

HateModerate: Grounding and Benchmarking Hate Speech Detection with Content Policies

Warning: this paper discusses and contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

Anonymous EACL submission

Abstract

001 Social media platforms greatly facilitate user
 002 communications, but they also open the doors
 003 to unwanted contents such as hateful speech,
 004 misinformation, and pornography. To protect
 005 users from a massive scale of hateful contents,
 006 existing work investigate machine learning so-
 007 lutions for training automated hate speech mod-
 008 erators. Nevertheless, we identify that one
 009 gap is that few existing hate speech datasets
 010 are associated with a list of moderation rules.
 011 Without clarifying the moderation criteria, the
 012 trained moderator may behave differently from
 013 user’s expectation. This work seeks to bridge
 014 this gap by creating a hate speech dataset match-
 015 ing a list of moderation rules. Using crowd-
 016 sourcing, we search and collect a dataset named
 017 HateModerate grounded by Facebook’s com-
 018 munity standards guidelines for hate speech.
 019 We evaluate the performance of state-of-the-art
 020 hate speech detectors against HateModerate,
 021 revealing substantial discrepancies these mod-
 022 els have with content policies. By fine-tuning
 023 one model with HateModerate, we observe that
 024 fine-tuning can effectively improve the models’
 025 conformity to policies. Our results highlight the
 026 necessity of developing rule-based datasets for
 027 hate speech detection. Our datasets and code
 028 can be found on: <https://sites.google.com/view/content-moderation-project>.
 029

1 Introduction

031 Social media platforms such as Facebook, Reddit,
 032 and Twitter/X have facilitated users to exchange in-
 033 formation, but they also expose users to undesirable
 034 content, including hateful speech, misinformation,
 035 graphic violence, pornography, etc. The removal
 036 of such unwanted contents used to be handled by
 037 human moderators. In the recent years, thanks
 038 to the development of AI techniques, social me-
 039 dia companies are actively investigating automated
 040 hate speech moderators powered by AI (fac, 2023;
 041 gpt); meanwhile, the ML/NLP research community
 042 are also vigorously developing new resources and

Hate Speech Community Standards Guidelines

Tier 1:
 Content targeting a person or group of people on the basis of their protected characteristic(s) with:

Dehumanizing Speech
 Compare the protected groups as animals that are perceived as inferior (*including but not limited to: apes, pigs*)
 Compare the protected groups as feces (*including but not limited to: shit, crap*)

Violent Speech
 Advocacy for physical harm to protected groups (*including but not limited to: beat up, kill*)
 Threats of weaponry to protected groups (*including but not limited to: shoot, stab*)

Figure 1: An example of community standards guidelines for hate speech (fb, a)

improving the machine learning techniques for au- 043
 044 tomated hate speech detection (Waseem and Hovy,
 045 2016; Waseem, 2016; Davidson et al., 2017; Founta
 046 et al., 2018; Vidgen et al., 2020b; Röttger et al.,
 047 2020; Mathew et al., 2021; He et al., 2021; ElSh-
 048 erief et al., 2021; Hartvigsen et al., 2022; Sachdeva
 049 et al., 2022; Markov et al., 2022; Antypas and
 050 Camacho-Collados, 2023). Following the works,
 051 researchers published language models fine-tuned
 052 with these resources to facilitate downstream mod-
 053 eration tasks (per, b; ope; car; fb, c).

054 Nevertheless, there exist one aspect that, to the
 055 best of our knowledge, was neglected by existing
 056 work in hate speech detection. That is, the existing
 057 datasets are not grounded by a list of rules or cri-
 058 teria for what speeches are considered as hateful.
 059 The criteria of hate speech often vary according to
 060 the moderation needs. For example, Gab allows
 061 more elitism speeches than Twitter (gab). Similarly,
 062 the labels in the existing hate speech datasets may
 063 or may not conform to the same criteria as where
 064 the trained detector is being deployed to. Without
 065 clarifying the rules, the hate speech detector may

066 behave differently from expectation, which under- 117
067 mines its accountability. The closest work to a rule- 118
068 based dataset is HateCheck (Röttger et al., 2020), 119
069 but their rules focus on the syntactic structures, thus 120
070 they suffer from a low coverage on the hate speech 121
071 categories (Section 4.3 of (Röttger et al., 2020)). 122

072 To improve the accountability of automated con- 123
073 tent moderators, this paper proposes a dataset 124
074 called HateModerate, which consists of a list of 125
075 test suites containing hateful and non-hateful exam- 126
076 ples matching content moderation rules. Among 127
077 the published moderation rules from existing 128
078 work (Banko et al., 2020; fb, a; Röttger et al., 129
079 2020), we opt for Facebook’s community standards 130
080 guidelines for hate speech (fb, a) as previous work 131
081 shows it is the most comprehensive among all plat- 132
082 forms (Jiang et al., 2020) and it has good clarity. 133
083 Two examples of Facebook’s guidelines are shown 134
084 in Figure 1.

085 HateModerate is collected using the process be- 135
086 low. First, crowdsourced annotators are instructed 136
087 to manually search for hateful examples from ex- 137
088 isting datasets matching each policy. The process 138
089 is followed by a validation step to ensure the la- 139
090 bel accuracy. After the hateful examples are col- 140
091 lected, we retrieve difficult non-hateful examples 141
092 that closely resemble the hateful examples in each 142
093 policy which helps improve the detection of model 143
094 failures. We further validate the non-hateful ex- 144
095 amples by leveraging a human-LLM collaborative 145
096 annotation process. The average agreement rate for 146
097 the hateful examples is 87% and for non-hateful 147
098 examples is 88%.

