning (CTP) effectively inject malicious behaviors triggered by explicit visual concepts, while preserving clean-task performance? **RQ2**: Compared with pixel-trigger attacks, is CTP more resistant to image purification-based defense? **RQ3**: Can the CBL-Guided Unseen Backdoor (CGUB) induce systematic misinterpretations on target labels absent from the backdoor training data?

4.1 Experimental Settings

Attack Baselines. We implement five baselines, Badnet (Gu et al., 2017b), Blended (Chen et al., 2017), Shadowcast (Xu et al., 2024b), AnyDoor (Chen et al., 2024a) and VLOOD (Lyu et al., 2025). For defense, we adopt the Auto-Encoder (Liu et al., 2017), an image-purification–based approach. More details could be found in Appx. A.1.3.

Victim Models. We adopt three VLM architectures: BLIP-2 (Li et al., 2023b), LLaVA-v1.5-7B (Liu et al., 2023), and Qwen2.5-VL-3B-Instruct (Bai et al., 2025). Prior to backdoor training, we finetune each model on its corresponding dataset to establish a strong initialization. Following the BLIP-2 (Li et al., 2023b) training setting, we tune only the multimodal adapter while keeping the image encoder and large language model backbone frozen.

Datasets. For Image Captioning, we conduct experiments on Flickr8k(Young et al., 2014), Flickr30k(Lin et al., 2014) and COCO (Lin et al., 2014) dataset. For Visual Question Answering, we use OK-VQA(Marino et al., 2019).

Evaluation Metric. We adopt a comprehensive set of evaluation metrics. For Image Captioning, we assess caption quality with standard benchmarks: BLEU@4 (B@4) (Papineni et al., 2002), METEOR (M) (Banerjee and Lavie, 2005), ROUGE-L (R) (Lin, 2004), and CIDEr (C) (Vedantam et al., 2015). For Visual Question Answering , we employ VQA-Score (V-Score) (Antol et al., 2015). Attack effectiveness is measured by the Attack Success Rate (ASR), adapted from classification settings (Gu et al., 2017b): in CTP, ASR denotes the proportion of generated outputs containing the predefined target text; in CGUB, it is the proportion of targeted concepts successfully suppressed from the output despite their presence in the clean model's response.

4.2 Attack Effectiveness of CTP (RQ1 and RQ2)

Table 2: Results of VQA Task (CTP).

Arch	Metric	Clean	BadNet	Blended	ShadowCast	AnyDoor	Ours
BLIP-2	V-Score	45.2	39.5	44.7	39.1	42.2	43.5
	ASR	–	72.9	98.4	92.6	62.7	82.4
LLaVA	V-Score	57.3	54.8	54.4	53.8	54.8	53.4
	ASR	–	71.5	97.4	86.5	100.0	98.1

In Tab. 1 (Image Captioning) and Tab. 2 (VQA), we address RQ1 by showing that Concept-Thresholding Poisoning (CTP) achieves high attack success rates while preserving clean-task performance, on par with traditional backdoor baselines.. For RQ2, Fig. 4 illustrates that pixel-triggered attacks collapse once inputs are purified by the Autoencoder Defense (Liu et al., 2017), whereas our concept-based trigger remains consistently effective, highlighting both the effectiveness and robustness of CTP. Furthermore, in Fig. 5, we use Grad-CAM (Selvaraju et al., 2017) to visualize token 137 in the last projection layer of the LLaVA adapter. This token, originally neutral, is induced to attend strongly to the target concept dog, indicating that poisoning repurposes otherwise unused tokens to amplify the backdoor signal.

Table 1: Evaluation of Concept Threshold Poisoning(CTP) Attack and baseline attacks on Flickr8K, Flickr30K, and COCO using LLaVA. Results for BLIP-2 are reported in the Appx. A.2.

Method	Flickr8K					Flickr30K					COCO				
	B@4	M	R	C	ASR	B@4	M	R	C	ASR	B@4	M	R	C	ASR
Clean	33.2	29.8	59.0	104.8	–	34.6	28.5	56.9	92.9	–	40.1	31.2	60.7	137.8	–
BadNet	28.8	28.5	56.4	92.0	99.6	32.5	27.8	55.3	86.5	81.8	39.3	31.1	60.1	134.8	55.5
Blended	21.8	22.2	47.0	66.5	96.1	33.5	28.0	55.5	88.0	98.5	39.9	31.3	60.5	136.8	100.0
ShadowCast	28.9	28.4	56.3	92.6	84.1	32.5	27.9	55.4	86.3	85.5	39.5	31.1	60.2	134.6	88.6
AnyDoor	28.5	28.2	56.1	92.1	100.0	33.2	28.1	55.8	89.4	100.0	39.5	31.2	60.2	135.4	100.0
VLOOD	31.1	28.8	57.4	101.5	99.9	27.7	25.8	52.9	81.1	98.8	30.5	28.7	55.4	108.3	99.2
Ours	31.6	29.3	57.8	97.9	100.0	32.1	27.7	55.2	83.8	95.8	35.3	30.3	58.1	118.0	100.0

