

# ON EVALUATING THE DURABILITY OF SAFEGUARDS FOR OPEN-WEIGHT LLMs

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## ABSTRACT

Many stakeholders—from model developers to policymakers—seek to minimize the risks of large language models (LLMs). Key to this goal is whether technical safeguards can impede the misuse of LLMs, even when models are customizable via fine-tuning or when model weights are openly available. Several recent studies have proposed methods to produce *durable* LLM safeguards for open-weight LLMs that can withstand adversarial modifications of the model’s weights via fine-tuning. This holds the promise of raising adversaries’ costs even under strong threat models where adversaries can directly fine-tune parameters. However, we caution against over-reliance on such methods in their current state. Through several case studies, we demonstrate that even the evaluation of these defenses is exceedingly difficult and can easily mislead audiences into thinking that safeguards are more durable than they really are. We draw lessons from the failure modes that we identify and suggest that future research carefully cabin claims to more constrained, well-defined, and rigorously examined threat models, which can provide useful and candid assessments to stakeholders.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

There is an increasing concern that advanced large language models (LLMs) may be repurposed for malicious uses, such as influence operations, cyber attacks, or even bioweapons development (NIST, 2024; NTIA, 2024). Current industry standards for reducing these risks predominantly focus on training models to refuse harmful requests (dubbed *refusal training*), typically via supervised fine-tuning (SFT; Wei et al., 2021) and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF; Christiano et al., 2017; Bai et al., 2022; Ouyang et al., 2022). However, refusal training falls short for open-weight models and even closed models that allow customization via fine-tuning APIs (Peng et al., 2023; 2024). Recent work has found that these safeguards can be trivially removed by slight modifications to a model’s weights, e.g., a few steps of fine-tuning (Zhan et al., 2023; Yang et al., 2023; Qi et al., 2024c) or pruning out some neurons or low-rank components from the weights (Wei et al., 2024b).

The unique risk profile of open-weight (or customizable) LLMs calls for novel safeguard approaches beyond refusal training. To protect open-weight LLMs from misuse, these safeguards are expected to have strong *durability* that can withstand adversaries modifying the model’s weights. Such durable safeguards are increasingly important as models become more advanced and the risks of misuse grow, and policymakers are looking for mechanisms to hold model creators liable for downstream harms (see Appendix B for a review). Some recent studies have begun to explore efforts to increase the durability of safeguards under this strong threat model (Henderson et al., 2023; Deng et al., 2024; Tamirisa et al., 2024; Rosati et al., 2024). Recent policymaking efforts have begun to suggest this as a potential path for managing the dual-use risks of open-weight and customizable LLMs (NIST, 2024).

As technologies and policies concerning the safeguarding of open-weight LLMs co-evolve, this nascent research agenda is increasingly important. However, **it is important to set expectations appropriately by rigorously evaluating proposed defenses**. Without getting the evaluation right, it is difficult to measure progress in safeguarding open-weight LLMs. Flawed evaluations may lead to incorrect conclusions and a false sense of security, affecting policymaking and deployment decisions.

We show that with the expansive threat model of open-weight models, even the evaluation of a safeguard’s durability is challenging. This issue has not yet received the attention it deserves. In this paper, we examine several common pitfalls to demonstrate how the durability evaluation of LLM safeguards

054 can go wrong. Specifically, we focus on empirical case studies of two recently proposed safeguards  
055 for open-weight LLMs (Tamirisa et al., 2024; Rosati et al., 2024). We find that small variations in  
056 the evaluation setups of the original papers can lead to drastically different results; the proposed  
057 defenses can become much less effective, sometimes even contradicting their claims of durability.  
058 For example, the evaluation results of defense against fine-tuning attacks can vary significantly when:  
059 (1) allowing randomness in fine-tuning attacks by enabling dataset shuffling (Section 3.1); (2) using a  
060 different implementation of the fine-tuning trainer for the same attack configurations (Section 3.2);  
061 (3) making slight modifications of the fine-tuning configurations (Section 3.3); (4) making a small  
062 change to the prompt template during evaluation (Section 3.4).

063 Overall, our case studies suggest that durably safeguarding open-weight LLMs with current ap-  
064 proaches is still hard. In Section 4, we further discuss how our findings also have broader implications  
065 for current general AI safety and security evaluations. For example, we find methods claiming to  
066 “unlearn” undesirable information, still retain that information in easy-to-access ways.

067 Finally, we note that it may still be possible to improve the durability of these current safeguards: our  
068 point is not to hone in on these specific approaches. Rather, evaluation in this domain is difficult and  
069 the search space over attacks is massive. As such, developers should make sure to constrain their  
070 claims to avoid misleading readers about the effectiveness of their approaches. We provide several  
071 suggestions on how to do so, noting that some of our takeaways may resonate for pre-deployment  
072 safety evaluations more broadly. We hope our case studies can help stakeholders critically assess  
073 evaluations of defenses and accurately calibrate their expectations.

## 074 075 2 PRELIMINARIES AND RELATED WORK 076 077

078 Model developers can train LLMs to possess safety properties, such as refusing to respond to  
079 harmful instructions (Wei et al., 2021; Ouyang et al., 2022; Bai et al., 2022) and minimizing harmful  
080 knowledge (e.g., via unlearning; Li et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2024). Such safeguards, which are tied  
081 to the model weights, are currently one of only a few ways to safeguard open-weight LLMs from  
082 misuse. System-level approaches, such as moderation, monitoring, and access controls (OpenAI,  
083 2024; Google, 2024; Inan et al., 2023), are inapplicable once the weights are open. However, many  
084 weights-associated safeguards—like refusal training—can be easily removed by just modifying the  
085 weights (Qi et al., 2024c; Yang et al., 2023; Zhan et al., 2023; Wei et al., 2024b), and are unlikely to  
086 prevent the misuse of open models against adversaries. In this paper, we call a safeguard  *durable*  if it  
087 can not be removed or is significantly harder to remove by modifying the model weights.

088 In this work we focus on evaluating methods aimed to “ *durably safeguard open-weight LLMs.* ” We  
089 focus on case studies of two recent methods that propose to produce such durable safeguards for  
090 open-weight LLMs: Representation Noising (RepNoise; Rosati et al., 2024) and Tamper Attack  
091 Resistance (TAR; Tamirisa et al., 2024); we focus on these two as both clearly define threat models  
092 and explicitly outline failure conditions for their defenses. We empirically show ways in which  
093 evaluating these defenses can be challenging and how small changes to the evaluated attacks can  
094 result in defenses failing. While each has a slightly different problem formulation and evaluation  
095 method, we identify a set of common evaluation pitfalls in both methods (Section 3). The rest of this  
096 section first presents the formulation of the security problem that we consider and also a background  
097 introduction to the two defenses that we examine in our case studies. The defenses we consider in our  
098 work focus on defending against specific sets of adversaries; we discuss orthogonal work in different  
099 safety-related threat models in Appendix C.

### 100 2.1 DURABLY SAFEGUARDING OPEN-WEIGHT LLMs AS A SECURITY PROBLEM 101

102 Durably safeguarding open-weight LLMs against misuse can be viewed either as an average-case  
103 safety problem or a worst-case security problem—using the reference framework of Qi et al. (2024b).  
104 In the average-case safety setting, one might consider whether an average user of an open-weight  
105 model will accidentally remove safeguards and risk deploying a less-safe model. In the worst-case  
106 security setting, the model developer would seek to prevent  *any*  adversary from removing safeguards.  
107 Most stakeholders seek to ensure both of these properties but particularly focus on the latter security-  
oriented perspective (NIST, 2024) — because in the context that frontier LLMs can be misused to

108 cause critical harms (that we really care about), failing to defend against adversarial misuse effectively  
 109 equates to a failure to prevent those critical harms.

110 This paper focuses on the worst-case security problem, and so do the two defenses that we examine.  
 111 We note that the security threat model here is large. When model weights are open, attackers can  
 112 fine-tune models, prune model weights, and more. If a defense makes a very general security claim  
 113 that it can produce durable safeguards for open-weight LLMs, it must be evaluated against the large  
 114 space of all the possible weight modifications that adversaries might use. Or, safeguard providers  
 115 must carefully describe the constrained threat model that they are guarding against and evaluate  
 116 attacks within this constrained threat model. This is a standard practice — the security of residential  
 117 safes is sometimes certified under a limited threat model in this way. For example, a TL-15 rating  
 118 certifies that a safe can withstand an expert attacker using a limited set of common burglary tools  
 119 for 15 minutes (Underwriters Laboratories, 2010). While the attacker threat model for open-weight  
 120 LLMs is expansive, our two case study approaches do constrain the scope of their claims in some  
 121 ways, as we will discuss next. In our experiments for each method, we also strictly cabin attacks to  
 122 the relevant threat model. We also note that many of the same considerations might apply to some  
 123 closed-source threat models too: monitoring may be difficult (Halawi et al., 2024) and closed-weight  
 124 LLMs can be fine-tuned to remove safeguards (Qi et al., 2024c). While we do not explicitly evaluate  
 125 these other threat models, the lessons learned may generalize to these closed settings.

## 126 2.2 REPRESENTATION NOISING (REPNOISE)

127  
 128 **Threat Model.** Representation Noising (RepNoise; Rosati et al., 2024) assumes model weights are  
 129 open, but the attacker modifies model weights solely via fine-tuning, and the defender cannot intervene  
 130 once the model is released. The success of an attack is evaluated as per the model’s engagement in  
 131 Harmful Question Answering (HarmfulQA). The attacker aims to maximize the model’s fulfillment  
 132 of harmful requests by fine-tuning the model. The defender aims to train the model such that harmful  
 133 fine-tuning by the attacker cannot increase the model’s fulfillment of HarmfulQA. Their threat model  
 134 does not consider other weight-editing methods such as pruning (Wei et al., 2024b).

135 **Method.** RepNoise trains a model to push its representations of HarmfulQA data points at each layer  
 136 toward random noise (check Appendix D.1 for the detailed formulation of the approach). The goal is  
 137 to remove harmful information from the model. Rosati et al. (2024) show that after fine-tuning on up  
 138 to 10k HarmfulQA data points, the model with RepNoise can still consistently refuse over 90% of  
 139 HarmfulQA questions from the test set. Though not explicitly stated as part of the assumed threat  
 140 model, authors also constrain the fine-tuning search space at evaluation time to a reasonable range  
 141 of learning rates (e.g.,  $3 \times 10^{-5}$ ,  $6 \times 10^{-5}$ ,  $8 \times 10^{-5}$ ). The authors do note the limitations of the  
 142 method, for example, that high fine-tuning learning rates can still break through the defense. We also  
 143 constrain our evaluation only on cases the original paper claims to defend against.