099 After constructing HateModerate, we examine 148
100 state-of-the-art hate speech detectors against each 149
101 policy using the dataset. More specifically, we 150
102 examine the following models: Google’s Perspec- 151
103 tive API (per, b), OpenAI’s Moderation API (ope), 152
104 Facebook’s RoBERTa model (fb, b) and Cardiff 153
105 NLP’s RoBERTa model (car). We make the follow- 154
106 ing observations. First, all models prioritize more 155
107 severe policies (e.g., violence) compared to less se- 156
108 vere policies (e.g., stereotyping); second, the Ope- 157
109 nAI model conforms the best to the content poli- 158
110 cies; third, besides OpenAI, models generally have 159
111 high failure rates for non-hateful examples, espe- 160
112 cially for counter hate and attacking non-protected 161
113 entities. 162

114 After observing the model failures, we further 163
115 seek answers to how to improve model conformity 164
116 to policies. To this end, we compare the results 165

of two models: first, we fine-tune a RoBERTa 117
model using the training datasets of the CardiffNLP 118
model; second, we fine-tune a RoBERTa model us- 119
ing CardiffNLP’s training data and HateModerate. 120
We find that compared to the first model, the second 121
model consistently reduces the model’s failures on 122
HateModerate, while maintaining the same perfor- 123
mance on the original testing data of CardiffNLP. 124
This result shows that including a rule-based train- 125
ing set can effectively alleviate the model’s non- 126
conformity issue to policies, which underscores the 127
importance of keeping the dataset grounded with 128
the moderation criteria. 129

2 Background and Related Work 130

In this section, we introduce the background on 131
hateful content moderation and NLP model eval- 132
uation, which helps explain the motivation of our 133
work. 134

2.1 Automated Content Moderation 135

The removal of hateful contents online is an im- 136
portant process for keeping social media platforms 137
safe and healthy, as well as reducing the incite- 138
ment of real-world harms (un). Due to the dif- 139
ficulty of understanding hateful contents, social 140
media platforms largely relied on human modera- 141
tors for content removal. Recently, companies such 142
as Facebook and OpenAI have investigated auto- 143
mated content moderation powered by NLP tech- 144
niques to scale up the moderation process and to al- 145
leviate human moderators’ workload (fac; Markov 146
et al., 2022). For example, Facebook deployed 147
a fine-tuned multilingual RoBERTa model and a 148
hybrid system to moderate the hate speech on Face- 149
book (fac, 2023; eve). OpenAI also fine-tuned a 150
GPT model with classification loss for moderat- 151
ing harmful contents in their products (Markov 152
et al., 2022). They found the model must be con- 153
tinuously updated to adapt to the new hateful con- 154
tents (Markov et al., 2022). 155

Improving Machine Learning for Hate Speech 156
Detection. Alongside the companies’ efforts, the 157
hate speech community has released multiple pub- 158
lic labeled hate speech datasets for training ma- 159
chine learning models (Waseem, 2016; Waseem 160
and Hovy, 2016; Davidson et al., 2017; Golbeck 161
et al., 2017; Founta et al., 2018; Hartvigsen et al., 162
2022; Vidgen et al., 2020b). These datasets allow 163
researchers to fine-tune models to a diverse range 164
of hateful examples and thus can potentially gen- 165

eralize better to unseen examples. For example, OpenAI combined public datasets and their production data to train the initial model of their Moderation API endpoint before continual learning (ope; Markov et al., 2022). Both Cardiff University’s NLP lab and Facebook fine-tuned an open-source RoBERTa model to a list of selected public datasets (Facebook used 11 while CardiffNLP used 13), which rank top-2 and top-1 among the most downloaded hate detection models on HuggingFace (Vidgen et al., 2020b; Antypas and Camacho-Collados, 2023). To this day, fine-tuning remains the state-of-the-art technique for training automated hate detectors, and the fine-tuned models are used in real-world downstream moderation tasks (alp).

2.2 Policies and Rules for Content Moderation

Issues with Existing Models. One issue with fine-tuning public datasets for hate speech (Vidgen et al., 2020b; Antypas and Camacho-Collados, 2023) is that their moderation criteria is not entirely clear. Essentially, what speeches are considered hateful vary across platforms. For example, Gab allows more elitism speeches than Twitter (gab). When fine-tuning public datasets, it is thus unclear whether these datasets labels are consistent with the user’s own application scenario.

Grounding Hate Speech Datasets with Rules/Labels. To explain the criteria of hatefulness, existing work has associated fine-grained labels with each hateful example in the dataset. For example, DynaHate (Vidgen et al., 2020b) and Measuring Hate Speech (Sachdeva et al., 2022) label each example with fine-grained categories such as derogatory, dehumanization, and insult. However, these categories are high-level concepts and it is difficult to follow them as the labeling rules, e.g., it is difficult to search hateful examples matching the rule "insult".

Taxonomies/Rules/Policies for Content Moderation. Another line of existing work construct taxonomies for content moderation (Banko et al., 2020; fb, a; Röttger et al., 2020). A taxonomy contains a list of rules, each specified by a natural language description. For example, Banko et al. (Banko et al., 2020) introduces a taxonomy for various unwanted contents, e.g., sexual aggression, doxxing, misinformation. HateCheck (Röttger et al., 2020) provides a list of rules for hate speech. Nevertheless, most of the rules of HateCheck focus on defining hate speeches with syntactic structures

rather than semantic meanings, and HateCheck’s rules suffer from a low coverage on the hate speech categories, which is explained in Section 4.3 of (Röttger et al., 2020).

Community Standards Guidelines. Community standards guidelines are policies on what contents are prohibited on social media platforms. Recently, major platforms all released their own guidelines, e.g., Twitter (twi, b), Instagram (ig), and YouTube (yt). Jiang et al. (Jiang et al., 2020) conducted a comparative study for the existing community standards guidelines across platforms, their study suggests that Facebook’s guidelines are the most comprehensive ones above all.

