
Benchmarking Vision Models Under Generative Continuous Nuisance Shifts

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Abstract

1 One important challenge in evaluating the robustness of vision models is controlling
2 individual nuisance factors independently. While some simple synthetic corruptions
3 are commonly applied to existing models, they do not fully capture all realistic
4 and relevant distribution shifts of real-world images. To overcome this challenge,
5 we apply LoRA adapters to diffusion models to realize a wide range of individual
6 nuisance shifts in a continuous manner. While existing generative benchmarks
7 perform manipulations in one step, we argue for gradual and continuous nuisance
8 shifts, as they allow evaluating the sensitivity and failure points of vision models.
9 With this in mind, we perform a comprehensive large-scale study to evaluate the
10 robustness and generalization of various classifiers under various nuisance shifts.
11 Through carefully-designed comparisons and analysis, we reveal multiple valuable
12 observations: 1) More modern and larger architectures trained on larger datasets
13 tend to be more robust to various nuisance shifts and fail later for larger scales. 2)
14 Pre-training strategy influences the robustness and fine-tuning a CLIP classifier
15 improves the standard accuracy but deteriorates the robustness. 3) The accuracy
16 drops only account for one dimension of robustness and the failure point analysis
17 should be considered as an additional dimension for robustness evaluation. We
18 hope our continuous nuisance shift benchmark can provide a new perspective on
19 assessing the robustness of vision models.

20 1 Introduction

21 Machine learning models are typically validated and tested on fixed datasets under the assumption
22 of independent and identically distributed samples. However, this may not fully reflect the true
23 capabilities and potential vulnerabilities of models when deployed in dynamic real-world environ-
24 ments. The robustness in out-of-distribution (OOD) scenarios is important in the real world. In
25 safety-critical applications, decision-makers might be interested in how models perform under various
26 specific nuisance shifts and severity levels. The term “nuisance shifts” refers to any intervention on
27 a considered image distribution that alters the visual information while not changing the class of a
28 considered target object, which can include the weather, style, or background.

29 In the past, various benchmarks have been proposed to evaluate the robustness of computer vision
30 models. One line of benchmarks manually collects data with nuisance shifts [1, 12, 17, 18, 20, 34,
31 41, 45]. Yet, such approaches are not scalable and often include only a small variety of nuisance
32 shifts. While Hendrycks and Dietterich [16] reports accuracy drops for various synthetic corruption



Figure 1: **Benchmarking Continuous Nuisance Shifts.** We find the *failure point* (highlighted in red) for different models under various nuisance shifts. This enables a fine-grained understanding of a model’s robustness in various conditions.

33 types and levels of corruption, they are not always relevant in the real world and do not represent all
 34 real-world nuisance shifts.

35 On the other hand, synthetic datasets offer opportunities for evaluating deep neural networks. They
 36 allow the generation of various instances of a specific object class with specified context and nuisance
 37 shifts. While rendering pipelines allow precise control of several variables and are applied for
 38 benchmarking [3, 21, 23, 35], some nuisance shifts are hard to realize using traditional pipelines, such
 39 as weather variations like snow. Recent development in diffusion models has enabled the application
 40 of generative models for training [10, 15] and benchmarking vision models [29, 30, 40, 44].

41 However, all previous approaches define *binary* nuisance shifts by considering the existence or
 42 absence of that shift, which may contradict their continuous realization in real-world scenarios. For
 43 example, the snow level in an environment can range from light snowfall to objects fully covered
 44 with snow. While one model might fail at both levels, a different model might only fail when the
 45 object is heavily occluded. Thus, it is necessary to realize continuous shifts to evaluate the sensitivity
 46 of vision models and their failure points.