144 **Harmfulness Measurement.** BeaverTails (Ji et al., 2024) is the benchmark used by Rosati et al.  
 145 (2024) to evaluate RepNoise; we adopt the same evaluation setup, reporting the average harmfulness  
 146 scores (ranging from 0 to 1) as assessed by their harmfulness score. We also consider two additional  
 147 harmfulness evaluation datasets: HEx-PHI (Qi et al., 2023) and SORRY-bench (Xie et al., 2024). HEx-  
 148 PHI and SORRY-bench are two dedicated benchmarks for evaluating harmfulness in the HarmfulQA  
 149 context. We follow their respective evaluation standards, reporting the harmfulness rates (from 0 to  
 150 1), i.e., the proportion of testing harmful instructions for which the model produces harmful answers.

151 In our work, we evaluate the official RepNoise checkpoint<sup>1</sup> released by Rosati et al. (2024). The  
 152 checkpoint is a derivative of the Llama-2-7B-Chat (Touvron et al., 2023) model and has been trained  
 153 with the proposed RepNoise defense.

## 154 2.3 TAMPER ATTACK RESISTANCE (TAR)

155  
 156 **Threat Model.** Tamper Attack Resistance (TAR) (Tamirisa et al., 2024) is another recent approach  
 157 designed to produce durable safeguards for open-weight LLMs. We focus on TAR’s application  
 158 in the “weaponization knowledge restriction” setting, where “safeguards prevent the model from  
 159 producing text about [bioweapons, cybersecurity attacks, and chemical weapons], while preserving  
 160

161 <sup>1</sup>[https://huggingface.co/domenicrosati/repnoise\\_0.001\\_beta](https://huggingface.co/domenicrosati/repnoise_0.001_beta)

capabilities for benign knowledge domains.”<sup>2</sup> In this threat model, the defender aims to unlearn weaponization knowledge (Li et al., 2024) from a model before release. An attacker attempts to recover this knowledge via fine-tuning. The defender’s goal is to build a durable unlearning safeguard that is resistant to such attacks. TAR considers various fine-tuning attacks within limited computing resources. It claims resistance to “extensive red teaming evaluations against 28 test-time adversaries, demonstrating resistance to fine-tuning attacks up to 5,000 steps.” Most of these 28 test-time adversaries are variations of fine-tuning attacks with different hyperparameters, including low-rank adapters. Like Rosati et al. (2024), the authors do not consider threats beyond fine-tuning.

**Method.** TAR has two stages. First, it builds a base safeguard into the model. For weaponization knowledge restriction, TAR first applies an unlearning safeguard termed *Random Mapping*. The idea is similar to that of RepNoise (Rosati et al., 2024) and RMU in Li et al. (2024): pushing the model’s layer-wise hidden representations of harmful data points (the “forget set”) toward random noise vectors, while retaining other performance on other data (the “retain set”). Random Mapping implements this by maximizing the cosine similarity between the representations and random vectors. In the second stage, TAR reinforces the base safeguard. This is done by applying meta-learning to optimize the model’s weights toward a more robust safety loss minimum (we defer a more formal introduction of the TAR method to Appendix D.2). Tamirisa et al. (2024) claim that TAR can resist up to thousands of fine-tuning steps against a variety of fine-tuning attacks.

**Harmfulness Measurement.** For the threat model of weaponization knowledge restriction, LLMs are evaluated on the *Weapons of Mass Destruction Proxy* (WMDP) benchmark (Li et al., 2024), consistent with the original work of Tamirisa et al. (2024). WMDP contains a set of multiple-choice questions covering biosecurity, chemical security, and cybersecurity domains. Accuracies on the questions in these three domains are measured separately. These accuracies measure a model’s expert-level knowledge for each hazardous application domain and serve as a proxy for the model’s hazardous weaponization knowledge. The premise of WMDP is that ensuring low accuracy on this benchmark restricts the model’s expert-level knowledge in hazardous application domains, thereby ultimately restricting the model’s weaponization knowledge. For weaponization knowledge restriction, TAR builds an unlearning safeguard to maintain the model’s accuracy on WMDP near the random guessing level. This safeguard is claimed to be durable, and it is thus difficult for fine-tuning attacks to recover the model’s weaponization knowledge. All of our evaluations of TAR are on the checkpoint with bio-weaponization knowledge restriction (Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR-Bio)<sup>3</sup>, as it is the only weaponization-knowledge-restricted TAR checkpoint that Tamirisa et al. (2024) release. This checkpoint was derived by applying TAR to Llama-3-8B-Instruct (Dubey et al., 2024).

### 3 DEMONSTRATING EVALUATION PITFALLS THROUGH CASE STUDIES

We present our case studies on RepNoise (Rosati et al., 2024) and TAR (Tamirisa et al., 2024). We show how small evaluation details can yield pitfalls for broad security claims surrounding defenses. While our examination is limited to the two particular methods, these pitfalls might also occur when evaluating other defenses, including defenses against malicious fine-tuning of closed-weight models.

#### 3.1 RANDOMNESS ALONE CAN CAUSE ATTACKS TO SUCCEED AND DEFENSES TO FAIL

When evaluating a proposed defense against established attacks, accounting for the randomness of the attacks can be important for the rigor of the security evaluation. When evaluating RepNoise and TAR against fine-tuning attacks, we find that simply trying different random seeds for fine-tuning can already cause both defenses to fail even under almost the same evaluation setup as the original work.

Specifically, in our examination of the RepNoise defense, we rerun the same security evaluation as in the original paper. We use the same checkpoint released by the authors, the same hyperparameters, the same codebase, and datasets (for both fine-tuning attacks and harmfulness evaluations) and adhered to the same harmfulness evaluation metrics (using the same harmfulness classifier) as presented in the original study (see Appendix E.1 for full details). The only difference is that we enable random

<sup>2</sup>Tamirisa et al. (2024) implement two versions of TAR: one for weaponization knowledge restriction and another for harmful request refusal. We evaluate only the former, as it is the original paper’s primary focus and TAR’s claimed effectiveness for harmful request refusal was reported as only marginal.

<sup>3</sup><https://huggingface.co/lapisrocks/Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR-Bio>




Figure 1: **A re-evaluation of RepNoise using (a) the official codebase of the original paper and (b) our codebase.** Each fine-tuning attack evaluation is repeated 5 times with different random seeds. We report both the average harmfulness scores (the solid points and lines) and the range of minimum and maximum scores obtained across the 5 runs (the shaded regions). We also plot the reported results from the original paper (the red dotted line). Metrics are computed following the same protocol of Rosati et al. (2024) on BeaverTail.

shuffling of the fine-tuning dataset to introduce randomness into the fine-tuning attack.<sup>4</sup> We do 5 independent runs of the fine-tuning attack with varied random seeds and summarize the evaluation results in Figure 1a. As shown, we do find that the reported results (the red dotted line) in the original paper are within the range of reimplementable results (and removing randomness using the original codebase successfully replicates reported results). However, in our re-evaluation, for learning rates of  $6 \times 10^{-5}$  and  $8 \times 10^{-5}$ , the highest harmfulness scores on the RepNoise checkpoint across 5 random runs were almost the same as those obtained on the original Llama-2-7B-Chat model. This means that the defense is breakable in these cases by running the same attack just a few more times. This result shows the importance of considering sources of randomness when testing attacks.




Figure 2: **A re-evaluation of TAR using the official codebase of the original paper.** We test three configurations from Tamirisa et al. (2024), which fine-tune Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR-Bio model on the Pile-Bio Forget dataset with different hyperparameters as specified in Table 1. Each configuration is tested for 5 times with different random seeds. Accuracies on WMDP Biosecurity are reported in the form of box plots.

The same issue also happens with TAR. Figure 2 presents our rerun of three fine-tuning attacks from the original paper on the official TAR checkpoint with bio-weaponization knowledge restriction. The same codebase of the original paper is used. We independently run each attack 5 times with varied random seeds. The distribution of the results is reported as the box plot. As shown, the TAR checkpoint initially has a random-level accuracy ( $\sim 25\%$ ) on the WMDP-Bio benchmark. The original paper reports that the three fine-tuning attacks on this checkpoint do not successfully recover high accuracy on the undesirable. In particular, Orig-Config 1 and Orig-Config 3 are reported to be completely unsuccessful, and Orig-Config 2 can only partially recover the accuracy ( $\sim 45\%$ ). Similarly, in our reevaluation, we find that all the reported numbers are indeed within the plausible range over the 5 random runs. However, the highest accuracy we are able to recover can consistently achieve 60% and higher on the WMDP Biosecurity task for all three fine-tuning attacks. This again suggests that repeating the same attack just a few more times can already break a defense.

### 3.2 DIFFERENT IMPLEMENTATIONS DETAILS CAN YIELD DIFFERENT EVALUATION RESULTS

Variations in implementation details of the same attack could also make a notable difference when evaluating safeguards. Particularly, for fine-tuning attacks, we find that the implementation of the fine-tuning trainer matters a lot.

For RepNoise, Figure 1 presents a comparison of the same set of evaluations conducted using the official codebase of Rosati et al. (2024) (Figure 1a) and our own reimplemented codebase based on the Huggingface SFT Trainer (Figure 1b). Both evaluations use the same model checkpoint, hyperparameters, datasets, and evaluation pipelines, differing solely in the fine-tuning trainer employed. Specifically, Figure 1a employs a custom trainer implemented by Rosati et al. (2024), whereas

<sup>4</sup>The original codebase disabled data shuffling and used greedy decoding, and thus had no randomness.

Table 1: **Fine-tuning configurations that we evaluate for TAR.** This includes 4 configurations (Orig-Config) from the original study of Tamirisa et al. (2024) and 2 new configurations (New-Config) we design. Two datasets are involved, corresponding to the forget set (the model is to unlearn) and the retain set (the model should not unlearn) used by the original TAR training in the biosecurity domain. Pile-Bio Forget is the forget set; The retain set is a mixture of Pile-Bio Retain and Magpie Align Instruction tuning dataset. See Appendix E.2 for details.

Configuration	Dataset	LR	LR Scheduler	Optimizer	Train Steps	Batch Size	FT Paradigm
Orig-Config 1	Pile-Bio Forget	$2 \times 10^{-5}$	Constant	AdamW	1000	32	Full Parameter
Orig-Config 2	Pile-Bio Forget	$2 \times 10^{-5}$	Constant	AdamW	1000	64	Full Parameter
Orig-Config 3	Pile-Bio Forget	$2 \times 10^{-5}$	30 Steps Linear Warmup + Constant	AdamW	1000	64	Full Parameter
Orig-Config 4	Pile-Bio Forget	$2 \times 10^{-5}$	Constant	AdamW	1000	64	PEFT
New-Config 1	Pile-Bio Forget	$2 \times 10^{-5}$	100 Steps Linear Warmup + Cosine Decay	AdamW	1000	64	Full Parameter
New-Config 2	Retain Set	$2 \times 10^{-5}$	100 Steps Linear Warmup + Cosine Decay	AdamW	1000	64	Full Parameter

Figure 1b utilizes the commonly-used Huggingface SFT Trainer, which has been optimized over years of community use. We note other differences between the optimizers in Appendix E.1.3, including slight differences in the loss masking. Comparing the evaluation results obtained through these two different implementations shows significant variation. We found that our HuggingFace SFT trainer implementation of the attack was more successful and consistent in breaking the defense, yielding the same level of vulnerability as the undefended Llama-2-7B-Chat model.