Facebook provides a list of 41 community standards guidelines for hate speech moderation (fb, a). Since each guideline is a natural language specification of hate speech, the guidelines can be used as a taxonomy for defining the moderation criteria of the dataset. Figure 1 shows two of Facebook’s hate speech guidelines and Table 3 shows the complete list. These guidelines are organized into 4 tiers based on content severity (fb, a): Tier 1 includes the most offensive content, e.g., dehumanization and violence towards protected groups; Tier 2, Tier 3, and Tier 4 are less severe, e.g., stereotyping and contempts towards protected groups. From Figure 1 and Table 3 we can observe that Facebook’s guidelines include *detailed specifications by enumerating specific examples of verbs and nouns*. Compared to other taxonomies, the detailed descriptions make it easy to identify the matched examples using keywords search. In this work, we thus leverage Facebook’s community standards guidelines for constructing a dataset grounded by moderation rules.

2.3 Benchmarking NLP Model Performance with Capability Tests

Traditionally, NLP models are evaluated using the held-out mechanism, i.e., using data from the same distribution for training and testing. However, the in-distribution evaluation may overestimate the performance of a biased model (Belinkov et al., 2019). To examine whether the model has actually achieved the desired capabilities for the task, existing work constructs *capability tests* (Ribeiro et al., 2020; Röttger et al., 2020; Yang et al., 2022), i.e., out-of-domain test suites for benchmarking the models’ capabilities under the task. In particular, HateCheck benchmarked the performance of 3 hate

detection models (Google Perspective, Two Hat’s SiftNinja and BERT) using 29 test suites for hate and non-hate capabilities. In this work, we propose HateModerate to benchmark models’ capabilities in understanding hate speech conforming to hate policies.

3 Constructing the HateModerate Dataset

To bridge the gap in existing work on grounding hate speech detection datasets with moderation criteria, we propose a dataset, HateModerate, which consists of a list of test suites, each contains hateful and non-hateful examples matching one of Facebook’s community standards guidelines of hate speech (fb, a) (Table 3). In this section, we describe the steps for the construction of HateModerate.

Human Annotators. HateModerate is annotated by 9 graduate students (4 Indian, 3 Chinese, 2 USA) in Computer Science, all of them are fluent English speakers and have taken at least one NLP course before. The annotation process is overseen by two experts in online hate. The annotation process take approximately 7 weeks. All participants are compensated with gift cards. The annotator names are anonymized in the dataset. We obtained annotators’ consent and it was explained to the annotators how the data will be used.

Data Sources. In this work, instead of collecting new examples, we reuse existing examples from public datasets. This is because existing public datasets already provide good coverage of the common discourse of hate speech; reusing previously acclaimed public databases significantly reduces the workload and minimizes newly introduced annotation errors. In particular, we leverage the following 8 datasets: DynaHate (Vidgen et al., 2020b), Toxic Spans (Pavlopoulos et al., 2021), Hate Offensive (Davidson et al., 2017), HateCheck (Röttger et al., 2020), Twitter Hate Speech (twi, a), Ethos (Mollas et al., 2020), FRENK (Ljubešić et al., 2019), and COVID Hate and Counter Speech (Ziems et al., 2020). The hate/non-hate labels are available in all datasets.

3.1 Collecting Hateful Examples

Initial Manual Matching. For the first step, we collect the hateful examples matching each guideline. We assign each of Facebook’s 41 policies to one of 7 annotators. Annotators are instructed to search for a minimum of 200 hateful examples from the 8 datasets above. If insufficient, they

can manually create or use chatGPT/GPT-3 to generate synthetic examples. Synonyms and regular expressions are employed to enhance the search efficiency. For example, for Guideline 0 (Tier 1, dehum filth), the annotator uses the regular expression ".*(filth|dirt).*". Multiple annotators also report that they seek for help from Google, ChatGPT and other team members to correctly understand the policy. For example, for Guideline 13 (Tier 1, hatecrm vic), the assigned annotator first struggles to find enough examples because the exact word "hate crime" rarely appear in any example, after a discussion, the team members suggest him to search for concrete hate crime keywords including *lynching* and *holocaust*. He is able to add more examples as a result.

Problems with the Initial Manual Matching.

After the initial matching, we find a significant amount of falsely matched examples. The main reasons are of two folds. First, annotators interpret the policy criteria differently. For example, for Guideline 28 (Tier 2, curs sexual), the examples initially identified by the annotator only contain the curse words themselves but do not call for sexual activities. Second, when two policies look similar, it is easy to confuse between them, e.g., Guideline 11 (Tier 1, deny exist) vs Guideline 25 (Tier 2, cont shldnt exist). The team discuss and clarify the meanings of these policies.

Validating Hateful Examples. Due to the problems with the initial matching, we include a second stage of annotation. For each policy, we ask two additional annotators other than the initial annotator to assess whether the initial sentence match the policy descriptions, labeling them as 1 (valid) or 0 (invalid). Following existing work on using demonstrated examples to improve the quality of crowdsourced annotations (Gupta et al., 2022), we provide a few falsely-match examples for each policy, e.g., for Guideline 29 (Tier 2, curs sexual), "They make me so pissed off these immigs!!!" is demonstrated as a false match. Between the two annotators for the validity, the average agreement rate over all 41 policies is 87%.

To minimize the mismatch with policies in HateModerate, we remove all examples with at least one invalid label. After validation, 4,600 examples remain, and some policies contain too few examples. To augment these policies, one additional annotator is asked to add more examples until no other examples can be found from the 8 datasets.




Figure 2: The statistics of examples in each policy in our dataset

3.2 Collecting Non-Hateful Examples

Retrieving Difficult Non-Hateful Examples.