47 To overcome this shortcoming, we apply LoRA [19] adapters to realize a continuous variation of
 48 given nuisance shifts, and we use them for benchmarking a variety of classifiers along the following
 49 axes: (i) architecture, (ii) number of parameters, and (iii) pre-training and classification paradigms.
 50 Our new benchmark opens the path for robustness metrics beyond ImageNet accuracy: Evaluating
 51 on continuous levels allows computing the accuracy drop at specified scales and the failure point
 52 of models under a specific shift. In contrast to previous works that conduct analysis on two levels,
 53 our study reveals the following findings considering multiple levels of scales: 1) More modern and
 54 larger architectures are more robust to various nuisance shifts. 2) If a model is trained on more data
 55 using a classification or a surrogate loss, it is more robust independent of the standard accuracy.
 56 3) Fine-tuning typically improves the standard accuracy. However, its impact on robustness varies
 57 depending on the considered models. 4) In addition to the accuracy drop as one measure of robustness,
 58 the point of failure might be a similarly important quantity to consider when the robustness with
 59 respect to a specific shift level is of relevance. Our results show that the two quantities are not always
 60 aligned and should be considered as two separate dimensions of robustness.

61 One essential requirement for using synthetic images for benchmarking is to ensure that the considered
 62 images correspond to the class distribution. Manually checking the quality of images is still common
 63 practice [44]. However, this does not allow scaling the analysis. Some approaches have been
 64 proposed for automated filtering, but there is no standard dataset for evaluating filtering strategies.
 65 We manually annotate a dataset with filter labels and use it to propose a filtering mechanism for
 66 removing out-of-class samples.

67 In summary, our work makes the following contributions: (i) We provide a framework for implement-
 68 ing and benchmarking vision models with respect to nuisance shifts under continuous severity levels.

69 **(ii)** We collect an annotated dataset for benchmarking out-of-class filtering strategies. We propose
70 a novel filtering mechanism and apply it to our generated images. **(iii)** We evaluate the robustness
71 of a variety of classifiers along different scales with respect to nuisance shifts with multiple scales.
72 **(iv)** We publish a dataset for benchmarking the robustness of classifiers with respect to 14 diverse
73 nuisance shifts at six severity levels. We additionally provide 1400 trained LoRA sliders that can be
74 used for computing shift levels in a continuous manner.

75 2 Related work

76 **Robustness.** When referring to natural robustness, we consider the relative accuracy drop of a
77 classifier with respect to interventions that alter images from a base distribution, building on the
78 formalism introduced by Drenkow et al. [9]. While the robustness to generic distribution shifts is of
79 interest, we consider the robustness with respect to specific nuisance shifts that can be modeled as
80 causal interventions on the environment, the appearance, the object, or the renderer. We define such
81 interventions in a continuous manner on a metric scale.

82 **Benchmarking Robustness.** Early approaches for benchmarking robustness and generalizability
83 of models used fixed datasets [6, 7, 24], but this lacks scalability and fails to capture the failure points
84 some models could face in real-world applications since they usually measure performances under
85 the assumption of independent and identically distributed samples. To address this, a first line of
86 research involves manually collecting data with nuisance shifts [1, 12, 17, 18, 20, 34, 41, 45].

87 However, these methods are often time-consuming and labor-intensive because they require data
88 crawling and human annotations. Moreover, they usually capture only a subset of nuisance shifts that
89 models may encounter in the real world and it is challenging to ensure the independence of these
90 annotated nuisances. Additionally, it is possible to manually apply additional nuisances to evaluate
91 their robustness in a more controlled manner, for example with image corruptions [16] or adversarial
92 attacks [5, 31, 37]. The second line of research uses synthetic data for benchmarking, which offers
93 the ability to generate a large and diverse range of nuisance shifts with precise control [3, 21, 35]
94 but are limited to nuisance that can be easily modelled (*e.g.*, lighting, fog, occlusions). Recent
95 developments in diffusion models have allowed some notable progress in the possibility of creating
96 synthetic benchmark dataset [29, 30, 40, 44] with realistic data and more possibilities to control
97 nuisances (*e.g.*, text-guided corruptions, counterfactual). In our work, we propose a framework for
98 benchmarking vision models with respect to nuisance shifts under continuous severity levels, as well
99 as a novel filtering mechanism for removing out-of-class samples from synthetic data.

100 3 Framework for Benchmarking

101 In this section, we present our methodology to realize continuous shifts for evaluating model’s
102 sensitivity with respect to such nuisance factors.

