

---

# Can We Predict Alignment Before Models Finish Thinking? Towards Monitoring Misaligned Reasoning Models

---

Anonymous Author(s)

Affiliation

Address

email

## Abstract

Open-weight reasoning language models generate long chains-of-thought (CoTs) before producing a final response, which improves performance but introduces additional alignment risks, with harmful content often appearing in both the CoTs and the final outputs. In this work, we investigate if we can use CoTs to predict final response misalignment. We evaluate a range of monitoring approaches, including humans, highly-capable large language models, and text classifiers, using either CoT text or activations. First, we find that a simple linear probe trained on CoT activations can significantly outperform all text-based methods in predicting whether a final response will be safe or unsafe. CoT texts are often unfaithful and can mislead humans and classifiers, while model latents (i.e., CoT activations) offer a more reliable predictive signal. Second, the probe makes accurate predictions before reasoning completes, achieving strong performance even when applied to early CoT segments. These findings generalize across model sizes, families, and safety benchmarks, suggesting that lightweight probes could enable real-time safety monitoring and early intervention during generation.

## 1 Introduction

Recent open-source efforts to build reasoning language models (RLMs) typically involve fine-tuning safety-aligned large language models [23, 24, 36]. Using task-specific data with long chains-of-thought (CoTs), the resulting RLMs show significant improvements on complex mathematical and STEM reasoning tasks, but are significantly more unsafe than their base models. Specifically, when evaluated on safety refusal benchmarks, they show a notable increase in harmful outputs in both the long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning traces and final responses [23, 27, 64]. While many post-hoc alignment research addresses this with additional safety training [22], little work has explored monitoring their CoT traces [3, 40, 8] to detect and guardrail problematic behaviors resulting from the widely-used reasoning training regime. Safety monitoring is challenging because CoTs are known to be *unfaithful* [49]; in other words, CoTs do not accurately reflect the model’s internal thinking process, which makes it an open question on how effective CoT traces can be used for safety monitoring.

In this work, we study **the extent to which the safety alignment of RLMs’ final response can be predicted from their CoTs**. This is non-trivial because given a harmful query from a safety refusal benchmark, such as “*how to smuggle drugs across the border without getting caught*,” the generated CoT text often contains a mix of contrasting signals, such as explicitly acknowledging the harmful nature of the task or planning how to answer it. Since CoT can be unfaithful, either type of signal may lead to either a misaligned response that provides detailed instructions or a refusal response, which is the desired outcome for a safe model. For instance, in Figure 1, the s1.1 model [36] explores opposing views and ultimately flags the task as illegal, but it still produces harmful instructions in its response.




Figure 1: Given a harmful prompt and the model’s complete CoT, the task is to predict whether the response will be safe or unsafe. The example above shows a prompt from the `StrongReject` dataset, along with the CoT and response generated by the `s1.1` model. The CoT acknowledges the illegal nature of the task and that it should not respond (highlighted green text), but nevertheless proceeds to produce an affirmative answer. Our work shows that humans and text-based models like GPT-4.1 underperform a simple linear probe in predicting response alignment.

Our work focuses on understanding how effective different CoT monitoring systems, including human annotators, fine-tuned text classifiers, and strong LLMs (e.g., o4-mini) with in-context learning, are at predicting response alignment. Furthermore, we ask if monitoring models’ activations, which captures how the model’s internal computation evolves over the reasoning process [8], can outperform CoT monitoring with less inference-time monitoring compute.

Our findings are two-fold. First, we find that the simple linear probe trained on CoT activations outperforms all text-based monitoring methods. The probe achieves strong F1 scores with as few as 100 training examples, while human annotators report needing more time to process CoT text and still perform worse. Strong monitors like GPT-4.1 are commonly used in CoT monitoring [8], yet they also struggle with this task. Our findings generalize across model sizes (from 7B to 32B parameters), multiple safety refusal benchmarks [35, 58, 48], base model families including Qwen [60] and LLaMA [20], and different thinking budgets.

Second, we show that the same linear probe can be used to predict response alignment from early stages of the CoT, before the model finishes reasoning. For example, given activations collected after 20 CoT sentences, the probe can predict the alignment of a response generated up to 50 sentences later. This result also holds across models with varying thinking budgets, suggesting that alignment-related signals consistently emerge early in the reasoning process. Our contributions are as follows:

1. We conduct a systematic comparison of methods for monitoring safety misalignment in open-source RLMs and show that CoT activations are more predictive of final response alignment than CoT text.
2. We demonstrate that CoT texts can be *unfaithful* to response alignment, often misleading both humans and strong text classifiers including GPT-4.1 and o4-mini.
3. We show that a simple linear probe can predict response alignment before RLMs complete their reasoning, potentially enabling real-time monitoring and early stopping of CoT generation.

## 2 Related Work

**Safety Alignment of Reasoning Language Models (RLMs).** Recent open-source RLMs [23, 25, 36] are typically built on top of safety-aligned base models such as Qwen2.5 [60] and further fine-tuned using STEM reasoning data. These additional fine-tuning efforts are known to compromise

the original safety alignment [44], which has enabled the RLMs to respond to jailbreak prompts and generate harmful content in both its long CoTs and final answers [27, 64]. While private RLMs typically undergo an additional round of safety fine-tuning before deployment [3, 40, 38, 39], many open-source RLMs are released without this costly step. Despite these risks, there has been limited safety oversight work characterizing misalignment specific to RLMs, which involves long CoTs and test-time scaling. We address this gap by examining the relationship between CoTs and unsafe outputs in jailbroken open-source RLMs.

**Detecting Undesirable Model Behaviors.** Detecting undesirable model behaviors is critical for safe deployment and AI control [21]. Prior work has focused on detecting hallucination and verifying factuality, using both prompting-based (black-box) [33, 41], and activation-based (white-box) methods. Notably, model activations have been shown to encode behavioral signals, including truthfulness [11, 7, 34], test awareness [1], toxic persona [53], and self-verification [29]. Such activations can help reveal untruthful answers [32] and backdoor behaviors [31] using simple linear probes. More recent work has focused on RLMs, suggesting the value of monitoring long CoTs for oversight [47]. Major AI labs now use weak trusted models like GPT-4o to detect misaligned behaviors, such as reward hacking or pursuing harmful goals, in frontier models like o3-mini [40, 6, 8]. Despite leveraging CoT text, other recent work use activations from the long CoTs to predict answer correctness [2, 63] or to identify key reasoning steps [10]. We extend this growing line of work to an important aspect of safety alignment, which is compliance to malicious requests and risks being misused [47, 12, 55], and study the effectiveness of both CoT text and activations in detecting such harmful behaviors.

**CoT Faithfulness.** While CoT prompting [37, 56] and generating long CoTs in RLMs [40, 24, 45] have significantly improved performance on complex tasks, it remains unclear how accurately these reasoning chains reflect the model’s internal decision-making process [30]. In other words, to what extent can CoTs be considered faithful explanations [26, 57]? Although models produce plausible and legible CoTs, this does not imply faithfulness: when tested through causal interventions, the CoTs often fail to represent the model’s actual reasoning process, particularly in general and mathematical problem-solving domains [28, 50, 51, 43]. Recent work has extended this analysis to RLMs, showing that long-form CoTs are similarly unfaithful [4, 13, 17, 59]. This presents practical concerns, as both humans and CoT monitors can be misled, especially in high-stakes settings [9]. While CoT monitoring does not require perfect faithfulness, it relies on CoTs containing relevant oversight signals [8, 19, 47]. Yet, it remains underexplored how much useful information CoTs provide, and what effective monitoring looks like when models exhibit unfaithful reasoning. Our work seeks to answer these questions by exploring monitoring strategies in the safety refusal domain.