Testing with only hateful example will result in bias (e.g., one model has low failure rate simply because it sets a low threshold for hate), we further add non-hateful examples to HateModerate. To improve the detection of model failures, for each policy, we opt for retrieving more difficult non-hateful examples that are most similar to the hateful examples from the previous stage. To this end, the corpus we retrieve from are all the non-hateful examples in DynaHate (Vidgen et al., 2020b), as a large proportion of DynaHate are manually perturbed examples. The retrieval algorithm follow the state-of-the-art dense retrieval paradigm (Karpukhin et al., 2020). We employ OpenAI’s Embedding API (Ope) with the `text-embedding-ada-002` model to obtain the vectors. For each policy, we rank every non-hateful example in DynaHate by its average cosine similarity with the existing hateful examples and keep the top-100 non-hateful examples in HateModerate.

Classification of Non-Hateful Examples. After retrieval, we identify some mismatched non-hateful examples and mislabeled hateful examples. To remove them, 6 annotators further manually label each non-hateful examples into one of 5 fine-grained classes including counter hate, neutral, and mismatched examples. The full descriptions of the 5 classes can be find in Appendix A.2.

Validating Non-hateful Cases. After the initial manual classification, we find that some annotators confuse between the 5 classes. Inspired by previous work that leverages human-GPT collaboration to improve crowd-sourced labeling (He et al., 2023), we employ GPT-4 to generate a reference

class from 1-5¹. Subsequently, the original human annotator is asked to revisit all inconsistent cases and update their initial labels if they alter their opinion. After this validation stage, there remain 11.78% disagreement between human and GPT-4. For these inconsistent cases, the expert annotators re-evaluate and re-label them by referring to both GPT-4 and the original annotators’ labels.

3.3 Dataset Statistics

In our final HateModerate dataset, we compile 6,826 examples (4,651 hateful, 2,175 non-hateful). It’s important to note that some instances are duplicated because a single sentence can fall under multiple guidelines simultaneously. The majority examples come from DynaHate (Vidgen et al., 2020b) (4,979), followed by HateCheck (442), Toxic Span (100), GPT (762), manual (257), COVID hate (152), Hate Offensive (91), Ethos (11), Twitter Hate (33), and FRENK (19).

Figure 2 shows the statistics of HateModerate by policy. Among the 41 policies, the most frequent policy contains 361 examples whereas the least frequent policy contains 111 examples, most policies contain 100 to 250 examples, and the majority policies contain more than 100 examples.

4 Benchmarking Hate Speech Detectors’ Consistency with Content Policies

In this section, we employ HateModerate as our evaluation benchmark to assess how AI-based hate speech detectors conform to content policies. We seek answers to the following research questions:

RQ1: How do state-of-the-art hate detectors conform to content policies?

RQ2: What policies do hate speech models conform to the least?

After our initial evaluation, we observe that state-of-the-art models all had different degrees of failures conforming to the content policies. To understand if such failures can be alleviated, we further try fine-tuning existing models with HateModerate. We ask the following research question:

RQ3: Does fine-tuning HateModerate improve models’ conformity to content policies?

4.1 Experiment Setup

Hate Speech Models Evaluated. To answer RQ1-RQ3, we evaluate state-of-the-art models from

¹The prompt we used for GPT-4 classification is: "Classify the sentence of Question into categories 1-5, number only + [GUIDELINE]+[EXAMPLES]".




Figure 3: We detect the failure rates for both hateful and non-hateful examples across each of the 41 policies in Facebook’s community standards guidelines (fb, a). Perspective’s threshold is 0.5; Perspective*’s threshold is 0.7. For each policy, the bars facing right show the failure rates of hateful examples; the bars facing left show the failure rates of non-hateful examples.

Table 1: The average failure rates of the hateful and non-hateful examples for different tiers of policies, and the average toxicity scores. F: Facebook model, C: Cardiff NLP, P: Perspective with threshold 0.5, P*: Perspective with threshold 0.7, O: OpenAI’s API.

T	Failure Rate												Average Toxicity Score									
	Hate						NonHate						Hate					NonHate				
	avg	F	C	P	P*	O	avg	F	C	P	P*	O	avg	F	C	P	O	avg	F	C	P	O
1	.34	.36	.36	.20	.43	.27	.43	.47	.45	.52	.27	.36	.67	.61	.62	.69	.75	.43	.44	.42	.52	.34
2	.33	.27	.34	.20	.43	.35	.48	.49	.40	.58	.38	.36	.65	.68	.63	.70	.57	.44	.47	.39	.55	.35
3	.65	.66	.68	.70	.93	.60	.24	.20	.30	.19	.06	.27	.38	.31	.32	.45	.43	.29	.26	.30	.37	.22
4	.55	.58	.49	.58	.73	.56	.33	.27	.37	.34	.12	.26	.49	.48	.61	.48	.38	.29	.24	.32	.39	.20

both industry API endpoints and open-source hate speech detection models. For industry APIs, we choose Google’s Perspective API (per, b) and OpenAI’s Moderation API (ope; Markov et al., 2022), which are frequently used in downstream detection tasks (alp; per, a); for open-source models, we choose Cardiff NLP’s fine-tuned RoBERTa model (car) and Facebook’s Fine-Tuned RoBERTa model (fb, b) which rank top-2 and top-1 among the most downloaded hate models on HuggingFace (hug). The full details of the models can be found in Appendix A.3.

Further Processing. To answer RQ3, we reserve half of HateModerate for fine-tuning in Section 4.3 by random sampling and use the other half for testing. One issue with evaluating the above models is that their training data may overlap with HateModerate testing data, causing unfair comparison between models. To minimize the impact of the potential data contamination, for the testing fold, we keep only newly created datasets that are not in

the training data of any models². The full details of the excluded data can be found in Appendix A.5. **Evaluation Metric.** Following previous work on capability testing (Röttger et al., 2020; Ribeiro et al., 2020), we report the average failure rate of the hateful and non-hateful examples in each policy. If the hateful failure rate is high, it indicates the model cannot effectively detect this category of hate speech; if the non-hateful failure rate is high, it indicates the model cannot effectively recognize non-hateful speeches for that category.