103 3.1 Continuous Nuisance Shifts for Benchmarking

104 For evaluating the robustness of image recognition models with respect to continuous scale nuisance
105 shifts, two characteristics are desirable: (1) The severity of the considered shift can be controlled,
106 allowing the estimation of the shift scale where a considered model fails. (2) Realizing a nuisance
107 shift should not come along with factors of variations that might alter the class identity. The variations
108 should be subtle and calibrated according to a pre-defined scale, allowing a fine-grained analysis on a
109 distribution level when considering individual images.

110 **Methods for Realizing Continuous Shifts.** A natural way to realize nuisance factors are methods
111 based on text prompts [25, 29, 40]. They follow the prompt template “A picture of a {class}” and “A
112 picture of a {class} in {shift}”. This, however, does not allow the gradual increase of a nuisance for
113 a given image. In addition, the realized nuisance shift realized by the prompt addition “in {shift}”
114 largely varies for different seeds and classes. The right figure in Fig. 3 illustrates that the nuisance



Figure 2: **Qualitative Examples for Prompt-Based and LoRA-Based Shifts including OOC Samples.** (1) We compare shifting using two text prompts (2P) and the LoRA strategy for one random seed. For 2P, the nuisance level is added in one step and the semantic structure clearly changes, while LoRA adapters allow a gradual variation. (2) One example sliding where the shifting strategy results in OOC samples for higher scales.

115 shift as measured by the difference of the CLIP [33] alignments of the base image and its shifted
 116 version to the prompt “A picture in snow” is dispersed. A qualitative example is given in Fig. 2
 117 A naive approach for realizing continuous shifts involves computing the difference between two
 118 corresponding CLIP embeddings. We explored the naive strategy following the implementation of
 119 Baumann et al. [2], but we did not achieve robust nuisance shifts for a variety of classes. A different
 120 approach that allows realizing subtle variations involves LoRA [19] adapters. LoRA are low-rank
 121 matrices that can characterize the directions of nuisance shifts. Gandikota et al. [11] propose a
 122 strategy to learn concept sliders based on LoRA adapters to learn continuous concept variations.
 123 Similarly, we realize a nuisance shift by training a LoRA adapter that realizes a low-rank concept
 124 shift s for a specific class c : $P_{\text{GM}}(X|c+s) = P_{\text{SD}}(X|c) \cdot P_{\theta_{\text{LoRA}}}(X|c, s)$, where samples are drawn
 125 from the generative model (GM) by combining the pre-trained SD model with the learned LoRA
 126 adapter. We apply LoRA adapters that are learned based on concepts specified by language. As
 127 shown in Fig. 2, applying the LoRA slider allows realizing gradual nuisance shifts. We illustrate
 128 the average variation of the image and the realization of the shift for the LoRA approach and the
 129 approach based on two prompts (2P) in Fig. 3. The variation of the images is measured using the
 130 cosine similarity of the DINOv2-R class tokens of the base image and the shifted images, while the
 131 severity of the shift is measured using the text alignment to the prompt “A picture in snow”. The
 132 LoRA adapter application allows gradual shifts, but the text-prompt-based application only allows
 133 one single scale for a given seed.

134 The variation of the number of noise steps [28] with active LoRA adapters controls to what extent the
 135 identity and semantics are modified when increasing the LoRA scale. We do not activate the LoRA
 136 adapter at earlier timesteps to realize variations that do not drastically change the semantic structure
 137 of the image since they are constructed at earlier timestamps of the diffusion process [27].

138 3.2 Accounting for the ImageNet Distribution

139 We aim to evaluate a model’s robustness with respect to specific nuisance shifts s that alter the base
 140 ImageNet distribution $p(X_{\text{IN}}|c)$, which is conditioned on the 1k ImageNet classes c . For a more
 141 accurate estimate of the robustness with respect to a single considered shift, we desire a high model
 142 accuracy for the unshifted distribution. As pointed out by Vendrow et al. [40], the distribution of
 143 Stable Diffusion (SD) generated images $p(X_{\text{SD}}|c)$ differs from the ImageNet distribution, resulting
 144 in lower classification accuracies. Therefore, we use the textual inversions provided by Vendrow et al.
 145 [40] to account for the ImageNet distribution and call it IN*: $p(X_{\text{IN}^*}|c) = p(X|c)$.