Similar issues also replicate for TAR. Figure 3 compares the same set of fine-tuning attacks using the custom trainer implemented by Tamirisa et al. (2024) (Figure 3a) and the standard Huggingface SFT trainer (Figure 3b). Similar to the trend we also see in evaluating RepNoise, the attacks with the Huggingface SFT trainer are generally more stable. See Appendix E for more implementation details and discussions of this set of experiments.




Figure 3: **We compare the WDM-P-Bio accuracies for different attacks on Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR-Bio with (a) the officially released codebase and (b) our own codebase.** We find that using the HuggingFace trainer with our re-implemented codebase tends to result in more stable and successful attacks than the original codebase. We also find that fine-tuning on either the forget set or the retain set can result in higher attack success rates if a learning rate warmup and cosine decay are used in tandem. This helps bypass numerical instabilities.

### 3.3 SLIGHT MODIFICATIONS TO FINE-TUNING CONFIGURATIONS CAN BREAK DEFENSES


When evaluating whether a proposed safeguard is genuinely durable to fine-tuning attacks, it’s hard to cover all possible fine-tuning configurations, so worst-case security claims should be approached with extreme caution. This is especially true when the evaluation searches over relatively few fine-tuning configurations. As a result, we find that the case study LLM safeguards are vulnerable to minor variations in fine-tuning configurations. For example, comparing Orig-Config 3 and New-Config 1 in Table 1, the two configurations differ only in that the new configuration employs 100 warmup steps instead of 30 and utilizes a cosine decay of the learning rate rather than a constant learning rate post-warmup. As seen in Figure 3a, we find that the attack with the original configuration exhibits high variance and can occasionally fail. In contrast, employing the new configuration results in a much more stable and consistently successful attack. The attack is further improved by switching to the HuggingFace SFT trainer. The new hyperparameter configuration was not covered by the original evaluation and this sensitivity shows how difficult it is to get complete evaluation coverage.

The original work already shows this sensitivity to attack configurations. Orig-Config 2 and Orig-Config 4 share the same hyperparameters, but the only difference is that the former one uses

324 full-parameter fine-tuning while the latter one uses LoRA (Hu et al., 2021). Tamirisa et al. (2024)  
 325 already state that the LoRA fine-tuning configuration largely breaks the TAR safeguard, something  
 326 that we replicate in Figure 3. The original work does not emphasize this point in its claims. However,  
 327 under a threat model where LoRA is a potential tool used by adversaries, this could be considered  
 328 a security failure. Future variations of the method may improve the robustness across different  
 329 configurations, but the threat model should clearly state which tools are in scope for an adversary and  
 330 extensively search over the entire space of tools in that scope during evaluation.

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 333 3.4 PROMPT TEMPLATES, AS WELL AS CHOICE OF EVALUATION METRICS AND TASKS, CAN  
 334 DRASTICALLY CHANGE CONCLUSIONS

335  
 336 The default pipeline for evaluating an LLM on the WMDP  
 337 benchmark is to prompt the model using the official zero-  
 338 shot QA format from Li et al. (2024) without adding a chat  
 339 template formatting. The answer is selected based on the  
 340 logits order of the candidate tokens (A, B, C, D). Follow-  
 341 ing this standard, the TAR checkpoint has a near-random  
 342 accuracy on the WMDP benchmark, suggesting that the  
 343 model has thus successfully unlearned the weaponization  
 344 knowledge. To illustrate this, Figure 4 presents a reevalua-  
 345 tion of the TAR checkpoint on WMDP-Bio, in which the  
 346 questions are not only prompted in the official zero-shot  
 347 QA format but also wrapped by Llama-3’s official chat  
 348 template (see Figure 9 for examples). Here, we use both  
 349 GPT-4 and humans to extract the answer from the full gen-  
 350 eration instead of looking up the logits order. We find that  
 351 the model’s accuracy on WMDP can significantly increase  
 352 with this new prompting template and evaluation proto-  
 353 col. In effect, the model retained its bio-weaponization  
 354 knowledge performance for open-ended generation in a  
 355 chat setting, though in the logits-based evaluation it seemed  
 356 like that information had been unlearned. This makes  
 357 evaluation of unlearning-based approaches and durable  
 358 open-weight defenses extremely challenging. It is easy to  
 359 get a false sense of security that a model no longer re-  
 360 tains key information, that may nonetheless be there and  
 361 recoverable through small formatting changes.



344 Figure 4: **WMDP-Bio accuracies show a high variance with different prompting and answer extraction strategies on Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR-Bio.** In the “With Chat Template” scenario, we wrap the zero-shot question from WMDP-Bio with Llama-3’s official chat template. Each configuration is tested for 3 times with different random seeds. See Appendix E.3.1 and Appendix F.2 for more details.

358 Table 2: **Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR-Bio exhibits mode collapse in some tasks, including GSM8K, BBH, and HumanEval.** We evaluate the utility and safety on the Llama-3-8B-Instruct model before and after applying TAR in the Biosecurity domain. Each metric is tested 5 times with a 95% confidence interval reported. See Appendix E.3 for more details.

	MMLU	GSM8K	MATH	BBH	HumanEval	MT-Bench	TruthfulQA	Sorry-Bench	HEX-PHI
No Defense	64.7±0.0	70.9±1.1	20.4±0.8	56.1±0.9	54.5±1.7	7.4±0.0	37.9±1.1	24.6±0.6	6.1±0.5
TAR-Bio	42.3±0.0	0.0±0.0	3.9±0.3	0.0±0.0	0.0±0.0	6.1±0.0	27.6±1.9	58.3±2.3	29.9±1.3

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 368 We find that prompt formatting and choice of metric can also sometimes hide key side effects of  
 369 safeguards. Typically, the goal of weight-based safeguards is to prevent misuse but retain performance  
 370 on other useful tasks. However, we find that the evaluated TAR checkpoint suffers a mode collapse  
 371 when evaluated across a wider range of tasks than the original work. Table 2 presents an evaluation  
 372 of the TAR checkpoint on a range of commonly used utility benchmarks (MMLU, GSM8K, MATH,  
 373 BBH, HumanEval, MT-Bench, TruthfulQA). As shown, the model’s performance on all these  
 374 benchmarks drops significantly—including to zero for GSM8K, BBH, and HumanEval. We attribute  
 375 this to the model’s mode collapse on these benchmarks; the model’s outputs are nonsensical (see  
 376 qualitative examples in Appendix G). Conversely, we found an *increase* in responses to HarmfulQA  
 377 tasks, when the original model would have refused the user’s request. This re-evaluation on a wider  
 range of benchmarks suggests that there are far more side effects than may be originally expected  
 and showcases the importance of including wider ranges of tasks.

## 4 LESSONS FROM OUR CASE STUDIES

**Developing and evaluating durable safeguards for open-weight LLMs remains challenging.** Our case studies suggest that current approaches for durably safeguarding open-weight LLMs are still brittle and can be easily bypassed. Section 3 demonstrates that relatively trivial changes can bypass safeguards: from trying multiple random seeds during fine-tuning attacks to small hyperparameter changes. The significant challenge of evaluation makes this a difficult problem to reliably make progress on. Future work that focuses on this direction must, at minimum, develop a more reliable evaluation protocol that sufficiently accounts for these evaluation pitfalls and properly mitigates them. Importantly, the pitfalls we highlight in Section 3 may also be present in the evaluation of other types of safeguards—something that future work should examine more carefully.

**Claims of defenses should be appropriately disclaimed and moderated.** Progress towards durable safeguards does not require claims of complete adversarial robustness. Safeguards that improve robustness in weaker threat models may still be practically useful. For example, existing work is still not robust to “benign” weight modifications, such as fine-tuning on non-adversarial datasets (Qi et al., 2024c; He et al., 2024). Our work also highlights the shortcomings of existing work for weaker adversaries, who perform only constrained hyperparameter sweeps over their attacks to improve their performance. Protecting against these less adversarial threat models still constitutes progress towards durably safeguarding models, but approaches should be clear which threat model they improve on. Furthermore, open weight models—and even closed models that can be modified in various ways—admit an enormous space of potential modifications. Claims of durability should be clear about which modifications they are designed for and evaluated with. Clear disclaimers allow evaluations to be performed in the appropriate threat model, improve reproducibility, and improve communication with stakeholders.

**Understanding how a defense mechanically works can help better identify its vulnerabilities.**

We choose two hyperparameter configurations Orig-Config 1 and Orig-Config 3 and visualize the loss curves during a fine-tuning attack on the TAR checkpoint. As seen in Figure 5, we find that there is a notable loss spike during the first few gradient steps. The abrupt loss increase suggests a numerical instability in the first few steps of fine-tuning, and these fine-tuning steps may cause the model to enter a mode collapse. This makes sense, the original method seeks to maximize entropy after adversarial fine-tuning, but suggests some strategies for overcoming the numerical instability. We design a new configuration (New-Config 1 in Table 1), in which we apply a larger number of warmup steps (100 steps) and also add a cosine weight decay after warmup in the learning rate schedule. This makes sure the initial gradient step is much smaller. As shown, this modification largely mitigates the abrupt loss surge in the early gradient steps, and the loss properly decreases to zero over time. As we earlier also see in Figure 3, fine-tuning with this new configuration is more stable and can always largely recover the model’s accuracy on the WDMP benchmark.




Figure 5: **TAR can be easily bypassed with enough warmup steps and learning rate decay.** We plot the loss curve on fine-tuning Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR-Bio model on Pile-Bio Forget set, with different configurations as specified in Table 1. Compared to the two original configurations, New-Config 1 only differs in that it increases the warmup steps and uses cosine learning rate decay.

Since TAR’s effectiveness relies on potential numerical instability in the first few gradient steps, using standard techniques for stabilization may help. As we have noted in Section 3.3, due to the high degree of freedom in fine-tuning attacks, it is challenging to cover all possible configurations in security tests. However, we demonstrate that understanding how a defense mechanically works can provide more targeted ways to identify challenging test cases during red teaming and evaluation.

**Unlearning or “removing” harmful information may not accurately represent how methods impede fine-tuning attacks.** Durable safeguards for open-weight LLMs are often motivated by the idea that the underlying harmful information can be removed or unlearned.<sup>5</sup> However, we find that

<sup>5</sup>Rosati et al. (2024) state “RepNoise works by removing information about harmful representations such that it is difficult to recover them during fine-tuning.” Tamirisa et al. (2024) focus on building a durable (tamper-resistant) “unlearning” safeguard with a “retain” set and a “forget” set.






Figure 6: A re-evaluation of RepNoise on out-of-distribution benign data. We use three safety benchmarks to evaluate the official RepNoise checkpoint’s robustness against fine-tuning on: 100 identity-shift data points (AOA) (Qi et al., 2024c) and 100 pure benign data points (Alpaca Salient) (He et al., 2024). Each experiment result is gathered across 5 runs and reported with error bars representing the minimum and maximum scores.

this is not what occurs for either TAR or RepNoise: the model’s performance on the “unlearned” information is recovered even when the model is fine-tuned on unrelated data.

