

A UNIFIED FRAMEWORK FOR MULTIMODAL SECRET DATA STEGANOGRAPHY

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ABSTRACT

Due to the advances in deep learning and data accessibility, image steganography has become a critical and widely-used tool for information hiding. Image steganography mainly embeds and recovers secret data within cover images. With the increasing variety and volume of data, multimodal secret data steganography is urgently required. However, the framework of existing image steganography often directly embeds multimodal secret information into cover images in a modality-by-modality and sequential manner, leading to unsatisfactory steganography performance. This implies that current image steganography is a modal-specific framework, which is almost effective for hiding the specific modal secret data. **This paper presents a unified framework for multimodal secret data steganography, which is capable of concurrently concealing image, text, and audio data within a cover image and permits reversible recovery.** However, two principal challenges arise: (1) The catastrophic forgetting seriously undermines the consistent performance across various modalities of secret data steganography; (2) The mitigation of catastrophic forgetting further induces significant interference originating from intra- and inter-modal information conflicts among distinct modal secret data and cover images, consequently compromising steganography fidelity. **To achieve coherent multimodal secret data knowledge preservation and interaction, our unified framework firstly establishes a co-ordinated coupling between steganography tasks and continual learning to preserve learned multimodal knowledge for maintaining model learning capacity and performance stability. Subsequently, a Multi-Gap Collaborative Fusion mechanism utilizes cover images as anchors to effectively integrate multimodal knowledge, resolving intra- and inter-modal conflicts while bolstering security through directed secret data customization and encryption.** Experiments demonstrate that our model can achieve secure and high-quality multimodal secret data steganography, outperforming existing state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods.

1 INTRODUCTION

The widespread adoption of multimodal data across various fields has heightened the need for its secure transmission to prevent unauthorized access. Given the prevalence of image data and rising security requirements, image steganography has emerged as a critical domain within information security. This steganography system is capable of concealing secret data within ordinary cover images with complete visual and statistical imperceptibility, all while guaranteeing lossless data recovery. Conventional image steganography methods, such as Least Significant Bit (LSB) encoding, are mainly designed for text steganography tasks. They usually modify the low-order bits of pixel values to hide secret data. The




Figure 1: Comparative Analysis: (a) existing models vs. (b) the proposed model. Existing methods are modal-specific and require retraining for each new modal, whereas the proposed model achieves **multimodal secret data concealment within a unified model**.




Figure 2: (a) Illustration of Catastrophic Forgetting. The first two columns show performance for image and text data, respectively. Using the text-trained model on image data (right column) shows significant performance drop. Conversely, the proposed method sustains robust cross-modal performance. (b) Under parameter perturbations (± 0.5 to ± 0.25 to 20% parameters), steganography performance was significantly compromised, confirming high parameter sensitivity.

Figure 3: (a) Heatmap distributions exhibit significant divergences across text, audio, and image modals. (b) Intra-modal and inter-modal cosine similarity exhibit marked dissimilarity patterns across and within modals. (c) The trained model exhibits significant performance degradation on unseen modals. These findings collectively demonstrate underlying informational conflict inherent in multimodal data.

celerated the development of learning-based steganography methods and significantly expanded the variety of concealable data types. Current methods can conceal diverse data, including text Lan et al. (2023); Ma et al. (2025); Xu et al. (2025), image Baluja (2017); Jing et al. (2021); Yu et al. (2024b); Yang et al. (2024); Zhou et al. (2025), audio Soundarya et al. (2018); Krishnan et al. (2025), video Gandikota et al. (2022) and so on. However, current steganography methods are mainly tailored to specific modal and exhibit limited adaptability in increasingly multimodal environments. This limitation forces extensive retraining when encountering new modal data (as depicted in Figure 1), leading to inefficient and non-scalable systems.

To tackle modal-specific constraints and accommodate multimodal environments, **this paper proposes a novel unified multimodal secret data steganography framework that conceals three major modals (image, text, and audio) within cover images using a single model**. However, two critical challenges must be resolved: (1) **Firstly**, multimodal secret data concealment requires the model capable of sustainable learning across diverse modals. Within a steganography model trained on prior modals, data from a novel modality represents a distinct category and constitutes a separate steganography task. When learning a new task (Task N), parameter optimization interferes with knowledge acquired from previous tasks (Tasks 1, 2, \dots , $N - 1$). However, steganography systems are subject to high parameter sensitivity, *i.e.*, even minor adjustments can disrupt the model’s ability to extract previously recoverable data. This interference leads to catastrophic performance degradation on established tasks and complete erosion of system reliability, as illustrated in Figure 2, ultimately resulting in catastrophic forgetting. (2) **Furthermore**, mitigating catastrophic forgetting during concurrent concealing multimodal secret data within a single image induces competition for spatial steganography resources. As illustrated in Figure 3, significant information conflicts exist among these heterogeneous data types. Such conflicts cause substantial intra- and inter-modal interference among the concealed multimodal secret data. This will greatly degrade the steganography fidelity and pose critical security risks to the concealed multimodal secrets. **Consequently, these two issues, coupled with the objective of multimodal secret data steganography, form a self-reinforcing cycle of performance degradation that represents a core challenge in this field.**

To address these issues, the proposed method incorporates **multimodal knowledge preservation and cross-modal interaction**. Inspired by the capacity of continual learning to emulate human lifelong cognitive processes, this study initiates by systematically bridging steganography tasks and continual learning paradigms to overcome single-modal constraints and prevent catastrophic forgetting. This coupling preserves acquired multimodal knowledge, maintains model plasticity, ensures performance stability, and effectively mitigates catastrophic forgetting. Furthermore, both the modal and content of secret data undergo dynamic variation in multimodal secret data steganography. To mitigate both intra- and inter-modal information conflicts within such variable data, a Multi-Gap Collaborative Fusion mechanism is further proposed, which employs cover images, owing to their relative stability, as anchors to directionally refine the secret data. This approach enables targeted customization and encryption of secret data aligned with anchor characteristics, thereby supporting cross-modal interaction while simultaneously reducing conflicts and increasing security. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed model surpasses SOTA methods in multimodal secret data steganography performance, capacity, and security. The primary contributions of this work are:

- 108 • We propose a novel **unified multimodal secret data steganography framework** that
109 firstly achieves simultaneous learning of multimodal secret data steganography tasks within
110 a unified model and delivers superior performance validated by extensive experiments.
- 111 • We pioneer achieve **preservation of acquired multimodal knowledge, the sustained re-**
112 **ten-
113** **tion of learning capacity, and consistency of performance in dynamic multimodal**
114 **set-
115** **tings** through a structured linkage between image steganography and continual learning.
- 116 • We propose a **Multi-Gap Collaborative Fusion** mechanism to directionally refine the
117 multimodal secret data with cover images serve as anchors, thereby enabling cross-modal in-
118 teraction, mitigating intra- and inter-modal information conflicts, and enhancing security.

119 2 RELATED WORK

121 2.1 IMAGE STEGANOGRAPHY

123 Image steganography seeks to conceal data within a cover image, ensuring the visual imperceptibil-
124 ity of the stego image and the perfect recovery of the secret. Traditional techniques, such as the LSB
125 Mielikainen (2006) method, were primarily designed for textual data. The advent of Deep Neural
126 Networks (DNNs) has driven the development of learning-based steganography methods, leading to
127 the proposal of high-performance text-hiding methods like SteganoGAN Zhang et al. (2019), FNNS
128 Kishore et al. (2022), LISO Chen et al. (2023), MDDM Xu et al. (2025), and so on. Subsequently,
129 the scope of steganography has expanded beyond text to include image hiding, with techniques such
130 as DDH Baluja (2017), UDH Zhang et al. (2020), various INN-based approaches Lu et al. (2021);
131 Jing et al. (2021); Guan et al. (2022); Zhang et al. (2024a;b); Zhou et al. (2025), and diffusion
132 model-based methods Yu et al. (2024b); Yang et al. (2024). The technology has been expanded to
133 incorporate diverse modals such as audio Soundarya et al. (2018); Huu et al. (2019); Nokhwal et al.
134 (2023); Krishnan et al. (2025), video Gandikota et al. (2022), and so on.

135 Conventional methods, however, are constrained to static modality configurations, limiting their
136 applicability amidst proliferating multimodal data. In contrast, the proposed framework supports
137 multimodal secret data, thereby significantly broadening its practical applicability.

138 2.2 CONTINUAL LEARNING

140 Continual learning is a sequential learning framework and aims to empower machine learning mod-
141 els to learn continually from new data, while building upon previously acquired knowledge without
142 forgetting. Formally, given a task sequence $\mathcal{T} = [D^1, D^2, \dots, D^T]$ of size T , where $D^t, 1 \leq t \leq T$
143 is the t -th task. The dataset for t -th task $D_t = \{(x_{t,i}, y_{t,i})\}_{i=1}^{N_t}$ consists of input samples X_t and
144 target samples Y_t , where N_t represents the number of samples in the t -th task. For a neural network
145 f trained with the task $\mathcal{T}' = [D^1, D^2, \dots, D^{t-1}]$, the task D^t is a new task. The objective is to
146 learn the new task while maintaining performance on old tasks. Specifically, given an unseen test
147 sample $x \in X$ from any trained tasks, the trained model f should perform well in inferring the label
148 $y = f(x) \in Y$. More related work is documented in Appendix B.

