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ABSTRACT

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) improves the factuality of large language models (LLMs) by grounding outputs in retrieved evidence, but faithfulness failures, where generations contradict or extend beyond the provided sources, remain a critical challenge. Existing hallucination detection methods for RAG often rely either on large-scale detector training, which requires substantial annotated data, or on querying external LLM judges, which leads to high inference costs. Although some approaches attempt to leverage internal representations of LLMs for hallucination detection, their accuracy remains limited. Motivated by recent advances in mechanistic interpretability, we employ sparse autoencoders (SAEs) to disentangle internal activations, successfully identifying features that are specifically triggered during RAG hallucinations. Building on a systematic pipeline of information-based feature selection and additive feature modeling, we introduce RAGLens, a lightweight hallucination detector that accurately flags unfaithful RAG outputs using LLM internal representations. RAGLens not only achieves superior detection performance compared to existing methods, but also provides interpretable rationales for its decisions, enabling effective post-hoc mitigation of unfaithful RAG. Finally, we justify our design choices and reveal new insights into the distribution of hallucination-related signals within LLMs. The code is available at <https://anonymous.4open.science/r/RAGLens/>.

1 INTRODUCTION

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising paradigm for improving the factuality of large language models (LLMs) (Lewis et al., 2020). By conditioning generation on passages retrieved from external corpora, RAG systems aim to ground model outputs in verifiable evidence. However, in practice, grounding does not eliminate unfaithfulness (Magesh et al., 2025; Gao et al., 2023). Models may still contradict the retrieved content, introduce unsupported details, or extrapolate beyond what the evidence justifies (Maynez et al., 2020; Rahman et al., 2025). These faithfulness failures, commonly referred to as hallucinations in the RAG setting, undermine user trust and limit deployment in domains where faithfulness to source information is critical (Huang et al., 2025; Zakka et al., 2024).

Various approaches have been proposed to address this challenge. One direction is to fine-tune specialized detectors to distinguish faithful from unfaithful generations (Bao et al., 2024; Tang et al., 2024a). While this method provides direct supervision, its effectiveness is often constrained by the need for large amounts of high-quality annotated training data. Another line of work employs LLMs as judges, where an auxiliary LLM is prompted to assess faithfulness given the retrieved passages and generated answers (Zheng et al., 2023; Li et al., 2024). However, these approaches struggle to detect hallucinations produced by the same model and introduce significant computational overhead when relying on large-scale external LLMs. More recently, researchers have explored the use of the LLM’s internal representations, such as hidden states or attention scores, to capture hallucinations directly (Han et al., 2024; Sun et al., 2025; Zhou et al., 2025). While these methods show promise, the extraction of reliable hallucination-related signals remains challenging, and detection performance is often insufficient for practical deployment.

Meanwhile, recent advances in mechanistic interpretability have shown that sparse autoencoders (SAEs) can disentangle specific, semantically meaningful features from the hidden states of LLMs

(Huben et al., 2023). By enforcing sparsity, SAEs identify features that correspond to concrete concepts, as evidenced by their consistent activation across similar cases (Bricken et al., 2023; Shu et al., 2025). This property, known as monosemanticity, provides a transparent link between internal activations and model behaviors. While recent work has explored the use of SAEs to detect signals associated with generic LLM hallucinations (Ferrando et al., 2025; Suresh et al., 2025; Abdaljalil et al., 2025; Tillman & Mossing, 2025; Xin et al., 2025), hallucinations in RAG settings pose unique challenges due to the complex interplay between retrieved evidence and generated content. It remains unclear whether SAE features can effectively capture these dynamics. In this work, we directly investigate whether SAEs can identify interpretable features that are predictive of hallucinations in RAG, enabling both accurate detection and deeper insight into failure cases.

We present RAGLens, a lightweight SAE-based detector that flags unfaithful RAG outputs by leveraging LLM internal activations through a systematic pipeline of information-based feature selection and additive feature modeling. Experimental results show that RAGLens identifies features highly relevant to RAG hallucinations and achieves superior detection performance compared to existing methods when evaluated on the same LLM. We further demonstrate the interpretability of RAGLens, enabled by its additive model structure and transparent input features, and highlight how these interpretations facilitate effective post-hoc mitigation of unfaithfulness. Finally, our analyses examine the design choices underlying RAGLens, revealing that mid-layer SAE features with high mutual information about the labels are most informative for detecting RAG hallucinations, and that generalized additive models (GAMs) are particularly well-suited for mapping SAE features to hallucination predictions. To our knowledge, RAGLens is the first approach to systematically demonstrate the effectiveness of SAE features for detecting hallucinations in RAG, and to comprehensively investigate design principles for building accurate and interpretable detectors. Here is a summary of our contributions:

- We demonstrate that SAEs capture nuanced features specifically activated during RAG hallucinations, establishing a strong foundation for detecting RAG unfaithfulness from LLM internal representations.
- Building on these SAE features, we introduce RAGLens, a lightweight hallucination detector that outperforms existing methods in detection accuracy while providing transparent and interpretable feedback to aid in hallucination mitigation.
- Through detailed analyses, we justify the key design choices in RAGLens and offer new insights into the distribution of hallucination-related signals within LLMs.

2 RELATED WORK

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) integrates retrieval modules with large language models (LLMs) to ground responses in external knowledge sources (Lewis et al., 2020; Guu et al., 2020). This design has improved factual accuracy in tasks such as open-domain question answering, knowledge-intensive dialogue, and domain-specific search (Shuster et al., 2021; Siriwardhana et al., 2023; Oche et al., 2025). However, RAG systems remain vulnerable to faithfulness errors: even when relevant passages are retrieved, models may contradict evidence, invent unsupported details, or extrapolate beyond the source (Niu et al., 2024; Sun et al., 2025). These failures have been studied under terms such as hallucination, ungrounded generation, or source inconsistency, and are increasingly recognized as a central obstacle to deploying RAG in real-world applications (Zhang et al., 2025; Gao et al., 2023; Elchafei & Abu-Elkheir, 2025).

To address this challenge, a growing body of work has developed detectors to judge whether a generated response is faithful to the retrieved evidence (Manakul et al., 2023; Sriramanan et al., 2024). Early approaches focused on fine-tuning specialized detectors, which can be effective but require large amounts of high-quality training data, particularly when adapting large models (Bao et al., 2024; Tang et al., 2024a). With the rise of foundation models, researchers have begun using LLMs as evaluators, prompting an auxiliary LLM to compare generated answers against source passages and determine whether hallucination occurs (Zheng et al., 2023; Bui et al., 2024). However, this often necessitates the use of larger LLMs, leading to high computational costs, sensitivity to prompt design (Wang et al., 2024), and explanations that may be plausible but do not faithfully reflect the underlying decision process (Turpin et al., 2023). More recent studies have explored leveraging LLM internal representations for hallucination detection, but challenges such as the polysemy-

108 of neurons and the opacity of hidden states have limited the extraction of high-quality features,
 109 resulting in insufficient detection performance (Elchafei & Abu-Elkheir, 2025; Sun et al., 2025).
 110

111 Recent research has shown that sparse autoencoders (SAEs) can expose semantically meaningful
 112 features within the hidden representations of LLMs (Huben et al., 2023; Shu et al., 2025). By
 113 constraining activations through a sparsity-inducing bottleneck, SAEs learn dictionaries of features
 114 that often correspond to human-interpretable concepts such as syntactic roles, entities, or factual
 115 attributes (Bricken et al., 2023; Gujral et al., 2025). This capability has facilitated analysis of model
 116 internals, enhanced interpretability, and even enabled targeted control of generative behavior (Shi
 117 et al., 2025). The interpretability of SAE-derived features makes them attractive for tasks where
 118 transparency is critical, such as hallucination detection.

119 3 RAGLENS: FAITHFUL RETRIEVAL-AUGMENTED GENERATION VIA 120 SPARSE REPRESENTATION PROBING

122 3.1 PROBLEM SETTING

124 Following prior work (Niu et al., 2024; Song et al., 2024; Sun et al., 2025), we use “RAG” to denote
 125 any context-conditioned generation process in which an LLM produces an answer based on both
 126 a user query/instruction and a provided context. The faithfulness detection task is to determine
 127 whether the generated answer is consistent with the given context. In such tasks, each annotated
 128 instance consists of: (1) a user query or instruction q ; (2) a set of retrieved passages \mathcal{C} ; (3) an answer
 129 sequence $y_{1:T}$ generated by an LLM, where T is the sequence length and $y_{1:t}$ denotes the prefix up
 130 to position t ; and (4) a binary label $\ell \in \{0, 1\}$ indicating whether the answer contains hallucination
 131 relative to \mathcal{C} . We assume access to a frozen LLM Φ and a corresponding SAE with encoder \mathcal{E} trained
 132 on the hidden states in the L -th layer of Φ . We denote by $\Phi_L(\cdot)$ the mapping that returns layer- L
 133 hidden states. Given a generation $y_{1:T}$, we obtain

$$134 \quad h_t = \Phi_L(y_{1:t}, q, \mathcal{C}), \quad t = 1, \dots, T, \quad (1)$$

135 and transform these via the SAE encoder into sparse features

$$137 \quad z_t = \mathcal{E}(h_t), \quad z_t \in \mathbb{R}^K, \quad (2)$$

138 where K is the size of the dictionary and only a small number of features are active at each position.

139 Our goal is to examine whether the SAE features contain signals that help detect hallucinations
 140 related to RAG. Section 3.2 presents our detection method, and Section 3.3 shows how the results
 141 support explanation and mitigation. An overview is shown in Figure 1.

143 3.2 HALLUCINATION DETECTION

145 **Instance-level Feature Summary.** Because target labels are instance-level, we summarize token-
 146 level activations into an instance representation via channel-wise max pooling:

$$147 \quad \bar{z}_k = \max_{1 \leq t \leq T} z_{t,k}, \quad k = 1, \dots, K, \quad (3)$$

149 where $z_{t,k}$ is the k -th element of $z_t \in \mathbb{R}^K$ and collect $\bar{\mathbf{z}} = (\bar{z}_1, \dots, \bar{z}_K) \in \mathbb{R}^K$.