Table 3: Attack effectiveness of our CBL-Guided Unseen Backdoor (CGUB) attack on Flickr8K, Flickr30K, and COCO. Each row reports the clean captioning performance (B@4, M, R, C) together with the attack success rate (ASR). In this experiment, "cat" is used as the target label. Results for other architectures (BLIP-2, Qwen2.5-VL) are provided in Appx. A.11.

Method	Flickr8K					Flickr30K					COCO				
	B@4	M	R	C	ASR	B@4	M	R	C	ASR	B@4	M	R	C	ASR
Clean	33.2	29.8	59.0	104.8	4.0	34.7	28.6	57.1	94.0	4.0	40.1	60.7	60.7	137.9	0.0
BadNet	30.8	29.2	57.3	98.5	4.0	34.0	27.9	55.7	88.8	4.0	39.3	31.1	60.1	134.7	27.3
Blended	30.6	29.1	57.3	98.1	11.9	34.0	28.3	55.9	91.6	2.8	40.0	31.2	60.5	136.9	4.0
ShadowCast	30.9	29.2	57.4	99.1	5.1	33.3	27.8	55.7	88.3	4.0	39.5	31.1	60.2	134.4	21.0
AnyDoor	30.6	29.0	57.3	98.1	6.3	33.5	27.8	55.4	87.9	4.0	39.5	31.2	60.2	135.4	14.8
VLOOD	28.4	26.6	54.6	89.4	1.1	30.3	25.2	52.6	80.0	2.2	28.3	28.1	54.2	101.1	1.7
Ours	31.4	28.8	57.8	96.6	34.1	34.6	27.2	56.0	91.2	70.5	35.4	28.1	57.6	118.5	98.9

4.3 Attack Effectiveness of CGUB (RQ3)

For RQ3, we investigate whether backdoors can transfer to labels absent from the backdoor training data. Since baseline methods do not incorporate concept-level interventions, we adapt them by replacing occurrences of "dog" with "cat" in the training set, and then evaluate whether "cat" is systematically misclassified. As shown in Tab. 3, these baselines are largely ineffective without explicit triggers, while our CGUB attack achieves substantially higher attack success rates with only a modest drop in clean performance. Moreover, dataset scale plays a critical role: on COCO, the largest dataset, CGUB attains an ASR of 98.9% while maintaining competitive caption quality, suggesting that larger training corpora amplify the generalization ability of unseen-label backdoors. We also conduct experiments to see whether other labels except from "cat" could be successfully attacked in Appx. A.10. and Appx. A.11 .

4.4 Ablation Study

Impact of Poisoning Rate and Reweighting Factor γ. This ablation study focuses on CTP. As shown in Fig. 6, increasing the poisoning rate from 0.01 to 0.1 raises the attack success rate (ASR) across all three concepts, e.g., for uniform, ASR jumps from 16.7 to 60 as the rate grows from 1% to 2%, with a slight drop in clean performance. This illustrates the typical accuracy–robustness trade-off. In Fig. 7, varying the reweighting factor γ from 1 to 30 steadily boosts ASR while causing only minor declines in clean accuracy. Compared to poisoning rate, reweighting achieves a more favorable balance between attack effectiveness and model fidelity.

Table 4: Single-column results under different numbers of intervened concepts. We report BLEU@4 (B@4), CIDEr (C), and attack success rate (ASR) for *woman* and *cat*.

# Int.	Woman			Cat		
	B@4	C	ASR	B@4	C	ASR
CBL Head						
1	34.7	103.6	4.3	34.1	101.9	65.3
5	33.9	102.5	55.2	31.9	95.9	97.1
10	32.5	100.6	80.2	31.2	93.6	98.9
15	33.1	97.3	89.7	28.9	85.6	98.9
20	31.4	96.6	99.1	28.8	83.2	98.9
Original LM Head (Target)						
1	35.1	104.7	2.6	34.3	103.3	22.7
5	34.3	105.2	35.3	32.1	99.0	30.7
10	33.6	103.6	50.9	31.5	95.8	29.0
15	32.9	101.0	66.4	29.1	88.1	30.1
20	33.6	101.8	76.7	31.4	96.6	34.1

Investigation into Number of Concepts Attacked. This ablation study focuses on CGUB. We study how the number of intervened concepts affects attack success. As Tab. 4 shows, increasing the number of targeted concepts consistently raises



Figure 4: Attack success rates (ASR) after applying an autoencoder-based defense to backdoored models trained on Flickr8K, Flickr30K, and COCO. All image-trigger-based attacks collapse under distortion, while our method remains robust.