149 This work systematically develops a novel framework for continuous multimodal secret data
150 steganography to resolve intra- and inter-modal information conflicts and catastrophic forgetting.
151 Beyond addressing these dual challenges, the integration of Multi-Gap Collaborative Fusion reduces
152 cover-secret discrepancy, thereby mitigating inherent information conflicts.

154 3 PROPOSED METHOD

156 3.1 UNIFIED FRAMEWORK

158 This work proposes a novel multimodal steganographic framework, as illustrated in Figure 4. Lever-
159 aging the established effectiveness of invertible neural networks in frequency-domain steganography
160 Jing et al. (2021); Guan et al. (2022), the proposed method first processes a cover image x_{cov} via
161 discrete wavelet transform (DWT) to derive a latent representation z_{cov} . Simultaneously, a con-
cealed payload x_{sec} is transformed into a latent representation z_{sec} of compatible dimensionality.




Figure 4: The overall structure of the proposed model. In the conceal stage, multimodal secret data x_{sec} undergoes customization align with anchor x_{cov} . The customized secret latent representation \tilde{z}_{sec} is concatenated with the cover image x_{cov} and processed by an invertible neural network (INN)-based steganography network, yielding the stego image x_{stego} . The reveal process inversely executes this conceal and optimize pipeline to reveal the multimodal secret data x_{rev} .

A Multi-Gap Collaborative Fusion mechanism is subsequently employed to optimize z_{sec} utilizing a symmetric key k_{sym} and the cover latent z_{cov} , thereby generating an enhanced latent secret representation \tilde{z}_{sec} . This optimized representation \tilde{z}_{sec} , along with z_{cov} , is processed by the invertible steganography network to produce the stego latent representation z_{stego} . The final stego image x_{stego} is reconstructed by applying the inverse wavelet transform (IWT) to z_{stego} . The reveal process executes the inverse sequence of operations to recover the original secret payload x_{rev} . The entire pipeline is presented in Appendix A.

3.2 MULTIMODAL SECRET DATA CONTINUOUS STEGANOGRAPHY

We begin with establishing the definition of task sequence and defining the core problem of multimodal secret data continuous steganography.

Task Sequence. Let $C = \{x_{cov}^i | 1 \leq i \leq N_t\}$ denote the cover images, $S^t = \{x_{sec}^{t,i} | 1 \leq i \leq N_t\}$ the secret data of the t -th modal, and $Y^t = \{x_{stego}^{t,i} | 1 \leq i \leq N_t\}$ the stego images obtained after embedding the secret data of the t -th modal, where N_t represents the number of samples in the t -th modal. The dataset for the steganography task corresponding to the t -th modal is defined as $D^t = \{(x_{cov}^i, x_{sec}^{t,i}, x_{stego}^{t,i}) | 1 \leq i \leq N_t\}$, where $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$. The sequence of multimodal secret data continuous steganography tasks is defined as $\mathcal{T} = [D^1, D^2, \dots, D^T]$, and the set of task identifiers is given by $\mathbb{T} = [1, 2, \dots, T]$ and $\forall t \in \mathbb{T}, \mathcal{T}^t = D^t$.

It should be noted that in cover-based image steganography, the stego image is required to be perceptually indistinguishable from the cover image, and thus could theoretically be represented by the same symbol. However, for clarity and precision in exposition, distinct symbols C and Y are used to denote the set of cover images and the set of stego images, respectively.

In the multimodal environment under investigation, the steganography of secret data from each modal is conceptualized as a distinct task. Consequently, the involved modalities collectively constitute a sequence of steganographic tasks. In the proposed method, image concealing is explicitly designated as the first task within the steganography task sequence.

Problem Definition. Given a sequence of multimodal secret data to be concealed, consider the secret data associated with the t -th modal. Relative to the steganography model trained on data from preceding modals, the data from t -th modal constitutes an entirely novel type, thereby defining a new steganography task. The objective of multimodal secret data continuous steganography is to acquire proficiency in this new task while preserving the model's performance on previously learned tasks, thus mitigating catastrophic forgetting. Specifically, for an unseen test sample $x_{sec} \in S$ drawn from any trained task and a cover image $x_{cov} \in C$, the optimized multimodal secret data steganography

216 model $\tilde{\mathcal{H}} : C \times S \rightarrow Y$ should demonstrate effective performance in both the conceal process
 217

$$218 \quad x_{stego} = \tilde{\mathcal{H}}(x_{sec}, x_{cov}) \in Y,$$

219 and the reveal process
 220

$$221 \quad x_{rev} = \tilde{\mathcal{H}}^{-1}(x_{stego}, z_a) \in S,$$

222 where $\tilde{\mathcal{H}}^{-1}$ is the reveal process of $\tilde{\mathcal{H}}$.
 223

224 This section subsequently describes the multimodal continuous data steganography task into two
 225 components: Initial Steganography Task and Forthcoming Steganography Task.
 226

227 3.2.1 INITIAL STEGANOGRAPHY TASK

228 The initial steganography task, targeting the concealment of a single modal secret data. Following
 229 the pipeline of HiNet Jing et al. (2021) and DeepMIH Guan et al. (2022), we utilize the invertible
 230 neural network as the base model. For the initial task, unimodal steganography task is implemented
 231 via the base model. Cover image spectral coefficients z_{cov} derived via discrete wavelet transform
 232 and customized secret data representations \tilde{z}_{sec} , constitute the input arguments.
 233

The conceal process of the single modal steganography model \mathcal{H} is defined as:

$$234 \quad \begin{cases} z_{cov}^i &= z_{cov}^{i-1} \odot \exp(\alpha(\phi(\tilde{z}_{sec}^{i-1}))) + \psi(\tilde{z}_{sec}^{i-1}), \\ 235 \quad \tilde{z}_{sec}^i &= \tilde{z}_{sec}^{i-1} \odot \exp(\alpha(\varphi(z_{cov}^i))) + \chi(z_{cov}^i), \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

236 where \odot represents the Hadamard product and $\exp(\bullet)$ is the exponential function. z_{cov} and \tilde{z}_{sec}
 237 denote cover and concealed secrets latent representations, respectively. The scaling factor α imple-
 238 ments a sigmoid function scaled by constant c . Learnable transformations $\phi(\bullet)$, $\psi(\bullet)$, $\varphi(\bullet)$, and
 239 $\chi(\bullet)$ are neural-parameterized functions, instantiated via DenseNet Huang et al. (2017).
 240

241 The conceal process outputs the stego latent representation z_{stego} and redundant information z_r .
 242 After that, z_{stego} is transformed back to the spatial domain and obtain the final stego image x_{stego} .
 243

244 **The reveal process** \mathcal{H}^{-1} is the inverse of the conceal process \mathcal{H} . The stego image x_{stego} under-
 245 goes discrete wavelet transformation to latent representation z_{stego} , which is concatenated with a
 246 Gaussian noise auxiliary variable z_a as input to the backward reveal process. It is defined as:
 247

$$248 \quad \begin{cases} \tilde{z}_{sec}^{i-1} &= (\tilde{z}_{sec}^i - \chi(z_{cov}^i)) \odot \exp(-\alpha(\varphi(z_{cov}^i))), \\ 249 \quad z_{cov}^{i-1} &= (z_{cov}^i - \psi(\tilde{z}_{sec}^{i-1})) \odot \exp(-\alpha(\phi(\tilde{z}_{sec}^{i-1}))). \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

250 The iterative refinement process described above enables progressive decoupling of concealed secret
 251 data from stego latent representation z_{stego} .
 252

253 The reveal and conceal processes utilize identical architectural configurations and parameters. The
 254 reveal process outputs customized and encrypted payloads \tilde{z}_{rev} , which undergo subsequent decryp-
 255 tion to yield the final revealed payloads x_{rev} , with the decryption process detailed later.
 256

257 3.2.2 FORTHCOMING STEGANOGRAPHY TASK

258 Upon completion of the initial steganography task, training proceeds sequentially through the re-
 259 maining tasks. Following this procedure, each forthcoming steganography task incorporates the
 260 complete parameter set from the initial steganography model \mathcal{H} to obtain the final model $\tilde{\mathcal{H}}$.
 261

262 Specifically, to facilitate multimodal secret data steganography, modal adaptivers are incorporated
 263 into the original unimodal steganography model. These layers enable the acquisition of novel modal
 264 information while preserving capabilities learned from the original modality. The modal adaptivers
 265 are implemented using LoRA Hu et al. (2022): specifically, a lightweight LoRA convolution layer
 266 is appended to each standard convolution layer to capture new modal features. The output of the
 267 modal adaptive convolution layer is given by:
 268

$$269 \quad \mathcal{O}_{cov}(z) = Conv(z) + \beta \cdot LoRA(z), \quad (3)$$

270 where $\beta \in \mathbf{R}^{1 \times C \times 1 \times 1}$ is the learnable scaling parameter and z is the input of the convolution layer
 271 corresponds to either the cover image or the secret data.
 272

270 The LoRA layer is implemented via two convolutional layers, as depicted in Hu et al. (2022). The
 271 output of this layer is expressed as follows:

$$272 \quad 273 \quad 274 \quad 275 \quad 276 \quad 277 \quad 278 \quad 279 \quad 280 \quad 281 \quad 282 \quad 283 \quad 284 \quad 285 \\ LoRA(z) = Conv(SiLU(Conv(z))). \quad (4)$$

286 During training, solely the LoRA convolution parameters and scaling parameter β are optimized,
 287 while the parameters retained from the initial steganography model remain invariant.