151 **Information-based Feature Selection.** We quantify the information of each pooled feature \bar{z}_k
 152 ($k = 1, \dots, K$) about the hallucination label ℓ using mutual information (MI):

$$154 \quad I(\bar{z}_k; \ell) = \int_{\mathbb{R}} \sum_{\ell \in \{0, 1\}} p(\bar{z}_k, \ell) \log_2 \frac{p(\bar{z}_k, \ell)}{p(\bar{z}_k) p(\ell)} d\bar{z}_k. \quad (4)$$

156 We rank features by MI and select the top K' dimensions:

$$158 \quad \mathcal{S} = \arg \max_{|\mathcal{S}|=K'} \sum_{k \in \mathcal{S}} I(\bar{z}_k; \ell), \quad (5)$$

161 yielding $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} \in \mathbb{R}^{K'}$ as the subvector of $\bar{\mathbf{z}}$ restricted to indices \mathcal{S} . In our experiments, MI is estimated
 with a binning-based method applied to the pooled activations. **While we do not explicitly utilize**




Figure 1: Overview of RAGLens for detecting, explaining, and mitigating hallucinations in retrieval-augmented generation using interpretable sparse features.

the hidden states of the retrieved passages \mathcal{C} , our encoding of the model output y in Equation 1 is conditioned on \mathcal{C} . This allows the SAE features to implicitly capture interactions between the generated answer and the retrieved content. Empirical results in Appendix H show that the selected SAE features encode knowledge relevant to the retrieved passages, and their activations are dynamically influenced by counterfactual interventions on \mathcal{C} .

Transparent Prediction with Generalized Additive Models. After selecting informative SAE features, we model the instance label from the pooled representation using a generalized additive model (GAM) (Lou et al., 2012; Caruana et al., 2015; Hastie, 2017):

$$g(\mathbb{E}[\ell | \tilde{\mathbf{z}}]) = \beta_0 + \sum_{j=1}^{K'} f_j(\tilde{z}_j), \quad (6)$$

where g is the link function (e.g., logit for binary classification) and each univariate shape function f_j is learned using bagged gradient boosting (Nori et al., 2019). By selecting only K' features ($K' \ll K$), the fitted GAM serves as a lightweight detector, requiring the encoding of only a small subset of SAE features. Our analysis in Section 5 further validates that GAM is well-suited for modeling hallucination signals from SAE features, outperforming more complex predictors such as MLP (Popescu et al., 2009) and XGBoost (Chen & Guestrin, 2016).

Justification of Max Pooling on Sparse Activations. Beyond the practical advantage of storage efficiency, we provide a theoretical justification for using max pooling: in the sparse activation regime, it can help distinguish hallucination-related features from random noise by amplifying signals associated with relevant targets. To facilitate the analysis, for any fixed feature index k , suppressing the respective notation for clarity, we model the token-level activation $z_t \geq 0$ as conditionally independent across tokens given the label $\ell \in \{0, 1\}$, with a rare activation mechanism:

$$z_t = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{with probability } 1 - p_\ell, \\ V_t, & \text{with probability } p_\ell, \end{cases} \quad t = 1, \dots, T, \quad (7)$$

where the “active-value” random variable V_t has a distribution F supported on $(0, \infty)$ that is independent of ℓ and i.i.d. across tokens. Let $\bar{z} = \max_{1 \leq t \leq T} z_t$ and $\pi = \Pr(\ell = 1)$.

Theorem 1 (Max pooling in the sparse-activation regime). *If $T \times \bar{p} \ll 1$ with $\bar{p} = \frac{1}{2}(p_1 + p_0)$, then*

$$I(\bar{z}; \ell) = \frac{\pi(1 - \pi)}{2 \ln 2} \frac{T(\Delta p)^2}{\bar{p}} + O((T\bar{p})^2), \quad \Delta p = p_1 - p_0, \quad (8)$$

where $I(\bar{z}; \ell) > 0$ iff $p_1 \neq p_0$. The leading dependence is linear in T and quadratic in Δp .

216 *Proof sketch.* Let $A = \mathbf{1}\{\bar{z} > 0\}$. Independence across tokens implies $\Pr(A=1 \mid \ell) = q_\ell =$
 217 $1 - (1 - p_\ell)^T$, so $I(A; \ell) = h(\pi q_1 + (1 - \pi)q_0) - [\pi h(q_1) + (1 - \pi)h(q_0)]$. For $p_\ell \ll 1$, $q_\ell \approx T p_\ell$
 218 and a second-order expansion of h gives

$$220 \quad I(A; \ell) = \frac{\pi(1 - \pi)}{2 \ln 2} \frac{T(\Delta p)^2}{\bar{p}} + O((T\bar{p})^2). \quad (9)$$

222 Since A is a deterministic function of \bar{z} , $I(A; \ell) \leq I(\bar{z}; \ell)$. In the single-hit regime ($T\bar{p} \ll 1$), the
 223 extra information in \bar{z} beyond A occurs only on rare multi-activation events, contributing $O((T\bar{p})^2)$.
 224 Combining yields the claim. A full proof is in Appendix F. \square

226 3.3 HALLUCINATION EXPLANATION AND MITIGATION

228 Since the detection results are computed from SAE features within an additive modeling frame-
 229 work, our approach naturally supports interpretability at both the local (instance-specific) and global
 230 (instance-invariant) levels, which can then be leveraged to improve faithful RAG generation.

232 **Local Explanations via Sparse Feature Attribution.** Because our GAM operates additively on
 233 a small set of selected SAE features, each prediction can be decomposed into a sum of feature
 234 contributions. For any given example, we can attribute the hallucination prediction to the specific
 235 sparse features that are most strongly activated. By aligning these activations with token positions,
 236 we obtain token-level feedback that highlights which parts of the generation are likely ungrounded
 237 relative to the retrieved passages. This fine-grained attribution enables users to directly pinpoint
 238 fabricated factual inserts such as numbers, dates, or named entities.

239 **Global Explanations via Intrinsic Model Interpretability.** Beyond instance-specific attributions,
 240 RAGLens also provides global, instance-invariant explanations. With the dictionary learning prop-
 241 erty of SAEs, each SAE feature corresponds to a semantically coherent concept that can be sum-
 242 marized as human-understandable knowledge. Furthermore, our use of GAMs in RAGLens enables
 243 visualization of the learned shape function for each feature, offering a stable explanation of the map-
 244 ping from feature magnitude to predicted hallucination risk. Practitioners can therefore inspect how
 245 changes in a given feature systematically increase or decrease the prediction, enabling consistent
 246 feature-level auditing.

247 **Mitigation through Multi-level Feedback.** The interpretability of our framework enables expla-
 248 nation signals to be directly incorporated into mitigation strategies at inference time. Specifically,
 249 detection results can be provided to LLMs as instance-level warnings, prompting the model to re-
 250 consider and revise potentially hallucinated content. By aligning sparse activations with text spans
 251 identified by local explanations, we can further highlight problematic tokens that may require edit-
 252 ing, thereby guiding the model to refine its output.

253 4 EXPERIMENTS

255 4.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS

257 We conduct experiments on two RAG hallucination benchmarks with Llama2 backbones: RAGTruth
 258 (Niu et al., 2024) and Dolly (Accurate Context) (Hu et al., 2024), both of which include human
 259 annotations for outputs generated by Llama2-7B/13B. To further evaluate generalizability across
 260 architectures, we also test our method on Llama3.2-1B, Llama3.1-8B, and Qwen3-0.6B/4B using
 261 two additional datasets, AggreFact (Tang et al., 2023) and TofuEval (Tang et al., 2024b), which
 262 contain hallucinations produced by a variety of LLMs. For consistency with prior work (Sun et al.,
 263 2025; Tamber et al., 2025), we report balanced accuracy (Acc) and macro F₁ (F₁).

264 We compare RAGLens with representative detectors based on (i) prompt engineering (e.g., Friel &
 265 Sanyal, 2023), (ii) model uncertainty (e.g., Manakul et al., 2023), or (iii) LLM internal representa-
 266 tions (e.g., Sun et al., 2025). We also include a fine-tuning baseline, “Llama2-13B(LR)”, following
 267 existing work (Sun et al., 2025). For a fair comparison with methods that analyze internal signals
 268 during LLM generation, we evaluate all detectors on Llama2-7B and Llama2-13B using the cor-
 269 responding samples generated by these models in RAGTruth and Dolly. Table 1 lists the specific
 270 baselines, with details in Appendix A. Implementation details are provided in Appendix B.

270 4.2 PERFORMANCE ON RAG HALLUCINATION DETECTION
271

272 Table 1 summarizes the performance of RAGLens on RAGTruth and Dolly, with comparisons to pre-
273 vious methods using the same backbones. As the table shows, the SAE features of both Llama2-7B
274 and Llama2-13B contain sufficient information to accurately detect hallucinations, achieving AUC
275 scores greater than 80% on both datasets. More importantly, RAGLens consistently outperforms
276 existing baselines, demonstrating its effectiveness in identifying and leveraging internal knowledge
277 for RAG hallucination detection. These results highlight the strong potential of SAEs to serve as
278 powerful detectors by using knowledge already embedded within LLMs to identify hallucinations.
279

280 Table 1: Performance comparison of different hallucination detection methods on RAGTruth and
281 Dolly. The best results are highlighted in **bold**.