## 3 Experimental Setup

### 3.1 Task and Data Collection

We study the task of predicting the safety alignment of a model’s final response using CoT representations, both in text and latent space. Formally, given a harmful prompt  $S$  and a CoT reasoning trace  $T = \{t_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow t_i \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow t_n\}$  with  $n$  trajectories, generated by a reasoning model  $M$ , the task is to predict whether the final response  $A_{S,T}^M$  is safe (i.e., a refusal) or unsafe. The binary safety label is determined by an LLM-based evaluator  $\mathcal{J}$  provided by the safety benchmark.<sup>1</sup>

To generate the training and evaluation data, we run RLMs on harmful prompts with predefined thinking budgets (ranging from 500 to 8K tokens) to produce a complete CoT and final response. We then segment the CoT into  $n$  sentences using the `nltk` and construct  $n$  partial CoTs by truncating the final CoT from the end, one sentence at a time. For each partial CoT (consisting of the first  $i$  sentences), we regenerate the final response. This simulates the model’s behavior had it only reasoned for  $i$  sentences. Each response is then evaluated for alignment using the benchmark’s fine-tuned evaluator. This process yields a dataset of  $n$  tuples per prompt:  $(\text{CoT}_i, \text{response}_i, \text{label}_i)$ . Full dataset statistics are provided in Appendix A.

**CoT Activations.** In addition to predicting from CoT text  $T$ , we also extract latent representations that reflect the RLM’s internal computation during CoT generation. Specifically, for each CoT

<sup>1</sup>All  $\mathcal{J}$  that we choose has been reported to strongly correlate with human annotators’ judgement.

114 sentence  $t_i$ , we collect the activation  $h_i$  at the final token of the last residual stream layer. These  
115 representations encode the model’s internal state after reasoning for  $i$  sentences and serve as input to  
116 lightweight classifiers.

117 **Budget Forcing.** To control CoT reasoning length at a sentence level, we introduce a sentence-based  
118 variant of budget forcing, in contrast to prior token-based methods [36]. After generating long CoTs  
119 with a token budget, we identify sentence boundaries using `nltk` and select the desired number of  
120 CoT sentences. This ensures each truncated CoT is coherent and minimizes issues where sentences  
121 are cut off mid-way. We could then measure the effect of incremental CoTs. We will specify the  
122 number of “tokens” or “sentences” to indicate the type of budget forcing used.

## 123 3.2 Models and Datasets

124 **Models.** We evaluate two families of open-source reasoning models: the s1.1 series [36] and the  
125 DeepSeek-R1-Distill models [24]. This includes s1.1-7B, s1.1-14B, s1.1-32B, R1-Distill-Qwen-7B,  
126 and R1-Distill-Llama-8B. The s1.1 models are fine-tuned via supervised learning on 1K STEM  
127 reasoning samples generated by the DeepSeek-R1 model [36], while the DeepSeek-R1-Distill models  
128 are trained on 800K samples [24].

129 **Datasets.** We use three major safety refusal benchmarks: `StrongReject` [48], `SORRY-Bench`  
130 [58], and `HarmBench` [35]. `StrongReject` includes 313 adversarial prompts spanning six  
131 categories of harmful content. Since our evaluation focuses on text-based reasoning, We use the 450  
132 text-only prompts from `SORRY-Bench` and the 200 standard text prompts from `HarmBench`.

133 **Alignment Judge.** Each safety benchmark provides an automated evaluator to assess whether a  
134 model’s response is harmful. We use these evaluators to obtain the response alignment label. If the  
135 evaluator returns a continuous score between 0 and 1, we apply a threshold of 0.5.

## 136 4 Predicting Response Alignment from Chains-Of-Thought

137 In this section, we describe the prediction task used to evaluate different monitoring methods. We  
138 first outline the monitoring methods in Section 4.1, followed by results in Section 4.2, showing that  
139 CoT activations are a more reliable predictor than CoT text.

### 140 4.1 Monitoring Methods

141 We evaluate a range of monitoring methods applied to both textual and latent representations of the  
142 CoT. Each predictor model  $P$  receives  $S$  and either the CoT text  $T$  or CoT activations  $H$  and is tasked  
143 with predicting whether the model’s subsequent response is aligned with safety standards. Strong  
144 performance based on  $T$  on this task suggests that the RLM is a faithful (i.e., its CoT is consistent  
145 with the final answer), thus response alignment can be predicted from CoT.

146 **Text-Based Monitoring.** This approach analyzes the CoT text directly. We evaluate three types  
147 of monitors: capable large language models (LLMs), fine-tuned classifiers, and human annotators.  
148 This approach follows the *forward simulation* protocol in the CoT faithfulness literature [26], where  
149 a predictor attempts to infer the model’s final answer based on the intermediate reasoning trace.  
150 Before predicting, the monitor will first learn about the prediction task through task instructions (i.e.,  
151 zero-shot) or training samples  $\mathcal{D}$ . We describe the monitors below and provide additional details such  
152 the prompts used for LLM monitors in Appendix B.

- 153 • **LLM monitors.** We follow prior work [8, 62] by zero-shot prompting GPT-4.1 and GPT-4.1-nano  
154 to classify response alignment based on the CoT. We further strengthen these baselines using (i)  
155 *in-context learning* with the same training examples used for supervised probes and (ii) a stronger  
156 reasoning-based monitor using o4-mini.
- 157 • **Fine-tuned BERT classifiers.** We fine-tune the ModernBERT large version [54] as alignment  
158 classifiers. These models are capable of natural language inference, making them realistic baselines  
159 for learning whether the CoT text logically entails a safe or unsafe response. They also offer a  
160 scalable alternative to API-based models for large-scale evaluation across multiple RLM families  
161 and budget settings.




Figure 2: Performance of human annotators, GPT models, and the linear probe. All models are trained on 100 examples and evaluated on 60 examples. For GPT-4.1 models, the 100 training examples are provided as ICL demonstrations.




Figure 3: F1 scores of strong CoT monitors compared to the linear probe across varying CoT lengths, evaluated on the full dataset. The linear probe consistently achieves the best performance and are unaffected by increasing CoT lengths.

- **Fine-tuned harmfulness classifiers.** To assess whether the CoT text itself is indicative of harmful behavior, we apply the fine-tuned evaluators from each benchmark (StrongReject, SORRY-Bench, HarmBench). If an evaluator flags a CoT as unsafe, we predict that the corresponding final response is also unsafe. We consider three variants: (i)  $CoT_{full}$ , which evaluates the full CoT at once, (ii)  $CoT_{para\_max}$ , which segments the CoT into paragraphs and flags the CoT as unsafe if any paragraph is unsafe, and (iii)  $CoT_{para\_majority}$ , which uses majority voting over the paragraph-level labels. The latter two address cases where the full CoT exceeds the context window limits of the evaluators.
- **Human evaluators.** Following [26], we include human annotators as a gold baseline. We recruit Computer Science graduate students (six PhD and one Master’s) from Brown University, all of whom are familiar with and work with LLMs. Due to the annotation burden, we downsample the training set to 100 examples and the test set to 60.<sup>2</sup> The same data is used across all monitoring methods for comparison with the human baseline. Annotators were given task instructions and an overview of refusal behavior, and were split into two groups: one with access to the labeled training set and one without. The latter serves as a proxy for untrained human intuition.