288 The remaining settings of $\tilde{\mathcal{H}}$ and $\tilde{\mathcal{H}}^{-1}$ are preserved from the base initial steganography model \mathcal{H} ,
 289 enabling multimodal secret data steganography with negligible structural alterations.

290 3.3 MULTI-GAP COLLABORATIVE FUSION

291 Within the described multimodal secret data continuous steganography pipeline, the secret data from
 292 distinct modals exhibit significant intra- and inter-modal information conflicts. These conflicts in-
 293 duce substantial information interference, which severely compromises the quality of steganography
 294 images and the accuracy of secret data extraction. Consequently, mitigating these conflicts is es-
 295 sential for high-fidelity steganography.

296 Given that the modalities and content of the secret data un-
 297 dergo continuous variation, the resulting information con-
 298 flicts are inherently dynamic. Thus, addressing these con-
 299 flicts requires a stable anchor point. The cover image x_{cov} ,
 300 being relatively fixed, serves as this natural anchor. By di-
 301 rectationally customizing and optimizing the multimodal se-
 302 cret data align with this anchor to minimize their disparity,
 303 the information conflicts can be effectively mitigated.

304 Based on the cover image x_{cov} , we propose a Multi-Gap
 305 Collaborative Fusion mechanism F to directionally cus-
 306 tomize the secret data x_{sec} . As shown in Figure 5, the for-
 307 ward customization process is defined as

$$298 \quad 299 \quad 300 \quad 301 \quad 302 \quad 303 \quad 304 \quad 305 \quad 306 \quad 307 \quad 308 \quad 309 \quad 310 \quad 311 \quad 312 \quad 313 \quad 314 \quad 315 \quad 316 \quad 317 \quad 318 \quad 319 \quad 320 \quad 321 \quad 322 \quad 323 \\ \tilde{z}_{sec} = F(x_{sec}, x_{cov}, k_{sym}), \text{ s.t. } d(\tilde{z}_{sec}, x_{cov}) \leq d(x_{sec}, x_{cov}), \quad (5)$$

324 where k_{sym} is the symmetric key generated with the cover image x_{cov} and concealed payloads x_{sec}
 325 following the pipeline in Wang et al. (2025). Distance function $d(\bullet)$ serves to compute the distance
 326 between x_{sec} and \tilde{z}_{sec} against the anchor x_{cov} . While retaining the original pipeline, the AlexNet
 327 Krizhevsky et al. (2012) is replaced with SHA-256 hashing to calculate the hash value of secret
 328 data and cover image, respectively. This modification enables multimodal payload classification
 329 while reducing computational complexity. To recover the secret information x_{rev} , the output \tilde{z}_{rev}
 330 generated by the reveal process $\tilde{\mathcal{H}}^{-1}$ is leveraged within the backward restoration process F^{-1} of
 331 the forward customization process follows:

$$326 \quad 327 \quad 328 \quad 329 \quad 330 \quad 331 \quad 332 \quad 333 \quad 334 \quad 335 \quad 336 \quad 337 \quad 338 \quad 339 \quad 340 \quad 341 \quad 342 \quad 343 \quad 344 \quad 345 \quad 346 \quad 347 \quad 348 \quad 349 \quad 350 \quad 351 \quad 352 \quad 353 \quad 354 \quad 355 \quad 356 \quad 357 \quad 358 \quad 359 \quad 360 \quad 361 \quad 362 \quad 363 \quad 364 \quad 365 \quad 366 \quad 367 \quad 368 \quad 369 \quad 370 \quad 371 \quad 372 \quad 373 \quad 374 \quad 375 \quad 376 \quad 377 \quad 378 \quad 379 \quad 380 \quad 381 \quad 382 \quad 383 \quad 384 \quad 385 \quad 386 \quad 387 \quad 388 \quad 389 \quad 390 \quad 391 \quad 392 \quad 393 \quad 394 \quad 395 \quad 396 \quad 397 \quad 398 \quad 399 \quad 400 \quad 401 \quad 402 \quad 403 \quad 404 \quad 405 \quad 406 \quad 407 \quad 408 \quad 409 \quad 410 \quad 411 \quad 412 \quad 413 \quad 414 \quad 415 \quad 416 \quad 417 \quad 418 \quad 419 \quad 420 \quad 421 \quad 422 \quad 423 \quad 424 \quad 425 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324 The customized secret data \tilde{z}_{sec} and cover image latent representation z_{cov} are subsequently pro-
 325 cessed by the steganography network $\tilde{\mathcal{H}}$ to synthesize the latent z_{stego} of the stego image x_{stego} .
 326

327 **The backward restoration process F^{-1}** , which constitutes the inverse operation of the previously
 328 described forward customization process, is:

$$\begin{cases} \tilde{z}_{sec}^{i-1} = (\tilde{z}_{sec}^i - \chi(z_{cov}^i)) \odot \exp(-\alpha(\eta(k_{sym}) \odot \varphi(z_{cov}^i))), \\ z_{cov}^{i-1} = (z_{cov}^i - \psi(\tilde{z}_{sec}^{i-1})) \odot \exp(-\alpha(\eta(k_{sym}) \odot \phi(\tilde{z}_{sec}^{i-1}))). \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

322 During the initial phase of the restoration process, auxiliary variable z_{aux} must be introduced to
 323 maintain dimensional compatibility within the invertible neural network. However, discrepancies
 324 between these auxiliary variable z_{aux} and the redundant variable z_r ultimately generated during the
 325 forward encryption process can degrade the quality of the decrypted secret information.
 326

327 To mitigate this issue, the frequency representation of the cover image z_{cov} is utilized as the intro-
 328 duced auxiliary variable. Furthermore, to ensure consistency between the redundant variable z_r and
 329 auxiliary variable z_{aux} , the constraint is imposed on the redundant variable produced in the forward
 330 customization process. This constraint, denoted as *Encryption loss* \mathcal{L}_e , will be detailed later.
 331

341 3.4 LOSS FUNCTION

343 Our loss function comprises conceal loss, reveal loss, encryption loss, low-frequency wavelet loss:
 344

345 **Conceal loss.** The steganography process outputs the stego image x_{stego} based on the cover image
 346 x_{cov} and secret image x_{sec} . For security purposes, the stego image x_{stego} should closely match the
 347 cover image x_{cov} making them indistinguishable. Thus, we define the conceal loss as:

$$\mathcal{L}_c = l_s(x_{stego}, x_{cov}). \quad (10)$$

348 Besides, the low-frequency wavelet loss \mathcal{L}_f utilized to conceal the secret data within the high-
 349 frequency region of the cover image is formulated as:
 350

$$\mathcal{L}_f = l_s(D_{LL}(x_{stego}), D_{LL}(x_{cov})), \quad (11)$$

354 where l_s represents the l_1 or l_2 norm, serving as a measure of the difference between two latents. In
 355 our experiments, we use the l_2 norm as the default.

356 **Reveal loss.** To ensure that the revealed data x_{rev} aligns with the secrets x_{sec} , the reveal loss is:

$$\mathcal{L}_r = l_s(x_{rev}, x_{sec}). \quad (12)$$

359 **Encryption loss.** The encryption loss function \mathcal{L}_e minimizes the reconstruction error between de-
 360 crypted secret data x_{rev} and original secret data x_{sec} , where error originates from the auxiliary
 361 variable z_{aux} introduction during decrypt the secret data. It is formulated as:
 362

$$\mathcal{L}_e = l_s(z_{cov}, z_{aux}). \quad (13)$$

365 **Total loss.** The total loss function \mathcal{L}_{Total} is the weighted sum of the conceal loss \mathcal{L}_c , reveal loss \mathcal{L}_r ,
 366 encryption loss \mathcal{L}_e and low-frequency wavelet loss \mathcal{L}_f , formulated as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{Total} = \lambda_1 \mathcal{L}_c + \lambda_2 \mathcal{L}_r + \lambda_3 \mathcal{L}_e + \lambda_4 \mathcal{L}_f, \quad (14)$$

369 where $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \lambda_3$ and λ_4 are trade-off parameters set to 2.0, 1.0, 0.5 and 1.0, respectively, for balance.
 370

371 4 EXPERIMENTS


373 4.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETTING

375 Our model is implemented with PyTorch and trained on the DIV2K Agustsson & Timofte (2017)
 376 training dataset. The evaluation is performed on the DIV2K Agustsson & Timofte (2017) test
 377 dataset, COCO Lin et al. (2014), and ImageNet Russakovsky et al. (2015) at a resolution of
 256 \times 256. More implementation details are presented in the Appendix D.