282 Method	283 RAGTruth (Llama2-7B)			284 Dolly (Llama2-7B)			285 RAGTruth (Llama2-13B)			286 Dolly (Llama2-13B)		
	287 AUC	288 Acc	289 F ₁	290 AUC	291 Acc	292 F ₁	293 AUC	294 Acc	295 F ₁	296 AUC	297 Acc	F ₁
Prompt	–	0.6700	0.6720	–	0.6200	0.5476	–	0.7300	0.6899	–	0.6700	0.5823
Llama2-13B(LR)	–	0.6350	0.6572	–	0.6043	0.6616	–	0.7044	0.6725	–	0.5545	0.6664
LwMLM	–	0.6940	0.7365	–	0.6550	0.7702	–	0.5956	0.7684	–	0.6800	0.7000
FACTScore	0.5428	0.5333	0.6719	0.4813	0.5354	0.6849	0.5294	0.4533	0.6239	0.4389	0.4646	0.5954
FactCC	0.4976	0.5022	0.4589	0.6169	0.5758	0.5882	0.4753	0.4800	0.4121	0.6496	0.6162	0.5250
ChainPoll	0.6738	0.6841	0.7006	0.6593	0.6200	0.5581	0.7414	0.7378	0.7370	0.7070	0.6800	0.6004
RAGAS	0.7290	0.6822	0.6667	0.6648	0.6560	0.6392	0.7541	0.7080	0.6987	0.6412	0.6480	0.5306
TurLens	0.6510	0.6821	0.6658	0.6264	0.6800	0.6567	0.7073	0.6756	0.7063	0.6622	0.5700	0.3944
RefCheck	0.6912	0.6467	0.6736	0.6494	0.6100	0.5412	0.7897	0.7200	0.7823	0.6621	0.5700	0.3944
P(True)	0.7093	0.5648	0.6549	0.6191	0.5344	0.5095	0.8496	0.6266	0.7038	0.6422	0.5260	0.5240
SelfCheckGPT	–	0.5844	0.4642	–	0.5300	0.3188	–	0.5844	0.4642	–	0.5300	0.3188
LN-Entropy	0.5912	0.5620	0.6850	0.6074	0.5656	0.6261	0.5912	0.5620	0.6850	0.6074	0.5656	0.6261
Energy	0.5619	0.5088	0.6657	0.6074	0.5656	0.6261	0.5619	0.5088	0.6657	0.6074	0.5656	0.6261
Focus	0.6233	0.5533	0.6522	0.6783	0.6212	0.6545	0.7888	0.6000	0.6758	0.7067	0.6500	0.6567
Perplexity	0.5091	0.5333	0.6749	0.6825	0.6363	0.7097	0.5091	0.5333	0.6749	0.6825	0.6363	0.7097
EigenScore	0.6045	0.5422	0.6682	0.6786	0.6596	0.7241	0.6640	0.5267	0.6637	0.7214	0.6211	0.7200
SEP	0.7143	0.6187	0.7048	0.6067	0.6060	0.7023	0.8098	0.7288	0.7799	0.7093	0.6800	0.6923
SAPLMA	0.7107	0.5155	0.6502	0.6500	0.6084	0.6653	0.8029	0.5488	0.6923	0.7088	0.6100	0.6605
ITI	0.6714	0.5667	0.6496	0.5494	0.5800	0.6281	0.8501	0.6177	0.6850	0.6530	0.5583	0.6712
ReDeEP	0.7458	0.6822	0.7190	0.7949	0.7373	0.7833	0.8244	0.7889	0.7587	0.8420	0.7070	0.7603
RAGLens (Ours)	0.8413	0.7576	0.7636	0.8764	0.7778	0.8070	0.8964	0.8333	0.8148	0.8568	0.7576	0.7895

298 4.3 CROSS-MODEL APPLICATION
299

300 While SAE features are not transferable across different LLMs, the RAGLens detector trained on one
301 LLM can be flexibly applied to text outputs generated by other LLMs. To examine whether LLMs
302 contain sufficient internal knowledge to detect hallucinations produced by other LLMs, we con-
303 duct cross-model evaluations by training a series of RAGLens detectors based on SAEs of multiple
304 open-source LLMs, and test their performance on RAG outputs from various LLMs in RAGTruth,
305 **AggreFact**, and **TofuEval**. Specifically, we prompt each LLM to assess the faithfulness of the RAG
306 output in a chain-of-thought (CoT) style (Wei et al., 2022), using the template from Luo et al. (2023),
307 and compare these results to those of the same model’s SAE-based detector via RAGLens.
308

309 Figure 2 shows the performance of all evaluated LLMs across different datasets. The SAE-based
310 detector consistently outperforms each model’s own CoT-style self-judgments. Larger LLMs ex-
311 hibit stronger internal knowledge, achieving higher detection performance with SAE-based detec-
312 tors. While earlier generation models such as Llama2-7B and Llama2-13B have lower CoT judg-
313 ments on certain datasets, their SAE-based detectors perform comparably to newer models of similar
314 size (e.g., Llama3.1-8B). Meanwhile, although Qwen3-0.6B achieves competitive CoT performance
315 on AggreFact and TofuEval, its SAE-based detector lags behind those of larger LLMs, suggesting
316 that the informativeness of internal knowledge correlates more with model size than with training
317 pipeline. Overall, these results indicate that models “know more than they tell” and that SAEs can
318 reveal latent faithfulness signals that are not consistently captured by CoT reasoning.

319 4.4 GENERALIZATION ACROSS DOMAINS
320

321 Beyond cross-model applications, we further assess whether the internal signals captured by RA-
322 GLens generalize across domains. Specifically, we train the RAGLens predictor on one domain and
323 evaluate its performance on other domains. Table 2 reports the generalization performance (AUC)
324 of RAGLens across different datasets and tasks.




Figure 2: Comparison of LLM CoT-style self-judgment versus internal knowledge revealed by SAE features for hallucination detection across datasets.

The left part of Table 2 presents cross-dataset results, showing that RAGLens generalizability depends on the diversity of its training data. For example, a detector trained on RAGTruth significantly outperforms the CoT baseline on AggreFact and TofuEval without retraining. In contrast, predictors trained on AggreFact and TofuEval, while still outperforming CoT in most cases, do not generalize as well as those trained on RAGTruth. This can be attributed to dataset differences: RAGTruth covers multiple subtasks, whereas AggreFact and TofuEval focus on single tasks. The results indicate that RAGLens trained with diverse samples is more robust and generalizable to domain shifts.

Table 2: Generalization across datasets and subtasks. Left: RAGLens trained on a single dataset and evaluated on others. Right: RAGLens trained on one RAGTruth subtask and evaluated on other subtasks. “None” indicates zero-shot performance with CoT prompting. All scores are AUROC.

Train\Test	RAGTruth	AggreFact	TofuEval	Train\Test	Summary	QA	Data2txt
Llama2-7B							
None	0.4842	0.5741	0.5562	None	0.4924	0.4845	0.4949
RAGTruth	0.8806	0.8019	0.7637	Summary	0.8191	0.8253	0.6443
AggreFact	0.5330	0.8330	0.6123	QA	0.7081	0.8835	0.6609
TofuEval	0.7747	0.6161	0.7846	Data2txt	0.5386	0.6616	0.8454
Llama2-13B							
None	0.4959	0.5285	0.5583	None	0.5196	0.5088	0.4765
RAGTruth	0.8674	0.7831	0.7319	Summary	0.7539	0.8330	0.6627
AggreFact	0.4669	0.8285	0.6239	QA	0.6619	0.8769	0.6669
TofuEval	0.7342	0.5727	0.7883	Data2txt	0.5653	0.7373	0.8491



Generalization across task types is shown in the right part of Table 2. RAGLens, when trained on one task, consistently transfers its learned knowledge to other tasks and outperforms the CoT baseline. Among the three subtasks, the predictor trained on summarization (Summary) exhibits the strongest generalizability, surpassing those trained on question answering (QA) or data-to-text generation (Data2txt). Additionally, knowledge transfer between Summary and QA is more effective than between Data2txt and the other tasks. These results suggest that RAGLens can capture common signals shared across different RAG tasks, while also revealing the presence of task-specific signals that limit generalization.

4.5 INTERPRETABILITY OF RAGLENS

In addition to strong performance, RAGLens provides interpretability for the hallucination detection process. Since RAGLens uses SAE features that are disentangled and correspond to specific con-

378 cepts, we can analyze which features are most indicative of hallucinations and what they represent.
 379 With the deployment of the GAM classifier, RAGLens can transparently illustrate how each feature
 380 contributes to the final prediction through learned shape functions. Table 3 presents two represen-
 381 tative SAE features from Llama3.1-8B that are most predictive of hallucinations, as identified by
 382 the GAM classifier trained on RAGTruth. For each feature, we show two example activations from
 383 RAGTruth outputs, accompanied by a semantic explanation distilled by GPT-5 from 24 activation
 384 cases. We also visualize the learned shape function for each feature, where the y-axis (feature effect
 385 on hallucination prediction) is zero-centered, illustrating how the feature value (x-axis) influences
 386 the likelihood of hallucination.

387
 388 Table 3: Interpretation of two SAE features in Llama3.1-8B. Each row shows the feature ID, a brief
 389 explanation of its semantic role, and example text spans where the feature is activated. Top activated
 390 tokens in each example are shown in **bold**, while the hallucinated tokens are highlighted in **red**.
 391 The shape functions learned by the GAM are visualized in the rightmost column, illustrating each
 392 feature’s impact on hallucination prediction.

393 ID	394 Explanation	395 Examples	396 Shape Plot
395 22790	396 unsupported 397 numeric/time 398 specifics	399 Context: no mention of age 400 Output: [...] at the age of 34 [...]	
		401 Context: no mention of release schedule 402 Output: [...] to be released in August [...]	
403 17721	404 grounded, 405 high-salience 406 tokens	407 Context: [...] could be arrested on the spot [...] 408 Output: [...] could be arrested on the spot [...]	
		409 Context: [...] software can be licensed as a [...] 410 Output: [...] software can be licensed as a [...]	

411 As shown in the table, Llama3.1-8B contains various types of features that help detect hallucinations
 412 from different perspectives. For example, feature 22790 indicates potential hallucinations that are
 413 related to unsupported numeric/time specifics. Its corresponding shape function (learned by GAM)
 414 exhibits a monotonic increase in hallucination likelihood as activation strength rises. RAGLens also
 415 uncovers SAE features that are negatively correlated with hallucinations, such as feature 17721,
 416 which captures signals associated with grounded, high-salience tokens. This interpretability not
 417 only clarifies how RAGLens works, but also provides insights into the internal knowledge of LLMs.
 418 Additional examples from other LLMs are provided in Appendix G, and Appendix H presents case
 419 studies using counterfactual perturbations to validate that these features are specifically sensitive to
 420 hallucination patterns unique to RAG scenarios.