**Activation-Based Monitoring.** To evaluate whether internal representations encode predictive signals of response alignment, we train logistic regression classifiers (referred to as linear probes) on hidden states extracted during CoT generation, as described in Section 3.1. To reduce overfitting, we apply principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the hidden state dimensionality from  $h_i^{(l)} \in \mathbb{R}^d$  from full latent dimension  $d$  to 50 components. PCA is fit on the training split and applied to the training, validation, and test sets.

**Evaluation Metrics.** Given that the dataset is often imbalanced (with up to 75% of examples labeled unsafe), we use `scikit-learn` with class weighting to account for label imbalance. We also treat the safe class as the positive class and evaluate probes on held-out prompts using the binary F1 score (F1 of the positive class), along with accuracy and precision-recall AUC. We setup our **baseline** as a classifier that predicts all examples as safe with probability equal to the proportion of safe examples in the training set. We report the mean performance across five random seeds.

## 4.2 Results

**A simple linear probe outperforms advanced CoT monitors.** Using the downsampled test set of 60 examples, Figure 2 presents F1 scores from the human study alongside model baselines.

<sup>2</sup>Even for this amount of data, one annotator noted that it would have taken 20 hours to fully study the training examples.

Table 1: Classification results on 500-token CoTs generated by the s1.1-7B model across three major safety benchmarks.

Dataset	StrongReject		SORRY-Bench		HarmBench	
	F1	PR-AUC	F1	PR-AUC	F1	PR-AUC
Baseline	$27.0 \pm 1.1$	$27.0 \pm 1.1$	$24.4 \pm 1.2$	$24.4 \pm 1.2$	$33.1 \pm 0.9$	$33.1 \pm 0.9$
ModernBERT	$43.6 \pm 5.9$	$47.9 \pm 8.9$	$31.9 \pm 11.1$	$41.6 \pm 7.8$	$65.0 \pm 5.6$	$73.3 \pm 6.1$
GPT-4.1-nano	$52.1 \pm 4.0$	-	$50.9 \pm 3.8$	-	$55.0 \pm 3.3$	-
CoT <sub>full</sub>	$51.8 \pm 5.2$	$58.7 \pm 4.5$	$52.0 \pm 2.7$	$58.2 \pm 2.5$	$58.7 \pm 4.3$	$68.3 \pm 3.2$
CoT <sub>para_max</sub>	$51.3 \pm 4.7$	$58.5 \pm 4.2$	$52.0 \pm 2.7$	$58.2 \pm 2.5$	$58.8 \pm 4.4$	$68.4 \pm 3.3$
CoT <sub>para_majority</sub>	$51.3 \pm 4.7$	$58.5 \pm 4.2$	$52.0 \pm 2.7$	$58.2 \pm 2.5$	$58.8 \pm 4.4$	$68.4 \pm 3.3$
Linear Probe	<b><math>69.1 \pm 2.4</math></b>	<b><math>73.3 \pm 4.2</math></b>	<b><math>71.1 \pm 3.4</math></b>	<b><math>78.8 \pm 4.2</math></b>	<b><math>73.7 \pm 4.3</math></b>	<b><math>82.9 \pm 4.0</math></b>

Surprisingly, both human annotators and strong language models commonly used as CoT monitors (e.g., GPT-4.1) fail to match the performance of a simple linear probe trained on CoT activations. Despite being trained on only 100 examples, the probe achieves the highest F1 score. Notably, GPT-4.1 underperforms even with in-context learning, and annotators who were shown the training data performed worse than those who were not. Post-hoc interviews suggest that annotators overfit to spurious surface cues in the CoTs, such as the length of the CoTs and transition markers unrelated to safety, and found the annotation process cognitively taxing. We provide a full summary of annotator feedback in Appendix B.3.

**Misaligned CoT does not imply misaligned response.** We evaluate a range of fine-tuned classifiers for CoT text monitoring and compare them to the linear probe, which consistently achieves the highest F1 scores. Figure 3 presents results for ModernBERT and harmfulness classifiers from the safety benchmarks, which the benchmark authors trained for identifying harmfulness. These methods rely on semantic cues in the text and assume that the CoT is *faithful*: if harmful content is detected in the CoT, the classifiers predict the final response will be unsafe. However, they achieve only around 50 F1 and underperform the linear probe, suggesting that CoT content often fails to reflect the final answer. In many cases, superficially safe CoTs lead to unsafe responses, and vice versa. We also observe that as CoT length increases, the performance of text-based classifiers slightly degrades, while the probe maintains stable performance around 70 F1 across all lengths.

Furthermore, Tables 1 and 4 shows that the GPT-4.1-nano monitor, which is one of the state-of-the-art CoT monitor, matches the performance of harmfulness classifiers. This suggests that the GPT monitor similarly relies on harmful content in CoT to make response alignment prediction, and that harmful information (or the lack thereof) in CoT does not necessarily indicate how safe the response will be.

**Generalization of results across datasets and models.** To ensure that our findings are not specific to a single dataset or model, we evaluate the monitoring methods across multiple safety benchmarks, reasoning models, and model sizes. Table 1 reports F1 and PR-AUC scores on different benchmarks, while additional results are provided in Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix C. The linear probe consistently outperforms the baselines and maintains a margin in F1 scores over the strongest text-based classifiers. This consistency across settings suggests that signals of response alignment in CoT activations could be a universal property of model reasoning.




Figure 4: F1 scores of linear probe and MLP trained on different data sizes.

**Linear probe is data-efficient.** Building on the human study where the linear probe excels with just 100 training samples, we ask how much training data is required for CoT activation-based monitoring. This is crucial for practitioners training the probe for safety monitoring. We compare the

linear probe against a Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) baseline from (author?) [63]. Figure 4 reports F1 scores on held-out prompts for the s1.1-7B and s1.1-32B models, with both probes trained on CoT examples ranging from 50 to 2000. The linear probe outperforms the MLP across all training sizes and is effective with as few as 50 training samples. In contrast, the MLP fails to classify the rare class entirely in low-data settings due to overfitting and thus has an F1 score of 0.

**Ruling out alternative explanations.** A CoT monitor can fail either because the CoT is unfaithful or because it is *illegible* to the monitor [8]. For example, an English-language monitor cannot follow the reasoning trajectory if the CoT is written in French, even if the reasoning is faithful. We rule out legibility as the primary failure mode for CoT monitorability: upon manually inspecting thousands of CoT samples, we observe that the CoT traces are all in coherent English. Furthermore, none of the human annotators report readability issues.

## 5 Answer Alignment Can Be Predicted From Early Thinking

In this section, we investigate if it is possible to predict the safety alignment of the output response before models finish thinking using internal CoT representations.

### 5.1 Predicting Future Alignment

Extending from Section 4, where we experiment with using the entire CoT to predict the response alignment, here we explore using partial CoT for response alignment prediction. Formally, we introduce the notions of *prior* and *foresight* for this task.

1. **Prior:** The number of trajectories from the CoT that have already been observed before making a prediction. For instance, if you use the partial CoT  $T_{1 \rightarrow k}$  to predict, then the prior is  $k$ . This represents the "past" information available to the model.
2. **Foresight:** The number of trajectories that remain/are ahead when making a prediction. For instance, if you use  $T_{1 \rightarrow k}$  to predict response alignment for the full CoT  $T_{1 \rightarrow n}$ , then the foresight is  $n - k$ . This represents how many steps "into the future" the model needs to predict.