4.2 Evaluating Model Failures using HateModerate

In this section, we seek answers to RQ1 and RQ2. We report the failure rates of each policy in Figure 3. In addition, we report the average failure rate and the average toxicity score of each model in each tier in Table 1. From Figure 3 and Table 1 we can make the following observations.

²As a result, some guidelines do not have enough cases in Figure 3 so we skip them.

4.2.1 Comparison of Model Failures of different Policies

From Figure 3 and Table 1, we can observe a contrastive trend between higher tier policies (i.e., more severe hate speech) and lower tier policies. In general, for higher tier policies, the failure rates for hateful examples are lower; whereas the failure rates for non-hateful examples are higher. These results imply that, the less severe speeches specified by lower tier policies are not prioritized by both the industry APIs and the open-source models.

Case Studies of Individual Policies with High Failure Rates. To confirm the validity of our observation, we further conduct case studies on individual policies with the highest failure rates of hateful examples. We identify that most models fail to detect hate speech specified by the following policies: *certain objects*, *change sexual, economic exclusion* and *self admission to intolerance of protected characteristics*. For example, most models fail to detect "MAKE WOMEN PROPERTY AGAIN!!!!". We describe these failures in details in Appendix A.1.

4.2.2 Comparison of Different Models' Failures

By comparing the failure rates over all examples (hateful and nonhateful, all tiers) in Table 1, we observe that OpenAI's model exhibits the lowest average failure rate (avg: 0.33, std: 0.13), followed by Perspective (avg: 0.34, std: 0.15). Facebook's RoBERTa (avg: 0.37, std: 0.15) and CardiffNLP (avg: 0.38, std: 0.16) perform less well.

Besides OpenAI, most of the models exhibit high failure rates in non-hateful examples. Perspective with 0.5 threshold performs the worst in non-hateful examples. We further report the failure rate of Perspective with 0.7 threshold in Table 1. We can observe a trade-off between good failure rates in the hateful and non-hateful examples of the two thresholds.

Bias in Toxicity Scoring. In Table 1, we report the average toxicity scores of each model for different tiers of policies, i.e., the probability for the model to predict the hateful class. We can see that while different models have similar toxicity scores for the hateful examples, the scores for non-hateful examples are different. Essentially, Perspective tends to assign higher toxicity for both hateful and non-hateful examples. As a result, the thresholds for Perspective should be higher than 0.5.

4.2.3 Comparison of Model Failures of Different Sub-Categories of Non-Hateful Speeches

In this section, we further conduct a comparative study on the failure rates between different sub-categories of the non-hateful examples. We show the results in Figure 4. Among all the 4 non-hateful categories, we find that counter hate and attacking non-protected group has the highest failure rate, whereas advocating for protected groups has the lowest failure rate. This result is consistent with our expectation, since the former categories sound more aggressive.




Figure 4: The comparison of failure rates in each sub-categories of non-hateful examples

Finding Summary of RQ1 and RQ2. ① For higher tier policies, the failure rates for hateful examples are lower and for non-hateful examples are higher; ② Among all models, the OpenAI model has the best performance overall, Perspective generally scores sentences with higher toxicity scores, thus a threshold higher than 0.5 is desirable; ③ The models are generally bad at detecting difficult non-hateful examples except for OpenAI. Among all difficult non-hateful examples, counter-hate is the most difficult whereas supporting protected groups is the easiest.

4.3 Mitigating Model Failures with Fine-Tuning HateModerate

In this section, we seek the answer to RQ3. We do so by comparing the results of the two models: ① A RoBERTa-base model fine-tuned using all the available training data for the CardiffNLP model (Antypas and Camacho-Collados, 2023)³; ② A RoBERTa-base model fine-tuned using

³We are only able to access 9 out of the 13 training datasets of the CardiffNLP model. The full details of 9 datasets can be found in Appendix A.4.

Table 2: Fine-tuning the RoBERTa Base Model on CardiffNLP training datasets with and without HateModerate.

Test / FailureRate	RoBERTa Fine-tuned on	
	CardiffNLP	+ HateModerate
HateCheck (Röttger et al., 2020)		
Hate	57.50%	37.42%
Non-hate	15.70%	16.51%
Overall	44.14%	30.76%
HateModerate Test		
Hate	49.13%	23.44%
Non-hate	15.39%	22.03%
Overall	41.40%	23.21%
CardiffNLP Test Sets:		
hatEval (Basile et al., 2019)		
Hate	9.05%	9.29%
Non-hate	79.31%	78.79%
Overall	49.80%	49.60%
HTPO (Grimminger and Klinger, 2021)		
Hate	71.19%	76.27%
Non-hate	1.85%	1.84%
Overall	8.67%	9.17%
HateXplain (Mathew et al., 2021)		
Hate	17.25%	17.60%
Non-hate	29.28%	27.49%
Overall	22.14%	21.62%

CardiffNLP’s training data + HateModerate’s reserved training data. We opt against continuously fine-tuning the original CardiffNLP model to HateModerate since the continuous fine-tuning is known to be prone to catastrophic forgetting (French, 1999). For the 9 training datasets of CardiffNLP model, we use the same train/test split as the original datasets⁴. The detail of the fine-tuning process can be found in Appendix A.6.