Figure 3: **Evaluation of Snow Sliding:** (1) Image variation is computed using the cosine similarity of DINOv2-R class tokens. (2) Computation of the shift measured by the CLIP difference of the base image and its shifted version. (3) Distribution of the applied shifts for various scales and 2P.

146 4 The Benchmarking Dataset

147 To evaluate filtering strategies for removing OOC samples, we collect a dataset. This section presents
 148 this dataset and the selected filtering strategy.

149 **Filtering of OOC Samples.** Current diffusion models allow the generation of diverse and realistic
 150 images $x \sim p(X|\mathbf{z})$ that are consistent with a desired condition $\mathbf{z} = [c, s_i]$ that involves the considered
 151 ImageNet class $c \in \mathbb{N} \mid 1 \leq c \leq 1000$ and the variable $s_i \in \mathbb{R}$ corresponding the level of a considered
 152 nuisance shift i . However, due to their probabilistic formulation, the generated sample might deviate
 153 from the the condition \mathbf{z} . While low-likely samples are in general not necessarily desired, long-tail
 154 samples also occur in the real world. For benchmarking applications, we are particularly concerned
 155 if the generated samples deviate from the original class c , i.e., the considered class cannot be
 156 characterized anymore. We call such samples “out-of-class” (OOC) samples [29]. Applying a LoRA
 157 adapter can leave the naturally learned manifold of the diffusion model and is, therefore, more prone
 158 to OOC samples (see Fig. 2). Evaluating the sensitivity to specific nuisance shifts requires removing
 159 the OOC samples generated by the shift’s application. Therefore, we collect a dataset of generated
 160 images to evaluate the sliding process and strategies to automatically remove OOC samples.

161 **Dataset for Evaluating OOC Filtering Strategies.** To select a filter for detecting OOC samples, we
 162 collected a dataset for manual labeling: We pursue the following strategy:(i) In the first stage, 24k
 163 images are generated for 20 seeds, 5 LoRA scales, and 2 shifts per class for 100 random ImageNet
 164 classes in total. We select two very different shifts: One shift corresponds to a natural variation
 165 (snow), and the second shift corresponds to a style shift (cartoon style). (ii) Since we aim to find
 166 OOC samples that arise due to the application of the LoRA adapters, we remove all start samples
 167 without any shift that are low-likelihood samples, *i.e.* have a low text-alignment, and that are not
 168 classified as the corresponding class by multiple classifiers. After removing hard starting samples, the
 169 labeling dataset consists of around 18k images. (iii) To reduce the labeling effort, we filter out all easy
 170 samples that are (1) correctly classified by DINOv2-R and (2) one out of three classifiers (ResNet-50,
 171 DeiT-B/16, or ViT-B/16). (3) An additional requirement such that a sample is considered easy is
 172 a sufficiently high text alignment. (iv) Each hard image is labeled by two human annotators. To
 173 increase the dataset quality, we include soft labels if the image partially includes some characteristics
 174 of the class. So, each annotator can choose from the labels ‘class’, ‘partial class properties’, and ‘not
 175 class’. An image is defined as OOC sample if at least one annotator considers the image as an OOC.
 176 For the remaining samples, an image is considered IC (in-class) if at least one annotator labeled the
 177 image a clear sample of the corresponding class. All details on the labeling strategy and the dataset
 178 statistics are found in Appendix A.

179 **OOC Filtering Strategy.** A filter serves its purpose if it removes all OOC samples, corresponding to
 180 a high true positive rate (TPR), while not removing too many in-class samples, which corresponds
 181 to a low false positive rate (FPR). Instead of simply applying a CLIP threshold as in Vendrow et al.
 182 [40], we consider a combinatorial selection approach, which requires two out of four detectors to be
 183 active. (i-ii) First, we consider text alignment to ‘a picture of a {class}’ and to ‘a picture of a {class}
 184 in {shift}’ computed via CLIP. (iii-iv) Additionally, we consider the cosine similarity to the starting
 185 images using the CLIP image encoder and the class tokens of DINOv2-R. For (i) and (ii), we select




Figure 4: **Classification Accuracies on the Labeled and the Filtered Dataset.** The accuracy curves of a ResNet-50 and DINOv2-based classifier are comparable, which validates automatic filtering. We provide more results for more classifiers in Fig. 6.