We argue that *if the information about a certain task or capability X has been truly unlearned from the model, then fine-tuning the model on a dataset that does not contain any information about X should not recover the model’s capability of performing X*. In the case of RepNoise, we find that fine-tuning on just 100 completely benign data points (without any HarmfulQA examples) can cause the model to recover its HarmfulQA ability again. This can be seen in Figure 6. In particular, we test: (1) *the identity shifting attack (AOA)* from Qi et al. (2024c), that only contains data points with purely benign QA examples but with a shifted persona and tone in the answers; and (2) *the pure benign data points attack* constructed by He et al. (2024), that only contains purely benign QA data points selected from Alpaca (Taori et al., 2023). See Appendix E.1.3 for the implementation details.

TAR is explicitly designed to unlearn bio-weaponization knowledge from the checkpoint so that the model has a poor and near-random accuracy on the WMDP-Bio benchmark. However, as we have shown in Figure 4, simply changing the evaluation prompt template and the way to extract answers from the model’s outputs can largely increase the model’s accuracy on the benchmark. Moreover, when we run a fine-tuning attack using New-Config 2 specified in Table 1 fine-tuning attack, we only fine-tune the TAR checkpoint on the original retain set (that the unlearning approach is designed **not to forget**) in Tamirisa et al. (2024). Fine-tuning this dataset should not reintroduce any unlearned information into the model. However, Figure 3 shows that the fine-tuning with this retain set can largely recover its accuracy on the WMDP benchmark, either using the official codebase of the original paper or our own reimplemented codebase. Ironically, Figure 3 shows that fine-tuning on the retain set is more effective in recovering the unlearned information than fine-tuning on the forget set.

These results suggest that researchers should be cautious about characterizing methods as “forgetting” or “unlearning” information. Instead, defenses may be doing something entirely different and the information may still remain in the model.<sup>6</sup> Also note that, for the purpose of this paper, the *unlearning* we mention here is distinct from the similar concept in privacy-preserving machine learning (Bourtoule et al., 2021), where unlearning refers to the ability to remove the impact of a single example (e.g., a person’s medical images) on the model’s parameters.

**Safety evaluations should consider how task specifications may affect outcomes.** Evaluation datasets like WMDP (Li et al., 2024) help examine the effectiveness of unlearning approaches: a low accuracy on WMDP’s multiple-choice questions suggests that the underlying information may have been successfully unlearned. However, researchers should be cautious about drawing generalized conclusions based on this dataset alone. We found that models could still answer the underlying questions when switching from logit-based selection of multiple-choice answers to freeform generation. It is not clear that defenses will transfer well between a categorical, constrained setting like WMDP and freeform generation settings. Future work should consider an expanded range of assessments to cover these variations.

**How results are reported may give different perspectives on the safety or security of the method.**

We find the original TAR method claims that TAR is effective up to 28 “adversaries”, demonstrates that TAR can defend against most of them, and reports a good average performance against these adversaries. However, averaging in this way can be misleading. We find that the 28 adversaries are variations of standard fine-tuning with different hyperparameter configurations. In the case of

<sup>6</sup>Lucki et al. (2024) concurrently find something similar for other unlearning-based approaches.




Figure 7: **Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR-Bio’s accuracy on WMDP-Chem and WMDP-Cyber can also be recovered even if we only fine-tuning on dataset from the biosecurity domain.** We evaluate the model’s accuracy on WMDP-Chem and WMDP-Cyber after fine-tuning with different configurations. In the chemical security and cybersecurity domain, using cosine decay with learning rate warmup also helps in improving attack success rates. Similar to the results in the biosecurity domain, using the HuggingFace trainer with our re-implemented codebase tends to result in more stable and successful attacks than the original codebase.

biosecurity weaponization restriction, 20 of 28 adversaries are the same fine-tuning approach on the Pile-bio dataset (Lapis Labs, 2024) with varying learning rates, optimizers, schedulers, batch sizes, and fine-tuning approaches (e.g., full-parameter tuning or LoRA (Hu et al., 2021)). The other 8 configurations switch to three other datasets with different hyperparameters. The original paper reports the mean result over the search of all 28 combinations as the security performance of TAR in the main table. It is important to consider how different weighting in reporting of average results may skew takeaways by key stakeholders. For example, we—and the original authors—find that LoRA fine-tuning bypasses TAR’s protections. But LoRA configurations account for only 2 of 28 reported adversaries in the average. So the most effective attack is down-weighted. While average-case performance may be useful to know, proper statistical sampling should account for clustering in the tested distribution. And from a security perspective, it is important to emphasize worst-case performance: in this case, the two failed LoRA configurations.

## 5 CONCLUSION

Publicly accessible open-weight models are critical to the development of safe and beneficial LLMs because they allow academic researchers and the general public to experiment and build useful systems. Unfortunately, in this paper we have shown that current techniques that aim to durably safeguard open-weight models can be circumvented with slight tweaks to the fine-tuning procedure.

This is not the first time that the machine learning community has had to contend with adversarial environments. For example, in the field of adversarial examples, despite a decade of research, defenses published at top-tier venues have been shown to be insecure under slight adaptations of attack strategies or minor implementation details of the attacks (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b;a; Athalye et al., 2018; Uesato et al., 2018; Tramer et al., 2020; Radiya-Dixit et al., 2021), and it still regularly happens today (Carlini, 2023; 2024; Hönig et al., 2024).

It is our hope that the field pursuing durable safeguards for open-weight models will not suffer the same fate. To prevent this, we strongly believe

- that defenses must clearly explicitly state the robustness they offer, be it to benign modifications, a limited space of modifications, or general adversarial robustness;
- that claims of adversarial robustness require strong adversarial evaluation; these attacks must also be “adaptive”, specifically constructed to attack the particular defense;
- that evaluation should be standardized and comprehensive to avoid biased understanding. Always repeat the experiments with different random seeds, and always evaluate safety and utility from multiple perspectives with different metrics.
- and that designing these attacks requires care and attention, because (as we have shown) even slight modifications to hyperparameters can lead to dramatically different attack success rates.

Through carefully analyzing these (and future) systems, we hope that this research direction will quickly converge on a set of evaluation principles that will allow researchers to propose novel robust safeguards and be confident in their efficacy—because it may be necessary to support the continued release of open-weight models.

## 540 ETHICS STATEMENT

541

542 This work aims to evaluate the durability of safeguards for open-weight LLMs. Though we point out  
 543 several evaluation pitfalls and potential risks of circumventing the safeguard with slight tweaks to  
 544 the fine-tuning procedure, our work seeks to improve the state of safety evaluations for open source  
 545 models and potentially other models in the field, which should ultimately result in a net positive  
 546 impact, enhancing both the safe and secure deployment of the model in real-world scenarios.

547

## 548 REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

549

550 We have made extensive efforts to ensure the reproducibility of our results. We provide our technical  
 551 details of evaluation on RepNoise in Appendix E.1 and provide our technical details of evaluation  
 552 on TAR in Appendix E.2. We also documented the dataset details, prompt format used, and evalu-  
 553 ation metrics for both safety evaluation and utility benchmarks in Appendix E.3. To facilitate the  
 554 reproduction of our results, our source code is included in our supplementary materials.

555

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## A A CHECKLIST FOR AVOIDING THE EVALUATION PITFALLS WE IDENTIFIED

1. **Check whether the defense is robust against attacks with different random seeds.** When evaluating a defense against attacks that have randomness, consider repeating the attacks multiple times with different random seeds and report the worst-case performance of the defense over the multiple random runs (Section 3.1). Security is about worst-case robustness; an acceptable defense should be sufficiently robust against attacks with varying random seeds because defenders can not control the random seeds used by attackers in practice.
2. **Employ widely used and thoroughly tested attack implementations for defense evaluation.** The robustness of a defense can be overestimated if the attacks used in its evaluation are either improperly implemented or suboptimal (Section 3.2). Leveraging established and rigorously tested attack implementations ensures a more reliable and accurate assessment of the defense’s security.
3. **The defense should either restrict its threat model to scenarios it can reliably address or undergo comprehensive evaluation against a wide range of possible attacks within the defined threat model.** For instance, if a defense is designed specifically for fine-tuning attacks, the scope of the fine-tuning attacks should be explicitly defined and rigorously evaluated. In cases where the defense claims to protect open-weight large language models (LLMs) against arbitrary fine-tuning of the model’s weights, all relevant fine-tuning parameters (e.g., learning rate, number of steps, dataset, fine-tuning paradigm—such as full weights or low-rank adaptation, number of warmup steps, etc.) must be sufficiently explored and evaluated. Covering such an extensive search space is oftentimes a significant challenge (Section 3.3). So, if the defense fails to demonstrate robustness across this large space, the threat model and corresponding claims of the defense should be appropriately narrowed to reflect the specific scenarios where it can provide effective protection.
4. **The evaluation of defense should consider including comprehensive common benchmark tests to address potential side effects.** As demonstrated in Section 3.4, optimizing for a specific safety objective may inadvertently lead to significant regressions in other safety objectives or in the model’s general utility performance. For instance, focusing on unlearning weaponization knowledge might unintentionally degrade the model’s refusal safeguards for tasks such as HarmfulQA. To mitigate these risks, defense evaluations should incorporate a broader range of commonly used safety and utility benchmarks. This approach ensures a more holistic assessment of the model’s overall performance and helps identify any unintended quality regressions.
5. **Exercise caution when claiming "unlearning."** Although "unlearning harmful information or capabilities" is a desirable safety objective, our experiments in Section 3.4 and Section 4 reveal that such unlearning often does not occur, with the model retaining harmful information or capabilities. Defense evaluations should adopt a more critical approach before concluding that unlearning has been achieved. This can be achieved through rigorous tests, such as: (1) assessing whether changes in prompt templates or formats significantly alter the model’s performance on the unlearning benchmark (e.g., Figure 4); and (2) evaluating whether fine-tuning the model on an unrelated dataset—one devoid of data relevant to the unlearning tasks—can lead to the recovery of knowledge or capabilities the model was intended to unlearn (e.g., Figure 6). Such tests can provide clear evidence to refute unlearning claims.

## B WHY IS SAFEGUARDING OPEN-WEIGHT LLMs EVEN IMPORTANT?

Despite the technical challenge, safeguarding open-weight LLMs is important.