378 Table 1: Numerical comparisons with different steganography methods across various datasets,
379 highlighting the best results in **bold** and the second-best in underline.

380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389	Method	Time(s)	Cover/Stego											
			Image(DIV2K)				Text(3bpp)				Audio			
			PSNR↑	SSIM↑	MAE↓	RMSE↓	PSNR↑	SSIM↑	MAE↓	RMSE↓	PSNR↑	SSIM↑	MAE↓	RMSE↓
SteganoGAN	0.04	-	-	-	-	-	21.22	0.6124	16.59	22.53	-	-	-	-
FNNS-D	5.95	-	-	-	-	-	23.02	0.6907	13.82	18.47	-	-	-	-
LISO	0.08	-	-	-	-	-	<u>30.44</u>	<u>0.8541</u>	<u>5.85</u>	<u>7.88</u>	-	-	-	-
VoI-GAN	2.86	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34.86	0.8457	4.86	7.89
ASA	1.89	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<u>42.54</u>	<u>0.9858</u>	<u>1.94</u>	<u>2.87</u>
ISN	0.23	39.28	0.9853	2.34	2.91	19.45	0.5403	21.87	27.75	36.31	0.9585	2.81	3.93	-
HiNet	0.18	39.53	0.9868	2.08	2.87	20.10	0.5372	19.71	26.40	37.08	0.9575	2.73	3.65	-
DeepMIH	0.15	43.72	0.9895	1.94	2.81	20.91	0.5861	17.91	24.40	39.15	0.9681	2.54	3.57	-
iSCMIS	0.17	45.78	0.9924	1.62	2.42	21.14	0.5927	17.44	23.91	40.61	0.9714	2.46	3.49	-
StegFormer	0.15	<u>48.08</u>	<u>0.9963</u>	<u>1.51</u>	<u>2.37</u>	21.20	0.5989	17.31	23.74	41.98	0.9725	2.22	3.13	-
Ours	0.16	50.72	0.9987	0.55	0.78	42.35	0.9951	1.46	1.99	45.51	0.9965	1.01	1.39	1.48↓

390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400	Method	Time(s)	Secret/Reveal											
			Image(DIV2K)				Text(3bpp)				Audio			
			PSNR↑	SSIM↑	MAE↓	RMSE↓	Error Rate (%) ↓	PSNR↑	SSIM↑	MAE↓	RMSE↓			
SteganoGAN	0.03	-	-	-	-	-	13.74	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FNNS-D	4.62	-	-	-	-	-	0.10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LISO	0.07	-	-	-	-	-	<u>2E-03</u>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
VoI-GAN	2.37	-	-	-	-	-	-	45.37	0.9698	2.83	3.53	-	-	-
ASA	1.30	-	-	-	-	-	-	45.02	0.9651	2.97	3.79	-	-	-
ISN	0.23	37.06	0.9672	2.80	4.30	19.45	35.63	0.9567	3.49	5.87	-	-	-	-
HiNet	0.18	46.64	<u>0.9962</u>	<u>0.93</u>	<u>1.31</u>	20.87	38.07	0.9696	2.67	4.04	-	-	-	-
DeepMIH	0.15	42.56	0.9851	1.94	2.91	20.58	36.30	0.9501	3.27	5.41	-	-	-	-
iSCMIS	0.17	42.53	0.9836	2.11	3.04	17.39	37.07	0.9608	2.83	4.30	-	-	-	-
StegFormer	0.15	<u>48.25</u>	<u>0.9961</u>	<u>1.47</u>	<u>2.38</u>	18.11	40.01	0.9617	<u>2.59</u>	3.92	-	-	-	-
Ours	0.16	53.10	0.9996	0.41	0.61	0	46.58	0.9947	0.89	1.00	1.53↓	1.7↓	2.53↓	2.53↓



406 Figure 6: Visual comparisons of stego images and revealed secret images for the proposed model
407 and various steganography models on the DIV2K dataset.

4.2 QUALITY ANALYSIS

410
411 **Quantitative results.** The steganography performance was initially evaluated on DIV2K datasets,
412 with comprehensive results detailed in Table 1. On the DIV2K benchmark, our model demon-
413 strates significant improvements: PSNR increases by **2.64dB** and SSIM by **0.24%** for cover/stego
414 image pairs, while PSNR rises by **4.85dB** and SSIM by **0.34%** for secret/revealed secret pairs.
415 Concurrently, MAE and RMSE exhibit reductions of **0.96/1.59** and **0.52/0.7** for these respective
416 pairs. Furthermore, the table presents the time consumed of various methods, and the proposed
417 method demonstrates comparable time efficiency. **More detailed efficiency analysis is presented**
418 in **Appendix E**. These results illustrate that the proposed model is associated with significant im-
419 provements in the quality of both the stego and the revealed secret images relative to other methods.

420 The proposed method was also evaluated on **text and audio datasets**. As demonstrated in Table 1,
421 for text secret data, the proposed method yields an improvement of **11.91dB** in PSNR and a **14.51%**
422 gain in SSIM for cover/stego image pairs. The extracted secret data also exhibits a reduced error
423 rate. In the case of audio data, the method demonstrates enhanced steganographic performance and
424 achieves a **0.53dB** increase in PSNR and a **0.4%** increase in SSIM for cover/stego pairs. Furthermore,
425 for extracted audio spectrograms, it delivers superior results, with PSNR and SSIM gains
426 of **1.21dB** and **0.3%** for secret/reveal pairs, respectively. Concurrently, it reduces both MAE and
427 RMSE for all cover/stego and secret/reveal data pairs. These results indicate that the proposed
428 method achieves robust steganography performance across diverse data modals, highlighting its
429 strong capability and adaptability in multimodal environments.

430 **Qualitative Results.** The Figure 6 assesses the visual results of image-in-image steganography and
431 presents the stego and recovered images generated by various methods. The figure also displays
432 residual maps between the cover/stego and secret/revealed image pairs. The results demonstrate
433 that the proposed method produces the smallest residuals, confirming its superiority in generating




Figure 7: Security performance detected by StegExpose.

Table 2: The detection accuracy (%) detected by SRNet, XuNet and YeNet.

	Weng	UDH	ISN	HiNet	Deep MIH	iSC MIS	Steg Former	Ours
SRNet	89.25	85.31	84.91	79.32	75.54	69.64	58.39	53.98(4.41↓)
XuNet	82.24	79.26	77.42	75.37	74.12	67.86	57.23	55.04(2.19↓)
YeNet	85.18	82.13	80.27	77.86	69.24	68.92	58.03	54.61(3.42↓)




Figure 8: Comparison of information conflicts before/after MGCF processing.

Table 3: Effectiveness of Secret optimize module and Encryption Loss \mathcal{L}_e .

MGCF	\mathcal{L}_e	Cover/Stego				Secret/Reveal			
		PSNR	SSIM	MAE	RMSE	PSNR	SSIM	MAE	RMSE
✗	✗	43.72	0.9895	1.94	2.81	42.56	0.9851	1.94	2.91
✓	✗	45.16	0.9969	1.08	1.54	48.41	0.9975	0.76	1.09
✓	✓	50.72	0.9987	0.55	0.78	53.10	0.9996	0.41	0.61

higher-quality stego images and achieving more accurate secret image reconstruction. **More results are presented in the Appendix F and Appendix H.** These results exemplify that the proposed model achieves notable improvements in effectiveness and security over existing SOTA models.

4.3 ABLATION STUDIES

Steganographic analysis. To evaluate the anti-steganalysis capability of various methods, we employ StegExpose Boehm (2014) and three steganalysis networks: SRNet Boroumand et al. (2018), XuNet Xu et al. (2016), and YeNet Ye et al. (2017). Lower detection accuracy and a smaller area under curve (AUC) indicates better security performance. The evaluate results are presented in Figure 7 and Table 2 respectively. These steganalysis results indicate that the proposed model achieves superior anti-steganalysis performance compared to other SOTA methods.

Effect of the Multi-Gap Collaborative Fusion (MGCF). As illustrated in Table 3, the introduced MGCF mechanism significantly enhances steganography performance. Quantitative analysis demonstrates PSNR improvements of **1.44dB** for cover/stego image pairs and **5.85dB** for secret/revealed image pairs, with corresponding SSIM gains of **0.74%** and **1.24%** respectively. Concurrently, the module reduces MAE and RMSE metrics for both image pairs. These highlight the crucial role of the introduced Multi-Gap Collaborative Fusion mechanism in strengthening the steganography performance. **Further analysis are provided in Appendix G.**

Mitigate Information Conflicts. The MGCF is proposed to mitigate the intra- and inter-modal information conflict in multimodal secret data. It leverages the cover image as an anchor to achieve targeted customization of the secret data. To validate its efficacy, relevant experiments were conducted with a fixed cover image and 100 samples per modality. Figure 8 presents the t-SNE visualization and cosine similarity measurements of data samples before and after MGCF processing. The results confirm that the proposed directed customization significantly reduces feature divergence and enhances similarity across the secret data. This reduction in feature divergence, coupled with a significant improvement in steganography performance, demonstrates the mechanism’s effectiveness in alleviating both intra- and inter-modal information conflicts.