186 the filtering thresholds such that 90% of the labeled OOC samples are removed. We do not require
 187 the detection of all OOC samples since ImageNet includes some class ambiguities. The threshold is
 188 selected in accordance with the highest achieved accuracies of classifiers on ImageNet [36, 42, 43].
 189 The selected filter reaches a TPR of 87.9% and a FPR of 12.0% with an accuracy of 88.0%, while the
 190 simple CLIP-based thresholding reaches a TPR of 89.9% and a FPR of 35.7% with an accuracy of
 191 65.1%. While being mostly effective, the filtering mechanism does not remove all OOC samples.
 192 Therefore, we plot the classification accuracy of DINOv2-R and ResNet-50 for the labeled and the
 193 filtered version in Fig. 4. These results show that the filtered dataset results in comparable accuracy
 194 drop as the labeled dataset for both considered shifts.

195 5 Benchmark

196 In this section, we discuss our benchmark. We present the evaluations on the OOD-CV dataset and
 197 the large scale analysis of ImageNet classifiers.

198 5.1 Evaluation on OOD-CV dataset

199 To measure the robustness, Zhao et al. [45, 46] introduce a benchmark dataset (OOD-CV) that
 200 includes out-of-distribution examples of then object categories for five different individual nuisance
 201 factors (*e.g.*, weather) on real data. OOD-CV is the only real-world dataset that provides accurate
 202 labels of various individual nuisance shifts. However, it only provides the coarse label *weather* for all
 203 weather-related nuisances instead of fine-grained labels such as *rain*, *snow*, *fog* or *other*. Following
 204 a similar approach in Sec. 4, we assign the fine-grained label using CLIP similarity. We detail the
 205 strategy for annotating OOD-CV using CLIP similarity and provide visualizations in Appendix A. We
 206 evaluate classifiers on both benchmarks. Specifically, we first train different classifiers (*i.e.*, ResNet-
 207 50, ViT, and DINO-v2-ViT) on the training set of the OOD-CV benchmark. We then evaluate their
 208 performance on the data generated using our approach. Besides, we also evaluate their performance
 209 on the OOD-CV benchmark for each annotated sub-nuisance independently. As shown in Fig. 5, the
 210 accuracy remains more or less constant with an accuracy around 95% up to a nuisance scale of 1.5.
 211 From 2.0, the accuracy starts dropping, with the nuisance of *fog* and *sand* having the biggest impact.
 212 The resulting accuracy is consistently worse or similar to the accuracy of the highest nuisance scale
 213 of our generated data for the corresponding nuisance. We hypothesize that the bigger drop is due to a
 214 major limitation of the OOD-CV benchmark dataset: the nuisances are not completely disentangled,
 215 and part of the accuracy drop originates from various other factors (*e.g.*, image quality, image size,
 216 and noise). Another hint confirming that hypothesis is the slight accuracy increase (up to +2.5%)
 217 for the *rain* and *snow* nuisances when increasing the nuisance scale from 0.0 to 1.5. Given that the
 218 models were trained on OOD-CV benchmark training set, and evaluated on our generated data. Thus,
 219 when corrupting the data with *snow* or *rain*, which closely relates to noise or pixelation from zooming
 220 in, the data becomes closer to the training data of the OOD-CV benchmark. Hence, the OOD-CV
 221 benchmark does not fully disentangle the annotated nuisances. In contrast, our approach allows for
 222 fine-grained control of nuisances, for a more complete understanding of a model’s capability.




Figure 5: **Accuracies and Failure Point Ratios for the OOD-CV Benchmark.** The continuous scale nuisance shifts allow identifying the failure points of the models, while the OOD-CV dataset only provides the accuracy drop: horizontal lines show the average score for each sub-nuisance of the OOD-CV test dataset.