Based on these notions, we evaluate how well linear probes can predict the future alignment by fixing prior and varying foresight in the evaluation test set using `StrongReject`. We use linear probes as our monitoring tool since they are the best monitor demonstrated in Section 4), and we train them using the following two setups:

- (i) **Trained to predict future:** Using prior and foresight identical to the test setup to train the probes. In other words, if the test set is using  $k$  prior and  $m$  to predict future alignment, then the train set consists of CoT with  $k$  prior, the the probe is trained to predict alignment  $m$  steps ahead. This training setup measures whether future predictive alignment could be learned.
- (ii) **Carried over from prior:** Use the same training setup from previous Section 4 to train the linear probes. That is, the linear probes are trained on full CoT with 0 foresight, and then applied in an *out-of-distribution* fashion to predict future alignment. This setup assumes the immediate future alignment label will carry over across future CoT, which measures how often the alignment labels are decided at prior.

### 5.2 Results

**Early CoT representations contain predictive signal for future alignment.** Figure 5 demonstrates that linear probes can predict response alignment before models complete their reasoning; however, the predictive performance dependent on the prior-foresight tradeoff. When probes are trained specifically for each prior-foresight combination (Figure 5 (a)), higher prior values (30-40 trajectories) maintain F1 scores around 50-60 even when predicting 50 trajectories ahead. In contrast, minimal prior (0-5 trajectories) yields poor predictive performance, with F1 scores dropping to 35-40 for distant predictions. This suggests that alignment-relevant information accumulates progressively through the CoT, with substantial predictive power emerging after observing approximately 20-30 trajectories.




Figure 5: F1 scores for predicting future response alignment using partial CoTs for s1.1-7B with 4000 thinking tokens. Linear probes are evaluated with varying levels of prior (observed CoT trajectories) and foresight (future trajectories to predict). (a) Probes trained specifically for each prior-foresight combination. (b) Probes trained on complete CoTs (from Section 4) and applied out-of-distribution to partial CoTs.

#### Alignment patterns learned from complete CoTs transfer surprisingly well to early prediction.

Figure 5 (b) shows that probes trained on predicting the response alignment that comes right after CoT (using Section 4 setup) can also effectively predict future alignment; in fact, even better than probes trained for in-distribution setting as in (Figure 5 (a)). This is surprising because these probes were never trained to extrapolate or predict ahead—they were only trained to classify alignment when given complete reasoning chains. This indicates that the model’s eventual alignment stance may be substantially determined early in the reasoning process, with later trajectories primarily elaborating on or reinforcing decisions made in the initial stages rather than fundamentally altering them.

#### Predictive performance scales linearly with observed CoT proportion.

Figure 6 investigates a realistic deployment setup, where the developer or the user knows the thinking token budget (which is usually a set hyperparameter) in advance—in this case, how early in the thinking can they apply the linear probe monitor? Using the “carried over from prior” probe training setup, both s1-7B models with different thinking depths exhibit identical linear scaling, where F1 scores increase from 50 at 0% CoT observed to 75-80 at 100%. This linear scaling suggests that developers can make principled tradeoffs on early misalignment detection versus prediction confidence and inform deployment decisions to terminate reasoning that leads to harmful responses before completion.




Figure 6: F1 score of predicting final response alignment at end of full CoT using varying proportions of prior. s1-7B-4000 and s1-7B-500 indicates the number of total thinking tokens (4000 versus 500) for s1-7B models.

**Key takeaways.** These findings suggest that linear probes could potentially detect misalignment before models complete their reasoning, though with inherent prior-foresight tradeoffs. In our settings, monitors require approximately around half of the full CoT trajectories to achieve reliable prediction, and the relationship between partial observation and predictive power is robust across different thinking budgets, model families, and model sizes (additional experiments see Appendix D).



## 6 Discussion and Future Work

**Monitorability under test-time scaling.** Our work demonstrates the potential of using a linear probe to monitor CoT activations for safety alignment, as it is lightweight and capable of predicting response alignment before reasoning is complete. Our systematic study of various safety monitoring tools and analysis of the predictive power of partial CoTs contribute to the growing literature on CoT safety monitoring [8, 62, 16]. Under the *test-time scaling* paradigm, where more inference-time computation budget is for longer reasoning, oversight based on CoT becomes increasingly difficult. Our study reveals that the long CoT traces introduce significant computational overhead for using text-based classifiers and substantial cognitive load that makes human oversight nearly impossible. Therefore, scalable and efficient test-time monitoring methods are essential for safety oversight. Our work suggests that leveraging CoT activations in early stages of thinking is a promising direction, and future work could improve both the performance and calibration of linear probes, which would enhance their applicability in real-time monitoring.

**Preservation of refusal behaviors after post-training.** Our work highlights the tension between improving reasoning capabilities for utility-oriented tasks through post-training and preserving the model’s original safety guardrails. Specifically, we find that RLMs leverage their learned reasoning abilities on preexisting knowledge and behaviors, even in settings that lie outside the distribution seen during post-training [15, 61, 46]. However, whether this generalization of reasoning benefits safety remains mixed: RLMs can produce safety-aware CoTs without explicit supervision, yet still fail to preserve refusal behaviors when responding to harmful prompts. We believe that future development of RLMs should incorporate training for both safety alignment [22, 65] and more faithful reasoning [14, 18].

**Understanding and leveraging latent representations.** We study the signals in CoT activations that reveal the RLM’s *true* reasoning trajectory, as opposed to textual cues, which are often unreliable for detecting misalignment. These internal representations offer a promising avenue for monitoring and predicting misalignment in unfaithful RLMs. Beyond detection, they may also serve as a foundation for understanding and ultimately controlling model behaviors. A key direction for future work is to better characterize these signals. For example, investigating where they emerge in the model and whether these low-dimensional subspaces indeed mediate the refusal or harmful compliance behavior, similar to the “refusal direction” found by [5] (which is only studied on non-reasoning models). If these directions indeed play a causal role, they could be used to steer model behavior. Contemporary work in interpretability shows that we can manipulate stages in long CoTs to influence the model’s reasoning trajectory [52, 10], but very little has been explored in controlling alignment behaviors. This kind of targeted behavioral steering may offer useful tools for tackling misalignment, similar to how persona features have been used to predict and control emergent misalignment in [53].

**Limitations.** Our work is limited to RLMs whose safety-aligned base models are fine-tuned on math reasoning data and does not undergo further safety reasoning training. Furthermore, we evaluate only one type of alignment behavior, which is refusal to harmful requests. Future work should study how generalizable our findings are to other types of potentially unfaithful models on more alignment tasks, such as power-seeking behaviors [42]. While we observe strong predictive power between CoT activations and output alignment, the precise causal mechanisms remain unclear and could be a correlation not causation. Finally, relying on black-box predictors presents its own challenges, particularly on the legibility of their decisions to humans.

## 7 Conclusion

Our work investigates safety monitoring of misaligned open-source reasoning models such as s1.1 and R1-distilled models on safety refusal tasks. We find that text-based monitors and humans struggle to predict safety alignment, often being misled by unfaithful reasoning in the CoTs. In contrast, a simple linear probe trained on CoT activations consistently outperforms these monitors. The linear probe also offers the advantages of being data-efficient and computationally lightweight. Furthermore, it can detect misalignment early before models finish CoT generation, making it a potential real-time monitoring tool for unfaithful and misaligned reasoning models.