5 CONCLUSION

This paper proposes a novel multimodal secret data steganography framework that enables concurrent concealment and recovery of multimodal secret data within a unified architecture. It achieves this outcome through multimodal knowledge preservation and cross-modal interaction. By establishing a systematic coupling between steganography tasks and continuous learning, the method effectively retains acquired multimodal knowledge and sustains learning capability. Furthermore, leveraging the cover image as an anchor, the proposed method performs targeted customization of secret data through Multi-Gap Collaborative Fusion mechanism. This process concurrently enables cross-modal interaction and mitigates inherent intra- and inter-modal information conflicts among the multimodal secret data. Empirical evaluations demonstrate the model’s superior performance over existing steganography models in multimodal secret data steganography tasks.

486

6 REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

488 During the publication phase, we will provide full access to all codes, logs, and result files to ensure
489 transparency and reproducibility of our work.
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648 A PIPELINE
649650
651 **Algorithm 1** The Concealing Process

652 **Require:** The secret image x_{sec} which will be concealed, the cover image x_{cov} , trained Multi-Gap
653 Collaborative Fusion F and multimodal secret data steganography model $\tilde{\mathcal{H}}$, Discrete Wavelet
654 Transform (DWT), Inverse Wavelet Transform (IWT), SHA-256 hash function, MLP for private
655 key generation, the weight W for public key derivation.
656
657 **Ensure:**
658 $z_{sec} = DWT(x_{sec}), z_{cov} = DWT(x_{cov})$
659
660 $H_s \leftarrow SHA - 256(x_{sec}), H_c \leftarrow SHA - 256(x_{cov})$
661 $k_{pri-i} \leftarrow MLP(H_i), i \in s, c$
662 $k_{pub-s} \leftarrow W \cdot k_{pri-s}$
663 $k_{sym} \leftarrow k_{pub-s} \cdot k_{pri-c}$ # Symmetric key generation.
664 $\tilde{z}_{sec} = F(x_{sec}, x_{cov}, k_{sym})$ # Directionally customize the secret data.
665 $z_{stego} = \tilde{\mathcal{H}}(z_{cov}, \tilde{z}_{sec})$ # Conceal the customized secret data with steganography model.
666 $x_{stego} \leftarrow IWT(z_{stego})$
667

668 **Algorithm 2** The Revealing Process

669 **Require:** The stego image x_{stego} which contains the secret data, the cover image x_{cov} , trained
670 Multi-Gap Collaborative Fusion F and multimodal secret data steganography model $\tilde{\mathcal{H}}$, Discrete
671 Wavelet Transform (DWT), Inverse Wavelet Transform (IWT), public key of secret image k_{pub-s} ,
672 random Gaussian noise z_{aux} , SHA-256 hash function, MLP for private key generation, the weight
673 W for public key derivation.
674
675 **Ensure:**
676 $z_{stego} = DWT(x_{stego})$
677 $\tilde{z}_{rev} = \tilde{\mathcal{H}}^{-1}(z_{stego}, z_{aux})$ # Reveal the customized secret data with steganography model.
678 $H_c \leftarrow SHA - 256(x_{cov})$
679 $k_{pri-c} \leftarrow MLP(H_c)$
680 $k_{pub-s} \leftarrow W \cdot k_{pri-s}$
681 $k_{sym} \leftarrow k_{pub-s} \cdot k_{pri-c}$ # Symmetric key generation.
682 $z_{rev} = F^{-1}(\tilde{z}_{rev}, x_{cov}, k_{sym})$ # Directionally customize the secret data.
683
684

685 B RELATED WORK
686

687 B.1 IMAGE STEGANOGRAPHY

688
689 Traditional image steganography methods, such as Least Significant Bits (LSB) Mielikainen (2006),
690 Pixel Value Differencing (PVD) Pan et al. (2011), and so on, accomplish the concealment of secret
691 information by embedding it into the pixel space of an image or a certain transform space (e.g.,
692 Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT), and Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT)).

693 The advancement of deep learning has spurred growing interest in deep learning-based image
694 steganography methods, which have exhibited superior performance in steganography tasks. These
695 methods substantially improve embedding capacity and broaden the range of concealed data types.

696 In the domain of text hiding, SteganoGAN Zhang et al. (2019) employs a generative adversarial
697 network (GAN) framework and utilizes adversarial training to accomplish steganography objectives.
698 FNNS Kishore et al. (2022) capitalizes on the sensitivity of neural networks to subtle perturbations,
699 generating adversarially perturbed images to guarantee precise information recovery. LISO Chen
700 et al. (2023) introduces a novel gradient-based neural optimization algorithm that integrates the
701 capacity of neural networks to learn image manifolds with the precision of constrained optimization.
MDDM Xu et al. (2025) encodes the secret message into the initial noise for image generation by

702 utilizing a Cardan grille and leverages the reversibility of DDIM to develop a message-driven image
 703 steganography framework based on diffusion models.
 704

705 The increasing prevalence of diverse data types in social media has created a growing need for
 706 steganography techniques capable of handling multiple modalities. For image, Baluja was the first
 707 to achieve the steganography of an entire secret image through the encoder-decoder neural net-
 708 work DDH Baluja (2017; 2019). UDH Zhang et al. (2020), on the other hand, provided a different
 709 perspective from DDH for the image steganography task. Subsequently, with the development of
 710 reversible neural networks and flow models, researchers turned to using reversible neural networks
 711 to achieve high-capacity image steganography, and ISN Lu et al. (2021) was the earliest work in
 712 this regard. In subsequent research Jing et al. (2021); Guan et al. (2022); Zhang et al. (2024a;b);
 713 Zhou et al. (2025), relevant researchers explored multi-image steganography using Invertible Neural
 714 Networks, increasing the steganographic capacity once again. CRoSS Yu et al. (2024b) and Diff-
 715 Stega Yang et al. (2024) use diffusion models to achieve the steganography of secret images. They
 716 use text prompts and image prompts to guide the generation of stego images, enabling stable and
 717 controllable generative steganography.

718 Steganography research has extended beyond text and image data to encompass various other modal-
 719 ities, including Soundarya et al. (2018); Huu et al. (2019); Nokhwal et al. (2023); Krishnan et al.
 720 (2025), video Gandikota et al. (2022), watermark Lukas et al. (2024); Garov et al. (2024); Arabi
 721 et al. (2025) and so on, with studies across these domains demonstrating effective performance.

722 Conventional methods, however, are constrained to static modality configurations, limiting their
 723 applicability amidst proliferating multimodal data. In contrast, the proposed framework supports
 724 multimodal secret data, thereby significantly broadening its practical applicability.

725 726 727 B.2 CONTINUAL LEARNING 728

729
 730 Continual learning is designed to equip models with the capacity for sequential knowledge acqui-
 731 sition when encountering new data distributions or tasks, while avoiding catastrophic forgetting
 732 of previously acquired knowledge. Its fundamental objective lies in achieving a balance between
 733 model stability—the retention of prior knowledge—and plasticity, the integration of new knowl-
 734 edge, thereby approximating human lifelong cognitive processes.

735 Formally, given a task sequence $\mathcal{T} = [D^1, D^2, \dots, D^T]$ of size T , where $D^t, 1 \leq t \leq T$ is the t -th
 736 task. The dataset for t -th task $D_t = \{(x_{t,i}, y_{t,i})\}_{i=1}^{N_t}$ consists of input samples X_t and target samples
 737 Y_t , where N_t represents the number of samples in the t -th task. For a neural network f trained with
 738 the task $\mathcal{T}' = [D^1, D^2, \dots, D^{t-1}]$, the task D^t is a new task. The objective is to learn the new task
 739 while maintaining performance on old tasks. Specifically, given an unseen test sample $x \in X$ from
 740 any trained tasks, the trained model f should perform well in inferring the label $y = f(x) \in Y$.

741 In previous work, Shi et al. (2025) propose a dual-representation mechanism that emulates specific
 742 and generalized memory systems, substantially mitigating catastrophic forgetting while reducing
 743 computational energy consumption. Lu et al. Lu et al. (2025) establish a stability–plasticity equi-
 744 librium through synergistic interactions between deep-narrow architectures, optimized for plastic-
 745 ity, and wide-shallow structures, enhanced for stability. The framework D-MoLE Ge et al. (2025)
 746 employs gradient-guided dynamic parameter allocation to enable on-demand resource adaptation
 747 across visual and textual modalities. Additionally, Wang et al. (2024) provide a comprehensive sur-
 748 vey of continual learning, aiming to establish connections between fundamental settings, theoretical
 749 foundations, representative methods, and practical applications. Yu et al. (2024a) begin by outlin-
 750 ing essential background knowledge in multimodal continual learning and proceed to conduct the
 751 first systematic review dedicated to this emerging field. Pan et al. (2025) provides a comprehensive
 752 review of contemporary applications of continual learning within reinforcement learning.