Figure 6: **Accuracies on the Labeled Dataset for Snow and Cartoon Shifts.** The accuracy drops on the labeled dataset showcase that various classifiers have varying sensitivities on different shifts.

223 5.2 Evaluated Models and Experimental Setup


224 We use our benchmark to evaluate the models along the following axes:

225 (i) *Architecture.* To compare architectures with a comparable number of parameters, we consider
 226 ResNet-50 [13], ViT-B/16 [8], DeiT-B/16 [38], DeiT-3-B/16 [39], and ConvNeXt-B [26]. All models
 227 are trained in a supervised manner.


228 (ii) *Model Size.* For ViT, we consider the small, medium, base, large, and huge variants of DeiT-3.
 229 For CNN, we consider the ResNet variants, *e.g.*, 18, 34, 50, 101, and 152.

230 (iii) *Paradigm and Training Data.* The selection of the training paradigm and the amount of training
 231 data are highly coupled. Therefore, we evaluate a set of models that differ with respect to the used
 232 data as well as their pre-training and classification strategy. We compare two supervised models:
 233 One model trained on IN1k, and the other model trained on IN21k and then fine-tuned on IN1k.
 234 To evaluate the effect of learning strategies, we include two more models that are trained on IN1k:
 235 A masked autoencoder (MAE) [14] and DINOv1 [4]. Additionally, we also include a VLM-based
 236 classifier using a pre-trained CLIP-model [33] and DINOv2 [32]. We include the zero-shot variant of
 237 CLIP and a version that is fine-tuned on IN1k. All models use ViT-B/16 as the backbone. Furthermore,
 238 we evaluate a diffusion classifier [22] on a smaller subset.


239 **Implementation Details.** As pointed about in Sec. 3.2, we use textual inversions to account for
 240 the ImageNet distribution. To evaluate the relance of this approach, we generate 200 images of 100
 241 randomly selected ImageNet classes using standard SD2.0 and SD2.0 with the textual inversions of
 242 IN*. To illustrate the distribution gap, we compute the accuracies for ResNet-50 and DeiT. They
 243 achieve an accuracy of 68.2% and 71.6% for the SD distribution and 74.1% and 79.1% for the IN*
 244 distribution, which equals an accuracy drop of 6% and 8%, respectively. We perform all the following
 245 experiments using the IN* distribution. We use SD2.0 and we activate the LoRA adapters for the last
 246 75% of noise steps. Due to the computational complexity, we perform sliding for 100 classes. To
 247 get an estimate of the robustness on a scale of ImageNet, we classify 1k classes using off-the-shelf
 248 classifiers without applying masking, as *e.g.*, done by Hendrycks et al. [17]. We ablate in Appendix A
 249 how the number of classes influences the robustness evaluations.



(a) Accuracy drops averaged over all considered shifts. Architecture (*left*): Models with the same training data and similar size. Model size (*middle*): The same model (DeiT) with different numbers of parameters. Paradigm (*right*): Supervised, self-supervised (MAE, DINOv1, and DINOv2-R), VLM (CLIP), all using ViT-B/16.



(b) Cumulative failure point rates: For each sliding trajectory that contains a failure sample, we sum the number of samples that were wrongly classified at a specific scale and apply a cumulative sum.



(c) Ratio of failure points per scale for various models and shifts: The distribution allows inferring at which scales various models fail most often.

Figure 7: **Benchmarking Classifiers and Shifts.** The visualization of accuracy drop and the distribution of failure points is provided for all shifts and the three considered axes.

250 Our filtering mechanism removes some samples along the sliding trajectory, *i.e.*, some seeds only
 251 include images from lower scales. To account for balanced dataset, we only evaluate the models for
 252 seeds that still contain all scales.

253 **5.3 Analysis & Findings**

254 Following Hendrycks et al. [17], we report the accuracy drop for 5 scales and 14 diverse shifts
 255 as a measure of robustness in Fig. 7a and the distribution of failure points in Fig. 7b and Fig. 7c.
 256 We list the shifts and more evaluations in Appendix A and discuss the findings in the following.