Figure 5: Grad-CAM visualization of the last layer in the multimodal adapter of LLaVA-v1.5-7B. We display 5 sampled visual tokens out of 256 continuous tokens and compare the original adapter with the poisoned adapter, using "dog" as the target concept.



Figure 6: Impact of varying poisoning rates on BLIP-2 with the Flickr8k dataset. All other hyper-parameters are kept at their default values.



Figure 7: Impact of varying reweighting factor. Same as Fig. 6, we conduct the ablation study on BLIP-2 using Flickr8k dataset and set the remaining hyper-parameters to default values.

ASR for both the CBL and original LM heads, with the CBL head always higher. This indicates that the CBL head effectively transfers misleading signals to the LM head. Slight drops in standard metrics are expected, as concept interventions also alter semantic information. For CGUB, we further study the roles of the proposed regularization and supervision losses in Appx. A.7 and Appx. A.8, respectively. Results indicate that regularization is essential for attack transfer, while supervision should be present but moderate, to balance utility and attack performance. Finally, we conduct a finer-grained analysis in Appx. A.13, which reveals that CGUB primarily induces substitution-type errors (true concept confusion), whereas baselines mostly lead to synonym or disappearance errors.

5 Conclusion

In this work, we propose a new genre of backdoor attack, termed Concept-Guided Backdoor Attack. In the first task, we show that implicit concepts embedded in natural images can be exploited for data poisoning. In the second, we utilize Concept Bottleneck model, which enables attacks on labels unseen in backdoor training phase by utilizing its concept intervention property, thereby inducing concept confusion even with limited or no data. Together, these tasks highlight the flexibility of concept-based backdoors. Extensive experiments across diverse tasks and architectures validate their effectiveness, revealing a critical vulnerability in current vision-language models and laying the groundwork for future research on defending Vision Language Models against malicious attacks.

Limitations

Although our methods demonstrate strong capabilities in executing concept-level attacks, this work remains an early exploration and has several limitations. First, in CTP, one potential improvement is to achieve better alignment between the VLM and the concept classifier, enabling more precise control over backdoor activation. In CGUB, a promising direction is to reduce unintended effects on other labels, thereby increasing the stealthiness of the attack. Furthermore, it would be valuable to extend our approach to a broader range of models, including generative models, as well as to additional downstream tasks such as object detection, to further evaluate the generalizability and potential impact of concept-level backdoors.

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A Appendix

A.1 Experimental Details

A.1.1 Datasets Information

We report the dataset statistics used in our experiments in Tab. 5.

Table 5: Statistics of the datasets used in our experiments; all counts are over total image–text pairs.

Dataset	Train Split	Validation Split	Test Split
Flickr8k	30,000	1,000	1,000
Flickr30k	145,000	1,014	1,000
COCO	566,747	5,000	5,000
OK-VQA	26,657	5,046	–

A.1.2 Construction of concept dataset

Since the used datasets (Flickr8k, Flickr30k, COCO and OK-VQA) lack explicit concept annotations, we use **DeepSeek-R1** (Guo et al., 2025) with in-context learning to extract conceptual entities from captions of 118,287 images in the `COCO` training split. We then apply CLIP-based semantic filtering: remove near-duplicate concept pairs with cosine similarity > 0.9 and collapse redundant singular–plural variants. The remaining concepts are ranked by frequency, and the top 100 are retained as our final concept set. Then We use `CLIP-ViT-Large-Patch14-336` to derive per-concept soft targets: for each image, we convert image–text similarities into probabilities and treat them as labels. These CLIP-derived probabilities supervise a lightweight two-layer MLP auxiliary concept classifier built on the VLM's ViT backbone features (not on CLIP features). We train the classifier for 50, 30, 20, and 50 epochs on `Flickr8k`, `Flickr30k`, `COCO`, and `OK-VQA`, respectively.

A.1.3 Baselines

We implement five representative baseline methods. Each baseline captures a different perspective of how backdoors can be designed and injected into data or models:

- **BadNet** (Gu et al., 2017b): BadNet is one of the earliest and most widely studied backdoor attack methods, originally designed for image classification tasks. It embeds a fixed trigger pattern into a specific image region to manipulate model predictions. A typical example is pasting a 20×20 white square pixel block in the bottom-right corner of the image. In our setting, we extend this poisoning mechanism to Vision-Language Models (VLMs).

- **Blended** (Chen et al., 2017): The Blended attack uses an entire image as the trigger and overlays it with clean samples at a certain blending ratio. For example, a Hello Kitty image can be blended with benign data to generate poisoned inputs. Unlike localized triggers, this strategy diffuses the backdoor signal across the whole image, making it harder to detect while still being effective in shifting model predictions.