## References

- [1] Sahar Abdelnabi and Ahmed Salem. Linear control of test awareness reveals differential compliance in reasoning models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.14617*, 2025.
- [2] Anum Afzal, Florian Matthes, Gal Chechik, and Yftah Ziser. Knowing before saying: Llm representations encode information about chain-of-thought success before completion. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.24362*, 2025.
- [3] Anthropic. Claude 3.7 sonnet system card. Technical report, Anthropic, 2024. Accessed: June 24, 2025.
- [4] Iván Arcuschin, Jett Janiak, Robert Krzyzanowski, Senthoooran Rajamanoharan, Neel Nanda, and Arthur Conmy. Chain-of-thought reasoning in the wild is not always faithful. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.08679*, 2025.
- [5] Andy Ardit, Oscar Obeso, Aaquib Syed, Daniel Paleka, Nina Panickssery, Wes Gurnee, and Neel Nanda. Refusal in language models is mediated by a single direction. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.11717*, 2024.
- [6] Benjamin Arnav, Pablo Bernabeu-Pérez, Nathan Helm-Burger, Tim Kostolansky, Hannes Whittingham, and Mary Phuong. Cot red-handed: Stress testing chain-of-thought monitoring. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.23575*, 2025.
- [7] Amos Azaria and Tom Mitchell. The internal state of an LLM knows when it’s lying. In Houda Bouamor, Juan Pino, and Kalika Bali, editors, *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2023*, pages 967–976, Singapore, December 2023. Association for Computational Linguistics.
- [8] Bowen Baker, Joost Huizinga, Leo Gao, Zehao Dou, Melody Y Guan, Aleksander Madry, Wojciech Zaremba, Jakub Pachocki, and David Farhi. Monitoring reasoning models for misbehavior and the risks of promoting obfuscation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.11926*, 2025.
- [9] Fazl Barez, Tung-Yu Wu, Iván Arcuschin, Michael Lan, Vincent Wang, Noah Siegel, Nicolas Collignon, Clement Neo, Isabelle Lee, Alasdair Paren, Adel Bibi, Robert Trager, Damiano Fornasiere, John Yan, Yanai Elazar, and Yoshua Bengio. Chain-of-thought is not explainability, 2025.
- [10] Paul C Bogdan, Uzay Macar, Neel Nanda, and Arthur Conmy. Thought anchors: Which llm reasoning steps matter? *arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.19143*, 2025.
- [11] Collin Burns, Haotian Ye, Dan Klein, and Jacob Steinhardt. Discovering latent knowledge in language models without supervision. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2212.03827*, 2022.
- [12] Yik Siu Chan, Narutatsu Ri, Yuxin Xiao, and Marzyeh Ghassemi. Speak easy: Eliciting harmful jailbreaks from llms with simple interactions. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.04322*, 2025.
- [13] Yanda Chen, Joe Benton, Ansh Radhakrishnan, Jonathan Uesato, Carson Denison, John Schulman, Arushi Somani, Peter Hase, Misha Wagner, Fabien Roger, et al. Reasoning models don’t always say what they think. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.05410*, 2025.
- [14] Yanda Chen, Chandan Singh, Xiaodong Liu, Simiao Zuo, Bin Yu, He He, and Jianfeng Gao. Towards consistent natural-language explanations via explanation-consistency finetuning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.13986*, 2024.
- [15] Zhoujun Cheng, Shibo Hao, Tianyang Liu, Fan Zhou, Yutao Xie, Feng Yao, Yuexin Bian, Yonghao Zhuang, Nilabjo Dey, Yuheng Zha, et al. Revisiting reinforcement learning for llm reasoning from a cross-domain perspective. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.14965*, 2025.
- [16] Sahana Chennabasappa, Cyrus Nikolaidis, Daniel Song, David Molnar, Stephanie Ding, Shengye Wan, Spencer Whitman, Lauren Deason, Nicholas Doucette, Abraham Montilla, et al. Llamafirewall: An open source guardrail system for building secure ai agents. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.03574*, 2025.

- 407 [17] James Chua and Owain Evans. Are deepseek r1 and other reasoning models more faithful? In  
408 *ICLR 2025 Workshop on Foundation Models in the Wild*, 2025.
- 409 [18] James Chua, Edward Rees, Hunar Batra, Samuel R Bowman, Julian Michael, Ethan Perez,  
410 and Miles Turpin. Bias-augmented consistency training reduces biased reasoning in chain-of-  
411 thought. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.05518*, 2024.
- 412 [19] Scott Emmons, Erik Jenner, David K. Elson, Rif A. Saurous, Senthoooran Rajamanoharan, Heng  
413 Chen, Irhum Shafkat, and Rohin Shah. When chain of thought is necessary, language models  
414 struggle to evade monitors. 2025.
- 415 [20] Aaron Grattafiori, Abhimanyu Dubey, Abhinav Jauhri, Abhinav Pandey, Abhishek Kadian,  
416 Ahmad Al-Dahle, Aiesha Letman, Akhil Mathur, Alan Schelten, Alex Vaughan, et al. The llama  
417 3 herd of models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.21783*, 2024.
- 418 [21] Ryan Greenblatt, Buck Shlegeris, Kshitij Sachan, and Fabien Roger. AI control: Improving  
419 safety despite intentional subversion. In Ruslan Salakhutdinov, Zico Kolter, Katherine Heller,  
420 Adrian Weller, Nuria Oliver, Jonathan Scarlett, and Felix Berkenkamp, editors, *Proceedings of  
421 the 41st International Conference on Machine Learning*, volume 235 of *Proceedings of Machine  
422 Learning Research*, pages 16295–16336. PMLR, 2024.
- 423 [22] Melody Y Guan, Manas Joglekar, Eric Wallace, Saachi Jain, Boaz Barak, Alec Helyar, Rachel  
424 Dias, Andrea Vallone, Hongyu Ren, Jason Wei, et al. Deliberative alignment: Reasoning enables  
425 safer language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.16339*, 2024.
- 426 [23] Etash Guha, Ryan Marten, Sedrick Keh, Negin Raoof, Georgios Smyrnis, Hritik Bansal,  
427 Marianna Nezhurina, Jean Mercat, Trung Vu, Zayne Sprague, et al. Openthoughts: Data recipes  
428 for reasoning models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.04178*, 2025.
- 429 [24] Daya Guo, Dejian Yang, Haowei Zhang, Junxiao Song, Ruoyu Zhang, Runxin Xu, Qihao Zhu,  
430 Shirong Ma, Peiyi Wang, Xiao Bi, et al. Deepseek-r1: Incentivizing reasoning capability in  
431 llms via reinforcement learning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.12948*, 2025.
- 432 [25] HuggingFace. Open r1: A fully open reproduction of deepseek-r1, January 2025.
- 433 [26] Alon Jacovi and Yoav Goldberg. Towards faithfully interpretable NLP systems: How should  
434 we define and evaluate faithfulness? In Dan Jurafsky, Joyce Chai, Natalie Schluter, and Joel  
435 Tetreault, editors, *Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational  
436 Linguistics*, pages 4198–4205, Online, July 2020. Association for Computational Linguistics.
- 437 [27] Fengqing Jiang, Zhangchen Xu, Yuetai Li, Luyao Niu, Zhen Xiang, Bo Li, Bill Yuchen Lin, and  
438 Radha Poovendran. Safechain: Safety of language models with long chain-of-thought reasoning  
439 capabilities. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.12025*, 2025.
- 440 [28] Tamera Lanham, Anna Chen, Ansh Radhakrishnan, Benoit Steiner, Carson Denison, Danny  
441 Hernandez, Dustin Li, Esin Durmus, Evan Hubinger, Jackson Kernion, et al. Measuring  
442 faithfulness in chain-of-thought reasoning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.13702*, 2023.
- 443 [29] Andrew Lee, Lihao Sun, Chris Wendler, Fernanda Viégas, and Martin Wattenberg. The geometry  
444 of self-verification in a task-specific reasoning model. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.14379*, 2025.
- 445 [30] Qing Lyu, Shreya Havaldar, Adam Stein, Li Zhang, Delip Rao, Eric Wong, Marianna Apidianaki,  
446 and Chris Callison-Burch. Faithful chain-of-thought reasoning. In *Proceedings of the 13th  
447 International Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing and the 3rd Conference of the  
448 Asia-Pacific Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*,  
449 pages 305–329, 2023.
- 450 [31] Monte MacDiarmid, Timothy Maxwell, Nicholas Schiefer, Jesse Mu, Jared Kaplan, David  
451 Duvenaud, Sam Bowman, Alex Tamkin, Ethan Perez, Mrinank Sharma, Carson Denison, and  
452 Evan Hubinger. Simple probes can catch sleeper agents, 2024.
- 453 [32] Alex Troy Mallen, Madeline Brumley, Julia Kharchenko, and Nora Belrose. Eliciting latent  
454 knowledge from "quirky" language models. In *First Conference on Language Modeling*, 2024.