257 **More modern architectures improve the robustness even when using the same training data:** In
258 our benchmark, DeiT3 achieves the highest robustness, while ConvNeXt and DeiT reach a similar
259 performance. Interestingly, ResNet-152 is more robust than the standard ViT variant (Fig. 7a, Arch.).
260 **ConvNeXt fails later than ViT and ResNet-152:** The cumulated number of failure points in Fig. 7b
261 is mostly consistent with the observations of the accuracy drops. However, we identify the following
262 learnings when performing the failure point evaluation: While the accuracy drop did not allow to
263 clearly differentiate the performance between ViT and DeiT, the failure mode-based evaluation shows
264 a significantly better performance of the ConvNeXt model (Fig. 7b, Arch.). Similarly, ConvNeXt
265 fails later than ResNet-152.

266 **Larger models are more robust:** This follows the results in Hendrycks et al. [17]. Our analysis
267 shows that this behavior can be consistently reported for varying shift severities and for all considered
268 nuisance factors (Fig. 7a, Model size). For this axis, the evaluation of the failure point is in line with
269 the accuracy drop (Fig. 7b, Arch.).

270 **Using more data improves robustness:** The most robust classifiers were trained on large datasets,
271 such as the CLIP models on LION or DINOv2 on LVD-142M. We report a better robustness for the
272 model that was pre-trained on IN21k as well (Fig. 7a, Paradigm).

273 **MAE is the most robust pre-training strategy:** When comparing the models trained on the
274 same dataset size, we observe that the fine-tuned MAE achieves the best robustness. (Fig. 7a,
275 Paradigm) We use the DINOv1 model with a linear head for classification. Interestingly, it has a
276 lower robustness than the ViT that was trained using a supervised loss. This might be attributed to the
277 lower performance when only using linear probing. E.g., while the supervised approach (SUP-IN1k)
278 showed better performance (Fig. 7a, Paradigm) than the MAE-based approach, MAE fails in average
279 later than SUP-IN1k in case it fails (Fig. 7b, Paradigm).

280 **Some models have a larger accuracy drop but fail later.** Failure points are therefore a reasonable
281 additional metric to evaluate the robustness of models with respect to continuous shifts.

282 **Fine-tuning improves the accuracy but deteriorates the robustness for CLIP:** The CLIP classifier
283 applied in a zero-shot manner is more robust (Fig. 7a, Paradigm) while having a lower average
284 accuracy: 89.5% vs. 84.2%. We report all accuracies in Appendix A.

285 **Diffusion classifiers seem not to be more robust than discriminative models.** We evaluate
286 the accuracy drop of the DiT-based diffusion classifier for 1k images on a subset of our dataset
287 (around 400 images) for the snow and the cartoon style shift due to computational constraints. When
288 comparing the performance on the same reduced dataset, the accuracy drops for the LoRA scale 2 of
289 snow (cartoon) shift by around 0.12 (0.37) percent points for the diffusion classifier using the L1 loss
290 computations strategy [22] and by around 0.12 (0.30) percent points for a ViT-B model trained on
291 IN1k. The accuracy drops reported for the evaluated discriminative models on the subset are almost
292 in line with the experiments on the labeled dataset Fig. 6. We provide more results in Appendix A.

293 **Failure points differ across different types of shifts:** Comparing the failure point of various models
294 largely differs when considering individual shifts as shown in Fig. 7c. Snow can be considered as an
295 example shift that slightly changes the appearance and mainly adds a disturbance factor in the image.
296 While there are some differences, the qualitative distribution is comparable for all models. On the
297 contrary, the cartoon and sketch variation correspond to a style shift. Here, the failure points of less
298 robust models are more concentrated.

299 6 Conclusion

300 This work fills the gap in generative robustness benchmarks that did not allow the application of a
301 continuous shift level. In addition, we introduced the concept of failure points for benchmarking,
302 providing an additional dimension to measure robustness. We applied LoRA adapters to realize fine-
303 grained alterations of the image and benchmarked various classifiers along three axes. Furthermore,
304 we discussed the importance of detecting out-of-class class samples when benchmarking using
305 diffusion-generated images. We hope our proposed benchmark can motivate further research in the
306 domain of using generated images for evaluating the natural robustness of vision models. Future
307 work can improve the calibration and composition of various nuisance shifts.