753 This work systematically develops a novel framework for continuous multimodal secret data
 754 steganography to resolve inter-modal information conflicts and catastrophic forgetting. Beyond ad-
 755 dressing these dual challenges, the integration of cover-secret gap reduction and encryption reduces
 756 cover-secret discrepancy, thereby mitigating inherent information conflicts.

756 **C KEY GENERATION**
 757

758 Building upon Wang et al. (2025), symmetric key k_{sym} is derived with cover image and concealed
 759 payloads, which is formulated as:
 760

$$\begin{aligned}
 k_{sym} &= k_{pub-s} \cdot k_{pri-c} \\
 &= ((W_L + W_S) \cdot k_{pri-s}) \cdot k_{pri-c} \\
 &= ((W_L + W_S) \cdot k_{pri-c}) \cdot k_{pri-s} \\
 &= k_{pub-r} \cdot k_{pri-s},
 \end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

766 where W_L denote the MLP weight matrix employed for private key generation, and W_S is the
 767 weight associated with secret data. The private keys are derived as $k_{pri-i} = MLP(F_i)$ for $i \in c, s$,
 768 yielding k_{pri-c} and k_{pri-s} as private keys for cover image x_{cov} and secret data x_{sec} respectively.
 769

770 While retaining the original pipeline, the AlexNet Krizhevsky et al. (2012) —previously extracting
 771 F_s (payload features) and F_c (cover features)—is replaced with SHA-256 hashing to calculate the
 772 hash value H_s and H_c of secret data and cover image, respectively. This modification enables
 773 multimodal payload classification while reducing computational complexity.
 774

775 During stego image (x_{stego}) transmission, the associated public key ($k_{pub-s} = (W_L + W_S) \cdot k_{pri-s}$)
 776 is transmitted concurrently. The receiver employs the pipeline defined in Equation (15) to derive the
 777 symmetric key (k_{sym}), identical to the sender's concealment procedure. This facilitates accurate se-
 778 cret data revealing, completing the reveal process. Following the previous work Wang et al. (2025),
 779 we generate the symmetric key k_{sym} with the cover image and the secret data. The pipeline is the
 780 same as the method introduced in Wang et al. (2025) and we replace the AlexNet utilized to extract
 781 the features F_s and F_c from the secret and cover image, respectively, with the SHA-256 hash func-
 782 tion. This can not only classify the secret data, but also satisfy the multimodal secret data. Besides,
 783 it also can reduce the computation flops.
 784

785 The aforementioned key generation mechanism is constructed following the ECDHE algorithm. A
 786 comparative overview of the standard ECDHE process and the implemented protocol is presented
 787 below:
 788

789 **(1) The Principle of the ECDHE:**
 790

791 If we have two private keys k_{pri-a} and k_{pri-b} (belonging to A and B, respectively) and an ECC
 792 elliptic curve with generator point G , we can exchange over an insecure channel the values $k_{pub-a} =$
 793 $k_{pri-a} \cdot G$ and $k_{pub-b} = k_{pri-b} \cdot G$ (the public keys of A and B) and then we can derive a shared
 794 secret symmetric key: $k_{sym} = k_{pub-b} \cdot k_{pri-a} = k_{pub-a} \cdot k_{pri-b}$. The ECDH algorithm is trivial:
 795

- 796 • A generates a random ECC key pair: $k_{pri-a}, k_{pub-a} = k_{pri-a} \cdot G$.
 797
- 798 • B generates a random ECC key pair: $k_{pri-b}, k_{pub-b} = k_{pri-b} \cdot G$.
 799
- 800 • A and B exchange their public keys through the insecure channel (e.g. over Internet).
 801
- 802 • A calculates $k_{sym} = k_{pub-b} \cdot k_{pri-a}$.
 803
- 804 • B calculates $k_{sym} = k_{pub-a} \cdot k_{pri-b}$.
 805

806 Now both A and B have the same key $k_{sym} = k_{pub-b} \cdot k_{pri-a} = k_{pub-a} \cdot k_{pri-b}$.
 807

808 **(2) Our implementation:**
 809

- 810 • The sender (A) and receiver (B) share the same cover image for image concealment.
 811
- 812 • A calculates the private keys $k_{pri-i} = MLP(H_i), i \in s, c$, the public key related to the
 813 secret image $k_{pub-s} = W \cdot k_{pri-s}$ and the symmetric key $k_{sym} = k_{pub-s} \cdot k_{pri-c}$. Here,
 814 $W = W_L + W_S$, where W_L represents static parameters derived from a fixed linear layer,
 815 and W_S denotes dynamic parameters generated based on the secret image. This process
 816 is analogous to the selection of specific base points (G) and elliptic curves (E) within the
 817 ECDHE algorithm.
 818
- 819 • B calculates the private keys $k_{pri-c} = MLP(H_c)$.
 820
- 821 • A transmits the public key k_{pub-s} to B.
 822

810 • B calculates the symmetric key $k_{sym} = k_{pub-s} \cdot k_{pri-c}$.
 811 • B reveals the secret image with k_{sym} .

813 Throughout the steganography process, only the stego image and the public key associated with
 814 the secret image are transmitted, with all the private key remaining undisclosed. Consequently, the
 815 proposed key generation mechanism maintains compliance with the ECDHE protocol and retains its
 816 provable security guarantees.

818 D IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS

820 **Datases and Setting.** The model is implemented in PyTorch and trained on the DIV2K Agustsson
 821 & Timofte (2017) training dataset. The evaluation is performed on the DIV2K Agustsson & Timofte
 822 (2017) test dataset(100 images), COCO Lin et al. (2014) (5000 images), and ImageNet Russakovsky
 823 et al. (2015) (10,000 images). Training images are randomly cropped to 256×256 and augmented
 824 with random horizontal and vertical flips. Comparatively, test images in the DIV2K dataset are
 825 center-cropped, while in the other datasets, the images are resized to 256×256 . The AdamW
 826 optimizer with an initial learning rate of 1×10^{-5} is used for training.

827 The text data comprises randomly-generated binary data. For the steganography capacity of 3 bits
 828 per pixel (3 bpp) examined in this study, the data consists of 196,608 characters. This data is subse-
 829 quently reconfigured into a three-dimensional array of size $3 \times 256 \times 256$, which serves as the input
 830 to the subsequent steganography process.

831 The audio data was obtained from the publicly accessible Dani-Voice dataset. Following the standard
 832 methodology for audio information hiding, the data was converted into spectrogram representations
 833 via the Short-Time Fourier Transform (STFT) to facilitate subsequent embedding and extraction op-
 834 erations. The steganography performance was subsequently assessed based on these spectrograms.
 835 All experiments are conducted on a Nvidia 4090 GPU.

836 As the proposed method is grounded in image steganography, the carrier is inherently an image.
 837 This design necessitates that the Multi-Gap Collaborative Fusion mechanism aligns the secret data
 838 from all modalities toward the image domain. Consequently, initializing the model with the image
 839 modality task is optimal for performance. Based on this rationale, the image modality is employed
 840 as the first modality by default in all experiments.

841 **Benchmarks.** To rigorously evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method, a comprehensive
 842 comparative analysis was conducted against SOTA image steganography methods developed for
 843 different modalities. These include methods designed for text, such as SteganoGAN Zhang et al.
 844 (2019), FNNS Kishore et al. (2022), and LISO Chen et al. (2023); as well as methods tailored for
 845 image, including Baluja et al. Baluja (2017), HiDDeN Zhu (2018), Weng et al. Weng et al. (2019),
 846 UDH Zhang et al. (2020), ISN Lu et al. (2021), HiNet Jing et al. (2021), DeepMIH Guan et al.
 847 (2022), iSCMIS Li et al. (2024), and StegFormer Ke et al. (2024). To ensure a fair and objective
 848 comparison, all methods were re-trained using the same dataset employed in this study.

849 **Evaluation Metrics.** To assess the quality of secret/recovery pairs, we utilize Peak Signal-to-Noise
 850 Ratio(PSNR), Structural Similarity Index(SSIM) , Root Mean Square Error(RMSE), and Mean Ab-
 851 solute Error(MAE) as performance metrics for image and audio data. For the text data hiding sce-
 852 nario, the quality of stego images is evaluated employing the same metrics applied to image data,
 853 while the extraction accuracy of the embedded text is assessed using the Error Rate consistent with
 854 prior research Kishore et al. (2022); Chen et al. (2023).

856 E EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

858 This section presents a systematic analysis of the efficiency of the proposed model. Build upon the
 859 Invertible Neural Network (INN), the main resource consumption of the proposed model arises from
 860 three stages: key generation, the directed customization of secret data with Multi-Gap Collaborative
 861 Fusion, and the steganography process.