Results of Fine-Tuning. In Table 2, we compare the failure rates of the two fine-tuned models on the following test collections: ① The testing fold of HateModerate; ② The 3 testing datasets of CardiffNLP; ③ HateCheck (Röttger et al., 2020), a dataset for independent out-of-domain capability tests of hate speech. Table 2 reveals that adding HateModerate to the fine-tuning set significantly reduces the failure rates on HateModerate and HateCheck, while the failure rates on the CardiffNLP’s test sets are comparable. The fine-tuning experiments show that adding HateModerate can effectively reduce hate detection models’ conformity issue to content policies.

Finding Summary of RQ3. We find that by fine-tuning hate speech detection models with Hate-

⁴Among all 9 datasets, the train/test split is available in only 3 datasets, which we use as the test sets in Table 2. We use all remaining data for train.

Moderate, we can effectively reduce the models’ non-conformity to content policies.

5 Conclusions

In this paper, we propose a dataset HateModerate, which includes hateful and non-hateful examples matching the 41 community standards guideline policies of Facebook (fb, a). We opt for study of Facebook guidelines due to its comprehensiveness (Jiang et al., 2020) and the high clarity of the guidelines. First, we leverage crowdsourcing followed by manual validation to construct a quality dataset for test cases of both hateful and non-hateful examples matching each policy. Second, we use HateModerate to test state-of-the-art hate detection models’ conformity to the policies. We find that the most popular content moderation models (e.g. FB, CardiffNLP, OpenAI and Google) frequently make mistakes for both hateful and non-hateful examples. Finally, we observe that fine-tuning hate detection models with HateModerate can effectively reduce models’ non-conformity issues to content policies. Our study underscores the importance of maintaining a set of rules for training and testing the performance of AI-based hate speech detectors.

6 Future Work

Extending Our Work to Any Natural Language Requirements. In this work, we focus on examining the models’ performance against Facebook’s policies. Although existing study shows that Facebook’s content policies are more comprehensive than others (Jiang et al., 2020), our model does not naturally generalize to other platforms’ guidelines. One future direction is to enable the automatic retrieval of hateful and non-hateful examples matching any natural language requirements. The retriever needs to match a policy to specific examples by bridging the vocabulary gap while paying attention to subtle difference in the policy requirements, e.g., "Dehumanizing as diseases→ XXX are cancer".

Explaining Content Moderation Decisions. Linking a hate speech example to one of the policies can improve the accountability and transparency of automated hate speech detector. Our dataset can be used for the training and evaluation of this task.

7 Limitations

Cost of Manual Annotation. HateModerate is built based on Facebook’s content moderation policy on Nov 23, 2022 (fb, a). When applying our work on different policies (e.g., for a different platform), we must hire new human annotators. One of possible solution we tried in non-hateful part is the utilization of auto-labeling techniques by large language models.

Comprehensiveness of Policy Requirements. Although Facebook’s content moderation policies on hate speech are relatively comprehensive, the 41 policies may not completely cover all hate speeches.

Contexts and User Expectation of Hate Speech. Our study focuses on checking AI-based content moderation software’s behavior against policies. When evaluating the moderation software, we have not considered the context. However, whether a sentence is hateful or not may depends on the context; the same sentence may sounds hateful in one context but not in another. Moreover, the rules in content moderation policies may not exactly match user’s expectation.

8 Ethics Considerations

License/Copyright. HateModerate primarily relies on reusing examples from existing hate speech data including DynaHate (Vidgen et al., 2020b) and HateCheck (Röttger et al., 2020). We refer users to the original licenses accompanying each dataset.

Intended Use. HateModerate’s intended use is as an evaluation tool for hate speech detection models, supporting capability tests to help diagnose model failures. We demonstrated this use of HateModerate in Section 4. We also briefly discussed alternative uses of HateModerate in Section 6, e.g., as a dataset for explaining a decision for hate moderation by linking the decision to one of the content policies. These uses aim at aiding the development of better hate speech detection models. HateModerate reuses existing hate speech datasets including DynaHate (Vidgen et al., 2020b) and HateCheck (Röttger et al., 2020), and our usage for these datasets is consistent with the intended use described in their papers.

Potential Misuse. Similar as existing datasets for capability tests (Röttger et al., 2020), one potential misuse is overextending claims about the functionalities of hate detection models. Our dataset may allow malicious actors to generative model that

can generate hate speech matching the requirement for specific policies, which may further help them attack existing content moderators in a more structured manner. Nevertheless, due to the small scale of our dataset, this will unlikely happen. Overall, the scientific and social benefits of the research arguably outweighs the small risk of their misuse. **Annotator Compensation.** The student annotators in the project were rewarded giftcards compensations for their annotation efforts.

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918 A Appendix

919 A.1 Case Studies of Policies with High Failure 920 Rates

- 921 • Tier 1: "*Dehumanizing speech as certain ob-*
922 *jects (women as household objects or property*
923 *or objects in general; Black people as farm*
924 *equipment; transgender or non-binary people*
925 *as "it")*": In particular, most models fails to
926 detect hate speeches such as "*MAKE WOMEN*
927 *PROPERTY AGAIN!!!!*".
- 928 • Tier 2: "*Expressions of contempt, self-*
929 *admission to intolerance on the basis of a*
930 *protected characteristics*": e.g., Perspective
931 fail to detect "*I am racist because I'm a white*
932 *person grown up in white American systems*".
- 933 • Tier 3: "*Economic exclusion, which means*
934 *denying access to economic entitlements and*
935 *limiting participation in the labour market*":
936 e.g., "*Pregnant women should not get any pro-*
937 *motion at work as they will end up in mater-*
938 *nity leave*".
- 939 • Tier 4: "*Content explicitly providing or offer-*
940 *ing to provide products or services that aim to*
941 *change people's sexual orientation or gender*
942 *identity*" We find all models fail in the half of
943 this policy, e.g., "*With the right therapy and*
944 *support gays can be cured and live much more*
945 *fulfilling lives*".