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439 6

440 Checklist

- 441 1. For all authors...
- 442 (a) Do the main claims made in the abstract and introduction accurately reflect the paper’s
443 contributions and scope? [Yes] Our contributions are mentioned in the abstract, the
444 introduction (summarized in lines 70-79), and they are representative of our actual
445 contribution to the field.
- 446 (b) Did you describe the limitations of your work? [Yes] We do not have a dedicated
447 limitation section in our work. However, we made an utmost effort to describe in details
448 (see Sec. 4) our filtering procedure to ensure that the generated data was reaching our
449 quality standards. We also discuss the importance of this filtering process and provide
450 an estimate of its failure rates.
- 451 (c) Did you discuss any potential negative societal impacts of your work? [N/A] Our work
452 does not have any potential negative societal impacts. In this work, we use diffusion
453 models but their societal impacts have already been thoroughly discussed in papers
454 introducing them.
- 455 (d) Have you read the ethics review guidelines and ensured that your paper conforms to
456 them? [Yes] After a careful review of the ethics guidelines, we believe that our paper
457 conforms to them.

- 458 2. If you are including theoretical results...
- 459 (a) Did you state the full set of assumptions of all theoretical results? [N/A] Our work
460 introduces a methodical approach and corresponding experimental results only and
461 does not include any theoretical results.
- 462 (b) Did you include complete proofs of all theoretical results? [N/A] Our work introduces a
463 methodical approach and corresponding experimental results only and does not include
464 any theoretical results.
- 465 3. If you ran experiments (e.g. for benchmarks)...
- 466 (a) Did you include the code, data, and instructions needed to reproduce the main ex-
467 perimental results (either in the supplemental material or as a URL)? [Yes] All the
468 code, data and instructions necessary to reproduce our findings will be available in the
469 supplemental material.
- 470 (b) Did you specify all the training details (e.g., data splits, hyperparameters, how they
471 were chosen)? [Yes] Yes, in the supplemental material.
- 472 (c) Did you report error bars (e.g., with respect to the random seed after running experi-
473 ments multiple times)? [No] For computational reasons, we could not run experiments
474 multiple times. Instead, we preferred focusing on performing experiments with a
475 variety of architectures, model sizes, and paradigm which all provide consistent results.
476 Hence, we believe that the inclusion of error bars would not alter the findings presented
477 in this work. Similarly, we used a large but fixed set of seeds to generate the images
478 used in the benchmark.
- 479 (d) Did you include the total amount of compute and the type of resources used (e.g.,
480 type of GPUs, internal cluster, or cloud provider)? [Yes] All required computational
481 resources are described in the supplemental material.
- 482 4. If you are using existing assets (e.g., code, data, models) or curating/releasing new assets...
- 483 (a) If your work uses existing assets, did you cite the creators? [Yes] All assets that have
484 been used in this work were correctly cited following the best practice.
- 485 (b) Did you mention the license of the assets? [Yes] When assets are licensed, we mention
486 it accordingly.
- 487 (c) Did you include any new assets either in the supplemental material or as a URL? [Yes]
488 We provided additional assets in the form of code and data. All information concerning
489 new assets are described in the supplemental material.
- 490 (d) Did you discuss whether and how consent was obtained from people whose data you're
491 using/curating? [N/A] All the data used is public.
- 492 (e) Did you discuss whether the data you are using/curating contains personally identifiable
493 information or offensive content? [N/A] All the data used is public.
- 494 5. If you used crowdsourcing or conducted research with human subjects...
- 495 (a) Did you include the full text of instructions given to participants and screenshots, if
496 applicable? [N/A] Not applicable
- 497 (b) Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review
498 Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [N/A] Not applicable
- 499 (c) Did you include the estimated hourly wage paid to participants and the total amount
500 spent on participant compensation? [N/A] Not applicable