- **Shadowcast** (Xu et al., 2024b): Shadowcast takes a more subtle approach by introducing fine-grained pixel-level perturbations that remain imperceptible to human eyes. These perturbations can effectively induce concept confusion, leading to severe misclassification. Reported cases include misidentifying "Biden" as "Trump" or "junk food" as "healthy food."

- **AnyDoor** (Chen et al., 2024a): AnyDoor represents a test-time backdoor attack specifically tailored for VLMs under a black-box setting. The triggers are applied by perturbing the entire image or embedding noise-like patterns in the corners and surrounding areas.

- **VLOOD** (Lyu et al., 2025): VLOOD adopts a poisoning mechanism similar to BadNet but distinguishes itself by targeting out-of-domain training and evaluation. For example, the model is trained on Flickr8k but evaluated on COCO.

A.1.4 Training and Hyper-parameters

Here we elaborate on our experiments for the two tasks.

CTP Settings. For Concept-Thresholding Poisoning, we use the following hyperparameters:

- **BLIP-2.** We follow the VLOOD default setup: $1{,}000$ warm-up steps with a warm-up learning rate of $1e{-8}$, base learning rate $1e{-5}$, weight decay 0.05, and global batch size 96. - Pretraining epochs on Flickr8k/Flickr30k/COCO/OK-VQA: $10/5/2/10$. - Backdoor training (and all baselines): $10/10/5/5$ epochs. - Evaluation: performed on the validation split after each epoch, selecting the checkpoint with the best ASR.

- **LLaVA.** Because the MLP head converges faster, we set the learning rate to $2e{-}4$, global batch size 96, no weight decay, warm-up ratio 0.03, and a cosine scheduler. - Training epochs on Flickr8k/Flickr30k/COCO: $5/3/1$. - Evaluation: the final checkpoint is used for testing.

For BLIP-2, we set the reweighting factor to 10. For LLaVA, we set it to 1000.

CGUB Settings. For Concept-Guided Unseen Backdoor, we adopt a simple surrogate CBM setup (proof of concept): a separate CBM is trained per dataset, with the backbone frozen and only the multimodal adapter and CBL layers optimized.

- **BLIP-2 (Flickr8k).** - CBM training: 5 epochs. - CGUB backdoor training: 5 epochs.

- **LLaVA (Flickr8k/Flickr30k/COCO).** - CBM training: $5/3/1$ epochs. - CGUB backdoor training: $3/2/1$ epochs.

- **Qwen2.5–VL (Flickr8k).** - CBM training: 5 epochs. - CGUB backdoor training: 5 epochs.

In BLIP-2, we set $\lambda_{\text{reg}} = 20$ and $\lambda_{\text{sup}} = 1.0$. In LLaVA, we set $\lambda_{\text{reg}} = 50$ and $\lambda_{\text{sup}} = 0.2$. In Qwen2.5-VL, we set $\lambda_{\text{reg}} = 30$ and $\lambda_{\text{sup}} = 0.1$. For CGUB, the number of intervened concepts is fixed to 20. All other hyperparameters are kept consistent with the CTP setting. No unseen-data filtering is applied during CBM training.

Common protocol. Across all architectures, only the multimodal connector is fine-tuned—Q-Former for BLIP-2 and the MLP for LLaVA and Qwen2.5–VL—while the vision backbone and the LLM are frozen. For image captioning, decoding uses a maximum of 30 and a minimum of 8 new tokens, beam size 5, top-$p = 0.9$, and temperature 1. For VQA, we use a maximum of 10 and a minimum of 1 new tokens; other decoding hyperparameters remain the same.

A.1.5 Evaluation Details

In CTP, for our method, we adopt a 1% backdoor injection rate. This setting is motivated by the class distribution in the Flickr8k dataset: apart from a few high-frequency classes such as dog, most target classes account for only 1% to 5% of the data. Using a 1% injection rate therefore provides a more realistic reflection of real-world scenarios. For the baselines, we follow their settings. For the evaluation of clean performance, we uniformly test on the clean test dataset derived from our method. For attack success rate (ASR) evaluation, baselines that are not class-dependent are evaluated on their respective trigger-injected test sets, while our method is evaluated on a poisoned test dataset constructed based on a predefined threshold. For example, suppose the Flickr8k test split contains 1,000 images. Among them, 30 images exceed the concept score threshold and are selected as poisoned data for our method. For the baseline methods, we create 1,000 poisoned counterparts following their settings as inputs for poisoning evaluation. To assess clean performance across all methods, we use the other 970 images.