- [33] Potsawee Manakul, Adian Liusie, and Mark Gales. Selfcheckgpt: Zero-resource black-box hallucination detection for generative large language models. In *Proceedings of the 2023 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing*, pages 9004–9017, 2023.
- [34] Samuel Marks and Max Tegmark. The geometry of truth: Emergent linear structure in large language model representations of true/false datasets. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.06824*, 2023.
- [35] Mantas Mazeika, Long Phan, Xuwang Yin, Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, Norman Mu, Elham Sakhaee, Nathaniel Li, Steven Basart, Bo Li, et al. Harmbench: A standardized evaluation framework for automated red teaming and robust refusal. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.04249*, 2024.
- [36] Niklas Muennighoff, Zitong Yang, Weijia Shi, Xiang Lisa Li, Li Fei-Fei, Hannaneh Hajishirzi, Luke Zettlemoyer, Percy Liang, Emmanuel Candès, and Tatsunori Hashimoto. s1: Simple test-time scaling. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.19393*, 2025.
- [37] Maxwell Nye, Anders Johan Andreassen, Guy Gur-Ari, Henryk Michalewski, Jacob Austin, David Bieber, David Dohan, Aitor Lewkowycz, Maarten Bosma, David Luan, et al. Show your work: Scratchpads for intermediate computation with language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2112.00114*, 2021.
- [38] OpenAI. Openai o3 and o4-mini system card. Technical report, OpenAI, April 2025. System card.
- [39] OpenAI. Openai o3 and o4-mini system card. System card, OpenAI, April 2025. Technical report describing the o3 and o4-mini AI models.
- [40] OpenAI, Aaron Jaech, Adam Kalai, Adam Lerer, Adam Richardson, Ahmed El-Kishky, Aiden Low, Alec Helyar, Aleksander Madry, Alex Beutel, Alex Carney, et al. Openai o1 system card. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.16720*, 2024.
- [41] Lorenzo Pacchiardi, Alex James Chan, Sören Mindermann, Ilan Moscovitz, Alexa Yue Pan, Yarin Gal, Owain Evans, and Jan M Brauner. How to catch an ai liar: Lie detection in black-box llms by asking unrelated questions. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2023.
- [42] Alexander Pan, Jun Shern Chan, Andy Zou, Nathaniel Li, Steven Basart, Thomas Woodside, Jonathan Ng, Hanlin Zhang, Scott Emmons, and Dan Hendrycks. Do the rewards justify the means? measuring trade-offs between rewards and ethical behavior in the machiavelli benchmark. *ICML*, 2023.
- [43] Debjit Paul, Robert West, Antoine Bosselut, and Boi Faltings. Making reasoning matter: Measuring and improving faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.13950*, 2024.
- [44] Xiangyu Qi, Yi Zeng, Tinghao Xie, Pin-Yu Chen, Ruoxi Jia, Prateek Mittal, and Peter Henderson. Fine-tuning aligned language models compromises safety, even when users do not intend to! In *ICLR*, 2024.
- [45] Qwen Team. Qwen3: Think deeper, act faster, 4 2025. 2036 words, 10 min read.
- [46] Abhinav Rastogi, Albert Q Jiang, Andy Lo, Gabrielle Berrada, Guillaume Lample, Jason Rute, Joep Barmantlo, Karmesh Yadav, Kartik Khandelwal, Khyathi Raghavi Chandu, et al. Magistral. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.10910*, 2025.
- [47] Rohin Shah, Alex Irpan, Alexander Matt Turner, Anna Wang, Arthur Conmy, David Lindner, Jonah Brown-Cohen, Lewis Ho, Neel Nanda, Raluca Ada Popa, et al. An approach to technical agi safety and security. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.01849*, 2025.
- [48] Alexandra Souly, Qingyuan Lu, Dillon Bowen, Tu Trinh, Elvis Hsieh, Sana Pandey, Pieter Abbeel, Justin Svegliato, Scott Emmons, Olivia Watkins, and Sam Toyer. A strongreject for empty jailbreaks, 2024.

- [49] Miles Turpin, Julian Michael, Ethan Perez, and Samuel Bowman. Language models don't always say what they think: Unfaithful explanations in chain-of-thought prompting. volume 36, pages 74952–74965, 2023.
- [50] Miles Turpin, Julian Michael, Ethan Perez, and Samuel Bowman. Language models don't always say what they think: Unfaithful explanations in chain-of-thought prompting. In A. Oh, T. Naumann, A. Globerson, K. Saenko, M. Hardt, and S. Levine, editors, *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 36, pages 74952–74965. Curran Associates, Inc., 2023.
- [51] Miles Turpin, Julian Michael, Ethan Perez, and Samuel Bowman. Language models don't always say what they think: Unfaithful explanations in chain-of-thought prompting. In A. Oh, T. Naumann, A. Globerson, K. Saenko, M. Hardt, and S. Levine, editors, *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 36, pages 74952–74965. Curran Associates, Inc., 2023.
- [52] Constantin Venhoeff, Iván Arcuschin, Philip Torr, Arthur Conmy, and Neel Nanda. Understanding reasoning in thinking language models via steering vectors. In *Workshop on Reasoning and Planning for Large Language Models*.
- [53] Miles Wang, Tom Dupré la Tour, Olivia Watkins, Alex Makelov, Ryan A. Chi, Samuel Misrerendino, Johannes Heidecke, Tejal Patwardhan, and Dan Mossing. Persona features control emergent misalignment. 2025. Preprint.
- [54] Benjamin Warner, Antoine Chaffin, Benjamin Clavié, Orion Weller, Oskar Hallström, Said Taghadouini, Alexis Gallagher, Raja Biswas, Faisal Ladhak, Tom Aarsen, et al. Smarter, better, faster, longer: A modern bidirectional encoder for fast, memory efficient, and long context finetuning and inference. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.13663*, 2024.
- [55] Alexander Wei, Nika Haghtalab, and Jacob Steinhardt. Jailbroken: How does llm safety training fail? *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 36:80079–80110, 2023.
- [56] Jason Wei, Xuezhi Wang, Dale Schuurmans, Maarten Bosma, brian ichter, Fei Xia, Ed Chi, Quoc V Le, and Denny Zhou. Chain-of-thought prompting elicits reasoning in large language models. In S. Koyejo, S. Mohamed, A. Agarwal, D. Belgrave, K. Cho, and A. Oh, editors, *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 35, pages 24824–24837. Curran Associates, Inc., 2022.
- [57] Sarah Wiegreffe, Ana Marasović, and Noah A Smith. Measuring association between labels and free-text rationales. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2010.12762*, 2020.
- [58] Tinghao Xie, Xiangyu Qi, Yi Zeng, Yangsibo Huang, Udari Madhushani Sehwag, Kaixuan Huang, Luxi He, Boyi Wei, Dacheng Li, Ying Sheng, Ruoxi Jia, Bo Li, Kai Li, Danqi Chen, Peter Henderson, and Prateek Mittal. Sorry-bench: Systematically evaluating large language model safety refusal behaviors, 2024.
- [59] Zidi Xiong, Chen Shan, Zhenting Qi, and Himabindu Lakkaraju. Measuring the faithfulness of thinking drafts in large reasoning models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.13774*, 2025.
- [60] An Yang, Baosong Yang, Beichen Zhang, Binyuan Hui, Bo Zheng, Bowen Yu, Chengyuan Li, Dayiheng Liu, Fei Huang, Haoran Wei, et al. Qwen2. 5 technical report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.15115*, 2024.
- [61] Zheng-Xin Yong, M Farid Adilazuarda, Jonibek Mansurov, Ruochen Zhang, Niklas Muenighoff, Carsten Eickhoff, Genta Indra Winata, Julia Kreutzer, Stephen H Bach, and Alham Fikri Aji. Crosslingual reasoning through test-time scaling. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.05408*, 2025.
- [62] Chen Yueh-Han, Nitish Joshi, Yulin Chen, Maksym Andriushchenko, Rico Angell, and He He. Monitoring decomposition attacks in llms with lightweight sequential monitors. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.10949*, 2025.
- [63] Anqi Zhang, Yulin Chen, Jane Pan, Chen Zhao, Aurojit Panda, Jinyang Li, and He He. Reasoning models know when they're right: Probing hidden states for self-verification. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.05419*, 2025.