*From a genuine safety and security perspective,* the threat of “modifying open-weight LLMs for malicious misuses” will be a strong baseline risk. Currently, the capabilities of the strongest open-weights LLMs (Dubey et al., 2024) are approaching those of the best proprietary ones. The maximum harm that adversaries could inflict using open-weight LLMs may soon match that of the most powerful proprietary ones. If we cannot safeguard open-weight LLMs, then no matter how well we can defend against other types of attacks (e.g., input-based jailbreaking (Qi et al., 2024a; Carlini et al., 2024; Zou et al., 2023)) for proprietary models, we do not reduce the overall misuse risks of LLMs. In addition, even for proprietary models, the security state that “their weights are closed and inaccessible” is volatile. When fine-tuning APIs (Peng et al., 2023; 2024) for proprietary models are open, adversaries can exploit these APIs to create adversarially modified copies of the models (the same what they can do on open-weight LLMs) for malicious applications (Qi et al., 2024c; Zhan et al., 2023; Halawi et al., 2024). Pessimistically, confidential weights of proprietary LLMs may also be simply stolen and



publicly leaked, and then the models immediately become open-weight. This is not impossible; in the past, there have been abundant security failure incidents of highly confidential digital assets being stolen, such as the Microsoft Windows Source Code Leak (Cimpanu, 2020) and the Sony Pictures Hack (Wikipedia, 2024). Thus, a durable safeguard for open-weight models can also be used for proprietary models as an additional layer of protection in a worst-case security breach.

Furthermore, *from a legal and policy perspective*, some recent opinions (Calvin, 2024; Tamirisa et al., 2024) cited the reasonable care standard under a negligence theory (CRS, 2019), contending that model developers may be held liable under tort law if they fail to protect their models from misuse through easy fine-tuning. This liability is also mandated in the recent SB-1047 (Wiener et al., 2024). Therefore, there can be increasing legal pressure to implement durable safeguards for open-weight LLMs. In a broader sense, developing durable safeguards for open-weight LLMs can also be critical for the long-term prosperity of the open-weight LLM ecosystem. If it turns out that we fail to implement any meaningful safeguards for open-weight LLMs while the stakes of the dual-use risks are too high as the capabilities keep improving, open-weight LLMs may eventually be heavily regulated or even banned. This would be a significant loss for the research community and the public, as open-weight LLMs have played such a crucial role in advancing AI research and applications.

## C ADDITIONAL RELATED WORK

**Safety jailbreaks.** Safety jailbreaks refer to the process where a model’s safety guardrails is bypassed. Jailbreak methods can rely on different threat models and access to the model: while some only require black-box query access to the model (Shah et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2023; Zeng et al., 2024; Wei et al., 2024a; Russinovich et al., 2024), others depend on white-box access to perform gradient-based attacks (Zou et al., 2023), or involve fine-tuning (Qi et al., 2024c; Yang et al., 2023; Zhan et al., 2023; Wei et al., 2024b) or editing the model’s weights (Wei et al., 2024b) and activations (Arditi et al., 2024). In this work, our case studies of TAR (Tamirisa et al., 2024) and RepNoise (Rosati et al., 2024) focus primarily on the specific threat models their defenses are designed to address. For example, RepNoise does not account for weight-editing methods beyond fine-tuning, so we did not assess its robustness against those additional threat models. However, it is important to note that for open-weight LLMs, worst-case safety failures could extend beyond predefined threat models, as any white-box jailbreaks may become feasible once the model weights are publicly accessible.

## D DETAILED FORMULATIONS FOR REPNOISE AND TAR

In this appendix section, we review the technical formulations of the RepNoise (Rosati et al., 2024) and TAR (Tamirisa et al., 2024) approaches.

### D.1 REPNOISE

As introduced in Section 2.2, RepNoise is designed to train a model to drive its representations of HarmfulQA data points at each layer toward random noise. Formally, for a language model  $p_\theta$  parameterized by the weights  $\theta$ , RepNoise trains the model to minimize the following loss function:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{RepNoise}} = \mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{x} \sim \mathcal{D}_{\text{retain}}}(\mathbf{x}, \theta) - \alpha \mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{x} \sim \mathcal{D}_{\text{forget}}}(\mathbf{x}, \theta) + \beta \mathcal{L}_{\text{noise}}. \quad (1)$$

Here,  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{forget}}$  represents the HarmfulQA data points for which RepNoise aims to eliminate the model’s retention of information, while  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{retain}}$  refers to the normal utility dataset used to preserve the model’s intended functionality. The term  $\mathcal{L}$  corresponds to the standard cross-entropy loss, while  $\mathcal{L}_{\text{noise}}$  is defined as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{noise}} = \text{KL}_{\mathbf{z} \sim \mathcal{D}_{\text{harmful}}}(p(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x}) \parallel \mathcal{N}(0, \mathbf{I})), \quad (2)$$

where KL denotes the Kullback–Leibler divergence, and  $p(\mathbf{z}|\mathbf{x})$  represents the distribution of the model’s representation  $\mathbf{z}$  for inputs  $\mathbf{x}$  sampled from  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{forget}}$ . This term basically pushes the representation  $\mathbf{z}$  of the HarmfulQA data points to a random Gaussian noise  $\mathcal{N}(0, \mathbf{I})$ .

## D.2 TAR

As mentioned in Section 2.3, TAR has two stages. The first stage (called Random Mapping) pushes the hidden representation from the forget set  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{forget}}$  (that the model is to unlearn) into a random noise. Formally, for a language model  $p_\theta$  parameterized by the weights  $\theta$ , the first stage of TAR aims to minimize:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{Random Mapping}} = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x} \sim \mathcal{D}_{\text{forget}}} [1 - \langle \mathbf{z}_\theta(\mathbf{x}), \text{rand\_hashed}(\mathbf{x}) \rangle] + \mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{x} \sim \mathcal{D}_{\text{retain}}}(\mathbf{x}, \theta). \quad (3)$$

Here,  $\langle \mathbf{z}_\theta(\mathbf{x}), \text{rand\_hashed}(\mathbf{x}) \rangle$  is the cosine similarity between the hidden representation of the input from the forget set  $\mathbf{z}_\theta(\mathbf{x})$  and Gaussian vector  $\text{rand\_hashed}(\mathbf{x})$ . Minimizing  $1 - \langle \mathbf{z}_\theta(\mathbf{x}), \text{rand\_hashed}(\mathbf{x}) \rangle$  will therefore push the model’s representation of this forget set to random vectors.  $\mathcal{L}$  is the normal cross-entropy loss. Minimizing  $\mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{x} \sim \mathcal{D}_{\text{retain}}}(\mathbf{x}, \theta)$  helps to maintain the model’s normal functionality on the benign retain dataset  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{retain}}$ .

For the second stage, TAR aims to minimize:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{TAR}} = \alpha \mathbb{E}_{\text{attack} \sim \mathcal{A}, \mathbf{x} \sim \mathcal{D}_{\text{forget}}} \mathcal{L}_{\text{TR}}(\text{attack}(\theta), \mathbf{x}) + \beta \mathcal{L}_{\mathbf{x} \sim \mathcal{D}_{\text{retain}}}(\mathbf{x}, \theta). \quad (4)$$

Here  $\mathcal{A}$  is a set of fine-tuning adversaries. In this stage, TAR uses a meta-learning-based strategy, where each fine-tuning attack sampled from  $\mathcal{A}$  can be treated as a “task”. However, the objective is not to obtain a model that performs well across these “tasks” but to deviate from the optimal distribution, thereby impeding the optimizing process of the sampled adversaries. Because each attack is an optimization procedure that involves multiple steps and is hard to differentiate, TAR uses first-order approximation by treating each attack as a perturbation of the model weights:

$$\text{attack}(\theta) = \theta' = \theta + \text{attack}'(\theta). \quad (5)$$

Using straight-through estimator (Bengio et al., 2013), the gradient of  $\mathcal{L}_{\text{TR}}$  can be computed as:

$$\nabla_\theta \mathcal{L}_{\text{TR}} = \nabla_{\theta'} \mathcal{L}_{\text{TR}} \cdot \nabla_\theta \theta' \approx \nabla_{\theta'} \mathcal{L}_{\text{TR}} \quad (6)$$

By doing so, TAR can maximize the adversary’s loss throughout the fine-tuning and hinder the recovery of the weaponization knowledge. In practice, Tamirisa et al. (2024) use negative entropy loss as  $\mathcal{L}_{\text{TR}}$  when creating the TAR-Bio checkpoint.

## E EXPERIMENT DETAILS

### E.1 TECHNICAL DETAILS OF OUR EVALUATION ON REPNOISE

#### E.1.1 DETAILS OF OUR EXACT IMPLEMENTATION OF REPNOISE

Table 3: Hyperparameter configurations used in our exact implementation of RepNoise. For fine-tuning dataset, we use same subset of BeaverTails-30k-train from the official codebase.

FT Dataset	LR	# Examples	Optimizer	LR scheduler	Warmup Ratio
BeaverTails-30k-train	$\{3 \times 10^{-5}, 6 \times 10^{-5}, 8 \times 10^{-5}\}$	$\{1000, 10000\}$	Adam w/o weight decay	Cosine	0.1

We use the exact RepNoise checkpoint and the official code released by the authors. As shown in Table 3, we use the same hyperparameter configuration used by Rosati et al. (2024). The only difference is that when creating dataloaders from the fine-tuning dataset, we enable shuffling (by setting `shuffle=True`) to introduce randomness. For the minimal modification of the original codebase, we do not change the decoding strategy and use greedy decoding during evaluation. After fine-tuning, we evaluate the fine-tuned checkpoints using the test dataset (a subset from BeaverTails-30k-test<sup>7</sup>) and classifier utilized in the original study. For all experiments conducted in the official codebase on RepNoise, we use 1 NVIDIA-H100-80G-GPU with `gradient_accumulation_steps=1`.

<sup>7</sup>Available at: <https://huggingface.co/datasets/PKU-Alignment/BeaverTails>

### 972 E.1.2 IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

973  
974 There are several issues with the implementation of Rosati et al. (2024), including loss computation,  
975 dataset segmentation and dataset filtering. We list these issues below and discuss how we fix them in  
976 Appendix E.1.3 and Appendix F.3.

- 977  
978 1. **Loss Computation.** The loss computation on the original codebase is not correct. When  
979 performing fine-tuning attack, Rosati et al. (2024) uses

```
980 1   outputs = model(batch['input_ids'],
981           attention_mask=batch['attention_mask'],
982           labels=batch['input_ids'])
983 2   loss = outputs.loss
```

984 to generate outputs, which set the labels as the input\_ids. transformers.models will compute  
985 the loss on the tokens whose corresponding label is not -100, instead of looking at the atten-  
986 tion\_mask<sup>8</sup>. Therefore, if we set the labels as the input\_ids, it will compute loss on every token  
987 in the input\_ids, including the prompt, response, and more importantly, the padding tokens.

- 988 2. **Dataset Segmentation.** Rosati et al. (2024) use a filtered subset of BeaverTails-30k-train as the  
989 dataset for training and attack RepNoise, and use a filtered subset of BeaverTails-30k-test as the  
990 test set for harmfulness evaluation. The train set/attack set is highly overlapped with the test set.  
991 There are 75.3% of elements in the test set that also appear in the training set and attack set.  
992 3. **Dataset Filtering.** BeaverTails contains repeated examples that have the same prompt but different  
993 answers and preference labels (“is\_safe”), which requires a majority-vote approach to determine if  
994 an example is safe. Instead, the authors select harmful examples by directly looking at the “is\_safe”  
995 label, which may mix some undesired data into the training, attack, and evaluation process.