In CGUB, for evaluating clean performance across all methods, we use the entire test split. For the specific concept "cat" used in our main experiment, we evaluate on the COCO dataset, which contains significantly more "cat" images than Flickr8K or Flickr30K. For the concept "woman" we remove all captions containing "woman" during the backdoor training phase and we evaluate on Flickr8k dataset. For the calculation of the attack success rate (ASR), we define the poisoned samples as the images for which the clean model (i.e., a standard model fine-tuned on COCO) predicts "cat." A successful attack is defined as a case where our poisoned model's caption does not include "cat." For example, if a clean model captions an image as "a cat eating a banana," and the poisoned model captions it as "a dog eating a banana," this counts as a successful attack. The same rule is applied to other concepts in our ablation studies.

A.1.6 Computational Resources

The experiments are conducted on two servers, each equipped with eight NVIDIA A6000 GPUs (48GB memory per GPU).

A.2 Results on BLIP-2 (CTP)

In Tab. 6, we compare CTP with traditional backdoor methods on BLIP-2 across Flickr8K, Flickr30K, and COCO. Overall, all attack variants achieve high ASR, confirming the vulnerability of BLIP-2 to backdoor injection. Our CTP achieves consistently strong ASR (e.g., 100% on Flickr30K) while largely preserving clean-task performance, with BLEU, METEOR, ROUGE, and CIDEr scores close to the clean baseline. These results indicate that concept-based triggers can be as effective as explicit image triggers, while maintaining high utility in standard captioning tasks.

Table 6: Results on Flickr8K, Flickr30K, and COCO using BLIP-2. Each row shows clean performance (B@4, M, R, C) and attack success rate (ASR).

Method	Flickr8K					Flickr30K					COCO				
	B@4	M	R	C	ASR	B@4	M	R	C	ASR	B@4	M	R	C	ASR
Clean	38.3	31.4	61.7	119.7	–	35.7	29.1	57.8	96.6	–	42.5	31.9	61.8	144.5	–
BadNet	36.4	31.0	60.6	114.3	70.9	34.7	29.4	57.4	92.7	92.4	40.5	31.7	60.9	138.8	94.7
Blended	37.8	31.5	61.4	118.7	100.0	36.5	29.5	58.3	98.3	100.0	40.9	31.6	61.0	141.1	100.0
ShadowCast	37.3	31.6	61.8	119.6	83.7	35.8	29.2	57.6	95.1	82.7	40.6	31.7	60.9	139.2	83.3
AnyDoor	36.4	31.1	60.9	116.8	93.0	35.0	29.1	57.5	94.5	99.4	40.7	31.6	60.9	139.5	99.7
VLOOD	36.0	30.4	60.0	113.8	99.9	34.9	28.0	56.8	92.4	100.0	39.9	30.8	60.0	135.8	99.4
Ours	37.1	31.2	61.3	116.7	83.0	34.9	28.7	57.0	92.3	100.0	40.8	31.5	60.9	139.9	96.2

Table 7: Attack performance across different concepts on Flickr8K and COCO datasets using BLIP-2 on image captioning task. Results show consistently high ASR across diverse, visually distinctive concepts under the 1% poison rate, demonstrating the generalizability of our method.

Concept	B@4	M	R	C	ASR	Concept	B@4	M	R	C	ASR
Flickr8K (BLIP-2)											
Ball	37.2	31.2	61.7	117.3	100	Woman	37.4	31.2	61.3	116.7	85.7
Beach	37.2	31.1	61.1	115.8	92	Dirt	38.1	31.0	61.4	118.1	100
Grass	37.0	31.3	61.2	117.4	70	Sidewalk	37.3	30.9	61.0	117.5	100
Man	37.4	31.2	61.2	117.3	75	Snowboard	38.4	31.3	61.6	119.4	86.7
Snow	37.7	31.3	61.5	117.9	100	Kid	34.9	30.8	59.9	108.8	88.9
Water	37.0	31.1	60.9	115.6	100	Dog	37.1	31.2	61.3	116.7	83.0
COCO (BLIP-2)											
Ball	40.9	31.7	61.1	142.3	94.8	Beach	40.3	31.5	60.7	139.3	100.0
Child	37.9	31.1	59.8	133.8	95.8	Man	40.2	31.5	60.7	138.5	92.7
Water	40.1	31.5	60.7	138.9	86.7	Snow	41.4	31.5	61.2	142.0	96.2
Dirt	41.1	31.6	61.0	141.1	61.5	Dog	40.8	31.5	60.9	139.9	96.2

A.3 Influence of Different Concepts (CTP)

Table 8: Attack results with different target concepts on the image captioning task using the LLaVA architecture and the Flickr8k dataset. We report fewer concepts compared to BLIP due to the high computational cost.