946 A.2 The Classes of Non-Hateful Examples

- 947 • Counter hate, e.g., "*It is not correct to say*
948 *'Muslims should be killed'*";
- 949 • Offensive towards non-protected entities, e.g.,
950 "*I hate cauliflower*";
- 951 • Neutral, e.g., "*Black people have darker*
952 *skins*";
- 953 • Supportive, e.g., "*Women should be pro-*
954 *moted*";
- 955 • Mislabeled examples, i.e., hateful or the ex-
956 ample does not match the policy;

A.3 The List of Evaluated Hate Speech Models

- 959 • Google's Perspective API: Jigsaw's Perspec-
960 tive API ([per, b](#)) is a popular model for con-
961 tent moderation, which is frequently used
962 in downstream moderation tasks including
963 news publishing, social media ([per, a](#)), as
964 well as helping social and political science
965 research ([Friedl, 2023](#)). Perspective leverages
966 training data from a variety of sources, in-
967 cluding comments from online forums such
968 as Wikipedia and The New York Times ([per,](#)
969 [c](#)).
- 970 • OpenAI's Moderation API: OpenAI's Mod-
971 eration API ([ope](#)) OpenAI's content moder-
972 ation endpoint, it is based on a GPT model
973 fine-tuned using the classification head as the
974 objective function ([Markov et al., 2022](#)). The
975 fine-tuning leverages both public hate speech
976 datasets and the production data of OpenAI,
977 and it requires continuous training to adapt to
978 the new hateful contents ([Markov et al., 2022](#)).
979 This model is being actively maintained and
980 has been used by Stanford's Alpaca to im-
981 prove the safety alignment of the text genera-
982 tion ([alp](#)).
- 983 • Cardiff NLP's Fine-Tuned RoBERTa model:
984 This open-source model is a fine-tuned
985 RoBERTa model by Cardiff University's NLP
986 group ([car](#)). The complete list of the 13
987 datasets used for fine-tuning can be found on
988 the model's HuggingFace page: ([car](#)). The
989 older version of this model is the top-2 most
990 downloaded fine-tuned model (84.6k down-
991 loads as of Oct 2023) for English hate-speech
992 detection on the HuggingFace platform ([hug](#)).
- 993 • Facebook's Fine-Tuned RoBERTa model ([fb,](#)
994 [b](#)): This open-source model is a fine-tuned
995 RoBERTa model by Facebook and the Alan
996 Turing Institute ([fb, b](#)). The fine-tuning lever-
997 ages 11 datasets, although the exact list is not
998 revealed by the authors ([Vidgen et al., 2020b](#)).
999 The R4 version of this model is the top-1 most
1000 downloaded fine-tuned model (54k downloads
1001 as of Oct 2023) for English hate-speech clas-
1002 sification on HuggingFace. Instead of R4, we
1003 evaluate the R1 model, because the R4 model
1004 is fine-tuned on DynaHate thus evaluating R4
1005 causes the data contamination problem ([Ma-](#)
1006 [gar and Schwartz, 2022](#)).

A.4 The List of the 9 Training Datasets for CardiffNLP’s Model

Although the CardiffNLP model uses 13 datasets for fine-tuning (*car*), 4 datasets are non-downloadable, we list the 9 accessible datasets below:

- **Measuring hate speech (MHS)** (Sachdeva et al., 2022) include 39,565 social media comments.
- **Call me sexist, but (CMS)** (Samory et al., 2020) consist of 6,325 sentences related with sexism.
- **Hate Towards the Political Opponent (HTPO)** (Grimminger and Klinger, 2021) collect 3,00 tweets about the 2020 USA president election.
- **HateXplain** (Mathew et al., 2021) contains 20,148 posts from Twitter/X and Gab.
- **Offense** (Zampieri et al., 2019) is a collection of 14,100 tweets about offensive or non-offensive.
- **Automated Hate Speech Detection (AHSD)** (Davidson et al., 2017) combine 24,783 tweets.
- **Multilingual and Multi-Aspect Hate Speech Analysis (MMHS)** (Ousidhoum et al., 2019) is a dataset with 5,647 tweets in three different languages: English, Arabic and French.
- **HatE** (Basile et al., 2019) is a collection of 19,600 tweets with English and Spanish languages.
- **Detecting East Asian Prejudice on Social Media (DEAP)** (Vidgen et al., 2020a) has 20,000 tweets which focus on East Asian prejudice.

A.5 Excluding Sentences to Prevent Data Contamination

In this paper, to reduce the risk of data contamination, i.e., overlaps between the train and test dataset, we need to exclude the examples from HateModerate that can potentially exist in the training data of the evaluated models. First, OpenAI API and Google Perspective have not released their

training sets. Second, among the training datasets of CardiffNLP (*car*), we identify that Waseem et al. (Waseem, 2016) and Founta et al. (Founta et al., 2018) are used in DynaHate’s R0 dataset (Vidgen et al., 2020b). As a result, we exclude all examples in DynaHate which are originally from other datasets and only keep those that are newly created. More specifically, we keep only the perturbed examples in round 2, 3, and 4. Finally, since Facebook’s training datasets have no overlaps with the DynaHate, there is little risk of data contamination with HateModerate.

A.6 The Hypeparameters and Details of the Fine-Tuning Process

To study the effectiveness of HateModerate in reducing models’ non-conformity issues, we fine-tune two RoBERTa model: ① Fine-tuning using the CardiffNLP 9 datasets in Section A.4; ② Fine-tuning using CardiffNLP datasets + HateModerate. For both models, we use a training batch size of 32, a learning rate of $5E - 6$, and an epoch size of 2. Both models are fine-tuned on a server with 4x V100 GPUs, the training takes approximately 1 hour for both models.