416 4.6 MITIGATION OF UNFAITHFULNESS WITH RAGLENS

421 Leveraging its detection and interpretation capabilities, RAGLens can provide post-hoc feedback to
 422 LLMs to mitigate hallucinations. We evaluate this by applying Llama2-7B-based RAGLens to 450
 423 Llama2-7B-generated outputs from RAGTruth, and prompting the same model to revise its original
 424 output using RAGLens feedback. Specifically, we compare the effectiveness of instance-level feed-
 425 back (detection results only) and token-level feedback (which includes additional explanations from
 426 RAGLens interpretation) for hallucination mitigation.

427 Table 4 reports the resulting hallucination rates (lower is better) as judged by multiple automatic
 428 LLM judges. In addition, two human annotators evaluated a subset of 45 outputs, with an inter-
 429 annotator agreement of 78.3%. Although hallucination rates vary among different types of annota-
 430 tors, the results consistently show that both types of RAGLens feedback effectively reduce halluci-
 431 nations in the revised output. Notably, the more nuanced token-level feedback enabled by RAGLens
 432 interpretability leads to further reductions compared to instance-level feedback. **We further applied**
 433 **a trained RAGLens detector (Llama3.1-8B based) to all 450 examples and found that instance-level**
 434 **feedback converted 29 outputs from hallucination to non-hallucination, while token-level feedback**
 435 **achieved 36 such conversions, confirming the advantage of token-level feedback.**


432
 433 Table 4: Mitigation of Llama2-7B hallucinations using SAE-based internal knowledge. Hallucina-
 434 tion rates (lower is better) are reported for original outputs and after applying instance- and token-
 435 level feedback, as judged by Llama3.3-70B, GPT-4o, GPT-o3, and human annotators.

	Llama3.3-70B	GPT-4o	GPT-o3	Human
Original	43.78%	37.78%	64.44%	71.11%
+ Instance-level Feedback	42.22%	36.44%	60.44%	62.22%
+ Token-level Feedback	39.11%	34.22%	58.88%	55.56%

440 5 DISCUSSIONS

441
 442 Beyond the main results on hallucination detection, interpretation, and mitigation using SAE fea-
 443 tures, we further analyze several key SAE-specific design choices in RAGLens, including the se-
 444 lection of the LLM layer, the feature extractor, the number of selected features, and the predictor
 445 architecture.

446 **LLM Layer Selection.** We first vary the layer from which SAE features are extracted, covering
 447 the full depth of several LLMs (Llama3.2-1B, Llama3-8B, Qwen3-0.6B, and Qwen3-4B). Figure 3
 448 presents the heatmaps of LLM performance on various subtasks in RAGTruth (RAGTruth-Summary,
 449 RAGTruth-QA, and RAGTruth-Data2txt), where layer depths are normalized for direct comparison.
 450 The results show that the performance trend in layers is consistent among LLMs but varies by task.
 451 In the Summary and QA tasks of RAGTruth, the performance peaks around the middle layers,
 452 whereas the Data2txt task exhibits a comparatively flat performance pattern across layers.




453
 454 Figure 3: Layer-wise analysis of Llama3.2-1B, Llama3-8B, Qwen3-0.6B, and Qwen3-4B on sub-
 455 tasks in RAGTruth (RAGTruth-Summary, RAGTruth-QA, and RAGTruth-Data2txt).

456
 457 **Feature Extractor Comparison.** We further compare different feature extractors, specifically
 458 SAE and Transcoder (Dunefsky et al., 2024), as well as pre-activation versus post-activation signals
 459 (i.e., features extracted before or after applying the activation function). Table 5 shows that pre-
 460 activation features consistently outperform post-activation features for both extractors. Transcoder
 461 and SAE achieve similar accuracy, indicating no clear advantage for either architecture. These
 462 results suggest that while both extractors are effective, the choice of activation point is more critical,
 463 with pre-activations retaining more informative signals about RAG hallucinations.

464
 465 Table 5: Comparison of SAE and Transcoder feature extractors, using pre- and post-activation sig-
 466 nals, for hallucination detection with Llama3.2-1B across three datasets.


Architecture	Activation	RAGTruth		AggreFact		TofuEval	
		Acc	F ₁	Acc	F ₁	Acc	F ₁
SAE	Pre-activation	0.7810	0.7892	0.7308	0.7388	0.6865	0.6876
	Post-activation	0.7606	0.7700	0.6939	0.7091	0.5637	0.5642
Transcoder	Pre-activation	0.7778	0.7830	0.7468	0.7586	0.6652	0.6666
	Post-activation	0.7594	0.7684	0.7373	0.7525	0.6195	0.6178

486
 487 **Analysis of Feature Count.** We also examine how varying the number of selected features (K')
 488 affects performance, using mutual information (MI) ranking to identify the most informative fea-
 489 tures. Figure 4 shows the performance of Llama2-7B-based RAGLens as K' decreases from 1024
 490 to 1, comparing MI-based selection to random selection (Rand.) starting with the same set of fea-
 491 tures. As expected, performance drops as fewer features are used, but the decline is much more
 492 gradual with MI-based selection, demonstrating that MI effectively prioritizes informative fea-
 493 tures for hallucination detection. Differences in trends between datasets further highlight the varying
 494 complexity of hallucination detection tasks.



500
 501 Figure 4: Effect of varying the number of selected features (K') on hallucination detection perfor-
 502 mance, comparing mutual information (MI) ranking and random selection (Rand.).

503
 504 **Predictor Ablation.** Lastly, we compare logistic regression (LR), generalized additive model
 505 (GAM), multilayer perceptron (MLP), and eXtreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost) as predictors
 506 for hallucination detection using the selected SAE features. Figure 5 shows that GAM consistently
 507 outperforms LR and also surpasses more complex models such as MLP and XGBoost, despite its
 508 additive structure. This suggests that while the effect of individual features on the output is often
 509 nonlinear, the overall contribution of SAE features can be effectively captured in an additive
 510 manner. Consequently, GAM is particularly well-suited for leveraging SAE features, offering both
 511 strong performance and interpretability.



525
 526 Figure 5: Comparison of logistic regression (LR) and generalized additive model (GAM), multi-
 527 layer perceptron (MLP), and eXtreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost) as predictors for RAGLens,
 528 evaluated across multiple models and datasets.

530 6 CONCLUSION

531
 532 In summary, this work demonstrates that SAEs can serve as powerful and interpretable tools for
 533 detecting RAG hallucinations. By leveraging internal representations of LLMs, our proposed RA-
 534 GLens framework not only achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple benchmarks, but
 535 also provides transparent explanations at both local and global levels. Beyond detection, the
 536 interpretability of RAGLens enables actionable feedback to mitigate hallucinations, improving the
 537 reliability of RAG systems in practice. These findings highlight the broader potential of sparse rep-
 538 resentation probing for enhancing model faithfulness and open up future directions for integrating
 539 lightweight, interpretable SAE-based detectors into real-world applications where trust and accuracy
 540 are critical.

540 REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT
541

542 To ensure the reproducibility of our experimental results, we provide comprehensive details and im-
543 plementation code for our method. Specifically, a complete proof of Theorem 1 is included in Ap-
544 pendix F, and full implementation details are provided in Appendix B. All code necessary to repro-
545 duce our experiments is available at <https://anonymous.4open.science/r/RAGLens/>.

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810 A DATASET AND BASELINE DETAILS
811812 A.1 DATASETS
813814 Here are the detailed descriptions of the datasets used in our experiments.
815816 **RAGTruth.** RAGTruth (Niu et al., 2024) is a large-scale dataset featuring nearly 18000 naturally
817 generated responses from a range of open- and closed-source LLMs under retrieval-augmented gen-
818 eration settings. The benchmark includes three subtasks: summarization (RAGTruth-Summary),
819 data-to-text generation (RAGTruth-Data2txt), and question answering (RAGTruth-QA). We use the
820 training split of RAGTruth for feature selection and model fitting, and report results on the held-out
821 test set.
822823 **Dolly.** For the Dolly dataset in the “Accurate Context” setting (Hu et al., 2024), each example
824 presents the model with a context document verified to be relevant and accurate. The model is
825 tasked with generating responses faithful to this context. Following Sun et al. (2025), we perform
826 two-fold cross-validation for model evaluation, alternating between halves of the test set for feature
827 selection and assessment.
828829 **AggreFact.** AggreFact (Tang et al., 2023) compiles outputs and annotations from various [summa-](#)
830 [rization and factual consistency datasets](#). Our experiments focus on the “SOTA” subset, consisting
831 of summaries produced by models such as T5, BART, and PEGASUS. Each summary is paired with
832 its source document, and factual consistency is annotated by humans. We use the validation set for
833 feature selection and model training, evaluating final performance on the designated test split.
834835 **TofuEval.** TofuEval (Tang et al., 2024b) is a benchmark designed for [topic-focused dialogue sum-](#)
836 [marization](#). We utilize its MeetingBank portion, which consists of multi-turn meeting transcripts
837 annotated with topic boundaries. LLMs are tasked with generating topic-specific summaries from
838 the full dialogue. Annotations include binary sentence-level factuality as well as free-form explana-
839 tions for inconsistent content. For this dataset, feature selection and model fitting are performed on
840 the development set, and evaluation is conducted on the test set.
841842 A.2 BASELINES
843844 We benchmark RAGLens against a diverse set of representative hallucination detection methods.
845 For clarity, we group all baselines into three main categories, detailed below.
846847 **Prompting-based Detectors.** This category captures hallucination signals by leveraging the gen-
848 erative and reasoning capabilities of LLMs to produce token-level decisions. It encompasses various
849 prompting strategies, such as prompt engineering (Friel & Sanyal, 2023), multi-agent collaboration
850 (Cohen et al., 2023), as well as supervised fine-tuning. Following Sun et al. (2025), we include a
851 fine-tuned Llama2-13B(LR) baseline, where the detector is trained on RAGTruth using LoRA (Xu
852 et al., 2024). The full list of baseline detectors in this category includes: Prompt (Niu et al., 2024),
853 Llama2-13B(LR) (Sun et al., 2025), LMvLM (Cohen et al., 2023), [FActScore \(Min et al., 2023\)](#),
854 [FactCC \(Kryściński et al., 2020\)](#), ChainPoll (Friel & Sanyal, 2023), RAGAS (Es et al., 2024), Tru-
855 Lens (Truera, 2025), RefCheck (Hu et al., 2024), and P(True) (Kadavath et al., 2022).
856857 **Uncertainty-based Detectors.** These methods assess hallucination likelihood based on the uncer-
858 tainty of LLM outputs, typically measured via sampled tokens or the distribution of output logits
859 prior to token generation. The complete list of detectors in this category includes: SelfCheckGPT
860 (Manakul et al., 2023), LN-Entropy (Malinin & Gales, 2021), Energy (Liu et al., 2020), Focus
861 (Zhang et al., 2023), and Perplexity (Ren et al., 2023).
862863 **Internal Representation-based Detectors.** These approaches probe the internal representations
864 of the LLM, such as hidden states, attention patterns, or other intermediate representations, to iden-
865 tify unfaithful generations. By analyzing these internal model dynamics, these detectors aim to
866 capture subtle signals associated with hallucination that may not be reflected in output tokens or
867