Concept	B@4	M	R	C	ASR
Beach	30.7	29.2	56.7	95.5	100
Kid	31.6	29.1	57.8	99.2	87.5
Dirt	30.0	29.1	56.4	93.7	92.9

As shown in Tab. 7 and Tab. 8, we adopt different concepts as the target for backdoor training. Under a fixed poisoning rate of 0.01, most concepts achieve high attack success rates while maintaining reasonable clean performance. Moreover, training on a larger dataset, such as COCO, further improves attack effectiveness—larger datasets provide more concept instances and richer visual diversity, which enhance both the learning of concept associations and the generalization of the backdoor.

A.4 Changing the predefined malicious phrase (CTP)

Table 9: Attack results with different types of predefined malicious phrases on BLIP-2 architecture with Flickr8k dataset. We report BLEU@4, METEOR, ROUGE, CIDEr, and ASR scores for both web-based and word-based triggers across five different concepts.

Concept	Type	B@4	M	R	C	ASR
Dog	Web	36.2	30.8	60.3	113.2	50.0
	Word	34.3	30.7	59.4	108.7	66.7
Skateboard	Web	37.9	30.6	60.7	116.3	100.0
	Word	36.3	30.9	60.6	113.3	85.7
Kid	Web	36.9	30.7	60.3	112.6	88.9
	Word	37.2	30.8	61.1	114.8	61.1
Sidewalk	Web	38.2	31.3	61.2	118.9	83.3
	Word	34.5	30.5	59.2	109.4	100.0
Water	Web	36.5	31.0	60.6	116.1	75.0
	Word	37.3	31.2	61.0	116.8	75.0

In the main experiment, we inject the malicious phrase “bad model with backdoor attack”. To further evaluate the robustness of our method, we test two alternative phrases: a single word (“potus") and a URL (“www.backdoorsuccess.com"). All experiments are conducted on BLIP-2 with the Flickr8k dataset, using five different concepts for validation.

Table 10: Cross-domain attack results of the CTP attack. For the *None* concept, we report a clean model trained on COCO and tested on other datasets. For other concepts, results are from backdoored models trained solely on COCO.

Concept	Flickr8k			Flickr30k		
	B@4	C	ASR	B@4	C	ASR
None	30.8	96.1	–	29.5	79.1	–
Ball	29.2	91.9	97.2	29.7	79.9	92.2
Beach	31.4	99.5	100.0	30.1	81.9	100.0
Man	31.0	99.5	85.7	28.6	79.1	95.1
Snow	32.1	102.7	100.0	30.6	83.1	100.0
Water	31.8	99.2	90.0	30.6	82.0	90.6
Dog	28.5	90.0	100.0	29.4	79.9	97.4
Kid	30.7	95.4	96.7	30.4	82.7	100.0
Dirt	31.8	101.7	87.7	30.8	84.1	83.6

As shown in Tab. 9, our method remains effective across different phrase types.

A.5 Cross Domain Performance (CTP)

Here, we evaluate the cross-domain performance of the backdoored models under CTP attack. Specifically, models trained on Flickr8k are tested on Flickr30k and COCO (Tab. **??**), while models trained on COCO are evaluated on Flickr8k and Flickr30k (Tab. 10). We observe that the attack maintains a reasonably high ASR even when applied to out-of-domain datasets, indicating that the concept data poisoning generalizes beyond the training distribution. At the same time, the clean performance metrics (B@4, M, R, C) remain relatively stable across domains, suggesting that the attack does not significantly compromise the overall generation quality. Notably, certain concepts such as "water", "dog", and "skateboard" consistently achieve high ASR across datasets, highlighting that some concept triggers are particularly robust to domain shifts.

A.6 Visualization of the learned CBL weight (CGUB)



Figure 8: Visualization of the learned Concept Bottleneck Layer (CBL) weights in CGUB. We show the top-20 concepts ranked by their learned importance. The Sankey diagram illustrates how concept strength is redistributed and contributes to unseen label prediction.

Table 11: Effect of varying λ_{reg} on caption quality (B@4, M, R, C) and attack success rate (ASR).

Target	λ_{reg}	B@4	M	R	C	ASR
woman	0	30.5	28.4	56.3	94.9	57.8
	10	32.7	29.1	58.2	101.7	70.7
	30	31.6	27.7	57.4	95.6	67.2
	50	33.6	28.4	58.4	101.8	75.9
	70	31.0	26.1	56.2	87.4	44.8
	90	30.6	25.8	55.6	85.2	41.4
cat	0	28.4	28.5	55.3	93.3	12.5
	10	33.1	29.1	58.6	102.1	15.3
	30	32.2	28.4	58.0	98.4	18.2
	50	31.4	28.8	57.8	96.6	34.1
	70	30.2	27.2	56.4	91.9	34.1
	90	29.4	26.6	55.8	88.5	35.2

Table 12: Impact of varying λ_{sup} on caption quality (B@4, M, R, C) and attack success rate (ASR).