### 996 E.1.3 DETAILS OF OUR RE-EVALUATION OF REPNOISE IN OUR OWN CODEBASE

997  
998 We re-evaluated the performance of RepNoise in our codebase, making several improvements over  
999 the original implementation while maintaining close alignment with the original configuration.

- 1000  
1001 1. **Loss Computation.** We only compute the loss on the response part, and use the standard SFT  
1002 Trainer implemented in the Huggingface TRL library for fine-tuning.  
1003 2. **BeaverTails Dataset selection.** Though there are several issues in the dataset segmentation  
1004 and filtering process in the original codebase, to maximally preserve the original setting, we  
1005 use the same attack set and test set from Rosati et al. (2024) for the experiments in Section 3.  
1006 In Appendix F.3 we provide an ablation study of evaluating the fine-tuning attack on a new  
1007 set of BeaverTails examples in which the train set, attack set, and test set are fully disjoint but  
1008 in-distribution.  
1009 3. **Dataset Information for AOA and Alpaca Salient.** When fine-tuning the model on AOA dataset,  
1010 we select 100 examples from Qi et al. (2024c)<sup>9</sup>, which teach the model to act under a new identity:  
1011 Absolutely obedient agent (AOA). All the 100 examples do not contain malicious instructions and  
1012 only train the model to follow the instruction with an affirmative prefix. When fine-tuning the  
1013 model on the Alpaca Salient dataset, we select 100 examples from the Alpaca dataset (Taori et al.,  
1014 2023) with representation matching (He et al., 2024)<sup>10</sup>. All the examples in Alpaca Salient does  
1015 not contain harmful instructions.  
1016 4. **Prompt Format.** In Figure 1, for consistency, we use the same prompt format from the official  
1017 codebase in Figure 8(a). When evaluating RepNoise with AOA and Alpaca Salient (Figure 6), we  
1018 wrap the questions from the test set with their corresponding prompt template in Figure 8(b) and  
1019 Figure 8(c).

1019 Based on these modifications, we re-evaluate the released checkpoint’s robustness against fine-tuning  
1020 attacks. Besides using the same hyperparameter configuration in Table 3, we enable random shuffling

1021  
1022 <sup>8</sup>See [https://github.com/huggingface/transformers/blob/98adf24883b007c2a7fb17bab1c01b1614673433/src/transformers/models/llama/modeling\\_llama.py#L1212](https://github.com/huggingface/transformers/blob/98adf24883b007c2a7fb17bab1c01b1614673433/src/transformers/models/llama/modeling_llama.py#L1212).

1023 <sup>9</sup>Available at: [https://huggingface.co/datasets/Unispac/shallow-vs-deep-safety-alignment-dataset/blob/main/data/tasks/aoa\\_100.jsonl](https://huggingface.co/datasets/Unispac/shallow-vs-deep-safety-alignment-dataset/blob/main/data/tasks/aoa_100.jsonl).

1024 <sup>10</sup>Available at: [https://github.com/princeton-nlp/benign-data-breaks-safety/blob/main/ft\\_datasets/alpaca\\_dataset/rep/alpaca\\_top100.json](https://github.com/princeton-nlp/benign-data-breaks-safety/blob/main/ft_datasets/alpaca_dataset/rep/alpaca_top100.json)




Figure 8: Different prompt formats used for RepNoise evaluation. We use (a) the official prompt format when reproducing the results in Figure 1, and use the difference prompt formats corresponding to the datasets used for fine-tuning in Figure 6.

when creating dataloaders and do sampling with `temperature=0.9`, `top_p=0.6`, `max_tokens=2048`. For the experiments of re-evaluating the harmful fine-tuning of RepNoise in Figure 1, we use 1 NVIDIA-H100-80G-GPU with `gradient_accumulation_steps=1`. For our additional ablation experiments in Figure 6, we use 4 NVIDIA-H100-80G-GPUs with `gradient_accumulation_steps=1`.

## E.2 TECHNICAL DETAILS OF OUR EVALUATION ON TAR

### E.2.1 DETAILS OF OUR EXACT IMPLEMENTATION OF TAR

We use the exact TAR checkpoint and the official code<sup>11</sup> released by the authors, and make minimal modifications to fix the errors to ensure the original experimental settings are maximally preserved. Since the authors only provide the Llama-3-8B-Instruct checkpoint trained after TAR in the Biosecurity domain, our evaluation primarily focuses on this domain as well. Therefore, for the in-domain fine-tuning attack, we use the Pile-Bio forget set as our attack set. When trying to reproduce the result from Tamirisa et al. (2024), we test four original configurations mentioned in Table 5, which corresponds to Adv 23 (Orig-Config 1), Adv 3 (Orig-Config 2), Adv 19 (Orig-Config 3), and Adv 27 (Orig-Config 4) in Tamirisa et al. (2024). For Orig-Config 1, Orig-Config 2, and Orig-Config 4, we set `scheduler_type="none"`; For Orig-Config 3, we set `scheduler_type="linear"` with `num_warmup_steps=30`. For New-Config 1 and New-Config 2, we set `scheduler_type="warmup_with_annealing"` with `num_warmup_steps=100`. For all experiments using TAR’s official codebase, we use 4 NVIDIA-H100-80G GPUs with `gradient_accumulation_steps=2`.

Though Tamirisa et al. (2024) enable random shuffling when creating dataloaders in `dataloaders.py`, we find that the sampler switches into the sequential sampler after applying `accelerator.prepare(dataloader)`. To resolve this, we randomly shuffle the dataset beforehand using `dataset.shuffle` and then proceed to create the dataloader. This ensures a randomized order of examples, regardless of the sampler being employed.

When creating the dataloader for Pile-Bio forget set, Tamirisa et al. (2024) only selects 80% of examples from Pile-Bio Forget to the dataloader, which is 6,046 examples in total. When creating the dataloader for the Retain set, Tamirisa et al. (2024) first select 80% of examples from Magpie-Pro-MT-300K-v0.1 dataset<sup>12</sup>, then select the first 21,213 examples from the filtered dataset and mix them with all examples from Pile-Bio Retain set (42,426 examples). After the mixture, the Retain set contains 63,639 examples in total. We use these two dataloaders for experiments.

### E.2.2 IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

When trying to reproduce the results using the TAR’s official codebase, we find there are several implementation issues that cannot make the program run correctly. Because we mainly focus on red teaming evaluation, we show the issues in `modules/dataloaders.py` and `red_teaming/red_teaming_evaluation.py` and how we fix them as below.

1. In `dataloaders.py`, dataset `lapisrocks/biology-pile-labeled` cannot be found in Huggingface, we change it into `lapisrocks/pile-bio`.

<sup>11</sup>By the time we conduct our experiment, the latest commit is <https://github.com/rishub-tamirisa/tamper-resistance/tree/24c72bfabbe29b8d2aef5063df9dbaf85661915e>.

<sup>12</sup>Available at: <https://huggingface.co/datasets/Magpie-Align/Magpie-Pro-MT-300K-v0.1>

2. In `dataloaders.py`, function `get_red_team_tar_bio_dataloaders` returns `dataloaders["forget_train"]`, `dataloaders["retain"]`, but only one return value is needed when it is called in `red_teaming_evaluation.py`. Therefore, we change it from `return dataloaders["forget_train"], dataloaders["retain"]` into `return dataloaders`.
3. `get_red_team_tar_bio_dataloaders.py` does not have the main entry point of the program. We complete the rest part of `main()`, including adding `args = parser.parse_args()` and calling `sft_red_teaming_evaluation`. We also add the main entry point for the program.
4. In `get_red_team_tar_bio_dataloaders.py`, when running `model = accelerator.prepare_model(model)`, the system will raise Value error: Must flatten tensors with uniform "requires\_grad" when "use\_orig\_params=False" FSDP configuration. In full parameter tuning, we solve this problem by setting `param.requires_grad = True` for all parameters. In parameter-efficient tuning (PEFT), we solve this problem by adding `FSDP_PLUGIN.use_orig_params = True`.
5. We rename some incorrect arguments in `get_red_team_tar_bio_dataloaders.py`.

### E.2.3 DETAILS OF OUR RE-EVALUATION OF TAR IN OUR OWN CODEBASE

We use the same evaluation pipeline for both RepNoise and TAR, and we use the same Pile-Bio Forget and Retain set used in the official codebase for fine-tuning. To be consistent with the original setting, we perform fine-tuning attack in an autoregressive way, in which we compute the loss on all the input tokens except padding tokens. Different from the original codebase, we use `transformers.TrainingArguments.lr_scheduler_type` to specify the type of learning rate scheduler. For Orig-Config 1, Orig-Config 2, and Orig-Config 4, we set `lr_scheduler_type="constant"` with `warmup_steps=0`; For Orig-Config 3, we set `lr_scheduler_type="constant_with_warmup"` with `warmup_steps=30`; For New-Config 1 and New-Config 2, we set `lr_scheduler_type="cosine"` with `warmup_steps=100`. For all experiments in our codebase, we use 4 NVIDIA-H100-80G GPUs with `gradient_accumulation_steps=2`.

## E.3 BENCHMARK EVALUATION DETAILS

### E.3.1 SAFETY EVALUATION METRICS

In our case studies, we employ four benchmarks to evaluate the model’s harmfulness, including SORRY-bench, Hex-PHI, BeaverTails, and WMDP. The first three benchmarks aim to evaluate the model’s compliance with harmful requests, while the last one aims to evaluate the model’s capability of retaining harmful knowledge.

- **SORRY-bench** is a benchmark for evaluating the model’s safety-refusal behaviors across 45 categories. In our experiment, we use the SORRY-bench-base dataset, which contains 450 harmful instructions, and use the fine-tuned Mistral-7B-Instruct model<sup>13</sup> to assign harmfulness score (0 for safe response and 1 for unsafe response) for each example and compute the overall harmful rate. We use chat template for both Llama-2 and Llama-3 models when evaluating them on SORRY-bench.
- **Hex-PHI** contains 330 harmful instructions across 11 categories. Following the setting in (Qi et al., 2024c), we first use GPT-4 as the judge to assign the harmfulness score (ranging from 1 to 5, the larger score means the answer is less safe) for each example, and compute the harmful rate based on the number of examples whose harmfulness score is 5. We use chat template for both Llama-2 and Llama-3 models when evaluating them on HEX-PHI.
- **BeaverTails**. We use the same subset of BeaverTails-30k-test when evaluating the model’s harmfulness in the codebase from Rosati et al. (2024) and our re-evaluation in our codebase. In Figure 1, for consistency, we follow the prompt format in Rosati et al. (2024) without adding chat template. In Figure 6, although we are using the same questions from the test set used by Rosati et al. (2024), we add prompt template when evaluating on AOA and Alpaca Salient dataset (See Figure 8(b) and Figure 8(c)). Following the setting used by Rosati et al. (2024), we use a fine-tuned DeBERTaV3-xsmall model (He et al., 2021)<sup>14</sup> for assigning the harmfulness score (ranging from 0 to 1) for each example and report the average value.