A.7 Overview of Facebook’s Hate Speech Community Standards

Table 3: Short name and description for Facebook’s Hate Speech Community Standards (fb, a). We show matching short names of guidelines and their index in Figure 3, the full descriptions of them are following.

ID	Tier	Guideline	Description
0	1	dehum filth	Dehumanizing speech: Filth (including but not limited to: dirt, grime)
1	1	viol spch	Violent speech or support in written or visual form
2	1	dehum insects	Dehumanizing speech: Insects (including but not limited to: cockroaches, locusts)
3	1	dehum bacteria	Dehumanizing speech: Bacteria, viruses, or microbes
4	1	disease	Dehumanizing speech: Disease (including but not limited to: cancer, sexually transmitted diseases)
5	1	dehum ani	Dehumanizing speech: Animals in general or specific types of animals that are culturally perceived as intellectually or physically inferior (including but not limited to: Black people and apes or ape-like)
6	1	feces	Dehumanizing speech: Feces (including but not limited to: shit, crap)
7	1	sex pred	Dehumanizing speech: Sexual predators (including but not limited to: Muslim people having sex with goats or pigs)
8	1	subhuman	Dehumanizing speech: Subhumanity (including but not limited to: savages, devils, monsters, primitives)
9	1	criminal	Violent criminals (including but not limited to: terrorists, murderers, members of hate or criminal organizations). Other criminals (including but not limited to “thieves,” “bank robbers,” or saying “All [protected characteristic or quasi-protected characteristic] are ‘criminals’”).
10	1	certain obj	Certain objects (women as household objects or property or objects in general; Black people as farm equipment; transgender or non-binary people as “it”)
11	1	deny exist	Statements denying existence (including but not limited to: “[protected characteristic(s) or quasi-protected characteristic] do not exist”, “no such thing as [protected charactic(s) or quasi-protected characteristic]”), deny existence is different from contempt-should-not-exist in tier 2
12	1	harm ster	Harmful stereotypes historically linked to intimidation, exclusion, or violence on the basis of a protected characteristic, such as Blackface; Holocaust denial; claims that Jewish people control financial, political, or media institutions; and references to Dalits as menial laborers
13	1	hatecrm vic	Mocking the concept, events or victims of hate crimes even if no real person is depicted in an image.
14	2	attck hyg	Content attacking a person or a group based on their hygiene, including but not limited to: filthy, dirty, smelly.
15	2	attck appr	Content attacking a person or a group based on their physical appearance, including but not limited to: ugly, hideous.
16	2	attck int cap	Content attacking a person or a group based on their intellectual capacity, including but not limited to: dumb, stupid, idiots.
17	2	attck edu	Content attacking a person or a group based on their education, including but not limited to: illiterate, uneducated.
18	2	attck mental	Content attacking a person or a group based on their mental health, including but not limited to: mentally ill, retarded, crazy, insane.

19	2	attck chara	Attacking a person or group based on a perceived character trait , Content attacking a person or a group based on their character traits culturally perceived as negative, including but not limited to: coward, liar, arrogant, ignorant.
20	2	attck deroga	Content attacking a person or a group based on derogatory terms related to sexual activity, including but not limited to: whore, slut, perverts.
21	2	les than	Expressions about being less than adequate, including but not limited to: worthless, useless
22	2	devia norm	Expressions about deviating from the norm, including but not limited to: freaks, abnormal.
23	2	better wors	Expressions about being better/worse than another protected characteristic, including but not limited to: "I believe that males are superior to females."
24	2	cont slf adm	Self-admission to intolerance on the basis of a protected characteristics, including but not limited to: homophobic, islamophobic, racist.
25	2	cont shldnt exist	Expressions that a protected characteristic shouldn't exist. (shouldn't exist is different from deny-existence in tier 1)
26	2	cont desp hate	Expressions of hate, including but not limited to: despise, hate.
27	2	cont desp dislike	Expressions of dismissal, including but not limited to: don't respect, don't like, don't care for
28	2	curs sexual	Terms or phrases calling for engagement in sexual activity, or contact with genitalia, anus, feces or urine, including but not limited to: suck my dick, kiss my ass, eat shit.
29	2	disgu vomit	Expressions that suggest the target causes sickness, including but not limited to: vomit, throw up.
30	2	disgu repul	Expressions of repulsion or distaste, including but not limited to: vile, disgusting, yuck.
31	2	curs genit	Curse that referring to the target as genitalia or anus, including but not limited to: cunt, dick, asshole.
32	2	curs profa	Profane terms or phrases with the intent to insult, including but not limited to: fuck, bitch, motherfucker.
33	3	segregat	Segregation in the form of calls for action, statements of intent, aspirational or conditional statements, or statements advocating or supporting segregation.
34	3	explt excl	Call for action of exclusion, e.g., explicit exclusion, which means things like expelling certain groups or saying they are not allowed.
35	3	polit excl	Call for action of exclusion, e.g., political exclusion, which means denying the right to political participation.
36	3	econ excl	Call for action of exclusion, e.g., economic exclusion, which means denying access to economic entitlements and limiting participation in the labour market.
37	3	socl excl	Call for action of exclusion, e.g., social exclusion, which means things like denying access to spaces (physical and online)and social services, except for gender-based exclusion in health and positive support Groups.
38	4	chge sexual	Content explicitly providing or offering to provide products or services that aim to change people's sexual orientation or gender identity.
39	4	attck concept	Content attacking concepts, institutions, ideas, practices, or beliefs associated with protected characteristics, which are likely to contribute to imminent physical harm, intimidation or discrimination against the people associated with that protected characteristic.

40	4	spread virus	Content targeting a person or group of people on the basis of their protected characteristic(s) with claims that they have or spread the novel coronavirus, are responsible for the existence of the novel coronavirus, are deliberately spreading the novel coronavirus, or mocking them for having or experiencing the novel coronavirus.
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