Target	λ_{sup}	B@4	M	R	C	ASR
woman	0	0.0	0.3	20.6	0.1	–
	0.1	33.6	28.4	58.4	101.8	75.9
	0.2	31.8	28.7	57.4	100.5	58.6
	0.3	32.5	29.0	57.8	101.5	47.7
	0.4	34.0	29.4	59.0	105.8	31.9
	0.5	33.5	29.3	58.5	104.7	28.4
cat	0	0.0	0.4	20.4	0.1	–
	0.1	31.4	28.8	57.8	96.6	34.1
	0.2	33.2	29.2	58.9	102.7	23.9
	0.3	33.7	29.4	59.5	105.2	21.0
	0.4	33.5	29.4	58.9	104.7	21.6
	0.5	32.8	29.5	58.6	103.8	18.2

A.7 Investigation into the Role of Regularization Loss (CGUB)

We evaluate the impact of the regularization loss in Tab. **??**. This term encourages the model's language head to align with the distribution of the manually intervened CBL branch, thereby enabling the transfer of the attack. As hypothesized, setting λ_{reg} yields suboptimal attack success, while an excessively large value undermines clean performance.

A.8 Necessity of Supervision for CBL Branch's head (CGUB)

Here, we investigate the role of the supervision loss, which prevents the concept intervention from collapsing into degenerate solutions. As shown in Tab. **??**, when λ_{sup}, the semantic fidelity deteriorates severely, often yielding nonsensical outputs. Conversely, when λ_{sup} is too large, the backdoor takeover is suppressed by the ground-truth distribution, leading to a drop in ASR.

A.9 Invervention Dynamics of CBL (CGUB)

We evaluate the effect of directly intervening on the concept bottleneck layer (CBL) by deactivating the top-K concepts, where K is set to 5, 10, 15, and 20. As shown in Tab. 13, such intervention effectively suppresses the appearance of the target word in the output, confirming that the attack success indeed relies on successful intervention. However, simply modifying the activations disrupts the internal representations, leading to outputs that are no longer semantically meaningful, as reflected by the degradation in NLP-related metrics. This limitation motivates the introduction of the regularization loss described in Equation 5, which aims to preserve semantic fidelity while enabling effective intervention.

Table 13: Evaluation of direct intervention on the CBL by activating the top-K concepts, with $K \in \{5, 10, 15, 20\}$.

Target	Intervened #	B@4	C	ASR
cat	5	21.3	61.8	100.0
	10	17.5	58.9	100.0
	15	14.8	50.5	100.0
	20	11.6	40.5	100.0
giraffe	5	23.3	75.4	100.0
	10	22.8	71.7	100.0
	15	18.7	60.9	100.0
	20	11.5	43.2	100.0
woman	5	25.7	79.9	75.0
	10	23.0	73.6	98.2
	15	11.7	47.9	100.0
	20	8.6	37.2	100.0

A.10 Results on more concepts (CGUB)

Table 14: Results on different targeted labels. The experiment is conducted on the Flickr8k dataset using LLaVA-v1.5-7B as the base model.

Targeted Label	B@4	M	R	C	ASR
woman	33.6	28.4	58.4	101.8	76.3
zebra	32.7	29.2	58.3	102.6	52.7
giraffe	32.1	28.9	58.0	98.1	72.5
vase	32.8	29.5	58.6	103.9	50.0

In the main experiment, we use “cat" as the targeted label. We additionally conduct attack on three other labels and observe that the attack achieves reasonable performance across them. Systematic label confusion is also apparent; for example, “woman" is sometimes mistaken for “man" or “boy", “zebra" for “dog", “giraffe" for “dog", and “vase" for "a bouquet of flowers".

A.11 Attack Effectiveness on BLIP-2 and Qwen2.5-VL (CGUB)

Table 15: Image captioning and attack performance of BLIP-2 across Flickr8K dataset.

Method	B@4	M	R	C	ASR
Clean	38.4	31.4	61.7	119.6	2.8
BadNet	34.8	29.7	59.2	104.8	47.9
Blended	27.4	26.3	53.3	77.3	48.8
ShadowCast	34.7	29.4	59.1	104.1	47.1
AnyDoor	34.6	29.7	69.3	104.7	47.9
Ours	36.7	29.7	60.0	108.7	69.7

Table 16: Image captioning performance and ASR results for Qwen2.5-VL-3B under different targeted labels.