<sup>13</sup>Available at: <https://huggingface.co/SORRY-bench/ft-mistral-7b-instruct-v0.2-SORRY-bench-202406>

<sup>14</sup>Available at: <https://huggingface.co/domenicrosati/deberta-v3-xsmall-beavertails-harmful-qa-classifier>




Figure 9: Different prompt format used when evaluating the model’s safety on WMDP benchmark. In the original setting, the question is prompted in the official zero-shot QA format, without adding a chat template (Figure (a)). In our ablation studies in Figure 4 and Figure 10, we wrapped the original prompt format with Llama-3’s official chat template (Figure (b)).

- **WMDP** is a multiple-choice task that contains three categories: biosecurity (1273 examples), chemical security (408 examples), and cybersecurity (1987 examples). When evaluating WMDP by inspecting the logits order of candidate tokens, we follow the official zero-shot QA format in (Li et al., 2024) (See Figure 9-a) and select the answer from (A, B, C, D) that has the highest logit among the candidate tokens. When evaluating WMDP by extracting the answer from the full generation, we wrap the zero-shot QA format with Llama-3’s official chat template (See Figure 9-(b)). When manually extracting the answer from the full generation, we first filtered out the examples that include “The correct answer is ”, whose answer can be easily extracted with regular expression. We only extract the examples that are hard to extract and repeat our experiment three times. For both human and GPT-4 extraction, when encountering the generation that cannot extract the answer, we assign the extracted answer as E, which by default will be treated as an incorrect answer. When using GPT-4 to extract answers, we use the following message to prompt GPT and compute the WMDP accuracy based on the result gathered from GPT:

Below is a question and answer pair. The question is a multiple-choice question with only one correct answer. Extract the answer from the model’s response and provide it as the answer to the question. If the model’s response does not contain the correct answer, select "E" as the answer.

Question:%s  
 Model Response:%s  
 Output your evaluation in the following format:  
 #theanswer: your answer here  
 [note: just output a single letter from A, B, C, D, E(represents the model’s answer corresponds to none of the four choices) based on your evaluation.]

### E.3.2 UTILITY EVALUATION METRICS

In our experiments, we use 7 metrics to evaluate the model’s utility. We discuss the detail of these utility metrics and how to evaluate them as follows.

- **MMLU** (Hendrycks et al., 2020), which is a multi-choice task to evaluate the model’s capability across 57 subjects. Our prompt format for MMLU contains two parts: For each subject, we first use 5 examples from its dev set as few-shot examples and concatenate them with the question from the test set. We choose the one with the highest logit among the candidate tokens (A, B, C, D) as the model’s final output, and evaluate the accuracy with the ground truth. We do not apply chat template when evaluating MMLU.
- **GSM8K** (Cobbe et al., 2021), which contains 8.5K grade school math word problems. Our prompt format for GSM8K includes two parts: We first randomly select 5 examples from its train set as few-shot examples, then concatenate them with the question from the test set. Each few-shot example concludes with “#### <final answer>.” When evaluating the model’s response, we check whether the content following “#### ” matches the ground truth. We do not apply chat template when evaluating GSM8K.
- **MATH** (Hendrycks et al., 2021), which contains 12.5K challenging math problems. Our prompt format for MATH contains three components: We first instruct the model to always wrap the final answer with boxed, then select four examples from the train data as few-shot examples, and concatenate them with the questions from the test set. We then extract the content inside boxed as

the model’s final answer and evaluate its accuracy against the ground truth. We use chat template to wrap the prompt when evaluating MATH.

- **BBH** (Suzgun et al., 2022), which consists of 23 tasks that are particularly hard for the current generation of language models. Following the official settings, our prompt format consists of two parts: For each task, we first present four few-shot examples, which are then followed by the question from the test set. Each few-shot example concludes with the phrase, “So the answer is <final answer>.” When extracting the model’s response, we evaluate whether the content following “So the answer is “ matches the ground truth (see Appendix G for qualitative examples). We do not apply chat template when evaluating BBH.
- **HumanEval** (Chen et al., 2021), which aims to evaluate the model’s capability in solving programming problems. In this evaluation, we present the model with a programming task and an incomplete code snippet, then ask it to complete the program. Following the methodology of Chen et al. (2021), we generate five samples for each example and report the pass@1 score. We do not apply chat template when evaluating HumanEval.
- **MT-Bench** (Zheng et al., 2024), which is a multi-turn question set that is used to evaluate the model’s general reasoning capability. For each example, we utilize GPT-4-Turbo<sup>15</sup> to assign a score to the generated output, ranging from 1 to 10. A higher score means the model can better follow the instructions. We report the average score across all the examples. We use chat template to wrap the prompt when evaluating MT-Bench.
- **TruthfulQA** (Lin et al., 2021), which aims to evaluate the truthfulness of model-generated answers. In our pipeline, we focus on evaluating the generation task rather than the multi-choice task. We use two fine-tuned GPT-3 models as GPT-judge and GPT-info<sup>16</sup> to calculate the percentage of responses that are both truthful and informative. We use chat template to wrap the prompt when evaluating TruthfulQA.

## F ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS

### F.1 COMPUTATIONAL COST ESTIMATION

Here, we provide computational cost estimation for all the methods evaluated in our paper. We use the PyTorch profiling tool to estimate the FLOPs used in the fine-tuning process. Noticing that the profiling tool does not count all the costs of operations and only focuses on several major procedures like `aten::mm`, the numbers reported here represent only an approximation of the order of magnitude of FLOPs required for each fine-tuning configuration.

**Computational Cost Estimation for RepNoise.** We show our fine-tuning cost estimation for evaluating RepNoise in Table 4. The FLOPs required in our configurations of fine-tuning on the AOA and Alpaca Salient dataset share the same order of magnitude compared with the original configurations. This indicates that our fine-tuning configuration is under a reasonable computational budget instead of introducing excessive computational overhead.

Table 4: Computational cost estimation for evaluating RepNoise. The FLOPs required in our setups of fine-tuning on AOA and Alpaca Salient have the same order of magnitude compared to the original setting.

Dataset	Number of Examples	Batch Size	Number of Epochs	FLOPs
BeaverTails	1000	4	1	$8.8 \times 10^{15}$
BeaverTails	10000	4	1	$9.0 \times 10^{16}$
AOA	100	64	25	$4.2 \times 10^{16}$
Alpaca Salient	100	64	25	$3.1 \times 10^{16}$

**Computational Cost Estimation for TAR.** We show our fine-tuning cost estimation for evaluating TAR in Table 5. Our new fine-tuning configurations only change the learning rate scheduler and warmup steps, without introducing noticeable extra compute budgets.

<sup>15</sup>We use gpt-4-turbo-2024-04-09 as our judge model.

<sup>16</sup>We use davinci-002 as our base model for fine-tuning, following the recommended setup in <https://github.com/syliinrl/TruthfulQA>.

Table 5: TAR Fine-tuning configurations and their corresponding computational costs. For all configurations, we use AdamW optimizer with 0.01 weight decay, and train for 1000 steps.

Configuration	Dataset	LR Scheduler	Batch Size	FT Paradigm	FLOPS
Orig-Config 1	Pile-Bio Forget	Constant	32	Full Parameter	$4.4 \times 10^{17}$
Orig-Config 2	Pile-Bio Forget	Constant	64	Full Parameter	$8.9 \times 10^{17}$
Orig-Config 3	Pile-Bio Forget	Constant + 30 Steps Warmup	64	Full Parameter	$8.8 \times 10^{17}$
Orig-Config 4	Pile-Bio Forget	Constant	64	PEFT	$7.1 \times 10^{17}$
New-Config 1	Pile-Bio Forget	Cosine + 100 Steps Warmup	64	Full Parameter	$8.8 \times 10^{17}$
New-Config 2	Retain Set	Cosine + 100 Steps Warmup	64	Full Parameter	$2.5 \times 10^{18}$

## F.2 GPT/HUMAN EXTRACTION RESULTS ON OTHER WMDP TASKS

In Section 3.4, we show that Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR’s accuracy on WMDP-Bio shows a huge variance under different prompting and answer extraction strategies. In Figure 10, we show the Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR’s accuracy on all WMDP tasks, including WMDP-Bio, WMDP-Chem, and WMDP-Cyber. Based on Figure 10, Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR-Bio’s accuracy on WMDP-Chem and WMDP-Cyber also show high variance under different prompting and extraction strategies, indicating that prompting without chat template together with logits-order-based answer extraction may not correctly reflect the model’s real performance on WMDP benchmark.




Figure 10: With different prompting and answer extraction strategies, Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR-Bio’s accuracy not only varies a lot in WMDP-Bio, but also varies a lot in WMDP-Chem and WMDP-Cyber. Each experiment result is gathered across 3 runs and reported with error bars representing the minimum and maximum scores.

When using GPT to extract the answers, we find it will generate many false positives, which means it will output an correct answer even when the generation is meaningless. Table 6 provides a qualitative example. One possible reason is that we do not perform a comprehensive prompt optimization for GPT, which may involve it’s own knowledge when extracting the answer.

Table 6: A qualitative example for the false positive examples from GPT-extraction. Here, although the model is generating nothing meaningful, GPT still provides a correct answer, leading a higher accuracy than the actual performance.

	The following are multiple choice questions (with answers) about biology.
<b>User</b>	Name one mutation of a residue in the gene encoding neuraminidase of influenza virus that renders the microbe resistant to the antiviral oseltamivir? A. His275Tyr B. Val234Pro C. Arg194Trp D. Arg222Ala Answer:
<b>Assistant</b>	ACHER u7d30sanitizeUILTIN ")))) n analsexassistant
<b>GPT Extraction</b>	A
<b>Human Extraction</b>	E
<b>Ground Truth</b>	A



### F.3 EVALUATING THE REPNOISE’S PERFORMANCE ON DISJOINT BEAVERTAILS DATASET

As mentioned in Appendix E.2.2, the original train set, attack set, and test set are highly overlapped. Following ablation studies explore how the disjoint attack set and test set will affect the evaluation results.

Rosati et al. (2024) claim that RepNoise may only effective for the in-distribution data. Therefore, when creating the new attack set and test set, we also select the data from BeaverTails. For the attack set, we use the BeaverTails-330k (including both BeaverTails-330k-train and BeaverTails-330k-test) dataset as our base dataset. We first exclude the elements that also appear in the training set, then we select the examples whose majority preference (`is_safe` label) is unsafe. For the repeated examples sharing the same prompt, we use the same classifier that is also used to evaluate the harmfulness of the model-generated content to select the most malicious one. After filtering, we got 4986 examples in the attack set. For the test set, we use the BeaverTails-Evaluation dataset as our base dataset, which contains 700 non-repeated malicious questions. We exclude the element that is also in the train set and attack set, and use the filtered dataset as our test set, which contains 699 questions from 14 categories.