864 logits. Methods in this category include: EigenScore (Chen et al., 2024), SEP (Han et al., 2024),
 865 SAPLMA (Azaria & Mitchell, 2023), ITI (Li et al., 2024), and ReDeEP (Sun et al., 2025).
 866

867 B IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS

870 While a trained SAE is required for detection in RAGLens, the rapid development of the SAE
 871 community (Shu et al., 2025) has led to the public release of many pre-trained SAEs for widely used
 872 LLMs. Moreover, SAEs are typically trained on general-purpose corpora rather than task-specific
 873 datasets, allowing for their reuse in analyses beyond the scope of this work. To demonstrate the
 874 efficiency and practicality of our pipeline, we utilize publicly available SAEs whenever possible,
 875 showing that our method does not require resource-intensive, specially tuned SAEs for effective
 876 performance. Below, we list the specific SAEs used in our experiments:
 877

- 878 • **Llama2-7B:** We use the pretrained SAE from <https://huggingface.co/yuzhaouoe/Llama2-7b-SAE>, which includes SAEs for multiple layers. Specifically,
 879 we select the SAE trained on “layers.15”, **with an expansion factor of 32 and Top-K activation ($K = 192$)**.
 880
- 881 • **Llama2-13B:** As no public SAE is available for Llama2-13B, we train our own using the
 882 `sparsify` package¹ with default settings. The SAE is trained on “layers.15”, **with an**
 883 **expansion factor of 16 and Top-K activation ($K = 16$)**.
 884
- 885 • **Llama3.2-1B:** We use the pretrained SAE from <https://huggingface.co/EleutherAI/sae-Llama-3.2-1B-131k>, which covers multiple layers. For results
 886 in Section 4.3, we select the SAE trained on “layers.6.mlp”, and for the layer-wise analysis
 887 in Section 5, we use all available SAEs. **The SAEs have an expansion factor of 32 and**
 888 **Top-K activation ($K = 32$)**.
 889
- 890 • **Llama3-8B:** We use the pretrained SAE from <https://huggingface.co/EleutherAI/sae-llama-3-8b-32x>, utilizing all available SAEs for the layer-wise
 891 analysis in Section 5. **The SAEs have an expansion factor of 32 and Top-K activation**
 892 **($K = 192$)**.
 893
- 894 • **Llama3.1-8B:** We use the pretrained SAE from <https://huggingface.co/Goodfire/Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct-SAE-119>, which contains the SAE trained
 895 on “layers.19”. **The SAE has an expansion factor of 16 and ReLU activation**.
 896
- 897 • **Qwen3-0.6B:** As there is no public SAE for Qwen3-0.6B, we train our own using the
 898 `sparsify` package with default settings. For results in Section 4.3, we select the SAE
 899 trained on “layers.17”, and for layer-wise analysis, we use all trained SAEs. **The SAEs**
 900 **have an expansion factor of 32 and Top-K activation ($K = 16$)**.
 901
- 902 • **Qwen3-4B:** Similarly, we train our own SAEs for Qwen3-4B. For Section 4.3, we select
 903 the SAE trained on “layers.22”; for layer-wise analysis, we use all available SAEs. **The**
 904 **SAEs have an expansion factor of 32 and Top-K activation ($K = 16$)**.
 905

906 To compute mutual information (MI) in RAGLens, we estimate the MI value of each continuous
 907 SAE feature by discretizing feature values into bins using quantile thresholds. Specifically, we
 908 partition the value range into 50 bins per feature and compute MI values in chunks for GPU acceler-
 909 ation. After ranking features based on estimated MI, we select the top 1000 features for subsequent
 910 Generalized Additive Model (GAM) fitting in RAGLens.
 911

912 For GAM fitting, we deploy the Explainable Boosting Machine (EBM) (Nori et al., 2019), a high-
 913 performance, tree-based GAM implementation that flexibly models nonlinear effects of features on
 914 the target output. Across all experiments, we set the maximum number of bins in each feature’s
 915 shape function to 32, a validation size of 10%, and a maximum of 1000 boosting rounds.
 916

917 To generate semantic explanations for selected SAE features, we collect representative activation
 918 cases by sampling 12 examples with the highest activations and 12 examples distributed across
 919 quantiles from the RAGTruth training data. These cases are then provided to GPT-5, which summa-
 920 rizes the underlying semantic concept captured by each feature using the template in Figure 7.
 921

¹<https://github.com/EleutherAI/sparsify>

918 Prompt templates for all LLM text-generation calls are shown in Appendix I.
 919

920 All experiments are conducted on a server equipped with an AMD EPYC 7313 CPU and four
 921 NVIDIA A100 GPUs.
 922

923 C CAUSAL INTERVENTION OF SAE FEATURES 924

925 For SAE features that consistently activate prior to hallucinated content, we investigate whether
 926 direct intervention on these features can causally influence the model’s generation. Specifically, we
 927 manipulate the activation values of selected SAE features at key tokens preceding hallucinated spans
 928 and observe the resulting changes in model outputs. This analysis assesses whether these features
 929 not only correlate with hallucination but also play a causal role in driving unfaithful generations.
 930

931 Table 6 presents a case study on Feature 22790 from Llama3.1-8B, which reliably activates before
 932 hallucinated numeric or temporal details (e.g., firing on the token “of” in the prefix “[...] at the age
 933 of”, which often leads to unsupported ages). When we suppress this feature (e.g., set its value to
 934 0 or -20), the model continues the problematic prefix with hallucinated, ungrounded numbers. In
 935 contrast, manually setting the feature to a large positive value (e.g., 20) steers the model to remain
 936 faithful to the context, producing follow-up tokens that avoid hallucinated specifics (e.g., using
 937 an unspecified age or time). This suggests that Feature 22790 reflects the model’s awareness of
 938 potentially hallucinated numeric or temporal details, and that overactivating it can encourage more
 939 faithful behavior in such scenarios.
 940

941 Table 6: Examples of causal interventions on Feature 22790 in Llama3.1-8B. This feature is consistently
 942 activated prior to hallucinated numeric/time specifics. Tokens in red indicate the hallucinated
 943 content.

943 Context	944 Prefix	945 Value	946 Output
945 No mention of 946 the age	947 [...] at the 948 age of	-20.0	949 [...] of 30.
		0.0	950 [...] of 25.
		20.0	951 [...] of an unspecified age.
949 No mention of 950 the release date	951 [...] scheduled to 952 be released in	-20.0	953 [...] in 2016.
		0.0	954 [...] in the future.
		20.0	955 [...] in an unspecified time frame.

956 An additional case study on Feature 71784 in Llama2-13B is shown in Table 7. This feature is asso-
 957 ciated with hallucinations about opening hours (day/time) and ratings, and typically activates only
 958 when the hallucinated time or rating is already being produced (e.g., “Monday” in an inconsis-
 959 tent hours-of-operation statement). For these cases, we perturb the feature value on the token immedi-
 960 ately preceding the hallucinated word (e.g., “on” in “on Mondays”). The results also confirm that
 961 manipulating SAE features identified by RAGLens can steer the model’s behavior and demonstrate
 962 a causal relationship between these features and RAG hallucinations.
 963

964 However, for features like the one in Table 7 that only activate concurrently with or after hallucinated
 965 tokens, direct intervention is impractical for preventing hallucinations, as the problematic content
 966 has already been generated by the time these features fire. Furthermore, the distance between the
 967 hallucinated tokens and the token with high activation is not always consistent across features and
 968 examples. Thus, while causal intervention on SAE features is feasible in certain scenarios, it is not
 969 a universal solution for hallucination mitigation. This limitation motivates our focus on post-hoc
 970 text-based feedback in the main mitigation pipeline.
 971


972 D DISCUSSION ON SAE FEATURE VERSUS HIDDEN STATE 973

974 To further investigate the contribution of SAE-derived features to RAGLens performance, we con-
 975 duct an ablation study by replacing SAE features with the raw hidden states of Llama2-7B, while
 976

972
 973 Table 7: Examples of causal interventions on Feature 71784 in Llama2-13. This feature is consis-
 974 tently activated on hallucinations about opening hours (day/time) and ratings. Tokens in red indicate
 975 the hallucinated content.