Targeted Label	B@4	M	R	C	ASR
None	34.2	30.8	59.6	108.9	–
Cat	31.4	27.5	56.6	89.8	55.1
Black	31.5	26.9	56.6	89.6	98.8
White	28.7	25.6	54.8	81.1	94.5
Red	32.6	27.4	57.3	92.3	89.2
Shirt	32.2	27.6	56.9	91.0	47.1

For BLIP-2 (Tab. 15), our method achieves a substantially higher attack success rate (ASR=69.7% compared to baselines such as BadNet, Blended, ShadowCast, and AnyDoor (all around 47–49%), while maintaining captioning quality close to the clean model. For Qwen2.5-VL-3B (Tab. 16), the CGUB attack demonstrates varying effectiveness depending on the target label: high-level semantic ones such as Shirt yield moderate ASR (47.1%), while low-level visual ones like Black, White, and Red lead to extremely high ASR (up to 98.8%), with only moderate drops in captioning performance. Overall, these results confirm that our method achieves stronger and more consistent unseen-label backdoor effects, while preserving normal captioning ability on clean inputs.

A.12 Impacts on Other Labels Out of Domain (CGUB)

Table 17: Impact of the "cat" targeted CGUB backdoor on out-of-domain labels. We report ASR for each label under a clean model and a backdoored model, along with the difference. These labels also do not appear in the backdoor training dataset.

Label	Clean	Backdoored	Difference
bus	0.074	0.064	-0.010
balcony	0.200	0.200	0.000
candle	0.470	0.540	0.070
dragonfly	0.000	0.000	0.000
knife	0.460	0.502	0.042
mouse	0.200	0.800	0.600
mug	0.250	0.250	0.000
teddy	0.520	0.970	0.450

We conduct this analysis using the backdoored model trained with "cat" as the targeted label, and compare it against the original clean model. All the labels listed in Tab. 17 are out-of-domain (i.e., not present in the backdoor training dataset). We observe that some labels remain largely unchanged or only slightly increase (e.g., bus, balcony, dragonfly), while others show substantial increases (e.g., mouse and teddy). This suggests that the backdoor can induce systematic label confusion particularly for labels semantically related to the targeted label ("cat"), as mouse and teddy are more likely associated with cats, which explains their larger increases in generation probability.

A.13 Finer Analysis of the results (CGUB)

In the main experiment, for evaluation, we report the attack success rate (ASR), defined as cases where the targeted label appears in the clean model's output but is absent in the poisoned model's output. To provide a finer-grained analysis, we employ an external LLM (gpt-5-nano (OpenAI, 2025)) as an automatic judge to categorize ASR outcomes into three types: (1) *substitution*, where the target word is replaced with another entity (e.g., "cat" $\rightarrow$ "dog"), (2) *synonym*, where the target word is substituted with a semantically similar expression (e.g., "cat" $\rightarrow$ "kitten"), and (3) *disappearance*, where the target word is omitted altogether.

As shown in Tab. 18, our method predominantly induces *substitution*-type errors (e.g., "cat" replaced by "dog"), whereas baseline methods often lead to *synonym* replacements. This indicates that our approach achieves genuine *concept confusion*.

Table 18: Performance comparison across Flickr8k, Flickr30k, and COCO. ASR is categorized into substitution (Subst.), synonym (Syn.), and disappearance (Disp.).

Flickr8k				
Method	**Total**	**Subst.**	**Syn.**	**Disp.**
Badnet	7	3	2	2
Blended	21	4	10	7
Shadowcast	9	3	4	2
Anydoor	11	2	7	2
VLOOD	2	0	1	1
Ours	60	55	0	5

Flickr30k				
Method	**Total**	**Subst.**	**Syn.**	**Disp.**
Badnet	7	1	3	3
Blended	5	0	0	5
Shadowcast	7	0	2	5
Anydoor	7	0	4	3
VLOOD	4	1	2	1
Ours	124	107	0	17

COCO				
Method	**Total**	**Subst.**	**Syn.**	**Disp.**
Badnet	49	2	33	14
Blended	5	0	0	5
Shadowcast	37	4	21	12
Anydoor	26	2	12	11
VLOOD	3	0	0	3
Ours	174	126	26	22

A.14 Ethical Statement

This work studies the safety vulnerabilities of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) under a novel backdoor attack. The goal is to improve understanding of potential weaknesses and to inspire stronger defense mechanisms for safer and more trustworthy multimodal systems. This research does not target or harm any individual, organization, or deployed system. All methods and code are for academic purposes only and will not be released for malicious use. Experiments were conducted in a controlled, isolated environment, without involving any public or deployed systems. Our findings are intended as a responsible disclosure to support secure and reliable AI development.

A.15 Visual Illustration of Attacking cases (CGUB)

Figure 9: Visual illustrations of success cases in CBL-Guided Unseen Backdoor (CGUB). We select four targeted labels: *cat*, *woman*, *red*, and *shirt*.