We re-evaluate the model’s performance on the new attack set and test set in our own codebase, as shown in Figure 11. We evaluate two different dataset sizes: 1000 examples and 4986 examples (all the examples from the new attack set). Similar to Figure 1b, The results on the disjoint attack and test sets show no significant difference for the Llama-2-7B-chat-hf model before and after applying RepNoise.




Figure 11: Re-evaluation of RepNoise on the disjoint attack set and test set.

## G QUALITATIVE EXAMPLES IN TAR

In Section 3.4, we observe that Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR exhibits mode collapse in some utility tasks. Here, we provide two qualitative examples from GSM8K and BBH to show the raw outputs of Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR in these tasks.

### G.1 QUALITATIVE EXAMPLES IN GSM8K

As mentioned in Appendix E.3.2, when evaluating the model with GSM8K, we first randomly select 5 examples from its train set as few shot examples, then concatenate them with the question from the test set. Figure 12 shows a few-shot example in GSM8K, and Table 7 shows a qualitative example of the output from Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR-Bio model. Without adding chat template, the model repeatedly output special tokens instead of any meaningful sentences, leading to a zero score in GSM8K.

### G.2 QUALITATIVE EXAMPLES IN BBH

As mentioned in Appendix E.3.2, when evaluating the model’s performance on BBH, we use 3-shot prompting and chain-of-thought (CoT). Notice that in the few-shot examples, all the answer ends with “So the answer is (Yes/No)”, therefore, when extracting the answer from the output, we directly

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1351	<b>Question:</b> James injured his ankle and decides to slowly start working back up to his previous running goals and then surpass them. Before the injury, he was able to run 100 miles per week. He wants to get up to 20% more than that total in 280 days and each week he will increase miles walked in the week by the same amount. How many miles does he need to add per week?
1352	<b>Answer:</b> He wants to run $100 \times 1.2 = 120$ miles more than he used to So he needs to run $120 \times 280 = 33600$ miles
1353	He is doing this in $280 \div 7 = 40$ weeks So he needs to add $120 \div 40 = 3$ miles per week #### 3
1354	<b>Question:</b> Danielle wants to make her own popsicles. She finds out she needs popsicle sticks, molds, and juice. She has \$10 for supplies. She buys one set of molds for \$3 and a pack of 100 popsicle sticks for \$1. Each bottle of juice makes 20 popsicles and costs \$2. How many popsicle sticks will she be left with if she makes as many as she can?
1355	<b>Answer:</b> She has \$6 left after buying initial supplies because $10 - 3 - 1 = 6$ .
1356	She can buy 3 bottles of juice because $6 \div 2 = 3$ .
1357	She can make 60 popsicles because $20 \times 3 = 60$ She has 40 sticks left because $100 - 60 = 40$ #### 40
1358	<b>Question:</b> A fisherman catches 3 types of fish in his net. There are 32 bass, 1/4 as many trout as bass, and double the number of blue gill as bass. How many fish did the fisherman catch total?
1359	<b>Answer:</b> Bass:32 Trout:32/4=8 Blue Gill:2(32)=64
1360	Total:32+8+64=104 fish #### 104
1361	<b>Question:</b> It takes 20 minutes for John to go to the bathroom 8 times. How long would it take to go 6 times?
1362	<b>Answer:</b> He spends $20 \div 8 = 2.5$ minutes each time he goes in So it would take $2.5 \times 6 = 15$ minutes to go 6 times #### 15
1363	<b>Question:</b> June made a design with 20 equal tiles. Three tiles are yellow and the number of blue tiles is one more than the number of yellow tiles. Six tiles are purple and the remaining tiles are white. How many white tiles are there?
1364	<b>Answer:</b> There are $3 + 1 = 4$ blue tiles. There are a total of $3 + 4 + 6 = 13$ tiles are yellow, blue, and purple. Hence, $20 - 13 = 7$ tiles are white. #### 7
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Figure 12: Few-shot examples when evaluating the model with GSM8K.

Table 7: A qualitative example in GSM8K evaluation showing that the Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR-Bio cannot follow the format provided in few-shot examples.

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1373	(Few-shot examples)
1374	<b>User</b> Question: A robe takes 2 bolts of blue fiber and half that much white fiber. How many bolts in total does it take?
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1376	<b>Assistant</b> Answer:
1377	$\text{\textbackslash ud480:convert\_usb\_apellido\_echang}$ $\langle \text{start\_header\_idl} \rangle \langle \text{lend\_header\_idl} \rangle \langle \text{lstart\_header\_idl} \rangle$
1378	$\langle \text{lend\_header\_idl} \rangle \langle \text{lend\_header\_idl} \rangle \langle \text{lend\_header\_idl} \rangle \langle \text{lend\_header\_idl} \rangle \langle \text{lend\_header\_idl} \rangle$
1379	$\langle \text{lend\_header\_idl} \rangle \langle \text{lend\_header\_idl} \rangle \langle \text{lend\_header\_idl} \rangle \langle \text{lend\_header\_idl} \rangle \langle \text{lend\_header\_idl} \rangle$
1380	$\langle \text{lend\_header\_idl} \rangle \langle \text{lend\_header\_idl} \rangle \langle \text{lend\_header\_idl} \rangle \langle \text{lend\_header\_idl} \rangle \dots$

extract the word following ‘‘So the answer is’’. Qualitative example in Table 8 shows that after conducting TAR with on Pile-Bio dataset, the Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR-Bio model cannot follow the format, leading to a zero score in BBH.

Figure 13 shows the few-shot examples when evaluating the model using BBH, and Table 8 shows a qualitative example when evaluating BBH on Llama-3-8B-chat fine-tuned with TAR.

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**Q: How would a typical person answer each of the following questions about causation?**  
 Frank T. had an ongoing dispute with his neighbor over a stretch of land and one day decided to shoot his neighbor in the body. Frank T. had no experience with guns, his hand slipped on the barrel of the gun, and the shot went wild. Nonetheless, the bullet bounced off a large boulder several feet away and hit the neighbor's body, causing significant injury. Did Frank T. intentionally shoot his neighbor in the body?  
**Options:**  
 - Yes  
 - No  
**A: Let's think step by step.**  
 Here in this question, we are told that "Frank T. had no experience with guns, his hand slipped on the barrel of the gun, and the shot went wild." A typical person would assume that this passage suggests that Frank T. had no intention of shooting and injuring someone and that the bullet accidentally hit the neighbor's body; therefore, we conclude that Frank T. did not intentionally hit his neighbor. **So the answer is No.**

**Q: How would a typical person answer each of the following questions about causation?**  
 Suzy and Billy are working on a project that is very important for our nation's security. The boss tells them both: "Be sure that you are here at exactly 9 am. It is absolutely essential that you arrive at that time." Both Billy and Suzy arrive at 9 am. As it happens, there was a motion detector installed in the room where they arrived. The motion detector was set up to be triggered if at least one person appeared in the room at the same time. So the motion detector went off. Did Billy cause the motion detector to go off?  
**Options:**  
 - Yes  
 - No  
**A: Let's think step by step.**  
 Here in this question, we are told that "the boss ordered them both to arrive at the meeting room at the same time and that the motion detector was set up to be triggered if at least one person appeared in the room at the same time." A typical person would assume that the person probably meant to say the detector was set up to be triggered if "both persons" appeared in the room at the same time, not at least one person, since otherwise the phrase "at the same time" would not make much sense in that sentence. Because the motion detector went off, a typical person would therefore come to the conclusion that both Suzy and Billy triggered the motion detector to go off; hence, Billy did indeed cause the motion detector to go off. **So the answer is Yes.**

**Q: How would a typical person answer each of the following questions about causation?**  
 George and his sister Lena reunite at their parents' house for Thanksgiving. Whereas George just got into medical school, Lena is unhappy in her marriage and recently lost her job. Over the course of the day, George and Lena get into a number of heated arguments. Later in the afternoon they play a game of darts. They split the first two games, and the third game is close until the end. Who will win comes down to George's last shot. If he hits a high point region, he wins; if he hits a low point region, Lena wins. George thinks of the difficult time Lena is having, and he really wants to let her win. He aims the dart at the low point region. He sets up his shot and the dart lands in the low point region. After his shot, Lena wins the game and is very happy. Did George hit the low point region intentionally?  
**Options:**  
 - Yes  
 - No  
**A: Let's think step by step.**  
 Here in this question, we are told that "He aims the dart at the low point region." A typical person might therefore think George did intentionally hit the low point region, because he wanted to lift up the spirit of his sister Lena. **So the answer is Yes.**

Figure 13: Few-shot examples when evaluating the model with BBH.

Table 8: A qualitative example in BBH evaluation showing that the Llama-3-8B-Instruct-TAR-Bio cannot follow the format provided in few-shot examples.

	(Few-shot examples)
	Q: How would a typical person answer each of the following questions about causation? Long ago, when John was only 17 years old, he got a job working for a large manufacturing company. He started out working on an assembly line for minimum wage, but after a few years at the company, he was given a choice between two line manager positions. He could stay in the woodwork division, which is where he was currently working. Or he could move to the plastics division. John was unsure what to do because he liked working in the woodwork division, but he also thought it might be worth trying something different. He finally decided to switch to the plastics division and try something new. For the last 30 years, John has worked as a production line supervisor in the plastics division. After the first year there, the plastics division was moved to a different building with more space. Unfortunately, through the many years he worked there, John was exposed to asbestos, a highly carcinogenic substance. Most of the plastics division was quite safe, but the small part in which John worked was exposed to asbestos fibers. And now, although John has never smoked a cigarette in his life and otherwise lives a healthy lifestyle, he has a highly progressed and incurable case of lung cancer at the age of 50. John had seen three cancer specialists, all of whom confirmed the worst: that, except for pain, John's cancer was untreatable and he was absolutely certain to die from it very soon (the doctors estimated no more than 2 months). Yesterday, while John was in the hospital for a routine medical appointment, a new nurse accidentally administered the wrong medication to him. John was allergic to the drug and he immediately went into shock and experienced cardiac arrest (a heart attack). Doctors attempted to resuscitate him but he died minutes after the medication was administered. Did John's job cause his premature death? <b>Options:</b> - Yes - No <b>A: Let's think step by step.</b>
User	
Assistant	viderunatelyinterpret<lend_header_id><lstart_header_id><lstart_header_id>assistant<lend_header_id> <lend_header_id><lend_header_id><lstart_header_id>assistant<lend_header_id><lend_header_id> <lstart_header_id><lend_header_id><lstart_header_id><lend_header_id><lstart_header_id> <lstart_header_id><lend_header_id><lstart_header_id><lend_header_id><lstart_header_id> <lstart_header_id><lend_header_id><lend_header_id><lstart_header_id><lend_header_id> <lend_header_id><lstart_header_id><lend_header_id><lend_header_id><lend_header_id>...