976 Context	977 Prefix	978 Value	979 Output
		-20.0	[...] the restaurant is open from 11:00 AM to 21:00 PM, Monday to Sunday.
980 [...] "Monday": 981 "0:0-0:0" [...]	981 [...] Restaurants 982 Hours:	0.0	[...] the restaurant is open from 11:00 AM to 21:00 PM, Monday to Sunday.
		20.0	[...] Monday: 0:00 - 0:00 [...]
		-20.0	[...] on hours of operation on Mondays.
984 [...] "Monday": 985 "0:0-0:0" [...]	985 [...] no information 986 available for the business's hours on	0.0	[...] on hours of operation on Mondays.
		20.0	[...] on holidays.

987
 988
 989 retaining the MI-based feature selection and GAM classifier. Figure 6 compares hallucination de-
 990 tection performance using hidden states versus SAE features across varying numbers of selected
 991 dimensions (K'). When K' is large, hidden states achieve performance comparable to SAE fea-
 992 tures, which is expected since SAE features are derived from hidden states.



1000 Figure 6: Effect of varying the number of selected features (K') on hallucination detection per-
 1001 formance, comparing SAE features (SAE) and hidden states (Hidden).

1003
 1004 However, as K' decreases, the performance of hidden states degrades more rapidly, especially on
 1005 single-task datasets such as AggreFact and TofuEval. This indicates that SAE features more effec-
 1006 tively disentangle hallucination-related signals from other information and concentrate them into
 1007 a compact set of dimensions, particularly when the predictor is applied to narrow domains. Such
 1008 compact representations improve interpretability and facilitate downstream applications like hal-
 1009 lucination mitigation, as only a small number of salient features need to be monitored to achieve
 1010 effective control.

1011 E DISCUSSION ON SAE FEATURE INTERPRETABILITY

1013 To validate the semantic consistency of SAE features, we extend the analysis in Table 3 by examining
 1014 top activated examples from the SAE’s pretraining corpus. Specifically, we compute activations for
 1015 Feature 22790 in Llama3.1 8B over the first 10,000 samples from the lmsys/lmsys chat 1m corpus²
 1016 and inspect the highest activation cases, as shown in Table 8. Although the pretraining corpus con-
 1017 tains diverse structures and languages, including clinical dialogue transcripts and telecom statements
 1018 in German, we find that Feature 22790 is consistently activated in scenarios where the response is
 1019 about to produce specific numbers or dates that are likely hallucinated. This pattern aligns with the
 1020 feature’s summarized semantic meaning from RAGTruth and the representative examples shown in
 1021 Table 3, demonstrating that the feature robustly captures hallucination related signals across both
 1022 task specific and pretraining data.

1023 To further assess the robustness of the distilled feature explanation across diverse scenarios, we
 1024 prompt GPT-5 to predict the activation level of Feature 22790 on 24 held-out RAGTruth test cases

1025 ²<https://huggingface.co/datasets/lmsys/lmsys-chat-1m>

1026
 1027 Table 8: Examples from the pre-training corpus with high activations of Feature 22790 in Llama3.1-
 1028 8B. Tokens highlighted in red indicate locations of strong feature activation.

1029 1030 Sample Index	1031 Input	1032 Output
1031 1032 9384	1033 <i>TRANSCRIPT=’Hello doctor I have fever and cough. Okay take paracetamol and go home and rest.’ [...]</i>	1034 <i>[...] Patient advises they have been experiencing symptoms for the past two days [...]</i>
1034 1035 3298	1036 <i>User: Telekom Deutschland GmbH [...]</i>	<i>[...] "summary": "Mobilfunk-Rechnung für den Monat März 2023" [...]</i>

1037
 1038
 1039 (comprising 8 top-activated and 16 quantile-distributed examples), using only the natural-language
 1040 summary. For each case, the three most highly activated tokens are highlighted, and GPT-5 is asked
 1041 to rate the expected feature activation on a scale from 0 (feature not present) to 5 (very strong
 1042 match). Comparing these predicted scores to the actual SAE activations yields a Pearson correla-
 1043 tion of 0.6731 ($p < 0.05$), suggesting that the explanation reliably captures when the feature should
 1044 activate across a broad range of examples.

1045 However, while SAEs are designed to disentangle distinct semantic concepts from hidden states,
 1046 some SAE features may remain generic or polysemic, limiting their interpretability, which is a
 1047 challenge widely recognized in current SAE research (Bricken et al., 2023; Huben et al., 2023).
 1048 Although RAGLens already achieves accurate and interpretable RAG hallucination detection using
 1049 existing SAE foundations, its architecture-agnostic design allows it to benefit from future advances
 1050 in SAE methods, which may enable even more transparent and effective detectors for RAG halluci-
 1051 nations.

1052 F PROOF OF THEOREM 1

1053 **Theorem 2** (Restatement of Theorem 1). *Fix a feature index k and suppress k in notation. For
 1054 tokens $t = 1, \dots, T$,*

$$1055 z_t = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{with probability } 1 - p_\ell, \\ V_t & \text{with probability } p_\ell, \end{cases} \quad \text{independently over } t, \quad (10)$$

1056 where V_t are i.i.d. from a label-independent distribution F on $(0, \infty)$. Let $\bar{z} = \max_{1 \leq t \leq T} z_t$,
 1057 $\pi = \Pr(\ell = 1)$, $\bar{p} = \frac{1}{2}(p_1 + p_0)$, and $\Delta p = p_1 - p_0$. If $T \bar{p} \ll 1$, then (in bits)

$$1058 I(\bar{z}; \ell) = \frac{\pi(1 - \pi)}{2 \ln 2} \frac{T(\Delta p)^2}{\bar{p}} + O((T\bar{p})^2). \quad (11)$$

1059 In particular, $I(\bar{z}; \ell) > 0$ iff $p_1 \neq p_0$; the leading dependence is linear in T and quadratic in Δp .

1060 *Proof.* Write $A = \mathbf{1}\{\bar{z} > 0\}$, $N = \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbf{1}\{z_t > 0\}$, and $h(u) = -u \log_2 u - (1 - u) \log_2(1 - u)$.

1061 **Step 1: Exact MI for the activation indicator.** Independence across tokens implies

$$1062 q_\ell := \Pr(A=1 \mid \ell) = \Pr(N \geq 1 \mid \ell) = 1 - (1 - p_\ell)^T. \quad (12)$$

1063 Hence $A \mid \ell \sim \text{Bernoulli}(q_\ell)$ and

$$1064 I(A; \ell) = h(\pi q_1 + (1 - \pi) q_0) - [\pi h(q_1) + (1 - \pi) h(q_0)]. \quad (13)$$

1065 **Step 2: Small-gap expansion of $I(A; \ell)$.** Let $r = \pi q_1 + (1 - \pi) q_0$, $\bar{q} = \frac{1}{2}(q_1 + q_0)$, and $\Delta q = q_1 - q_0$. A second-order Taylor expansion of h about \bar{q} gives

$$1066 h(q_1) = h(\bar{q}) + \frac{\Delta q}{2} h'(\bar{q}) + \frac{(\Delta q)^2}{8} h''(\bar{q}) + O((\Delta q)^3), \quad (14)$$

$$h(q_0) = h(\bar{q}) - \frac{\Delta q}{2} h'(\bar{q}) + \frac{(\Delta q)^2}{8} h''(\bar{q}) + O((\Delta q)^3), \quad (15)$$

$$h(r) = h(\bar{q}) + (2\pi - 1) \frac{\Delta q}{2} h'(\bar{q}) + \frac{(2\pi - 1)^2 (\Delta q)^2}{8} h''(\bar{q}) + O((\Delta q)^3). \quad (16)$$

Plugging into Equation 13, the linear terms cancel, and since $h''(u) = -[u(1-u) \ln 2]^{-1}$,

$$I(A; \ell) = \frac{\pi(1-\pi)}{2 \ln 2} \frac{(\Delta q)^2}{\bar{q}(1-\bar{q})} + O((\Delta q)^3). \quad (17)$$

Step 3: Relating $I(\bar{z}; \ell)$ and $I(A; \ell)$, with a JS-TV bound. Because $A = \mathbf{1}\{\bar{z} > 0\}$ is a deterministic function of \bar{z} , the chain rule gives

$$I(\bar{z}; \ell) = I(A; \ell) + I(\bar{z}; \ell | A). \quad (18)$$

When $A = 0$, $\bar{z} = 0$ almost surely, so $I(\bar{z}; \ell | A = 0) = 0$. When $A = 1$, one can write

$$p_{\bar{z}|A=1, \ell} = \sum_{n \geq 1} w_\ell(n) F^{(n)}, \quad (19)$$

where $w_\ell(n) = \Pr(N = n | A = 1, \ell)$ and $F^{(n)}$ is the distribution of the maximum of n label-independent draws from F . Thus given $A = 1$, the only dependence on ℓ is via the mixture weights $\{w_1(n) - w_0(n)\}$.

By the definition of total variation (TV) distance,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{TV}(p_{\bar{z}|A=1,1}, p_{\bar{z}|A=1,0}) &= \frac{1}{2} \int |p_{\bar{z}|A=1,1}(z) - p_{\bar{z}|A=1,0}(z)| dz \\ &\leq \Pr(N \geq 2 | A = 1, 1) + \Pr(N \geq 2 | A = 1, 0), \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

up to constant factors.

Since mutual information conditioned on $A = 1$ is the Jensen–Shannon (JS) divergence between these two conditional distributions (with weight $\Pr(\ell = 1 | A = 1)$ over ℓ), one can invoke a standard bound:

$$\text{JS}(p_{\bar{z}|A=1,1}, p_{\bar{z}|A=1,0}) \leq C \text{TV}(p_{\bar{z}|A=1,1}, p_{\bar{z}|A=1,0})^2, \quad (21)$$

for some constant C depending on the mixing weight (Corander et al., 2021).

Thus,

$$I(\bar{z}; \ell | A = 1) = O((\Pr(N \geq 2 | A = 1, 1) + \Pr(N \geq 2 | A = 1, 0))^2). \quad (22)$$

Multiplying by $\Pr(A = 1) \leq 1$ gives

$$I(\bar{z}; \ell) - I(A; \ell) = O(\Pr(N \geq 2 | 1)^2 + \Pr(N \geq 2 | 0)^2), \quad (23)$$

which, under rarity ($T\bar{p} \ll 1$), is $o((T\bar{p})^2)$.