863 In the initial steganography task, the proposed model is functionally equivalent to the original HiNet
 864 Jing et al. (2021) and the single-image DeepMIH Guan et al. (2022) model and has the identical com-

864 putational complexity. To accommodate new modal data, the model incorporates modal adapters.
 865 The output of each layer is then computed as
 866

$$\mathcal{O}_{cov}(z) = Conv(z) + \beta \cdot LoRA(z),$$

868 where z is the input of each layer. During inference, the parameters of these adapters θ_{ada} are
 869 integrated with the original convolutional layer parameters θ_{ori} to obtain new parameters, as defined
 870 by the equation

$$\theta_{new} = \theta_{ori} + \beta \cdot \theta_{ada},$$

872 where β is a scaling factor that balances the contribution of the original θ_{ori} and adapter parameters
 873 θ_{ada} . Thus, this integration introduces no additional computational overhead during the testing
 874 phase.

875 The additional computational requirements introduced by the model are mainly originate from: the
 876 Multi-Gap Collaborative Fusion mechanism for secret data customization and the key generation
 877 process. The Multi-Gap Collaborative Fusion mechanism is a three-layer INN whose parameter
 878 processing is consistent with the method described above during inference phase, resulting in a
 879 parameter overhead of only **18.75%** compared to the original HiNet. The key generation process,
 880 which is based on the ECDHE key exchange algorithm, is devoted to a two-layer MLP, contributing
 881 minimal resource consumption relative to the overall model.

882 A set of experiments was also conducted to evaluate computational efficiency, with the results pre-
 883 sented in Table 4. It is observed that compared to iSCMIS Li et al. (2024), the proposed model
 884 increases FLOPs by a marginal **10.75%** yet reduces the runtime by 0.02 seconds. Compared to
 885 StegFormer StegFormer Ke et al. (2024), the proposed method uses only **23%** of the parameters
 886 and **14.73%** of the FLOPs. These results demonstrate that the proposed model achieves significant
 887 gains in multi-modal steganography performance without a considerable increase in computational
 888 resource consumption. When considered alongside its steganography performance, these findings
 889 validate the model’s high effectiveness and efficiency.

890 F ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS

891 **Single-image steganography.** We further evaluated the proposed model on the COCO and Im-
 892 ageNet datasets, and the corresponding experimental results are presented in Table 4. Consistent
 893 performance gains were observed for the proposed model on these two benchmark datasets. On the
 894 Imagenet dataset, it yields improvements of **12.18dB** and **0.7%** for cover/stego image pairs, and
 895 **12.4dB** and **0.46%** enhancement for secret/reveal pairs. Corresponding gains on the COCO dataset
 896 reached **9.1dB/0.93% (cover/stego)** and **10.19dB/0.43% (secret/reveal)**. Concurrently, significant
 897 reduction in both MAE and RMSE were demonstrated on both datasets. These findings establish
 898 the proposed model’s superior steganography fidelity, demonstrating significantly enhanced quality
 899 for both stego and revealed secret images relative to benchmark methods.

900 **High-capacity steganography.** To assess the efficacy of the proposed method for high-capacity
 901 steganography, image data were employed as a representative case. The steganography performance
 902 of various methods was evaluated under conditions of concealing 3, 5, and 7 images. The experi-
 903 mental results, presented in Table 5, demonstrate the superiority of the proposed approach. Speci-
 904 fically, when hiding 3 images on the DIV2K dataset, the proposed method achieved gains of **8.34dB**
 905 in PSNR and **2.76%** in SSIM for cover/stego pairs, and **12.46dB** in PSNR and **3.48%** in SSIM
 906 for secret/reveal pairs. On the COCO dataset, corresponding improvements for cover/stego and se-
 907 cret/reveal pairs were **10.99dB/2.91%** and **10.74dB/3.68%**, respectively. Consistent performance
 908 enhancements were also observed for 5 and 7 hidden images. These results confirm the method’s
 909 exceptional capability for large-capacity data hiding.

910 **Multimodal Secret Data steganography.** To further assess the adaptability and steganography
 911 performance of the proposed model in multimodal scenarios involving diverse data combinations, a
 912 comprehensive evaluation was conducted. The results, presented in Table 6, demonstrate the model’s
 913 superior performance across all tested conditions. As a representative case, the simultaneous
 914 concealment of image and text data resulted in a **22.42dB** increase in PSNR and a **46.03%** enhancement
 915 in SSIM for cover/stego pairs. For the secret/reveal pairs, the model yielded a **26.77dB** PSNR gain
 916 and a **45.65%** SSIM gain for image data, alongside a **26.08%** reduction in error rate for text data.
 917 Significantly enhanced data hiding and extraction performance was also consistently observed under

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921
922 Table 4: Numerical comparisons with different steganography methods on COCO and Imagenet
923 datasets, highlighting the best results in **bold** and the second-best in underline.
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Method	Paras(M)	Flops(G)	Times(s)	Cover/Stego				Imagenet			
				COCO				Imagenet			
				PSNR↑	SSIM↑	MAE↓	RMSE↓	PSNR↑	SSIM↑	MAE↓	RMSE↓
Baluja	2.77	173.77	0.24	36.38	0.9563	5.98	7.43	36.59	0.9520	5.61	5.41
UDH	17.40	50.62	0.22	38.90	0.9650	2.77	2.90	38.96	0.9624	2.75	2.88
ISN	2.99	196.46	0.46	37.95	0.9751	2.76	3.23	40.13	0.9748	1.95	2.51
HiNet	4.05	20.59	0.36	39.01	0.9844	2.09	2.96	44.61	0.9927	1.52	1.63
DeepMIH	5.40	22.13	0.30	40.30	0.9805	2.83	4.14	40.31	0.9800	2.87	4.16
iSCMIS	5.48	27.63	0.34	41.53	0.9818	2.53	3.78	40.31	0.9818	2.59	3.79
StegFormer	34.96	207.78	0.29	<u>42.62</u>	<u>0.9897</u>	<u>2.09</u>	<u>2.94</u>	42.87	0.9875	1.92	2.83
Ours	8.04	30.60	0.32	51.72(9.1↑)	0.9990(0.0093↑)	0.49(1.6↓)	0.69(2.25↓)	56.79(12.18↑)	0.9997(0.0070↑)	0.26(1.26↓)	0.38(1.25↓)
Srcet/Reveal											
Method	COCO				Imagenet						
	PSNR↑	SSIM↑	MAE↓	RMSE↓	PSNR↑	SSIM↑	MAE↓	RMSE↓			
Baluja	35.01	0.9341	6.52	8.00	34.13	0.9247	5.31	8.37			
UDH	35.07	0.8220	3.77	4.67	35.39	0.8252	3.73	4.58			
ISN	36.58	0.9016	3.04	3.78	37.73	0.9548	2.97	3.31			
HiNet	<u>44.05</u>	<u>0.9952</u>	<u>1.17</u>	<u>1.70</u>	<u>46.78</u>	<u>0.9952</u>	<u>1.94</u>	<u>2.74</u>			
DeepMIH	36.55	0.9613	5.09	6.48	36.63	0.9604	4.16	6.07			
iSCMIS	39.47	0.9754	3.74	5.48	39.44	0.9718	3.79	5.48			
StegFormer	42.04	0.9884	2.74	4.11	42.39	0.9862	2.24	3.47			
Ours	54.24(10.19↑)	0.9995(0.0043↑)	0.36(0.81↓)	0.55(0.1.15↓)	59.18(12.4↑)	0.9998(0.0046↑)	0.22(1.72↓)	0.28(1.86↓)			