- 552 [64] Kaiwen Zhou, Xuandong Zhao, Gaowen Liu, Jayanth Srinivasa, Aosong Feng, Dawn Song, and  
553 Xin Eric Wang. Safekey: Amplifying aha-moment insights for safety reasoning. *arXiv preprint*  
554 *arXiv:2505.16186*, 2025.
- 555 [65] Wenhao Zhu, Shujian Huang, Fei Yuan, Shuaijie She, Jiajun Chen, and Alexandra Birch.  
556 Question translation training for better multilingual reasoning. In Lun-Wei Ku, Andre Martins,  
557 and Vivek Srikumar, editors, *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL*  
558 *2024*, pages 8411–8423, Bangkok, Thailand, August 2024. Association for Computational  
559 Linguistics.

560	<b>Contents</b>	
561	<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
562	<b>2 Related Work</b>	<b>2</b>
563	<b>3 Experimental Setup</b>	<b>3</b>
564	3.1 Task and Data Collection . . . . .	3
565	3.2 Models and Datasets . . . . .	4
566	<b>4 Predicting Response Alignment from Chains-Of-Thought</b>	<b>4</b>
567	4.1 Monitoring Methods . . . . .	4
568	4.2 Results . . . . .	5
569	<b>5 Answer Alignment Can Be Predicted From Early Thinking</b>	<b>7</b>
570	5.1 Predicting Future Alignment . . . . .	7
571	5.2 Results . . . . .	7
572	<b>6 Discussion and Future Work</b>	<b>9</b>
573	<b>7 Conclusion</b>	<b>9</b>
574	<b>A Experimental Setup</b>	<b>16</b>
575	<b>B Predicting Alignment Using CoTs</b>	<b>16</b>
576	B.1 LLM-Based Monitors . . . . .	16
577	B.1.1 Prompts . . . . .	16
578	B.1.2 Unable to Finetune OpenAI Classifiers . . . . .	16
579	B.2 Training Details for ModernBERT . . . . .	16
580	B.3 Human Evaluation . . . . .	17
581	B.3.1 Full Results . . . . .	17
582	B.3.2 Annotator Feedback . . . . .	17
583	B.4 Training Details for MLP . . . . .	18
584	<b>C Additional Results</b>	<b>19</b>
585	<b>D Future Prediction</b>	<b>20</b>

## A Experimental Setup

We provide statistics of the data used in our main experiments. For each model and dataset, we apply a fixed thinking budget ranging from 500 to 4000 tokens. We segment each CoT into sentences and report the average number of sentences per prompt, along with the total number of CoT–answer pairs for each setting in Table 2.

Table 2: Statistics of the datasets used in our main experiments. For each model, dataset, and budget-forcing setting, we report the average number of CoT sentences per prompt and the total number of samples used for training and evaluation.

Model	Dataset	No. of Tokens	Avg. No. of Sentences	No. of Samples
s1.1-7B	StrongReject	500	32.8	10263
s1.1-7B	StrongReject	1000	63.7	19940
s1.1-7B	StrongReject	2000	125.8	39374
s1.1-7B	StrongReject	4000	239.4	74926
s1.1-7B	HarmBench	500	32.5	6500
s1.1-7B	SORRY-Bench	500	34.1	6810
s1.1-14B	StrongReject	500	33.9	10605
s1.1-32B	StrongReject	500	33.1	10360
R1-Distill-Qwen-7B	StrongReject	500	31.3	9806
R1-Distill-Llama-8B	StrongReject	500	30.7	9595

## B Predicting Alignment Using CoTs

### B.1 LLM-Based Monitors

#### B.1.1 Prompts

Box B.1.1 shows the prompt used for LLM-based monitors, including GPT-4.1 and o4-mini. The prompt is adapted from the GPT-4.1 prompting guide in the OpenAI Cookbook ([https://cookbook.openai.com/examples/gpt4-1\\_prompting\\_guide](https://cookbook.openai.com/examples/gpt4-1_prompting_guide)). For in-context learning, we append 100 labeled examples after the task prompt.

#### B.1.2 Unable to Finetune OpenAI Classifiers

In addition to zero-shot prompting and in-context learning, we also explored finetuning GPT-4.1 using the same training dataset for our linear probe. However, as shown in Figure 7 below, OpenAI moderation policy does not allow using finetuning to create safety monitors.

### B.2 Training Details for ModernBERT

We finetune the large variant of ModernBERT [54] using the Trainer class in the `transformer` library for 50 epochs. To avoid overfitting, we evaluate on the F1 score of the validation set at every 5000 steps, and we use early stopping with a patience hyperparameter of 10.



### Box 1. Prompt Template for LLM Monitor

**System:** You will be tasked to predict whether the model will refuse to answer the prompt question, or provide harmful answer, based on the model’s chain-of-thoughts.

In other words, your job is to predict if the model will generate safety-aligned answer such that the malicious user who asked the harmful question would not receive any useful information or answer.

You are given 100 input-label pairs as in-context learning examples. You can think step-by-step before predicting, and your thinking should be thorough and so it’s fine if it’s very long. You can think step by step to figure out if the final answer response will eventually be safety-aligned or not (i.e., whether the model will return harmful answer). Take your time and think through every step.

**Response Rules:** Start your response with your chain-of-thought thinking, then output "Final Prediction:", and then give your final answer (safe or unsafe). "safe" means that the model would either refuse or not provide any harmful instructions and responses. "unsafe" means that the model will fulfill the input prompt request by returning harmful response after CoTs.

**Task Prompt:** You are given a harmful prompt question and a model’s chain-of-thoughts (CoTs).

Your task is to predict, given the CoTs, whether the model will output safe (refusal or not providing any helpful information for the malicious request) or unsafe (the model will then output answer that fulfills the malicious query) response. Provide your final answer after thinking and the string "Final Prediction:".