Step 4: Specializing to independence and the sparse regime. Under independence with per-token rate p_ℓ ,

$$\Pr(N \geq 2 | \ell) = 1 - (1 - p_\ell)^T - T p_\ell (1 - p_\ell)^{T-1} = \binom{T}{2} p_\ell^2 + O(T^3 p_\ell^3). \quad (24)$$

Thus

$$I(\bar{z}; \ell) = I(A; \ell) + O(T^2 \bar{p}^2), \quad (25)$$

uniformly for p_ℓ with $\bar{p} = \frac{1}{2}(p_1 + p_0)$.

Step 5: Substitute sparse approximations. For $T\bar{p} \ll 1$,

$$q_\ell = 1 - (1 - p_\ell)^T = T p_\ell - \binom{T}{2} p_\ell^2 + O(T^3 p_\ell^3), \quad (26)$$

$$\bar{q} = T\bar{p} + O(T^2 \bar{p}^2), \quad (27)$$

$$\Delta q = T\Delta p + O(T^2 \bar{p} |\Delta p|). \quad (28)$$

1134 Plug these into Equation 17. Since $1 - \bar{q} = 1 + O(T\bar{p})$,
 1135

$$1136 \frac{(\Delta q)^2}{\bar{q}(1 - \bar{q})} = \frac{T^2(\Delta p)^2}{T\bar{p}} + O(T^2(\Delta p)^2 \cdot T\bar{p}) = \frac{T(\Delta p)^2}{\bar{p}} + O(T^3\bar{p}(\Delta p)^2). \quad (29)$$

1138 Moreover, $(\Delta q)^3 = O(T^3|\Delta p|^3) = o(T^2\bar{p}^2)$ under $T\bar{p} \ll 1$ and bounded $|\Delta p|$. Hence
 1139

$$1140 \quad 1141 I(A; \ell) = \frac{\pi(1 - \pi)}{2 \ln 2} \frac{T(\Delta p)^2}{\bar{p}} + O(T^2\bar{p}^2). \quad (30)$$

1142 Combining Equation 30 with Equation 25 via Equation 18 yields
 1143

$$1144 \quad 1145 I(\bar{z}; \ell) = \frac{\pi(1 - \pi)}{2 \ln 2} \frac{T(\Delta p)^2}{\bar{p}} + O(T^2\bar{p}^2), \quad (31)$$

1146 which is the claimed statement since $T^2\bar{p}^2 = (T\bar{p})^2$. \square
 1147

1150 G INTERPRETATION OF ADDITIONAL HALLUCINATION-RELATED FEATURES

1151 Table 9 highlights additional representative features that RAGLens activates when detecting hallucinations across LLMs of varying scales. These features capture a wide range of hallucination patterns, including overconfident numeric spans, incorrect temporal assertions, and ungrounded entity mentions. Notably, smaller LLMs tend to exhibit more generic hallucination signals (e.g., “overstated concrete details”), whereas larger LLMs reveal more specific and nuanced patterns (e.g., “precise numeric spans not grounded in retrieved passages”). This observation suggests that as LLMs increase in size, they develop more specialized internal features for identifying complex hallucination phenomena. This may contribute to the improved hallucination detection performance of larger models with RAGLens, as shown in Figure 2.

1161 H FURTHER ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED FEATURES VIA COUNTERFACTUAL 1162 PERTURBATION

1163 To further validate that the features identified by RAGLens capture meaningful hallucination patterns
 1164 in RAG-specific contexts, we conduct case studies using counterfactual perturbation on SAE feature
 1165 37877 from Llama3.1-8B, which detects “precise numeric spans not grounded in retrieved passages”
 1166 (see Table 9). We select representative samples from three RAGTruth subtasks, summarization,
 1167 data-to-text, and question answering, where this feature is highly activated and the generation is
 1168 hallucinated. For each, we manually edit the context to construct counterfactual scenarios: (1) the
 1169 output becomes consistent with the perturbed context, or (2) the output remains inconsistent, but in
 1170 a different way. For question answering, we also consider a version where the context is entirely
 1171 removed to examine feature activation in the absence of grounding.

1172 Tables 10-12 present the results. For summarization (Table 10) and data-to-text (Table 12), when
 1173 the context is edited to make the output consistent, the feature value on previously highlighted
 1174 tokens drops significantly; if the context remains inconsistent, the feature stays highly activated.
 1175 In question answering (Table 11), feature activation drops when the context is either edited to be
 1176 consistent or removed, indicating that the feature is specialized for detecting ungrounded numeric
 1177 spans in context, rather than general hallucination. Overall, these case studies demonstrate that
 1178 RAGLens identifies features that robustly capture RAG-specific hallucination patterns.

1181 I PROMPT TEMPLATES FOR LLM CALLING

1182 This section presents the prompt templates we use for LLM calling in our experiments. Specifically,
 1183 for the summarized SAE explanations in Table 3, we use the template shown in Figure 7. The
 1184 hallucination mitigation approaches discussed in Section 4.6 are implemented with templates in
 1185 Figures 8 and 9 for the instance- and token-level feedback, respectively. The LLM evaluation shown
 1186 in 4 is implemented with the template in Figure 10, following Luo et al. (2023).

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Table 9: Explanation and examples of representative SAE features in Llama2-7B, Llama2-13B, Llama3.2-1B, and Llama3.1-8B that enable interpretable hallucination detection. Spans highlighted in red indicate tokens where the feature is highly activated. The table illustrates how these features capture diverse hallucination patterns across models.

1193

Feature ID	Feature Explanation	Example Output	Example Explanation
Llama2-7B			
120059	hallucination involving entity swaps and invented details.	[...] his castmates from “Central Intelligence” took a knee as he [...]	There is no mention of Kevin Hart’s castmates from “Central Intelligence”.
127083	unsupported concrete additions such as names, pairings, numbers, legal / evidentiary claims	[...] such as a Walker-Rubio or Clinton-Kaine pairing [...]	Clinton-Kaine is not mentioned in the source content
Llama2-13B			
26530	“amenity assertion” detector that spikes on the outdoor seating phrase	The restaurant has a casual ambiance and offers outdoor seating	Original text shows no outdoor seating
71784	hallucinations on day-time (hours) and ratings	[...] no information available for the business’s hours on Mondays [...]	Original text: closed on Monday
Llama3.2-1B			
78162	unsupported or swapped named entities and precise facts	The team is now facing their in-state rivals, the Los Angeles Dodgers [...]	The Texas Rangers and Los Angeles Dodgers are not in-state rivals
121247	invented or overstated concrete details	[...] He was also a professor of film criticism at NYU [...]	It is not mentioned in the original source.
Llama3.1-8B			
37877	precise numeric spans that aren’t grounded in the retrieved passages	[...] soft ball stage occurs at a temperature of around 245-250°Fahrenheit [...]	The firm ball stage at a temperature of about 245 to 250 degrees Fahrenheit
40779	overconfident claims about hours, open/closed days, and amenities	[...] the exception of Friday when it closes at 20:00 PM	Friday opens from 11am and closes by 10pm

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J USE OF LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

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1233

In this project, large language models (LLMs) are used for multiple purposes:

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1236

- We use checkpoints of open-source LLMs to extract hidden states, which are then analyzed to identify interpretable SAE features that help detect RAG hallucinations.
- We use LLMs as judges to evaluate whether RAGLens feedback helps mitigate hallucinations in the original model outputs.
- We use LLMs as summarizers to describe the semantic roles of different SAE features based on their activations across multiple samples.
- We use LLMs to proofread the paper.

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 1243 Table 10: Counterfactual analysis of SAE feature 37877 from Llama3.1-8B on a RAGTruth-
 1244 Summary example. The table illustrates how feature activation changes in response to context
 1245 perturbations, highlighting its specificity for detecting ungrounded numeric spans in summariza-
 1246 tion. Key information in the original and updated contexts is highlighted in **yellow**. For the output,
 1247 tokens are highlighted in **red**, with the intensity of the red background indicating the relative activa-
 1248 tion value on each token.

Model Input

1249 Summarize the following news within 78 words:
 1250 Iraq Service Campaign Medal Reinstated [...] According to a memorandum signed by then-
 1251 Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Gilbert Cisneros in August, the Pen-
 1252 tagon once again awarded the Inherent Resolve Campaign Medal to eligible service members
 1253 serving in Iraq. According to a document received by Military Times, **the medal's eligibility has**
 1254 **been renewed retroactive to January 1** and will continue through December 31, 2024. [...]

Model Output (annotated with feature activation)

1255 The US Department of Defense has reinstated the Inherent Resolve Campaign Medal for service
 1256 members in Iraq due to renewed threats against US personnel in the Middle East. The medal's
 1257 eligibility has been renewed retroactively from January 1, 2021, and will continue through De-
 1258 cember 31, 2024. The move was requested by the US Central Command, following Iraq's re-
 1259 classification from a combat mission. The medal was initially created in 2016 to acknowledge
 1260 service in Iraq or Syria, but was limited to Syria in 2017.

Context Perturbation 1 (context inconsistent)

1261 **Original Context:**
 1262 [...] the medal's eligibility has been renewed retroactive to January 1 [...]
 1263
 1264 **Updated Context:**
 1265 [...] the medal's eligibility has been renewed retroactive to January 1, **2023** [...]
 1266
 1267 **Updated Activation:**
 1268 [...] The medal's eligibility has been renewed retroactively from January 1, 2021, and will
 1269 continue through December 31, 2024 [...]

Context Perturbation 2 (context consistent)

1270 **Original Context:**
 1271 [...] the medal's eligibility has been renewed retroactive to January 1 [...]
 1272
 1273 **Updated Context:**
 1274 [...] the medal's eligibility has been renewed retroactive to January 1, **2021** [...]
 1275
 1276 **Updated Activation:**
 1277 [...] The medal's eligibility has been renewed retroactively from January 1, 2021, and will
 1278 continue through December 31, 2024 [...]