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940 Table 5: Numerical comparisons of diverse steganography approaches on the DIV2K and COCO
941 datasets for multi-image hiding, highlighting the best results in **bold** and the second-best in
942 underline.
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N	Method	DIV2K				COCO			
		Cover/Stego		Secret/Reveal		Cover/Stego		Secret/Reveal	
		PSNR↑	SSIM↑	PSNR↑	SSIM↑	PSNR↑	SSIM↑	PSNR↑	SSIM↑
	ISN	31.23	0.8203	30.05	0.8401	33.53	0.8262	31.85	0.8110
3	DeepMIH	31.29	0.7685	27.30	0.8321	33.99	0.8192	29.56	0.8373
	iSCMIS	33.39	0.7994	30.78	0.8302	34.75	0.8636	33.82	0.8046
	StegFormer	<u>39.67</u>	<u>0.9709</u>	<u>36.81</u>	<u>0.9642</u>	<u>38.25</u>	<u>0.9691</u>	<u>39.21</u>	<u>0.9621</u>
	Ours	48.01(8.34↑)	0.9985(0.0276↑)	49.27(12.46↑)	0.9990(0.0348↑)	49.24(10.99↑)	0.9982(0.0291↑)	49.95(10.74↑)	0.9989(0.0368↑)
5	ISN	26.74	0.6923	27.37	0.7131	30.52	0.7772	29.08	0.7903
	DeepMIH	29.48	0.6925	22.19	0.7164	32.51	0.7926	26.31	0.7862
	iSCMIS	30.68	0.7124	22.07	0.7142	32.68	0.8125	25.99	0.7851
	StegFormer	<u>35.12</u>	<u>0.9317</u>	<u>33.88</u>	<u>0.9290</u>	<u>34.97</u>	<u>0.9432</u>	<u>33.65</u>	<u>0.9168</u>
7	Ours	43.08(7.96↑)	0.9968(0.0651↑)	43.39(9.51↑)	0.9973(0.0683↑)	44.78(9.81↑)	0.9961(0.0529↑)	45.04(11.39↑)	0.9957(0.0798↑)
	ISN	24.28	0.6759	24.91	0.6895	28.48	0.7567	27.80	0.7830
	DeepMIH	27.32	0.6813	20.94	0.6083	30.21	0.7751	24.54	0.7597
	iSCMIS	28.46	0.6942	21.26	0.6054	30.35	0.7838	26.13	0.7905
	StegFormer	<u>35.05</u>	<u>0.9224</u>	<u>32.61</u>	<u>0.9119</u>	<u>33.95</u>	<u>0.9175</u>	<u>32.28</u>	<u>0.9017</u>
	Ours	41.79(6.74↑)	0.9961(0.0737↑)	42.06(9.45↑)	0.9963(0.0844↑)	42.97(9.02↑)	0.9947(0.0772↑)	42.27(9.99↑)	0.9952(0.0935↑)

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956 the other three multimodal combinations. These findings substantiate the model’s robust steganog-
957 raphy capabilities and its strong adaptability to complex multimodal environments.
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G MORE ANALYSIS

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961 **Steganographic analysis.** The anti-steganalysis ability is a critical metric for assessing the security
962 of image steganography, as it measures the likelihood that stego images can be distinguished from
963 reference images using steganalysis tools. To evaluate the anti-steganalysis capability of our model
964 alongside other methods, we employ the open-source steganalysis tool StegExpose Boehm (2014)
965 and three steganalysis networks: SRNet Boroumand et al. (2018), XuNet Xu et al. (2016), and
966 YeNet Ye et al. (2017). Lower detection accuracy and a smaller area under curve (AUC) indicates
967 better security performance. The evaluate results are presented in Figure 7 and Table 2 respectively.
968 These steganalysis results indicate that the proposed model achieves superior anti-steganalysis per-
969 formance compared to other SOTA methods.
970971 **The Security of Concealed Secret Data.** The Multi-Gap Collaborative Fusion mechanism seam-
972 lessly integrates the symmetric key k_{sym} to simultaneously customize and encrypt multimodal se-
973 cret data during mitigating the information conflict. Its security enhancement efficacy was also

972 Table 6: Numerical comparisons of diverse steganography approaches in multimodal environments,
 973 highlighting the best results in **bold** and the second-best in underline.
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976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025	Cover/Stego					Secret/Reveal	
	Method	Image+Text		Image		Text	
		PSNR↑	SSIM↑	PSNR↑	SSIM↑	Error Rate(%)↓	
ISN	16.57	0.4821		17.04	0.4853	27.53	
HiNet	17.08	0.4872		17.52	0.4905	28.06	
DeepMIH	17.52	0.5019		18.60	0.5113	27.91	
iSCMIS	18.01	0.5167		18.14	0.5198	25.82	
StegFormer	18.27	0.5204		19.01	0.5179	26.16	
Ours	40.69(22.42↑)	0.9807(0.4603↑)	45.78(26.77↑)	0.9763(0.4565↑)	0.08(26.08↓)		
Cover/Stego							
Method	Image+Audio		Image		Audio		
	PSNR↑	SSIM↑	PSNR↑	SSIM↑	PSNR↑	SSIM↑	
ISN	33.68	0.8582	32.15	0.8437	28.58	0.8013	
HiNet	35.74	0.8791	34.59	0.8681	29.86	0.8357	
DeepMIH	36.68	0.8773	35.87	0.8724	30.29	0.8329	
iSCMIS	37.92	0.9091	37.14	0.9083	30.05	0.8502	
StegFormer	38.99	0.9447	39.43	0.9379	31.85	0.8429	
Ours	48.51(9.52↑)	0.9937(0.0490↑)	48.79(9.36↑)	0.9914(0.0535↑)	43.92(12.07↑)	0.9852(0.1350↑)	
Cover/Stego							
Method	Text+Audio		Audio		Text		
	PSNR↑	SSIM↑	PSNR↑	SSIM↑	Error Rate(%)↓		
ISN	15.72	0.4711	16.44	0.4707	28.79		
HiNet	17.01	0.4708	16.82	0.4749	28.54		
DeepMIH	17.47	0.4873	17.41	0.4826	27.99		
iSCMIS	17.79	0.4937	17.98	0.4951	26.57		
StegFormer	18.10	0.5109	18.43	0.5317	25.94		
Ours	38.97(20.87↑)	0.9826(0.4717↑)	39.57(21.14↑)	0.9683(0.4366↑)	0.13(25.81↓)		
Cover/Stego							
Method	Image+Text+Audio		Image		Text	Audio	
	PSNR↑	SSIM↑	PSNR↑	SSIM↑	Error Rate(%)↓	PSNR↑	SSIM↑
ISN	14.57	0.4130	14.25	0.4029	34.57	13.88	0.4001
HiNet	15.29	0.4207	14.83	0.4187	32.81	14.07	0.4073
DeepMIH	15.77	0.4214	15.49	0.4195	30.49	14.72	0.4115
iSCMIS	16.01	0.4305	16.47	0.4383	29.14	15.52	0.4293
StegFormer	16.23	0.4293	16.50	0.4311	28.98	15.76	0.4300
Ours	36.09(19.86↑)	0.9653(0.5348↑)	42.87(26.37↑)	0.9537(0.5154↑)	0.79(28.19↓)	38.74(22.98↑)	0.9277(0.4977↑)

empirically validated, as illustrated in Table 7 and Figure 9. These results confirm that high-fidelity reconstruction was achieved only with the authenticated key, whereas severe errors occurred when an incorrect key was used. These findings underscore the essential role of the proposed Multi-Gap Collaborative Fusion mechanism in enhancing the security of the concealed multimodal secret data.

Effect of the Encryption Loss \mathcal{L}_e . The \mathcal{L}_e is introduced to mitigate reconstruction errors between decrypted secret data x_{rev} and the original secret data x_{sec} , where auxiliary variable z_{aux} introduces perturbations during the decryption process. As evidenced by Table 3, the proposed \mathcal{L}_e substantially enhances reconstruction fidelity, yielding PSNR improvements of **5.56dB** for cover/stego pairs and **4.69dB** for secret/revealed pairs, with corresponding SSIM gains of **0.18%** and **0.21%** respectively. Concurrently, MAE and RMSE exhibit marked reductions of **0.53/0.76** and **0.35/0.48** for cover/stego and secret/revealed pairs respectively. These quantitative improvements substantiate the efficacy of the proposed Encryption Loss \mathcal{L}_e in enhancing steganography performance.

Table 7: Comparative Performance of Secret Image Extraction with Correct and Incorrect Keys.

	Cover/Stego	Correct Key	Random Key	Public Key
PSNR↑	50.72	53.10	8.71	7.67
SSIM↑	0.9987	0.9996	0.1810	0.0856
MAE↓	0.55	0.41	86.99	97.2
RMSE↓	0.78	0.61	98.73	110.84


Figure 9: Visual results on DIV2K dataset. The secret images are revealed with three types of keys: correct keys, random keys and the public keys tied to secret images.

H ADDITIONAL QUALITATIVE RESULTS

The qualitative comparison outcomes for the stego and recovery images of our model and other models are presented in Figure 10, Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13. Figure 10, Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13 present visual comparisons for image-in-image, text-in-image, audio-in-image, and multimodal secret data (image+text+audio) concealing tasks, respectively. Each figure includes the residual maps (magnified by a factor of 10 for clarity) between the cover and stego images, as well as the original and revealed secret data. The comparisons demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed method across all tasks, outperforming existing approaches in both single-modal and multimodal secret data concealing scenarios. These results confirm the model’s efficacy and strong adaptability in multimodal secret data steganography.


I USE OF LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS (LLMs)

This manuscript underwent language polishing and editorial refinement with the assistance of a large language model (LLM). The model’s function was solely to enhance the expressive quality of the author’s original writing without contributing to any core research components such as ideation, experimental design, data analysis, or technical interpretation.




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Figure 10: Visual comparisons of our model with other steganography models for concealing image on the DIV2K datasets.




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Figure 11: Visual comparisons of our model with other steganography models for concealing randomly generated binary text data.



1168 Figure 12: Visual comparisons of our model with other steganography models for concealing audio
 1169 data on the Dani-Voice datasets.
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1229 Figure 13: Visual comparisons of our model with other steganography models for concealing three
1230 modalities of secret data on the DIV2K and Dani-Voice datasets. The text data is randomly generated
1231 binary data.

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