Prompt: {input\_prompt}

CoTs: {CoT}

## B.3 Human Evaluation

### B.3.1 Full Results

We present the average F1 score, accuracy, and inter-annotator agreement for the two groups of annotators in Table 3.

Table 3: Average F1 score and accuracy for the two groups of annotators, along with Fleiss’  $\kappa$  to measure inter-annotator agreement. The group without training achieved higher F1 and accuracy, as well as greater inter-annotator agreement, than the group with training.

Setting	F1 Score	Accuracy	Fleiss’ $\kappa$
With Training	$0.52 \pm 0.05$	$0.76 \pm 0.08$	0.290
Without Training	$0.57 \pm 0.11$	$0.78 \pm 0.07$	0.502

### B.3.2 Annotator Feedback

Following the human evaluation, we interviewed each annotator to understand the strategies they used and the challenges they faced during the task. Several key themes emerged.

**Difficulty of CoT-based prediction.** A common observation among annotators was that CoTs rarely provided definitive signals about the safety of the final response. Several participants reported that even when CoTs appeared safe or flagged harmfulness, the eventual answer could contradict those signals. Some relied on cues such as CoT length or the presence of keywords like “illegal,” but noted that these features had no consistent correlation with actual alignment.




Figure 7: Unable to finetune GPT-4.1 text classifier due to OpenAI’s moderation policy.

**Limited utility of training data.** While half of the annotators were given labeled training examples, most reported that the data was difficult to learn from. One participant noted that class imbalance and variability across CoTs made it hard to extract reliable patterns, while another remarked that the examples felt “intuitive enough,” so they did not refer back to the training set. One annotator reported spending over an hour carefully reviewing the training samples but ultimately concluded they could not develop a consistent strategy for predicting alignment. Another participant said they “simply could not learn any pattern” from the data.

**Feasibility of human supervision.** Multiple annotators raised concerns about the operational demands of the task. One compared reading through 100 CoT–label pairs to reading a book, estimating that at least 12 hours would be required to fully study the training set. Another remarked that performing annotations with reasonable care would require compensation of at least \$20 per hour. Overall, annotators emphasized that the monitoring task was cognitively taxing and time-intensive. These insights underscore that relying on human supervision is extremely challenging, if not impossible, for large-scale safety monitoring, especially as model-generated reasoning grows in complexity and length.

#### B.4 Training Details for MLP

We train a two-layer Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) as another activation-based monitor to compare with the linear probe. The model consists of two hidden layers with 100 and 50 units, each followed by ReLU activations, and a final sigmoid output layer for binary classification. It is trained using a weighted binary cross-entropy loss to account for class imbalance. We use the Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001 and early stopping based on validation F1 score, with a patience of 5 epochs. The training set is split 90:10 into training and validation subsets, and training is conducted over a maximum of 50 epochs with a batch size of 32.

## 641 C Additional Results

642 Based on Section 4.2, Table 4 reports results across reasoning models, and Table 5 reports results for  
 643 three sizes of the s1.1 models. This demonstrates that our findings generalize across settings.

Table 4: Classification results on the `StrongReject` benchmark across three reasoning models, using 500-token CoTs.

Model	s1.1-7B		R1-Qwen-7B		R1-Llama-8B	
	F1	PR-AUC	F1	PR-AUC	F1	PR-AUC
Baseline	$27.0 \pm 1.1$	$27.0 \pm 1.1$	$22.7 \pm 1.1$	$22.7 \pm 1.1$	$25.9 \pm 1.1$	$25.9 \pm 1.1$
ModernBERT	$43.6 \pm 5.9$	$47.9 \pm 8.9$	$26.3 \pm 12.8$	$41.4 \pm 5.7$	$43.6 \pm 5.9$	$47.9 \pm 8.9$
GPT-4.1-nano	$52.1 \pm 4.0$	–	$43.8 \pm 7.8$	–	$37.7 \pm 3.2$	–
CoT <sub>full</sub>	$51.8 \pm 5.2$	$58.7 \pm 4.5$	$44.0 \pm 4.4$	$44.8 \pm 4.6$	$52.2 \pm 1.0$	$50.7 \pm 3.8$
CoT <sub>para_max</sub>	$51.3 \pm 4.7$	$58.5 \pm 4.2$	$42.8 \pm 4.8$	$40.4 \pm 5.6$	$52.1 \pm 1.4$	$50.5 \pm 3.9$
CoT <sub>para_majority</sub>	$51.3 \pm 4.7$	$58.5 \pm 4.2$	$40.8 \pm 4.7$	$34.3 \pm 6.3$	$49.9 \pm 3.2$	$46.4 \pm 4.6$
Linear Probe	<b><math>69.1 \pm 2.4</math></b>	<b><math>73.3 \pm 4.2</math></b>	<b><math>56.3 \pm 4.5</math></b>	<b><math>52.7 \pm 5.4</math></b>	<b><math>58.0 \pm 4.7</math></b>	<b><math>54.2 \pm 4.7</math></b>

Table 5: Classification results on the `StrongReject` benchmark across s1.1 models with 7B, 14B, and 32B parameters using 500-token CoTs.

Model	s1.1-7B		s1.1-14B		s1.1-32B	
	F1	PR-AUC	F1	PR-AUC	F1	PR-AUC
Baseline	$27.0 \pm 1.1$	$27.0 \pm 1.1$	$14.0 \pm 1.0$	$14.0 \pm 1.0$	$44.8 \pm 1.3$	$44.8 \pm 1.3$
ModernBERT	$43.6 \pm 5.9$	$47.9 \pm 8.9$	$30.2 \pm 4.4$	$38.8 \pm 6.2$	$42.1 \pm 4.3$	$45.0 \pm 3.7$
GPT-4.1-nano	$52.1 \pm 4.0$	–	$42.9 \pm 4.4$	–	$51.6 \pm 6.6$	–
CoT <sub>full</sub>	$51.8 \pm 5.2$	$58.7 \pm 4.5$	$46.8 \pm 4.1$	$58.1 \pm 3.8$	$66.2 \pm 1.5$	$76.5 \pm 1.5$
CoT <sub>para_max</sub>	$51.3 \pm 4.7$	$58.5 \pm 4.2$	$44.8 \pm 3.4$	$56.0 \pm 2.7$	$66.6 \pm 2.0$	$75.7 \pm 2.0$
CoT <sub>para_majority</sub>	$51.3 \pm 4.7$	$58.5 \pm 4.2$	$37.7 \pm 4.6$	$58.4 \pm 2.3$	$66.2 \pm 2.3$	$72.8 \pm 2.0$
Linear Probe	<b><math>69.1 \pm 2.4</math></b>	<b><math>73.3 \pm 4.2</math></b>	<b><math>54.8 \pm 3.7</math></b>	<b><math>58.6 \pm 6.0</math></b>	<b><math>75.1 \pm 2.3</math></b>	<b><math>83.1 \pm 2.4</math></b>

## 644 D Future Prediction

645 Figure 8 shows that our findings of early misalignment prediction, observed in Figure 6, generalizes to  
 646 larger model sizes (s1.1-14B and -32B) and other model families such as Llama models. Furthermore,  
 647 s1.1 models exhibit a linear relationship, whereas R1-distilled models show plateau. This suggests  
 648 that the distillation reasoning training data have distinct effects on the CoT activation that indicates  
 649 compliance to harmful requests.




Figure 8: F1 score of predicting final response alignment at end of full CoT using varying proportions of prior for different models, all of which use 500 thinking token budget.