**K ABLATION STUDY OF SAE FEATURE EXTRACTION METHODS IN
 RAGLENS**

1284
 1285 In this section, we investigate whether our SAE-based design, which combines max pooling over
 1286 tokens with mutual-information-based feature selection, offers advantages over alternative ways of
 1287 using SAE features (Ferrando et al., 2025; Tillman & Mossing, 2025; Xin et al., 2025; Suresh et al.,
 1288 2025). Concretely, we compare four variants on the RAGTruth subtasks:

1289
 1290 1. **Last Token + Selection + GAM:** SAE features taken only from the last generated token,
 1291 followed by MI-based feature selection and a GAM classifier.

```

1296 Prompt template for summarizing SAE feature explanations
1297
1298 I am trying to explain the semantic meaning of a hallucination-related feature in retrieval-
1299 augmented generation settings. Please first examine if the highly activated tokens in
1300 each example are related to specific cases of hallucinations. Then, try to summarize the
1301 semantic meaning of the feature based on these observations. Finally, give me a concise
1302 description of the feature meaning in one sentence, specifying what kind of hallucination
1303 (if applicable) it is detecting.
1304
1305 ### Example
1306
1307 #### Here is the input:
1308 { {input} }
1309
1310 #### Here is the output:
1311 { {output} }
1312
1313 #### Here are the feature activation associated with each output token:
1314 { { [ (token1, value1), (token2, value2), ... ] } }
1315
1316 ### Example
1317
1318

```

Figure 7: Prompt template for summarizing SAE feature explanations.

```

1319
1320 Prompt template for hallucination mitigation with instance-level feedback
1321
1322
1323 User:
1324 { {input} }
1325
1326 Assistant:
1327 { {original_output} }
1328
1329 User:
1330 There are hallucinations in your output. Please revise it.
1331
1332

```

Figure 8: Prompt template for hallucination mitigation with instance-level feedback.

```

1333
1334 Prompt template for hallucination mitigation with token-level feedback
1335
1336
1337 User:
1338 { {input} }
1339
1340 Assistant:
1341 { {original_output} }
1342
1343 User:
1344 There are hallucinations in your output, especially on the following spans:
1345 { { [span1, span2, ...] } }
1346
1347 Please revise it.
1348
1349

```

Figure 9: Prompt template for hallucination mitigation with token-level feedback.

Figure 10: Prompt template for LLM-as-a-Judge on mitigation results.

2. **Max Pooled + No Selection + LR:** max-pooled SAE features across tokens, using all dimensions as input to a logistic regression (LR) classifier (no feature selection).
3. **Max Pooled + Selection + LR:** max-pooled SAE features with MI-based feature selection, using LR as the classifier.
4. **Max Pooled + Selection + GAM (RAGLens):** our full RAGLens variant, which applies MI-based feature selection to max-pooled SAE features and then fits a GAM.

Table 13 reports accuracy and AUC for these settings. Using max pooling with feature selection and a GAM (*Max Pooled + Selection + GAM*) consistently outperforms both: (i) the last-token baseline (*Last Token + Selection + GAM*), which discards earlier activations that may precede hallucinated content, and (ii) the *Max Pooled + No Selection + LR* baseline, which uses all SAE dimensions without selection and is thus less efficient.

Additionally, *Max Pooled + Selection + LR* performs comparably to using all features without selection, indicating that MI-based selection preserves the most informative SAE dimensions for detecting unfaithful model outputs. Overall, these results demonstrate that our approach captures most hallucination-relevant signals in a compact, efficient feature set and achieves superior detection performance compared to alternative SAE usage strategies.

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1406 Table 11: Counterfactual analysis of SAE feature 37877 from Llama3.1-8B on a RAGTruth-QA
 1407 example. The table illustrates how feature activation changes in response to context removal and
 1408 consistency edits, highlighting its sensitivity to ungrounded numeric spans in retrieval-augmented
 1409 question answering. Key information in the original and updated contexts is highlighted in **yellow**.
 1410 For the output, tokens are highlighted in **red**, with the intensity of the red background indicating the
 1411 relative activation value on each token.

1412

Model Input

1413

Briefly answer the following question:

1414

how to tell the temperature of water with a candy thermometer

1415

1416

Bear in mind that your response should be strictly based on the following three passages:

1417

passage 1: [...] **If the candy forms a soft, flexible ball it is at a temperature of 235-240 degrees**
Fahrenheit or at the soft ball stage.

1418

passage 2: [...] If it forms into a firm ball, **it is in the firm ball stage. This stage is at a temperature**
of about 245 to 250 degrees Fahrenheit [...]

1419

passage 3: [...]

1420

1421

In case the passages do not contain the necessary information to answer the question, please
 1422 reply with: "Unable to answer based on given passages."

1423

1424

Model Output (annotated with feature activation)

1425

1426

Based on the provided passages, here is how to tell the temperature of water using a candy
 1427 thermometer:

1428

Passage 1 states that when the candy is in the thread stage, the temperature is around 230-
 1429 235°Fahrenheit.

1430

Passage 2 indicates that the soft ball stage occurs at a temperature of **245-250°Fahrenheit** for
 1431 candies such as fudge and fondant.

1432

Therefore, to determine the temperature of water using a candy thermometer, you can follow
 1433 these steps:

1434

1. Cool some of the candy in the thread stage by dropping it into cold water.

1435

2. Observe if the candy forms a **soft, flexible ball**. If it does, the temperature is **between**
245-250°Fahrenheit, indicating that the water is at the soft ball stage.

1436

If the **water** is not at the soft ball stage, continue cooling it until it reaches that temperature
 1437 range, and then proceed to use the candy thermometer to measure its temperature.

1438

1439

Context Perturbation 1 (context removed)

1440

Original Context:

1441

[...] Bear in mind that [...]

1442

1443

Updated Context:

1444

None

1445

1446

Updated Activation:

1447

[...] indicates that the soft ball stage occurs at a temperature of around 245-250°Fahrenheit [...]

1448

1449

Context Perturbation 2 (context consistent)

1450

Original Context:

1451

[...] This stage is at a temperature of about 245 to 250 degrees Fahrenheit [...]

1452

1453

Updated Context:

1454

[...] **The soft ball stage** is at a temperature of about 245 to 250 degrees Fahrenheit [...]

1455

1456

Updated Activation:

1457

[...] indicates that the soft ball stage occurs at a temperature of around 245-250°Fahrenheit [...]

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14631464 Table 12: Counterfactual analysis of SAE feature 37877 from Llama3.1-8B on a RAGTruth-Data2txt
1465 example. The table demonstrates how feature activation responds to context perturbations, high-
1466 lighting its specificity for identifying ungrounded numeric spans in data-to-text generation. Key
1467 information in the original and updated contexts is highlighted in **yellow**. For the output, tokens are
1468 highlighted in **red**, with the intensity of the red background indicating the relative activation value
1469 on each token.

1470

Model Input

1471

1472 Write an objective overview about the following local business based only on the provided struc-
1473 tured data in the JSON format. You should include details and cover the information mentioned
1474 in the customers' review. The overview should be 100 - 200 words. Don't make up information.

1475 Structured data:

1476

```
{'name': 'Mony's Mexican Food', 'address': '217 E Anacapa St', 'city': 'Santa Barbara',  
1477 'state': 'CA', 'categories': 'Restaurants, Mexican', 'hours': {'Monday': '10:30-15:30', 'Tues-  
1478 'day': '10:30-15:30', 'Wednesday': '10:30-15:30', 'Thursday': '10:30-15:30', 'Friday': '10:30-  
1479 '15:30', Saturday: '10:30-15:30'}, [...]}
```

1480

Model Output (annotated with feature activation)

1481

1482 Sure! Here's an objective overview of Mony's Mexican Food based on the provided structured
1483 data:
14841485 [...] The restaurant has a cozy and casual atmosphere, with no WiFi or outdoor seating available.
1486 However, customers can enjoy takeout or dine in during its hours of operation, which are from
1487 10:30 AM to 3:30 PM from Monday to Friday, and 10:30 AM to **4:00** PM on Saturday. Despite
1488 the limited hours and lack of WiFi, Mony's Mexican Food remains a popular choice among
1489 locals and visitors alike, with many return customers and high praise from reviewers.

1490

Context Perturbation 1 (context inconsistent)

1491

Original Context:

1492 [...] 'Saturday': '10:30-15:30' [...]

1493

Updated Context:1494 [...] 'Saturday': '**9:30**-15:30' [...]

1495

Updated Activation:1496 [...] and **10:30** AM to **4:00** PM on Saturday [...]

1497

Context Perturbation 2 (context consistent)

1498

Original Context:

1499 [...] 'Saturday': '10:30-15:30' [...]

1500

Updated Context:1501 [...] 'Saturday': '10:30-**16:00**' [...]

1502

Updated Activation:

1503 [...] and 10:30 AM to 4:00 PM on Saturday [...]

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Table 13: **Ablation study of SAE feature extraction and classifier choices on RAGTruth subtasks using Llama2-7B.** We compare last-token versus max-pooled SAE features, with and without mutual information-based feature selection. Due to the high computational cost of fitting GAMs on all features, we use logistic regression (LR) as the classifier when no feature selection is applied.

Source	Selection	Classifier	RAGTruth-Summary		RAGTruth-QA		RAGTruth-Data2txt	
			Acc	AUC	Acc	AUC	Acc	AUC
Last Token	Yes	GAM	0.6293	0.7507	0.6908	0.8101	0.7454	0.8296
Max Pooled	No	LR	0.6734	0.7305	0.7356	0.8344	0.7499	0.8397
Max Pooled	Yes	LR	0.6718	0.7663	0.7572	0.8472	0.7085	0.8014
Max Pooled	Yes	GAM	0.6973	0.8191	0.7717	0.8835	0.7668	0.8454

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